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ARTES SCIENTIA VERITAS







THE  
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.



**Cambridge :**

**PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A.  
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.**

Aristoteles.

THE  
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

WITH A  
COMMENTARY

BY THE LATE  
EDWARD MEREDITH COPE, M.A.  
FORMERLY SENIOR FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE;

*REVISED AND EDITED FOR  
THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS*

BY  
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## EDITOR'S PREFACE.

IT is just ten years since the lamented Author of this Commentary gave to the world of scholars an *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, containing, amongst other valuable matter, a general outline of the contents of the treatise and paraphrases of the more difficult portions. In the preface to that book, which is an almost indispensable companion to the present edition and renders any special prolegomena to these volumes unnecessary, the Author describes the *Introduction* as preparatory to the detailed explanation of the work itself in an edition of the Greek text which had been long in preparation and was to appear as soon as it could be got ready. This promise is now at last fulfilled, under circumstances however in which the pathetic interest naturally attending the publication of any posthumous work like the present, is in this particular instance, if I may judge of the feelings of others by my own, intensified into a sense of more than usually deep regret that the labours of a large portion of an eminent scholar's life-time must now see the light without the advantage of his own editorial care.

Mr Cope died in the year 1873, but during the last four years of his life his work on the *Rhetoric*, though it had nearly approached completion, unhappily but unavoidably remained untouched. He was actively engaged upon it during the two years that succeeded the publication of the *Introduction* in 1867;—a year that was also marked by the appearance of a long-expected edition of the *Rhetoric* by Spengel, which,

AR. I.

b

by the critical acumen and maturity of judgment generally displayed in its pages, and in particular by its wealth of illustration from the remains of Greek Oratory and the technical treatises of the later Greek rhetoricians, proved the most important aid to the study of the subject that had been published since the time of Victorius. With Spengel's earlier contributions to the criticism of his author, as also with those of Brandis and Bonitz and Vahlen and other eminent Aristotelian scholars on the continent, Mr Cope was of course familiar, as the pages of these volumes abundantly testify; but while preparing his own Commentary, he appears during the last two years of his active work to have only occasionally consulted and quoted Spengel's edition, refraining purposely from incurring any such indebtedness as would prevent his own edition remaining a perfectly independent work.

In June, 1874, the year after Mr Cope's death, his brothers took into consideration the desirability of publishing his Commentary; and, acting under the advice of two distinguished members of his own College, Mr Munro and Mr Jebb, did me the honour to invite me to undertake its completion and revision. The manuscript, so far as it was finished, consisted of nearly seven hundred closely written pages requiring a certain amount of general revision before they could be sent to press; and, owing to other engagements, I found it impracticable to arrange for the printing of the work to commence till June, 1875. During the progress of the work through the press in the last two years, my duties as reviser have proved more laborious than I had anticipated; as even apart from the necessity of reading several times over at various stages of progress not far from a thousand pages of printed matter, I have found it requisite to consult the reader's convenience by rearranging many of the paragraphs, by recasting many of the more complicated sentences, and by endeavouring to prevent the sense from being obscured by the partiality for parenthesis, which, in this case, happens to be characteristic of the commentator and his author alike. In a work of this compass, accidental repetitions of nearly identical notes in various parts of the Commentary are almost unavoidable, and though I have succeeded in detecting and

striking out some of these repetitions, others still remain unremoved.

It will probably occur to some of those who use this book that, in the way of retrenchment of matter and condensation of style, something might without disadvantage have been done by the original writer; but such correction, I may remark, was the very thing from which he consciously shrank; and as a mere reviser I felt that I had no right to assume the responsibility of abridging, still less of rejecting, what the writer himself clearly intended to leave standing. In the case of verbal alterations, however, which I was morally certain would not have been disapproved by the original writer, I have used such slight discretion as appeared to fall within my province; this kind of revision cannot of course generally appear on the surface, but wherever it is practicable any additional matter for which I am alone responsible is indicated by the use of square brackets with or (as the work proceeded) without my initial. Such insertions are generally very brief, and often take the form of simple reference to important works that have appeared since the Commentary was prepared; as it seemed only due to the readers of this edition and to the writers of the works in question, that I should endeavour to bring it up to date by referring as occasion served to books such as Dr Thompson's edition of the *Gorgias* of Plato (1871); Grote's *Aristotle* (1872); Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, ed. 2, 1874; Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, 1868, '74; and Professor Jebb's *Attic Orators*, 1876. In testing the references to other parts of Aristotle, I have made frequent use of the great *Index Aristotelicus* of Bonitz, which appeared in 1870, and was therefore not available when Mr Cope's notes were written;—a fact that only increases one's admiration at the wide and minute acquaintance with all the Aristotelian writings which he had acquired by his own independent reading.

In any trifling additions of my own, I have seldom gone beyond the briefest annotations, but in the case of the third book, which was left in a less finished state, and on which I had happened to have lectured on several occasions during the last ten years, I felt myself somewhat less restricted; and indeed, as Mr Cope's manuscript unfortunately comes to an



abrupt conclusion in the course of Chapter XVII of that book, I was compelled, for the convenience of those who use this edition and in accordance with the wishes of Mr Cope's representatives and the Syndics of the University Press, to endeavour to supply the deficiency in the three concluding Chapters by writing the notes that occupy the last twenty pages of the Commentary.

In so doing, I have tried to follow the general plan of Mr Cope's own work, and in particular have paid attention to such slight indications of his intended treatment of that portion as I could glean from the memoranda in the margin of his own copy of Bekker's Oxford text of 1837. This volume and an interleaved copy of earlier date, and of somewhat less value for this purpose, were kindly placed at my disposal by the authorities of Trinity College, and, as they contain part of the first rough material for the Commentary, they have proved of some use in verifying doubtful references and also in ascertaining Mr Cope's intentions with regard to the text on points of detail such as punctuation and various readings. But, holding as he did that an editor's main duty was explanation in its widest sense and accordingly devoting himself mainly to questions of exegesis, to elucidation of subject matter, to illustration of verbal expression, and to matters of grammatical and lexicographical interest, he was content on the whole to accept the text as he found it in the earlier editions with which he was familiar. Under these circumstances, in the absence of any intention on his part to make an independent recension of the text, I have thought it best to adopt as the text of the present Commentary the last reprint (1873) of Bekker's third edition (octavo, 1859); and instead of impairing the integrity of that text by altering it here and there to suit what I gathered to be Mr Cope's intentions, I have briefly indicated the instances in which the evidence of his translation or notes, or again the memoranda in his own copy of the Rhetoric already mentioned, pointed clearly to some other reading as the one which he deliberately preferred to that of Bekker's third edition, or in which he was at any rate content to acquiesce. In the margin, beside the references to Book, Chapter and Section at the top of each page, is marked the beginning of each page of Bekker's last

octavo edition, and also of that published in quarto in 1831: the former will, it is trusted, make this work easy to refer to side by side with the plain text in ordinary use; the latter, though it involves a cumbersome method of notation, is worth recording, as it is the mode of reference adopted in the *Index Aristotelicus*, in Spengel's edition, and often elsewhere.

In an Appendix to the third volume, I have added Mr Shilleto's *Adversaria* on the Rhetoric, which I have transcribed almost exclusively from one of his two copies of the book, lately acquired (with a selection of his other books) by the Syndicate of the University Library. I have also constructed what I hope may be found to be a fairly comprehensive Greek index to the text and notes; and to this I have subjoined a supplementary index to the notes and subject matter, including amongst other miscellaneous items, almost all the passages in the rhetorical writings of Cicero and Quintilian referred to in the Commentary; the passages of Homer and other authors quoted in the text, and the illustrations from Shakespeare in the notes, and also (under the head of 'lexicographical notes') a series of references to Mr Cope's incidental contributions to Greek lexicography. In the transcription of both these indexes for the press, I have had much assistance from my brother, James Stuart Sandys, one of the undergraduates of St John's College.

I cannot close these few prefatory explanations of what I have attempted to do in discharging however imperfectly the editorial duty with which it has been my privilege to be entrusted, without recording the fact that Mr Cope (as I am assured by his surviving brother) fully intended, had he lived to see his work through the press, to dedicate it to one of his most intimate friends, Mr Munro. The latter, however, has kindly supplied a short biographical notice by which I am glad to feel that he will be as inseparably associated with the crowning work of his friend's career as if it had appeared inscribed by that friend himself with the honoured name of the Editor of Lucretius.

J. E. S.

CAMBRIDGE,  
2 July, 1877.

## CORRIGENDA.

(In the notes.)

### VOL. I.

- p. 40, line 14, *for* 'this ἀρετή, this special excellence', and on p. 49, last line, *read* 'the' *for* 'this' in all three cases.  
p. 56, line 10, *read* ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου.  
p. 76, line 29, *read* νενεμημένων.  
p. 93, line 1, *for* 'in' *read* 'is.'  
p. 105, line 28, *read* ἀρχινοια.  
p. 153, line 30, *read* ὀλιγαρχίας.  
p. 161, line 23, *read* 'fortitude.'  
p. 173, line 31, *for* 'be' *read* 'the.'  
p. 190, below text, *read* ῥᾶθυμα.  
p. 239, line 32, insert (3) before διὰ λόγων.

### VOL. II.

- p. 56, note 1, l. 3, *read* 'Gorg. 522 D.'

### VOL. III.

- p. 12, line 21, *read* 'II 4. 9.'  
p. 30, line 1, *for* 'by' *read* 'at.'  
p. 62, line 19, *read* 'writings.'

## EDWARD MEREDITH COPE.

MANY of Cope's friends having expressed an opinion that it would be well if a short memoir of him were prefixed to this posthumous work, and his sole surviving brother having written to me that he and his nieces would rather leave it in my hands than in those of anybody else, I could not hesitate to undertake the task.

Edward Meredith Cope was born in Birmingham on the 28th of July 1818. He was for some time at the Grammar School of Ludlow under Mr Hinde, and then for about five years at Shrewsbury, where he remained until October 1837, when he commenced residence at Trinity College Cambridge.

During the first years of his Shrewsbury life Dr Butler, late Bishop of Lichfield, was Headmaster; for the last year and quarter Dr Kennedy. Cope throughout his school career was always first or among the first of boys of his own age and standing. For to a great natural aptitude for study and scholarship he joined a strong will and a determination to use his best efforts to excel in whatever was given him to do. Not that he was a bookworm by any means: for he enjoyed extremely the society of his friends and loved innocent recreation in almost any form. Thus though he was not made, and never sought, to distinguish himself in any of them, he thoroughly enjoyed nearly all the usual games and amusements of the place. This taste he retained for years after he took his degree at the University, and Mr Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, and many other friends will bear me witness that he was a consistent votary of Hockey up to the time when the Great Western Railway extinguished this pleasant game first at Eton and then at Cambridge.

The last year and quarter of his residence at Shrewsbury was of vital importance for Cope's future career. Greek was the main and favourite study of his life; and in the summer of 1836 Greek scholarship at Shrewsbury was, if not in comparison with other schools of the day, yet absolutely at a very low ebb. Boys were left in great measure to their own natural lights. Now the light of nature seems capable in favourable circumstances of doing a good

deal for Latin; but in the case of Greek it fosters often the conceit of knowledge, but rarely indeed can impart the knowledge itself.

When Dr Kennedy came to Shrewsbury in the autumn of 1836, he proved himself equal to the task that was before him. Knowledge and method, united with kindness and enthusiasm, effected at once a marvellous change; and all who were able and willing to learn felt in a few months that they had gotten such an insight into the language and such a hold of its true principles and idiom, as to render further progress both easy and agreeable. I would appeal to those who were high in the school at the time when the change in question took place, and ask them whether I have at all overstated the facts of the case; I would refer to Henry Thring and John Bather who came next to Cope in the Classical Tripos; to Francis Morse and others of the same year with myself, and to many others.

But none was more conscious of what he owed to Dr Kennedy, or was more ready to acknowledge it, than Cope himself. The judicious training and the well-directed reading of that year and quarter had an incalculable effect on his future career as a scholar; and, when he went to Cambridge in the October of 1837, he was prepared, as few are, to profit by the advantages the place afforded for classical study. There during his undergraduate days he led a blameless, industrious, and, I believe from what I observed myself and what he often told me, a thoroughly contented and happy life, enjoying the esteem and friendship of many of his worthiest contemporaries, some of them his old schoolfellows, others new acquaintances both in Trinity and in other Colleges, whose names are too numerous to mention. All the while his studies were pursued with a constant and uniform diligence; for none knew better than he to make a good and judicious disposition of his time. He became Scholar of his College as soon as the statutes permitted him to be a candidate, and, after taking his degree in the Mathematical Tripos of January 1841, he gained, as was generally expected, the first place in the Classical. For a year or two after this success he read with a few private pupils, though this employment was never very greatly to his taste. He was elected Fellow of Trinity in 1842: this Fellowship he retained till the day of his death. During the summer of 1843 he resided for some months in Jersey with a few pupils; and in the autumn of that year he made a short tour in Normandy, where he first imbibed, or first tried to satisfy, that intense love for Continental travel which exercised so marked an influence on his future tastes and development.

The moment he had been created Master of Arts at the beginning of July 1844, he threw off for a time the trammels of

Academical life and on the 4th of that month started for a continuous tour of more than fourteen months, never setting foot again in England before the 11th of September 1845. At the commencement of this tour he had for companions two friends, both of them now dead, James Hemery, Dean of Jersey, and Richard Pike Mate, Fellow of Trinity. He always dearly loved and would sacrifice much for the companionship of intimate friends in his travels. But for the greater part of the time he was moving about by himself. In these fourteen months he traversed Switzerland almost from end to end, being a good and indefatigable walker; saw Italy thoroughly, with its thousand objects of interest, as far South as Naples; made a short excursion to Greece in November 1844, seeing Athens well and visiting a part of the Peloponnese and landing in Malta and in Sicily on his return to Italy. I have before me now a full and precise Journal which he kept of the occurrences of every day during this 14 months' peregrination. The whole would make a good-sized printed volume. Here we find minutely recorded where he slept on each succeeding night; what he ate and drank; how many miles he walked each day and the number of hours spent in walking them. He was passionately fond of mountain scenery, and of mediaeval and Italian architecture and art. In this Journal all the varying phases of Swiss scenery are described; the buildings, the pictures and other works of art of every Italian town, great or small.

Cope possessed in a high degree the happy faculty, which does not by any means always accompany general power of mind, of readily picking up a foreign language by ear and conversation; and in the course of this journey he made himself an excellent Italian scholar, acquiring such a mastery over the idiom, as is seldom possessed by Englishmen who have not resided many years in the country. On this and his many subsequent tours he attained to no less facility in colloquial French. German seemed to give him more trouble, although by continued exertion he gained a sufficient acquaintance with it too. He never appeared to me to care very much for Italian literature, with however the very important exception of Dante; nor did the great French classics seem to have any very absorbing interest for him. German he made large use of for purposes of study and critical research, while at the same time Goethe and the other classics of the language were enjoyed for their own sakes.

This first comprehensive tour imbued him with a passion for foreign travel, which he indulged without stint until permanent ill-health brought it to a close. External circumstances compelled him however to confine and modify it in future years. While he was

on his travels in 1845, he was offered and accepted an Assistant-Tutorship at Trinity, the duties of which formed the main occupation of his subsequent life. These duties compelled him to be in residence for most of the year between October and June, and left only the summer months for travel, a time not the most suitable for some of the countries which he would have most liked to see. Palestine for instance and Egypt he never set his foot in; Greece he saw only for a few weeks in 1844; nor did he ever get again to Rome or Naples after his first visit. Between June and October however he continued to be a most indefatigable traveller, confining himself almost entirely to a few favoured lands, first and foremost his first loves, Switzerland and North Italy, next France, then Belgium, Germany, Austria, and the Tirol. I should calculate that, in the twenty-four years between 1844 and 1868 when he was compelled to give up travelling, he must have spent at least six years in the countries just enumerated. With the exception of 1848, an ominous time for continental travel, during the summer of which he visited the North of England and Scotland; of 1865 when he was again in Scotland, and of one other summer when he travelled in Ireland, he was on the Continent every one of these years.

Thus in 1846 he was abroad from June the 12th to October the 5th, traversing assiduously the South West and South East of France, the Pyrenees from end to end, the Tirol and South Germany, and finally crossing through France to Paris. In 1847 he was on the Continent from June the 25th to October the 6th, passing by the Rhine and Switzerland into North Italy and to Florence, in which place he found me to my delight and profit, and accompanied me home by Bologna, Milan, Como, Switzerland, the Rhine and Belgium. I have now in my hands twenty manuscript volumes of various sizes, filled with the most minute writing, in which he describes at length the proceedings of every day and almost every hour during all these years' travel, with the exception of the six years from 1854 to 1859. That he was abroad all or most of these years I know, and that he kept equally minute journals of them I have no doubt; but whether they are lost or where they now are, I cannot ascertain. In 1855 I well remember I was with him for some time in Germany and France and in Paris, seeing the great Exhibition of that year. The moment he quits the Continent, his Journals come to an end. So far as I know or can learn, he never kept any diary of his life at home. Had he done so on any thing like the scale which he has adopted in his Journals of travel, he would have accounted for almost every hour of his life.

His social disposition greatly enjoyed the companionship of intimate friends in these travels; and this he was sometimes able to have during his earlier journeyings. In the first of them he had for a time the society of the friends who have been already spoken of. In 1847 I can remember how thoroughly happy he was in Florence together with W. G. Clark and myself. He writes in his Journal of September the 10th, the evening before he left that city: 'Altogether I don't think I ever enjoyed a visit to any foreign town more than this last three weeks at Florence. First I had very pleasant society of intimate friends which has rarely been my lot before—men that take an interest in the same things that please me; the weather has been delightful,' and so on. Again in 1851 he had a long tour, from July 2 to October 16, in Switzerland and North Italy with two intimate friends and brother Fellows, H. R. Luard, now Registrar of the University, and C. B. Scott, the present Headmaster of Westminster. I joined them for a time in Venice and found him thoroughly happy.

But as time went on and he continued year after year to pursue his travels with unabated energy, it was not so easy for him to get his old friends for companions. They did not care to walk for twenty or thirty miles over an Alpine pass under pouring rain, or to defy the summer heats of the Pyrenees, or of the sweltering cities and dust-tormented plains of North Italy. For he hated to pass a single day in inaction, looking upon this as a dereliction of duty and an ignoble concession to laziness. His Journals, as years go on, become more and more instructive, as his taste grew more refined and his discrimination keener; and the ordinary guidebooks of the countries he so often visited might gain greatly by a judicious study of these volumes. At the same time I feel convinced that these later journeys overtaxed his strength and energies, created in him an unnatural excitement and irritation, and fostered the seeds of that malady by which he was subsequently struck down.

In October 1845 Cope commenced the work of what might be called his future profession as Lecturer at Trinity, and continued to perform the duties attached to this office, with energy and success and without the intermission of a single term, for twenty-four years, until the failure of his health put a final stop to all intellectual effort in the summer of 1869.

For some years his favourite subjects of lecture were the Greek Tragedians, the two elder of whom he very decidedly preferred to Euripides. In fact until the very end of his career one or other of their plays was almost invariably the subject of his lecture for the Michaelmas term. And thus by constant repetition and careful pre-



paration he gained a thorough insight into the texts themselves and a very extensive acquaintance with the voluminous literature connected with the Greek drama. But often one or other of the two great historians, Herodotus or Thucydides, or else Demosthenes or another of the orators supplied the text on which he discoursed.

If the best scholars in any of the twenty-four generations of Freshmen who listened to his teaching were consulted, I believe they would one and all avow that their knowledge of the language and of its literature was very greatly furthered by his learned and elaborate lectures.

He gradually established his reputation in the College and the University as one of the very best and soundest Greek scholars of his time: I could cite, if it were necessary, many distinguished names to bear me out in this assertion. In his efforts to be thorough, he would collect a great mass of materials, which he did not always take sufficient pains to mould into shape and symmetry. Indeed he often avowed to me that, when he had once put on paper his thoughts and collections on any question—and this he was in the habit of doing with very great rapidity—he found it quite impossible to rearrange and rewrite what he had prepared. Hence no doubt there was often a great diffuseness and some want of clearness in his work,—defects with which I have most frequently heard him charged by his auditors. He was by nature too very mistrustful of his own powers, and consequently a great stickler for authority. He seemed to think there was something sacred in the printed text, as it presented itself to him, and was sometimes determined to explain the inexplicable and see a meaning in that which had none. But with all this he was an admirable Greek scholar and a most valuable and highly valued lecturer.

Sometimes, though rarely, he lectured on a Latin writer; but for Latin literature, especially poetry, he did not greatly care; though he quite felt and freely admitted the surpassing merits of style in the great prose authors. After a time however he almost entirely dropped the Classical Latin writers, except for purposes not connected with the study of the language, and took up a position of benevolent neutrality with regard to the whole literature. He treated the Latin in much the same way as he treated their compeers, the great French Classics.

When he had been Assistant Tutor about ten years, he undertook the College lecture on Plato, and afterwards on Aristotle as well; and these two philosophers he resolved to make the main object of his study henceforth. For a long time his great natural diffidence seemed to give him a disinclination to commit anything to the press. One of his earliest essays in print were his criticisms, in the *Journal*

of Classical and Sacred Philology, of Grote's famous dissertation on the Sophists. There is a good deal to be learnt from what he has written; but, if I am not mistaken, he has hardly caught Grote's point of view, which in this country at all events has I believe now gained very general acceptance among the best judges. In 1864 he published a translation of Plato's *Gorgias*. His translation is strikingly literal and very excellent in its kind; but this kind is peculiar. Mr Henry Jackson in his introductory remarks to Cope's translation of the *Phaedo*, a posthumous work which Mr Jackson has edited with great skill and diligence, has given a short and trenchant exposition of the principle which Cope has followed out in both these translations. A more elaborate effort is the Introduction to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, published in 1867 and designed to serve as a preliminary study to the present edition of that work. We find in this dissertation a very full exposition of Aristotle's principles, set forth with learning and research; but one feels perhaps here too that want of concentration and careful revision, which, as I have said, Cope used himself to acknowledge with regret as a peculiar feature of his style which he was quite unable to remedy. Anyhow I fancy a reader would have liked to have seen it incorporated in the present edition as an essential portion of it, neither of the two being a complete whole without the other. This edition it is not for me to offer an opinion upon: suffice it here to say that it was the main occupation of the latest and most mature years of his working life, and bears witness in every page to unsparing labour and genuine scholarship.

Cope was ordained Deacon in November 1848 and Priest in September 1850 by Dr Turton, late Bishop of Ely. A short experience with his friend Mate, then Vicar of Wymeswold, convinced him that, as he had already for some years devoted himself to a life of study, Parish work was not the sphere for which his tastes and habits were best adapted; and he contented himself afterwards with occasionally assisting one or other of his clerical friends, when he would make them a visit during a vacation.

Perhaps the most important crisis in the even tenour of his laborious College life was occasioned by the Greek Professorship becoming vacant in 1866, when he came forward as one of three candidates for that office. The votes of the electors, the Council of the Senate, having been equally divided between him and Dr Kennedy, the appointment finally devolved by statute on the Chancellor of the University who gave it to Dr Kennedy. There is no doubt that this result was a poignant disappointment to Cope at the time; it is no less certain that his strength and the tone of his mind

were already a good deal affected by ill-health. This I could illustrate from my own knowledge, if many considerations did not counsel silence on matters which neither his friends nor the public would care to know, or see paraded before them.

Every one, they say, has the defects of his virtues; and it cannot be denied that in his later years, when health became uncertain, Cope was too prompt to take offence and conceive causeless suspicions against his most intimate friends. But they could understand that this arose from excess of susceptibility and perversion of tender feeling; and the offence was forgotten as readily as it was conceived.

In August 1869 he was seized with that malady from which he never rallied during the four remaining years of his life. He died on the 5th of August 1873, and on the 14th of that month he was followed to his grave in the Church of England Cemetery at Birmingham by his two brothers, his nephew and a few of his oldest and dearest friends.

I never knew a kinder-hearted or more charitable man than Cope. Suffering of any sort excited in him an uncontrollable longing to relieve it, whether the relief were to be afforded by sympathy and personal attention, or by money. Many indeed are the acts of charity on his part which fell under my own observation; and I am sure that I never learnt but a small portion of them, for he loved to do good by stealth. Whenever a friend needed care and sympathy, none so prompt as he to offer them. When Robert Leslie Ellis, for whom he felt an unbounded admiration, was seized with fever at San Remo in 1849, off hurried Cope at once to render him all the assistance it was in his power to give. So when his poor friend Mate was struck down by crushing disease, Cope hastened at once to lavish on him his affectionate care. It was always among the chief pleasures of his existence to make a round of visits to his old friends who lived away from Cambridge. One of the oldest of them, R. W. Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, writes to me as follows: 'Of all my old friends of King's and Trinity he alone from 1848 to the year of his sad seizure visited me regularly at Shenstone. He preached in my Church, he taught in my schools, and rarely left me without contributing liberally to some Parochial charity, never without wishing to do so'. 'No one living', he adds with good reason, 'is more capable than I am of testifying to the warmth, the steadiness and depth of his friendship'.

H. A. J. M.

# ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

## ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

### Α.

Ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρὴ·  
ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς· ἡ δὲ πείρα σφαλερὴ· ἡ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπή.

HIPPOCRATES.



# ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

## ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α.

1 Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ ἀμ-

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§ 1. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ is translated by Cicero, *ex altera parte respondere dialecticae*, Orat. XXXII 114. 'Vox a scena ducta videtur. Chori antistrophe strophae ad assem respondet, eiusque motus ita fit, ut posterior in prioris locum succedat...Significat ex altera parte respondere et quasi ex adverso oppositum esse; id quod etiam in antistrophe cadit.' Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* § 14 p. 74: and to the same effect, *Comment. ad Arist. de Anima*, II 11 5 p. 408. ἀντίστροφον dicitur quod alius rei quasi partes agit eamque repraesentat; Waitz, *Comm. ad Anal. Pr.* I 2, 25 a 6.

The term is borrowed from the manoeuvres of the chorus in the recitation of the choral odes. Στροφή denotes its movement in one direction, to which the ἀντίστροφή, the counter-movement, the wheeling in the opposite direction, exactly corresponds, the same movements being repeated. Müller, *Diss. Eumen.* p. 41. *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. XIV § 4. Mure, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* Bk. III. c. I § 15. Hence it is extended to the words sung by the chorus during the latter of these evolutions, and signifies a set of verses precisely parallel or answering in all their details to the verses of the στροφή. And thus, when applied in its strict and proper sense, it denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a fac-simile or counterpart.

Hence in Logic ἀντιστρέφειν is used to express terms and propositions which are convertible, and therefore identical in meaning, precisely similar in all respects. On the various senses of ἀντιστρέφειν and its derivatives in Logic, see Waitz, u. s. In this signification, however, ἀντίστροφος does not properly represent the relation actually subsisting between the two arts, the differences between them being too numerous to admit of its being described as an exact correspondence in detail; as I have already pointed out in the paraphrase (Intro. p. 134).

It also represents Rhetoric as an art, independent of, though analogous to, Dialectics, but not growing out of it, nor included under it. The word is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (Gorgias, Republic, Philebus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Leges), who joins it indifferently with the genitive and dative; and he employs it in this latter sense; as likewise Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδ. § 182; and Aristotle himself in several places; *Polit.* VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 7, καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος (corresponding)

φότεραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσιν, ἃ κοινὰ

αὐτῇ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις. c. 6 ult. 1293 a 33. c. 10, 1295 a 18. de part. anim. II 17 ult. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτοις τοῖς (φοῖς) ἡ γλῶττα τοιαύτη τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἀντιστρόφως ἔχουσα τῇ μυκτῇ τῶν ἐλεφάντων.

Lastly, Waitz, u. s., points out a peculiar signification of it, 'res contraria alteri quam potestate aequiparat,' in de Gen. Anim. II 6, 743 δ 28. τὸ ψυχρὸν συνίστησιν ἀντίστροφον (as a balance) τῇ θερμότητι τῇ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. Trendelenburg, *Comm. ad de Anima* u. s., after defining ἀντιστρέφειν as above, adds, ἀντίστροφος ex eadem chori similitudine significat *ex altera parte respondere* (this is from Cicero, u. s.) Arist. Rhet. I 1; quod non significat, rhetoricam in dialecticae locum succedere (i. e. can be substituted for it, step into its place, as a *convertible term*), sed quasi ex adverso esse oppositam (stands over against it, as a corresponding opposite in a *συστοιχία*, two parallel rows of coordinate opposites, like the partners in a country dance). Quintilian, Inst. Orat. II 17, 42, *specie magis quam genere differunt*.

The term ἀντίστροφος therefore applied to the two arts, seems to represent them as two coordinate opposites, or opposites in the same row (see Spengel on the study of Rhetoric, Munich 1842, p. 21). They are sister arts, with general resemblances and specific differences; two species under one genus, proof: both modes of proof, both dealing with probable materials, but distinguished by the difference of the two instruments of proof employed: the one concluding by the formal syllogism, and by the regular induction, assumed complete; the other drawing its inferences by the abbreviated, imperfect, conversational enthymeme, never complete in form, and by the single example in the place of the general induction.

Rhetoric is afterwards described as παραφύς, μόριον and ὁμοίωμα (infra c. II § 7). παραφύς and μόριον both express in different ways the relation that Rhetoric bears to Dialectics as the off-shoot, branch, or part; a species or variety of the general art of probable reasoning: παραφύς as a subordinate shoot, growing out of the same root with the larger plant or tree,—a term so far corresponding with ἀντίστροφος, but differing from it in making Rhetoric subordinate. μόριον reduces it to a still lower level in comparison with the other. ὁμοίωμα implies no more than a mere general resemblance.

In Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII 6, occurs an explanation of ἀντίστροφος, quite in character with the ordinary Greek etymologies, *ρητορικὴν, ἥς ἀντίστροφον εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν*, (not referring apparently to this passage, but most probably to the *συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν*) *τοιαύτην ἰσόστροφον, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην στρέφεσθαι (versari circa)*, as Homer called Ulysses *ἀντίθεον* instead of *ἰσόθεον*. Alexander (infra.) gives the same explanation.

Bacon *Adv. of learning* Bk. II IX 3, has *antistrophe* for 'correspondence', "and it hath the same relation or *antistrophe* that the former hath."

The points of correspondence and difference between the two arts have been already fully explained in the Introduction, p. 90 foll.: I will here give a summary of them from Alexander's Commentary on the

τρόπον τινὰ ἀπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν, καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης. διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον

*Topics*, p. 4. They are 1. that both of them are μὴ περὶ ἓν τι γένος ἀφωρισμένων; that is, that neither of them has any special subject-matter, like the sciences, but argues or perorates upon any thesis or subject whatsoever that can be presented to it. 2. τὸ δὲ ἐνδόξων καὶ πιθανῶν, no proof or conclusion, or principle, that they employ is more than probable; exact demonstration and necessary conclusions are excluded from both alike; πίστις, belief, the result of mere persuasion, and not ἐπιστήμη, the infallible result of scientific demonstration, being the object aimed at. 3. μὴ δὲ οἰκείων ἀρχῶν, they have no 'special, appropriate' first principles, such as those from which the special sciences are deduced; though they likewise appeal to the τὰ κοινά, the κοινὰ ἀρχαί, the ultimate axioms and principles common to all reasoning, which are above those of the special sciences, and from which the latter must be deduced. And, 4. they are ὁμοίως περὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλους; they argue indifferently the opposite sides of the same question, and conclude the positive or negative of any proposition or problem; unlike science and demonstration, which can only arrive at one conclusion. Where the materials and the method are alike only probable, every question has, or may be made to appear to have, two sides, either of which may be maintained on probable principles; in Dialectics and Rhetoric no certainty is either attained or attainable. The chief points of difference between them are, that Dialectics deals practically as well as theoretically with every kind of problem or question that can be submitted to it; proceeds by question and answer, in the way of debate, and its discussions are of a more general or universal character; whereas the subjects of Rhetoric are practically, though not theoretically, almost absolutely limited to Politics; it follows a method of continuous narration or explanation (διεξοδικῶς), and deals in its conclusions rather with individual cases than with general principles or universal rules, maxims and axioms.

Alexander, in a preceding passage, gives the following very extraordinary account of the derivation and original meaning of ἀντίστροφος: τὸ γὰρ ἀντ. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰσόστροφόν τε καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ στρεφόμενην καὶ καταγωνομένην λέγει.

κοινὰ ἀπάντων] See Intro., p. 87, and the Paraphrase, pp. 134—5.

ἀφωρισμένης] 'marked off, separated by a limit', from every thing else about it; and so 'definite, special' (§ 7). 1, 2, 1 περὶ τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμένων, opposed to περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος. *Polit.* I 13, 1260 b 1 ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ δουλείαν (a definite, limited, kind of slavery). *Ib.* IV (VI) 4, 1290 b 25 ἀποδιορίζειν. ἀφορίζεται (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις) πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῇ ἔργῳ τούτῳ, "this capacity of the soul is marked off, separated, distinguished, from all the rest by this function," *de Anima* II 4, 9, 416 a 20. The preposition is similarly used in the compound ἀποβλέπειν, which is 'to look away, or off', from all surrounding objects, so as to fix the attention on one particular thing, or turn it in one particular direction. *Comp. Lat. definire, determinare.*

Parallel passages, in which this same characteristic of Rhetoric and



τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον, καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ 2 κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἔξω. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν· δι' ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἱ

Dialectics is noticed, are cited in the Introd. p. 75. See also Quintilian, II 21, 16—19, on the province of the orator.

ἐξετάζειν...λόγον] Note 1, Introd. p. 135. ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἐξεταστική, Top. A 2, 101 b 3.

§ 2. συνήθειαν] 'habitation, familiarity, practice', acquired by *association* (prop. that of living or herding together). Top. A 14, 105 b 27 τῇ διὰ τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς συνηθείᾳ πειρατέον γνωρίζειν ἐκάστην αὐτῶν (τῶν προτάσεων). See also on I 10, 18. This συνήθεια is derived from the constant operation or activity, the ἐνέργειαι, of the developed and acquired and settled ἔξις, or mental state (ἔξις from ἔχειν, 'to be in such and such a state or condition', τὸ πῶς ἔχειν): by the constant exercise of the ἔξις, or established condition habit, and its ἐνέργειαι, is produced by association that familiarity, or habituation, or practice, which secures success even to the empirical unartistic use of Dialectics or Rhetoric.

εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶν is the use of them antecedent to practice, and without previously acquired familiarity: ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, by a mere spontaneous impulse, and therefore 'at random.'

'Est autem dialectica,' says John of Salisbury, *Metalogicus*, II 4, 'ut Augustino placet, bene disputandi scientia: quod quidem ita accipiendum est ut vis habeatur in verbis; ne scilicet dialectici credantur, quos casus iuvat artis beneficio destitutos.'

αὐτὰ] Rhetoric and its processes.

ὁδοποιεῖν] 'to make a way'; to trace a path to be followed, which will lead you without unnecessary deviations to the place at which you wish to arrive. ὁδὸς therefore, in this metaphorical usage, is not merely *a way*, but *the way*, the *best way*; the way which will lead you most surely and expeditiously to the end proposed. Hence it denotes a regular, systematic, or scientific method; the best and easiest way of attaining the end desired in any intellectual pursuit or branch of study. And thus it is that the simple ὁδὸς, as well as the compound μέθοδος, come to denote a scientific or systematic procedure in the pursuit of truth as a philosophical 'method', or in any art or study. Hence we find ὁδῷ διηρησθαι. Plat. Phaedr. 263 B, of a systematic methodical scientific division; and Rep. VII 533 D: κατ' ὁδόν, in the same sense, Rep. IV 435 A, and Crat. 425 B. In Aristotle, de gen. et corr. I 8, 2 ὁδῷ δὲ μάλιστα περὶ πάντων...διωρίσασθαι Λευκίππος καὶ Δημόκριτος. de part. Anim. I 4, 9 πῶς μὲν οὖν ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ τὴν περὶ φύσεως μέθοδον, καὶ τίνα τρόπον γένοιτ' ἂν ἡ θεωρία περὶ αὐτῶν ὁδῷ καὶ ῥᾶστα... Anal. Pr. I 30 init., ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὕτη καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιοῦν καὶ μάθημα. Top. B 2, 109 b 14 ὁδῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν ἐλάττωσιν ἡ σκέψις. Eth. Nic. I, 2 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ

τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν  
θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη πάντες ἂν  
3 ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι. νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς  
τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν  
αὐτῆς μόνον· αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἐντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ  
δ' ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, οἱ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν  
λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ

τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ὁδός. Dionysius, de Comp. Verb. c. 25, has ἡ ῥητορικὴ ὁδός for the more usual μέθοδος: and again ὁδός, de Comp. Verb. c. 4 sub fin. From this usage of the Greek word the Latins seem to have borrowed their *via* or *via et ratione*, which frequently occurs in precisely the same sense. See Cicero de Fin. III 5, 18, IV 4, 10; Orat. III 10, XXXIII 116; de Orat. I 25, 113. Quint. II 17, 41 *esse certe viam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitaverit*; and x 7, 6 *via dicere*.

The verb ὁδοποιεῖν is found in the same sense, Met. A 3, 984 a 18. προΐόντων δ' οὕτως, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὁδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάκασε ζητεῖν, and Rhet. III 12, 3 (according to MS A<sup>c</sup> and some others); and the substantive ὁδοποιοίς, III 14, 1.

προοδοποιεῖν, which occurs several times in Aristotle (as Rhet. II 2, 10, II 13, 7, III 12, 3, Prob. XXX 1, 954 b 12, de part. Anim. II 4, §§ 4, 5, 6, III 9, 8, de gen. anim. IV 4, 9, περὶ Μαντικῆς, I 11. Polit. II 9, 1270 a 4, IV (VII) 17, 1336 a 32, and V (VIII) 3, 1338 a 35 πρὸ ὁδοῦ), has a meaning slightly differing from the preceding. The metaphor is now taken from the office of pioneers, who precede an advancing army, and prepare, clear, or 'pave the way' for them.

δι' ὅ...τὴν αἰτίαν] τὴν αἰτίαν is here grammatically the antecedent to ὅ, the cause, αἰτία, being in the relative pronoun expressed as an abstract notion ('the cause, which thing') in the neuter. A similar change from feminine to neuter, in antecedent and relative, occurs in de Anima I 3, 407 a 4 τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντός (ψυχὴν) τοιαύτην εἶναι βούλεται οἷόν ποτ' εἶστιν ὁ καλούμενος τοῦς, Pol. II 2 init. καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νομοθετηθῆναι... οὐ φαίνεται συμβαίνειν ἐκ τῶν λόγων, and in Eur. Iph. T. 900 (Herm.) ἡ δ' αἰτία τίς ἀπὸ τοῦ κτείνει πάσιν; where τοῦ must be understood as neuter: see Hermann on v. 1038.

§ 3 seq. To the same effect III 14, 8 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα· πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾗ; οὐθέν δὲ προοιμίον—as the vehicle for appeals to the feelings and other indirect proofs addressed to the judges personally, which were usually introduced into the προοίμιον.

πίστεις rhetorical, not demonstrative proofs; modes of belief, of things probable; all the materials and arguments of Rhetoric being probable merely, none of them certain. See Introd. p. 136 note.

προσθῆκαι...σῶμα τῆς πίστεως] All kinds of indirect proof are secondary, subordinate, non-essential, mere 'adjuncts' or 'appendages', like dress or ornaments to the body: 'the body' being the actual, logical, direct and substantial proof of the case. What is here called 'the body', meaning

τῶν ἕξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλείστα πραγματεύ-  
ονται· διαβολή γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργή καὶ τὰ

the substance as opposed to accidents, we usually represent by 'the soul' in this same relation; the body in its turn now standing for the accidents and non-essentials of a thing. So the Scholiast on Hermogenes, Proleg. (quoted by Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Graecae* p. 110, Art. ἐνθύμημα) οἱ παλαιοὶ ὥσπερ τι ζῶον τὸν λόγον ὑπέθεντο ἐκ σώματός τε συνεστηκότα καὶ ψυχῆς· ψυχὴν μὲν καλοῦντες τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν διὰ τῶν κεφαλῶν συνισταμένην· σῶμα δὲ τὴν φράσιν καὶ τὸ ἔξωθεν κάλλος, ὃ ποιεῖν εἰώθασι αἱ ἰδέαι. And Cicero, Orat. XIV 44 nam et invenire et iudicare quid dicas magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam animi instar in corpore.

Quintilian describes the views of some of those who thus rigorously limit the province of Rhetoric as an *art*—αἱ πίστεις ἔντεχον· ἄξιόν τι μόνον—to the employment of the 'enthymeme', the rhetorical representative of the logical and demonstrative 'syllogism'; with the exclusion of all that is, strictly speaking, 'beside the subject or real issue', all that is beside the facts of the case and the direct proof of them; all indirect proof, namely, from the assumed character of the speaker himself, or appeals to the feelings of the judges or audience, and also all ornaments and graces of style and delivery. Aristotle here assumes this to be theoretically the only true and proper method, though he by no means consistently adheres to it in his actual treatment of the subject. Quintilian's description is as follows, though, as the reasons for the exclusion of these indirect proofs are somewhat different from those assigned by Aristotle, he probably does not refer immediately to him: *Fuerunt et clari quidem oratores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere. Namque et affectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant: primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio; deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia vel ira similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium petere, quum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur.* Inst. Orat. V. Prooem. 1.

On the general question of appeals to the feelings, Quint. II 17, 26 seq.: and on the prevailing practice, Isocr. *περὶ ἀντιδ.* § 321.

πραγματεύεσθαι is well explained by Bonitz on Metaph. A 6, 987 a 30. 'πραγματεύεσθαι περὶ τι, vel περὶ τινος is dicitur ab Aristotele, qui in investiganda et cognoscenda aliqua re via ac ratione procedit; itaque conjunctum legitur cum verbis διαλέγεσθαι, ζητεῖν, θεωρεῖν'. The primary sense of doing business, or occupying oneself about anything, passes into the more limited or special signification of an intellectual pursuit, and thence of 'a special study', 'a systematic treatment of a particular subject of investigation, or practice' (as in this present case, of Rhetoric, comp. § 10). πραγματεία, like μέθοδος, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία, and many other words, is used to express not only the intellectual process of investigation, but also the resulting science, art, treatise, or written work, or part of such work. See on this point, Introd. p. 17, note 2. Also, on the general meaning of the term, Waitz on Anal. Post. II 13, 96 b 15. Trendel. *de Anima* p. 199. *Elem. Log. Arist.* § 58, p. 135.

§ 4. διαβολή from διαβάλλω 'to sunder or set at variance', and so

τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός  
 ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστὴν. ὥστ' εἰ περὶ πάσας  
 ἦν τὰς κρίσεις καθάπερ ἐν ἐνίαις γε νῦν ἐστὶ τῶν  
 πόλεων καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις, οὐδὲν ἂν  
 5 εἶχον ὃ τι λέγωσιν· ἅπαντες γὰρ οἱ μὲν οἴονται  
 δεῖν οὕτω τοὺς νόμους ἀγορεύειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ χρῶνται  
 καὶ κωλύουσιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν, καθάπερ  
 καὶ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ, ὀρθῶς τοῦτο νομίζοντες· οὐ

'to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties', in its technical application to Rhetoric, of which it is a potent instrument; and with its opposite ἀπολύεσθαι 'to absolve oneself, clear away from oneself ill-feeling and suspicion', forms one of the principal topics of the προοίμιον (see *Introd.* pp. 343, 4). It denotes the exciting of suspicion and ill-will in the minds of the judges or audience, in order to prejudice them against the opponent with whom you are in controversy: and is therefore improperly classed with the πάθη or emotions such as ἔλεος and ὀργή. This has been already noticed by Victorius and Muretus: the latter says, 'διαβολὴ non est πάθος, sed pertinet ad iudicem ponendum in πάθει.'

Top. Δ 5, 126 α 31. [διάβολον] τὸν δυνάμενον διαβάλλειν καὶ ἐχθρὸς ποιεῖν τοὺς φίλους. These words, which seem to be a mere gloss upon διάβολον in the text of the Topics, occur apparently in one MS only, marked u by Waitz, and inserted by him in the critical notes of his edition, Vol. II p. 144. Bekker altogether omits to notice them. Though of no authority they will equally well answer the purpose for which they are here employed, of helping, namely, to define the meaning of διαβολή.

On πάθος and πάθη, see *Introd.* pp. 113—118.

οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος δικαστὴν] Appeals to the feelings are ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος: they are 'beside the proper subject, the real question, the direct issue', which is the fact and the proof of it; and 'directed to the judge', intended to bias and pervert his judgment, to incline him to our side in the contest, and so to have the effect of a secondary or indirect kind of proof of the justice of our case.

ὥστ' εἰ περὶ πάσας—λέγωσιν] Similarly in *Rhet.* III 1, 4, it is said of the ornaments of style, and declamation in general, as of appeals to the feelings here, that they are only allowed to be employed διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν; in *well-governed* states they would not be permitted at all.

§ 5. οἱ μὲν...οἱ δέ] 'either...or'. The one only ἰσθίη that the laws ought to be so framed, hold the opinion as a theory; the others, as the Court of Areopagus, actually (καὶ, also, besides the mere theory) carry it into practice, καὶ χρῶνται.

ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ] Heindorf ad *Theaet.* § 76. Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 12, 13, quoted by Gaisford, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστον ἔχοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων παράδειγμα τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συνίδριον, ὃ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, ὥστε

γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προά-

καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁμολογεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀλικομένοις δικαίαν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν. πρὸς δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀποβλέποντας μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν κ.τ.λ.

Lucian, *Hermotimus*, c. 64, has something similar about the practice of this court, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀρεσπαγίτας αὐτὸ ποιοῦντα· οἱ ἐν νυκτὶ καὶ σκότῳ δικάζουσιν, ὥς μὴ εἰς τοὺς λέγοντας ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποβλέποιεν. (Lucian ed. Hemsterh. I p. 805), and again, *Anacharsis s. de Gymn.* c. 10, (Vol. II p. 898) οἱ δὲ (δικαζόμενοι) ἐς τ' ἂν μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγων ἀνέχεται ἢ βουλὴ καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀκούουσα· ἦν δὲ τις ἢ φροῖμιον εἴπη πρὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὥς εὐνουστέρους ἀπεργάσαιτο αὐτούς, ἢ οἰκτον ἢ δεινῶσιν ἔξωθεν ἐπάγοι τῷ πράγματι, οἷα πολλὰ ῥητόρων παῖδες ἐπὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς μηχανῶνται, παρελθὼν δὲ κήρυξ κατεσιώπησεν εὐθύς, οὐκ ἔῶν ληρεῖν πρὸς τὴν βουλήν κ.τ.λ. There are several allusions to the same in Quintilian, II 16, 4, VI 1, 7, X 1, 107, XII 10, 26. Spalding in his note on the first of these passages calls attention to—what indeed is sufficiently apparent on the face of the statements—Quintilian's carelessness in extending to all the law-courts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at the most only in one of them; in spite of the direct evidence to the contrary in the extant orations of the Athenian orators, and the story of Hyperides and Phryne which he himself tells in II 15, 9.

διαστρέφειν to warp or distort to wrest out of the straight ('right') line or proper direction, to pervert or 'deprave' the judgment. The same metaphor is repeated in *στρεβλόν*. The metaphor which compares wrong, the deviation from the 'right' line or path, to the crooked or twisted, the divergence from the straight, and represents wrong judgment as the warping of the moral rule, occurs in various languages; *σκολιός*, and *ὀρθός*, εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, Solon ap. Dem. de F. L. p. 423, *σκολιαῖς ἰδοῖς παῶν*, Pind. Pyth. II 156, Pl. Theaet. 173 A &c. &c. So *ἐλκτός*, Eur. Androm. 448 *ἐλκτὰ πάνθ' ὅθεν ὕγιες ἀλλὰ πᾶν περίεξ φρονούντες*. So Plato of the good and bad horse in the human chariot, *Phaedr.* 253 D, *ὁ μὲν...τὸ τε εἶδος ὀρθός...ὁ δ' αὖ σκολιός* κ.τ.λ.

So also *rectum* and *pravum* or *varum* or *curvum*, right and wrong (wrung or twisted out of shape, distorted, similarly *intortus*) *tort*, Fr. (*tortum*), *torto*, Ital. Compare Lucretius, IV 516, *denique ut in fabrica, si prava est fabrica prima Normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit*,—*Omnia mendose fieri*, &c. Cic. Acad. Pr. II 11, 33, *interesse oportet, ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum*. Hor. Ep. II 2, 44, *curvo dignoscere rectum*, ('virtutem distinguere a vitio'. Orelli). Pers. Sat. III 52, *haud tibi inexpertum curvos deprendere mores*. IV 11, *rectum discernis ubi inter curva subit, vel cum fallit pede regula varo*. V 38, *apposita intortos extendit regula mores*.

'Crooked' for perverse, immoral, wrong, is very common in the earlier writers of our own language. Deut. xxxii 5, *a perverse and crooked generation*. Ps. cxv 5, Prov. ii 15, whose ways are crooked, and they froward in their paths. Ep. ad Phil. ii 15, and in many other places and authors. For examples of the latter, see Richardson's Dict. Art. 'crooked'.

Very different to this are the principles laid down by the author of

γοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ τις, ᾧ p. 2.

the 'Ρητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον as a guide to the practice of the rhetorician, c. 36 (37) § 4. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐπαίνῳ θεραπεύσαι, ὡς δικασταὶ δίκαιοι καὶ δεινοὶ εἰσιν. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐλαττώσεις, εἴ που τῶν ἀντιδίκων καταδεεστέρας ἔχει πρὸς τὸ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα. The judges are to be flattered, and the opponent represented in the darkest colours, whether his alleged defects have or have not any bearing upon the matter at issue. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐμβλητέον τὸ τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀκόλουθα; which is the exact contradictory of the course prescribed by Aristotle in § 6 as alike fair and in accordance with the true principles of the art.

προάγοντας εἰς] Comp. III 14, 7, and note.

κἂν εἴ τις...ποιήσῃ] The process by which ἂν in this and similar forms of expression—ὡς ἂν εἴ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ, καθάπερ ἂν εἴ, οἷονπερ ἂν εἴ, and the like—has lost its force, become inactive, (*consopitum*, 'gone to sleep', Buttm.) in the sentence, is explained by Buttmann in his note on Dem. Mid. § 15, p. 530. The conditional ἂν belongs to some verb in the apodosis, originally expressed, afterwards left to be understood, as in the clause before us. The expression at full length would be, κἂν, εἴ τις ποιήσῃ, ποιήσῃ, 'as one would do, if he were to do'. Still, though the particle has lost its direct and active force in this sentence, some latent notion of conditionality always remains, even when the verb which ἂν supposes cannot actually be supplied. This is the case in such phrases as φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ παῖς, Pl. Gorg. 479 A 'fearing as a child would': Ar. parva naturalia περὶ μαντικῆς I 2, 2 ὅσων ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ λάλος ἢ φύσις ἐστίν, 'whose natural habit is, as it might be (ἂν), talkative'; de Anima I 5, 5, 409 b 27, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. in such cases the ἂν is retained by habit and association, when the sense no longer requires it. The phrase accordingly is not found in the earlier forms of the language, and does not become common till the time of Plato and Aristotle, with whom, the latter especially, it is very frequent. The association required time before it was established as a fixed habit. I believe that it does not occur in Thucydides, and that it makes its first appearance in Xenophon; that is, in the forms above given; for as an unnecessary appendage to a participle, or in cases *analogous*, ἂν is thus used by earlier writers. See Hermann on Soph. Phil. 491, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 430, 1, for some instances [Kühner's *Ausführliche Grammatik* § 398 p. 209 sq. s.].

Aristotle seems to be the earliest writer who assumed the license of joining κἂν εἴ with the subjunctive mood, as in Pol. II 1 init. κἂν εἴ τυγχάνωσιν, c. 2, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ σταθμῆς πλείον ἐκλύσῃ, and III 8 κἂν εἴ συμβαίῃ, also Poet. I 5, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνωσιν. Κἂν εἴ μὴ τῷ δοκῇ is the MSS reading in Plat. Rep. IX 579 D, and defended by Schneider (not. ad loc.); but rejected by Ast, Bek., Stallb. and the Zurich Editors who substitute δοκεῖ. I subjoin a few examples of the usage in its various forms. Soph. Aj. 1078 δοκεῖν πεισεῖν ἂν κἂν (it might be even) ἀπὸ μικροῦ κακοῦ. Xenophon, Symp. II 20, IX 4, Cyrop. I 3, 1, Memor. III 6, 4 and 10, 12. Plato, Apol. 23 B, Phaed. 72 C, 109 C, and elsewhere, Men. 97 B, Gorg. 479 A, Rep. VI 493 A, Isocr. Paneg. §§ 69, 148, Aristotle in addition to

μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσῃε στρεβλόν.  
 6 ἔτι δὲ φανερόν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ἀμφισβητοῦντος οὐδὲν  
 ἔστιν ἔξω τοῦ δείξαι τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ  
 ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρόν  
 ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἀδικον, ὅσα μὴ ὁ νομοθέτης διώρικεν,  
 αὐτὸν δὴ πού τὸν δικαστὴν δεῖ· γινώσκειν καὶ οὐ  
 7 μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων. μάλιστα μὲν  
 οὖν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, ὅσα  
 ἐνδέχεται, πάντα διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα  
 καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἔνα

those already quoted, Rhet. II 20, 4, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, Eth. N. V 7, 1132, 11. Ib. V 12, 1137, 2; VI 13 sub. fin., 1145, 2 and 10; VII 8, 1150, 16, καὶ εἰ βέπουσι, Pol. III 6 (sub init.) καὶ εἰ πλείους, and several more: Hist. Anim. IV 2, 16, IV 11, 11, VIII 2, 10, de part. Anim. IV 5, 26, de Gen. Anim. III 9, 7. In Aristotle it has become habitual. The analogous use of ἂν with the participle is exemplified by Pol. II 2, 1261 b 4 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι; and Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. I 5, 1, ὡς ἂν καθόλου λέγοντας, and I 6, 6, ὡς ἂν κατὰ λόγον, where ἂν may be considered as redundant. [Vahlen, *Beiträge zu Ar. Poet.* I p. 35—37; Eucken, *de Ar. dicendi ratione* I p. 61—64. S.]

§ 6. On the 'legal issues', στάσεις, ἀμφισβητήσεις, which, as Victorius remarks, are here tacitly referred to, see Introd. p. 397, Appendix E to Bk. III.

§ 7. κειμένους νόμους] κεῖσθαι and some of its compounds are often convertible with the passive of τιθέναι. κεῖσθαι itself 'to be placed, fixed, established' = τίθεσθαι; συγκεῖσθαι 'to be put together or composed' = συντίθεσθαι; διακεῖσθαι 'to be disposed' = διατίθεσθαι; ποκεῖσθαι (as I 2 13) 'to be assumed' = ὑποτίθεσθαι or ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι.

[κείμεαι is constantly borrowed as a perfect passive to τίθημι, while τέθειμαι is almost invariably used as a deponent perfect. Thus the usage of the perfect in the best writers would be: ὁ νομοθέτης τέθεικε τὸν νόμον. ἡ πόλις τέθειται τὸν νόμον· ὁ νόμος κεῖται (Dem. Or. 46 § 12 note). *infrā* chap. 15 § 23 τοῖς νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἄλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, Plato Leg. p. 793 B (νόμων) τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἐτι τεθησομένων. See also Cobet's *variae lectiones* p. 311. S.]

τοῖς κρίνουσι, κρίσεις, τοὺς κρίνοντας] On the different senses of κρίνειν and κριτής as applied to the different branches of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 137 note 1; and on the necessary imperfections of laws in their application to particular cases, the consequent introduction of ἐπιείκεια to modify them and adapt them to the circumstances of the case, and Plato's opinion, on the authority of laws, see p. 138 note 1.

ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι] ἐπὶ resting, and so depending upon; hence *penes*, in the power of, at the discretion of. § 8 ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν.

This primary, literal, and physical sense of ἐπὶ, (in this application of it,

λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ῥᾶον ἢ πολλοὺς εὖ φρονούντας P. 1354 b.  
καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν· ἔπειθ' αἱ  
μὲν νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνον-  
ται, αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἐξ ὑπογυίου, ὥστε χαλεπὸν ἀποδι-  
δόναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καλῶς τοὺς κρίνον-

which represents the object of the preposition as the *basis* on which some-  
thing stands or rests, and therefore depends upon), of the half dozen  
Grammars and Lexicons, which, after forming my own opinion, I have  
consulted on the point, is to be found distinctly stated only in that of Rost  
and Palm, where it lurks hardly discoverable, amidst the enormous mass  
of illustrations of the various usages of *ἐπὶ* accumulated in Vol. I pp. 1032  
—1045, in p. 1038, col. 2.

αἱ νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνονται] 'legislation arises  
from (is the work of men after) long previous consideration'. Thuc. I 58,  
ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες οὐδὲν εὗροντο ἐπιτήδειον.

ἐξ ὑπογυίου] (retained by Bekker; Gaisford *not. var.* prefers ὑπογίου,  
and so L. Dindorf, on Xen. Cyr. VI I, 43.) ὑπόγυιον πρὸ μικροῦ γεγονός,  
Hesychius. ἐξ ὑπογυίου· παρ' αὐτὰ, ἀπερισκέπτως, ἐκ τῶν σύνεργος, Suidas.  
By the Scholiast on Arist. Nub. 145, in Suidas v. ἀρτί (Gaisf.), ἐξ ὑπο-  
γυίου λέγειν is interpreted by αὐτοσχεδιάζειν; and in Eustath. (ap. eund.)  
it is said to be derived from γυῖον in the sense of χεῖρ, (compare Theocr.  
Idyl. XXII 81 and 121; the 'hand' is *the* member, *par excellence*), from  
which likewise he deduces ἔγγυη, ἔγγυα, and ἐγγυαλίζειν; and ὑπόγυιον, ὃ  
καὶ ἐξ ὑπογυίου λέγεται, τὸ ἐγγύς φασι προσδόκιμον, ἢ παραντίκα γεγονός, καὶ  
ὡς εἰπεῖν πρόχειρον, ἢ μᾶλλον ὑποχείριον. Examples may be found, all  
bearing much the same sense, in Koch's note on Moeris Lex. p. 343, and a  
still larger list in Rost and Palm's Lex. s. v., to which add Rhet. II 22, II;  
Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1321 b 17. ὑπογυιότατον (the readiest way or means)  
πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν. Isocr. Paneg. § 13. Menand. ap. Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III  
391. In Isocr. περὶ Ἀντιδ. § 4, and Epist. 6. 2, p. 418 B, it stands for 'close  
at hand', ἥδη ὑπογυίου μοι τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς οὐσσης, and similarly Ar.  
Eth. Nic. III 9 (Bekk.) sub fin., ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπογυῖα ὄντα.

It appears from all this that ὑπογυῖον means 'under the hand', as an  
unfinished or just finished work, fresh and recent, πρόσφατον (so Rhet. II  
3, 12) as Moeris explains it: and ἐξ ὑπογυίου, 'from under the hand', cor-  
responds to our 'off-hand', or 'out of hand', and is used to express any-  
thing 'sudden and unexpected' or 'unpremeditated', 'extemporaneous',  
a signification which appears in all the examples. Similarly ἐκ χειρός, ἀπὸ  
χειρός, 'off-hand'.

ἀποδιδόναι] a word of very frequent use in Aristotle, has for one of its  
elementary senses that of 'to give back', *reddere*: ἀπό as in ἐπενεμῖν,  
ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀπαιτεῖν, ἀπόπλους, ἀποπλεῖν (see Sturz. Lex. Xenoph.), from  
which all the other senses in which at least Aristotle employs it may be  
deduced. Another of the original senses of the word is 'to give forth',  
or 'produce', as the earth produces her fruits, and this also *might* be  
applied to the interpretation of it in several of its various uses. But as  
this signification is likewise deducible from the other—for production, as



τας. τὸ δὲ πάντων μέγιστον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου κρίσις οὐ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ περὶ μελλόντων

when the earth produces her fruits, may be regarded as a payment or restoration, or 'return' of something *as due*—it may perhaps be better to refer them all to the one original signification, *reddere*. So in Eth. N. II 1, 1103, a 27, b 22, τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδιδόναι is not simply 'to produce', but to produce energies that are *due to the system*, energies *corresponding* to the faculties from which they spring. So Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Arist.* § 55, p. 132, ἀποδιδόναι proprie est reddere, unde ex suum cuique tribuendi significatione facile orta est declarandi vis (*declarare* is the sense which the word bears in the passage specially referred to, Top. A 5, 102 a 3) nihil enim est aliud quam logice suam cuique naturam reddere.

ἀποδιδόναι is therefore (1) to give back, restore, repay, render, always implying some kind of obligation, (2) to render as a due, 'assign' (which best represents it in the majority of cases in Aristotle); of *due* distribution, *summi cuique*; hence (3) of the due fulfilment of any office or duty, as ἀποδιδόναι λόγον, 'to render an account', to explain, or set forth, any statement or doctrine, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, *declarare*. To one or the other of these I believe all the multifarious uses of the word may be referred.

I will add a few examples in the way of illustration:—Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 638 § 56, τοὺς ἐχθρὰ ποιοῦντας ἐν ἐχθροῦ μέρει κολάζειν ἀπέδωκεν (assigns as a due) ὁ νόμος; and elsewhere. Plat. Phaed. 71 E (a good example), οὐκ ἀνταποδοῶσμεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γίνεσιν (pay back in return), ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλὴ (mutilated, defective, lopsided, single where all the rest are pairs) ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 1, 403 b 1, τοῦτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, 'assigns' or 'applies', that is, to the definition, which is the thing in question, to which it assigns matter as the sole element: comp. c. 4, 408 a 3; and ἀπονέμειν, in precisely the same sense, ib. v 1, and Pl. Tim. 34 A. ἀποδιδῶσι make to correspond, bring into comparison, Rhet. III 11, 13. ἀποδ. λειτουργίαν de part. An. III 14, 9, 'duly to fulfil certain functions (services)'. Ib. II 14, 5, (ἡ φύσις) πανταχοῦ ἀποδίδωσι (makes due compensation, duly assigns) λαβοῦσα ἐτέρωθεν πρὸς ἄλλο μῦρον. Top. Δ 1, 121 a 15, et passim, τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, ἀποδιδόναι γένος. Top. A 18, 108 b 9, τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῶν ὁρισμῶν, the rendering, or due preparation, production, of definitions: and so elsewhere. de part. An. III 7, 18, ἀποδ. τὸ ἔργον of the due performance of the work. Ib. I 1, 43 ἀποδ. τὸ δοστοῦν τί ἐστι, to state, give a sufficient account or explanation. Phys. I 6, 1, 189 a 16, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πάντα ἀποδιδόναι (to produce, effect everything) οἶεται ὅσπερ Ἄναξ. ἐκ τῶν ἀπειρῶν. Eth. Nic. III 1, 110 b 8, ποῖα δὲ...οὐ ρᾶδιον ἀποδοῦναι, to give an account, explain.

So here ἀποδιδόναι is 'duly to assign, distribute, or apportion' and again I 2, 5, ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις 'we render our judgments'. These same applications of the word occur likewise in Plato, as Rep. 379 A, (to represent), Ib. 472 D, VI 508 E, Phaedr. 237 C, Theaet. 175 D, Polit. 295 A. The precise opposite, ἀπολαμβάνειν, occurs with the same sense of ἀπό, I 11, 3. ἀπονέμειν is used in exactly the same sense, 'to assign as a due'; see for instance Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 18, ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, Ib. V 35, τιμὴ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Ib. 1124 a 9.

τε καὶ καθόλου ἐστίν, ὁ δ' ἐκκλησιαστὴς καὶ δικαστὴς  
ἤδη περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀφωρισμένων κρίνουσιν· πρὸς

ἤδη...κρίνουσιν] by this time, now that we have come to them, 'they actually decide—' So in the next line, τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν 'this time', in *their* case, not in the former, of something new, special, and *marked*. ἤδη therefore in these cases is often translatable by a mere emphasis. The word is repeated so soon after, applied to the same persons, and expressing almost identically the same thing, that it is not improbable that Spengel may be right in his conjecture that the one or the other should be erased. *Rhet. Gr.* Vol. I. Pref. p. v. 'paulo post alterutrum ἤδη abundat, puto prius.' However there are two still closer together, II 25, 14.

It may be worth while to say a few words on this very common usage of ἤδη and analogous particles of time, in the way of illustration and exemplification. 'Ἢδη and its analogues ἔτι, οὐκέτι, οὐπω, are used emphatically to mark a critical point, climax, degree attained, as deserving of special and particular attention, at the moment, and in reference to something else which is not equally remarkable. They are all particles of time, and derive this their secondary sense from the metaphorical application of this notion of 'already', a definite time which we have just reached: 'point', or 'stage', or 'degree' attained being substituted by the metaphor for 'time' in the original sense of the word.

This will be best illustrated by a few examples. Arist. *πρὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως* c. 2. 16, ὥσπερ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, 'habit, already by this time, now that we have reached this point, has become a second nature'. Met. Δ 21, 1022 b 18, εἶνα δὲ [τρόπον πάθος λέγεται] τοῦτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη, 'one sense of πάθος is, the actual energies and changes of these'. ἤδη, by the time that they have reached this stage or state, and have *actually* become what they are. Categ. c. 8, 9, a 4, ἣν ἂν τις ἴσως ἔξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύσοι, 'which may now (at this stage) be fairly called a *ἔξις*'. περὶ ἑρμηνείας c. 9, 19, a 39, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀληθὴ τὴν ἐτέραν, οὐ μέντοι ἤδη (not yet actually, not quite, not yet arrived at the stage of,) ἀληθὴ ἢ ψευδῇ. Polit. II 8, 1268 b 20, ἐκείνος ἤδη ἐπιωρεῖ. III 7, 1279 a 40, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἡκριβώσθαι. VIII (v) 8, 1308 a 15, ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δημοὺς ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι, i. e. though this may not be strictly true of all oligarchies, when we come to the ὅμοιοι, at this stage, by this time, it is now quite true that they may be regarded as a *δῆμος*. Eth. Nic. v 3, 1132 a 2, πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων, 'when a man has come to be a ruler, he must then...' in the case of others this perhaps is not necessarily true, but the ruler must, *actually*, live or act in relation to others and in society'. Rhet. I 6, 24, πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν. I 10, 11, ἤδη διαφέρει 'it does make a difference'. c. II § 3, τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται. Ib. § 26, ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται. II 6 § 12, and 25 § 14, bis. I have confined myself in these illustrations to examples from Aristotle; from the ordinary language, in which this usage is at least equally common, I will content myself with citing Herod. III 5, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἤδη Αἴγυπτος: and Eur. Hippol. 1195 (Monk) πρὸς πόντον ἤδη κειμένον Σαρωνικόν.

It is found also in French, Italian and German—*déjà, già, schon. C'est*

οὐς καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον  
 συμφέρον συνήρῃται πολλάκις, ὥστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι

*déjà quelque chose*, 'and that's something'. *das ist schon etwas*. The Italian *già*, when used as an expression of assent, may be similarly explained.

The use of *demum* is precisely similar, and common in most Latin writers. Sallust, Cat. xx *idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum* (that and that alone) *firma amicitia est*. Quint. II 5, 1, *artemque de qua loquimur bonis demum* (to the good, and to them alone) *tribui volunt*. VII Praef. init. *neque enim ea demum quae ad docendum pertinent exsecuti sumus*. VII 2, 21, VIII Prooem. 3, IV 5, 7, XI 1 § 44, 3 § 68, et passim. Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 19, 43, *eaque ei demum naturalis est sedes*, et seq., de Orat. II 30, 131, *hi loci ei demum oratori prodesse possunt*. Rarer is the analogous use of *denique* and *tandem*: Cic. de Orat. II 30, 131, c. 34, 146, *tum denique scrutari locos*, c. 75, 304, *quantum est in eo tandem mali!* c. 77, 315, *hisce omnibus rebus consideratis, tum denique id...* Hor. Ep. I 17, 2, *quo tandem pacto...* On *iam* in this same usage, see Munro, on Lucr. I 600, 613, II 314, 426; add, II 974, and Virg. Aen. v 179, *iam senior*, VI 304, VII 46, 735.

Similarly in a negative sentence, οὐπω sometimes introduces the notion of time in estimating the amount or degree, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 a 11, τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι οὐπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. Ib. 23, ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὐπω. Ib. b 24, οὐ μέντοι πῶ ἄδικοι—in the two former cases the unjust habit of mind is distinguished as 'not yet amounting to' the actual crime or unjust act; and in the third case this distinction is applied to the ἀμάρτημα, which, though a wrong in itself, has not yet reached the stage or degree of the vice, confirmed evil habit, of ἀδικία—also VI 10, 1142 b 14, αὕτη γὰρ οὐπω φάσις. Ib. 25, οὐδ' αὕτη πῶ εὐβουλία, and 28.

So also οὐκέτι, 'no longer; not as before; not, now that we have reached this point'. Pol. v (VIII) 3, 1338 a 6. Rhet. I 2, 21, ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχη ἀρχαῖς οὐκέτι διαλεκτικῇ οὐδὲ ῥητορικῇ, II 24, 3, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη κ.τ.λ. Ib. II 9, 3. de gen. et corr. I 2, 3, 315 b 3, πῶς δὲ τοῦτο οὐκέτι, Hist. Anim. I 6, 3, 490 b 16, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ζῴων οὐκέτι τὰ γένη μέγαλα, Ib. v 1 7, 539 a 30, τὰ δὲ θηλία μὲν ἐστίν, ἄρρενα δ' οὐκέτι. Dem. de F. Leg. § 80, ὅν δ' ἂν αὐτοὶ λάβητε μηκέτ' ἐκείνοις περὶ τούτου προστάττετε. Plat. Gorg. 503 A, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς. Protag. 312 E. Xen. Oecon. 3. 1. Buttm. ad Mid. 13 a p. 528, 'οὐκέτι proprie valet non ut antea, hinc non ut alias, non item, non iam.'

συνήρῃται] (Bekker and Spengel. Alii συνήρῃται) 'with whom are connected...' In πρὸς οὐς, πρὸς expresses a mere general reference, 'with respect to whom', 'in whose case'; and συνήρῃται 'are often taken into, embraced in, the account', σύν, together with their proper business, the mere facts of the case and the proof of them. I can find no sufficient authority for συναρπεῖν in this sense; the nearest approach to it is in Plat. Phaedr. 249 B, *eis ἐν λογισμῷ συναρπύμενον*, but even this is something different. Vater makes a similar observation. The interpretation also of πρὸς is certainly rather strained. Probably συνήρῃται is right.

θεωρεῖν ἰκανῶς τὸ ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει  
8 τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων,  
ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δεῖ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖν κύριον τὸν  
κριτὴν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι,  
ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι,  
ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν· οὐ γὰρ  
9 δυνατόν ταῦτα τὸν νομοθέτην προῖδεῖν. εἰ δὴ  
ταυθ' οὕτως ἔχει, φανερόν ὅτι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγ-  
ματος τεχνολογοῦσιν ὅσοι τᾶλλα διορίζουσιν, οἷον  
τί δεῖ τὸ προοίμιον ἢ τὴν διήγησιν ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν  
ἄλλων ἕκαστον μορίων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο  
πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα

τὸ ἀληθές] No one is a fair judge, where his own passions or interests are concerned. Gaisford quotes appositely, Pol. III 16, 1287 *a ult.* ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονται γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς οἱ λατοὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους λατρούς, καὶ οἱ παιδο-  
τρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές διὰ τὸ κρί-  
νειν περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες.

ἐπισκοτεῖν] 'to bring darkness, throw a shadow over, overshadow'.  
Dem. c. Mid. 565, 25, οἰκίαν ὑποκόμην ἐν Ἑλευσίῃ τοσαύτην ὥστε πᾶσιν  
ἐπισκοτεῖν τοῖς ἐν τῇ τόπῳ. Infr. III 3, 3. Plat. Euthyd. 274, ὁ Εὐθύδημος  
ἐπισκοτεῖ τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θέας: an odd and unexplained use of this  
word. It seems to mean that Euthydemus, by bending forward and getting  
in the way, obscured or darkened Ctesippus—not however in the ordinary  
sense of the word, but in that of intercepting the object, and so darkening  
by throwing a cloud over, and thereby depriving him of his view (τῆς θέας  
gen. of deprivation, implied in the verb).

In a metaphorical sense it occurs in Dem. Olynth. B 23, 26, Isocr.  
ad Dem. § 6, and in several fragments of the Comic Poets, (Ind. ad  
Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* Vol. v Pt. 1 p. 393,) for instance, Eubul. incert.  
Fr. 11 (Mein. III 267) τὸν οἶνον τῷ φρονεῖν ἐπισκοτεῖν; and in other  
authors. See also Victorius: and Gaisford in not. var. p. 18.

§ 9. ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος] ἔξω for ἐκτός. Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 128.

τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν] infra § 11; comp. de Anima I 3,  
406<sup>b</sup> 26 καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος (Plato, in the Timaeus) φυσιολογεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν  
τὸ σῶμα.

διορίζειν] to separate by a limit or boundary line. Herodot. IV 42  
διορισμάτων Ἀσίην τε καὶ Λιβύην. Hence to separate a thing from others, to  
mark off as a special province or domain, and so of 'the definition', which  
includes all that is essential to, or characteristic of, the thing defined, and  
excludes everything else. The word here of course means something  
more than a bare definition; it expresses the limitation or 'determination'  
of the proper contents of the προοίμιον.

ποιήσωσιν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν  
δεικνύουσιν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅθεν ἂν τις γένοιτο  
 10 ἐνθυμηματικός· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης  
μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικά καὶ δικανικά, καὶ καλ-  
λίονος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγμα-

P. 3.

ἐντεγνοὶ πίστεις] are the regular systematic proofs by enthymeme and example, the σῶμα τῆς πίστεως § 3, and opposed here, not merely to the ἀτεγνοὶ πίστεις of c. 15, the witnesses, documents, torture, oaths and such like, which we do not *invent*, but find ready to our hand to be employed in the support of our case; but also to the irregular appeals to the feelings (πάθος), and to evidence from character (ἥθος).

§ 10. πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας] πραγματείας, here applied to the study and practice of one of the departments of Rhetoric; see on § 3—πολιτικωτέρας: There are three possible senses of this word, firstly, 'more worthy of, more becoming to, a citizen', more agreeable to the position and duties of a citizen, 'better and worthier'; secondly, 'more suitable to a public man, statesman, or politician', larger, more comprehensive, and liberal; as opposed to the comparatively trifling and petty occupations of private citizens: thirdly, more public and common, wider, more general; κοινόν, as opposed to ἴδιον and οἰκίον: the second seems to be the most appropriate here, and so I have rendered it in the paraphrase. [p. 141 of the Introduction: "nobler and larger and more liberal (or 'statesmanlike', or 'more worthy of a citizen',) *vid. not. ad loc.*"]

μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικά καὶ δικανικά] The third kind of Rhetoric, τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν, is here omitted, but afterwards supplied, c. 3 § 1.

τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα] 'The most general expression which the Athenians have for a contract is συναλλάγμα, συνθήκη, συμβόλαιον.' Meier und Schömann *der Attische Process* p. 494. The difference usually taken between συνθήκη and συναλλάγμα appears in Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πρᾶτται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων (ordinary dealings, buying and selling and such like transactions); καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας (in the way of, by contracts): we are concerned here only with the first and third of these, συναλλάγμα and συμβόλαιον.

The ordinary signification of both of these is a contract, or covenant, or mutual agreement, or interchange (συναλλάγμα), between two or more parties. They are thence extended to any dealings, especially business transactions, or even any circumstances of ordinary intercourse between man and man, and more particularly any of those which may give rise to a suit at law. These are ἴδια συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα: see Dem. de Cor. p. 298 § 210, τὰ τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίου συμβόλαια, with Disson's note: Isocr. Paneg. §§ 11, 78. π. ἀντιδ. §§ 3, 38, 40, 42, 79 τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ συμβόλαια τὰ γιγνόμενα πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς. § 309 ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς περὶ τῶν συμβολαίων. The former of these two seems to refer rather to dealings in general, the second to special contracts. Areop. §§ 33, 34. Arist. Eth. N. II 1, 1103 b 15 πρᾶττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γιγνόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοί. Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πρᾶτται πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια κατὰ τὰς συν-

τείας ούσης ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα, περὶ μὲν ἐκείνης οὐδὲν λέγουσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν, ὅτι ἥττον ἐστὶ πρὸ ἔργου τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς καὶ ἥττον ἐστὶ κακοῦργον ἢ δημηγορία δικο-

θήκας. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2 Oxf.) § 2 ταῖς περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια δικαιολογίαις.

That the meaning of the terms is not confined to contracts proper, is plain also from Eth. N. v 1131 a 2. (This passage is quoted at length on I 15, 22.) τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια (the 'voluntary' being illustrated by buying and selling, lending and borrowing, whereas 'involuntary' are all of them crimes, λαθραῖα or βίαια: all of them cases in which the breach of the supposed contract, private or public, entitles the aggrieved party to a legal remedy). Opposed to these ἴδια συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα are the public (κοινά) international commercial treaties, σύμβολα. See further on σύμβολα, note on c. 4 § 11.

συμβόλαια is also employed in a wider and more general sense, as Rhet. ad Alex. c. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2 περὶ τῶν πρὸς ἄλλας πόλεις συμμαχιῶν καὶ συμβολαίων. Other examples may be found in Plat. Gorg. 484 D ἔπειροι τῶν λόγων οἷς δὲ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς ξυμβολαίοις. Rep. I 333 A τί δὲ δῆ; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρεῖαν ἢ κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρῆσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, ὧς Σώκρατες. Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἢ τι ἄλλο; κοινωνήματα δῆτα, and several others in Ast's Lexicon. Arist. Polit. IV (VI) 16, 1300 b 22, and 32 περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμαῖα καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρὰ πλείονος. Ib. 15 ult. 1300 b 12, ἀρχὴ ἢ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν συμβολαίων (dealings) κυρία. Comp. c. 8 sub init. ἀρχὴ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια. VI (VII) 2, 1317 b 27, III 13, 1283 b 30, and elsewhere.

πρὸ ἔργου] 'to the purpose'; anything 'for', or 'in favour of', and therefore 'likely to promote', any 'work' we may have in hand; and hence generally 'serviceable' or 'profitable' to any purposes. πρὸ ἔργου (which also occurs *infra* I 4 §§ 3, 7) is the Aristotelian mode of writing what in Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, and indeed ordinary Greek in general, appears as προύργου. Some examples in Fritzsche ad Eth. Eud. A 3, 1215 a 8.

κακοῦργον] As a special variety of the general conception of dishonesty, fraud, knavery, this adjective is applied in a peculiar sense to sophistical reasoning. Rhet. III 2, 7 τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι, παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακοῦργεῖ. Topic. 4 11, 172 b 21. Plat. Gorg. 483 A. Dem. Lept. 491. Stallb. ad Rep. I 338 D. Similarly συκοφαντεῖν is used for cheating in argument, bringing fallacious objections, Top. 2, 157 a 32. I (de Soph. El.) 15, 174 b 9. Both of them represent the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning. Plat. Rep. 341 B πρὸς ταῦτα κακοῦργεῖ καὶ συκοφαντεῖ.

A debate in a political assembly, which turns upon questions of public and national concern (κοινότερον), in which accordingly the audience, who

λογίας, ὅτι κοινότερον. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κριτὴς περὶ οἰκείων κρίνει, ὥστ' οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεῖ πλὴν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς φησὶν ὁ συμβουλευών· ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικανικοῖς οὐχ ἱκανὸν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν ἀκροατὴν· περὶ ἄλλοτρίων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν σκοπούμενοι καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἀκροώμενοι διδόασιν τοῖς ἀμφισβη-  
~~τοῖς~~ ~~ἀκροώμενοις~~

are all members of it, have a strong personal interest, and are therefore impatient of anything that would divert them from the direct proof of the expediency or in expediency of the policy recommended or condemned, affords much less room for these deceptive arts *ad captandum*, τὰ ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος, than the practice of the law-courts, where the judges who decide the case are usually not personally interested in the issue, and the pleader has therefore to *create* an interest in them by these irregular methods: this is on the principle so pithily stated by the Corinthian envoys, Thuc. I 120, 3 κακοὺς κριτὰς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι. (This is a more correct mode of stating the argument than that adopted in the paraphrase, Introd. p. 141.)

This contrast of the two kinds of audiences, in respect of their several dispositions to keep the speakers to the point, does not hold of our own law-courts and parliaments. The Athenian dicasts, careless, ignorant, and unprofessional, selected at random from the population of the city, with their sense of responsibility diminished or destroyed by the large number of those who had to decide, might very likely be indifferent to the issue of the case before them, and require a stimulus to their attention from the parties immediately concerned: but this is not true of the *professional* judges of our courts, who regard the right decision of the case as a business and a duty.

ὁ κριτὴς] applied to the ἐκκλησιαστὴς in the *general* sense of 'judge' or 'critic' of the question or arguments employed; supr. § 7. Introd. p. 137, note 1.

ἀναλαβεῖν] is to 'bring back', 'recover'; hence to 'gain over', 'conciliate'; as ἀνά in ἀναπείθειν, ἀναδιδάσκειν, ἀναδιδόναι, ἀναδέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ. 'Membranae Balliolenses, *captare*: Muretus, *accurare*, *excipere*: Portus, *reficere*, *recreate*, ἡ μεταφορὰ ἀβ αegrotis; *vel conciliare*. Omnes hae notiones a primaria *resumendi*, *ad se recipiendi*, facile deducuntur.' Gaisford. The order is, (1) to 'get or bring back'; thence, (2) to 'bring back into the proper and normal state', as of 'recovery' from a disease—the notion of something as *due* being again implied as in ἀποδιδόναι, note on § 7—and thence again, (3) as here, to 'restore', as it were, the audience to their proper state of mind, conciliate them to your views and interests. Hence, lastly, the senses of *reparare*, *reficere*, *recreate*, and the like; abundantly illustrated in Steph. *Thes.* ed. Did. Vol. II pp. 431—2.

διδόασιν] (ἐαυτοὺς) *sece dant*, 'lend themselves', ὁ δ' ἡδονὴ δούς, Eur. Phoen. 21. Valck. *Diatr.* p. 233. And so, many of its compounds,

τούσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κρίνουσιν. διὸ καὶ πολλαχοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἶπομεν, ὁ νόμος κωλύει λέγειν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος. ἐκεῖ δ' αὐτοὶ οἱ κριταὶ τοῦτο τηροῦσιν  
 11 ἱκανῶς. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξις τις (τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀποδεδειχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν), ἔστι δ' ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ ἐνθύμημα, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ὡς εἶπεν ἀπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς τις, περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ὁμοίως ἅπαντος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστίν

ἐκιδιδόναι, ἐκιδιδόναι, ἐπιδιδόναι, ἀποδιδόναι, διαδιδόναι, ὑποδιδόναι, παραδιδόναι, (ἡδονῇ παραδούς, Pl. Phaedr. 250 D), προδιδόναι (Herod. *bis*), ἐκιδιδόναι (Herod.). The process is the usual one by which transitive verbs become intransitive, viz. by the ellipse of the reflexive pronoun.

§ 11. ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξις τις] ἀπόδειξις, in its strict, proper, and highest senses, is exact scientific demonstrative proof, by syllogism, leading from and to universal and necessary conclusions. And therefore, properly speaking, παραπλήσιον φαίνεται μαθηματικῷ τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν, Eth. Nic. I 1. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς ἐπιστημονικός, Anal. Post. I 2, 71 b 18. ἐξ ἀναγκαίων ἄρα συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, c. 4, 73 a 24. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς δεικτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῆς, Ib. c 24, 85 b 23. ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ᾗ, ἡ ἐκ τοιούτων ἂ διὰ τινων πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφεν, Topic. A 1, 100 a 27. Waitz, *Comm. ad Anal. Post.* Vol. II p. 293 seq. πίστις therefore, whose premisses and conclusions are never more than 'probable', cannot properly be said to be 'a kind of demonstration'. It resembles it however, and may be regarded as a 'sort of demonstration' in this; that probable proof often produces a belief or conviction as strong and certain as that which follows from demonstration. It is therefore to be understood here, as often elsewhere, as a general term including proof of every kind. A similar misapplication of ἀπόδειξις to rhetorical proof is found in Rhet. II 1, 2, and II 20, 9. So συλλογίζεσθαι, of reasoning, inference, conclusion in general; Rhet. I 6 § 17, 10 § 1, II § 23 and II 22 § 4, where συλλογισμοὶ stands for 'Enthymemes'; Poet. 4, 5, συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον. Phys. II 1, 193 a 7, συλλογίσαιτο γὰρ ἂν τις ἐκ γενετῆς ὦν τυφλὸς περὶ χρωμάτων. Similarly, ἀποδεικτικὸς of a rhetorical argument or speech, Rhet. II 1, 2, πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὄργᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς (conclusive) ἦ καὶ πιστός. A still more remarkable example of this looseness of expression occurs I 4, 5, where Dialectics is called ἡ ἀναλυτικὴ ἐπιστήμη. The rhetorical enthymeme, again, 'a kind of ἀπόδειξις', is subsequently and this time correctly, called κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων. See Introd. p. 92.

τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς τις]. On the enthymeme, Introd. p. 101—105. On περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ἰδεῖν, and on μέρους τινός, Introd. p. 143, note.



ιδεῖν, ἢ αὐτῆς ὅλης ἢ μέρους τινός, δῆλον<sup>1</sup> ὅτι ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτο δυνάμενος θεωρεῖν, ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός, οὗτος καὶ ἐνθυμηματικὸς ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, προσλαβὼν περὶ ποῖά τ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφορὰς πρὸς τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμούς· τό τε γὰρ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ

<sup>1</sup> δῆλον δ' ὅτι

δῆλον δέ] δέ, omitted by one MS, and rejected by Buhle, Schrader, Bekker, and Spengel, is retained and defended by Victorius and Vater. It is justified not only by the common usage of the Greek language (see Buttm. Exc. XII on Dem. c. Mid. *de particula δέ in apodosis*, p. 150; the passages which he thus quotes might be multiplied indefinitely), but also by the special usage of Aristotle himself. Waitz, on Organ. I 7 δ 1, Vol. I p. 335, comp. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 1 § 4, Vol. II p. 5, who quotes examples from Aristotle, to which add Rhet. I 4 § 2, I 10 § 4, I 11 §§ 6 and 11, II 25 § 10, an exact parallel, the protasis here also commencing with ἐπεὶ. Similarly Pol. VII (IV) 13 init. ἐπεὶ δὲ δυν' ἐστὶν (a long parenthesis of several clauses intervenes, and the apodosis begins with) δέ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 3, 406 a 4 and 10. Phys. VI 8, 2, εἰ τὸ μὲν... ἵστασθαι δέ. See also Stallb. on Phædo 78 C. The particle is thus used in the apodosis generally, not always, as a repetition of a preceding δέ, and in these cases may be translated by "I say". It repeats in order to recal the attention to the connexion of the apodosis with the foregoing protasis, which might be overlooked after a long parenthesis: in cases where this would not be necessary, it may be accounted for by the influence of habit or association. Of the many illustrative passages I had collected from other writers as well as Aristotle, I will content myself with citing two or three apposite ones from Thucydides. I 11, sub init., ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν, (parenthesis) φαίνονται δέ κ.τ.λ. I 18 init., ἐπειδὴ δέ (ten lines) μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατὰλυσιν κ.τ.λ. II 65, ἐπεὶ τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοῦς τὴν δύναμιν. IV 132, ὁ δὲ Περδικκας κ.τ.λ. and VIII 29 (three of these are referred to by Arnold, note 2 on I 11). Paley on Aesch. P. V. 952, 994, 2nd ed. gives some instances from Aeschylus. I may also add Plat. Phædo 78 C, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μήδεποτε κατὰ ταῦτά, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ξύνθετα. A good example may be found in Phædo 87 A, B, δοὺς δέ—εἰ δὲ τοῦτο...

τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμούς] Waitz on Anal. Post. I 21, 82 b 35, p. 353, 'opponitur τῷ λογικῷ τὸ ἀναλυτικῶς 84 a 8, 86 a 22, 88 a 19, accurata demonstratio, quae veris ipsius rei principiis nititur, ei quae probabili quadam ratione contenta est....Unde fit ut λογικόν idem fere sit quod διαλεκτικόν.' And this is its usual signification... 'Quamquam' (he adds, referring to the present passage) '1355 a 13, quum λογικὸς συλλογισμὸς et hic et in iis quæ proxime sequuntur opponatur rhetorico syllogismo (ἐνθυμήματι), veram demonstrationem significare videatur.' To the same effect is what follows, where τὸ ἀληθές exact truth and knowledge, scientific certainty, is represented as the object of the λογικοὶ συλλογισμοί, and τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ (probability, τὰ ἔνδοξα, which has only a resemblance to truth),

ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμειος ἰδεῖν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς πεφύκασιν ἱκανῶς καὶ τὰ πλείω τυγχάνουσι τῆς ἀληθείας· διὸ πρὸς τὰ ἐνδοξα στοχαστικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνολογοῦσι, καὶ διότι μᾶλλον ἀπονενεύκασι πρὸς

as the object of the enthymeme. And as both are apprehended by the same faculty, this faculty will be cultivated by the study and exercise of both alike, and the processes that lead to them, syllogism and enthymeme: and therefore the knowledge of the materials and modes of constructing syllogisms, and the practical application of them, equally in all their varieties, demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical (enthymeme), are serviceable to the rhetorician as a training and preparation for the practice of his art.

πρὸς τὰ ἐνδοξα] 'things probable, matters of opinion, not certainty'; the materials, objects, and results of Rhetoric, as of Dialectics. Top. A 10, 104 a 8, ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἐνδοξος, κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 1, 100 b 21, ἐνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκούντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τοῖς τοῖς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. Cic. de Orat. I 23, 108, *sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem popularemque sensum accommodata omnia genera huius forensis nostrae dictionis*.

διότι] 'that', = ὅτι. The earliest instance of this use of διότι appears to be in Herod. II 50. It occurs in Xenophon (add Symp. I 11, to the examples in Sturz's Lexicon), Plato, Ep. I 309 D, Dem. de Cor. §§ 155, 167, 184, but each time in a document. Isocr. Paneg. § 48, Phil. § 1, Archid. § 24, Plat. § 23, Antid. §§ 133, 263. π. τοῦ ζεύγους § 43, πρὸς Καλλίμαχον §§ 1, 31. (Some of these referring to Isocrates are derived from Benseler's note, Praef. p. v note 4, who has the following remark, from Baiter on Paneg. § 48, 'Isocrates ubicunque διότι usurpavit, id fecisse videtur hiatus evitandi causa' [see esp. Isocr. Lochit. § 7, where ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι is followed by καὶ διότι...S.]. It is found several times in the Rhet. ad Alex. as c. 17 p. 1432 a 16, c. 30 p. 1437 a 19, and elsewhere, but it is in Aristotle that it first becomes common; too common to need further illustration. See however Waitz on Anal. Pr. 58 b 7, *Comm.* I p. 495. For διότι = ὅτι, Steph. Thes. Vol. II 1544 cites Crato. Com. ap. Athen. 4, p. 173 C, πάντων ἀκούων διότι παρασιτῶ τόπος οὗτος τρία μόνον ἀγαθὰ κεκτηῖσθαι δοκεῖ. Its ordinary sense is 'because'.

It has also a third signification, 'why'; the indirect interrogative, corresponding to the direct, διὰ τί, as ὅπως to πῶς, ὅποτε to πότε, ὅσος to πόσος, ὅπου to ποῦ, &c. In this sense it occurs in Plato, Phaedo 100 C, (four other examples in Ast's Lex.), Xen. Cyrop. VIII 4, 7, ἢ καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀνείπειν διότι; Demosth. Phil. A 46, 10; Isocr. Archid. § 16, and in Aristotle, Rhet. II 23, 24, (where it is explained by the preceding τὴν αἰτίαν), Polit. IV (VI) 11, 1296 a 22. Met. A 1, 981 a 29, where again it is explained by τὴν αἰτίαν). περὶ ἀναπνεύσεως 14, ult. and elsewhere, e.g. Ar. de

12 τὸ δικολογεῖν, φανερόν· χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ  
διὰ τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τ' ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια  
τῶν ἐναντιῶν, ὥστε εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσήκον αἰ  
κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι· τοῦτο

p. 4.

Anima II 8, 12, 421 a 4, φανερόν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθὺς ἄφωνοι, οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. In Rhet. III 11, 14, it is explained by τὸ αἶτιον. Cf. Amphis Dith. Fragm. I ap. Meineke, *Comm. Fragm.* III 306; B. διὰ τί δ' οὐκ ἄγεις εἰς τὸν ὄχλον αὐτό; A. διότι φυλὴν περιμένω.

With διότι 'that', compare οὐνεκα and ὁθούνεκα in Sophocles, as Philoct. 634, the *reason*, the *what for*, passes into a mere statement of fact; *because*, into *that*. See Ellendt, *Lex. Soph. ὁθούνεκα*.

ἀπονεύειν, to bend the head away from something else and turn the attention to a particular object; hence, to incline to, fix the attention upon: ἀπό as in ἀποβλέπειν, (supr. § 1). Plat. Theaet. 165 A, ἐκ τῶν ψυχῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀπενεύσαμεν. In Plat. Legg. VII 815 A, ἔκνευσας πληγῶν καὶ βολῶν, is *declinatio*, the bending of the head aside to avoid a blow. (In Eur. Iph. T. 1186 v. 1155 Herm. σὺ δ' εἰς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ' ἐξένευσας εἰκότως, ἐξένευσας is of doubtful interpretation. Hermann, followed by Paley, derives it from ἐκνεῖν *evadere*, referring to Valckenaer on Hippol. 469, and 822. It seems however at least equally probable that the aorist belongs to ἐκνεύειν *abnuere*, opposed to ἐπινεύειν *appnuere*, and that the meaning of the line is "It was natural, or reasonable, for thee to decline, reject, their offer, εἰς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ', looking to, in respect of, in regard of, thy duty to the goddess". This sense of the word seems to be more in conformity with what precedes; and it occurs again in line 1330 Dind., with the same sense and derivation, ἐξένευσ' ἀποστήνηαι, beckoned us off, "gave us a sign to stand aloof".)

§ 12. χρήσιμος—ἐντεύξεως] This passage is cited by Dionysius, *Epist. ad Amm.* I c. 6. He reads διὰ γε for διὰ τε, and διδασκαλία for διδασκαλίας (six lines below).

On the defence of Rhetoric, compare Quint. *Inst. Orat.* II 17, 26, seq. (in II 16 he sums up the arguments against the use of it), Isocr. *ἀντιδ.* § 251 seq. and Id. Nicocles, §§ 1—9, also Gorgias, in Plato's dialogue, c. XI 456 A—457 C. On the true office and functions of the orator, Cic. *de Orat.* I 46, 202—a striking passage. Id. *de Invent.* I 3 and 4.

διὰ τε] τε is answered by the (irregular) correlative δὲ in ἔτι δὲ at the beginning of the next sentence. de Anima II 4, 7, 416 a 2—6, οὕτε (parenth.)...πρὸς δὲ τοῖσι.

ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι] The argument of this clause, χρήσιμος δὲ—ἐπιτιμήσεως, is summed up in two lines of Euripides, Alex. Fragm. 55 (12) Dind. ἀγλωσσία δὲ πολλάκις ληφθεὶς ἀνὴρ | δίκαια λέξας ἦσσαν εὐγλώσσου φέρει. It is to the effect, that truth and right having a natural superiority over falsehood and wrong, the proper use of Rhetoric is to enable them to assert and enforce that superiority; to bring truth to light, and detect and expose deceit and sophistry. If the opposites of truth and right do ever prevail over these, it must be the fault of the parties concerned themselves, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι, who have failed to avail themselves

δ' ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ' εἰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχομεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥάδιον ἀπ' ἐκείνης πείσαι λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως. ἔτι δὲ

of this powerful instrument. Rhetoric is therefore 'corrective' or 'remedial' of the perversion of truth and right to which legal decisions are always more or less liable from misrepresentation of facts, fallacious arguments, or the blinding of the judgment by appeals to the feelings.

According to this translation of δι' αὐτῶν, it is correctly and logically said that it is a consequence (ὥστε) of the natural superiority of truth and right to their opposites, that if those who have truth and right on their side are defeated, their defeat must be due to themselves, to their own neglect of Rhetoric, which would have enabled them to enforce this their natural superiority. Whereas if we follow Victorius (and Spengel who assents to his view, *Arist. Ars Rhet.* Vol. II p. 26) in explaining δι' αὐτῶν by δι' ἐναντίων, ὥστε becomes incorrect or meaningless: for there is neither truth nor sense in saying that it follows from the natural superiority of truth and justice that these, in the case of a wrong judgment, are defeated by their opposites; and not only so, but with this interpretation ἀνάγκη is also wrong—the consequence, if there be one, is certainly not necessary—and δι' αὐτῶν should be ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

In the *Introd.* p. 144 note, I have referred to Waitz's note on *Anal. Pr.* 55 a 14, who gives examples of αὐτῶν &c. for the reflexive αὐτῶν &c. The usage is however so constant in Aristotle as hardly to need illustration. A good example is *de Anima* II 5, 6, 417 b 24, διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὅπῃ βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. *Rhet.* I 4, 9, ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, 'in their own power'.

πρὸς ἐνίους] 'in dealing with some'.

διδασκαλίας] *de Soph. El.* c. 2, 161 b 1, quoted in *Introd.* p. 75. Genuine and complete 'instruction' by demonstrative proofs. *Top.* A c. 14, 105 b 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ' ἀλήθειαν (i.e. δι' ἀποδείξεως) περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς (and therefore also ῥητορικῶς) πρὸς δόξαν.

ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος] ἐπιστήμη defined ἕξι ἀποδεικτικῇ, *Eth. Nic.* VI 3. τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ... ἡ δὲ δόξα ἀβέβαιον.

ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς] *A* 2 101 a 30.

τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως] *Topic.* u. s. *Metaph.* Γ 5, 1009 a 17, ἔστι δ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς πάντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοὺς δεόνται, οἱ δὲ βίας, where in line 20, ἀπάντησις is substituted for ἐντεύξις. *Isocr.* πρὸς Δημόνικον § 20, τὰς ἐντεύξεις μὴ ποιῶν (hold conversation, intercourse) πικρὰς τοῖς αὐτοῖς. *Alex. ad Top.* I. c. ἐντεύξεις λέγει τὰς

τάναντία δει δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δει τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τάναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ρητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν ὁμοίως γὰρ εἰσιν ἀμφότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τάληθῇ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχροὺς μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὁ μᾶλλον ἰδίον ἐστίν P. 1355 δ.

13 ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας. εἰ δ' ὅτι μεγάλα

πρὸς πολλοὺς συνουσίας, οἷς δει μὲν ἐντυχᾶν κοινωνικοὺς ὄντας καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ ἐντυχᾶν ὠφελίμως.

ἐντυχία is therefore a lighting upon, or, meeting; hence a meeting which leads to a 'conversation'; or, as arising casually out of that, a dialectical 'encounter'.

ἔτι δὲ τάναντία—λύειν ἔχωμεν] de Soph. El. 1, 165 a 24, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἐν πρὸς ἐν εἰπεῖν ἔργον περὶ ἑκάστον τοῦ εἰδότες ἀψευδεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν οἶδε, τὸν δὲ ψευδόμενον ἐμφανίζειν δύνασθαι, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 19 (20) 2, τὰ μὲν οὖν αἰτήματα ταῦτά ἐστι, διεκλόμεθα δ' αὐτῶν τὰς διαφοράς, ἵν' εἰδότες τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον χρώμεθα κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν, καὶ μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ ἐναντίοι ἀδικόν τι αἰτοῦντες τοὺς δικάζοντας.

πῶς ἔχει] 'the true state of the case' (how things really are).

λύειν] solvere, diluere, 'to loose, untie, the knot of a fallacy', or difficulty; and so to 'solve' as a problem. ἡ γὰρ ὑπερὸν εὐπορία λύσις τῶν προτέρων ἀπορουμένων ἐστὶ, λύειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν Met. B 1, 995 a 28. λύσις opposed to δέσις, Poet. c. 18, §§ 1, 2. On λύσις and λύειν see Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note.

τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν—τῶν ἐναντίων] Introd. p. 78.

τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα] Comp. I 2, 1, subiecta materies ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὄλη Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 12. τὸ ὑποκείμενον, 'the logical subject', of which other things are 'predicated', κατηγορεῖται. See Waitz, *Comm. ad Organ.* I a 20, Vol. I p. 274. Trendel. *El. Log. Ar.* § 1, note p. 52. Id. *Categorienlehre* § 10, p. 53 seq. Bonitz ad Met. Z 3, 1028 b 36.

τῷ σώματι μὲν...λόγῳ δέ] On this use of μὲν and δέ, Buttm. *Gr. Gr.* (Engl. Transl.) § 149, p. 396. Id. not. on Mid. § 7 a, 49 e, 56 d.

§ 13. εἰ δ' ὅτι μέγιστα βλάψειν ἂν (φῆσει τις κ.τ.λ.) On the abuse of arts and natural gifts, and the answers to the argument from the abuse to the use of them, see Quint. Inst. Orat. II 16, 5, Isocr. *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως*

βλάψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος ὑγείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· τούτοις γὰρ ἂν τις ὠφελήσκειε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως.

- 14 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἐνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου ἢ ῥητορικῆ, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἢ διαλεκτικῆ, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πείσαι

§ 252, Plato, Gorg. u. s., Bacon, *Nov. Org.* p 129. Comp. Eth. Nic. III 3 τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάσιν ἔχει καὶ τάχα διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν.

τοῦτό γε κοινόν] Ovid. Trist. II 266, *Nil prodest quod non laedere possit idem.* Schrader.

πλὴν ἀρετῆς] Gaisford refers in illustration to Archytas ap. Stob. I p. 15. Xen. Cyrop. IV 1, 15. Pl. Meno, 87 E and Isocr. Nicocles, init.

§ 14. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου ἢ ῥητ., ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἢ διαλεκτικῆ] See note and reff. on § 1 p. 3.

οὐ τὸ πείσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ.] on Aristotle's alteration and improvement of the original definition of Rhetoric by the Sophistical school of Rhetoricians, see *Introd.* p. 32 seq.

Non dubium est quin verba illa dirigantur adversus id quod apud Platonem ait Gorgias, p. 453 A, τὴν ῥητορικὴν πειθοῦς δημιουργὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. Muretus. Cicero's definition follows that of Aristotle, de Orat. I 61, 260, *accommodate ad persuadendum posse dicere.*

The notion of art, or proceeding by rule of art, consists not in the result, or success of the process, which is often unattainable, but in the correctness of the method followed. Top. Z 12, 149 b 25. τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ ὁ τοῦ κλέπτου ὁρος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ ῥήτωρ μὲν ὁ δυνάμενος τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῳ πιθανὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπειν, κλέπτης δ' ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων. δηλον γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐκάτερος ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ῥήτωρ ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς κλέπτης ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν. The art of doing anything is distinguished from the mere fact that the thing is done (as accidentally for instance), by the intention of the agent systematically carried out, but not necessarily realised in success. Comp. de Anima III 9, 8, καὶ ὅπως δὲ ὁρώμεν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἱατρικὴν οὐκ ἴσται, ὡς ἑτέρου τινος κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην (of the successful result of the artistic process), ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 b 12.

Topic. A 3, ἔχομεν δὲ τελείως τὴν μέθοδον, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἱατρικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν ἢ προαιρουμένα. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει, οὔθ' ὁ ἱατρικὸς ὑγιᾶσει. ἀλλ' ἐὰν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων μηδὲν παρὰ τὴν ἱκανὴν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν. Comp. Top. E c. 7, 136 b 57, and 137 a 5.

ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ  
 περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις  
 πάσαις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἱατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιαῖ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ  
 μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστι  
 γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως  
 θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς  
 τό τε πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἰδεῖν πιθανόν, p. 5.  
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συλλογισμὸν τε καὶ  
 φαινόμενον συλλογισμὸν. ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ  
 ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει· πλὴν ἐνταῦθα  
 μὲν ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁ δὲ κατὰ  
 τὴν προαίρεσιν ῥήτωρ, ἐκεῖ δὲ σοφιστῆς μὲν κατὰ  
 τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρε-  
 σιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. περὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἤδη  
 τῆς μεθόδου πειρώμεθα λέγειν, πῶς τε καὶ ἐκ τίνων  
 δυνησόμεθα τυγχάνειν τῶν προκειμένων. πάλιν οὖν  
 οἷον ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ὀρισάμενοι αὐτὴν τίς ἐστι, λέγωμεν  
 τὰ λοιπά.

Quint. II 17, 23 seq. Cic. de Inventione I 5, 6. Bacon, *Adv. of learning*, Bk. II x 2. 'For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause. The master in the ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage.'

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις (φανερὸν) ὅτι—κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν] The explanation and connexion are given in the Paraphrase, Introd. p. 148, and note 3.

Comp. Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ...ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῇ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαίρεσει, and Bonitz' note. Top. Δ 5, 126 a 35, πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγονται. Z 12, 149 b 29 u.s. οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν. Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 b 15, οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει. Rhet. I 13, 10.

πλὴν] 'except that,—only', a reservation. Soph. Oed. Col. 1639 (Herm.), Trach. 41, Arist. Equit. 1397, Dem. de Cor. p. 281 init., Arist. An. Pr. II 27, 70 a 29, Top. Β 8, 114 a 8, Γ 4, 119 b 22, Θ 3, 158 b 37; I (de Soph. El.) c. 4, 166 a 4, Eth. N. IV 12, 1126 b 27, Polit. II 6, 1266 a 16, Rhet. I 12, 10.

μεθόδου] Note on ὁδοποιεῖν, § 2.

πάλιν οὖν—λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά] 'Let us then take as it were a fresh start, and so first define it, and then proceed to the rest'.

Ι ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ CHAP. II.  
θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδε-  
 μιᾶς ἐτέρας ἐστὶ τέχνης ἔργον· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων  
 ἐκάστη περὶ τὸ αὐτῇ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι διδασκαλική  
 καὶ πειστική, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσερὸν  
 καὶ γεωμετρία περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς  
 μεγέθεσι καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμόν, ὁμοίως δὲ  
 καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· ἡ δὲ  
 ῥητορικὴ περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος ὡς εἰπεῖν δοκεῖ δύνασθαι

## CHAP. II.

§ 1. On this definition of Rhetoric, see Intro. pp. 33—4; and note on  
 paraphrase, p. 149: on the other current definitions of it, Ib. pp. 27—36.  
 On Rhetoric as a δύναμις, Ib. p. 14 seq.

ὑποκείμενον] on I 1, 12 p. 24 *supra*.

ὑγιεινόν] Three different senses of this word are distinguished, Top. A  
 15, 106 b 35, τὸ ὑγιεινὸν πλεοναχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὑγείας ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ φυλακτι-  
 κόν, τὸ δὲ σημαντικόν.

τὰ συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι] These are usually called *συμβε-  
 βηκότα καθ' αὐτά* in Aristotle's terminology, i. e. absolute, necessary conse-  
 quences (rather than accidents) of the essence or definition of a thing.  
 The ordinary *συμβεβηκότα* are *separable* accidents, qualities or properties,  
 which do *not* form part of this essence of the subject, or consequently  
 of its definition; with or without which the essence of the subject, (that  
 which constitutes its being, or makes it to be what it is,) remains the  
 same. The *συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτά* are distinguished from the ordinary  
*συμβεβηκότα* in this; that although they are not of the essence, and  
 therefore do not enter into the definition, still they are immediately de-  
 ducible from it, and *inseparable* from the subject, and are therefore the  
 proper objects of study. They are in fact identifiable with the *ἴδια* or  
*propria* of the five predicables. The *συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι* in  
 the text are accordingly 'the inseparable properties of magnitudes'; as  
 'the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles' is a  
 necessary property of the triangle, though not included in the definition,  
 which is 'a plane figure bounded by three straight lines': still the pro-  
 perty is deducible from the definition, and thus is inseparable from the  
 notion of it: the triangle cannot exist without this property, though it is  
 not of its essence, and therefore not part of the definition. This example  
 is given in de Anima I 1 § 8, 402 b 19. See the whole section. And again  
 de part. Anim. I 3, 10 *συμβεβηκός γάρ τι (καθ' αὐτὸ) τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δυσιν  
 ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν τὰς γωνίας.* See further in Trend. ad de Anima I 1, 1,  
*Comm.* p. 188 seq. Bonitz ad Metaph. Δ 30, 1025 a 30. Anal. Post.  
 I 7, 75 a 42, *ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν...τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὗ τὰ πάθη  
 καὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοῖ ἡ ἀπόδειξις...οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν  
 ἀπόδειξιν ἐφαρμόσαι ἐπὶ τὰ τοῖς μεγέθεσι συμβεβηκότα.*

On *πάθη* see Intro. p. 114.



θεωρεῖν τὸ πιθανόν. διὸ καὶ φαμεν αὐτὴν οὐ περὶ  
 2 τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμένον ἔχειν τὸ τεχνικόν. τῶν  
 δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν αἱ δ' ἔντεχνοι.  
 ἄτεχνα δὲ λέγω ὅσα μὴ δι' ἡμῶν πεπóρισται ἀλλὰ  
 προὔπηρχεν, οἷον μάρτυρες βάσανοι συγγραφαὶ καὶ  
 ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἔντεχνα δὲ ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ  
 δι' ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν, ὥστε δεῖ τούτων  
 3 τοῖς μὲν χρῆσασθαι τὰ δὲ εὐρεῖν. τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ P. 1356  
 λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἶδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν

§ 2. On ἔντεχνοι and ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, see Introd. p. 150 (paraphrase), and on the general subject, analysis of I c. 15, pp. 193—207.

τοῖς μὲν χρῆσασθαι τὰ δὲ εὐρεῖν] The former lie ready at hand, and require only to be employed; the latter, proofs of all kinds, direct and indirect, πίστεις, ἦθος, πάθος, must be 'discovered' or 'invented' for this occasion by the speaker himself. Hence the distinction of *inventio* from the other parts of Rhetoric by the Latin Rhetoricians. So Cicero, de *Inventione* (this title is adopted to represent the whole domain of Rhetoric, because 'invention' or proof of one kind or another is the *σῶμα τῆς πίστεως*, I 1 § 3, by far the most prominent and important part of the entire art) VII 9, *quare materia quidem nobis rhetoricae videtur ea, quam Aristoteli visam esse diximus; partes autem hae quas plerique dixerunt, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio* (invention, order and arrangement of parts, style, memory, and delivery including action). *Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similibus quae causam probabilem reddant* &c. Similarly Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* I 12, 4, *Quid? nos agendi subita necessitate deprehensi nonne alia dicimus alia providemus, quum pariter inventio rerum, electio verborum* (style in single words), *compositio* (combination of words in sentences), *gestus, pronuntiatio, vultus, motusque desiderantur?* XII 1, 30, *bonos nunquam honestus sermo* (style) *deficiet, nunquam rerum optimarum inventio.*

§ 3. πίστεων τρία εἶδη] Compare *Rhet.* III 1, 1. This threefold division of rhetorical proofs, due to Aristotle, is recognized by Dionysius, de *Lys. jud.* c. 19, ἀρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἐντέχνων πίστεων, καὶ χωρὶς ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου μέρους διαλέξομαι. *τριχῇ δὲ νενεμημένων τούτων, εἰς τε τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἦθος κ.τ.λ.*: and by Charmadas, in *Cic. de Orat.* I 19, 87, where only the ἦθος and πάθος are directly mentioned, but the other, which is absolutely indispensable, must of course be assumed as a third division: by Cicero himself, de *Orat.* II 27, 115, *ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa; ut probemus vera esse quae defendimus; ut conciliemus nobis eos qui audiunt; ut animos eorum ad quemcunque causa postulabit motum vocemus.* This is repeated in §§ 121 and 128 and the ἦθος and πάθος described at length in c. 43 and the following. These two latter are again referred to *Orat.* xxxvii 128; and again in *Partitiones Oratoriae* xiii 46 the three πίστεις are thus ingeniously distinguished in a twofold division. *Argumentandi duo*

γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἥθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ 4 τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ

*sunt genera, quorum alterum ad fidem directe spectat, alterum se inflectit ad motum.* (These are the 'direct' and 'indirect' proofs and arguments.) *Dirigitur cum proposuit aliquid quod probaret, sumpsitque ea quibus niteretur; atque his confirmatis ad propositum se retulit atque conclusit. Illa autem altera argumentatio, quasi retro et contra, prius sumit quae vult eaque confirmat, deinde id quod proponendum fuit permotis animis iacit ad extremum.*

Quintilian touches on this subject in many places of his work; the most detailed account of ἥθος and πάθος is given in the second chapter of his sixth book: the description and distinction of them occur in §§ 18, 19. They are both referred, as subordinate species, to the general head of 'affectus', § 8, comp. § 12; and these are again distinguished from the direct and logical arguments, § 3. In this and the following section he compares these two classes of arguments together in respect of their rhetorical value and importance, and comes to a conclusion precisely opposite to that of Aristotle. For Aristotle holds that these indirect proofs, though necessary to the orator by reason of the deficiencies and infirmities of his audience, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν, III 1 § 5, and therefore not to be excluded from the theory or practice of Rhetoric, yet are to be regarded as merely auxiliary and subordinate, standing in the same relation to the direct proofs as dress and personal ornaments to the body, serviceable but not essential. Quintilian on the contrary pronounces that these in comparison with the overpowering force of the appeals to the feelings are only not contemptible in respect of their power of persuasion; *quos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles credo ne quid per eos iudici sit ignotum; atque ut dicam quod sentio, dignos a quibus causas disertis docerentur* § 3: that those that use them therefore are only fit to lay before the judges the facts of the case, not to influence their decision, and to instruct the real advocate, who can sway their minds and feelings at his will, and force them to decide in favour of his client: *ubi vero animis iudicum vis afferenda est, et ab ipsa veri contemplatione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est* § 5.

It may be observed in concluding this note, that there is a somewhat important difference, which I have already pointed out in the Introduction, between Aristotle's view of the use to be made of ἥθος in the practice of Rhetoric, and that of the Latin Rhetoricians, as well as the author of the Rhet. ad Alex.; see c. 39 (38) 2. Quintilian's *auctoritas*—and compare Cicero in de Oratore, II 43—expresses the influence of character upon opinion, in general: but in Aristotle's system the ἥθος means something more; the effect must be produced immediately by the speech *δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδεδοῖσθαι ποῖόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα*, Rhet. I 2, 4; and hence it finds a place in Rhetoric as in Art: whereas in the other view the *auctoritas* exercised may have been previously acquired, and altogether ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, acting independ-

ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάπτον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς, ἐν οἷς

ently of any artistic or systematic process, in the way of reasoning or proving.

§ 4. On ἤθος, as *auctoritas*, see Introd. p. 151 note.

τοῖς ἐπεικέσι] 'worthy and respectable people'. Eth. Nic. v. 14 sub init. καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπεικίστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες. The primary sense of ἐπεικὲς is therefore 'equitable', one who has a leaning to the merciful side and of an indulgent disposition, as opposed to one who takes a strict and rigorous view of an offence, puts a harsh construction on men's motives and actions, is inclined to enforce on all occasions the letter of the law. From this, and because we think this the *better* disposition of the two, ἐπεικὲς is 'transferred' by metaphor (i.e. the μεταφορά ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος, the second of the four species of metaphors, Poet. XXI 7) to the general (or generic) signification of 'good'.

ἀπλῶς] has various usages. It may for instance mean (1) 'simply', opposed to συνθέσει or κατὰ συμπλοκὴν: and this appears to be the primary sense of the word, in accordance with the derivation. Thus as the elements of nature are often called ἀπλὰ σώματα in their simple, uncombined state, so we have ἀπλῶς, de Anima II 14, 8, to denote 'singly, or simply, by itself' (καθ' ἑαυτήν Themistius), without the admixture of any other element; δοκεῖ δέ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἀπλῶς αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι. Similarly when applied in a moral sense to human character, it denotes 'simplicity' (of composition), 'singleness' of heart and purpose, as opposed to 'duplicity', (Plat. Rep. III 397 E, οὐ διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς. VIII 55, 4 D, Rhet. I 9, 29, Eur. Rhes. 395 φιλῶ λέγειν τάληθές δει καὶ διπλοῦς πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ. Ruhnck. Tim. p. 86).

The commonest signification however is that of (2) *simpliciter et sine exceptione* 'generally' or 'universally', as opposed to καθ' ἕκαστον, 'specially', 'particularly', 'individually', Eth. N. I 1, 1095 a 1, or to ἕστιν ὡς 'partially', or κατὰ μέρος, de Anima II 5, 4, νῦν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν, in *general* terms—we must now come to *particulars*. Hence it signifies 'altogether', 'absolutely', *omnino*, as οὐδὲν ἀπλῶς 'none at all', de Part. An. IV 13, 9, ἀδύνατον ὅλως 'absolutely impossible'. Plato will supply abundance of examples of this usage. See also Waitz, *Comm. on Organ.* Vol. I p. 354, who exemplifies it from Aristotle.

From this again may be distinguished a third sense (3), in which it is equivalent to καθ' αὐτόν, and opposed to πρὸς τι, 'the relative'. In this sense it is defined, Top. B 11, 115 b 33, ὃ ἂν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀπλῶς ῥηθήσεται. de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 22 and b 37, where τὸ ἀπλῶς and μὴ ἀπλῶς are opposed as the absolute and relative in a paralogism of the substitution of the one for the other. Anal. Post. I 4, 83 a 15, κατηγορεῖν μὲν μὴ ἀπλῶς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κατηγορεῖν. Eth. N. I 3, 1095 b 3, Polit. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 17, καὶ ἀπλῶς (absolutely, in itself) καὶ ἡμῖν (relatively to us).

δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παν-  
τελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου,  
ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ προδοδεχᾶσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν  
λέγοντα· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων  
τιθέασιν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγον-  
τος ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλὰ  
σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος.  
5 διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου  
προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις  
λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες·  
πρὸς δὲ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαι φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι  
τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογούντας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δη-  
λωθήσεται καθ' ἕκαστον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν παθῶν λέγω-

From these three may perhaps be distinguished a fourth sense (4) in which it occurs; for instance, in Met. A 6, 987 a 21, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι... λίαν ἀπλῶς ἐπραγματευθῆσαν "treated the subject too simply", i.e. too carelessly, without taking sufficient pains with it, with insufficient *ἐlaboration*; "negligenter", Bonitz ad loc. q. v. On the various modes in which ἀπλῶς is opposed to the relative and particular see Schrader on I 9, 17.

κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος] 'is the most authoritative, effective, instrument of persuasion'. On the influence of character on the judgment add to the passages already quoted, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (39), 2, and Isocr. ἀντίδοσις §§ 276—280.

The oratorical artifice here described is well illustrated by Marc Antony's speech in *Julius Caesar*, Act III Sc. 2, "I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts," &c.

κύριος in this and similar cases seems to derive its meaning from the 'authority' or 'influence' exercised by any one or any thing that has the power of doing so, of which general notion it is a special application. It corresponds to our 'sovereign', as when we speak of a sovereign remedy. Trendelenburg, on de Anima II 5, 7, *Comm.* p. 368, would connect this signification with the κύριος νόμος, 'ratio e iudiciis et foro tracta videtur. κύριος νόμος, qui ἀκέρως oppositus est, lex est quae rata viget &c.—ita hic κύρια δνόματα, quatenus eorum auctoritas valet.' This is perhaps unnecessarily narrowing the signification. Other persons and things, besides laws, exercise authority. A good instance of κύριος in this general sense, implying superiority, authority, mastery, occurs in de Anima II 8, 3, 419 b 19, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀήρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ, where κύριος may be interpreted 'absolute master', the air and water are not *absolute masters* of sound: some other conditions are required to produce it. Ib. 419 b 33, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ ἀκούειν.

§ 5. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν κ.τ.λ.] Comp. II 1, 4.

6 μὲν· διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων [πιστεύουσιν], ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ  
 φαινόμενον (ἀληθὲς) δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα  
 7 πιθανῶν. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσὶ, φανερόν

§ 6. διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων] In § 3 we are told that there are three kinds of *πίστεις* or rhetorical proofs, which are conveyed through the channel or *medium* (διὰ with the *genitive*) of the speech. These three are then described *seriatim*. The first, § 4, is διὰ τοῦ ἤθους; the second (§ 5), διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν; and the third, § 6, διὰ τῶν λόγων, plainly in the sense of the direct *πίστεις* or arguments proper, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν. διὰ τῶν λόγων is the reading of all the MSS except A\*, which has τὸν λόγον: but this, as an unnecessary and unaccountable departure from the construction of the parallel expressions, διὰ τοῦ λόγου, τοῦ ἤθους, τῶν ἀκροατῶν, and afterwards διὰ τούτων, seems to be self-condemned.

By these *λόγοι* we may understand either the actual words which are the instruments or *medium* of the reasonings, or better the reasonings or arguments themselves which the words convey. This explanation appears to be sufficiently rational and consistent, and in accordance with the ordinary usages of the language. Spengel, however, in his paper *über die Rhet. des Arist.* (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851) p. 26, and again in his edition of the *Rhetoric*, Vol. II p. 46, thinks that the text requires alteration, and would read δι' αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ λόγου, or διὰ δ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, which seems to be totally unnecessary. The explanation above given is confirmed by the rendering of the *Vetus Translatio* 'per orationes autem credimus', where '*orationes*' plainly stands for the 'words of the speeches in which these arguments are expressed'.

ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον] The second of these terms denotes the fallacious branch of Rhetoric, 'the apparent, unreal, sham' arguments, exemplified in II 24, and corresponding to the spurious branch of Dialectics treated in the *Σοφιστικοὶ Ἀγῶνες*, and appended to the *Topics*. The illustration of these is allowed to enter into a scientific treatise only for the purpose of detecting and exposing these fallacies, and enabling the pleader or dialectician to confute them when employed by an adversary. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινόμενη σοφία οὕσα δ' οὐ, de *Soph. El.* I, 165 a 21.

§ 7. ἐπεὶ δὲ αἱ πίστεις—καὶ πῶς] "seeing then that these are the channels, or modes of communication of rhetorical proofs, it is plain that to grasp, or get possession, or make himself master of them (λαβεῖν) is a task for one who has a capacity for logical reasoning, and for the contemplation or study of characters, and thirdly [for the discernment] of the emotions;—and of the latter, what each is in itself, and what are its qualities and properties (ποιόν τι), and from what sources (what motives and impulses, ἐκ τίνων,) it may be excited, and in what modes (πῶς)."—ταῦτα...ἔστι λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου, lit. 'it belongs to the student of logic to get hold of them'.

Of these the logical branch belongs to Dialectics, which teaches the habit of reasoning and discussion, the other two to the study of Ethics,

ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ τρία ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι  
δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὰς  
ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἕκαστόν  
ἐστὶ τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται  
καὶ πῶς. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παρα-  
φυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἦθη

which deals with human beings as individuals, and investigates the fixed habits, virtuous or vicious (*ἔξεις*), which constitute their characters (*ἦθη*), and the moral *πάθη* or 'emotions', which when developed by exercise, according to the direction which they take, become virtues and vices. The consequence is, *ὥστε συμβαίνει*, that Rhetoric may be considered a scion or offshoot of the study of Dialectics and Ethics, the latter 'which may fairly be called Politics' (because it treats of men in society and therefore includes the science of the individual, *ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος* (Ethics) *τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα*. Eth. Nic. I 1, 1074 b 11), standing to them in the relation of the offshoot to the parent plant. *Sed idem* (Aristoteles) *et de arte rhetorica tres libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur, sed et particulam civilitatis sicut dialectices assignat*. Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 4.

*συλλογίσασθαι*] improperly applied here, as *ἀπόδειξις* above, I § 11 p. 19, to *rhetorical* reasoning. But as there the rhetorical *πίστεις* are called a kind of 'demonstration', 'a sort of', or subordinate variety of, demonstration in a general sense, so here the syllogistic process is allowed to stand for reasoning in general, to which even rhetorical reasoning, though not syllogistic in the strict sense, but enthymematic, of course belongs.

*παραφυές*] which usually appears under the form *παραφύας* in Aristotle and Theophrastus, properly denotes either a branch or a separate plant 'growing alongside' of the parent plant, and proceeding either from the stem or the root, as a scion or offshoot. In the latter of these two senses it certainly occurs in Theophr. Hist. Plant. II 2, 4, *ἐὰν ἀπὸ ρίζης ἡ παραφύας ᾖ*, though here also the hypothetical *ἐάν* admits the other possibility. Also *παραφύεσθαι*, Hist. Plant. III 17, 3, *ἀποκοπὴν δὲ καὶ ἐπικαυθὲν παραφύεται* (grows from the root) *καὶ ἀναβλαστάνει*. This word and its cognates, *παραφύεσθαι*, *παραφύσις*, *ἀποφύας* (Hist. An. II 1, 53, de part. An. III 5 § 1, 10 § 5, 14 § 14, Theophr. Hist. Plant. I 6, 6, VII 2, 5 and 8, &c.), *παραβλαστάνειν*, *-βλαστή*, *-βλάστημα*, are applied by Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus primarily to plants, and by analogy to the corresponding parts of animals.

It occurs again as a metaphor in Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 a 21, *παραφύαδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος*; that is, *τὸ καθ' αὐτό* and *ἡ οὐσία* stand to 'the relative', *τὸ πρὸς τι*, in the same relation as parent plant to offshoot. 'Similitudo, explicante Giphanio, a pullis arborum desumta, qui Graecis dicuntur *παραφύαδες*'. Zell, ad loc. So that Rhetoric is represented by this metaphor as a scion derived from two stocks or plants, Dialectics and Ethics, not identical with either, but with a general or inherited family resemblance to both. (The analogy will not bear

πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν. διὸ καὶ ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἢ ῥητορικῆς καὶ οἱ ἀντιποιοῦμενοι ταύτης τὰ μὲν δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τὰ δὲ δι' ἀλαζονείαν τὰ δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικὰς· ἔστι γὰρ μόριόν τι τῆς δια-

pressing: one does not see, for example, how a young plant can be the scion or offspring of *two* others, but this general meaning is clear, that it bears a likeness to both, though differing from each of them.)

ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα] 'creeps under, insinuates itself into, the form or figure'; 'assumes the mask or disguise of (for the purpose of acting a part)', 'personates', Plat. Gorg. 464 C, ἡ κολακευτική... ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ... ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν λατρικὴν ἢ ὀψοποικὴν ὑποδεδυκε... Sopater, ap. Stallb. not. ad loc. ὑποδύεται, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπεισέρχεται, ὑποκρίνεται, ὡς ἐκείνη ταῦτ' ὁκεῖν εἶναι. Metaph. A 2, 1004 b 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ταῦτ' ὁκεῖν ὑποδύνονται σχῆμα τῆ φιλοσόφου.

ἀλαζονεία implies both presumption and imposture; either a character between both and a mixture of *both* (as Theophrastus' ἀλαζών, 'the braggart', of which Pyrgopolinices in the *Miles Gloriosus*, Thraso in the *Eunuchus*, and Captain Bobadil in *Every Man in his Humour*, are the three types, ancient and modern; and probably also the Sophistical Rhetoricians here referred to): or again a character in which *either* presumption *or* imposture is characteristic and predominant. For example, the insolent assumption, arrogance, and swagger appear more prominently in this picture of the ἀλαζών drawn by Xenophon, Cyrop. II 2, 12, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζών ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἢ εἰσι, καὶ ἀνδρειωτέροις, καὶ ποιήσιν δὲ μὴ ἱκανοὶ εἶσιν ὑπισχνουμένοις· καὶ ταῦτα φανεροῖς γιγνομένοις ὅτι τοῦ λαβεῖν τι ἔνεκα καὶ κερδᾶναι· ποιοῦσιν. This last mercenary element is not found elsewhere in the character of the ἀλαζών. In Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II 7, IV 13, empty pretension, ostentation and swagger are the leading characteristics of the ἀλαζών. The vice is one of the extremes of which ἀλήθεια, the social virtue of frankness, sincerity, and plain dealing is the mean, the opposite extreme being εἰρωνεία, 'mock' in conversation, Socrates' habit. It is the extreme in *προσποίησις*, 'pretension', of which ἀλήθεια is the mean state. Whereas in Aristophanes it usually represents rather the other side of the character, its quackery and imposture; and ἀλαζών is 'a quack or a humbug'. Of course Socrates and his brother Sophists are the great representatives of the class. *Nubes* 102, 1494, *et passim*. And this is also the side of the character which is generally uppermost in Plato's view of it. See Rep. VI 486 B, 490 A, VIII 560 C, Phaedo 92 D, ἡ δονή... ἀπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, Phil. 65 C. The definition of it given in the Platonic *δροι*, p. 416, is that of undue pretension, assumption, imposture. *ἔξισ* προσποιητικὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθῶν τῶν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων. Quackery and imposture are also predominant in the application of it, Rhet. II 6, 11.

δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικὰς] 'incident to humanity', implying the infirmities, imperfections, frailties, miseries, and especially errors to which

| Λεκτικῆς καὶ ὁμοίωμα, καθάπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενοι εἴπομεν·  
περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὠρισμένου οὐδετέρα αὐτῶν ἐστὶν  
ἐπιστήμη, πῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι  
λόγους.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι  
8 πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἰκανῶς. τῶν δὲ διὰ  
τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν  
τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ συλλο- P. 1356 b.

the human condition is exposed, and from which the divine nature, which is tactily opposed to it in this conception, is exempt. 'The other human causes' here referred to are any other defects or imperfections to which the human nature is liable. Thuc. III 40 ἀνθρώπινως ἀμαρτάνειν, compared with III 45, πεφύκασί τε ἅπαντες ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἀμαρτάνειν: 'humani est errare'. Plato, Soph. 229 A κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπινον δόξαν, 'ex humana opinione, quae obnoxia est erroribus. Uti apud Latinos homo fuit frequens erroris vel imbecillitatis humanae excusatio' (Heindorf ad loc. Polit. 279 C, ἀλεξιφάρμακα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα εἰς ἐστ.). Demosth. de Cor. p. 328, § 308, ἡ παρὰ τῆς τύχης τι συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίωμα, ἡ ἄλλο τι δύσκολον γέγονε—πολλὰ δὲ τὰνθρώπινα.—Id. c. Lept. p. 506, 15, πάντα δ' ἀνθρώπινα ἡγείσθαι. Bæot. de Nomine p. 998, πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰνθρώπινα. Ar. Rhet. I 13, 17, καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώπιναις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές. Eth. Nic. IV II, 1126 a 31, ἀνθρωπικώτερον (more humane) γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι. VIII 16, sub. fin. χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι.

In Rhet. I 5, 10, διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, it has this more general sense of 'all human affairs, business and enjoyments': with which comp. Plat. Theæt. 170 B καὶ πάντα που μετὰ τὰνθρώπινα (all human society or affairs in general) ζητούντων διδασκάλους κ.τ.λ. So Virgil, Æn. I 462, sunt lacrimae rerum; et mentem mortalalia tangunt: and in the second sense, Ecl. VIII 35, nec curare deum credis mortalia quæstquam.

§ 8. The eighth and ninth and part of the tenth sections of this chapter are quoted by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I c. 7, from τῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει. The variations are, δεικνυσθαι (his) for δεικνύναι, ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς for ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, the omission of ἡ ὀντινούν, and of αὐτῶν ἑκατέρω; for ἑτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, we have ἑτερόν τι διὰ τ. σ. παρὰ τὸ ταῦτ' εἶναι, also φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι for ὅτι καὶ, further τὸ omitted before εἶδος, and γὰρ after καθάπερ, and lastly ῥητορείας for ῥητορικῆς.

τῶν δὲ] πιστεῶν.

ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς] Dionysius has ἀναλυτικοῖς, which Spengel has introduced into the text, with the remark, certe Aristoteles τῇ διαλεκτικῇ scripsisset (Rhetores Graeci p. 5, Praef. p. 5); and again, über die Rhet. des Arist. Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 44, Aristoteles sagt nur ἐν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ, nicht ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς; in reply to which I will merely quote Rhet. II 22, 14, where ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς again occurs. Even without this evidence



γισμός τὸ δὲ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός. καλῶ δ' ἐνθύμημα μὲν ῥητορικὸν συλλογισμόν, παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγὴν ῥητορικὴν. πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστες ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ p. 7. παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν· ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ ὅλως ἀνάγκη (ἡ)

<sup>1</sup> οὐδέν πως.

I can see no reason why an author who speaks habitually of others of his works in the plural, as τὰ ἀναλυτικά, ἠθικά, πολιτικά, μεθοδικά, should be denied that privilege in the special case of the Topics. Nor do I see why the single testimony of Dionysius should override the authority of all the Aristotelian MSS. I have therefore retained the old reading.

πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστες ποιοῦνται—καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν πως] Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 *b* 9, ὅτι δ' οὐ μόνον οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων γίνονται σχημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ καὶ ἄπλους ἡτισσὺν πίστες καὶ καθ' ὅποιον μίθοδον, νῦν ἂν εἴη λεκτέον. ἅπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς. Anal. Post. I 18, 81 *a* 40, εἴπερ μαθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει. Eth. Nic. VI 1139 *b* 27, ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῶ. The reference here is most unmistakably to the opening words of the Anal. Post., an additional evidence, against Brandis (see the succeeding note), that the reference in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν is either directly and exclusively to this passage of the Analytics or at any rate includes it with the others.

ἡ ὀντισσὺν] is rejected by Spengel on the authority of Dionysius, who omits it, and against that of the Aristotelian MSS, which, as appears from Bekker's revision, all agree in retaining it. It is not merely perfectly intelligible, and absolutely unexceptionable on all critical grounds, but when compared with the commencement of the Anal. Post., to which reference is immediately after made, it seems to tally so precisely with what is there stated, that it might almost be regarded as a necessary addition. In the passage of the Analytics we are told that every kind of instruction and learning, proof scientific and popular, mathematical or dialectical knowledge, is conveyed by way of syllogism or induction: and it is then added, ὡς δ' αὖτως καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπεύουσιν· ἡ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐπαγωγή, ἡ δι' ἐνθυμημάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός, a statement with which the ἡ ὀντισσὺν of the Rhetoric seems to correspond to a nicety. And for the same reason I hold that this passage is referred to in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν, as well as Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 *b* 9, (quoted in the preceding note,) and the continuation of the subject there suggested in chapters 24 and 27, (which contain the logical description of induction and example, and the enthymeme), though Brandis, in his tract on the Rhetoric in Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV 1, p. 24, would confine the reference to the latter passage.

συλλογιζόμενον ἢ ἐπάγοντι· δεικνύναι ὅτι οὖν<sup>1</sup> (δῆλον δ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), ἀναγκαῖον ἐκάτερον 9 αὐτῶν ἐκατέρῳ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. τίς δ' ἐστὶ διαφορά παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμήματος, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων δείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστίν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ τινῶν ὄντων ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἢ καθόλου ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐκεῖ μὲν 10 συλλογισμὸς ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐνθύμημα καλεῖται. φανερόν δ' ὅτι καὶ ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς· καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἴρηται,

<sup>1</sup> ὅτι οὖν ἢ ὅστι οὖν.

§ 9. ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν] On this reference to the Topics see note in Introd. p. 154, and note on II 25, 3, in this Commentary. The reference to the Topics there made is precisely similar to this: that is, it is made to the work in general and its contents, and not to any particular passage: what is stated here may be *gathered* or *inferred* from the Topics.

§ 10. φανερόν δ' ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς] 'It is plain that either kind of Rhetoric (the παραδείγματῶδες or the ἐνθυμηματικὸν) has good in it', that each of them has its own particular virtue and excellence, or advantage. Buhle construes the words τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἔχει ἐκάτερον ἀγαθόν, '*Rhetoricen utroque bono frui, et enthy-memate et exemplo*'. (He takes τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥ. for a mere periphrasis. So in fact it does occur in Pol. I 4, 1253 b 28, ἐν ὄργάνῳ εἶδει "in the shape of an instrument", de gen. et corr. I 3, 10, ἐν ὕλης εἶδει—but εἶδος in this usage does not seem to admit the definite article.) We have a similar use of ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν in Rhet. II 20, 7, εἰσὶ δ' οἱ λόγοι δημιουργικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς] '*Scheint eine mittelstellung zwischen analytik und dialektik eingenommen zu haben*', Brandis, u. s. p. 13. The work is mentioned twice by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I cc. 6 and 8, each time in company with Analytics and Topics. From this circumstance and from the reference here, it is natural to conclude that its subject was connected in some way with Logic. Diogenes Laert. V 1, 23, includes in his list of Aristotle's writings μεθοδικὰ in eight books, and § 25, μεθοδικόν in one: the former comes amongst the logical, the latter amongst the rhetorical works. It appears also in the list of the 'Anonymous' author of the life of Aristotle (in Buhle, Vol. I p. 62), again in near connexion with works on Logic, 'Αναλυτικῶν, Προβλημάτων, Μεθοδικά. Hesychius Milesius in his life of Aristotle (Buhle, Vol. I p. 72), describes it thus; πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν εὕρεσιν, τὰ τε τοπικὰ καὶ μεθοδικὰ, παρέδωκε

καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις ῥητορεῖαι αἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικάι, καὶ ῥήτορες ὁμοίως οἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις οἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικοί. πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἦττον οἱ λόγοι οἱ

προτάσεων πλῆθος, ἐξ ὧν πρὸς τὰ προβλήματα πιθανῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ὁλόντε εὐπορεῖν : classing it, like Dionysius and Diogenes, with the Topics and Analytics, the latter of which is mentioned immediately after. Simplicius ad Categ. fol. 7 a (quoted by Buhle) speaks of it as one of Aristotle's ὑπομήματα, *commentarii*; ἐν τοῖς ὑπομήμασιν, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικαῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομήμασι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ὑπομήματι. Brandis, u.s., adds a reference to the Schol. in Arist. p. 47 b 40.

ῥητορεῖαι] 'rhetorical exhibitions or displays' Probl. XVIII 3. The word is a rare one, and as distinguished from ῥητορική denotes rather the practice and results of Rhetoric, speaking and speeches, than the system and theory of it as embodied in the 'art'. It is found in Plato, Polit. 304 A, where Stallbaum notes, 'vox ῥητορεία a Platone ficta videtur ut ars oratoria nobilior et generosior distingueretur a varia illa ῥητορικῇ cuius nomen profanaverant qui ad explendas suas cupiditates abusi erant.' The fact, that the word was a Platonic invention, and the ground assigned for the distinction, seem equally unauthenticated. It occurs also in Isocrates, κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν § 21, for 'the practice of rhetoric' in general, also Panath. § 2, Phil. § 26; and amongst the later writers, in Plutarch and Lucian : ῥητορεύειν, in Plato, Isocrates, and Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 35.

πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν—οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί] Anal. Pr. II 23, ult. φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλογισμός, ἤμιν δ' ἐναργέστερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. The objects of sense and observation from which we derive our inductions and examples are 'nearer to us', more readily apprehensible by us, than the universals of the syllogism : and therefore, Top. A 12, 105 a 16, ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγή πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμός βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον, 'induction is a mode of reasoning which is clearer (to us) and more persuasive, because its materials are better known to us', the example must be familiar and well known or it will not produce its effect in the way of proof; also some kind of induction is constantly used by every one, τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν; the syllogism and enthymeme are more 'cogent' and 'effective' against an adversary in a debate, and are therefore 'more applauded', *θυροβοῦνται* δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί.

There is no real contradiction between what is here said and in Probl. XVIII 3. In the Problem the question is *why* people in general are better pleased with examples than with enthymemes, the fact being assumed. The answer is, that they learn more from them, and are therefore more amused, and the facts which are adduced by way of examples are more familiar and interesting; the enthymeme (as the syllogism in the Topics) proceeds from universals, which we are less acquainted with than with particulars. Consequently, examples are more pleasing and therefore plausible (*πιθανά*), whilst the conclusive

διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, θορυβοῦνται δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ  
 11 ἐνθυμηματικοί. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἐκατέρω  
 χρηστέον, ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τού-  
 των μᾶλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρῶς.

ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν  
 εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει δι' αὐτὸ πιθανὸν καὶ πιστὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ  
 δείκνυσθαι δοκεῖν διὰ τοιούτων, οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκο-  
 πεῖ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τί Σωκράτει τὸ  
 ὑγιεινὸν ἐστὶν ἢ Καλλία, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς  
 τοιοῖσδε (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον  
 ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν), οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ'  
 ἕκαστον ἐνδοξον θεωρήσει, οἷον Σωκράτει ἢ Ἰππία,  
 ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῖσδε, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ. καὶ  
 γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν (φαίνεται  
 argument, the enthymeme which leaves the adversary without reply, is  
 more striking, and therefore more applauded.

θορυβεῖσθαι, 'to be applauded', is a regular formation of the passive.  
 For although the usual construction of θορυβεῖν is with ἐπὶ and the  
 dative, many examples of the transitive use of it are found. See the  
 examples of both, and of the passive, in Ast's Lex. Plat. Isocr. Panath.  
 § 233, (ὁ λόγος) ἐπηνήμενος ἦν καὶ τεθορυβημένος: and Rhet. II 23, 30,  
 τῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τοιαῦτα ὅσα κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. I 9, 40,  
 quoted in Introd. p. 155.

§ 11. ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον] II chapters 20—24.

πιθανόν] 'plausible', that which readily persuades; πιστόν, 'credible',  
 that which is to be relied on; the latter represents the higher degree of  
 trustworthiness. διὰ τοιούτων, πιθανῶν καὶ πιστῶν.

The connexion of the argument of this section is given in the para-  
 phrase, Introduction p. 155.

Art and science deal with universals, art prescribes rules for classes,  
 not individuals; practice, ἐμπειρία, follows the opposite method. Rhet.  
 II 19, 27, τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτά τι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγέθους ἀπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κeno-  
 λογεῖν ἐστίν· κυριώτερα γὰρ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν (for use or practice) τὰ καθ'  
 ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων. Eth. Nic. VI 12, 1143 a 32, ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα  
 καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων πάντα τὰ πρακτὰ κ.τ.λ. Met. A 1, 981 a 12, πρὸς μὲν οὖν  
 τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχά-  
 νοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων. αἴτιον δ'  
 ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνώσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ  
 πρόξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν κ.τ.λ.] Compare Top. A 10,  
 104 a 4, 11, 105 a 3—9, οὐδεὶς δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκο-  
 πεῖν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις τῶν λόγου δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως·  
 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποροῦντες πότερον δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν, ἢ οὐ,

γὰρ ἅττα καὶ τοῖς παραληροῦσιν), ἀλλ' ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ P. 1357.  
 τῶν λόγου δεομένων, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βου-  
 12 λεύεσθαι εἰωθότων. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περὶ τε  
 τοιούτων περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἔχομεν,  
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἱ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολ- p. 8.  
 λῶν συνορᾶν<sup>1</sup> οὐδὲ λογιῶσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα

<sup>1</sup> συνορᾶν *infra*.

κολάσσεως δέονται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ἢ χιῶν λευκὴ αἰσθήσεως, κ.τ.λ., and Eth. Eud. I 3, quoted in Intro. p. 156, note.

[ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν] sc. ἐξ ἐκείνων ἃ ἔτυχεν: 'any materials, or propositions taken at random, any chance propositions'. So Rhet. I 5, 11, διὰ τὸ μὴ δὲν ἔχειν ὧν τὸ γήρας λωβάται. On the attraction of the relative from its proper case after the verb to that of its antecedent, see Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 473, and note on Rhet. I 5, 11.

§ 12. τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς] The proper office, the special function, business, 'work', ἔργον, of Rhetoric, is exercised in such things as we are obliged to take advice about, where there are no definite rules of art ready laid down to guide us.

The ἔργον of anything is that which it is specially appointed (by nature) to do, its proper special work. It is in the execution, the carrying out or fulfilment of this ἔργον, that this ἀρετή, this special excellence of everything, resides. Nature always works intelligently with a purpose in view, πρὸς τέλος τι, everything has its own special ἔργον. This is especially manifest in all 'instruments', ὄργανα (things in which the purpose is *apparent*); as of an axe or knife the office or purpose is to cut (large and small things), of a horse to run, of an eye to see, of the mind to think, and so on; and the purpose or office being the same in kind and differing only in degree, in doing a thing at all and in doing it well, the ἀρετή is shewn in and measured by the performance of this special work; sharpness in the knife to cut well, swiftness in the horse to run well, is the due fulfilment of its ἔργον. Eth. N. VI 2, 1139 a 16, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκείον. This doctrine is first laid down by Plato, Rep. I 352 E seq. and borrowed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I 6, and II 5, where the theory of moral *virtue* is based upon it. Hence Pol. I 2, 1253 a 23, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει. Eth. Eud. II 1, 1218 b 38, περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ἡ ἔξις ἡ δύναμις ἐκάστων, ὅσων ἐστὶ τις χρῆσις ἢ ἔργον, which is there illustrated at length.

διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν] 'to take in at a glance through the *medium*, or along the line, of many steps of proof or syllogisms', 'to take in a long chain of arguments at one view'.

λογιῶσθαι πόρρωθεν] expresses much the same thing as διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν, to deduce or string together syllogisms in a chain from a long way off or back, 'to string together a long chain of connected syllogisms'. With πόρρωθεν here, compare the similar use of it in II 22, 3, and Top. A 11, 105 a 8 οὐδὲ δι' ὧν σύνεγγυς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδ' ὧν λίαν πόρρω.

βουλευόμεθα δέ] On the proper objects of deliberation compare Eth.

δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν·  
περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ ἔσεσθαι  
13 ἢ ἔχειν οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων· οὐδὲν  
γὰρ πλέον. ἐνδέχεται δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν

Nic. III 5, VI 2 λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων (τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων) τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν, τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταυτόν, οὐθεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. c. 5, 1140 a 32, βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πράξει. de Anima III 10, 4, 433 a 29, πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. We deliberate and act only in cases where the event or issue is uncertain (may be in either of two ways, ἀμφοτέρως); where the event is necessarily this or that, i.e. certainly one way, and not the other, or where it is not in our own power, where we have no control over it, no one either deliberates whether or no anything is to be done or tries to do it. τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν is usually expressed by τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, things contingent and uncertain in their issue; opposed to τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, things certain and necessary, which can be only in one way, which have only one possible issue, and cannot be in one way or another, indifferently.

οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων] 'on that supposition', i.e. if he actually supposes them to be necessary and unalterable: because it is possible that he may have deliberated or even attempted in action things which he did not know were beyond his control, in mere ignorance.

οὐδὲν πλέον] 'there is nothing to be gained by it, no advantage in it'. Valckenaer, *Diatr. in Eur. Fragm.* p. 150 (156), supplies numerous examples. In three MSS (Bekker) the words οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον are followed immediately by ἢ οὕτως ἐνδέχεται συμβουλεύειν. They were first omitted by Bekker, though previously suspected by Muretus. The origin of this interpolation, for such it seems to be, may be thus accounted for. The words συλλογίζεσθαι and συνάγειν being very nearly synonymous, some one may have added in the margin ἢ οὕτως ἐνδέχεται δὲ συμβουλεύειν—meaning that we might read συμβουλεύειν in place of συλλογίζεσθαι to avoid the tautology, συμβουλεύειν referring to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric, or public speaking: ἢ οὕτως, 'or thus', merely expressing the possibility of a *various reading*, ἐνδέχεται δὲ συμβουλεύειν. The essential stop after οὕτως was then omitted or overlooked, and the words finally introduced into the text as an appendage to πλέον, with the sense, as rendered by Gaisford, 'nihil enim amplius profici potest, quam quod sic deliberatur: i.e. incassum enim instituitur ista (altera) consultatio'.

§ 13. συνάγειν, (*ratione*) *colligere*. Rhet. II 22, 3 and 15. The σύν in words of this kind, which denote a process of reasoning or understanding, as συνιέναι, συμβάλλειν, (to comprehend, *comprehendere*), and συλλογίζεσθαι itself, denotes the bringing of things together in the mind for the purpose of *comparison*, upon which either a judgment is founded and a conclusion drawn, or the understanding itself developed or enlightened. συνάγειν and συλλογίζεσθαι are found again together as synonyms, Met. H. init. 1042 a 3, ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογίσασθαι δεῖ, καὶ συναγαγόντας τὸ κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιτιθέναι.

τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μὲν δεομένων δὲ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι εἰεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτῆς ὑποκειται εἶναι ἀπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων εἶναι μηδ' ἐνδόξων, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγὴν τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἦ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν· αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο προστίθῃσιν ὁ ἀκροατής. οἷον ὅτι Δωριεὺς στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα νενί-

τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον] 'the conclusions of previous syllogisms', which serve as major premisses to new syllogisms, and so on through the entire chain of demonstration.

ἀπλοῦς] 'a simple, uncultivated person', Germ. *einfach*. This use of the word belongs to the first of the three varieties above distinguished (note on ἀπλῶς, § 4 p. 30). It is opposed here rather to the 'complications' of an advanced stage of civilization and refinement, than to duplicity of character, and expresses 'an elementary state of cultivation'. Similarly Pol. II 8, 1268 b 39, τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἀπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικοῦς 'rude and barbarous'.

ἐνθύμημα—παράδειγμα] On enthymeme and example see Introduct. pp. 99—108.

ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός] πρῶτος 'in its earliest, most elementary', or 'normal, typical, form'. πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης (primary, in its original form) πῶλεως, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 a 17. ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν ἀληθινήν καὶ πρώτην. Ib. c. 8, sub fin. Pol. VII (VI) c. 4, 1319 a 39, τὴν βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην δημοκρατίαν. On this passage, see note on II 21, 6.

οἷον (πρὸς τὸ δηλοῦν, συλλογίζεσθαι ἀποδείξαι) ὅτι. Infr. § 19, οἷον ὅτι ἐπέβουλεν κ.τ.λ. and c. I § 13.

Δωριεύς] the type of an Olympic victor; son of Diagoras of Rhodes, to whom Pindar's seventh Olympian ode is inscribed. See Introduct. p. 158, note 1.

στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα] This is the title distinctive of the four great games, of which honour was in reality the prize, the garland being merely a symbol or external sign. They were hereby distinguished from ἀγῶνες χρηματίζται or ἀργυρίζται (Plut.) in which the prize was money, and in which therefore mercenary motives might possibly enter into the competition. Pausanias x 7, 3 tells us that it was not till the 2nd Pythiad that the Pythian games became an ἀγὼν στεφανίτης. Add to the instances

κηκεν, ἱκανὸν εἶπῃν ὅτι Ὀλύμπια γὰρ νενίκηκεν·  
 τὸ δ' ὅτι στεφανίτης τὰ Ὀλύμπια, οὐδὲ δεῖ προσθεῖ-  
 14 ναι· γιγνώσκουσι γὰρ πάντες. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα  
 μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ  
 εἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις,  
 ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πρᾶτ-  
 τουσι βουλευόνται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα  
 πάντα τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἶπῃν  
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτων), τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμ-  
 βαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἐτέρων  
 συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ἀναγκαίων (δῆλον  
 δ' ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), φανερόν ὅτι ἐξ

from Xen. Mem., Demosth., and Lycurg., Aesch. c. Ctes. § 179, and Isocr. Antid. § 301, τοὺς ἀθλητὰς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς στεφανίταις ἀγῶσι νικῶντας.

[*Ανοπ. vita Euripidis*, init. ἤσκησε δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς παγκράτιον ἢ πυγμὴν, τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ χρησμὸν λαβόντος ὅτι στεφανηφόρους ἀγῶνας νικήσει. S.] Ὀλύμπια νενίκηκεν] The accusative in these phrases is an extension or 'equivalent' of a cognate accusative. Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 564.

§ 14. A summary repetition of the contents of the following sections, 14—19, is given in the chapter on λύσις, II 25, 8—9.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα—ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] Comp. II 22, 3, καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλ' καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

ἐνδεχόμενα] 'things possible', as opposed to things *necessary*, not here to things *impossible*. On ἐνδέχεσθαι and δύνασθαι, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον and τὸ δυνατόν in Aristotle, see Waitz on Anal. Pr. I 3, 25 a 37, (Vol. I p. 375 seq.) and Bonitz on Metaph. Θ 3, 1047 a 26, p. 387. δυνατόν according to Waitz, where the two are distinguished, expresses *physical*, ἐνδεχόμενον *logical*, possibility: the latter implies the possible *truth* of an *assertion*, viz. that when we assert anything we do not contradict ourselves. ἐνδεχόμενα are therefore here 'possibilities' as opposed to certainties; things and events which are only conceived as possible, which may be in one way or in another. In the ordinary language ἐνδέχεσθαι and ἐνδεχόμενον have usually some other words, as ἄλλως ἔχειν, γένεσθαι ἢ μὴ γίγνεσθαι, or something similar, added to them in the way of a definition or limitation. With the *absolute* use of it in this passage (and the general sense in which it appears in Waitz's and Bonitz's *Commentaries*) comp. I 4, 3, οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων. Eth. Nic. VI 2, 1139 a 8, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. Ib. c. 12, 1143 b 2, τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου.

ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.] Anal. Pr. I 8, 29 b 29, ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν (πολλὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχει μὲν, οὐ μόνον ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὰ δ' οὐτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐθ' ὑπάρχει ὅλως, ἐνδέχεται δ' ὑπάρχειν) δῆλον ὅτι καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐκάστου τούτων ἕτερος ἔσται, καὶ οὐχ



ὧν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται,  
 τὰ δὲ πλείστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. λέγεται γὰρ ἐνθυ-  
 μήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων, ὥστε ἀνάγκη τούτων  
 15 ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ ταὐτὸ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκὸς  
 ἔστιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δέ, καθ-  
 ἅπερ ὀρίζονται τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα  
 ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκείνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκὸς, ὡς P. 1357 b.  
 16 τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος· τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ P. 9.  
 μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθ' ἑκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθ-  
 όλου, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος.  
 τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ  
 17 ἀναγκαῖον ἀνώνυμόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν διαφοράν. ἀναγ-  
 καῖα μὲν οὖν λέγω ἐξ ὧν γίνεται συλλογισμός. διὸ  
 καὶ τεκμήριον τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν σημείων ἐστίν· ὅταν  
 γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι οἴωνται λῦσαι τὸ λεχθέν, τότε  
 φέρειν οἴονται τεκμήριον ὡς δεδειγμένον καὶ πεπερασ-  
 μένον· τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταυτόν ἐστι κατὰ

ὁμοίως ἐχόντων τῶν ὄρων, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ἐξ ἀναγκαίων, ὃ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχόντων, ὃ δ' ἐξ ἐνδεχομένων. Anal. Pr. I 13, 32 b 4, where two kinds of possibility, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, are distinguished: one, the order of nature, which from its ordinary uniformity makes a near approach to the necessary, and the other, the indefinite, the purely accidental, τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης, in which there is no natural order at all.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλείστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] 'It is plain that the materials of enthymemes, the propositions or premisses of which they are constructed, though they *may* be necessary, are most of them no more than probabilities, or things that *usually* happen'. [On μὲν—δέ, see the references above given in note on I § 12 p. 24.]

λέγεται ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων] Comp. I 3, 7, II 25, 8, where παραδείγματα are added. Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 a 10.

On εἰκότα and σημεία, Introd. p. 160—163. The meaning and connexion of the following sections on the rhetorical instruments of proof are explained in full detail in the paraphrase, to which the reader is referred (Introd. p. 163—168).

§ 17. Λῦσαι τὸ λεχθέν] On λύειν, λύσις, λυτόν, see Introd. on II 25 p. 267 and note 1.

τέκμαρ] Eustathius ad Il. H. p. 665, 45. τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸ τελειοῦν, ἀπὸ τοῦ τέκμαρ, ὃ δηλοῖ τὸ τέλος. τὸ μέντοι τεκμαίρεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ σημειοῦσθαι, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τέκμαρ τὸ σημείον, οἱ μεθ' Ὁμήρον λέγουσι. 'Antiqua lingua, quam mox commemorat Aristoteles, non erat ab Homeri dialecto diversa.

18 τὴν ἀρχαίαν γλῶτταν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ᾧδε, οἷον εἴ τις εἶπειεν σημεῖον εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ σοφὸς ἦν καὶ δίκαιος. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σημείον ἐστὶ, λυτὸν δέ, κἂν ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ εἰρημένον· ἀσυλλόγιστον γάρ. τὸ δέ, οἷον εἴ τις εἶπειεν σημεῖον ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, ἢ τέτοκεν ὅτι γάλα ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον. ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριον μόνον ἐστίν· μόνον γάρ, ἂν ἀληθὲς ἢ, ἄλυτον ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἔχον, οἷον εἴ τις εἶπειεν, ὅτι πυρέττει, σημεῖον εἶναι, πυκνὸν γὰρ ἀναπνεῖ. λυτὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, κἂν ἀληθὲς ἢ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ μὴ πυρέττοντα πνευστιᾶν<sup>1</sup>. τί μὲν

<sup>1</sup> πνευστιᾶν *infra*.

Vide Il. N. 20. Od. δ. 373, et alibi. Homeri carmina ea aetate qua vixit Aristoteles propter vetustatem apud vulgus obscuriora fuisse aliunde constat. Ex. gr. Vox ἀποινα invenitur in Iliadis locis minimum viginti et sex: Olympiade tamen CVII qua orationem c. Aristocratem habuit Demosthenes, ea Athenis prorsus obsoleverat. Dignus est Demosthenis locus qui hic proponatur. Vetarat scilicet antiqua lex τοῖς ἀνδροφόνους — μὴ λυμαίνεσθαι μηδὲ ἀποιᾶν. Quam sic explicare pergit orator summus p. 630, 25. τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ λυμαίνεσθαι, γνώριμον οἷδ' ὅτι πᾶσι—τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποιᾶν, μὴ χρήματα πράττεσθαι· τὰ γὰρ χρήματα ἀποινα ἀνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοί. Adeo universe verum est quod de Homeri tantum geographia scripsit Strabo VIII p. 484=513. τὰ δ' 'Ομήρου σκέψεως δέεται κριτικῆς, ποιητικῆς λέγοντος, καὶ οὐ τὰ νῦν, ἀλλὰ τάρχαϊα, ὧν ὁ χρόνος ἡμαῦράκε τὰ πολλά' Gaisford.

§ 18. τὸ δέ, οἷον εἴ τις...ἀναγκαῖον.] The auctor ad Heren. II 25, 39, gives two 'signs' of an opposite, fallacious, or refutable character, derived from the same sources, *Necesse est quoniam pallet aegrotasse: aut, necesse est peperisse, quoniam sustinet puerum infantem*. These illustrations had doubtless become traditional, and commonplaces in the rhetorical books.

πνευστιᾶν] 'to have an affection or disease of the breath'. A large class of verbs in αω and ιαω are either desiderative (like those in εαω and in Latin in *urio*) or expressive of an affection, usually some form of disease; the latter can be extended to a 'mental' affection. Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 330, Obs. 3 *e* and Obs. 4, would separate these into two classes (1) desideratives in αω and ιαω, and (2) verbs in ιαω, which express a state of sickness [Kühner's *Ausführliche Grammatik* § 328. 8]. Buttman also in his *Gr. Gr.* § 119 and p. 294 (Engl. Transl.) assumes a distinction between some varieties of them, which is not very clearly made out. They fall under three heads, first desideratives, second imitatives (as

οὖν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ νῦν· μᾶλλον δὲ φανερώς τυραννῶν, to play the tyrant); "but," he adds, "it is improper to rank verbs denoting *diseases* (the third), ὀφθαλμῶν, ὑδερῶν, ψωρῶν, &c., in the same class (as the imitatives);" these belong rather to a preceding division, viz. verbs in *αι* formed from nouns, "and expressing, chiefly, the having a thing or quality, and performing an action; as κομᾶν, χολᾶν, βοᾶν, γοᾶν, τολμᾶν."

A much better and more exact account of these forms of verbs, in respect of the connexion and distinction of their senses, is to be found in Lobeck's learned note on Phrynichus, p. 79—83. "Verbs in *ῶν* and *ῖν*," (this is not true of *all* these verbs and requires qualification; δαμῶν, γειτνῶν, περῶν, for instance, can hardly be said to denote either a bodily, or mental affection. It should be "*some* verbs" or "a large class of verbs in *αι*" "in *δοῖν* forms, are properly used of affections of mind and body. σπληνῶν, τὸν σπλῆνα ἀλγεῖν, λιθῖν, κριθῖν, μολυβδιῶν express bodily ailments; δυσερωτῖν, νυμφῖν, πασχητῖν, and all *desideratives* (which have either of these terminations) express some affections of the mind, either as a malady, a longing, or in some other form." This is an amplification of what Lobeck actually says: and it is *also* I think implied that the bodily affection is the primary signification, which is extended by metaphor to the mental. A long list of examples is there given, chiefly of rarer words. I have collected some examples from various Greek writers, which, as most of them do not appear in Lobeck's list, or in the grammars, I will here add.

In Aristophanes, as was to be expected, they most abound. ὀφθαλμῶν Ran. 192, βουβωνῶν ib. 1280, ληματῶν 494, ὠρακῶν 481 and Pac. 702, δαιμονῶν, δαιμονῶν Thesm. 1054 (and in Aeschylus, Eur., Xenoph.), στρατηγῶν (quoted by Schol. on Ran. 965, Xen. Anab. VII c. 33, Dem. de F. L. § 337 "to have an itch or mania for commanding an army"), εὐρωτῶν Nub. 44, λημῶν 326, μαθητῶν 183, χειρητῶν 1387, σιφυλλῶν Eq. 81, κορυβαντῶν Vesp. 8, βουλιμῶν Plut. 870, φονῶν Soph. Phil. 1209 (Hesych. τὸ ἐπὶ φόνον μαίνεισθαι), τομῶν Aj. 589 (τομῆς ἐπιθυμῶν, Schol.), θανατῶν Schol. ad Phil. I c., θανατῶν (to long for death) Plut. Phaed. 64 B, ναυτῶν Theaet. 191 A, Legg. I 639 B, κησιῶν Gorg. 494 E, ψωρῶν καὶ κησιῶν ib. c. (Arist. Eccles. 919), ποδαγρῶν Alcib. II 139 E, 140 A. In Aristotle we have σπονδαρχῶν (to be infected with the disease of office-hunting), Pol. VII (v) 5 sub fin., αγωνῶν, of mental distress or anxiety, Rhet. I 9, 21. Many in the works on Nat. Hist., as ταυρῶν, σκυζᾶν, ὄργᾶν, καπρίῶν (or καπρῶν), all implying a sexual impulse, Hist. An. VI 18 §§ 12, 14, 17, VI 20, 4; ποδαγρῶν VI 21, 5, σατυρῶν de Gen. An. IV 3, 22, ὑδρωπῶν ib. v. 8, 13, ἐξυδρωπῶν ib. v 20, 5, στραγγουριῶν (also Arist. Thesm. 616, Plat. Legg. XI 2, 916 A, στραγγουριῶν, λιθῶν). Theophr. π. ἀλασυνείας, ἀνητῶν, "to have a mania, or itch, for buying", Diog. Laert. vit. Plat. III 18 "οἱ λόγοι σου, φησὶν (ὁ Διονυσίος), γεροντιῶσιν" (are infected with, smack of, old age), καὶ ὅς, (ὁ Πλάτων), "σοῦ δέ γε τυραννῶσιν". (If this is the passage referred to by Buttm. in quoting the verb τυραννῶν in his Grammar, above cited—no reference is given—he is wrong both in attributing to it the sense of "imitation", and in assigning it to a separate class.)

καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν ἀσυλλόγιστα ἔστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς διώριστα περὶ αὐτῶν. παράδειγμα δὲ ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ περὶ ποῖα ἐπαγωγὴ, εἴρηται· ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὔθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος οὔθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμώτερον δὲ θάτερον ἢ θατέρον, παράδειγμά ἐστιν. οἷον ὅτι ἐπιβουλεύει τυραννίδι Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακὴν· καὶ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ἤτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράννευσε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις· καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους p. 10. ἴσασι, παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου,

ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς] Anal. Pr. II 27.

§ 19. ἄμφω ἢ.] This union of neuter dual with verb singular, following the analogy of neuter plural in the same construction, is illustrated in Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 384, Obs. 1. [Kühner's *Ausf. Gram.* § 364.]

οἷον ὅτι ἐπιβουλεύει τυραννίδι Διονύσιος κ.τ.λ.] The stratagem by which Dionysius actually succeeded in obtaining his body-guard (496 B.C.) contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Syracusan citizens is related by Diodorus, XIII 95. See Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. x. p. 610—614. Aristotle again refers to the attempt, Pol. III 15 ult. On the similar, and equally successful attempt of Pisistratus, Grote, *H. G.* Vol. III p. 208, 209. This occurred at his *first* usurpation of government B.C. 560. (Grote, Clinton.) Theagenes of Megara (Grote, *H. G.* Vol. III p. 59, 60) is mentioned by Aristotle, Pol. VIII (v) 5 sub fin., together with Pisistratus and Dionysius, as one of those who had succeeded in making themselves tyrants of their native countries, by imposing upon the popular party; Aristotle notices the stratagem by which he effected his purpose (τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη ἀποσφάξας, λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπινέμεντας). Thucydides also, I 126, mentions him as having assisted Cylon in the attempt which he also made on the tyranny at Athens; Herod. v. 71. Cylon was his son-in-law, Thuc. u.s. Cylon's attempt was made in 620 B.C. (Clint. *F. H.* sub anno), and Theagenes κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ἐτυράννευε Μεγάρων (Thuc.). Cylon's attempt (and consequently the tyranny of Theagenes) took place, says Herodotus u.s., "before the age of Pisistratus." Theagenes was contemporary with Periander of Corinth, whose reign lasted from B.C. 625—585 (Grote u.s. p. 58).

αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακὴν] Plat. Rep. VIII 16, 566 B, τὸ δὲ τυραννικὸν αἶτημα τὸ πολυθρύλιτον ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φυλακὰς τινὰς τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ἢ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός. Herod. I 59, of Pisistratus. Infr. ad I 8, 4.

ὃν οὐκ ἴσασι πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα  
ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλευὼν τυραννίδι  
φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ.

ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν λέγονται αἱ δοκοῦσαι εἶναι πίστεις P. 1358.  
ἀποδεικτικά, εἴρηται. τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων μεγίστη  
20 διαφορὰ καὶ μάλιστα λεληθυῖα σχεδὸν πάντας ἐστὶν  
ἥπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλο-  
γισμῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν  
ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν [μέθοδον τῶν συλλο-  
γισμῶν], τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ δυνάμεις, τὰς  
μὲν οὔσας τὰς δ' οὔπω κατειλημμένας· διὸ καὶ λαν-  
θάνουσι τε [τοὺς ἀκροατάς], καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι

ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου] “under the same universal”, i.e. genus or species; which stand to the species or individuals subordinate to each respectively, in the relation of universal to particular. τὸ καθόλου is that which is universally predicable, or predicable of every member of a class. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 ὁ 29, τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου καὶ τὸ ὅλως λεγόμενον ὡς ὅλον τι ὃν οὕτως ἐστὶ καθόλου ὡς πολλὰ περιέχον τῷ κατηγορεῖσθαι καθ' ἑκάστου καὶ ἐν ἅπαντα εἶναι ὡς ἕκαστον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον, ἵππον, θεόν, ὅτι ἅπαντα ζῷα. Ib. Z 13, 1038 ὁ 11, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὁ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. Anal. Post. I 4, 73 ὁ 26, καθόλου δὲ λέγω ὁ ἂν κατὰ πάν-  
τος τε ὑπάρχη καὶ καθ' αὐτό καὶ ἡ αὐτό (see Waitz, *Comm.* p. 315), of which the triangle is given as an exemplification, as the universal notion of all three-sided figures; applicable to any one of them, τὸ τυχόν, and πρῶ-  
τον, the highest or primary conception of triangles (the ἰσοσκελές, for ex-  
ample, a subordinate species, being only secondary): τὸ καθόλου δὲ ὑπάρχει  
τότε, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ τυχόντος καὶ πρώτου δεικνύηται. Thus the καθόλου is equi-  
valent to the γένος under which all the species and individuals of the  
entire class are included, ὁ κατὰ πάντων κατηγορεῖται, and is opposed to  
καθ' ἕκαστον and κατὰ μέρος.

§ 20. κατειλημμένας] ‘fixed, established, settled’. καταλαμβάνειν is  
‘to lay hold of, to get into one's possession’, or ‘to occupy’, as an army  
occupies a conquered city or country. See the Lexicon for examples of  
this, the primary sense of the word. Thence it passes into the significa-  
tion of ‘binding’ as by an oath, Herod. IX. 106, πίστι τε καταλαβόντες καὶ  
ὀρκίοισι ἐμμένειν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι. Thuc. V 21 (σπονδὰς) εὖρον κατει-  
λημμένας (settled or concluded, ‘confirmed’, Schöf. ἰσχυράς) VIII 63, 3, τὰ  
ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἔτι βεβαιώτερον κατέλαβον (they secured, established  
or confirmed their interest in the army, Arnold). Plat. Legg. VII 23, 823 A,  
τὰ ταῖς ζημίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα (*comprehensa et firmata*, Stallbaum).  
Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 2, 1324 ὁ 21, τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν,  
(*fest gesetzte*, Stahr). Eth. Nic. X. 10, 1179 ὁ 18, τὰ ἐκ πάλαιου τοῖς ἡθεσι  
κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστήσασθαι.

κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουνσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν. μᾶλλον δὲ  
 21 σαφὲς ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον διὰ πλειόνων ῥηθέν. λέγω  
 γὰρ διαλεκτικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικούς συλλογισμούς  
 εἶναι περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ  
 κοινῇ περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν  
 καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἶδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλ-  
 λον καὶ ἥττον τρόπος· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔσται ἐκ  
 τούτου συλλογίσασθαι ἢ ἐνθύμημα εἰπεῖν περὶ δικαίων

τοὺς ἀκροατάς] should be omitted, with Muretus, Vater, and Spengel. The 'oversight' in question applies only to the rhetoricians, not to the audience.

καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουνσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν] μᾶλλον belongs to ἀπτόμενοι ἀπὸ μεταβαίνουνσιν, "the more they handle their subject according to the 'appropriate method', the more they pass out of, or stray beyond, transgress the limits of, the true province of Rhetoric". κατὰ τρόπον is equivalent or nearly so τὸ δειόντως, 'duly', 'in the right and proper way'; and is often found in Plato opposed to ἀπὸ τρόπου. πρῶτον τοῦ καθήκοντος, Schol. ad Theaet. 143 C. Gaisford from Steph. *Thesaurus* supplies examples from Plato and Isocrates, and others will be found in Stallbaum's note on Rep. v 16, 470 B. δειόντως itself appears in three MSS after τρόπον, being doubtless, as Gaisford supposes, a gloss on the preceding. I have followed Mr Poste, *Intro. to Transl. of Post. Anal.* p. 20, n. 3, in translating κατὰ τρόπον, 'the appropriate method', 'in the right way, or in due order', and it may very well bear that meaning. It will therefore be equivalent to κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν μέθοδον, the method which confines itself to the peculiar principles, the ἰδία or οἰκίαί ἀρχαί, of the special science which it investigates. μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον is equivalent to, and explained by, ὅσα τις ἂν βέλτερόν ἐκλέγεται τὰς προτάσεις, near the end of the next section, § 21; and the ἀρχαί, which are spoken of immediately afterwards, ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχη ἀρχαίς, are the ἰδία ἀρχαί, the special principles of each particular science above mentioned. Dialectics and Rhetoric have no such special principles, and their method is the 'inappropriate'. Gaisford follows Muretus in inserting ἡ before κατὰ τρόπον 'by handling them too properly'. The other interpretation seems preferable in itself, and requires no alteration. μεταβαίνειν is μεταβαίνειν εἰς ἄλλο γένος, technically used of passing from one science to another, and illicitly transferring its appropriate principles. *Comp.* I 4, 6. See Poste, u.s. p. 51, note 1, for examples from the *Organon*. Add *Top.* Θ 11, 161 a 33. *Anal. Post.* I 7 treats of this subject.

On κοινὰ and οἰκίαί ἀρχαί see *Intro.* p. 73 note and the references there given.

§ 21. περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν] (περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν): to which we apply the term 'the τόποι, *par excellence*'; the κοινὸι τόποι, namely. See below, § 22; and for this treatment of them, II 19.

AR. I.

ἡ φυσικῶν ἢ περὶ ὁτουοῦν. καίτοι ταῦτα εἶδει διαφέρει. ἴδια δέ, ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γένος προτάσεων ἐστίν, οἷον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσὶ προτάσεις ἐξ ὧν οὔτε ἐνθύμημα οὔτε συλλογισμός ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλαι ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἔσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντων. κάκεῖνα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει περὶ οὐδὲν γένος ἔμφρονα· περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἐστίν· ταῦτα δέ, ὅσῳ τις ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγεται τὰς προτάσεις, λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς· ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥητορικὴ ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἔσται ἧς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς.  
22 ἔστι δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν λεγόμενα τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἰδίων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν

ἴδια δέ, ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γένος προτάσεων ἐστὶ] *εἶδος καὶ γένος*, species or genus, whichever you please. In any classification the same member may be either genus or species, according as it is regarded from above or below : Physics and Mathematics, for example, are either *species* in relation to the genus Philosophy, or again *genera* in relation to the subordinate *species*, Psychology (so all the ancient philosophers) and Natural History of the one, and Geometry and Arithmetic of the other. Only the *summum genus* and the *infima species* are not thus interchangeable.

κάκεῖνα μὲν—ἔμφρονα] 'The former, the κοῖνοι τόποι, will make no one any the wiser, will convey no intelligence or instruction to any one, about any class of things'. This is the διδασκαλία or genuine instruction that belongs to science, διδασκαλίας γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος (I 1, 12 ; see note on p. 23) ; comp. I 4, 4, διὰ τὸ μῆτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι τέχνης, ἀλλ' ἔμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς. Plato has employed the word in the same way, Legg. VII 14, 809 D τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους περὶ αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἔμφρονας ἀπεργάζονται.—ἔμφρων belongs to the class of adjectives compounded with ἐν, in which the preposition expresses the indwelling or inherence of something in something else, ἔμφυχος (with soul in it, containing life, animated), ἔνθεος, ἔνθους, ἐνθρος, ἔμπρους, ἔμψοφος, ἔγχυμος, ἐντρίχος, ἐνδικος, ἐντομα (insects), Ar. Hist. An. IV 1, 5, ἐστὶ δ' ἐντομα ὅσα κατὰ τοῦνομα ἐστὶν ἐντομάς ἐχοῦντα κ.τ.λ.

ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς] ἄλλος, a comparative in *form* as well as in *sense*, naturally, like ἕτερος, διάφορος, διαφέρων, *et sim.*, takes the same construction, with the genitive. On the comparative form of ἄλλος see Donaldson, *New Crat.* §§ 165, 166.

οὐκέτι] See note on I 1, 7 on ἤδη &c. esp. p. 14.

κοινῶν ἐλάττω. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, καὶ  
ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἶδη καὶ p. 11  
τοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον. λέγω δ' εἶδη μὲν τὰς  
καθ' ἑκάστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοὺς  
κοινούς ὁμοίως πάντων. πρότερον οὖν εἴπωμεν περὶ  
τῶν εἰδῶν· πρῶτον δὲ λάβωμεν τὰ γένη τῆς ῥητο-  
ρικῆς, ὅπως διελόμενοι πόσα ἐστί, περὶ τούτων χωρὶς  
λαμβάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις.

1 ἔστι δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς γένη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν· CHAP. II  
τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν  
ὄντες. σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τε  
τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὃν, καὶ τὸ

§ 22. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς—ληπτέον] 'Cum tanta formarum  
(i.e. τῶν εἰδῶν) locorumque differentia sit, quantam ipse supra demonstravit :  
ut scilicet illae fraudi dialectico et oratori, non recte usurpatae ab ipsis, esse  
possint, loci nullum tale periculum secum portent : aliaque etiam discrimina  
sint, affirmat oportere distinguere enthymematum species appellatas  
ab his qui loci vocantur, ex quibus illa ipsa promuntur : ut in Topicis  
factum est, ita etiam in his qui oratorem instruunt libris.' Victorius. 'We  
must *here* also, as well as in Dialectics, carefully distinguish the sources  
and materials (ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον) from which the special and the general  
topics are to be derived'.

πρότασις, a logical or rhetorical premiss or proposition, in syllogism  
or enthymeme : propositio praemissa, 'est enim προτείνειν' (Top. Θ 1,  
155 b 34, 38), vel προτείνεσθαι (ib. c. 14, 164 b 4 &c.) eas propositiones  
constituere unde conclusio efficiatur.' Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* § 2, p. 53.

τὰ στοιχεῖα] On στοιχεῖα, 'the elements' of rhetorical reasoning, see  
Introduct. p. 127. Add to the illustrations there given Rhet. ad Alex. c. 36  
(37) 9, στοιχεῖα κοινὰ κατὰ πάντων, apparently in this sense.

### CHAP. III.

The triple division of Rhetoric, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν,  
is, as we learn from Quintilian, II 21, 23, III 4, 1, and 7, 1, due to  
Aristotle : Anaximenes, his predecessor, had admitted only two *genera*,  
with seven *species* subordinate to these, III 4, 9.

Almost all writers (*prope omnes*) on the subject, subsequent to Ari-  
stotle, had accepted his division, as proceeding from the 'highest autho-  
rity' (*utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis*) III 4, 1. Quintilian in  
this fourth chapter mentions, besides Aristotle's division, those which  
were adopted by Anaximenes, Protagoras, Plato (in the Sophist), and  
Isocrates. He decides in favour of Aristotle's, as the safest to follow,  
both because the preponderance of authority is on its side, and also  
because it is the most reasonable.



τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστι, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν.  
 2 ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτὴν,  
 κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων. ἔστι  
 δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων οἶον ἐκκλησια-  
 στής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων οἶον ὁ δικαστής,  
 3 ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
 αὖ εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβου-

§ 2. θεωρὸν ἢ κριτὴν] This classification of the different kinds of 'audience' is made for the purpose of determining the divisions of Rhetoric; because, the audience being the end and object of the speech, that to which every speech is ultimately referred, and everything being defined or determined by its end (τέλος, Eth. Nic. III 10, 1115 b 23), the number of the varieties of audiences must fix the number of the divisions or branches of Rhetoric. Audiences are of two kinds; either mere 'spectators', like the *θεαταί* in a theatre, at the games, or in any exhibition where amusement is the object, or at all events where there is no interest of a *practical* character or tendency<sup>1</sup>; or else 'judges', where some real interest is at stake, and they are called upon to pronounce a decision (*pars negotialis*, *πραγματική* Quint.). But these decisions, and those who pronounce them, again fall into two classes, according as they are referred to questions, (1) of political expediency and look to the *future*, or (2) of right or wrong in respect of *past* acts or facts.

So that we have three kinds of audiences, and consequently three branches of Rhetoric. The public or national assembly, to which the *deliberative* kind of rhetoric is addressed; the law-courts and their 'judges', properly so called, the object of the *forensic* or *judicial* branch of the art; and thirdly the 'spectators', those who go to be amused or interested by the show-speeches, or *ἐπιδείξεις*, the Panegyrics (in two senses), funeral orations, burlesques, or whatever other form may be taken by speeches composed merely to display skill in composition without practical interest (where the *δύναμις*, the faculty, or skill shewn, is only in question); or, if they please, to criticise them, and so become 'critics'.

The term *κριτής*, 'judge', which belongs properly only to the second of the three branches, may also be extended to the other two, since they all have to 'decide' in some sense, to choose between opposite views, either on questions of expediency in matters of state, or right and wrong in legal questions, or the merits of a composition as 'critics'. Comp. II 18, 1, III 12, 5, and also Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18 (19), 14, where (comp. § 10) *κριταί* seems to be used in this general sense for all kinds of *ἀκροαταί*.

<sup>1</sup> Thuc. III. 38 (Cleon to the Athenian assembly), αἱ τοὶ δ' ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγνοοθετοῦντες, οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, κ.τ.λ. "You go to the public assembly as you go to the theatre, merely in quest of intellectual excitement. You go as *θεαταί* or *θεωροί*, that is, merely for your amusement; and not as *κριταί*, that is, carefully weighing the matter of what is said, in order to adopt it in your practice or reject it." Arnold.

λευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν. συμβουλευῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπὴ τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή· αἰεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδία συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν. δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν κατηγορία τὸ δ' ἀπολογία· τούτων γὰρ ὅποτερονοῦν ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. ἐπιδεικτικῷ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος  
 4 τὸ δὲ ψόγος. χρόνοι δὲ ἐκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν συμβουλευόντι ὁ μέλλων (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβουλευεῖ ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων), τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γενόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων αἰεὶ ὁ μὲν κατηγορεῖ ὁ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δ' ἐπιδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ παρών, κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσιν ἢ ψέγουσι πάντες, προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀναμιμνήσκοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα  
 5 προεικάζοντες. τέλος δὲ ἐκάστοις τούτων ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὖσι τρία, τῷ μὲ συμβουλευόντι τὸ συμφέ-

§ 3. ἐπιδεικτικόν] 'ea quae constat laude ac vituperatione. Quod genus videtur Aristoteles, atque eum secutus Theophrastus, a parte negotiali, hoc est πραγματικῇ, remouisse, totamque ad solos auditores relegasse; et id eius nominis, quod ab ostentatione ducitur, proprium est.' Quint. III 7, 1.

οἱ ἰδία συμβουλευόντες] II 18, 1, ἂν τε πρὸς ἓνα τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος προτρέπῃ ἢ ἀποτρέπῃ, οἷον οἱ νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες.

ὅποτερονοῦν] Append. [This Appendix was apparently never written. S.]

§ 4. χρόνοι—τῷ μὲν συμβουλευόντι ὁ μέλλων] I have already pointed out, Introd. p. 120, that Demosthenes adds τὸ παρόν, 'present time', to the 'future' of Aristotle, as characteristic of the deliberative branch of Rhetoric; and Aristotle himself, in two subsequent passages of this treatise, I 6 § 1, and 8 § 7.

κυριώτατος] On κύριος, in its secondary and metaphorical application, see note on I 11 § 4. The kind of 'authority' which this 'present time' is here said to carry with it in the epideictic branch is, that it has of all the three *the best right* to be there; that it is most 'proper' or appropriate in that place. It has here very much the same sense as in the phrases κυρία ἡμέρα, κυρία ἐκκλησία, a day or assembly which has a special authority, as 'fixed' and 'appointed' for a certain purpose; opposed to all ordinary days, and irregular assemblies, which are σύγκλητοι, called together at a moment's notice on special emergencies.

τὰ γενόμενα—τὰ μέλλοντα] The accusatives are here attracted by the participles, instead of following the principal verb in the dative.

προεικάζοντες] 'with, in the way of, an anticipatory guess or presentiment', of future honours and distinctions of the subject of the encomium.

ρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν· τοῖς δὲ δικαζομένοις τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα· τοῖς δ' ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ψεύγουσι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον ἐκάστοις τέλος· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίστε οὐκ ἂν ἀμφισβητήσαιεν, οἷον ὁ δικαζόμενος ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔβλαψεν· ὅτι δ' ἀδικεῖ, οὐδέ ποτ' ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει δίκης. ὁμοίως δὲ

p. 12.

§ 5. ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον ἀποτρέπει.] 'Fr. A. Wolf's *einleuchtende verbesserung* ὡς χείρονος *findet einige bestätigung in den ungrammatischen Worten der paraphrase: ἐποτρέπει δὲ τῷ χείρονι*' (Brandis, ap. Schneid. *Philol.* p. 45). This alteration seems to me to be totally unnecessary. It is true that the ordinary construction of the verb in the sense here intended is ἀποτρέπειν τινὰ τινος, or ἀπὸ τινος, as § 6, 'to divert or dissuade some one from something'. But it is plain it can equally well be adapted to the other form of expression adopted here, 'to divert the thing from the person—in the way of dissuasion—to turn it away from him, as (being) worse', i.e. 'to dissuade him from it (as the Greeks as well as ourselves usually say) as the less expedient course'. An author like Aristotle, always regardless of the ordinary usages of language, may very well be allowed such a liberty of expression. If, however, this be still objected to, we may, without alteration of the text—to be admitted I think, as a general rule, only as a last resource—understand ὡς χεῖρον as an absolute case, nomin. or accus., ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον (ὄν τι), ἀποτρέπει (τινὰ αὐτοῦ). See similar examples in note on II 8, 10.

πρὸς τοῦτο] 'with a view to, with reference to, this'; all the rest (τὰ ἄλλα) as supplementary and subordinate to this.

συμπαραλαμβάνει] 'takes in as an adjunct, in aid of, as an auxiliary, subordinate and subsidiary, to his main purpose'; de Anima A 2, 1, τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφάνητο. Plat. Phaed. 65 A εἰάν τις αὐτὸ (τὸ σῶμα) ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ. Ib. 84 D, Lach. 179 E. Spengel ad Rhet. ad Alex. xxv 8, p. 192.

τοῖς δὲ δικαζομένοις] τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ.

ἐπαναφέρουσι] 're-fer' (ἀναφέρειν) 'to' (ἐπὶ).

§ 6. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ.] On the 'legal issues' here intimated, the ἀμφισβητήσεις (Aristotle), or στάσεις (subsequent Rhetoricians and Lawyers), comp. I 13, 9; III 15, 2; 16, 6; 17, 1, and Intro. p. 397, Append. E to Bk. III.

καὶ οἱ συμβουλευόντες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προ-  
 ενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμβουλευέουσιν ἢ ἀπ' ὠφε-  
 λίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν ὡς δ' οὐκ  
 ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς  
 μηδὲν ἀδικούντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. ὁμοίως  
 δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ψέγοντες οὐ σκοποῦσιν P. 1359  
 εἰ συμφέροντα ἔπραξεν ἢ βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν  
 ἐπαίνῳ πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὀλιγωρήσας τοῦ αὐτῷ  
 λυσιτελοῦντος ἔπραξέ τι καλόν, οἷον Ἀχιλλεῖα ἐπαι-  
 νοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἐταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι  
 δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν, ἐξὸν ζῆν. τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν  
 τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον.  
 7 φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τούτων

ὡς δ' οὐκ ἄδικον] (i.e. τοῦ λέγειν ὡς, or τοῦ ὡς, 'the fact that'), οὐδὲν  
 φροντίζουσιν. On the necessary limitation and qualification of this posi-  
 tion of Aristotle, see Introd. p. 170.

ἐν ἐπαίνῳ πολλάκις τιθέασιν κ.τ.λ.] Isocrates gives credit to the Athenian  
 people, ἐν ἐπαίνῳ τίθησιν, for this kind of disinterested policy, in a passage  
 referred to by Victorius. Paneg. § 53 Ἀχιλλεῖα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε κ.τ.λ.  
 Plat. Symp. 179 E πεπυσμένος παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς ὡς ἀποθανοῖτο ἀποκτεῖνας  
 Ἑκτορα, μὴ ποιήσας δὲ τοῦτο οἶκαδ' ἐλθὼν γηραιὸς τελευτήσοι, ἐτόλμησεν  
 εἰσελθεῖν βοηθήσας τῷ ἔραστῇ Πατρόκλῳ καὶ τιμωρήσας οὐ μόνον ὑπεραποθα-  
 νεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαποθανεῖν τετελευτηκότι. Apol. 28 C ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς  
 τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομῆναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ  
 εἶπεν ἢ μνητὴρ αὐτῷ προθυμωμένη Ἑκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, Θεὸς οὐσα, οὕτωςί πως,  
 ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἑκτορα  
 ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἑκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος  
 (Hom. Il. 2 98 εἰ ἡν/γα αὐτίκα τεθναῖην κ.τ.λ. v. 104) ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας κ.τ.λ.  
 comp. Il. I 410 seq. Aeschines likewise, c. Timarch. §§ 145, 150, refers  
 to (in the one) and quotes (in the other) this same passage of Hom. Il.  
 2. u. s., but with a totally different purpose.

τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν (ζῆουζῃ life) συμφέρον]  
 Eth. Nic. IX. 8, 1169 a 18, ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τῶν φίλων ἔνεκα  
 πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κὰν δὲ ὑπεραποθνήσκῃ... τοῖς δ' ὑπεραπο-  
 θνήσκουσι τούτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἰρούνται δὲ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς.

§ 7. The argument of this and the two following sections of this  
 chapter will be found in a more connected shape in the paraphrase of  
 the Introd. pp. 171—2. The sum of it is simply this: each of the two  
 kinds of τόποι is equally necessary in all the three branches of Rhetoric;  
 (1) the εἶδη, or ἴδιοι τόποι, or ἴδια, from which the rhetorical propositions or  
 premisses, the εἰκότα, σημεία, and τεκμήρια are necessarily derived, § 7:  
 and (2) the four κοινὸι τόποι, here apparently reduced to three, the possible

ἔχειν πρῶτον τὰς προτάσεις· τὰ γὰρ τεκμήρια καὶ τὰ εἰκότα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα προτάσεις εἰσὶ ρητορικά· ὅλος μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεων ἐστὶ, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶ συνεστηκὸς ἐκ τῶν εἰρη-  
 8 μένων προτάσεων. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε πραχθῆναι οἶόν τε οὔτε πραχθήσεσθαι τὰ ἀδύνατα ἀλλὰ τὰ δυνατά, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ ἐσόμενα οὐχ οἶόν τε τὰ μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι τὰ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῷ συμβουλευόντι καὶ τῷ δικαζομένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐπι-  
 9 δεικτικῷ ἔχειν προτάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μὴ, καὶ εἰ ἔσται ἢ μὴ. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ ἅπαντες καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ ψέγοντες καὶ προτρέ-  
 ποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ ἀπολογούμενοι οὐ μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύναι πειρῶν-  
 ται ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκον,  
 ἢ καθ' αὐτὰ λέγοντες ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντιπαραβάλλ-  
 λοντες, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι αὖ καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρό-  
 τητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος προτάσεις ἔχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου, οἷον τί μείζον  
 ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἐλάττον ἢ ἀδίκημα ἢ δικαίωμα· ὁμοίως δὲ

p. 13.

and impossible', 'fact past and future', and 'the great and small (the topic of magnitude or importance) either (1) absolute or (2) comparative (degree)'. §§ 8, 9.

§ 9. δικαίωμα] is used here and in c. 13 §§ 1, 3, as the opposite to ἀδίκημα, in the sense of 'an act of justice'. So Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 a 8, διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἀδικον μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει' (i. q. νόμῳ, natural or of human institution.) τὸ δ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ὅταν πραχθῇ ἀδικημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι οὐπω, ἀλλ' ἀδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπαιρόμενον τοῦ ἀδικήματος : where in the first clause it is used in its *ordinary acceptance* as 'a just act', = δικαιοπράγημα, and contrasted with ἀδίκημα, and afterwards distinguished from it in the more correct sense of 'a *rectification* of an act of injustice'. It is in this signification that Plato employs it, Legg. ix 8, 864 E, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δικαιο-  
 μάτων ἀφελισθῶ, 'all other penalties', which are as it were 'amendments of a wrong or injustice'. In Thuc. i 41 init. it stands for 'just claims', 'rechtsgründe', Poppe; *rechtsanspruch*, Heitz, l. c. In Arist. de Caelo,

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἴρηται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαιρετέον ἰδία περὶ ἐκάστου τούτων, οἷον περὶ ὧν συμβουλή καὶ περὶ ὧν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὧν αἱ δίκαι.

- 1 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ CHAP. IV.  
ὁ συμβουλευὼν συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἅπαντα  
2 ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή. ὅσα δὲ ἐξ  
ἀνάγκης ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι,  
3 περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ  
τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἓνια

1 10, 1, it has a sense either derived from that rectification or amendment, an *ἐπανόρθωμα* of a wrong view or argument, μᾶλλον ἢ εἴη πιστὰ τὰ μέλλοντα λεχθήσεσθαι προακηκούσι τὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων δικαίωμα: or rather, as in Thucydides, it denotes a justification or just claim, meaning what the conflicting arguments have each of them to say for themselves. δικαίωμα 'actio iuris, exsecutio iuris, iustificatio, ex qua (per arbitrum) status iustus qui erat violatus restituitur: nam δικαιοῦν est facere ut quid sit δίκαιον'. Fritsche ad Eth. Eudem. Δ 10, 1135 a 13 (p. 109) q. v., Heitz, *Verh. Schrift. Arist.* p. 253.

οἷον] 'for example', one of *several*, is used here, as constantly elsewhere, loosely and carelessly, by Aristotle, in the place of τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, *id est*, *videlicet*, as a more explanatory repetition.

#### CHAP. IV.

§ 1. On the first of the three branches of Rhetoric, τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν or δημηγορικὸν γένος.

§ 2. εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι] This 'fundamental antithesis' and cardinal distinction of ancient philosophy is noticed by Gaisford, incredible as it may appear, for the sole purpose of making merry with it as a sophistical quibble! 'Has *Sophistarum ineptias* facete ridet Antiphanes apud Athenaeum, III 99 A.'

περὶ δὲ τούτων] See note on δῆλον δέ, c. 1 § 11 p. 20.

§ 3. καὶ φύσει...καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ] This same distinction of goods naturally and accidentally accruing to us, is found in Eth. Eud. I 3, 5, 1215 a 12, εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γενομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἔστιν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς. These are opposed to those advantages and objects of desire the acquisition of which depends upon ourselves and our own exertions and studies. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δι' ἐπιμελείας ἢ κτήσεως οὐδὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας compared with ὅσα πείθουκεν ἀνάγκη εἰς ἡμᾶς (to be referred to ourselves), καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν. The gifts of nature and the good things that result from accident cannot be included amongst the possible advantages,

καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου τὸ συμβουλευεῖν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ἕως ἂν εὕρωμεν εἰ ἡμῖν P. 1359 h.

4 δυνάτᾳ ἢ ἀδύνατᾳ πρᾶξαι. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἶδη περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν, ἔτι δ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται περὶ

the 'profitable' or 'expedient', which are the object and aim of the deliberative speaker, because they are not attainable by any exertions of our own; and so for the purposes of Rhetoric are just as useless as things necessary and impossible. The subjects of Rhetoric are the subjects of deliberation, and no one deliberates about anything which is beyond the sphere of his influence.

πρὸ ἔργου] Note on c. 1 § 10 p. 17.

ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι] (τὸ συμβουλευεῖν ἐστὶ) περὶ ὅσων κ.τ.λ.

§ 4. The following passage, §§ 4—6, descriptive of the rhetorical method and its necessary limitations, and the distinction between it and the method of scientific demonstration, one of the most important in the entire work, will be found almost literally translated in the Introduction, pp. 173—4, to which the reader is referred.

ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι] 'to make an exact numerical division', or 'to enumerate in an exact division or analysis'. Plat. Phaed. 273 E, Crat. 437 D, Gorg. 501 A, Legg. I 633 A, *et alibi*. It is used in a general sense of 'accurate distinction'.

διαλαβεῖν] 'to part, separate, divide, distinguish', is also familiar to Plato, Polit. 147 E, τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν, Symp. 222 E, ἵνα χωρὶς ἡμᾶς διαλάβῃ, Phileb. 23 C, πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα...διχῇ διαλάβωμεν, and numerous examples in Ast's Index, s. v.; and still more so διαιρεῖν in the same sense, and διαιρέσεις, Sophist. 225 A, διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα, Polit. 262 D, κατ' εἶδη δύο διαιρεῖν, ib. 283 D, διελωμεν αὐτὴν δύο μέρη, Phaedr. 273 E, κατ' εἶδη διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα. διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἶδη, 'to classify by genera and species'. Similarly διορίζειν.

περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν] 'the subjects of ordinary business, i. e. deliberation (in the assembly)'. χρηματίζειν, which is properly to 'transact χρήματα or business' in general, is here 'transferred' by metaphor (of the class ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος, Poet. XXI 7), to the special signification of the particular kind of business which is transacted in the general assembly, its debates and consultations; so Pol. VI (IV), 14, 1298 b 29, καὶ περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν (of a general assembly as opposed to a βουλή or πρόβουλοι) περὶ ὧν ἂν οὗτοι προβουλευσωσιν. Ib. c. 15, 1299 b 39, ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἐν αἷς ὁ δῆμος χρηματίζει περὶ πάντων (holds its assemblies and discusses everything). Also to the consultations of the law-courts,

αὐτῶν διορίσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ζητεῖν διὰ τὸ μήτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς

Demosth. c. Timocr. p. 717, 26, περὶ ὧν ἂν γνῶ τὸ δικαστήριον, πάλιν χρηματίζειν: and again, v. 28, to the deliberations of the assembly. Æschin. c. Timarch. § 23, of the πρόεδροι. Lastly, Demosth. de F. L. p. 430, 24, § 317, applies it to the intrigues of individuals, οὗτοι δ' οὐδὲν ἐπαύσαντο ἰδίᾳ χρηματίζοντες.

κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν...ἐμφρονεστέρως καὶ μάλλον ἀληθινῆς] of the scientific method which has 'certainty' or necessary truth for its aim and object, as opposed to the popular method of Dialectics and Rhetoric, which has no higher aim than *probable* opinion, πρὸς δόξαν. Top. A 14, 105 b 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν (true philosophy, science) κατ' ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν. See references in Introd. p. 173, note 1. Add, Anal. Post. I 33, 88 b 30, τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. Eth. Nic. III 4, 1112 a 8, δοξάζομεν ἂ οὐ πάντ' ἴσμεν. On δόξα in general, see Waitz *Comm. ad Org.* p. 444. On ἐμφρονεστέρως, 'more intelligent, wiser, more instructive', see above, note on c. 2 § 21 p. 50.

διὰ τὸ μήτε...πολλῶς δέ...] Wolf and MS A<sup>c</sup> have πολλῶς τε, which is of course the more regular and strictly grammatical usage. On the general question of the meaning and distinctions of καί, δέ, and τε, with and without the negative, see Hermann's excellent dissertation in his Review of Elmsley's *Medea*, on lines 4, 5. Porson, Elmsley, and their English followers were in the habit of laying down rigorous and inflexible rules of Greek grammar, which were supposed to admit of no exception; any apparent violation of them was to be summarily emended: one of the great services rendered by Hermann to the study of the Greek language is the relaxation of these over exact rules, and the substitution of a rational and logical explanation of these differences of expression, and the analysis of their distinctions, for these often unwarranted alterations of the text. 'Καὶ particula est coniunctiva', says Hermann; 'τε adiunctiva; δέ disiunctiva'. In the case of οὐδέ and μηδέ, οὐτε and μήτε, when several things are subordinated to, and included under, one negative conception, the one or the other (δέ or τε) is used according as the writer had or had not any notion of a *difference* between them. If the things under the general negative conception are represented *merely* as subordinate and with no expression of difference or opposition between them, the *adnexive* τε is employed, and the formula is οὐ...τε...τε, or οὐ...οὐτε...οὐτε, and similarly with μή: on the other hand, if some difference between any of the subordinate members of the division is to be marked, τε must be replaced by δέ, and the formula will be οὐ...οὐδέ, or οὐδέ...οὐδέ, or οὐ...οὐτε...οὐτε...οὐδέ, and so on for other similar cases. And the change of τε into δέ in the second clause of the sentence before us, represents the sudden occurrence to the writer's mind of the thought that there is an important difference between the two things that are assigned as reasons for not introducing a regular scientific division into the treatment of Rhetoric (viz. its necessarily unscientific character, and the fact that its



εἶναι τέχνης ἀλλ' ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς, πολλῶ τε<sup>1</sup> πλείω δεδούσθαι καὶ νῦν αὐτῇ τῶν 5 οἰκείων θεωρημάτων· ὅπερ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον εἰρηκότες τυγχάνομεν, ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύγκειται μὲν ἕκ τε τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πολιτικῆς, ὁμοία δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τὰ

<sup>1</sup> πολλῶ δὲ (see note).

province has already been unduly extended by previous professors), which requires to be marked, and accordingly is marked by the change of the particle. This, however, is not the only irregularity in Aristotle's sentence; for, evidently intending at the commencement to include both the subordinate members under the original negative, he introduces in the second clause a positive conception; contributing perhaps to enforce the distinction of the two, but in violation of grammatical accuracy.

πλείω δεδούσθαι...τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων] 'far more has been already assigned to it than its own proper subjects of inquiry', refers doubtless to the sophistical professors of Rhetoric, his predecessors and contemporaries; who ὑποδύονται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτικῆς, and lay claim to the whole extent of the field of Politics, Rhet. I 2, 7. What this assumption of the Sophists implies is explained in Eth. Nic. X 10, 1181 a 1, τὰ δὲ πολιτικά ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι κ.τ.λ., infr. v. 13, τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρω ἐτίθεσαν κ.τ.λ.

§ 5. τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης] See note on c. I § 11, p. 19, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ.

ἀναλυτικῶς, opposed to λογικῶς (which is equivalent to διαλεκτικῶς, Waitz on Anal. Post. 82 b 35, p. 353, Poste, u. s., p. 19), properly implies scientific demonstration; and 'analytical' reasoning follows that method: see Anal. Post. I 22, 84 a 7 seq. It is there said to be exercised ἐν ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις...ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ τῶν ὅσα ὑπάρχει καθ' αὐτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν. On 'Analytics' comp. Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* p. 47 sq. Waitz *Comm. ad Anal. Pr.* p. 366, 7. When Dialectics is here called an 'analytical' science, either 'analytical' stands for 'logical' in general (which is Mr Poste's view, l. c.), or else it represents and includes methodical systematic reasoning of all kinds, which proceeds by way of 'analysis', 'resolving' the objects of knowledge into their ultimate elements, to discover their causes (Trendelenburg, l. c.); and the latter is the explanation that I should prefer.

τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πολιτικῆς] Ethics being a department or branch of the more general and comprehensive science of Politics, Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 11, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος (ἡ ἠθικὴ) τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὕσα: the end of both being the same, viz. human good, v. 6. Ib. I 10, 1029 b 29, and c. 13, init. Ib. X 10, 1180 b 31, μόριον γὰρ ἰδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. So that the two together make up the 'philosophy of humanity', of man as an individual and in society, ἡ περὶ τὰνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία, X 10, 1181 b 16.

6 δὲ τοῖς σοφιστικοῖς λόγοις. ὅσῳ δ' ἂν τις ἢ τὴν  
 διαλεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλ'  
 ἐπιστήμας πειράται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν  
 φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων p. 14.

§ 6. καθάπερ ἂν] On καθάπερ ἂν (κατασκευάζοι), see above, note on I 1, 5 p. 9.

δυνάμεις] sc. τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους, I 2, 7. On Rhetoric as a practical faculty, see Introd. pp. 14—19.

It may be as well here to sum up the characteristics of Rhetoric which respectively entitle it to the name of 'art' and 'faculty'. In so far as it is systematic, and follows a method—a logical method—and can look forward to results (implying a knowledge of causes and effects) in *persuading* its hearers, it is an art; as a practical exercise, not admitting of absolute exactness, or universal conclusions, employing the propositions of all arts and sciences, and the axioms common to them all, only as probable and popular, and having itself no special subject-matter, taking opposite sides of the same question indifferently and arriving at opposite conclusions (so Alexander Aphrodisiensis), it is a *δύναμις*, a faculty, capable of development and to be exercised in practice.

μεταβαίνειν] See on I 2, 20. Vater (who seems to have misunderstood the passage), without reason or authority, would omit the words τῷ μεταβαίνειν, as not properly applicable to the context ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων. And his view is so far supported by the Paraphrast, who also rejects them. Brandis, u. s. p. 46. No one but himself, however, would prefer to connect εἰς ἐπιστήμας with ἐπισκευάζων rather than μεταβαίνειν—a much more natural construction, though this often is certainly admissible—and secondly, the two words, though not absolutely necessary to the sense, are at least in perfect accordance with it when the passage is properly interpreted. 'In proportion as...he will be unconsciously, unintentionally, effacing their real nature by passing over, in his attempt to reconstruct them (alter their formation or system), into sciences of definite special subjects, instead of those (ἐπιστήμας) which deal with mere words', i. e. *instead of confining himself* to these latter. This is in fact a case of that very common violation of an ordinary grammatical rule which is called the 'figure', *ζευγμα*<sup>1</sup> (a mere carelessness of expression dignified by

<sup>1</sup> Of this so-called 'figure', *ζευγμα*, the illicit conjunction of the two heterogeneous notions or expressions under one *vinculum*, there are in fact two varieties, explained and abundantly illustrated from the works of Tacitus by Bötticher in his *Lex. Tacit., Proleg. de Stili Taciti breuitate*, p. LXXVIII sq., *σύλληψις* and *ζευγμα* proper. The figure in general is thus described, 'qua aut genere aut personis aut alio quo modo diversa uno eodemque constructionis genere *comprehenduntur*'; but as I have failed to enter into the distinction which Bötticher makes between the two varieties I will substitute my own explanation of the difference. In *σύλληψις* the two terms are united in one construction with a third, to which one is referred *literally*, the other *metaphorically*, or at all events in different senses. This appears in the instances given, as *dissimulationem nox et lascivia exemerat: nocte ac laetitia incaluisse: praeda famaque onusti: mixti*

εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ  
7 μὴ μόνον λόγων. ὅμως δ' ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μὲν ἐστί

that name), 'a figure of speech', as it is briefly expressed in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, 'wherein two subjects *are used jointly* with the same predicate, which strictly belongs only to one, as in Il. A 533, where ἔβη must be supplied with Ζεύς.' So Herod. 1 90, χρηστὰ ἔργα καὶ ἔπεα ποιεῖν, where of course λέγειν is required with ἔπεα. Under this head comes the case before us, where to complete the intended sense we must supply ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον (not τῷ μεταβαίνειν, but τῷ ἐπισκευάζειν ἐπιστήμας) λόγων.

ἐπισκευάζειν, 'to re-construct or re-constitute', is opposed to κατασκευάζειν. The latter is 'to lay down (κατὰ), settle or establish a system'; the former, 'to construct anew or afresh, to renew'. ἐπί, from the primary sense of direction to, *in place*, passes into a secondary one of direction or succession *in time*, 'after'; hence, thirdly, it takes the meaning of repetition, as anew, afresh, re- (in comp.), and of development in the way of growth, as in ἐπιδιδόναι 'to augment or grow'. Hence ἐπισκευάζειν is properly to 'refit', 'renew', 'repair', 'restore', as walls, ships, bridges, roads (Thucyd., Xenoph., Demosth., see the Lexx.), and thence transferred to 'reconstruction' of a science or study. A similar sense of ἐπί appears in the verbs, ἐπειπεῖν 'to say *after*, or *add* the words', ἐπαγείρειν 'to collect *after* or *in addition*', ἐπιμανθάνειν, ἐπακολοθεῖν, ἐπανθεῖν, ἐπιβιοῦν (to live *after*, outlive), ἐπαναθεῖσθαι (Xen. Cyr. V. 4, 11, to look at repeatedly, over and over again), ἐπαναχωρεῖν *ibid.*, ἐπανίαναι, ἐπανέρχασθαι, ἐπανορθοῦν. Rost. u. Palm, Lex. Art. ἐπί, p. 1046 a.

§ 7. ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μὲν ἐστί διελεῖν, ἔτι δ' ὑπολείπει σκέψιν] Another case of grammatical irregularity and of the 'figure' ζεύγμα. ὅσα in the first clause is the accus. after διελεῖν: in the second it must be *repeated*, as the nomin. to ὑπολείπει.—On πρὸ ἔργου, see *supr.* c. 1 § 10 p. 17.

*copius et laetitia.* To these I will venture to add from a modern English writer the case of Miss Bolo in *Pickwick*, who after her defeat at whist in the Bath Assembly Rooms retires 'in a flood of tears and a sedan chair'; to which Eur. Hel. 182, αὐγαῖσιν ἐν ταῖς χρυσέαις ἐν τε δόνακος ἔρρεσιν, is an exact parallel. In ζεύγμα proper, this third term will not apply in *any sense* to *both* of the others, and some other word or phrase must necessarily be *supplied* to complete the sense; as in the passage of Herodotus quoted above, and in the text of Aristotle.

Add to the examples collected from Tacitus by Bötticher, Hor. Od. III 4. 11, *ludo fatigatumque somno*. Liv. XXVII 46 sub fin. *fessi somno ac vigiliis (fessi vigiliis ac propterea somno graves)*. Hom. Il. K 98, καμάτων ἀηκότες ἤδ' καὶ ὕπνῳ. Soph. Oed. R. 271, Electr. 72, 435, 6. Eur. Heracl. 312 Elms. ad loc., 839, 1040. Dem. de F. L. § 93, μὴ...ἐᾶτε, ἀλλ' ὡς κ.τ.λ. Dorvill. *ad Charit.* p. 394, seq. and Matth. *Gr. Gr.* 634, Obs. 3, supply examples. Ernesti, in *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v., thus defines ζεύγμα: *in qua figura unum ad verbum plures sententiae referuntur, quarum unaquaque desideraret illud, si sola poneretur*. This use of the figure he has not illustrated. It seems to represent something quite different from the other; but what? The ζεύγμα in fact is a kind of grammatical bracket, under which two heterogeneous expressions are improperly included. Another well-known example of this *figure* is the truly Irish epitaph on Boyle the Philosopher: 'He was the father of Chemistry, and grand-uncle of the Earl of Cork.'

διελεῖν, ἔτι δ' ὑπολείπει σκέψιν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, εἰπωμεν καὶ νῦν.

σχεδὸν γάρ, περὶ ὧν βουλευόνται πάντες καὶ περὶ ἃ ἀγορεύουσιν οἱ συμβουλευόντες, τὰ μέγιστα τυγχάνει πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ περὶ τε πόρων, καὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων, καὶ περὶ νομοθεσίας. ὥστε περὶ μὲν πόρων τὸν μέλλοντα συμβουλεύσειν δέοι ἂν τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως εἰδέναι τίνες καὶ πόσαι, ὅπως εἴτε τις παραλείπεται προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις ἐλάττων ἀυξηθῇ, ἔτι δὲ τὰς δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως ἀπάσας, ὅπως εἴ τις περιέργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις μείζων ἐλάττων γένηται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστι-

σχεδὸν γάρ, περὶ ὧν βουλευόνται πάντες κ.τ.λ.] The unaccountable difference between the list here given of the principal subjects of Politics with which the deliberative or public speaker will have to deal, viz. (1) πόροι, supplies, ways and means, revenue, finance; (2) war and peace (possibly including alliances); (3) the defence of the country; (4) exports and imports (commerce, trade); and (5) legislation; with that which is found in Polit. vi. 1v), 4, has been already pointed out in the Introd. p. 176. In the corresponding chapter of the Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2, we have seven such subjects enumerated: religion, *περὶ ἱερῶν*; legislation, *περὶ νόμων*, (*νόμων συμφερόντων θέσεις*, Dem. de Cor. § 309, in a parallel passage); the constitution of the state (*περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κατασκευῆς*); alliances and commercial treaties (*συμβολαίων*) with foreign nations; war; peace; and revenue (*περὶ πόρων χρημάτων*).

In Xenophon, Memor. III 6, a conversation is reported between Socrates and Glaucon, whom the former cross-examines on the subject of his political knowledge, with the view of shewing him that he is not yet ripe for a statesman. The principal objects of a statesman's care there enumerated are, the *πρόσοδοι*, Aristotle's πόροι, the revenue: the state expenses, with the view of reducing them, τὰ ἀναλώματα: war, and the means of carrying it on: the enemy's forces, naval and military, and your own: the defence of the country, ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας: mines, and the supply of silver (this is from the *Athenian* point of view): and the supply of corn and other food. These details, and in the same order, are all, with the exception of the mines in Aristotle, and the legislation in Xenophon, enumerated by Aristotle in the following sections, 8—11, so that Gaisford may possibly be right in his suspicion, 'respexit fortasse Aristoteles Xenophontis Mem. III 6.'

§ 8. ἀφαιρεθῇ] 'it may be reduced, curtailed, retrenched'.

πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστιθέντες κ.τ.λ.] Not of course = πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρ-

θέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιρῶντες τῶν δαπανημάτων. ταῦτα δ' οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμπειρίας ἐνδέχεται συνορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι  
9 πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν. περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὅποση τε

χουσιν, 'by adding to present resources', but 'with reference to them', as πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαλαμβάνει, and συμπαλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα, *supr.* c. 3, § 5. 'For not only *in respect of* their existing resources do they become wealthier by adding to them (*προστιθέντες αὐτοῖς*)'.

ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμπειρίας] 'from one's own personal experience'. τὰ ἴδια are the facts which have come under one's own personal observation, i.e. the resources of our own country, and the system followed and methods adopted in providing, maintaining, and augmenting them, at home; not these alone are to be 'inquired into', ἱστορικὸν εἶναι, by the statesman and public speaker, but also the 'inventions', the practices and policy of other nations in regard of these same matters.

συνορᾶν] 'to take a *comprehensive* view', 'to look at *together*', for the purpose of *comparison*. See note on συνάγειν, c. 2 § 13 p. 41.

ἱστορικόν] The termination -ικός corresponds to the English -ive, and denotes a capacity for, or tendency to. ποιητικός productive, αἰσθητικός sensitive, δεκτικός receptive, πρακτικός active, εὐρετικός inventive, ἀποδεικτικός demonstrative, and so on: though in some cases there is no corresponding English word actually in use. According to this analogy ἱστορικός is 'inquisitive', qualified and disposed to inquire into things in general.

When Herodotus at the opening of his work uses the term ἱστορίη, he means no more than the 'inquiries' or 'researches' which he is now collecting into a continuous narrative. (Comp. § 13, αἱ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἱστορίαι and the note there.) It is not till we come to Polybius that the word assumes its modern signification, a scientific history, a systematic work that can be employed in education, *Hist.* I 1, 2. It is now defined, and distinguished from other departments of study by the addition of πραγματική, I 2, 8, the study of human actions and affairs. Its scientific character, which entitles it to the epithet 'demonstrative', ἱστορία ἀποδεικτική, II 37, 3, ἀποδ. διήγησις, IV 40, 1, is derived from its method of tracing causes and motives of actions: ἱστορίας γὰρ εἶαν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη, καὶ τὸ πραχθέν πότερα εὐλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίνεταί· καὶ παραντίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφέλει τὸ παράπαν.

But it is only the term, not the thing, that is new in Polybius' time. Thucydides' History, though not so called, (Thucydides is called a ξυγγραφεύς, see Poppo on I, 1, 2,) is at least as scientific in all essential points as that of Polybius, or indeed any other.

On the distinction of λόγιος, λογοποιός, and ἱστορικός, see some good observations in Dahlmann's *Life of Herod.* c. 6 § 2.

ὑπάρχει ἤδη καὶ πόσιν ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρξαι, καὶ ποία

§ 9. ὑπάρξαι, ἀρκεῖν, *Anonymus*, ap. Brandis, u. s., p. 44.

The verbs ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι, stand to one another in the relation of past, present, and future; to be already in existence, to be (simple and absolute being, independent of time), and to become, to come into being from a state (if that be possible) of non-being. The aorist infin. gives ὑπάρξαι here a future sense, 'to become or to be made', which does not naturally, *ex vi verbi*, belong to it. Hermann, in one of those notes which have thrown so much light upon the niceties of Greek grammar (on Ajax 1061 subsequently referred to without further discussion in the treatise *de Part.* ἄν IV, 2, *Opuscula*, Vol. IV), contends against Elmsley (who had condemned as a solecism this use of the aorist infin. without ἄν, after verbs such as δοκεῖν, νομίζειν, οἶσθαι, φάναι, ἐλπίζειν, προσδοκᾶν, in reference to future time) in support of the usage; and distinguishes three modes of expression in which futurity is conveyed by the infinitive: first, the simple future inf. as δοκεῖν πεσεῖσθαι, which conveys directly the simple and absolute notion of futurity, without modification or qualification; second, the infin., aorist or present, with ἄν, πίπτειν ἄν, πεσεῖν ἄν, which indicates a merely conditional futurity, might or would fall, under certain circumstances or conditions; and thirdly, the present or aorist infin. without ἄν, πίπτειν, or πεσεῖν, which, corresponding to the indefinite (in point of time) present and aorist, πίπτει and ἔπεσε, denote simply the possibility or likelihood of the object falling at some uncertain future time; *caducum esse*. The distinction between the *present* and *aorist* infinitive is this: \*Praesentis autem et aoristi infinitivis, sive accedat ἄν sive non, ita utuntur, ut aoristus rei transeunti, praesens duranti adhibeatur.'

Without disputing the truth of this, it is yet possible to explain the difference otherwise. *Permanence* ('duranti') does not seem to me to be in any way connected with the conception of present time, though the perfect often is; as when we say 'this *has been*' up to the present time, we often imply our belief in its continuance; and I should rather explain the present infin. in these cases as expressing the mere fact of the existence of the thing named, or the abstract notion of it. The present tense, as it is called, I act, I do, to act, to do, is in reality independent of time: the time present is, I am acting, I am doing; and the present infin. 'to do' is the naked conception of 'doing' without any connotation of time (so the *present* infinit. with the definite article stands for a *substantive*; τὸ εἶναι is the mere notion of being). The aorist infin. again may derive its notion of futurity and likelihood, either, as Hermann thinks, from the indefiniteness expressed by the tense, or, in other cases, from the connotation of *habit*, implying *liability*, which is also one of its acquired senses. The broad distinction will be, δοκῶ πεσεῖσθαι, 'I think it *will* fall', at some future time, and nothing more: δοκῶ πίπτειν or πεσεῖν ἄν, 'I think it *could, would, or might* fall', under certain conditions; δοκῶ πίπτειν, 'I think the notion of falling belongs to it', 'I think it *may* fall'; that is, that it is *liable, or likely*, to fall, *caducum esse*: and δοκῶ πεσεῖν, implying also the liability or likelihood of the preceding, is distinguished from it (according to Hermann) by

τις ἢ τε ὑπάρχουσα ἔστι καὶ ἢ τις ἐνδέχεται προσ-  
γενέσθαι, ἔτι δὲ πολέμους τίνας καὶ πῶς πεπολέμηκεν.  
οὐ μόνον δὲ τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων  
ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι. ἢ καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἐπίδοξον  
πολεμεῖν, ὅπως πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείττους εἰρηνεύηται, P. 136a  
πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἥττους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἢ τὸ πολεμεῖν. καὶ  
τὰς δυνάμεις, πότερον ὅμοιαι ἢ ἀνόμοιαι· ἔστι γὰρ

representing the act or event as transient and not permanent. But such a distinction as this last, though it be intelligible, is at least untranslatable; as in such a case as *νοεῖς δρᾶσαι* (Soph. Phil. 918), 'what dost thou intend to do', where the expression of the liability must needs be omitted, and still more the transient nature of the proposed act. But we can hardly suppose that any distinction can be seriously intended when Sophocles writes *νοεῖς δρᾶσαι*: and then, three lines afterwards, v. 921, *δρᾶν νοεῖς*. The choice between the two seems to be dictated rather by convenience than by any other motive.

With regard to the distinction of the present and aorist infin., it may be observed, that we are often obliged, as the practice of translation shews, to disregard whatever difference there may be conceived to be between them, as either inappreciable or at all events inexpressible, and to render them by the same English words. Take, for example, the ordinary phrase *δεῖ λαβεῖν* (it occurs, for instance, II 8, 12). It is quite certain that in this case past time is not directly signified; though it may possibly be included as an accessory in the notion of it in the way of an addition to the abstract conception of 'taking up, acquiring'—as representing the *previous formation* of the opinion, which has been *taken up* before. But at all events no one would think of *translating* *δεῖ λαβεῖν* in any other form than that of the simple verb 'to assume or suppose'.

ἢ τις ἐνδέχεται] ἐνδέχασθαι is here used, as is customary with other writers, as a personal verb; Aristotle generally employs it as an impersonal. Comp. note on c. 2, 14.

ἢ καὶ οὓς ἐπίδοξον] 'or indeed of those with whom war may be expected'. Supply for the sense, ἢ καὶ (δεῖ εἰδέναι τὴν δύναμιν τούτων) πρὸς οὓς ἐπίδοξον (ἡμῖν or ἡμᾶς) πολεμεῖν. *ἐπίδοξος*, 'subject to, liable to expectation', ἐπὶ *φenes*, note on I 1, 7, ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι. Similarly *ἐπίδικος*, subject to a *δίκη*, ἐπιζήμιος *infr.* I 14, 7, II 23, 21, ἐπαίτιος liable to blame, ἐπάξιος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπιθάνατος (Demosth.), ἐπικληρος, ἐπισφαλές (liable to trip) Pol. II 5, ἐπίμαχος, ἐπίβατος, ἐπίδρομος. This notion is more directly expressed by ὑπό in composition, ὑπόδικος, ὑπεύθυνος, &c.

εἰρηνεύηται] *εἰρηνεύειν*, though used as a neuter in Plat. Theaet. 180 B, and in other authors, is properly transitive, 'to bring into a state of peace, pacificate, or reconcile' contending parties, and hence employed here as a passive.

ἐπ' αὐτοῖς] Note on I 1, 7 p. 10; and on I 1, 12 p. 22, δι' αὐτῶν: I 7, 35, τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and note there.

καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις] (τῶν ὁμόρων ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι) πότερον ὅμοιαι ἢ ἀνό-

καὶ ταύτῃ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς οἰκείους πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαίνουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων τὰ ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι  
 10 πέφυκεν. ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλήθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακτηρίων (τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον μὴ ἔμπειρον ὄντα τῆς  
 χώρας), ἵν' εἴτ' ἐλάττων ἢ φυλακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις περιέργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους

μοιαι (εἰσι ταῖς οἰκείαις). This rule is well illustrated by Archidamus' comparative estimate of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian forces preparatory to engaging in the war, Thuc. I 80, 3.

πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι] properly contrasted. πλέον ἢ ἐλαττον ἔχειν, 'to have too much or too little', 'more or less than your due'. So in Thucyd. I 77, ἐλασσοῦσθαι and πλεονεκτεῖσθαι (the irregular passive of πλεονεκτεῖν) represent the same notion, 'to come by the worse, or to be overteached'. And so here, 'for in this point also we may be at an advantage or disadvantage'.

ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ.] 'for similar circumstances are naturally followed by, or naturally give rise to, similar results'.

§ 10. ἵν' εἴτ' ἐλάττων] (ἐστὶν ἡ φυλακὴ), ἡ φυλ. προστεθῇ, or perhaps rather, εἴτ' ἐλλάττων (ἐστὶν) ἡ φυλακὴ, (αὕτη) προστεθῇ.

περιέργος] is properly said of one 'who troubles himself over much' (περὶ), either about his own affairs, or those of others; (these two significations will be found illustrated in the Lexicons). Hence it acquires the general sense of 'superfluity', as here. Comp. Plāt. Polīt. 286 c, περιέργα λέγειν, and Apol. 19 B, Σωκράτης...περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια (of an idle curiosity). Dem.? Phil. 8 150, 24, ἐξ ὧν ἐργάζη καὶ περιεργάζη τοὺς ἐσχάτους ὄντας κινδύνους. Ib. 143, 17, περιεργον καὶ μάταιον ἀνάλωμα, and elsewhere in Dem. and the other orators. Arist. Eccles. 220, εἰ μὴ τι καινὸν ἄλλο περιεργάζετο. See also in *Ind. ad Fragm. Com. Graec.* Meineke, Vol. v. Pt. 2.

καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους τηρώσι μᾶλλον] Translate the whole passage, 'in order that whether the defence (defensive preparation) be too little, addition be made to it, or if superfluous, it be retrenched, and their attention be rather directed to the watching or guarding (fortification) of favourable positions'. ἐπιτηδείους τόπους are places favourable, defensible, suitable to the purpose for which they were intended, viz. for protecting the country. Thuc. II 20, ὁ χώρος ἐπιτήδειος ἐφαίνετο ἐνστρατοπεδεύσαι: Herod. IX 2, χώρος ἐπιτηδεώτερος ἐνστρατοπεδεύεσθαι: VI 102, ἐπιτηδεώτατον χώριον ἐνικπεῦσαι, always apparently of a 'favourable' position, and this seems to be here the natural, as it is the usual, sense of ἐπιτήδειος and of the passage in general. And so Victorius, 'et ut relictis parum opportunis



- 11 τηρῶσι μᾶλλον. ἔτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση δαπάνη  
 ικανὴ τῇ πόλει καὶ ποία ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ  
 εἰσαγωγίμος, καὶ τίνων τ' ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων  
 εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνθῆκαι καὶ συμ-  
 βολαὶ γίγνωνται· πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν ἀναγ-  
 καῖον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρὸς τε τοὺς κρείτ-  
 12 τους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμους. εἰς δ'  
 ἀσφάλειαν ἅπαντα μὲν ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον δύνασθαι  
 θεωρεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίειν·

locis magis idoneos tueantur.' (There is another possible—but I think not probable—interpretation of ἐπιτηδαίους τόπους, viz. *loca commoda* or *opportuna*, suitable or convenient to the enemy, easy of access, readily assailable: τηρεῖν, as before, being to guard or defend.)

§ 11. πρὸς τούτους] i.e. παρ' οἷς ἔστιν ὧν δέονται: those that are capable of providing them with that they want.

συνθῆκαι καὶ συμβολαί] On συμβόλαια and συναλλάγματα see above, note on I 1, 10 p. 16.

συνθήκη is a general term for a treaty, compact, contract, convention, usually of a public nature, between two states, but also all private contracts, covenants, and bargains; see Rhet. I 15, 20—23, περὶ συνθηκῶν. συμβολα—here called συμβολαί, apparently a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον in this sense; in Pol. III 9, 1280 a 38, συνθήκαι and σύμβολα are contrasted—are technically confined by the grammarians to a particular and special kind of contract, international commercial treaties. Meier ü. Schömann, *Att. Process*, p. 494, note 49. In the passage referred to, σύμβολα first occurs apparently in its proper sense, πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους: and then, as distinguished from συνθήκαι, which here stand for commercial treaties in general, συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων, seems to be applied to those special and subordinate articles of commercial contracts which made provisions against the infliction of mutual damage and wrong, or established a system of compensation which protected the contracting parties against mutual injury, σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. In the usual sense, Pol. III 1, 1275 a 9, τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν, 'even the members of different states who are connected by international commercial treaties have reciprocal legal rights, so that it cannot be *this* which constitutes a citizen'. In Thuc. I 77, the ξυμβόλαια πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαι denote the actions at law which arise out of these ξύμβολα. Dem. c. Mid. 570, τὰ σύμβολα συγχέων. See Buttm.'s *Ind.*, s. v.

πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν κ.τ.λ.] 'for there are two classes of persons between whom and the citizens it is necessary that irreproachable conduct or behaviour, or a thoroughly good understanding, should be steadily, persistently (διὰ, thoroughly, throughout), maintained'.

§ 12. περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίειν] 'to understand the subject of legislation'.

In this section occur several points in common between the Rhetoric

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶδέναι πόσα τ' ἐστὶ πολιτειῶν εἶδη, καὶ ποῖα συμφέρει ἐκάστη, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων φθείρεσθαι πέφυκε καὶ οἰκείων τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἐναντίων. λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς βελτίστης πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιέμεναι καὶ ἐπιτεῖ-

and Politics, which, though they may not be direct references from one to the other, yet serve to illustrate the relation between them. They are noticed by Brandis, in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, u. s. p. 33. I will compare them in the order in which they stand.

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως] On legislation comp. I 1, 7. That the laws ought to be supreme in a state, and not any one or several, or the entire body of citizens, is argued and concluded in Polit. III 15, 1286 a 7 seq. and again c. 16, 1287 a 18, τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἀρχεῖν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα τινά κ.τ.λ. The different forms of constitutions, and what is salutary and conservative or destructive of each of them, are treated, for instance, in Pol. III 6, and VIII (V) 1 et seq. And not only is the substance of the next sentence, λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι κ.τ.λ., found in the discussions of the Politics VIII (V) 1, but the very same metaphor, from the tightening and relaxation of the strings of the lyre, is employed there, 1301 b 17, as here; and in c. 9, 1309 b 18, the same illustration, derived from the flat and aquiline nose, is used to represent the excessive exaggeration and intensification, or depression and relaxation of the constitution, as of the feature, which altogether effaces its true character.

ἀνιέμεναι καὶ ἐπιτευνόμεναι] This metaphor from the screwing up or relaxation of the strings of the lyre, producing a difference of musical pitch or tone, which it raises or lowers, is a very favourite one both with Plato and Aristotle, and is used to represent, as I have already said, exaggeration or intensification on the one hand, (exactly as we speak of 'screwing up our courage' *Macbeth* I 7, 60), and depression or relaxation on the other. If for example the nose is lowered or depressed to excess in the way of flatness as a snub-nose, or exaggerated in the other direction to excessive sharpness and prominence as an aquiline nose, it ends by losing the character of a nose altogether, and is either altogether effaced or becomes a beak: and so with the constitutions of states.

τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι therefore means that forms of government are destroyed or change their character by the exaggeration or relaxation of their own proper and peculiar institutions, and it is in the 'mean' state alone between these two excesses that the constitution can be said to maintain its true character. For instance the *ὅρος*, definition or principle, of a democracy is equality; if this be intensified or exaggerated, or carried to excess, if the thing be logically carried out, and everybody actually becomes equal, the government degenerates into mob-rule or anarchy and thus loses its true democratic character; if it be relaxed and the equality diminished, the democratic principle and its institutions become

νόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ἔξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη σφόδρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ σιμότης οὐ μόνον ἀνιέμενα ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα γρυπὰ γινόμενα ἢ σιμὰ οὕτω διατίθεται ὥστε μηδὲ μυκτῆρα δοκεῖν εἶναι. χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαίειν  
 13 τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ

so enfeebled, that the inequalities increase until at last it becomes an oligarchy, ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ἔξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν.

Plat. Lys. 209 B, Rep. IV 441 E, τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνουσα καὶ τρέφουσα...τὸ δὲ ἀνίεισα παραμυθουμένη, VI 498 B, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια, III 412 A, ἐπιτεινομένη καὶ ἀνιέμενη, ib. 410 D, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθῆν τοῦ δέοντος σκληρόν τε καὶ χαλεπὸν γίγναι' ἄν...μᾶλλον ἀνεθίγτος αὐτοῦ μαλακώτερον κ.τ.λ. Phaedo 98 C, οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίσθαι, 86 C, 94 C and elsewhere.

This was transmitted by the master to his disciple. In Aristotle it occurs, Pol. VIII (V) 1, 1301 b 16, ἢ ἵνα ἐπιταθῶσιν ἢ ἀνεθῶσιν. Ib. c. 8, 1308 b 2, τὰ τιμήματα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνίειν, εἰ μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ ἐπιτείνοντας...εἰ μὲν δὲ ἐλλείπῃ ἀνίειν, ib. c. 9, 1309 b 18, u. s., VII (VI) 6, 1320 b 30, VI (IV) 6, 1293 a 26 and 30 ὑπερτείνειν, Eth. Nic. VI 1, 1138 b 23, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίει. In Pol. V (VIII) 7 1341 b ult., he says of music as a 'relaxation' πρὸς διαγωγὴν, that it is πρὸς ἀνεσίαν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας (overstraining or exertion) ἀνάπασσιν. Comp. Pol. VI (IV) 3, ult. ἀρμονίας συντονωτέρας καὶ ἀνιέμενας; whence ἔντονος (intense), σύντονος, ἀνιέμενος, ἀνιέμενος, are applied, the two first to braced nerves, vigorous exertion or character; the latter to relaxation or dissoluteness of life and manners, or to slackness, laxity, and effeminacy. In Pol. IV (VII) 17, 1336 a 30, it is said that children's sports should be neither ἐπιπόνους nor ἀνιέμενας; and c. 4, 1326 a 26, that no well-constituted state should be ἀνιέμενην, uncontrolled, slack, loose, relaxed, i. e. allowed to run to excess, in its numbers. Eth. Nic. II 4 sub. init. ὀργισθῆναι σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνιέμενος, ib. III 7, 1114 a 5, ἀνιέμενος ζῆν, open, easy, careless, dissolute life. Comp. Thuc. I 6, II 39 ἀνιέμενη τῇ διαίτῃ, ἀνιέμενος διατρώμενοι. The corresponding Latin terms are *intendere* and *remittere*, Cic. Orat. § 59, Quint. X 3, 24, doubtless borrowed from the Greek.

οὕτω διατίθεται ὥστε κ.τ.λ.] 'it assumes such a condition or shape that it seems to be no nose at all'.

§ 13. ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι] 'by studying out of', i. e. 'drawing conclusions or deriving observations from the study of the past'.

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle had already probably, when this was written, supplied the deliberative orators of his time with the means of acquainting themselves with this branch of political study, by his work called *Πολιτεῖαι*, a collection of the constitutions

ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἀρμόττουσιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι  
 πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι  
 (ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστι τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους),  
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλάς αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς  
 of 158 states existing at that period, and serving apparently as an appen-  
 dix to the extant Politics. It is included in the lists both of Diogenes,  
 v 27, and of the *Αποκρυψις* in Buhle, *Arist.* Vol. I p. 65. Diogenes' title,  
 which is more descriptive than the other, runs thus: Πολιτεῖαι πόλεων  
 δυοῖν δεύουσιν ἐξήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ δημοκρατικά, δολιγαρχικά, ἀριστο-  
 κρατικά, καὶ τυραννικά. The extant fragments of this work are collected  
 in Rose's *Arist. Pseudepigraphus*, Pt. 2, p. 391—537 (this collection is  
 much more complete than that of Neumann, which is printed in the  
 Oxf. ed. of Bekker's text, Vol. x p. 234, as an appendix to the Politics).  
 The latest results of the researches on this subject are given by Heitz,  
*Verlor. Schrift. Arist.* p. 230, seq.

αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι] 'Travels round the world', 'survey of the  
 earth'. These were books of Geography physical and descriptive, con-  
 taining not only an account of the relative position of cities and coun-  
tries, but also observations upon the manners and customs of the inha-  
bitants. Hence they are recommended to the study of the Politician.  
 These were founded either upon personal observation, or upon the  
 reports of travellers; whence the name περίοδοι. *Ar. Meteor.* I 13, 13,  
 δῆλον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο θεωμένοις τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους· ταύτας γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πυνθά-  
 νεσθαι παρ' ἐκάστων οὕτως ἀνέγραψαν, ὅσων μὴ συμβέβηκεν αὐτόπτας γενέσθαι  
 τοὺς λέγοντας (quoted by Victorius). For a similar reason books of the  
 same kind were called περίπλοι, 'circumnavigations or nautical surveys',  
 as those of Scylax, Hanno, &c. or περιηγήσεις. (Διονύσιος ὁ περιηγητής.  
 Διόδωρος ὁ περιηγητής, *Athen.* XIII 591 E. Πολέμων ὁ περιηγ., *ib.* IX 372 A,  
 XXI 552 B.) One of the earliest and best known of them was that of  
 Hecataeus, referred to by Herodotus, IV 36 γελῶ δὲ ὀρέων Γῆς περιόδους  
 γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη...οἱ Ὀκεανὸν τε βέοντα γράφουσι περὶ τὴν γῆν εἶδυσαν  
 κυκλοτερέα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου, καὶ τὴν Ἀσίην τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ποιεῦντας ἴσιν. In  
 v 49 the term is applied to Aristagoras of Miletus' famous *map*, (by  
 Strabo assigned to Anaximander), *πίνακα ἐν τῷ γῆς ἀπάσης περιόδους ἐνετί-  
 μωτο, καὶ θάλασσά τε πᾶσα, καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.* From the hints in Herod.  
 IV. 36, *Ar. Meteor.* II 5, διὸ καὶ γελοῖως γράφουσι νῦν τὰς περιόδους τῆς γῆς·  
 κ.τ.λ. (where the author proceeds to say, following Herodotus, that the cir-  
 cular shape of the earth assigned to it by these writers is impossible), and  
 from *Pol.* II 3, 1262 a 12, sub fin., the general nature of the contents of these  
 works may be gathered. Eudoxus, the mathematician and astronomer,  
 of Cnidos was the author of one of these works, referred to by *Athen.* VII  
 288 c, ἐν ἑκτῷ γῆς περιόδου (Victorius), also Ctesias, Dionysius, Diodorus,  
 Polemo. An account of Hecataeus' περίοδος is given by Mure, *Hist. Gr.*  
*Lit.* IV 144, Bk. IV ch. 3 § 3.

αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστορίαι] See note on ἱστορίαι, § 7.  
 The addition 'about men's actions' is still required to define the kind of  
 'inquiries' in which 'history' engages: ἱστορία has not yet become tech-  
 nical, indicating a special department of study.

πράξεις γραφόντων ιστορία· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ ρητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.

περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα συμβου- P. 1360 b.  
λεύειν, τὰ μέγιστα τοσαῦτα ἐστίν· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ καὶ  
περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων προτρέπειν ἢ ἀπο-  
τρέπειν, λέγωμεν πάλιν.

I σκεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδία ἐκάστω καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπός CHAP. V.  
τις ἐστίν, οὗ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἰροῦνται καὶ φεύ- P. 16.  
γουσιν· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν ἢ τ'

ἔχειν] 'to be informed or furnished'. 'The information' which he must 'have' is left to be supplied. Understand τὰς προτάσεις, which generally stands in Aristotle for the 'materials' of Rhetoric which the speaker must have at his command.

λέγωμεν πάλιν] 'let us go back, begin again, take a fresh start as it were, and proceed to state...' Compare the end of the first chapter. This form of expression and use of πάλιν are very familiar to Aristotle in commencing a new subject. See, for example, de Anima II 1 init., c. 2 init.

#### CHAPTER V.

##### The analysis of Happiness.

The object of the public or deliberative speaker lies in *the future*, and is always something attainable; no one deliberates about that which is altogether out of his power. Now happiness or some form or part of it is the universal aim; the complete analysis of happiness, therefore, will include every object of *προτροπή* and *ἀποτροπή* which he can suggest to his audience, and every kind of political *expediency*.

§ 1. Eth. Nic. I 1 init. πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφώνησαντο τὰγαθόν, οὐδ' ἅπαντ' ἐφίεται. Ib. 1094 b 3, χρωμένῃς δὲ ταύτης (τῆς πολιτικῆς) ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχει ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. X 6 init. ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν (τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. Polit. I 1 init. ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυίαν, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες, ὅλον ὡς πᾶσαι ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς στοχάζονται. Plat. Symp. 205 A καὶ οὐκέτι προσθεῖ ἔρωςθαι ἵνα τὶ δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἢ ἀπόκρισις. Phileb. 54 C τό γε μὴν οὐ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνεται' ἂν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκείνῳ ἐστὶ. Gorg. 499 E τὸ ἀγαθὸν τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τὰλλα πράττεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Euthyd. 278 E *alibi*.

ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν] 'to speak summarily', to sum up in one notion, to describe all human ends and aims by the single phrase 'happiness and its parts'.

<sup>2</sup> εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς. ὥστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἢ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύτης· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτῃ αἱ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ πᾶσαι εἰσὶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἢ τῶν μορίων τι, ἢ μείζον ἀντ' ἐλάττονος ποιοῦντα, δεῖ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ φθείροντα ἢ ἐμποδίζοντα ἢ τὰ <sup>3</sup> ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν. ἔστω δὲ εὐδαιμονία

§ 2. ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν] speaking broadly and generally, without descending to *particulars*. Opposed to καθ' ἑκαστον. See note on I 2, 4, p. 30.

§ 3. ἔστω δὲ εὐδαιμονία] Brandis, u. s. p. 48, note 42, (after Spengel) remarks upon this use of ἔστω as marking the *popular* character of the definitions that follow—as if it were a matter of indifference whether they are right or not, provided that they are so generally acceptable as to be certain to satisfy the audience. The same form is repeated c. 6, 2; 7, 2; 10, 3; II 2, 1, and throughout the chapters on the *πάθη*. On the definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 13; and on *this* definition of happiness, p. 176.

Aristotle's own definition of happiness in the *Eth. Nic.*, the result of his inquiries in that work, is something far different, *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν*, the fully developed activity or active exercise (implying full consciousness) of the soul in respect of its proper (and therefore highest) excellence: that is contemplation, *θεωρία*, the exercise of the highest faculty, the *νοῦς*, or intuitive reason; the highest faculties being the *intellectual*. This is the theory; but practically a lower view of happiness is admitted (Bk. X), which consists in the exercise of the moral as well as the intellectual virtues. Of the definitions here given, *αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς* comes nearest to his own: it expresses a self-sufficing life, complete in itself, independent of all external aids and advantages, and is in fact essential to the notion of happiness. See *Eth. Nic.* I 5 (quoted below).

The essentials of the three first of these definitions are found all united in the conception of happiness, the ultimate end of all human desire and effort, which forms the conclusion of the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, from the sixth chapter to the end. It contains first, the *εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς*, in the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue, the intellectual being the higher and more perfect form of it, and in that the intuitive contemplative energy; secondly, the *αὐτάρκεια τῆς ζωῆς*, the self-sufficiency and independence of everything external, which is necessary to perfection and happiness; and thirdly, the life *μετ' ἀσφαλείας*, the happiness residing in *θεωρία* being most secure because it is most independent and the nearest approach to the happiness of the Gods, who have all their wants and faculties satisfied in themselves, and want nothing ~~from~~ without (C. 7); and also *ἡδυστος*, because pleasure is the necessary accompaniment of

εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἢ αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς, ἢ ὁ βίος ὁ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἡδιστος, ἢ εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ every ἐνέργεια (active exercise, *realisation* in exercise, of any δύναμις or capacity), and θεωρία being the most perfect form of ἐνέργεια, the pleasure that accompanies it must needs be the highest and most complete; and the exercise of the moral faculties in proportion to their comparative excellence. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος (ἡδιστος καὶ κράτιστος), εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονίστατος. Eth. N. x 7 ult. (In the popular and lower sense of the words this definition of happiness would belong to the *Epicurean* school.) The fourth definition, εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμειος φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων' is only applicable to a state. The Stoic definition of happiness was εὐροια βίου. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. Γ § 172, πρὸς Ἡθικούς § 30.

εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς] Comp. Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 20, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστῃ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθέν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἕτερον εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 3, 1326 b 12, ἅλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. By comparing this latter passage with the definition, it would seem that the sense of εὐπραξία in the latter must be limited to 'well doing', and not extended to 'welfare', which it, like εὐ πράττειν, is capable of including. Pol. IV (VII) 1, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τὴν μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσαν. Ib. c. 3 sub init. ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηθὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὐ, τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταῦτόν. Ib. c. 8, εὐδαιμονία...ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος. c. 13, 1332 a 7.

αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς] Eth. Nic. I 5, 1097 b 7, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν (the notion of αὐταρκείας leads to the same result, or conception of happiness as that of τέλειον, previously applied to determine it). τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ...τὸ δ' αὐταρκες τίθεμεν ὁ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἴομεθα εἶναι. Comp. x 6, 1176 b 5, οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκεια. c. 7, 1177 a 28, ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια (which is essential to happiness) περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη (and therefore the highest and most perfect happiness must consist in θεωρία). A similar αὐτάρκεια or independence is attributed to the perfect state in the Politics. On the notion of the perfect state or constitution in the second degree, that is, under the necessary limitations incident to a human condition, so far as humanity allows of perfection at all, see Pol. VI (IV) 11 init. In Pol. IV (VII) 5 init. αὐτάρκεια is thus defined, τὸ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς αὐταρκες.

εὐθηνία] and εὐθηνεῖν are Ionic and also late Greek forms belonging to the κοινὴ διάλεκτος, for the Attic εὐθενεῖν and εὐθενία or εὐθένεια, and denote a 'flourishing state', or 'prosperity' in general. 'εὐθενεῖν enim non tam robur (quod verbo εὐσθενεῖν subiectum est) quam vigorem et vitalitatem declarat, ut v. c. Ajax aliquis aut Hercules εὐσθενεῖν dicatur, sed vel

σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ἐν ἡ πλείω τὴν 4 εὐδαιμονίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι ἅπαντες. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν πολυφιλίαν χρηστοφιλίαν πλοῦτον εὐτεκνίαν πολυτεκνίαν εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς, οἶον ὑγίειαν κάλλος ἰσχὺν μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστι-

tenerima planta, quum laeto iuventae flore nitet, εὐθενεῖν dici possit. Et maximi quidem proprie de succo sanitatis et corporis incremento deque uberi proventu et auctu, sed non minus apte de *prospero rerum publicarum privatarumque successu*, deque omni ubertate et affluentia dicitur.' (From an excellent note by Lobeck on these words, *ad Phryg. &c.* p. 465—7: Lobeck derives εὐθενεῖν from εὖ and θέω (τίθημι), comparing it with other verbs of similar formation. The MSS of Arist. give sometimes εὐθενία and εὐθενεῖν, but generally εὐθηνία and εὐθηνεῖν. Lobeck's note may be applied as a corrective of Victorius' ad h. l.)

κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων] 'property' of all kinds, goods and chattels, including especially flocks and herds; and 'population', here estimated by 'bodies', not by 'souls' as Christianity has taught us to reckon it.

§ 4. εὐτεκνία (εὐτεκνος, εὐπαις, εὐπαιδία, εὐτεκνεῖν, Aeschylus and Euripides), and εὐγηρία, εὐτεκνος, and εὐγήρως, 'blessing in children, and in old age', are applied by Aristotle to animals, as well as to the human race, in his works on Natural History: *e.g.* to birds, in the sense of 'prolific', Hist. An. IX 11, 1; 12, 3; 17, 1; IX 12, 3; εὐγηροὶ ὄρνιθες.

πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, both defined by Aristotle himself in § 16, 'number of friends, worthiness of friends'. The latter is defined by Liddell and Scott, 'the love of good men or good deeds', [a slip corrected, however, in a subsequent edition. S.]

τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς] The ἀρετή or 'excellence' of anything is determined by its ἔργον or special function or business; that which it was made *to do*. On this notion of ἔργον, see the reff. given in note on c. 2, § 12. ἀρετή therefore is so far from being confined to moral virtue, though it is applied to this κατ' ἐξοχήν, that it may be extended to everything which has any use or object, animate or inanimate; but in the highest and most appropriate sense is attributed to human faculties bodily, mental, and moral.

μέγεθος] So Homer and Hesiod reckon size as well as strength and beauty amongst personal advantages. Od. ζ 276, τίς δ' ὅδε Νανικῆά ἔπεται καλὸς τε μέγας τε ξείνος; Ib. σ 248, περίεσσι γυναικῶν εἰδὸς τε μέγεθος τε. ω 252, οὐδὲ τί τοι δούλειον ἐπιπρέπει εἰσορᾶσθαι εἶδος καὶ μέγεθος. σ 218. ω 373. Il. B 58, &c. Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 3, and Plato, Alc. I p. 123 E, in an enumeration of the personal qualities and other advantages that a young man might be proud of, εἰ οὖν λέγοιμεν ὅτι κάλλει τε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς... Charmid. 154 C, θαυμαστός ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος. So Ovid's Romulus, after his deification, *pulcer et humano maior*. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1323 b 7, ἐν μεγέθει



κῆν, δόξαν τιμὴν εὐτυχίαν ἀρετὴν.<sup>1</sup> οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχῃ αὐτῷ τὰ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν σῶματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή. ἔτι δὲ προσήκειν οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχην·

<sup>1</sup> ἢ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδρίαν δικαιοσύνην σωφροσύνην.

γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστέιοι (pretty or neat) καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. Pol. IV (VII) 4, 1326 a 33, τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. Poet. VII 4, τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστὶ, ap. Zell, ad loc. Eth.

δόξαν] 'reputation', estimation in men's *thoughts or opinion*. ('Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, that last infirmity of noble minds, to scorn delights, &c.' *Lycidas*).—*τιμὴν* honours, substantial and externally manifested, which are *conferred* upon a man, offices, titles, *προεδρίας, civil privileges, and such like*. See further in § 9. On the value of *τιμή* in general, Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 18, μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλων τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή. μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, 1124 a 17.

εὐτυχίαν] distinguished from εὐδαιμονία, Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 20 seq., quoted above in note on § 3.

ἢ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδρίαν δικαιοσύνην σωφροσύνην] These words are omitted by MS A\*, put in brackets as doubtful by Bekker [4to ed. 1831], and rejected by Spengel.

αὐταρκέστατος] referring to the second definition, § 3. See note on § 3, p. 73.

τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ] When Aristotle adds 'besides these there are no others', he includes, as he tells us in the following sentence, the goods of body and mind under the first head, τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. His usual division of goods, called the Peripatetic division, is into three kinds; goods of 'mind, body, and estate'. This division, however, was not his own invention; as he tells us in Eth. Nic. I 8, 1098 b 17, ταύτην τὴν δόξαν (the opinion in question) παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. Cic. Tusc. v 30, *tria genera bonorum, maxima animi, secunda corporis, externa tertia, ut Peripatetici, nec nullo veteres Academici secus*. Eth. Nic. I 8, sub init. *νενημημένων* δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν *τριχῇ*, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ. Pol. IV (VII) 1 sub init. *τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων*, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις δεῖ. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 8, 2. Cic. de Fin. III 13, 43, *ei alibi*. Schrader ad h. l. This division cannot be at all events confined to the Peripatetics or derived from them alone, for it appears in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. I (2 Oxf.) 8, *διαίρησις δὲ τοῦτο (τὸ συμφέρον) τοῖς μὲν ἰδιώταις εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπίκτητα*: unless indeed this be taken as an argument of the later authorship of the *Rhet. ad Alexandrum*.

δυνάμεις] either 'power' of various kinds, 'opes ac civilem potentiam',

οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀσφαλέστατος ὁ βίος εἴη. λάβωμεν τοῖνυν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον τί ἐστίν.

5 εὐγένεια μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἔθνει μὲν καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτόχθονας ἢ ἀρχαίους εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπιφανεῖς, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς γεγενῆσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ζήλουμένοις· ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, καὶ γνησιότης ἀπ' ἀμ-

Muretus, Victorius, 'potentiam', Vet. Transl.; or faculties and capacities, bodily and mental, 'facultates', Riccob. The first seems to agree better with εὐτυχία.

[ἀσφαλέστατος] referring to the third definition of § 3.

§ 5. εὐγένεια] in an individual or family is defined in Pol. VI (IV) 8, 1294 a 21, ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετῇ, and VIII (V) 1, 1301 b 2, εὐγενεῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετῇ καὶ πλοῦτος. Rhet. II 15. 2, 3. Plat. Theaet. 174 E, τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἐπὶ τὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, which seems to have been the current definition of εὐγένεια at Athens in Plato's time.

αὐτόχθονας] Herod. I 171, Thuc. I, 2 and 6, Arist. Vesp. 1076, Eur. Ion 29, 589, 737, of Athens; Isocr. Panath. § 124, also of Athens; Paneg. § 24, 25, Dem. de F. L. § 296, of the Athenians and Arcadians. Quint. III 7, 26, *laudantur autem urbes similiter atque homines. Nam pro parente est conditor; et multum auctoritatis affert vetustas, ut iis qui terra dicuntur orti.*

καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπιφανεῖς] 'and to have had for their first rulers famous men', like Theseus at Athens.

καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς—ἐπὶ τοῖς ζήλουμένοις] 'and many men sprung from their race renowned for things (personal qualities, feats of arms, noble deeds, and such like) that are esteemed and admired'. ἐπὶ, 'standing, resting upon', 'upon the basis, terms, or condition of ...'.

ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] 'privately, in a family, it may be derived either from the father's or the mother's side', i.e. from famous ancestors on either.

γνησιότης ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν] 'legitimacy on both sides', in birth and citizenship. γνήσιος, opposed to νόθος, Il. A 102, *ὣε δὴ Πριάμοιο νόθον καὶ γνήσιον*, Plat. Rep. VII 536 A, *τὸν νόθον τε καὶ τὸν γνήσιον*, and also to ποιητός, εἰσποιητός, θετός υἱός, Dem. c. Leoch. 1095, 5, *τὸ μὲν γὰρ γνήσιόν ἐστιν ὅταν ᾖ γόνος γεγονός, καὶ ὁ νόμος ταῦτα μαρτυρεῖ λέγων, ἦν ἂν ἐγγύησθαι πατὴρ ἢ ἀδελφός ἢ πάππος ἐκ ταύτης εἶναι παῖδας γνησίους...ποιητός δ' ὁμολογῶν εἶναι φαίνεται οὐκ εἰσποιηθείς ὑπὸ τοῦ τετελευτηκότος αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.* and 1099, 19; and hence metaphorically 'genuine', real, true, as opposed to spurious, fictitious. Plat. Rep. IX 587 B, *μᾶς μὲν (ἡδονῆς) γησίας, δυοῖν δὲ νόθων*. On the γνήσιος πολίτης, cf. Ar. Pol. III 5. The conditions of citizenship vary according to the form of constitution, and the number of the population. In the normal state no βάνανσοι or θῆτες, no *mechanics* or paid agricultural labourers, still less slaves, should be admitted to the rights of citizenship. When the number of the γνήσιοι πολῖται (legitimate by birth) declines, νόθοι are admitted; in the opposite case a more stringent rule

φοῖν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως τοὺς τε πρώτους γνωρί-  
 μους ἢ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τῶν τιμω-  
 μένων, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ γένους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους.  
 6 εὐτεκνία δὲ καὶ πολυτεκνία οὐκ ἄδηλα. ἔστι δὲ τῷ P. 1361.  
 κοινῷ μὲν [εὐτεκνία], νεότης ἂν ἢ πολλή καὶ ἀγαθὴ,  
 ἀγαθὴ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν σώματος, οἷον μέγεθος κάλλος  
 ἰσχὺν δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικὴν· ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη  
 καὶ ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταί. ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐτεκνία καὶ πολυ-  
 τεκνία τὸ τὰ ἴδια τέκνα πολλὰ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἶναι,

prevails; and then, εὐποροῦντες δ' ὄχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται τοὺς ἐκ  
 δούλου πρώτον ἢ δούλης, εἴτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ  
 ἀμφοῖν ἀσπῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν—as was the case at Athens.

καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως] 'and as in the case of a city (so in the private  
 family, ἰδίᾳ), the distinction of its founders for virtue or wealth, or any-  
 thing else that is highly valued, and a number of illustrious members of  
 the race, men and women, young or advanced in years'.

§ 6. τῷ κοινῷ] 'the community, the commonwealth', *respublica*. τὸ  
 κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων, Herod. V. 109, τῶν Σαμίων, VI. 14, τῶν Σπαρτιητέων, VI.  
 58. 'τῷ κοινῷ *communi* recte vertit Muretus, Latini enim Graecos imi-  
 tantes gentem, nationem, rempublicam, civitatem appellant *commune*.  
 Cic. in Verr. II 46, statuæ a *communi* Siciliae, quemadmodum inscriptum  
 videmus, datae. Item, I 28, quomodo iste *commune* Miliadum vexarit'.  
 Schrader. Comp. Fr. *Commune*. Germ. *Gemeinde*.

ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταί] This is a statement of what  
young men ought to be; their character, what they actually are, is  
 minutely analysed and described in II 12, under the second head of ἥθη,  
 c. 12—17. ἀνδρία appears as one of their characteristics in § 9: σωφρο-  
 σύνη, self-control, is *not* characteristic of this age, and is therefore not  
 mentioned.

εὐτεκνία] The strong feeling of the blessing of children, implied,  
 though not *directly* expressed, in εὐτεκνία, especially characteristic of the  
 Jews, appears also in the Greek writers, as Euripides, who uses εὐτυχεῖν  
 and δυστυχεῖν to express the possession and the absence of a family, as  
 though the possession of them were happiness, and the want of them  
 misery. See Ion, 699, 772, 775, Androm. 429 (Paley's note), and 713.

τοιαῦτα] 'such' as above described. On this use of τοιοῦτος, implying  
 a notion suggested by a previous expression, see Stallbaum's note on Plat.  
 Phaed. 80 C, ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοι-  
 αύτῃ (i. e. χαριέσσει) ὥρᾳ. Compare, *inter alia*, 59 A, 67 A. Thuc. III 58,  
 νομίζων ἐν γῇ τε φιλίᾳ τιθεῖναι καὶ παρ' ἀνδράσι τοιοῦτοῖς (of the like sort,  
 i. e. φιλίοις). Dem. d. F. L. § 103, ἀλλ' ὅσων οὗτος αἴτιος σκεψάμενοι, καὶ  
 χάριν, ἂν ταύτης ἄξιός ᾖ, καὶ τούναντίον ὀργὴν, ἂν τοιαῦτα ('of *that* kind'  
 sc. ὀργῆς ἄξια φαίνεται πεποιηκώς, ποιείσθε.) Arist. Pol. I 8, 1256 a 36, οἱ δ'

καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρρενα· θηλειῶν δὲ ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἄνδρας καὶ κατὰ γυναῖκας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅσοις γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαῦλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίοις, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἡμῖσι οὐκ εὐ-  
7 δαιμονοῦσιν. πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλήθος,

ἀφ' ἀλυσίας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμούς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην (of the same kind, suitable for fishing) προσοικοῦσιν. II 4, 1262 δ 2, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι, i. e. (from the preceding) less friendly, VIII (V) 10, 1310 δ 12, τοιούτου γένους, 'a similar family' (similar to what had been just described).

φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας] 'industry, without (mean, sordid, illiberal) unladylike habits'.

τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας, κ.τ.λ.] 'the character and conduct of the women', Polít. II 9, 1269 δ 12, εἴτι δ' ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσις (relaxation, laxity of manners) καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως... ὥστ' ἐν ὅσαις πολιτεῖαις φαύλως ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ἡμῖσι τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεῖ (at Sparta) συμβέβηκεν... (ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς. On the condition of the Spartan women, and the difference in the account given of their moral character by Aristotle, here and in the Politics, on the one hand, and by Xenophon and Plutarch on the other, see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. II. p. 516 seq.

§ 7. πλούτου μέρη νομίσματος πλήθος κ.τ.λ.] In the discussion of wealth, in the more exact and scientific Politics, this is denied of *true* wealth. Pol. I 9, 1257 δ 8, καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλούτον πολλὰκις τιθέασιν νομίσματος πλήθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὁδὲ (sometimes) δὲ πάλιν λήρος (mere nonsense, a mere joke or farce) εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασιν (an absolute convention, with no reality, no true nature, φύσις, in it), φύσει δ' οὐθέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐθενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλὰκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄσπονον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλούτον οὐ εὐπορῶν λιμὴ ἀπολείται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκείνον... διὸ ζητοῦσιν ἑτεράν τι τὸν πλούτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, ὁρθῶς ζητοῦντες.—πλούτος is defined, Pol. I 8, sub fin. ὀργάνων πλήθος οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν, 'a stock, or number, of implements or instruments for economical (domestic) and public or political uses'.

This confusion of money and wealth, the foundation of the famous 'Mercantile Theory', is exposed by Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. IV. See also J. S. Mill, *Pol. Econ.* Prelim. Remarks, Vol. I. p. 2 seq. 'To mistake money for wealth, is the same sort of error as to mistake the highway which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, for the house and lands themselves.' p. 8<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> It is well worth while to compare the chapters of the first book of the Politics in which the germs of the supposed invention, the science of Political Economy, already appear, with the corresponding passages of the *Wealth of Nations*. The

γῆς, χωρίων κτήσις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτήσις καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα. ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ

γῆς, χωρίων κτήσις] γῆ, 'territory', the acquisition or possession of *public* property, χώρια (dim. of χώρος or χώρα, little places, regions, countries, 'spots'), 'farms', 'estates', 'domains', *private* properties. Or perhaps rather, γῆ merely 'land' in general, and χώρια the divisions of land, the *actual* private properties.

ἐπιπλα, (a division of property) 'moveables', moveable furniture or property of all kinds: opposed to 'fixtures', such as houses and land. Xen. Oecon. I x 6 includes in it all sacrificial furniture or apparatus; and articles of dress, shoes, female ornaments; and of house furniture, as beds. In Thuc. III 68, ἃ ἦν ἐν τῷ τειχεὶ ἐπιπλα, χαλκὸς καὶ σιδηρός, it stands for household furniture of bronze and iron: everything of this kind which was in the fort, the Laced., after the capture of Plataea, converted into couches (κλίνας) and dedicated to Ἥρα. In Arist. Pol. II 7, 1267 b 12, καὶ κατασκευὴ πολλή (a large stock) τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων, it is opposed, first, *with* money, slaves and cattle, to land, and then, secondly, to the three former. Similarly in the present passage, they are distinguished from cattle and slaves as *inanimate* moveable furniture, or 'ple-nishing'. Herodotus writes the word ἐπίπλοα in I 94; elsewhere, as usual, ἐπιπλα. The derivation appears to be, τὰ ἐπιπολῆς σκεύη, τὰ ἐπιπόλαια, superficial'. They are said to be 'superficial', to 'lie on the surface', because they are not fixed or rooted, like land, houses, trees; which are all 'property' nevertheless.

ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα] All the kinds of property just mentioned are 'secure', (in the sense, 'that the use of it is always in your own power', *infra*), not liable to risk, as money made and employed in trade or commerce; and 'liberal', such as befit a gentleman, a man of 'liberal' education and pursuits, cultivated and accomplished and refined, ὁ πεπαιδευμένος (παιδεία, ἣ διαγιγνώσκουμεν τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 260); and also 'useful', πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, and therefore a part of genuine *wealth* (with which *money* is here included, contrary to the true theory).

ἐλευθέριος, as here applied, expresses the general notion of liberality, in character and habits of mind. In the Ethics, and most frequently in the ordinary language, it is restricted as a moral virtue to a *species* of liberality, that namely which manifests itself *περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν*. Eth. Nic. II 7. The *ἐλευθέριος* represents the gentleman

resemblance is sometimes so close—see, for example, Aristotle's account of the origin and use of money in I 9 above referred to, and of the three earliest stages of civilisation indicated in c. 8, the hunting, the pastoral or nomad, and the agricultural stage (though it is true that Smith, and with him Mill, *Pol. Econ.* u. s., inverts the order of the two first and adds a fourth, the commercial stage), that it seems almost impossible that the notions at least should not have been suggested by Aristotle, though as far as I am aware Smith never mentions his name.

κάρπιμα, ἐλευθέρια δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλυσιν· κάρπιμα

from the democratic point of view; he embodies the notion of 'freedom which is the ὅρος, the principle, and the end and aim of the democratic commonwealth; he is the type of a free citizen, and therefore as expressive of *character* the term denotes 'that which a model free citizen ought to be'; and connotes or implies those qualifications, particularly education and enlightenment, which enable him efficiently to discharge the proper functions of a free citizen, and those social qualities and habits which fit him for such a society. This is opposed to the aristocratic conception of a gentleman which makes the character or notion depend rather upon birth, wealth and station; and according to which the *ἀγαθοί*, *ἀριστοί*, *ἀριστῆες*, the *boni*, *optimi*, *optimates*, &c., are the nobles, the men of rank, and of good family in a state. See further on this subject, Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, §§ 321—328.

Another characteristic of Greek feeling, which deserves notice, is brought into view in the application of the term *ἐλευθέρια* to distinguish a particular kind of property; and this is, the contempt for trade and commerce as a profession and a means of acquiring wealth, which as B. St Hilaire observes (note on *Transl. of Ar. Pol.* p. 36) was common to all antiquity. A similar observation is made by Böckh, *Publ. Econ. of Athens*, Bk. I c. 8 p. 43 (Transl.).

Plato's writings abound with contemptuous epithets and expressions applied to *ἐμπορία*, *καπηλεία*, *χρηματιστική*, *χρηματισμός*, and all arts and professions of which money-making was the only object; for instance, Legg. IV 1, 705 A, *ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλείας ἐμπιπλάσα αὐτήν, ἥθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὐτήν τὴν πόλιν ἄπιστον καὶ ἄφιλον ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὡσαύτως*, where trade is represented as corrupting and demoralizing. In XI 4, 918 D, in the course of a discussion on the legitimate objects and uses of trade, he makes the remark, *διὸ πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν καπηλείαν καὶ ἐμπορίαν καὶ πανδοκίαν γένῃ (in the actual practice of them) διαβέβληται τε καὶ ἐν αἰσχροῖς γέγονεν ὀνειδεῖσιν*, which results from their general tendency to corrupt the character of those who follow these pursuits, by the immoderate desire of gain which they stimulate and foster. Accordingly no citizen of the model state is allowed to follow any retail trade; this must be confined to metics and strangers, *μέτοικον εἶναι χρεὼν ἢ ξένον δεῖν ἀν μέλλῃ καπηλεύσειν*. VIII 11, 847 D, *καπηλείαν δὲ ἔνεκα χρηματισμῶν μήτε οὐδ' αὐτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου μηδεὸς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ὅλη καὶ πόλει ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι*. On Plato's general views on this subject, as expressed in the 'Laws', see Grote, Plato, III 431.

Aristotle similarly condemns trade and the business and practice of interchanging commodities, so far as its object is mere money-making, *χρηματιστική*. This is the accumulation of *unnatural*, artificial property: the only kind of property or wealth that is natural, *φύσει*, is that which can be applied directly to one's own use, *πρὸς χρῆσιν*, and ultimately *πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, and falls under the province of *οἰκονομική*, from which *χρηματιστική* is excluded. Pol. I 9. Hence of the two kinds of *κτητική*, the one, which may be called *οἰκονομική*, because it forms part of the science of *œconomics* (domestic economy) properly understood, is neces-

δὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι, ἀπολαυστικά δὲ ἀφ' ὧν  
μηδὲν παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν γίγνεται, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον.

sary and laudable; the other, ἡ καπηλική or μεταβλητική, with its offspring usury, which *breeds* money out of money, and is thence called τόκος, 'is justly reprehended' and usury 'most reasonably the object of abhorrence'. τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν, εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολοστατική διὰ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη. κ.τ.λ. I 10 sub fin.

On the character and tendencies of ἔμποροι, compare Xen. Œcon. xx 27, 28. In the same treatise, c. I 12, 13, 14, a distinction is taken, similar to that of Aristotle, between χρήματα, wealth or property which you can *use* directly, which does you direct service, and money, which is excluded from the notion of property *in this sense*. Xenophon, like Aristotle, approves of nothing but the agricultural mode of life as the best both for mind and body, and as cultivating and promoting the habits which go to form the best of citizens. See Œcon. c. VI 8, 9, 10, c. XV 9.

These extracts will throw light upon the meaning of the word ελευθέρια as applied to the land and stock and buildings and moveables of the landed gentleman or country proprietor. They are said to belong to the gentleman or man of cultivation, in contrast with the degrading or corrupting habits engendered by trade and commerce.

ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.] Property employed in business, and therefore productive, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι 'from which one derives one's income', is more useful, but carries with it the notion of sordidness or meanness; the other, because it produces nothing but the *enjoyments*<sup>1</sup>, which proceeds from *using* it, because it is not corrupted and degraded by any contact or connexion with money-making, better befits the cultivated man, who should hold himself aloof from such pursuits, and partakes more of the notion of καλόν. Comp. I 9, 25, καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν, αἰρετά τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα. § 26, καὶ κτήματα ἄκαρπα (καλὰ ἐστὶ). ελευθεριώτερα γάρ. Eth. N. IV 8 sub fin. (of the μεγαλόψυχος), καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων—the contrast of 'honour' and 'profit'.

ἀπολαυστικά δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Metaph. A 1, 981 b 17, on the ascending scale of arts, in the order of superiority in knowledge and general excellence. πλείονων δ' εὕρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τάναγκαία τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν (*passé-temps*, pastime, diversion) οὐσῶν, αἱ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. The highest in degree are 'sciences', the invention of which is due neither to necessity nor to the mere desire of amusements, and requires 'leisure': whence it happened that mathematics were first studied in Egypt by the priestly class.

ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον] καὶ emphatic 'which is in fact *at all* worth mentioning'.

<sup>1</sup> ἀπολαύσεις is properly 'sensual enjoyment'. In Eth. N. I 3, where the three kinds of lives, the ἀπολαυστικός, πρακτικός or πολιτικός, and θεωρητικός are distinguished and compared, the first is that which has *ἡδονή* for its sole object, the gratification of the animal appetites and desires, the satisfaction of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; the second has ἀρετή moral virtue for its τέλος; the third, θεωρία, the highest activity of the intellect.

ὅρος δὲ ἀσφαλείας μὲν τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω κεκτῆ-  
σθαι ὥστ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν, τοῦ δὲ<sup>1</sup>  
οἰκεῖα εἶναι ἢ μὴ, ὅταν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπαλλοτριῶσαι.  
λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλοτριῶσιν δόσιν καὶ πρᾶσιν. ὅλως δὲ<sup>1</sup>  
τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ  
κεκτῆσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων  
8 καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλούτος. εὐδοξία δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ  
πάντων σπουδαῖον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι, ἢ τοιούτον τι

<sup>1</sup> τε *infra*. ['*scribendum* τοῦ δὲ οἰκεῖα εἶναι, *quod in scripto libro, quo Victorius utebatur, exstat.*' Spengel, *g. v.*]

ἄξιον (λόγου). This emphatic use of *καί*, to enforce the meaning, usually of the single word following, and attract special attention to it, is so common in all Greek authors as scarcely to require illustration. It may be worth while to quote one or two prominent examples. Thuc. I 15, *πάντες δὲ ἦσαν, ὅσοι καὶ* (actually) *ἐγένοντο*, 97, *τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἤφατο...* 'Ελλη-  
νικός, II 51, *ὁ δὲ καὶ γένοιτο εἰ τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα*. Arist. Nub. 840, *τί δ' ἂν παρ' ἐκείνων καὶ μάθοι* (what *could* one learn?) *χρηστόν τις ἂν*; Eur. Hippol. 91, *τοῦ δὲ καὶ μ' ἀνιστορεῖς πέρη*; 224, *τί κυνηγεσίων καὶ σοὶ μελέτη*; (what is *thy* concern with hunting?), Ion, 241, *ὅτι καὶ θέμις*, 346, *ταῦτα καὶ μαντεύομαι*. Aesch. Agam. 97, *ὅτι καὶ δυνατόν*. 279. Dem. de F. L. § 87, *ὅπερ καὶ γέγονεν*. § 97, *ὁ καὶ θαυμάζω* (Schäfer's note). Porson ad Phoen. 1373; in interrogation, Wunder ad Antig. 720.

*ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω*] 'in such places and in such a way, as to &c.'

*τοῦ τε οἰκεῖα εἶναι ἢ μὴ κ.τ.λ.*] The definition of their being our own or not (of ownership), lies in the power of alienation, that is, giving or selling.

*ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν κ.τ.λ.*] Polit. I 9 referred to above, pp. 79 and 81.

*ἡ ἐνέργεια*] This technical term, and the opposition of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* which pervades Aristotle's entire philosophy, represents *πλοῦτος* as a mere *δύναμις* or dormant faculty or capacity, until it is 'developed' or 'realised' and 'set in action' (energized) by use (*χρῆσις*), by application to the 'service' of its owner. On this 'fundamental antithesis' of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* as a physical, moral, and metaphysical conception, consult Metaph. Θ 6—9, and Bonitz *Comm.*; Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* § 6, p. 61, *Kategorienlehre*, p. 157 seq., *Comm. ad Ar. de Anima*, Lib. II p. 295—312; Grant, *Essays on Ethics*, Ess. IV. p. 181 seq. (1st ed.) [p. 231 (3rd ed.)].

§ 8. *σπουδαῖον*] As *ἐπιεικής* is transferred from the special sense of a particular kind of goodness, i.e. equity, or merciful consideration, to the sense of 'good' in general, (see *ante*, note on I 2, 4); so *σπουδαῖος* (serious, earnest, Xen. Cyrop. II 2. 9, 3. 8, as opposed to *παίζων*<sup>1</sup> 'in jest'), to levity and frivolity; and thence, in the sense of something solid and substantial,

<sup>1</sup> Eth. Nic. x 6, 1177 a. 3, *βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδῶν, καὶ τοῦ βελτίους δὲ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιότεραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν*.



ἔχειν οὐ πάντες ἐφίενται ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἢ οἱ φρόνιμοι. τιμὴ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς δόξης, τιμῶνται δὲ δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ εὐεργετηκότες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος εὐεργετεῖν· εὐεργεσία δὲ ἢ εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ ὅσα αἷτια τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ εἰς πλούτον, ἢ εἰς τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ὧν μὴ ῥαδία ἢ κτήσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ποτέ· πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ P. 18.

sound and true, to φαῦλος, light, empty, trifling and worthless) acquires a moral sense coextensive with ἀγαθός, and is opposed to φαῦλος, Plat. Rep. VII 519 D, Legg. VI 757 A, &c. as the sound and solid to the light, empty, and unsubstantial. This familiar application of the word is recognized (as in the parallel case of ἐπικεικός, Eth. N. V 14) by Aristotle, Categ. c. 8, 10 b 7, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος· τῷ γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ' οὐ παρῶνως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς (i. e. the notion is derived from ἀρετή, but not the word itself). Plat. ὅροι, p. 415 D (ed. Tur. p. 888) σπουδαῖος ὁ τελείως ἀγαθός.

There is however one point of difference between ἐπικεικός and σπουδαῖος, that σπουδαῖος is extended to every kind of excellence, like ἀγαθός, whereas ἐπικεικός is confined to the expression of excellence in human character. Also σπουδαῖος has another sense distinguishable from the preceding, as opposed to γελοῖος, the 'serious' to the 'jocose' or 'ridiculous'. Xen. Cyrop. II 3, 1, τοιαῦτα καὶ γελοῖα καὶ σπουδαῖα ἐλέγετο, and Symp. VIII 3, σπουδαῖα ὄφρως, 'grave and serious'. σπουδὴ and παιδία 'jest' and 'earnest', 'serious work' and 'play' or 'sport', are constantly brought into contrast by Plato.

§ 9. σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς δόξης] 'a sign or mark' (in the recipient of the honour) of a reputation for beneficence, of a capacity for or tendency (τιμῶς) towards doing good'. All these 'marks of honour' here specified, being intended for the use of the public speaker, have themselves a public or national character. Eth. Nic. IX 16, 1163 b 4, τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας...οὕτω δὲ ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται. οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδωται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν.

οὐ μὴν ἀλλά] 'not but that', 'though at the same time', marks a qualification of, or exception to, too large and unlimited an assertion: οὐ μὴν (ὅλως) ἀλλὰ (τόδε). 'Those who have already done good are fairly and more than all others entitled to such signs of reputation—not however that this need be understood absolutely, so as to exclude the capacity or inclination to do good as a title to honour.'

ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ποτέ] 'either entirely, absolutely, or at particular places or times'.

πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα κ.τ.λ.] Trifles acquire importance, and confer honour, on special occasions, under special circumstances of time and place. Thus what is in ordinary cases a very trifling and unimportant action, as the gift of a cup of cold water, becomes under the circum-

τόποι καὶ οἱ καιροὶ αἵτιοι. μέρη δὲ τιμῆς θυσίαι, μνήμαι ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, γέρα, τεμένη, προεδρίαί, τάφοι, εἰκόνες, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι, τὰ βαρ-

stances in which Sir Philip Sidney gave it at the battle of Zutphen a renowned act of self-denial and heroism. And under other and different circumstances the same cup of water may assume an importance which does not naturally belong to it. 'For whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward.' Mark ix. 41, Matth. x. 42.

μέρη τιμῆς] Some of these are enumerated in Homer, Il. M 310, Γλαῦκε, τίη δὴ νῶϊ τετιμῆμεσθα μάλιστα ἔδρη τε κρίασί τ' ἡδὲ πλείους δεπασσι ἐν Λυκίῃ; πάντες δὲ, θεοὺς ὦς, εἰσορώσι; καὶ τέμενος νεμόμεσθα μέγα Ξάνθοιο παρ' ὄχθας,—καλὸν, φυταλιῆς καὶ ἀρούρης πυροφόροις; comp. Z 194, Θ 161.

θυσίαι] as those that were instituted by the Amphipolitans in honour of Brasidas, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1134 b 24, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασιδᾶ, Thuc. v 11, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολίται περιέρχαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον ὡς ἡρώϊ τε ἐντίμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας κ.τ.λ. Victorious quotes from Plutarch, Vit. Flam. c. 16, p. 378 B, the honours paid by the Chalcidians to T. Quinctius Flaminius, ἐτι δὲ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἱερεὺς χειροτονητὸς ἀπεδείκνυτο Τίτου, καὶ θύσαντες αὐτῷ τῶν σπονδῶν γενομένων ἄδουσι παιᾶνα πεποιημένον.

μνήμαι ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων] 'Memorials in prose and verse', possibly epitaphs; but rather, as these may be included in τάφοι, to be understood (as Vict.) of poems and prose compositions *in memoriam*, such as the English work that bears this title, poems in honour of the illustrious dead, and panegyrics in prose, like some of Isocrates' speeches and Xenophon's Agesilaus. Philosophical dialogues too were sometimes inscribed to the memory of departed friends and named after them, as Aristotle's Gryllus and Eudemus, and Theophrastus' Callisthenes, &c. Introd. p. 53.

γέρα] gifts of honour; as μισθοί, 'rewards of merit', not money, for mere *use*; such as privileges conferred on princes and persons of distinction ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασιν πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι, Thuc. i 13; constantly in Homer, (*pars praecipua, donum praecipuum, principi prae aliis datum*, Damm, *Lex. Homer.*) as the prime of the spoils, the fairest of the captives, κούρην, ἣν ἄρα μοι (Achilles) γέρας ἔξελον νῆες Ἀχαιῶν, Il. II 56, the largest portion of meat, or drink, at the banquet, Il. M 312 (quoted above). Eth. Nic. v. 10, 1134 b 8, μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας. Fritzsche, ad h. l., quotes Plato, Rep. VII. 516 C, τιμαὶ καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ γέρα, and Legg. XI 922 A.

τεμένη] From τέμνειν, something 'cut off' and appropriated, as a portion of land, to the special service of a God or hero; also to chieftains and kings during their lifetime for their own use. Frequent in Homer, as Il. M 313 (u. s.). Z 194, καὶ μὴν οἱ Λύκιοι τέμενος τάμον ἔξοχον ἄλλων, Y 184, 391.

προεδρίαί, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι] The privilege of the 'foremost or front seat' at public spectacles, public assemblies, games, the theatre, &c. (Herod. i 54, ix 73 &c.), and 'maintenance at the public expense'; at

βαρικά, οἶον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐκστάσεις, δῶρα τὰ

Athens in the Prytaneum or Θόλος (Dem. de F. L. §§ 279, 361), σίτῃσις ἐν Πρυτανείῳ, Arist. Ran. 764, Pac. 1084, Acharn. 125, Dem. u. s. and §§ 35, 259; both of these privileges were conferred in acknowledgment of meritorious public services, and are often named together, Arist. Equit. 573, καὶ στρατηγὸς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς | τῶν πρὸ τοῦ σίτησιν ἦτησ' ἐρόμενος Κλεαίνε-  
τον' | νῦν δ' εἰ μὴ προεδρίαν φέρωσι καὶ τὰ σίτια, | οὐ μαχεῖσθαι φασιν. Ib. 702, Κλέων ἀπολῶ σε νῆ τὴν προεδρίαν τὴν ἐκ Πύλου. 'Αλ. ἰδοὺ προεδρίαν' οἶον ὁψομαί σ' ἐγὼ | ἐκ τῆς προεδρίας ἔσχατον θεώμενον. 709, 'Αλ. ἀπονυχῶ σου τὰν Πρυτανείῳ σίτια.

τὰ βαρβαρικά, οἶον προσκυνήσεις] προσκύνῃσις, from πρὸς, and κυνῆν, 'to kiss', denotes the oriental and 'barbarous' custom of saluting by 'kissing the hand to' another, in token of inferiority and subjection, and thence is applied to any act of *servile* obeisance or homage, or to worship and adoration in general: in the last or metaphorical sense it is found in most of the best Greek writers. This practice may very likely have been accompanied by the analogous one of prostration, as the two are often found associated together in one expression. It was distinctive of *Oriental* barbarism; and prevailed amongst the Medes, Herod. I 119, of Harpagus and Astyages, the Persians, Id. I 134, ἐντυγχάνοντες δ' ἀλλήλοισι ἐν τῇσι ὁδοῖσι, τῷ δὲ ἂν τις διαγνοῇ εἰς ὁμοίῳ εἰσι οἱ συντυγχάνοντες. ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ προσαγορεύει ἀλλήλους, φιλέουσι τοῖς στόμασι. ἦν δὲ ἢ οὐτερος ὑποδείστερος ὀλίγῃ τὰς παρειὰς φιλέονται' ἦν δὲ πολλῇ ἢ οὐτερος' ἀγεννέστερος, προσπίπτων προσκυνεῖ τὸν ἔτερον, and the Egyptians II 80, ἀντὶ τοῦ προσαγορεύει ἀλλήλους ἐν τῇσι ὁδοῖσι προσκυνέουσι κατιέντες μέχρι τοῦ γούνατος τὴν χεῖρα. Obeisance by *prostration*, the *saldm* or *kotoo*, differs from this, though they probably were often used together. It is the latter that is referred to, as a barbarous practice and unworthy of a free Greek, by Aeschylus, Agam. 919 (Dind.), and Pers. 594, comp. 152. They appear to be confounded by Euripides, Orest. 1507, προσκυνῶ σ', ἀναξ, νόμοισι βαρβάροισι προσπίπτων. Plato distinguishes them, Legg. x 887 ε, προκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις. Stallb., in his note on this passage of Plato, cites, in illustration of the προσκύνῃσις, Lucian. Encom. Demosth. § 85, καὶ τὴν χεῖρα τῷ στόματι προσάγοντας, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ προσκυνεῖν ὑπέλαβον. [Cf. Isocr. Paneg. § 151, (οἱ βάρβαροι) ἐξεταζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καὶ προκαλινδούμενοι καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες, θνητὸν μὲν ἄνδρα προσκυνοῦντες καὶ δαίμονα προσαγορεύοντες, κ. τ. λ. S.]

ἐκστασις is the abstract conception of 'getting out of the way'. This 'making way or room' for the passage of a person of rank seems also to have been characteristic of Persian manners. Victorius quotes Plutarch, Artax. c. 11, p. 1016 C, ἐπαυρόμενος δὲ (ὁ Κύρος) τῇ νίκῃ, καὶ μεστὸς ὦν ὀρμῆς καὶ θράσους, διεξήλαυνε βοῶν, 'ἐξίστασθε πενιχροί' ('out of the way, beggars'), τοῦτο δὲ Περσιστὶ πολλάκις αὐτῷ βοῶντος, οἱ μὲν 'ἐξίσταντο προσκυνούντες. Herodotus, II 80, says of the Egyptians, συμφέρονται δὲ καὶ τότε ἄλλο Αἰγύπτιοι Ἑλλήνων μόνονισι Λακεδαιμονίοισι' οἱ νεώτεροι αὐτῶν τοῖσι πρεσβυτέροισι συντυγχάνοντες εἰκονοῦσι τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ ἐκτράπονται' καὶ ἐπιουσι ἐξ ἑδρῆς ὑπανιστάται. So Simonides to Hiero (Xenoph. Hiero VII 2, comp. § 9), in enumerating his privileges as a tyrant, ὑπανιστῶνται δ' ἀπὸ τῶν θάκων ὁδῶν τε παραχωρῶσι: and Aristotle of the respect due

παρ' ἐκάστοις τίμια. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δῶρόν ἐστι κτήματος  
 δόσις καὶ τιμῆς σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ οἱ φιλοχρήματοι καὶ  
 οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐφίενται αὐτῶν· ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ ἔχει P. 1361 b.  
 ὧν δέονται· καὶ γὰρ κτημὰ ἐστίν, οὐ ἐφίενται οἱ  
 φιλοχρήματοι, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει, οὐ οἱ φιλότιμοι.  
 10 σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια, αὕτη δὲ οὕτως ὥστε ἀνό-  
 σους εἶναι χρωμένους τοῖς σώμασιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ  
 ὑγιαίνουν ὥσπερ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὐς οὐδεὶς ἂν  
 εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς ὑγείας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι

from youth to age, Eth. Nic. IX 2, 1165 a 28, καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ  
 τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ἱπασσάσθαι καὶ κατακλίσαι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. Cic.  
 Cato Maior 18. 63. On the deference paid to old age, enjoined *by law* at  
 Athens, see Aesch. c. Tim. § 24. Xen. Symp. 31, ὑπανίστανται δέ μοι ἥδη  
 καὶ θάκων, καὶ ὁδῶν ἐξίστανται οἱ πλούσιοι· and de Rep. Lac. xv 6, of the  
 customs at Sparta, καὶ ἔδρας δὲ πάντες ὑπανίστανται βασιλεῖ, πλὴν οὐκ  
 ἔφοροι κ.τ.λ. Another illustration of ἔκστασις is the custom, once gene-  
 rally prevalent, of 'giving the wall' to a superior, as a mark of respect,  
*céder le haut du pavé*. (Dict. Acad. Fr.) [Ovid, Fasti, v 67, (senex)  
*et medius iuvenum, non indignantibus ipsis, ibat, et interior, si comes*  
*unus erat* and Horace, Sat. II 5. 17, '*comes exterior*'. S.]

προσκυήσεις, ἐκστάσεις] The plural of *abstract* nouns denotes the  
 various individual acts or moments or states included under the general  
 conception.

δῶρα τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις τίμια] 'quae apud singulas gentes in pretio sunt',  
 Victorius: who illustrates by the olive crown as a prize in the Greek  
 games, and quotes Horace, Ep. II 2. 32, *clarus ob id factum donis orna-*  
*tur honestis*, of the prize of valour, bearing a special value in the *Roman*  
*Military service*, assigned to 'Lucullus' soldier'. Of the words by them-  
 selves this interpretation is perfectly fair and natural; but in connexion  
 with what follows (as Aristotle seems to have intended, καὶ γὰρ τὸ  
 δῶρον...) they may be understood somewhat differently, and the παρ'  
 ἐκάστοις referred to 'the individuals of the two classes' mentioned imme-  
 diately after, the φιλοχρήματοι and φιλότιμοι.

§ 10. σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια] Health, as a bodily excellence, neces-  
 sarily implies vigour and the power of active exertion for the fulfilment of  
 the duties of life, without these it is no ἀρετή at all, and no subject of con-  
 gratulation to the possessor. Health is said to be the ἀρετή of the body,  
 in reference to the doctrine of the proper ἔργον of anything; see  
 note on p. 40 c. 2 § 12. Life is the special function of the body (Eth.  
 Nic. I 6), and health is life in its best form, as far as the body is con-  
 cerned]

Ἡρόδικος] a famous physician, native of Selymbria, in Thrace on the  
 Propontis; to be distinguished from another less known physician, Gor-  
 gias' brother, of Leontini, Plat. Gorg. 448 B, 456 B. On Herodicus and

- 11 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. κάλλος δὲ ἕτερον καθ' ἐκάστην ἡλικίαν ἐστίν. νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόρους χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα τοῦς τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ἡδὺν ὄντα ἰδεῖν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν, διὸ οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι, ὅτι πρὸς

his medical practice, see Plat. Phaedr. 227 E, and Heindorf's and Ast's notes; also Rep. III 406 A seq., where an account of him and his system of self-tormenting is given. Protag. 316 E<sup>1</sup>.

τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων] See note on c. I § 7, δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς.

§ 11. Personal beauty has no absolute standard or uniform expression, manifesting itself in the same forms at all periods and under all circumstances. It is relative, not only to the three stages of human life, youth, prime (ἀκμή) and old age, but also to the habits and functions natural and appropriate to each of those stages; manly and athletic exercises, in the way of training, to youth; military service, the imperative duty of an active and able-bodied citizen, to middle age; sedentary and intellectual pursuits, to old age, yet so that strength and vigour remain adequate to the endurance of ordinary or 'necessary' labours—extraordinary exertions, as in athletic exercises and service in the field, being no longer required. The habit of body which is fitted to the exercise of these several functions at the corresponding period of life is a constituent element of its personal beauty.

νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος κ.τ.λ.] When it is said that the beauty of a young man consists partly in the possession of a body in a serviceable state for undergoing the labours and pains incident to the race and feats of strength, the meaning seems to be that the robust habit of body and the muscular development required for the one, and the indications of activity combined with strength, which appear in the outward form, necessary for the other, are pleasant to the eye, both in themselves and also as suggesting a fitness or adaptation or harmony of the exterior of the person with the habits and pursuits which are appropriate to youth.

πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν] means no more than the mere enjoyment afforded by the sight of personal beauty. Victorius, who suggests another interpretation, concludes finally in favour of this.

οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι] The combination of a natural aptitude or

<sup>1</sup> Macaulay, in his celebrated Essay on Bacon, *Edin. Rev.*, July, 1837, selects these opinions of Plato, which he describes at length from the passage of the Republic, as to the value of Herodicus' system of medical practice, as one of the illustrations of the contempt for all that is useful and practical which pervades the Platonic philosophy; contrasting this, much to the disadvantage of the ancient philosopher, with the opposite spirit and tendency of the Baconian system, which aims, as he assumes, exclusively at practical and attainable good, and promotes the investigation of truth solely with a view to the substantial and solid benefit of the human race. Schrader cites Dial. de Orat. XXIII 4 *Ne in corpore quidem valetudinem medici probant, quae animi anxietate contingat. Parum est uegrum non esse; fortem et laetum et alacrem volo. Prope abest ab infirmitate in qua sola sanitas laudatur.*

βίαν καὶ πρὸς τάχος ἅμα πεφύκασιν· ἀκμάζοντος δὲ

capacity (πεφύκασι πρὸς) for strength and speed, vigour and activity, as evidenced by success in the *various* exercises of the πένταθλον, and the outward expression of these faculties in the configuration of the body, when accompanied with beauty in the shape, symmetry, and expression of the features, is the highest form of personal beauty in the young man. 'Die übung im Pentathlon war wegen der verschiedenartigkeit der fünf wettkämpfe ganz vorzüglich das werk junger rustiger männer mit elastischem leibe. Die Pentathlen zeichneten sich daher durch gleichmässige stärke der glieder, allseitige gewandtheit und körperlich harmonische bildung vor allen übrigen vortheilhaft aus, und werden daher vom Aristoteles als die schönsten Agonisten genannt.' Krause, *Gymn. u. Agon. der Griechen*, Vol. I, p. 494, *abschn.* VI § 31. The exercise of the πένταθλον is therefore mentioned in the passage before us as belonging solely to the period of youth<sup>1</sup>.

The πένταθλον consisted of five exercises as the name implies. These are enumerated in an epigram of Simonides, Anthol. 67 (73), Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr.* p. 791,

Ἴσθμα καὶ Πυθοὶ Διοφῶν ὁ Φίλωνος ἐνίκα  
ἄλμα, ποδωκείην, δίσκον, ἄκοντα, πάλην,

and in an epigram of unknown authorship quoted by Eustath. ad Il. Ψ. p. 1320, Anthol. ἐπιγράμματα ἀδέσποτα CCCLIV,

ἄλμα ποδῶν, δίσκον τε βολή, καὶ ἄκοντος ἐρωή,  
καὶ δρόμος, ἥδὲ παλή· μία δ' ἔπλετο πᾶσι τελευτή.

The same five are named in the Schol. on Pind. Isthm. I 35, and in the Schol. on Plat. Erast. c. 4. 135 D, πάλη, σίγυννος (i. e. ἄκων), ἄλμα, δίσκος, καὶ δρόμος. On the πένταθλον and its contents, see Krause, *Op. cit.* p. 476 seq. *abschn.* VI § 29.

Πυγμή, boxing, was therefore not included in the πένταθλον; and we are driven to suppose that the concluding words of § 14, ὁ δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλος, which certainly according to the ordinary laws of the interpretation of language ought to include it with the rest of the foregoing exercises, are one amongst many instances of Aristotle's carelessness in expressing himself, and affirm something which he could not really have meant. πᾶσι, if it can be said to have any meaning at all, must be understood simply to imply, that the πένταθλον combines in one the greatest number and variety of the single and separate exercises. Such is also the opinion of Krause, *Op. cit.* p. 258, n. 6. He observes that such a conclusion (as would naturally be drawn from the words of Arist.) is opposed to all the

<sup>1</sup> The πένταθλος however, though by the number and variety of his accomplishments he is superior to all other athletes, yet in regard of certain *special* excellences, as compared for instance with the runner or wrestler, he is only second rate. Plat. Erast. 135 E. The philosopher in the popular sense, Aristotle's πεπαιδευμένος, the man of universal attainments, is compared to the all-accomplished athlete. 'Ἀρ' ἐνωῶ οἶον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι λέγειν οἶον ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ εἶσιν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστές. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἄθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς.

πρὸς μὲν πόνοὺς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς, ἡδὺν δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖν  
μετὰ φοβερότητος· γέροντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνοὺς τοὺς  
ἀναγκαίους ἱκανόν, ἄλνυον δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὧν  
12 τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται. ἰσχὺς δ' ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις τοῦ

notices which we find in the ancient writers. *Aristoteles konnte hier in bekannten dingen die mehr worte bedürfende deutlichkeit einer gedrun- genen präcisen, und in gemessener gradation fortschreitender redeweise, welche ihm eigenthümlich ist, aufopfern, da ja doch jedem Hellenen die fünf bestandtheile des Pentathlon bekannt waren.*

ἀκμάζοντος δὲ κ.τ.λ.] The simplest way of filling up the elliptical construction seems to be to supply κάλλος after ἀκμάζοντος, and γέροντος in the next clause, and πεφυκέναι from the immediately preceding πεφύκασιν after πολεμικοὺς in the former clause and ἱκανόν in the latter. The required sense may be equally well supplied by repeating (as Victorius) the first words of the sentence, ἀκμάζοντος δὲ (κάλλος) (τὸ) πρὸς μὲν πόνοὺς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς (χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα); but the consideration of the immediate proximity of πεφύκασιν seems more in favour of the other.

ἱκανόν] fit for, strong enough for, capable of.

ἄλνυον] causing no pain, no painful impression or repulsion, in consequence of the absence of all the ordinary deformities or disfigurements incident to old age.

ὧν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται] i. e. ἐκείνων ἃ τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται. This unusual and irregular form of attraction of the relative to the case of its antecedent, where, had the antecedent been expressed, the relative should have been the *nominative* to a succeeding verb, is exemplified by Matthiae, *Gr. Gr.* § 473, obs. 1, from Herod. I 68, οὐδὲν καὶ εἰδότες τῶν ἦν..., Thuc. VII 67 ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν παρσκεύασται. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 334 C ἐν τούτοις οἷς μάλλει ἰδεσθαι, de Rep. V 465 D, εὐδαιμονίζονται ἐκεῖνοι ὧν τούτοις ὑπαρχει. Dem. de Cor. p. 318, 19, § 277, οὐδ' ἐφ' ἃ συμφέρει τῇ πόλει χρήται. And from Aristotle, this passage, and Rhet. I 2, 11, ἐξ ὧν ἐγγεν. In Dem. c. Steph. p. 1116, περὶ ὧν μὴ κατηγορεῖται λέγειν, which has been cited as an instance, κατηγορεῖται is the irregular passive 'has been accused', and therefore περὶ ὧν need not be interpreted as περὶ ἐκείνων ᾧ; it is for περὶ ἐκείνων περὶ ὧν. Another doubtful example is Eur. Med. 262, τὸν δόντα τ' αὐτῷ θυγατέρ', ἦν τ' ἐγῆματο, where Seidler retains this (the v. l.), and regards ἦν as a case of attraction for αὐτῇ ᾧ. An analogous case of this kind of attraction is Sophocles' οἷας γ' ἐμοῦ, Trach. 443, for οἷα ἐγὼ εἰμι.

§ 12. ἰσχὺς] bodily strength, is defined, in a very superficial and perfunctory manner, with a special view to strength in personal encounter—as appears in the several forms it takes, though it is afterwards more definitely expressed in ἀγωνιστικὴ ἀρετή—as the power of moving some one else (ἕτερον may possibly be neuter, *something* else, anything whatsoever), by pulling, or pushing, or lifting (possibly referring to the encounter of Herakles with Antaeus, who showed his great strength by 'lifting' him off the ground into the air; or, if ἕτερον be neuter, by lifting any heavy weight), or squeezing, or crushing; which seems to be intended for

κινεῖν ἕτερον ὡς βούλεται, ἀνάγκη δὲ κινεῖν ἕτερον  
 ἢ ἔλκοντα ἢ ὠθοῦντα ἢ αἶροντα ἢ πιέζοντα ἢ συν-  
 θλίβοντα, ὥστε ὁ ἰσχυρὸς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τούτων τισὶν  
 13 ἐστὶν ἰσχυρὸς. μεγέθους δὲ ἀρετὴ τὸ ὑπερέχειν κατὰ  
 μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσούτῳ  
 μείζονι ὥστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ  
 14 τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ σώματος ἀρετὴ σύγ-  
 κειται ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ τάχους· καὶ γὰρ ὁ  
 ταχὺς ἰσχυρὸς ἐστὶν· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ σκέλη ῥιπτεῖν

a complete analysis of the different ways in which a person or thing can be 'moved' by another.

§ 13. *μείζονι* agrees with *τινὶ* understood after *ἀρετῇ*: the accusative *μείζονα*, with *τινὰ* understood in *τὸ ὑπερέχειν*, would be more usual. Two MSS read *μείζονα*. 'Excellence in size' implies superiority over the average (people in general), in length (height), depth (thickness), and breadth, but only (superior) to such an extent as not to impede the motions (of the body) by the excess (of size), lit. to one being only so much greater as not to make the body's motions (slower than they otherwise would be, or than they ought to be, i.e.) *too* slow. *Μῆκος*, *βάθος*, and *πλάτος* are the three dimensions of space; but it is not quite certain how they are applied here to the proportions of the human body; *μῆκος* or *βάθος* might possibly represent the abstract height. I have taken *μῆκος* in this sense here because it is found in Homer to represent the 'stature' of a man, and *μάκιστος* for 'tallest'. *Odys.* λ'. 309, *Otus* and *Ephialtes*, *οὓς δὲ μακίστους θέψε ξειθαυρος ἄρουρα*, and 312, *ὅτ' αὖ μῆκος γε γενίσσθην ἐννεόργυιοι*. ν'. 71, of the daughters of Pandareus, *μῆκος δ' ἔπορ'* Ἀρτεμις ἀγνή, and in Xenoph. *de Rep. Lac.* II 5, *εἰς μῆκος αὐξάνεσθαι τὰ σώματα*. *Μῆκος* therefore is the man's height, *πλάτος* the breadth of the body, measuring from right to left, and *βάθος* the depth or thickness, measuring in the direction backwards and forwards. *Βάθος*, though it can be applied to *vertical* measure, up and down, yet as in the ordinary language it represents only what is *below* us, and not what is *above*, could hardly be applied to the more than average stature of a *tall* man.

§ 14. *ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος* for boxing and wrestling; *τάχους*, for the foot-race.

*καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρὸς ἐστὶν* seems to be added as a mere passing observation, or note upon *τάχους*: and the *γάρ*, which implies that this clause gives a reason for the preceding, must therefore be regarded as due to mere carelessness of writing, there being no logical connexion between the two sentences. (If there were any such connexion between the two, the meaning could only be, that the relation of strength and speed as *genus* and *species*, speed being only a variety of strength, is the reason for the introduction of *τάχος* into the list of agonistic virtues: the *fact* being that this could only be a reason for omitting it.)

*ῥιπτεῖν iacere, ῥιπτεῖν iactare, of a repeated action.* Hermann ad *Aiac.*



πως καὶ κινεῖν ταχὺ καὶ πόρρωδρομικός, ὁ δὲ θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὤσαι τῇ πληγῇ πυκτικός, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις παγκρατιαστικός,  
 15 ὁ δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλος. εὐγηρία δ' ἐστὶ βραδυτῆς γή-  
 ρως μετ' ἀλυντίας· οὔτε γὰρ εἰ ταχὺ γηράσκει, εὐγη- P. 19

235, Trach. 776. See also Lobeck, Aj. 239, p. 177<sup>1</sup>. This distinction, which has been doubted by some scholars, is now I believe generally accepted. At all events it applies very well here, where the simple notion of flinging or hurling, once for all, from you, as a stone, would be quite inappropriate to the motion of the legs intended to be described. *ρίπτειν τὰ σκέλη* is to 'toss about' or 'swing the legs', backwards and forwards, again and again.

*κινεῖν πόρρω*] 'to take long strides'.

*ὤσαι τῇ πληγῇ*] in boxing, to push or thrust away from you by the blow, so as *aliquem de statu deicere*; as when you knock a man down.

*ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις*] These two last, boxing and wrestling; not running. Supply therefore, in explanation of *ἀμφοτέροις*, *θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν, καὶ ὤσαι τῇ πληγῇ δυνάμεως*. Victorius (and also Krause, u. s., p. 534, n. 1) quotes Plut. Symp. 4, *ὅτι γὰρ μέμικται τὸ παγκράτιον ἔκ τε πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης, δῆλον*, and Quint. Inst. Orat. II 8, 13, as confirming Aristotle's statement. Other ancient authorities are given in Krause's notes.

On the *pancratium*, and the size, strength, and skill required by those who engaged in it, see Krause, u. s. p. 534—538, *abschn.* VI § 41.

Compare with the four preceding sections the following passage of Plato on the use of athletic exercises. Legg. VIII 832 E seq. *ἔστι γοῦν πάντων πολεμικώτατον ἢ σώματος ὀξύτης πάντως, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν· φυγεῖν μὲν καὶ εἰεῖν ἡ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς (the παγκράτιον, and especially wrestling) μάχη καὶ σύστασις ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης δεομένη.*

§ 15. *εὐγηρία*] sup. § 4, 'fortunate old age, good fortune or happiness in old age'.

*βραδυτῆς*] 'tardiness', i. e. slow approach or progress.

*εὐγηρως*] occurs under the form *εὐγηρος* in Hippocrates, and Ar. Hist. Anim. IX 12, 3.

<sup>1</sup> Lobeck in his elaborate dissertation on the question seems to leave the matter in doubt; and no doubt, from the uncertainty of the MSS readings, the distinction of the two forms of the verb being shewn in most cases merely by the difference of accent, it is difficult to decide in any particular case which of the two forms is to be preferred: and Lobeck shews by examples that (so far as the reading is to be depended on) the same notion of the verb is expressed indifferently by either form. At the same time in the somewhat obscure summing up at the conclusion of his note, he seems (as I understand him) to be in favour, as a general principle, of the hypothesis, that a difference of form in the termination of a verb radically the same (he cites *ἔλλω* or *ἐλλω* and its numerous varieties as a remarkable instance) *does* express a corresponding variety in the signification; as in the instance given, the various terminations correspond to different varieties of the general notion of 'rolling'.

ρως, οὐτ' εἰ μόγῃς μὲν λυπηρῶς δέ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ τύχης· μὴ ἄνοσος γὰρ ὦν μηδὲ ἰσχυρὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθής, οὐδ' ἄλυπος καὶ πολυχρόνιος [οὐτ'] ἄνευ τύχης διαμείνειεν ἄν. ἔστι δέ τις καὶ χωρὶς ἰσχύος καὶ ὑγείας ἄλλη δύναμις μακροβιότητος· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν μακρόβιοι εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἢ ἀκριβολογία  
 16 χρήσιμος ἢ περὶ τούτων εἰς τὰ νῦν. πολυφιλία δὲ καὶ χρηστοφιλία οὐκ ἄδηλα τοῦ φίλου ὠρισμένου, ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὅς τις, ἃ οἶεται ἀγαθὰ εἶναι

[ἄνευ τύχης] in Muretus' excellent emendation of v. 1. ἂν εὐτυχής.

[ἔστι δέ τις κ.τ.λ.] The causes of length and shortness of life in plants and animals are further investigated in the little treatise *περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος*, in the collection of tracts called the *Parva Naturalia*, appended to the work *περὶ ψυχῆς*. They all belong to the 'Physical' department of philosophy. π. μ. καὶ βρ. I § 4.

[ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἢ ἀκριβολογία κ.τ.λ.] Nice, exact, or scientific analysis and the treatment of a subject in minute detail, are out of place in a rhetorical treatise. Any further details on the subject of longevity would be useless to the rhetorician. On the various senses of *ἀκριβεία*, see Grant on *Eth.* Nic. I 7, 18: and on the mode of handling a subject appropriate to Rhetoric, *Introd. on the 'materials of Rhetoric'*, p. 11—14.

§ 16. *ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος κ.τ.λ.*] 'all such are friends, as, when they think anything good for some particular person' (*ἐκείνῳ*, some one in particular, *that* particular person, whoever it may be) 'are inclined to do it for his sake'. In this definition, friendship or love is described as a state of mind, a moral habit or disposition, not as a natural affection. The desire of doing our friend good for his own sake is a necessary accompaniment and consequence of the feeling or affection, but not identical with it. The definition is 'rhetorical', and does not give the 'essence' of the thing, as a scientific definition would. The definition of *φιλία* as a *πάθος*, II 4, 2, is in exact conformity with this, and equally deficient. In the *Ethics*, VIII 2, after quoting some of the ordinary current notions of love to be found in the preceding poets and philosophers, he proceeds to the establishment of his own. And here again the same conception of it reappears in the words *τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα*. Accordingly *φιλία* is *εὐνοία ἐν ἀντιπεπονησσι*, *reciprocal* goodwill or affection; the reciprocity being essential to true *φιλία* or affection of two human beings to one another. For though we may be 'fond' of wine, *φίλοινοι*, or 'fond' of animals, there is in these cases no true reciprocity of affection. Further, since 'fondness' is applicable to three classes of objects, the good, the pleasant, and the useful, three classes of corresponding 'friendships' or 'fondnesses' are hereby determined; but only the first of them, the love of the good, is the basis of true and perfect love; and consequently

ἐκείνω, πρακτικός ἐστὶν αὐτῶν δι' ἐκείνον. ᾧ δὲ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πολύφιλος, ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρες, 17 χρηστόφίλος. εὐτυχία δ' ἐστίν, ὣν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν P. 1361. αἰτία, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα. αἰτία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίων

the highest and perfect form of 'love' can only exist between the good, τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων οὗτοι γὰρ τάχα, ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἀγαθοί· ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς, c. 4, init. In the concluding definition of c. 2, the *jeeling* or loving *disposition* is introduced in the word εὐνοεῖν. δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τάχα μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἐν τι τῶν εἰρημένων. These τὰ εἰρημένα are the three objects of affection. This is therefore the *general* conception of love according to Aristotle. The highest form of *human* love or friendship would be εὐνοεῖν...διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

ἐπιεικεῖς] Note on c. 2 § 4, p. 30.

§ 17. εὐτυχία] 'good fortune or luck', accidental, transitory, fragmentary, is opposed to εὐδαιμονία, complete, permanent, substantial happiness, the essence of which resides in its αὐτάρκεια or independence of all accidental and external conditions. Eth. Nic. II 5 (Bekk.), 1097 b 6 seq. X 7, 1176 a 27 (ὅτι θεωρητικὴ as the highest happiness). Polit. IV (VII), 1, 1323 b 23, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὅς εὐδαίμων μὲν ἐστί καὶ μακάριος, εἰ οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποίους τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐτέραν εἶναι· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν αἰτίων ταυτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστί. Eur. Med. 1229, δλθου δ' ἐπιρρυέντος εὐτυχέστερος ἄλλου γίνοιτ' ἂν ἄλλος, εὐδαίμων δ' ἂν οὐ, where Paley quotes, Troad. 509, τῶν δ' εὐδαιμόνων μηδένα νόμιζετ' εὐτυχεῖν πρὶν ἂν θάη, explaining the distinction; and Androm. 420, ἥσσαν μὲν ἀλγεῖ δυστυχῶν δ' εὐδαιμονεῖ.

ἡ τύχη αἰτία] On Aristotle's conception of τύχη as 'a cause', with further details, see Intro. Appendix C to Bk. I c. 10, p. 218—224. On this passage, p. 223.

γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν] 'acquisition or possession'. καὶ in this and similar cases is properly rendered by 'or'. Aristotle frequently expresses as a combination two things which are not actually, but only hypothetically, combined in the conception, which we therefore more correctly represent as an alternative.

αἰτία ἡ τύχη ἐνίων ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι] Simplicius, ad Phys. II p. 73, 6, inter alia haec habet: καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν δὲ εἶναι πάντα σχεδὸν εἰς τὴν τύχην ἄγουσιν, ὥστε καὶ τῆς τέχνης οἰκίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖν, λέγοντες, τέχνη τύχην ἔσπερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην (Agathon ap. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI 4<sup>1</sup>). τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα δὲ καὶ φρονεῖν φασι (Eur. Fragm. Inc. 204). πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁρῶμεν εἶνα τῶν ἀπὸ τέχνης γινόμενων καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα· καὶ γὰρ ὕγεια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τέχνης· διψήσας γὰρ καὶ πῖον τις ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ γίγνεται

<sup>1</sup> καὶ τρόπον τινα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησί, τέχνη τύχην, κ.τ.λ.

μὲν ὦν καὶ αἱ τέχναι, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνων, οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις· ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι· ὑγείας μὲν γὰρ τέχνη αἰτία, κάλλους δὲ καὶ μεγέθους φύσις. ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τύχης, ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος. ἔστί δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, θῖον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι αἰσχροὶ ἀδελφοί, ὃ δὲ καλός, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν θησαυρόν, ὃ δ' εὔρεν, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πλησίον ἔτυχε τὸ βέλός, τούτου δὲ μή, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος αἰεὶ φοιτῶν, οἱ δὲ ὑγιῆς.' These are illustrated in the text by two examples ; health, which may be due to chance as well as art ; and beauty and strength, to chance as well as nature.

ἀτέχνων] 'independent of art'.

οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις] The contradiction between this and the statements in the scientific Physics is pointed out in the *Introd.*, u. s., p. 223.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι] Most probably a mere occasional and parenthetical note, according to the usual practice of this author (*comp.* § 14), 'chance may give rise not only to things natural and independent of nature, but also to things unnatural, monstrous, or abnormal', τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τέρατα : on which see the *reff.* in *Introd.* p. 225. Compare the def. of φύσις in I 10, 13, δόξει δ' ἂν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. τῶν παρὰ φύσιν. In this case the colon should be retained after εἶναι, the connexion being carried on from οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις to ὑγείας μὲν κ.τ.λ. as examples, ὦν αἱ τέχναι, καὶ ἡ φύσις αἰτία, and the *note* parenthetical.

Bonitz, however, *Aristotel. Stud.* I 87, would alter the punctuation, placing a comma at εἶναι, and connecting this clause closely with the preceding, in the sense, 'of which the cause is nature, but (which) may be also contrary to nature': regarding this as an instance of the Aristotelian custom of 'not repeating the relative in the second of two co-ordinated members', illustrated by Waitz, *Organ.* 25 δ 35, and certainly common enough in our author. This is further supported by Muretus, who translates, 'quae natura efficiuntur, ita tamen ut etiam praeter naturam evenire possint.'

The words quoted above from I 10, 3, seem to me to be in favour of the former interpretation : and the practice of introducing 'notes' of this kind is at least as common with Aristotle as that which is noticed by Bonitz.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη] *Phys.* 197 a 18, καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναι τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡ τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων ἢ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρὰ ταῦτα· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἀόριστα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἡ τύχη ἀόριστος. See further in *Introd.* p. 221.

τοῦ πλησίον] (ὄντος, ἱσταμένου), 'one's next neighbour', as ὁ πέλας. In *Plat. Theaet.* 174 C, it is distinguished from γείτων, ὁ πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων, having a more extended and general sense, 'a fellow-creature'.

ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος αἰεὶ φοιτῶν κ.τ.λ.] 'Or if one who was in the constant

ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες διεφθάρησαν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐτυχήματα δοκεῖ εἶναι.

- 18 περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐπέπερ οἰκειότατος ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους τόπος, ὅταν περὶ ἐπαίνου ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον, τότε διοριστέον.

- I ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσο- CHAP. VI.  
μένων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὧν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερόν·  
τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τούτων ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ  
συμβουλευόντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον, βουλευόνται δὲ  
οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,  
ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ  
δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν, ληπτέον ἂν εἴη στοιχεῖα περὶ  
2 ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἀπλῶς. ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν p. 10.

habit of visiting a certain place' (φοιτᾶν, to go backwards and forwards, ever and anon, repeatedly, to frequent, haunt) 'was the only one that failed to go (on some particular occasion), whilst those that went only once (ἅπαξ, once for all) all perished'. It is possible that this sense of repetition in the verbal termination ᾶν may be the origin of the other signification of 'disease' illustrated on the word πνευστιᾶν, c. 2 § 18 p. 45. A too-frequently repeated action might very well be interpreted as a diseased habit.

§ 18. ὅταν περὶ ἐπαίνου κ.τ.λ.] i. e. in c. 9 of this book, the chapter on the topics of encomium and censure, proper to the encomiastic or epideictic branch of Rhetoric.

#### CHAP. VI.

On the purport of this chapter, its principal divisions, and connexion with the general plan of the work, see *Intro.* p. 177.

§ 1. ἡ ὑπαρχόντων] On this addition over and above the theory, see note on c. 3 § 4; and *Intro.* p. 120.

βουλευόνται δὲ... τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος] *Eth. Nic.* III 5, 1112 b 12, βουλευόμεθα δὲ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. (This is because the means are within our own power to attain, the ends are not. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν, 1112 a 31, ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν... περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, *Ib.* line 12, and this is afterwards repeated.) Οὐτὲ γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὐτὲ ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὐτὲ πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, κ.τ.λ. *Ib.* b 34, οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

στοιχεῖα] i. e. τόποις, the 'Elements', the primary topics of the subject 'good'. See *Intro.* p. 127, 8.

ἀπλῶς] See note on p. 30, c. 2 § 4. The sense in which ἀπλῶς is here intended is evidently that of good in general, as a general or abstract

ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔνεκα ἢ αἰρετόν, καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ἄλλο

conception, opposed to καθ ἕκαστον special and particular goods. Schrader's rendering *extra comparationem*, if it means, as it seems to do, 'absolute good', 'good in itself', opposed to 'relative' or 'human good'—that which *cannot be compared with*, i.e. has no relation to, any other kind of good, but exists in itself independently—is certainly wrong. 'Absolute good' can have no place in a rhetorical system or in the practice of the rhetorician; such a definition would be in direct violation of the principle so often laid down by Aristotle, that the rhetorical method must be in conformity with the materials of the art, of a popular and practical character, adapted to the understanding of an unlearned and unscientific audience. This is especially the case with definitions. See Introd. p. 12, 13. The general notion of good is first considered in §§ 1—3, and then this is applied and illustrated in particulars in the remainder of the chapter.

§ 2. ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ.] The 'popular' character of these definitions is marked by the introductory ἔστω, 'let it be taken for granted'; no demonstration is required, any current notion of good will serve our purpose. The same phraseology occurs again in a similar case, c. 7 § 2, ἔστω δὴ ὑπέρεχον κ.τ.λ.: c. 5 § 3, and 10 § 3.

First, 'Good is anything that is in itself and for its own sake desirable (an object of choice), and that for whose sake we choose something else (which is the ulterior end of our preference for anything); and that which is the universal aim, either of everything or' (as a qualification to exclude inanimate things) 'everything that has sensation or reason, or (would be their aim) if they were to *acquire* the reasoning faculty' (supposing they have it not yet, as infants and beasts). Comp. c. 7 § 21, ὃ λαβύντα τὰ πράγματα (anything) φρόνησιν ἔλοιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον<sup>1</sup>.

The first of these two definitions, which represents Good as desirable in and for itself, and as *that* to obtain which we choose something else, is in fact identical with the second which describes it as the ultimate end or aim of all action and desire, only differing from it in terms. Every thing that we choose or desire, and every act that we perform, is as the means to one universal end, the Good. This view of the nature of Good is laid down and illustrated in the first chapter of the Nic. Eth. *πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο* (it is a current, popular, definition of) *τὰγαθόν, οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται—εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστι τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο* (the means to the universal end) *καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἑαυτὸν αἰρούμεθα*, (there is *something*, i. e. Good, which we desire only for itself,)...*δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον*, and so on. Comp. c. 5. Similarly at the commencement of the Politics, we find that this is the end of states as well as individuals, because τοῦ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ

<sup>1</sup> Schrader quotes 'Cic. de Fin. 1 11, *non est igitur voluptas bonum. Hoc ne glatuum quidem dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset.* v. 14, *earum etiam rerum quas terra gignit educatio quaedam et perfectio est—ut ipsae vites, si loqui possent, ila se tractandas tuendasque esse faterentur.* Add Aesch. Agam. 37, *οἶκος δ' αὐτὸς εἰ φθογγὴν λάβοι σαφέστατ' ἂν λέξειεν.* Eur. Iph. Taur. 51.

αἰρούμεθα, καὶ οὐ ἐφίεται πάντα ἢ πάντα τὰ αἰσθη-  
σιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν, ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν· καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς  
ἂν ἐκάστω ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἑκάστον νοῦς  
ἀποδίδωσιν ἐκάστω, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκάστω ἀγαθόν, καὶ

χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες. Comp. III 12, init. Metaph. B 2, 996 a 23—26, A 3, 983 a 31, τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰγαθόν.

The same view of the nature of Good is to be found equally in Plato, from whom Aristotle may have derived it. See, for instance, Phileb. 53 E, seq. particularly 54 C, where good is proved to be the οὐ ἕνεκα, or universal end. Sympos. 205 A, where happiness, which consists in the possession of good, is similarly represented. Gorg. 499 E, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν δεῖν πάντα ἄλλα πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο τῶν ἄλλων. Euthyd. c. 8, 278 E, seq.

καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ.] 'And all that reason in general, or universal reason, would assign to each of us, and all that the individual reason assigns to each of us, *that* is good to every human being'. That is, all that this supreme or universal reason or the particular reason of each individual, would assign as suitable to each; the former what is good for all alike, the latter what is good for each particular individual; since these sometimes differ: or, as Schrader interprets it, the universal reason that dictates *general* principles or rules of action, as contrasted with ὁ νοῦς ὁ περὶ ἑκάστον, *mens quae de singularibus decernit*, which decides in special and individual cases. The reason as an agent is here opposed to mere nature, or to a blind natural impulse; the choice of good is a reasonable choice, good is what reason universal or individual would necessarily choose. (νοῦς stands here in a *general* sense for the special faculty or part of it φρόνησις<sup>1</sup>, the practical reason, the calculating discursive and moral part of the intellect, which directs us in our choice between good and evil. In Eth. Nic. VI, νοῦς in its proper sense, the intuitive and speculative reason, is distinguished from the διάνοια or discursive intellect, and its special virtue φρόνησις or practical wisdom).

'Or *that*, by the presence of which anything (not only man in soul and body, but also things inanimate) is put in a healthy or proper condition (is made what it ought to be, what is best for it to be) and made self-sufficing (independent of all external conditions), and self-sufficiency or independence in general'. On αὐτάρκεια see note on § 3 of Chapter V, p. 74, αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς. It is thus briefly defined Pol. IV (VII) 5, init. τὸ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενός.

'Or anything that is productive or preservative of (tends to produce or preserve) things of that sort, or that which is attended by such, or things that have a tendency to prevent and destroy the opposites of these'. These forms of good belong to a lower order, subordinate to τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ, as means to the end. Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 b 10, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.

<sup>1</sup> This is actually substituted for νοῦς in the corresponding passages c. 7 § 21.

οὐ παρόντος εὖ διάκειται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ὃ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ κωλυτικά  
 3 τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἅμα ἢ ὕστερον, οἷον τῷ μὲν μαθαίνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν ἅμα. καὶ τὰ ποιητικά τριχῶς, τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιείας,

§ 3. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχῶς] 'the term *attending upon* admits of two different senses, either simultaneous (attendance, accompaniment) or subsequent (consequence), as knowledge attends on learning subsequently, but life on health simultaneously<sup>1</sup>. ἀκολουθεῖν and ἐπισθαι are both used in logic to denote not merely something that follows, a 'consequence' in the ordinary acceptance of the words, but also an invariable or necessary attendant or concomitant in five different senses: (1) a *preceding* concomitant, or antecedent, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 11, καὶ γὰρ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐπισται, as learning is always preceded by ignorance; Categ. c. 12, πρότερον ἔτερον ἐτέρου λέγεται τετραχῶς...δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθίαν, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῶν δύο πρότερον· δυοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὕντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἐν εἶναι, κ.τ.λ. (2) a *simultaneous* concomitant, ἅμα: as health and life, Rhet. I 6, 3; 7, 5. (3) a *subsequent* concomitant, or 'consequent', ὕστερον, as learning is followed by knowledge, Rhet. II. cc. (4) *δυνάμει*, a virtual concomitant, *by implication*, as sacrilege necessarily implies, includes *potentially* or *virtually* the notion of theft or fraud, by the rule *omne maius continet in se minus*; and (5) *reciprocal contradictories* regarded as consequents, Top. Β 8, 113 b 25, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀκολουθήσεις, or ἀντικατηγορουμένως, where two terms or propositions are 'convertible', ἀντιστρέφει: such are ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, and τὸ μὴ ζῶν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος: τὸ μὴ ἡδὺ οὐ καλόν, and τὸ καλόν ἡδύ. It seems from this as if the primary sense of ἀκολουθεῖν were to attend or wait upon, and that that of 'following' is a special and secondary signification under the general notion of accompaniment. Hence ἀκόλουθος becomes *pedisequus*, a constant attendant, footman, or 'follower'. The 'simultaneous' kind of accompaniment appears also in this word sometimes even in the ordinary language, as when Plato writes, Menex. 249 D, ἀκολουθεῖ μετ' ἐμοῦ, Lach. 187 D, μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκολουθῶν: and similarly Demosthenes and the Orators; and Xenophon joins it with σύν. Diog. Laert. VII § 125, τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀνακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, of the Stoics. Plutarch, de Repugn. Stoic. c. 27, p. 1045 E, attributes the same doctrine in the same words to Chrysippus.

καὶ τὰ ποιητικά τριχῶς] This triple division of productive causes or conditions is thus explained by Majoragius. 'Ponit tres species rerum conficiendum quae ita distingui possunt. Quae conficiunt, aut sunt a

<sup>1</sup> So Quintilian, Inst. Orat. v 10. 75. *Sed haec consequentia dico, ἀκόλουθα; est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas: illa sequentia, παρεπόμενα, quae postea facta sunt aut futura...hoc temporis, illud naturae.*



τὰ δὲ ὡς σιτία ὑγείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὅτι  
 4 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν. τούτων δὲ κειμένων  
 ἀνάγκη τὰς τε λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς εἶναι καὶ  
 τὰς τῶν κακῶν ἀποβολὰς· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν τὸ  
 μὴ ἔχειν τὸ κακὸν ἅμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν  
 5 ὕστερον. καὶ ἡ ἀντ' ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ μείζονος λή-  
 ψις καὶ ἀντὶ μείζονος κακοῦ ἐλάττονος· ᾧ γὰρ ὑπερ- P. 1362 δ.

natura, h. e. intrinsecus, aut extrinsecus adhibentur. A natura sunt, ut temperies humorum, et bona corporis constitutio, conficiens est bonae valetudinis. Quae extrinsecus adhibentur aut sunt tanquam instrumenta, aut sunt actiones; instrumenta, ut cibaria :...actiones, ut exercitatio corporis, et deambulatio, quae frequenter bonam valetudinem efficit.' This account, though correct in the main, requires a little further explanation and modification. The ground of the distinction of the first of the three classes, of which the illustration is τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, the healthy state of body, active, actual health, as produced by ὑγεία, health in itself, we learn from two passages of the Nic. Eth. First, VI 13, 1144 a 4, *ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν (αὐταὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ) οὐχ ὡς ἱατρικὴ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὕσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαιμονα.* Here ὑγίεια itself represents the formal cause of health, which is internal and essential (μέρος, ἔχεσθαι), and develops, quickens, and stimulates the bodily functions into healthy activity, gives health an active reality (ἐνεργεῖ), and is therefore contrasted with the efficient, and *external* cause, the physician, who, as the Paraphrast on the parallel passage, X 4, says, *συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει, καὶ ὅπως παραμείνη ζητεῖ.* The second passage, X 4, 1174 b 25, is again an illustration : *οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τόπον ἢ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἱατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτιά ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν :* on which the Paraphrast's (Andronicus Rhodius) commentary is, *ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ποιεῖ μὴ οὕσα (i. e. ἐνέργεια, not 'non-existent') τὴν τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἐνέργειαν, ὁ δὲ συντηρεῖ κ.τ.λ.* as before. The second and third divisions represent two kinds of extraneous causes or conditions, distinguished from this formal, intrinsic cause. These are first, necessary conditions, as of health, represented by food; and secondly, probable conditions, as exercise, which, as Aristotle adds, only produces health ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

§ 4. We now proceed to the application or illustration of the general principles laid down in the three first sections, which continues to the end of the chapter; τούτων δὲ κειμένων κ.τ.λ. Application of the two topics of 'consequents', ἅμα and ὕστερον ἀκολουθεῖν : the receipt of all good things is an instance of the latter, because it is *followed* by the possession of good things; and the loss or riddance of evil things, which is accompanied *simultaneously* by the relief from what is bad, exemplifies the former. This latter conclusion rests upon the principle, here understood, but stated in § 18, *ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν.* Comp. also Top. Γ 2, 117 b 2, on λήψεις and ἀποβολαί.

§ 5. *ᾧ γὰρ ὑπέρχει κ.τ.λ.*] 'for the amount of the excess of the greater

έχει τὸ μείζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος, τοῦτο γίνεται τοῦ μὲν  
6 λήψις τοῦ δ' ἀποβολή. καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη  
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται οἱ  
έχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πρακτικάί.  
7 περὶ ἐκάστης δέ, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία, χωρὶς ῥητέον. καὶ  
τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ ἐφίεται τὰ ζῶα

over the less, the same is the measure of the gain of the one (good) and the loss of the other (evil)'. γίνεται, 'becomes', i. e. 'amounts to'. The excess of the greater over the lesser good, and the excess of the greater over the lesser evil, is the measure of the gain in the one case, and the loss in the other; the loss of the *evil* being a gain, by the same rule as before, ὅ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν.

§ 6. ποιητικά...καὶ πρακτικά] virtues, besides being 'productive of good', like many other things, have also this special peculiarity, that they are effective of good by action. The distinction is, that whereas ποιεῖν tends to some ἔργον or substantial enduring result, as a picture, or statue, or other work of art, the end of πράττειν is action itself, and there is no further result. See the commencement of the Nic. Eth., and what is there said about these two τέλη. Ethics and Rhetoric are πρακτικὰ τέχναι, the arts of the painter and statuary ποιητικά. Compare Introd. pp. 16—19. By the distinction here taken we find brought into view the specially 'practical' character of the virtues, which, like the art that describes them, end in action: though besides this, some of the virtues, at any rate, produce lasting effect, and leave results beyond the mere performance of the act, some positive benefit (as an ἔργον) to an individual or the community. But the words here distinguished are elsewhere employed indifferently to express generally the power of producing an effect or result, as appears in the comparison of 5 §§ 3, 16; 6 § 2. Of the two, ποιητικός is most frequently used in the expression of this conception, as may be seen in the following sections.

All moral virtues must necessarily be each a form of good: for they produce a good moral habit, or condition, or constitution in those that possess them, and are besides productive (and effective) of good in their actions and the results of these.

'Each of them, its substance or true nature' (the first Category, τί ἐστί, οὐσία, substance what the thing is, really and essentially), 'and qualities' (the third Category), 'must be treated separately, χωρὶς, apart'. This is done in c. 9. The contents of the chapter to which reference is here made shew that ἀρεταὶ are here confined to the ἠθικά or moral virtues, the 'virtues' *par excellence*, and do not include physical, or any other, 'excellences'.

§ 7. καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] What is here taken for granted, as universally admitted, that pleasure is good (though not necessarily *the* good) is in both the treatises on pleasure, in the 6th and 10th books of the Nicomachean Ethics, carefully investigated and discussed, and the opinions held upon the question by preceding philosophers, as Eudoxus

αὐτῆς τῇ φύσει. ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ αἰρετά ἐστιν.

8 ὥς δὲ καθ' ἐν εἰπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τάδε. εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν καὶ αὐταρκες,

and Plato, examined, Bk. VII, c. 12, seq. and X, c. 2. Aristotle's conclusion (in Bk. X) is that though pleasure may be regarded as good it is not *the* good, i.e. the supreme good, good in itself, because there are *some* pleasures which are not proper objects of choice and therefore not good. Eudemus (if the seventh book be his), seems rather to be inclined to the contrary view; it is said at any rate, c. 14, init., ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν τι εἶναι, and three lines further, ἄριστον τ' οὐδὲν καλύει ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι. And at the beginning of c. 13, in answer to Plato's objection in the Philebus, we find, ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. This difference of view between the master and pupil (on the supposition that Eudemus is the author of Bk. VII) is in fact in exact conformity with the difference of their respective definitions of pleasure; Aristotle defining it as the perfecting (τελείωσις) of the ἐνέργεια, but not our ἐνέργεια itself, and therefore not 'the supreme good'; whilst Eudemus goes further and describes it as an 'unimpeded energy', ἀνεμπόδιτος ἐνέργεια: and in fact this variation may be regarded as one of the principal arguments for the difference of authorship of the two treatises on pleasure in the Nic. Eth. The principle upon which the fact is here assumed in the Rhetoric, is stated in both treatises of the Ethics; the universal recognition, namely, of the principle that pleasure is desirable. See VII 14 init. and X 2, 1172 b 35, οἱ δ' ἐπιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν· ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναι φασκέν.

τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.] This division of καλόν brings into view the physical and moral aspects of it united in the term beauty and right. καλόν as ἡδύ, an object of pleasure, is the physical beauty that pleases in nature and art; in καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν we are referred to the moral side of it, that which is 'fair' and right, which is an end in itself, in itself desirable, and to be sought on its own account and with no ulterior object. It is defined in this latter sense, c. 9, 3, δ' ἂν δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ὃν ἐπαινετὸν ἦ, (its being the object of 'praise' confers upon it its moral character) ἢ δ' ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἡδύ ἦ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. Comp. II 13, 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς. Eth. Eudem. VII 15, 3, 1248 b 18, τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλος ἐστίν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ἐνεκά ἐστιν αἰρετά. τοῦτων δὲ καλά, ὅσα δι' αὐτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετά ἐστιν. On the καλόν as a moral end, the ultimate object and motive of human action, to which all action should be directed and all lower interests sacrificed, see the fine passage of Eth. Nic. IX 8, 1169 a 6, seq., particularly 20—27.

§ 8. ὥς δὲ καθ' ἐν εἰπεῖν] 'to describe good things singly', in detail, by an enumeration of particular kinds of good.

εὐδαιμονία] happiness, the universal τέλος, aim and end of life and

9 καὶ ἔνεκα αὐτοῦ πολλὰ αἰρούμεθα. δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ  
 10 αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἔξεις· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς. καὶ  
 ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώμα-

action. See especially Eth. Nic. I 5, where happiness is defined by its three principal characteristics; it must be *τέλειον*, *αὐταρκες*, *τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*. These same characteristics appear in the definition here given in the Rhetoric: *τέλειον* corresponds to *τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν*, its perfection or completeness being chiefly shewn in its desirability for its own sake. Eth. N. I 5, 1097 b 31, *τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἑτερον*, καὶ *τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετόν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν*, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ *τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν* ἀεὶ καὶ *μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο*. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ *εὐδαιμονία* μάλιστα· εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτήν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτὰ...αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς *εὐδαιμονίας* χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες *εὐδαιμονήσῃν*. τὴν δ' *εὐδαιμονίαν* οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο: note on c. 5 § 1, p. 72. On *αὐτάρκεια*, the second characteristic of happiness, see c. 5 § 3, and note there, p. 74. The sentences of Eth. Nic. I 5, following those already quoted, are upon this same subject. The concluding summary of the contents of the chapter is, *τέλειον δὲ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος*, which gives the third of the conditions in the Rhetoric. A precisely similar description of happiness is found in Eth. Nic. X, cc. 6 and 7.

§ 9. The list of virtues here given is very incomplete, and a mere extract or sample of that given in the Nic. Eth. II 7, which is itself anything but a complete or satisfactory enumeration of them. A longer list is to be found in c. 9 § 5, which includes the two intellectual virtues, *σοφία* and *φρόνησις*, but still omits several of those which are distinguished in the table of the Ethics. All the virtues here mentioned are analyzed in detail in Eth. N. III, IV, V, justice being treated separately at great length in the fifth book.

*ἔξις*, the *genus* of the definition of virtue, is an acquired, developed, confirmed habit or state, physical, mental or moral—the last of the three, of course, when applied to virtue. It is properly opposed to *διάθεσις*, as a settled and permanent state, opposed to a temporary and changeable *disposition*. It is developed out of the *πάθη* by the operation of *ἔθος*, habit or association, till it has acquired a fixed tendency and direction and a confirmed character, which shews itself in the constant exercise of similar *ἐνεργεῖαι*, and is now no longer liable to change and the opposite tendency to vice. On the growth of virtue, and the formation of the *ἔξις*, see Eth. Nic. II 1—5, particularly 4 and 5. Also Sir A. Grant, *Ess. on Ethics*, I p. 120 seq. (1st Ed.) [=p. 164, 3rd Ed.] Trendel. on de Anima p. 311, and 366. *Kategorienlehre*, p. 95.

§ 10. *ὑγίεια*...ἀριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι] This is one of many *opinions*. So the 'Delian inscription', quoted by Aristotle, Eth. N. I 9, and Eudemus, Eth. Eud. I 1, 1, with a slight variation; also in Theogn. Eleg. 255 (Bergk), *κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῦστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν | ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ*

τοῖς καὶ ποιητικαὶ πολλῶν, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἡδονῆς  
καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, διὸ καὶ ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι δύο τῶν p. 21.

τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμιωτάτων αἰτιόν ἐστιν, ἡδονῆς καὶ  
11 τοῦ ζῆν. πλοῦτος· ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν  
12 πολλῶν. φίλος καὶ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸν αἵρε-  
13 τὸς ὁ φίλος καὶ ποιητικὸς πολλῶν. τιμή, δόξα·

τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν, for which Bergk gives in the second line, *πρῆγμα δὲ*  
*τερπνύτατον τοῦ. τις ἔραιτο τυχεῖν.* Soph. Creus. Fragm. ap. Stob. CIII 15  
(Dind. Fr. Soph. 326), *κάλλιστόν ἐστι τοῦνδικον πεφυκέναι· λῆστον δὲ τὸ*  
*ζῆν ἄνοσον· ἡδιστον δ' ὅτφ πάρεστι λῆψις ὧν ἐρᾷ καθ' ἡμέραν.* Ariphron,  
Dithyr. I (ap. Bergk, Fragm. Lyric. Gr. p. 841 [p. 984 Ed.. 2]), *ὑγίεια,*  
*πρεσβίστα μακάρων, μετὰ σεῦ ναίοιμι τὸ λειπόμενον βιοτᾶς...σέθεν δὲ χωρὶς*  
*οὔτις εὐδαίμων ἔφυ.* See also a fragment of Licymnius, Fr. 4, in Bergk,  
u. s., p. 840 [p. 986 Ed. 2] (a dithyrambic poet and rhetorician, mentioned  
by Aristotle, Rhet. III 12, 2 ; 13, 5, and quoted, as Bergk supposes, in III  
14, 5); Plut. de virt. mor. c. 10, quoting from some poet, *ἡ τε τοῦ σώματος*  
*ὑγίεια—δοκεῖ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν· οὔτε γὰρ πλούτου χάριν ἢ τεκείων, οὔτε τᾶς*  
*ισοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιλεῖδος ἀρχᾶς—τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν μὴ παρόντος.* de fra-  
terno amore, c. 2, *ἥς χωρὶς οὔτε πλούτου, φασίν, οὔτε τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος*  
*ἀνθρώποις βασιλεῖδος ἀρχᾶς εἶναι τινα χάριν καὶ ὄνησιν.* (ap. Bergk not.)

§ 11. πλοῦτος, ἀρετὴ κτήσεως] The ἔργον, special office or function,  
that which it was intended by its nature to do, determines the ἀρετὴ or  
special excellence of anything. If wealth is the object of acquisition,  
and acquisition fulfils its proper function, its destination, the law of its  
being, in the accumulation of wealth ; then the ἀρετὴ or special excellence  
of the art of acquiring is manifested in the attainment of that object, or  
the wealth amassed. Wealth as a 'good' *seem*s here to be regarded as  
an end ; if so, this is in contradiction to the more scientific doctrine laid  
down in the Politics I 8, according to which wealth is only an instrument,  
see note on p. 79 (c. 5, 7), and note 1 on the same page. However, as  
some good things are only instrumental and means to an end, we are  
not obliged to suppose that Aristotle regards wealth here otherwise than  
as one of those mediate ends, subordinate and subservient to some other  
and higher end. On the relation of ἔργον and ἀρετὴ, see notes on c. 2,  
12, and 5, 4, and the reff. in the former.

§ 12. καθ' αὐτὸν αἰρετός ὁ φίλος] This is an application of the general  
principle in § 2, that good in general is in itself desirable, to the special  
case of friendship. That a good friend, or the friendship of the good, is  
desirable in itself is made to appear in the course of a long and subtle  
argument in Eth. N. IX 9, of which the conclusion is (at the end of the  
chapter) *δεῖσθαι ἄρα τῶν εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.* The words most  
in point here are, *εἰ οὐ τῷ μακαρίῳ τοῦ εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ*  
*φύσει ὃν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρε-*  
*τῶν ἂν εἴη.*

§ 13. τιμή, δόξα] The distinction between these two is stated in note  
on c. 5, 4, p. 76. These are not only 'pleasant' and therefore good in them-

καὶ γὰρ ἡδέα καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ  
14 αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφ' οἷς τι-  
μῶνται. δύνανται τοῦ λέγειν, τοῦ πράττειν· ποιη-  
15 τικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν. ἔτι εὐφυνία,

selves, but also productive of various advantages which accrue to them from the respect of others, and so 'good' in this secondary or subordinate sense likewise.

καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] 'and they are accompanied for the most part by the actual possession of the things' (natural gifts, qualities, accomplishments, acquirements, military distinction, rank and fortune, and such like) 'which the honours paid them (these supposed possessors) imply', ἐφ' οἷς τιμῶνται, on the basis of which, on account of, for which, they receive the honour paid, or 'on which the honours paid them rest, are grounded, or based'. ἐφ' οἷς τ. might possibly be rendered 'for which they (the honour and reputation) are valued'; on which their value depends, or, by which it is measured; but the other interpretation seems more direct and natural.

The rule here tacitly referred to, as warranting the inference that, when honour is conferred, those so honoured are generally worthy of it, is that a generally received opinion, or popularly current maxim, or the expression of these in the ordinary language, may be for the most part depended on as true<sup>1</sup>. With τὸ ὑπάρχειν, τοῖς κεκτημένοις, or something similar, must be supplied.

§ 15. εὐφυνία] is a happy natural constitution of mind or body or both; εὐφυνὴς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, Plat. Rep. III 409 E. In de Soph. Et. c. I, 165 a 5, we have εὐφυνέστατος applied to 'a topic', in the sense (apparently) of 'naturally best adapted to a certain purpose'. And in the spurious addition to the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (Bekk. 39), 19, εὐφυνία τόπων occurs to denote the 'natural advantages of situation', *opportunitas locorum*. The word is however applied here, as it usually is, to the mental faculties, and signifies cleverness, quickness of intellect, intellectual dexterity, differing very little from ἀρχνεία. And so, infr. § 29 and II 15 3. Similarly de Anima B 9, 2, 421 a 25, οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφνεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφνεῖς, Top. Γ 2, 118 a 22, φιλοπονεῖν ἀρνούμεθα ἵν' εὐφνεῖς εἶναι δοκῶμεν, 'we deny that we are industrious in order to gain the reputation of cleverness'. In Top. Θ 14, 163 b 13, ἡ κατ' ἀληθειαν εὐφυνία is defined, for dialectical purposes, τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς εἰσεῖναι τὰ ληθῆς καὶ φυγεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος· ὅπερ οἱ πεφυκότες εὐδύνανται ποιεῖν. In Eth. Nic. III 7, 1114 b 9, it is used similarly to denote sagacity in aiming rightly at the true end, καὶ τὸ εὐ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινή ἂν εἴη εὐφυνία. Rhet. III 2, 10 init. In Poet. 22, 17 it stands for readiness in poetical invention. ἀφνης, the opposite, is 'dull' and 'stupid', Plat. Phaed. 96 C. In the Platonic δροι, p. 413 D, it is defined, ταχος μαθήσεως· γέννησις φύσεως ἀγαθῆ· ἀρετὴ ἐν φύσει.

<sup>1</sup> This principle is in fact constantly appealed to by Aristotle, and is one of the ordinary arguments to which he has recourse in the establishment of the doctrines of his philosophy.

μνήμαι, εὐμάθεια, ἀγχίνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιη-  
 τικαὶ γὰρ αὗται ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν. ὁμοίως δὲ  
 16 καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν· εἰ  
 γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἔποιτο ἀγαθόν, καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν  
 ἔστιν· καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἔστιν.

μνήμαι] Victorius, Vater and Vahlen (in *Trans. of Vienna Acad.* Oct. 1861, p. 105) object to the plural of this word, on the ground either that abstract nouns do not admit of the plural formation, or (as Vahlen) that as it is the *faculty* of memory that is here in question the plural is inadmissible. As to the former, such is no doubt the rule, but the exceptions are abundant. Parallel to this is ἀναμνήσεις, 'acts of recollection', de Memor. 2, 6 and 10. We have already noticed προσκυνήσεις and ἐκστάσεις as examples in c. 5, 9; three more occur together in c. 11, 4, ῥαθυμῖαι, ἀπονῖαι, ἀμέλειαί. Eth. N. I 13, 1102 b 4, ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, II 1, 1103 b 19, τὰς ὀργάς, 2, 1104 a 27, γενέσεις, αὐξήσεις, φθοραί, b 25 τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας. Pol. II 5, 1264 a 35, εἰλωτείας τε καὶ πενσιτείας καὶ δουλείας. The plural expresses the several acts or moments of these abstract conceptions when carried into operation, or particular cases or instances of the manifestation of them. Μνήμαι therefore means here, any ordinary examples of retentive memory. It occurs itself, Metaph. A 1, 980 b 29, and Anal. Post. II 19, 100 a 5. [Also, in Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 25; X 2, 1173 b 19, *Index Aristotelicus*. S.]

εὐμάθεια] which is equivalent to εὐφύια πρὸς μάθησιν, is a particular kind of natural sagacity and readiness directed to learning. εὐφύια ψυχῆς πρὸς τάχος μαθήσεως. Ὅροι Platon. 413 D.

ἀγχίνοια] 'ready wit', 'quickness of apprehension', is mentioned as a kind of εὐστοχία and distinguished from εὐβουλία (*right* judgment), but not defined, Eth. Nic. VI 9. The defin. of ὅροι Platon. is εὐφύια ψυχῆς, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων σὺνδραστικός ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ τοῦ δεόντος· ὀξύτης νοῦ, which agrees very well with the preceding. It is therefore an *intellectual* (not moral) 'presence of mind', the faculty of seeing the point at once, or 'ready wit'. In Anal. Post. I 34, init. it is thus defined, εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ (intuitive, immediate) τοῦ μέσου (the middle term of the syllogism, which expresses the cause), οἷον εἰ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν αἰεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου· ἡ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται· ἢ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, which expresses in a logical form precisely the same characteristic of the faculty, rapidity of apprehension, ταχὺ ἐνόησε.

εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ.] This seems to refer exclusively to the last mentioned of the three, τὸ ζῆν, to which alone it is strictly appropriate. Sciences and arts are avowedly 'productive of good', and rest their claims upon that alone.

§ 16. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ.] The argument is, justice is κοινῇ συμφέρον, it promotes the public interest, it is advantageous or expedient to society, whose interest it is that the laws should be duly observed and the rights of its citizens maintained, and evildoers punished, and all this is the effect of τὸ δίκαιον: but that which is useful or expedient is good, § 1,

17 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ἀγαθὰ  
18 ἔστιν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις ἐκ τῶνδε οἱ συλ-  
19 λογισμοί. ὧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν. καὶ

because it is the means to an end, that end being happiness, the ultimate and universal aim.

§ 17. So far the good things treated of are universally acknowledged to be such, and we may therefore take it for granted that they are so. We now come to cases of *doubtful* good things, which are or may be disputed, and which therefore require argument for their support. συλλογισμός here stands for the rhetorical enthymeme, or rather, perhaps, for any kind of regular inference or ratiocination in general. See note on c. 2, 11, and c. 4, 5.

σχεδόν] 'pretty nearly', 'about'. Used in qualification of a too general expression, just like ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. The author means to say that he has given a *tolerably* complete list, or exact account of them; he does not profess perfect accuracy.

§ 18. ὧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν] If, for instance, you can shew that vice and folly are bad, you may infer at once that their opposites, virtue and wisdom, are good. This is not universally true; Aristotle himself places it amongst the topics which are 'open to question'. So Bacon, *Cuius contrarium malum bonum; cuius bonum malum. Non tenet* (this does not hold) is the 'redargutio', *in iis rebus quarum vis in temperamento et mensura sita est. Dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt.* Pref. to *Colours of Good and Evil*. Bacon's Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, Vol. VII p. 67. According to Aristotle, Eth. N. II 8, there is double opposition in the case of virtue and vice, αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀκραὶ καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντία εἰσὶν, ἡ δὲ μέσῃ ταῖς ἀκραῖς. When virtue, the mean disposition, is opposed to either of the extremes or vices, the rule holds; when the extremes or vices are considered as opposed to one another, it fails. Categ. c. 11, 13 ὁ 36, ἐναντίον δὲ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθὸν μὲν κακόν· τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἑκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακὸν δὲ ὅτι μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὅτι δὲ κακόν· τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακόν ὄν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἐκατέρωφ, οὕσα ἀγαθόν. ἐπ' ὀλίγων δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων αἰὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐναντίον ἔστιν. 14 α 19, ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι...ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακόν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τιῶν ὄντα. Cic. Topic. XI 47, *deinceps locus est qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt* (Aristotle's ἐναντία, in his ordinary usage of the term. Good and bad however are different *genera*, not extremes of the same *genus*), *ut sapientia et stultitia. Eodem autem genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt tamquam e regione quaedam contraria, ut celeritati tarditas, non debilitas: ex quibus argumenta talia existunt: si stultitiam fugimus sapientiam sequamur: et bonitatem si malitiam.* The dialectical topics of τὰ ἐναντία, in which this is not included, are analysed in Topic. B cc. 7, 8. To this head may also be referred the topic of στήρησις, *privatio*, criticised by Bacon, *Colours of Good*



οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει· οἷον εἰ τὸ δει-  
 λους εἶναι μάλιστα συμφέρει τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, δηλὸν ὅτι  
 20 ἀνδρία μάλιστα ὠφέλιμον τοῖς πολίταις. καὶ ὅλως ὁ  
 οἱ ἐχθροὶ βούλονται ἢ ἐφ' ᾧ χαίρουσι, τούναντίον  
 τούτῳ ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται· διὸ εὖ εἴρηται  
 ἢ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος.

ἔστι δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· οὐθὲν  
 γὰρ κωλύει ἐνίοτε ταῦτ' ὅτι συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις·  
 ὅθεν λέγεται ὡς τὰ κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, P. 1363.

*and Evil*, No. 6, *cuius privatio bona, malum: cuius privatio mala, bonum*.  
 στέρησις and ἔξις, one of the forms of *contrariety* or *opposition*, Met. I 4,  
 1055 a 33, πρώτη δὲ ἐναντίωσις ἔξις καὶ στέρησις ἴστιν. And Top. B 8, 114  
 a 7 (though in a different application), ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν  
 στερήσεων καὶ ἔξεων σκεπτόμεν. Στέρησις contrasted with ἔξις is one of the  
 four (Categ. 10, 11 b 17) or five (Metaph. Δ 10, 1018 a 20) kinds of oppo-  
 sition, ἀντικείμενα. Comp. supr. § 4, in which this is implied.

§ 19. Victorius quotes in illustration, Cic. pro Muren. c. 39, *Si L. Catilina cum suo consilio nefariorum hominum quos secum eduxit hac de re posset iudicare, condemnaret L. Murenam: si interficere posset, occideret.... Idemne igitur delecti amplissimis ex ordinibus honestissimi atque sapientissimi viri iudicabant quod ille importunissimus gladiator hostis rei publicae indicaret?*

οὐ ἐναντίον] The gen. immediately following the ordinary construction  
 ὃ ἐναντίον, is remarkable. The genitive after the adjective is accounted  
 for by the comparison implied in it, just as it follows ἕτερος, ἄλλος, διά-  
 φορος, διαφέρειν, διαφερόντως, ἄλλοιος, ἀλλότριος. See for examples Matth.  
*Gr. Gr.* 366, on ἐναντίος, Obs. 2.

§ 20. ἢ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος] Il. A 255, 'Huc confugit fallacissimus  
 homo Sinon apud Virgilium (Aen. II 104) et ab hoc loco praesidium peti-  
 vit, cum salutem suam callide procurans, quam abiicisse videri volebat,  
 inquit, *Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae.*' Victorius.

ἔστι δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.] This last rule is liable to exceptions, as in  
 the case where the same thing, the same course of action or policy, hap-  
 pens to be for the interest of two adversaries: a common misfortune has  
 often this effect of 'bringing' enemies 'together', or uniting them, as  
 when the Athenians were forced into alliance with the Thebans by their  
 common dread and hatred of Philip. συνάγει γὰρ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς  
 φόβος, Polit. VIII (V), sub init. 'Misery acquaints a man with strange  
 bedfellows', says Trinculo in the *Tempest* (Act II Sc. 2), which illus-  
 trates the *proverb*. However, the ordinary rule is, that it is common  
 interests that produce sympathy, συνέχει τὸ κοινόν, Eth. Nic. 14, ult.;  
 and the example of Athens and Thebes is only an apparent exception,  
 because in the given case the common danger had altered their original  
 relations and engendered common interests and common sympathies and  
 antipathies.

21 ὅταν ἢ ταυτό βλαβερὸν ἀμφοῖν. καὶ οὐ μὴ ἔστιν  
ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὃ δ' ἂν ἢ μείζον ἢ δεῖ,  
22 κακόν, καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται·  
φαινόμενον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἦδη, καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον  
ὑπολαμβάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν· τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγα-  
θόν. ὅθεν ταῦτ' εἴρηται,

καὶ δὲ κεν εὐχολὴν Πριάμῳ

καὶ

αἰσχροὺν τοι δηρὸν τε μένειν·

23 καὶ ἡ παροιμία δέ, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν. καὶ οὐ

§ 21. οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή] 'that which does not admit of excess', health, life, virtue, and all that lies in a *mean* state, happiness, are all ends in themselves, and desirable in and for themselves. Pleasure by this rule, which *does* admit of being carried to excess, is properly speaking no 'good'.

ὃ ἂν ἢ μείζον ἢ δεῖ, κακόν] by the rule, μηδὲν ἄγαν.

§ 22. πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται] 'much labour or expense has been incurred'.

ἦδη] note on c. 1, 7, p. 13 'already', for that reason alone, and without looking any farther. The time, trouble, and expense which we have spent in the pursuit of an object shews *already*, without any further consideration, or without our knowing whether it is really good or not, that it *seems* at any rate good to us: it consequently becomes an *end* to us, and all ends are good. ἀγαθόν, οὐ εἴφεται πάντα, 6, 2.

τὸ τέλος ἀγαθόν] because 'every art, science, action, and purpose has some good in view at which it aims, and which is therefore its end in every case'. Eth. Nic. init.

The two quotations from Homer are taken from Il. B 176, and 298. Vater observes that the half line quoted of the first does not convey the intention of the quotation; the 'boast to Priam' is not in point. The lines applicable are these: *λίποιτε Ἀργεῖν' Ἑλένην, ἧς εἵνεκα πολλοὶ Ἀχαιῶν ἐκ Τροίῃ ἀπόλοντο φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἵης*. The second line, *αἰσχροὺν τοι δηρὸν τε μένειν κενὸν τε νέεσθαι*, became proverbial; whence Cic. de Offic. III 2, 6 (of the result of his son's studies at Athens), *ad quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem redire turpissimum est*.

§ 23. καὶ ἡ παροιμία δέ] This δέ, introduced after καί—always (except in Epic poetry, Il. Ψ 80, καὶ δέ σοι αὐτῷ μοῖρα, Odys. π' 418) with a word or more intervening—is inserted as something additional to the preceding, which it enforces or emphasizes, and has in these, as in all other cases, a reference to μέν expressed or implied. A first implies a second, and a second a first. Of μέν implied in δέ, see some instances in Herm., note on Soph. Phil. 86, and the reverse case, δέ in μέν, Don. *New Crat.* § 154, where the origin and derivation of the two particles is made out. The δέ here may

πολλοὶ ἐφίενται, καὶ τὸ περιμάχητον φαινόμενον· οὐ<sup>p. 12.</sup>

be readily explained as in correlation to a suppressed μέν after ταῦτα, 'these first, and secondly the proverb'; or 'these on the one hand, on the other the proverb'. It may be rendered 'too', 'also', or *from the emphasis that it conveys*, 'in fact', or any thing similar. This special usage, like the other senses of δέ, is derived from the primary meaning of μέν and δέ, 'one' and 'two'; and so, as conjunctions, in the sense of 'firstly' and 'secondly'. See Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 769, 2, where a few examples are cited. Others are given in Paley's note on Prom. Vinc. 994 (from Aeschylus): in Arnold's note on Thucyd. II 36, 6 (from Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon): Plat. Rep. IX 573 B (ed. Tur.), καὶ μανίας δέ. It is found in all Greek writers, but is more common in Aristotle than elsewhere: Rhet. I 7. 18, 19, 20; 9. 29, 30; II 3. 12; II. 11, καὶ ἀρχὴ δέ: Eth. N. v 5, 1130 b 21, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δέ: Polit. VI (IV), 13, 1297 b 10, καὶ εἰσθῆσαι δέ: and again v 16, καὶ ἡ πρώτη δέ πολιτεία, de Anim. A 4, init. καὶ ἄλλη δέ: c. 5, 411 a 7, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ, B 3, 415 a 6, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δέ, et passim. ['Maxime in Ethicorum libro quarto octavo nono decimo.' Eucken, *de Arist. dicendi ratione* I p. 32. s.] The same meaning is much more frequently expressed by these particles in the inverted order, δέ καί.

The proverb, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν, 'to drop<sup>1</sup> or break the pitcher at the door', after you have carried it home from the distant well with much toil and trouble, expresses the general conception of 'lost labour', 'labour thrown away'. Erasmus, *Adagia*, p. 350, in *foribus urceum*, misinterprets the proverb as expressing something vile and contemptible, not worth the trouble of taking up.

Another more common corresponding proverb is πλύνειν πλίνθον, *laterem lavare* (Terent. Phorm. I 4, 9) 'to try to make a red brick white

<sup>1</sup> In the endeavour to represent these English words by precisely corresponding Greek terms, no difficulty is found in the case of *break*: if καταγνύναι λύραν (Pl. Phaed. 85 A) is to *break a lyre*, it is equally applicable to a pitcher. But when we try to render 'to drop' by a word *exactly corresponding* (ἀντιστροφος in its primary sense), the language seems to fail us. I examined all the analogous Greek words (that I could think of), βάλλειν, ῥίπτειν, ἐάν ('to let go', but intentionally), χεῖν, and a dozen others, with their compounds, and found them all infected with the same vice, in respect of the representation of the word 'to drop', viz. that they all express a voluntary and conscious action, whereas *drop* is applied to an accidental and unintentional relaxation of the muscles, which cannot properly be called an *action* at all. The notion may no doubt be expressed by a circumlocution, of which the Homeric ἔκπεσε, or ἐκφυγε, χειρός (said however of the *object*, not the *subject*), co.np. Lat. *figere*, is a frequent example. We might also say (of the subject) περιορᾶν τι πίπτειν or πίπτειν, or (of the object) λαμβάνειν πρὸν. But these are not single words. And I am brought to the conclusion that the Greek language *has* no single word to express the notion exactly; which is the less surprising, inasmuch as the French language labours under the same deficiency; the periphrasis *laisser tomber* being made to supply the place of 'to drop'. ἐκχεῖν, Soph. Phil. 13, might seem to come nearest to the literal representation of it, were it not for Arist. Ran. 855, where the word undoubtedly expresses a conscious and intentional act. ὁ λόγος...ἐκπεσὼν οὐχ ἵσταται, Plat. Phileb. 13 n.

γὰρ πάντες ἐφίενται, τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ  
24 ὥσπερ πάντες φαίνονται. καὶ τὸ ἐπαινετόν· οὐδεὶς  
γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινεῖ. καὶ ὁ οἱ ἐχθροὶ [καὶ οἱ  
φαῦλοι] ἐπαινοῦσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἤδη ὁμολο-

by washing it'. Theocr. Id. XVI 62, ἡ ὕδατι νίξιν θολερὰν λοιδεῖ πλίνθον<sup>1</sup>, and answering to our 'washing a blackamoor white'. Compare also Eur. Iph. Taur. 116, οὔτοι μακρὸν μὲν ἤλθομεν κώπη πόρον, ἐκ τερμάτων δὲ νόστον ἀροῦμεν πάλιν.

περιμάχτον φαινόμενον] 'apparently, manifestly, conspicuously (with φαίνεσθαι in this sense, comp. II 2, 1, *dis*) an object of contention'.

τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν] 'this is, as was said', i.e. in § 2. This use of the imperfect, referring to a past transaction or statement referred to in present time, is so common both in Plato and Aristotle as to require no illustration.

οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ...φαίνονται] The acts and opinions of the great body of people, the most of those that you know or have heard of, are as convincing to the popular audience to which Rhetoric is addressed, as those of all mankind if they could be ascertained. The fact therefore that the possession of anything is much contested and coveted, implying that a great many people seek after it and care for it, is as sufficient a proof *to them* that it is a good, as if it could be shewn, as it ought by the rules, § 2, that it is the *universal* object of human aims: the sanction of 'the many' is as good as an universal admission.

§ 24. τὸ ἐπαινετόν] The proper object of *ἔπαινος* is virtue, any kind of *practical* excellence; *ἔστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς*, Rhet. I 9, 33. On *ἔπαινος* as the test of virtue and the distinction of this from *ἐγκώμιον* and *εὐδαιμονισμός*, see Introd. Appendix B to Bk. I ch. 9, p. 212 seq. It is there said that *ἔπαινος* and *ψέγος* are the equivalents of Butler's 'moral approbation and disapprobation'. This requires some qualification. When the 'intellectual' virtues are included as the objects of *ἔπαινος*, as they certainly are in the Eth. Eud. II 1. 18, the approbation loses its exclusively moral character. In Eth. Nic. I 12, Aristotle together with the moral virtues, justice, courage, 'goodness' in general, includes also as objects of praise all kinds of *ἀρετή* or excellence, such as strength and swiftness, which are manifested in *action*.

καὶ ὁ οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἐπαινοῦσιν] Victorius, in illustration of the former of these two topics, quotes Virg. Aen. XI 282, *Stetimus tela aspera contra, Contulimusque manus; experto credite quantus In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam*. The prowess of Aeneas could not be more highly extolled than by the praises extorted from his enemy Diomedes.

καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι] is rejected as a subsequent insertion by Muretus, F. A. Wolf, Bekker, Brandis, and Spengel, because it is passed over unnoticed in the explanatory commentary that follows, ὥσπερ γὰρ—πεπονθότες.

<sup>1</sup> θολερὰν πλίνθον is to be interpreted here not of the colour of the brick, but of an unbaked brick dried in the sun, which melts away and turns to mud when it is washed.

γούσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονηότες· διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανε-  
ρὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἂν, ὥσπερ καὶ φαῦλοι οὐς οἱ φίλοι

Vater alone defends it. The explanation of it is easy, and it is perfectly consistent with the context and with good sense. If the vilest and meanest, the 'worthless and contemptible', φαῦλοι, who are *least* likely to be sensible of merit in others, being almost devoid of right moral instinct, find themselves compelled to praise some signal act of valour, disinterestedness, or virtue—we are engaged here upon *actions*—*a fortiori* it must meet with the approbation of better judges, and be emphatically good. If with this reasonable explanation we take into account Aristotle's hasty and careless habit, twice already noticed, of interrupting an explanation or an argument by the insertion of something bearing indirectly on the subject, but not immediately appropriate, I think we may without scruple retain the words objected to.

ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν] 'for this is *now* as good as, equivalent to, an universal admission'. ἤδη, 'by this time', now that we have got as far as this, have reached, that is, the level of enemies, the extreme case of those who are interested in denying the merit—if *they* approve, all others must necessarily do so.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερὸν...τὸ Ἰλιον] There is a difficulty here which has much occupied the commentators, arising from the want of connexion, as the present text stands, between the two rules laid down, ὥσπερ καὶ... ἐπαινοῦσιν, and the example (from Simonides) which is *said*, διό, to follow from them: the example, according to the present reading, is *not* an inference from either of them. The best way of meeting the difficulty seems to be to adopt, with Spengel, the reading of the best MS A<sup>1</sup>. This omits the words οὐς οἱ φίλοι ψέγουσι καὶ ἀγαθοί, without which the sense is clear and consistent. 'For it must be owing to its being *evident* that they are inclined to (would) admit it, just as' (it is equally evident that, by the same rule, in the opposite case) 'those who are praised by their enemies must be worthless', (because if your enemy approves of your conduct towards him, which is assumed to be hostile, it shews that you can have done him no harm: and therefore that you have been wanting either in courage or patriotism or energy and skill). Of this the example of the Corinthians is now a real instance, and their suspicion of Simonides' intentions may be traced to the general rule. 'And this was why the Corinthians conceived the suspicion that they had been insulted by Simonides, when he wrote, 'Ilium has no fault to find with the Corinthians' (which it ought to have had if they had done their duty). The Corinthians misinterpreted Simonides' expressions; his intentions were innocent, but he failed to perceive the inference that might be derived from them. The line of Simonides is apparently misquoted by a lapse of memory. The Schol. Pind. Ol. XIII p. 78, who cites it, has *μανίει* (i) for *μέμφεται*; and this reading appears also in another reference to it in Plut. Vit. Dion. c. 1 sub init. (cf. Bergk and Gaisf.), ὁ Σιμωνίδης φησὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις οὐ μνηνείν τὸ Ἰλιον ἐπιστρατεύσασθαι μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὅτι κακείνοις οἱ περὶ Γλαῦκου ἐξ ἀρχῆς Κορίνθιοι γεγονότες συνμάχουν προθύμως. Homer only says, Il. Z 152 seq., that Glaucus himself attributed his origin to

ψίγουσι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οὓς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν. διὸ  
λελοιδορησθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου  
ποιήσαντος

Κορινθίοις δ' οὐ μέμφεται τὸ Ἴλιον.

- 25 καὶ ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ  
γυναικῶν προέκρινεν, οἷον Ὀδυσσεύς Ἀθηναῖα καὶ Ἑλένην  
Θησεὺς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ὀμηρος.  
26 καὶ ὅλως τὰ προαιρετὰ προαιροῦνται δὲ πρᾶττειν

Sisyphus of Ephyre or Corinth. If this be the true explanation of the reason why Ilium was 'not wroth', or 'found no fault', with the Corinthians, and Aristotle remembered it when he used the example, it seems that the instance is very ill chosen for the purpose of illustrating the rule. In this case nothing is imputed to the Corinthians except that the aid of Glaucus and his men of Corinthian race compensated the Trojans for their own hostility, and therefore that Troy had nothing to reproach them with, which could scarcely be construed by them as an *insult*: and the example only applies to the rule which it is supposed to exemplify in this sense; that the Trojans ought by the rule to have been represented as having directly censured the Corinthians, if Simonides had intended to pay them a compliment; by the mere omission of this they thought that he had insulted them.

§ 25. Compare the corresponding topic of II 23, 12. On this kind of 'authority' see I 15, where it is exemplified under the head of 'witnesses', §§ 13 and 15. The φρόνιμος, the man of practical wisdom, skill and judgment, the 'artist' or expert in each pursuit, is the proper standard or measure to be appealed to in every disputed question. The general judgment of such well-qualified persons is the ὀρθὸς λόγος, which must be applied even to the determination of the due measure of virtue, which is a μεσότης... ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν. Eth. N. II 6, init.

ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν] so Eth. X 5, ult., the standard of moral judgment is said to be ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός. IX 4, 1166 a 12, μέτρον ἐκάστης ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος. III 6, 1113 a 32, διαφέρει πλείστον ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τᾶλθῆς ἐν ἐκάστοις ὀρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ἔν.

προέκρινεν] 'decided, distinguished by preference'.

Ἑλένην Θησεύς] The preference of Theseus, a man of consummate authority, πατελεῖ τὴν ἀρετὴν κτησάμενον, for Helen, is actually introduced by Isocrates as one of the topics of his encomium of that much calumniated lady, Helen. §§ 18—22.

§ 26. τὰ προαιρετὰ] 'objects of deliberate and voluntary choice'. The προαίρεσις seems here intended in the more general sense in which προαιρείσθαι and προαίρεσις are employed in the ordinary language, and even sometimes in the Ethical treatise itself, as I 2, init. ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀργεταί. προαίρεσις is defined in Eth. Nic. III 5, ult. βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, 'an impulsive faculty (implying, not directly expressing the free will) capable of deliberation, directed

τά τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς  
27 φίλοις ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατά. ταῦτα δὲ διχῶς ἐστὶ,

to things within our power'—no one deliberates about things *beyond* his power, οὐδὲν γὰρ πλεόν. And again in precise conformity with this, de Mot. Anim. c. 6, ἡ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως, ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον (is the ultimate mover, the origin of motion or action) τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητὸν, (it is the *object* of the two faculties, and not the faculties themselves, which is the real origin of motion, according to the Aristotelian doctrine that the primary moving agent must be itself unmoved,) οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. Thus the προαίρεσις is composed of two separate elements or faculties, intellectual and impulsive, of which the latter alone is the agent of motion, or stimulates to action: the intellectual part deliberates prior to action, and decides whether the proposed object of the action is good or bad, right or wrong<sup>1</sup>. Though the προαίρεσις in its general and wider signification of 'deliberate, voluntary purpose' is capable of prompting to action of every kind, yet in its narrower and specially ethical usage it is *moral* action alone that it originates and determines, οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων, Eth. N. III 4, init. Comp. III 2, 1110 b 31, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει ἀγνοία αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας. From the ethical point of view therefore the definition will be 'a deliberate and voluntary moral purpose'. The principal passages on the subject of προαίρεσις are Eth. Nic. III cc. 4, 5, 6, where it is analysed and distinguished from ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, which are mere animal impulses, on the one hand, and from βούλησις, βούλευσις and δόξα, on the other: ib. VI 2; and de Anima III 9, 10, where it is treated in reference to its action as a motive principle.

τὰ εἰρημένα] all the objects of voluntary choice already mentioned which consist in, or are to be obtained by, action; such as health, pleasure, and especially the various moral virtues.

καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακὰ] This was an article of the received code of popular morality amongst the Greeks and Romans: comp. § 29, where one class of good things are ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. This is a duty, and a part of justice. In Rhet. I 9, 24, it is said to combine two kinds of virtue, τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι· τό τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. II 5, 5. Rhet. ad Alex. I (2), 13. Xen. Memor. IV 2, 15, 16. Eur. Ion 1046, ὅταν δὲ πολέμιους δρᾶσαι κακῶς θέλῃ τις, οὐδεὶς ἐμποδὼν κεῖται νόμος. Med. 808, βαρεῖον ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοιςιν εὐμενῇ κ. τ. λ. Cic. de Off. I 7, *Iustitiae primum munus est ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria*.

§ 27. ταῦτα, sc. τὰ δυνατά.—τὰ γενόμενα ἂν καὶ τὰ ῥαδίως γιγνόμενα.] Two kinds of possibilities; 'things which might' (ἂν, under certain conditions, possibly difficult) 'be brought to pass, and those which *are* easily attained'.

<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, Metaph. Θ 5, 1048 a 11, *ὄρεξις* and *προαίρεσις* are distinguished; *ὄρεξις* is the general and spontaneous impulse to action, which when controlled and determined by the intellectual principle, *διάνοια*, becomes the compound *προαίρεσις*, the deliberate moral purpose.

τά τε γενόμενα [ἀν] καὶ τὰ ῥαδίως γιγνόμενα. ῥάδια δὲ ὅσα ἢ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ὀρίζεται ἢ λύπη ἢ πλήθει χρόνου. καὶ ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται· βούλονται δὲ ἢ μηδὲν κακὸν ἢ ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν ἢ λανθάνῃ ἢ τιμωρία 28 ἢ μικρὰ ἢ. καὶ τὰ ἴδια, καὶ ἃ μηδεὶς, καὶ τὰ περιττά·

The distinction is between ends or things hard and unlikely, and easy and likely, to be attained or obtained.

The same distinction of possibilities is found in Cic. de Inv. II 56, 169. (Victorius, who refers to it, quotes only the definition of *facilis*.) *Atque in iis omnibus quae ante dicta sunt, quid fieri et quid facile fieri possit oportet considerare. Facile id dicimus, quod sine magno aut sine ullo labore, sumptu, molestia quam brevissimo tempore confici potest; posse autem fieri quod quamquam laboris, sumptus, molestiae, longinquitatis indiget, atque aut omnes aut plurimas aut maximas causas habet difficultatis, tamen, his susceptis difficultatibus, compleri atque ad exitum perducí potest:* an excellent commentary on Aristotle's topic.

τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ.] 'facility' is defined by the absence of pain or laborious effort, or by the shortness of the time occupied in doing anything or getting anything done, *because* difficulty is defined by the opposites.

ὀρίζεται ἢ λύπη ἢ πλήθει χρόνου] A various reading in several of the earlier Editions is *λύπη ἢ πλήθος*. In this case *ὀρίζεται* is the middle voice, as it usually is in the sense of 'defining'. *ὀρίζεσθαι* however, as a passive, is found, though rarely, elsewhere, as Eth. Nic. III 10, 1115 b 23, *ὀρίζεται* ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει, ib. IX 8, 1168 b 5, *πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται*, Pol. VII (VI) 2, 1317 b 39, *ὀλιγαρχία γένει καὶ πλουτὶ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὀρίζεται*, Theophrast. Hist. Plant. I 1, 6, *ἢ μὲν ἀνομοιότης ὀρίζεται σχήματι χρώματι κ.τ.λ.* It is not to be included in the class of irregular passives formed from neuter verbs, the act of *ὀρίζειν* being transitive.

καὶ ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται] sc. γίνηται τι (or τὰ πράγματα) ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, 'anything that turns out as they desire'; any result, either of their own acts, or of the course of events, such as they like; [Gaisford says, 'nescio an in ὡς ἂν βούλωνται' (a various reading) 'lateant vestigia melioris scripturae, ὅς' ἂν βούλωνται.' This is not so suitable to what follows.] 'but what they *do* like is either no evil at all, or less than the good (ensuing): and this (the latter of the two preceding) will be the case, when (for instance) the penalty (which is attached to some illicit gain or advantage) is either unfelt (λανθάνῃ, escapes *your* notice, not the notice of *others*), or trifling'. In both of these cases the profit, or good, is greater than the loss, or evil.

§ 28. καὶ τὰ ἴδια] Things or qualities, special and peculiar, not shared by the rest of the world in general, such as personal gifts, graces, or accomplishments: anything that *distinguishes* a man from the mass. Of the three kinds of *ἴδια* distinguished in Top. A 5, 102 a 18—30 (*ἴδιον* proper, the fourth predicable, *proprium*), these are *ἴδια ἀπλῶς*; the second, are not absolutely and at all times *ἴδια*, but only at particular times, under particular circumstances of time, *ποτέ*; the third class, to which those



τιμὴ γὰρ οὕτω μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς·  
τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ τε προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύνα-  
here spoken of belong, are 'relative' ἴδια, ἴδια πρὸς τι, special and peculiar,  
i. e., in this case, to a few men as compared with the rest.

ἂ μὴδεῖς (ἄλλος ἔχει)] This is only a particular case of the preceding:  
in *that* the advantage is shared by few, in *this* the possessor stands alone.  
Anything excessively rare or unique, as a coin, a tulip, a piece of china,  
a book, may acquire a special value from this circumstance. Comp.  
Magn. Mor. B 7, 1205 b 29, τὸ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν οὐκ ἀγα-  
θόν. This feeling is characteristic of ambition, τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ φιλο-  
τιμοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτιμίας οἰκείον ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ φιλοτιμός ἐστίν ὁ μόνος βουλό-  
μενος ἔχειν καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερίχειν.

περιττά] 'things that are singular, preeminent, specially distinguished'  
amongst their fellows or congeners, or among things of the same sort, 'for  
by this they obtain greater credit'. περιττός is 'odd', singular, striking,  
remarkable'. From περί, 'over and above', 'exceeding', (Homer, περὶ  
δ' ἄλλων φασὶ γενέσθαι, περὶ μὲν Δαναῶν,) the derivative περιττός passes  
into the metaphorical sense of surpassing, preeminent, standing out from  
the rest, out of the common way, extraordinary. This signification of  
the word will be found illustrated in the Lexicons. Add to these, as  
marked examples of some of its various significations, Eur. Hippol. 437,  
445, 948. Ar. Pol. II 6, 1265 a 10, in the well-known passage on Plato's  
style, Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1312 a 27, πράξεις περιττῆς (extraordinary, signal)  
καὶ δι' ἣν ὀνομαστοὶ γίνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, Ib. II 8 init. of Hippo-  
damus of Miletus, that he became περιττότερος 'rather odd, eccentric,  
extravagant', in his dress and habits. Top. Z 4, 141 b 13, ἀκριβὲς καὶ  
περιττὴ διάνοια. Metaph. I 2, 1053 b 3, of Protagoras' dictum, (πάντων  
μέτρον ἄνθρωπος), οὐθὲν δὲ λέγων περιττὸν φαίνεται τι λέγειν, Rhet. II 15, 3,  
Probl. xxx 1 init. περιττοὶ ('distinguished' in any art or science) φαίνονται  
μεγαλοχολικοὶ ὄντες. (Waitz, on Top. Γ 2, 118 a 6, illustrates other senses of  
the word in Aristotle.) Of excellence of style, Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 3,  
dis, sub init. et sub fin. From περί again, in the sense of 'over and above',  
exceeding', comes περιττός as applied to an 'odd' number; the suppo-  
sition on which the name is based being, that the ἄρτιος ἀριθμός, or even  
number, was the primary number—2 was in fact considered as the first  
arithmetical number, 1 being the principle of unity—the odd number is  
an *addition* to or excess over the other, the next step in advance.

The three kinds of good just enumerated are all repeated in c. 9. 25,  
26, under the head of καλόν. As 'goods' they are in fact all of them of  
the specially 'questionable' sort, ἀμφισβητήσιμα; supr. § 17.

τὰ ἀρμόττοντα] 'suitable, appropriate', specially applicable or belong-  
ing to them.

τὰ προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν] 'things that naturally belong to  
them, or are due to them in respect of birth and power'.

<sup>1</sup> 'Odd' in early English is sometimes employed by a similar metaphorical  
application to denote superiority to others, striking excellence. 'For our tyme  
the odde man to performe all three perfitlie,...is in my poor opinion Joannes  
Sturmus'. Ascham, *Scholemaster*, p. 113 (Mayor's ed.). Richardson has omitted  
to notice this use of 'odd' in his Dictionary.

μιν, καὶ ὧν ἐλλείπειν οἴονται, κἂν μικρὰ ἢ· οὐδὲν γὰρ  
29 ἥττον προαιροῦνται ταῦτα πράττειν. καὶ τὰ εὐκατ-  
έργαστα· δυνατὰ γὰρ ὡς ῥάδια· εὐκατέργαστα δὲ ἅ  
πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι ἢ οἱ ἥττους κατῴρθω-  
σαν. καὶ ἅ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ ἅ ἀπεχθήσονται  
τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. καὶ ὅσα οὐς θαυμάζουσι προαιροῦνται

ὧν ἐλλείπειν οἴονται] ἐλλείπειν with genitive, 'to come short of, be deficient in'. 'And anything men think wanting to them, as appropriate, or suitable to their condition' (a second case of τὰ ἀρμόττοντα), 'however trifling', (they regard as a good, and eagerly pursue it): 'for none the less for *that* (διὰ τὸ μικρὰ εἶναι) do they choose (deliberately purpose) to do it'; i. e. to *do* things, to act, so as to attain their end. So Victorius, who illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. II 6, 8, *O si angulus ille proximus accedat qui nunc denormat agellum*. If this is right, as I suppose it is, προαιροῦνται πράττειν is carelessly written for ζητοῦσιν or ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, or ἐφίενται, or some verb that would imply the object of action, and not the mere action itself.

§ 29. The things mentioned in this and the following section all of them designate what is considered good because *men like to do it*.

τὰ εὐκατέργαστα] 'things easily effected, or easy achievements', are considered as good, because they are possible, by the rule §§ 26, 27; they belong to the *second* class of things 'possible', such as are 'easy'.

κατῴρθωσαν] aor. 'ever succeeded in'; or indicating the notion of 'habit' which the verb ὀρθοῦν and its compounds acquire. The secondary and metaphorical signification of safety and success, from the notion of going through a career, as a race, erect and in an upright position, without stumble or fall, is well illustrated by the following passages of Sophocles, Electr. 741, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους πάντας ἀσφαλεῖς δρόμους ὀρθοῦθ' ὁ τλήμων ὀρθὸς ἐξ ὀρθῶν δίφρων. Oed. Col. 394, *Ἰσμενε, νῦν γὰρ θεοὶ σ' ὀρθοῦσι, προσθε δ' ὤλυσαν*. Oed. γέροντα δ' ὀρθοῦν φλαῦρον δε νέος πίση.

ἅ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις] 'anything by which one will oblige one's friends'. ἅ cognate accus. for ἅς χάριτας. In obliging a friend you may be said to oblige yourself, a true friend being ἕτερος αὐτός: Eth. N. IX 9, sub init. Ib. 1170 δ 7. Ib. c. 4, 1166 α 31, *προς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ἵστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός*.

ἅ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς] 'or by which one may shew one's hostility to (offend or annoy) one's enemy'. As before, ἅς ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθ. τ. ἐχθροῖς. ἀπεχθάνεσθαι πρὸς τινα, or τινί, is 'to make oneself odious or hostile to', 'to quarrel with', or 'to disoblige, offend, annoy'. Compare διαβάλλεσθαι πρὸς, in Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Aristotle, to have a hostile feeling towards one, to be set against him, to quarrel with him (from διαβάλ-λειν, to set two people at variance, to engender animosity and ill feeling between them, and hence to give one an ill opinion of the other, and so, finally, to calumniate). Both of these, men think good and right, and proper objects of pursuit.

θαυμάζειν, 'to look up to, respect, reverence, admire'. Valck. ad

πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἃ εὐφυνεῖς εἰσι καὶ ἔμπειροι· ῥᾶον γὰρ κατορθώσιν οἷονται. καὶ ἃ μηδεὶς φαῦλος· ἐπαινετὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦντες τυγχάνουσιν·  
 30 οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον φαίνεται. καὶ μάλιστα ἕκαστοι πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον οἱ φιλόνοικοι <sup>P. 1363 δ. p. 23.</sup> εἰ νίκη ἔσται, οἱ φιλότιμοι εἰ τιμή, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι εἰ χρήματα, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὡσαύτως.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἐκ τούτων  
 1 ληπτέον τὰς πίστεις· ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁμολογοῦν- <sup>CHAP. VII.</sup>

Hippol. 106. Ar. Rhet. II 6. 15, 16, 24. Aristoph. Nub. 180, 428, ἡμᾶς τιμῶν καὶ θαυμάζων. Ran. 1008, *alibi*. Isocr. Areop. *ter* &c.

εὐφυνεῖς] 'clever', § 15, note on p. 105. Comp. c. II 28, Probl. XVIII 6, there quoted.

ἔμπειροι] those who have *acquired* skill by practice and experience, distinguished from the naturally clever and dexterous. Success, the attainment of one's object, in any practice or occupation for which any one has either a natural talent or an acquired aptitude, is regarded as a good, because it is more *easily* attained, § 27; 'more easily', either than by others who are not so skilful, or than in other pursuits and practices.

ἃ μηδεὶς φαῦλος] (οὐδεὶς, no definite particular person; μηδεὶς, no indefinite person, no man *whatever*); sub. *πραξίῃν ἄν*. 'Hinc ducto argumento, apud Euripidem quidam divitias non se movere dixit, quas etiam saepe improbissimi homines facillime consecuti sunt: Fragm. Aeol. 14 (5, Dind.) μὴ πλοῦτον εἴπης· οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεὸν ὃν χεὶρ κάκιστος ῥάδιως ἐκτήσατο'. Victorious.

ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον] All objects of *desire* are supposed to be good, all *αἰρετά*, and ὧν ἐφίενται, § 2. The desire of a thing therefore implies not only that the satisfaction of it will give you pleasure, but also that you suppose it (φαίνεται) to be good.

§ 30. καὶ μάλιστα ἕκαστοι (ἀγαθὰ ἡγοῦνται ταῦτα) πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι] 'to which they are so and so', disposed in such and such a way. In the parallel passages of the Ethics this is expressed by φιλοτοιοῦτοι. Eth. N. I 9, 1099 a 8, ἕκαστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. Ib. III 13, 1118 b 22, τῶν φιλοτοιοῦτων λεγομένων. Ib. IV 10, 1125 b 15, πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιοῦτου λεγομένου.

#### CHAP. VII.

The κοινὸς τρόπος of μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον or degree applied to τὸ συμφέρον, expediency. Most of the special topics of this chapter are derived from, or at all events coincide with, those of the third book of the Dialectical Topics.\* Brandis, *über Ar. Rhet. ap. Schneidewin's Philologus*, IV 1. pp. 14, 15, infers from certain slight differences of the mode of treatment, in the case of two or three of these topics in the two works, the later composition of the

τες ἄμφω συμφέρειν περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν,  
ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ  
2 τοῦ μᾶλλον συμφέροντος. ἔστω δὴ ὑπερέχον μὲν  
τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔτι, ὑπερεχόμενον δὲ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον.  
καὶ μείζον μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ πλείον πρὸς ἑλαττον, μέγα δὲ

Rhetoric ; but in this latter work the references, tacit or acknowledged, to the Topics, are so numerous and so precise, that we do not need this indirect evidence to establish the point. The passages to be compared are, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 11, with Rhet. I 6. 3, and 7. 5 ; Top. Γ 3, 118 b 20, with Rhet. I 7. 36 ; Top. Γ 1, 116 a 29, and 6. 8, with Rhet. I 7. 8. Cicero, Topic. XVIII 68—70, in a passage too long to quote here, enumerates the topics of *Comparatio*, following Aristotle very closely : most of Aristotle's topics of this chapter are found in Cicero's list. The topics of comparison fall under four general heads. *Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur : in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio* ; which are there severally illustrated at length. First, some general principles are laid down ; then we are referred back to c. 6. 2, for the various definitions of good ; and then, (from § 3 to the end of the chapter), these general principles and definitions are applied to the determination of cases, special *τόποι* or *εἶδη*, of comparison of two good things, so as to shew which of them in each case is the greater.

§ 1. *ἄμφω*] 'both'—of two things, left to be understood.

§ 2. *ἔστω*] See note on c. 5. 3, 6. 2, 10. 3.

*ὑπερέχον—ὑπερεχόμενον*] 'Hae definitiones possunt declarari duabus lineis parallelis, quarum una ultra alteram protenditur : item numeris, e.g. 6 et 9. Maior enim sive linea sive numerus et aequat minorem et excurrit : minor vero inest in maiori.' Schrader. On the passive form *ὑπερέχσθαι*, see Appendix (B) *On the irregular passive* (at the end of the notes to this Book).

*τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔτι*] 'so much and something over'.

*τὸ ἐνυπάρχον*] 'that which is contained or included in the other'.

*καὶ μείζον μὲν αἰεὶ κ.τ.λ.*] That all 'quantity', and all terms that express it, *μέγα μικρόν, πολὺ ὀλίγον*, are relative, *πρὸς τι*, we learn from the Categories, c. 6, 5 b 15—29, of which this passage is a summary repetition. The same thing, as a mountain or a grain of millet, when compared with two different things, is called great or little, greater or less—and so of 'many' and 'few'. None of them is absolute *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό* : all of them are relative to something else, with which they are compared, *πρὸς τι, πρὸς ἕτερον*.

"And 'greater' and 'more' have always reference to a 'less', and 'much' and 'little' to the average, magnitude (*τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος*, the object to which the term is applied being thereby compared with

<sup>1</sup> If *πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον* are here intended to include 'many' and 'few', *πολλοὶ καὶ ὀλίγοι*, as they most probably are, since they occur in the Categories and are wanted to complete the list, we must extend the *τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος* to number, *πλήθος*, as well as magnitude.

καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπον 3 μικρὸν, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τό τε αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου αἰρετόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, καὶ ὃ νοῦν ἂν καὶ φρόνησιν λαβόντα ἔλοιτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικόν, ἢ ᾧ ἔπεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστί, τέλος δ' ἐστὶν οὐ ἔνεκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ταῦτα πεπονθός, ἀνάγκη τὰ τε πλείω τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων,

its congeners, as a mountain or man with the average, τοῖς πολλοῖς, of mountains and men, in order to estimate its size): and that which is called 'great' exceeds (this average ordinary size), whilst that which falls short of it is called 'small', and 'much' and 'little' in like manner<sup>1</sup>.

§ 3. The following definitions of good are repeated from c. 6. 2, with a few trifling alterations. This section is translated, and the illogical character of the construction explained, in *Intro.* pp. 177—8.

αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ταῦτα πεπονθός] This clause contrasts the notion of good in itself, καθ' αὐτό, here expressed by the dative αὐτῷ 'to', or, 'for and by itself', with good as the universal τέλος, the object of all men's aims and aspirations. Schrader, Vater, Buhle, and Bonitz (*Aristotelische Studien*, I p. 89), are in favour of αὐτῷ and αὐτόν, which would thus contrast 'good to the individual with good in general'. *Eth. N.* VII 13, init. ἀγαθὸν διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τι. *Top.* Γ I, 116 b 8, τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τι καὶ αἰρετώτερον. This use of the pronoun is quite in conformity with ordinary Aristotelian usage, as *infra* § 35, τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and frequently elsewhere. Vater says that the Greek Scholiast gives αὐτῷ as well as αὐτό: and Bonitz adds that Muretus' rendering, *cuique autem bonum id quod ita est affectum ad ipsum*, shews that he followed this reading. Nevertheless it appears that there is no manuscript authority for the change, and Bekker and Spengel have retained αὐτῷ and αὐτό.

ἀνάγκη...μείζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] *Top.* Γ 2, 117 a 16, ἔτι τὰ πλείω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων (αἰρετώτερα), ἢ ἀπλῶς, ἢ ὅταν τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐνυπάρχη, τὰ ἐλάττω ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν. Two ἐνστάσεις ('reprehensions of the fallax' Bacon calls them, *Colours of Good and Evil*), objections, or instances opposed to the universal validity of this rule, are next given: (1) when one thing is done for the sake of another, to attain a certain end, as getting well, healthy practices for the sake of health; in this case the two together are in no way preferable to health alone: (2) and things not good accom-

<sup>1</sup> Gaisford refers to Harris, *Philosophical Arrangements* ('arrangements' mean collections of notions under general heads; and the 'arrangements' that he treats of are Aristotle's *summa genera*, or *Categories*), ch. 9 p. 191. Harris merely repeats what Aristotle had already said in his *Categories* to which Gaisford does not refer.

συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μείζων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπάρχον ὑπερέ-  
4 χεται. καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχη, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅσα αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου· οἷον εἰ ὁ μέγιστος ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων, καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους· καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ ἀνὴρ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς μεγίστης γυναικὸς μείζων· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αἱ ὑπεροχαὶ

panied by a single good (so Waitz), *may* be preferable to several good things, as happiness, in conjunction with something not good, to justice and courage together, καὶ ταῦτα μεθ' ἡδονῆς μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνεῖ ἡδονῆς (αἰρετώτερά ἐστιν) καὶ ταῦτα μετ' ἀλυσίας ἢ μετὰ λύπης.

ὑπερέχει γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] On ὑπεροχή as a test of excellence, besides other topics of this chapter, comp. c. 9, 25, 39, Eth. N. IV 8 init. there quoted. The opposition of the active and passive, superiority and inferiority, occurs Eth. N. ib. 1124 b 10, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχόμενου.

§ 4. καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχη κ.τ.λ.] Top. Γ 2, 117 b 33, εἴ τι εἰ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τοῦτου βέλτιον, καὶ τὸ βέλτιον τῶν ἐν τούτῳ βέλτιον τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ βελτίστου, οἷον εἰ βέλτιον ἄνθρωπος ἵππου, καὶ ὁ βέλτιστος ἄνθρωπος τοῦ βελτίστου ἵππου βελτίων. καὶ εἰ τὸ βέλτιστον τοῦ βελτίστου βέλτιον, καὶ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τοῦτοι βέλτιον, οἷον εἰ ὁ βέλτιστος ἄνθρωπος τοῦ βελτίστου ἵππου βελτίων, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄνθρωπος ἵππου βελτίων. A practical application of this rule occurs in Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 13, ὅλως τε δῆλον ὅς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, ἥνπερ εἴληχε διάστασιν ὧν φαμέν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμώτερον καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν ἀναγκὴ καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν.

ἀνάλογον ἔχουσιν] 'are proportional to one another'.

In Bacon's *Colours of Good and Evil*<sup>1</sup>, ('a table of colours or appearances of good and evil and their degrees, as places of persuasion and dissuasion, and their several fallaxes, and the elenches of them'), this topic is given in the form, *cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior id toto genere melius*. 'This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather logical than rhetorical, yet is very oft a fallax'; and he proceeds accordingly to 'reprehend' it. Bacon's works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, vol. VII. p. 78. He certainly proves the non-universality of the rule; but by the theory of Rhetoric all these positions are alike open to question, and can always be argued on either side.

<sup>1</sup> Some of the topics selected for 'reprehension' are identical with those of Aristotle, and probably borrowed from him. The meaning of the word 'Colours' in this application is thus explained by Erasmus, *Adagia*, s.v. *fucus*, p. 1915, "Qui ad exornationes atque figuras se conferunt apud Gallos proverbio dicuntur 'rhetoricis coloribus' uti: hoc est, fucatis pigmentis, quibus nihil ineptius si bonis sententiis non fuerint conjuncta". And by Bacon himself in his preface.

5 τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτοῖς. καὶ ὅταν  
τόδε μὲν τῷδε ἔπηται, ἐκείνο δὲ τούτῳ μὴ ἔπεται  
δὲ ἢ τῷ ἅμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ δυνάμει· ἐνυπάρχει  
γὰρ ἢ χρήσις ἢ τοῦ ἐπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου. ἔπεται  
δὲ ἅμα μὲν τῷ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν, τούτῳ δὲ ἐκείνο οὐ,  
ὑστερον δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ  
τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἱεροσυλήσας κἂν

§ 5. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν τῷδε ἔπηται κ.τ.λ.] ‘and whensoever one thing ‘follows’ (i. e. attends upon, always *accompanies* it, in one of its five senses) ‘another, but not reciprocally (or conversely, the other does not always follow it)’. Any good A, which is necessarily accompanied by another good B, where the converse does not hold, must be the greater of the two; because the one (A) always implies the presence of B, and includes the use of it, whereas this is not always true of the converse; and when there is no such reciprocal consequence A must be superior to B. Let A and B be health and life; life invariably accompanies health, but health by no means invariably accompanies life: and therefore *from this point of view* health may be regarded as superior to life.

ἔπεται δὲ ἢ τῷ ἅμα κ.τ.λ.] On the various senses of *ἔπασθαι* and *ἀκολουθεῖν* see note on c. 6, 3.

δυνάμει· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] ‘Potential concomitance or accompaniment’, is explained as ‘the inherence, (i. e. the virtual existence, which may be developed into actual, active, existence, or realized, *ἐνεργεία*,) of the use or practice of the consequent or concomitant in the other’, that namely which it accompanies. The higher crime of sacrilege or temple robbing, for instance, necessarily implies, virtually contains, the lower crime of simple theft or fraud (cheating<sup>1</sup>), the lower habit always accompanies, but not necessarily in a state of activity, the higher, and is included in it: *omne maius continet in se minus*. Or thus, the use of cheating, fraud, resides, is included in, sacrilege, not actually, in a fully developed realized state, *ἐνεργεία*, but in a dormant state, latent; it is a faculty or capacity, always ready and liable to be developed into actual sacrilege.

The use of the general topic of ‘consequence’ is explained, Top Γ 2, 117 a 5, *ἔτι ὅταν δύο τινὰ ἢ σφόδρα αὐτοῖς παραπλήσια καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ὑπεροχὴν μηδεμίαν συνιδεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, ὅρῳ ἀπὸ τῶν παρεπομένων· ὃ γὰρ ἔπεται μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦθ’ αἰρετώτερον. ἂν δ’ ἢ τὰ ἐπόμενα κακά, ὃ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν, τοῦθ’ αἰρετώτερον. ὄντων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων αἰρετῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει δυσχερὲς τι παρέπασθαι. διχῶς δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔπασθαι ἢ σκέψις κ.τ.λ.* See note, c. 6, 3.

<sup>1</sup> ἀποστερεῖν is properly ‘to defraud or cheat’, and especially applied to keeping back a deposit. Rhet. II 6. 3, τὸ ἀποστερῆσαι παρακατάθηκην. Gaisf. quotes Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 373, ἀποστερῶ ἐστὶν ὅταν παρακατάθηκην παραλαβὼν εἰς διαβολὴν χωρήσω καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλω δίδόναι αὐτῷ ἃ ἔλαβον. [See Shilleto’s note on Thuc. I 69, 1. s.]

6 ἀποστερήσειεν. καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μείζονι  
7 μείζω· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ μείζονος· καὶ<sup>p. 24.</sup>  
τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ μείζω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ  
μείζονος ποιητικῶ εἶναι. καὶ οὐ τὸ ποιητικὸν μείζον,

§ 6. καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ 'κ.τ.λ.] 'anything which (all that, *plural*) exceeds the same thing by a greater amount (than a third thing) is the greater (of the two); because it must exceed the greater also (i. e. as well as the less)'. This with the mere substitution of μείζον for ἀρετώτερον is taken from Top. Γ 3, 118 b 3, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ δύο τινὰ τινὸς εἴη ἀρετώτερον, τὸ μᾶλλον ἀρετώτερον τοῦ ἥττον ἀρετωτέρου ἀρετώτερον. Let A be 9, B 6, and C 3. A (9) exceeds C (3) by a greater amount than that by which B (6) exceeds it, A therefore must be greater than B—*must* be (ἀνάγκη), because, by the hypothesis, it is greater than the greater of the other two. This is certainly not a good *argument*, though the fact is true, and the application easy: and yet I think it is what Aristotle must have meant. There is no various reading, and no suspicion of corruption. The interpretation is that of Schrader, the most logical of the Commentators on the Rhetoric. And it seems, as the text stands, the only possible explanation. The fact at all events is true; and the only objection to the explanation is that the γάρ, which professes to give the reason, does in fact merely repeat in other words the substance of the preceding proposition. I believe that Aristotle, in framing his topic, *meant* by the first clause to state the fact, and by the second to give, as he thought, the reason: and that the expression actually adopted is one of the very numerous evidences of haste and carelessness in his writings. On the application of the topic, see Intro. p. 180.

§ 7. καὶ τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ κ.τ.λ.] 'Eundem hunc locum commutatis verbis exponit in III Topicorum c. 1 (116 b 26), ἔτι δύο ποιητικῶν ὄντων, οὗ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον καὶ αὐτὸ βέλτιον. Ad haec verba Alex. Aphrod. p. 125, ἀσαφῶς εἴρηται διὰ βραχύτητα· ὁ τόπος δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος· εἰ δύο εἴη τινὰ δύο τελῶν ποιητικά, οὗ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον καὶ ἀρετώτερον καὶ αὐτὸ βέλτιον. οὕτως παιδεία γυμνασίῳ δεικνύοιτ' ἂν ἀμείνων, εἰ γε γυμνάσια μὲν ὑγείας ἐστὶ ποιητικά, παιδεία δὲ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ φρόνησις τῆς ὑγείας ἀρετώτερον· πάλιν τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι ἀρετώτερον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλούτου, τὸ δὲ ὑγείας ποιητικόν, βέλτιον δ' ἡ ὑγεία πλούτου.' Victorius.

τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν] 'this is what was meant by', this *is* what *was* (said to be) good; viz. in § 3.

τὸ...ποιητικῶ εἶναι] On this Aristotelian formula which denotes the abstract conception of a thing by the mind, as opposed to its actual existence as an object of sense, see Trendel. *de Anima*, p. 471 seq. and on I 1, 2; II 1, 8, also in *Rheinisches Museum* 1828, Vol. II 457 seq., *Kategorienlehre*, p. 35 with reff. in note, and Waitz, *Organ.* Vol. II p. 386. The distinction, which is nowhere expressly stated, is, as may be gathered from numerous passages, the following: τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι *universam esse notionem, quae res constituitur, a materia avocata, universa cogitatione conceptam*—the λόγος of the thing—τὸ μέγεθος *vero ad singula quaeque pertinere quae sub sensus cadant*. Metaph. Z 15, 1039 b 25, οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ



ὡσαύτως· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν αἰρετώτερον τοῦ ἡδέος  
καὶ μείζον ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ἡδονῆς μείζων.  
8 καὶ τὸ αἰρετώτερον καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ' αὐτό, οἶον

οἰκία εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ. Anal. Post. II 4, 91 δ 5, ἀληθὲς γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ζῶν εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ πάντα ἀνθρώπον ζῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε ἐν εἶναι. Phys. I 3, 4, οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἐν ἴσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῇ λόγῳ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἴσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ κ.τ.λ. It abounds in the de Anima. Why and when Aristotle employs it, and whether the distinction is always necessary and appropriate, are questions that I will not undertake to answer. [*Index Aristotelicus*, p. 221 a 34—40; p. 764 a 50—p. 765 a 6. S.]

The Syntax of the phrase, which only Trendelenburg, as far as I know, has attempted to explain<sup>1</sup>, seems to be this:—The dative is in apposition with a supposed *τινί*, *τό τινι εἶναι μεγίθει*, and the construction is analogous to ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, I 10, 18. Other instances of a similar use of the dative, which lead up to the explanation of this, are such as Thuc. I 24, ἐν δεξιά ἐσπλέοντι τὸν Ἴόνιον κόλπον: and others are to be found in Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 388.

καὶ οὐ τὸ ποιητικὸν μείζον ὡσαύτως] 'and that of which the productive agent or producing cause is of a higher order, (superior), follows the same rule', viz. that the product or result of the superior cause or agent is superior in a comparison between two. If wholesome food and exercise which produce health are more desirable and therefore superior to things which are merely pleasant, then the result of the former, health, is superior to the result of the latter, pleasure.

§ 8. καὶ τὸ αἰρετώτερον καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ' αὐτό] Top. Γ I, 116 a 29 καὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον αἰρετοῦ αἰρετώτερον, οἶον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἕτερον. And again, Ib. δ 8, καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὲ αἰρετώτερον, οἶον τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι τοῦ τέμνεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τινὲ τῷ δέοντι τῆς τομῆς. These two though differing in expression seem to be reducible to the same head, and, from the *examples* given, applicable to the same cases: for the absolute good is that which is in itself desirable, and conversely; and τέμνε-

<sup>1</sup> Trendel. in *Rhein. Mus.* 1828, Vol. II p. 481—3. The author, who has discussed with great learning and ingenuity the meaning of this Aristotelian technicality, and its relation to τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, is, it seems to me, less successful in his grammatical explanation. I think that from the analogy of similar constructions of this dative in the ordinary language, the use of it here must needs be a case of *attraction*, as I have explained it in the note. Trendelenburg, who takes nothing into account but the possible meanings of the dative (or, as he rightly prefers to call it, the 'acceptive') case, locative, instrumental, acceptive, selects the last of the three as that which belongs to the dative in this phrase. τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι express, according to him, 'the abstract conception (τὸ εἶναι) belonging to (given to and received by) magnitude': making this dative depend solely upon εἶναι, and leaving out the attraction to a word in the dative, actually or hypothetically preceding, as in any way concerned in the 'government' of it. This is all that I have to object to in Trendelenburg's paper: in the rest he has shewn the same ability and intimate knowledge of his author which characterizes all his other writings upon Aristotle.

ἰσχύς ὑγιεινοῦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ P. 1364.  
 9 αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθόν. κἂν ἢ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ  
 δὲ μὴ τέλος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ,  
 10 οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ τὸ  
 ἦττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ ἐτέρων· αὐταρκέστε-  
 ρον γάρ· ἦττον δὲ προσδεῖται τὸ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ραόνων  
 11 προσδεόμενον. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τούδε μὴ ἢ ἢ  
 μὴ δυνατόν ἢ γενέσθαι, θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ τούτου· αὐ-  
 σθαι the example in the second case of particular good, is only good as  
 the means to an end, δι' ἑτερον.

ἰσχύς ὑγιεινοῦ] strength is more desirable in itself; the 'wholesome' only  
 as the means to an end, health. Strength is considered by Aristotle not as  
*absolutely* desirable αἰρετὸν καθ' αὐτό, but only relatively to other things—  
 'more desirable in itself than many others.' Brandis, *Philologus*, IV, i, p. 44.

ὅπερ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθόν] ἦν, § 7. The reference is to 6 § 2 p. 97.

§ 9. κἂν ἢ τὸ μὲν τέλος κ.τ.λ.] Top. Γ 1, 116 b 22, καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν  
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος αἰρετώτερον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἔργιον τοῦ τέλους. The  
 end, the ultimate object of your aims, must always be more desirable  
 than the means which are only serviceable for the attainment of that end,  
 as health and exercise.

§ 10. τὸ ἦττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ ἐτέρων] 'that which less stands in  
 need of any subsidiary aid' (to make it a good), 'either of *the* other' (when  
 two things are brought into comparison, as wealth and health), 'or of  
*other* things (in general)'. A topic, which may be brought under this of  
 the Rhetoric, but is not identical with it, occurs in Top. Γ 2, 117 a 37,  
 where justice is preferred to courage on the ground of its comparative  
 αὐτάρκεια, though this word is not there employed. Victorius quotes in  
 illustration Virgil's comparison of the 'olive' and 'vine'. Georg. II 421, 2  
 and 428. (Victorius has here quoted from memory, and forgotten the  
 original. It is not the 'vine' but '*poma*', of which is said, *vi propria  
 nituntur opisque haud indiga nostrae*; and the example is hardly in  
 point. The note is cited by Gaisford without remark).

αὐταρκέστερον] 'it makes a nearer approach to independence, self-  
 sufficiency': appealing to the definitions of good in c. 6, 2, of which τὸ  
 αὐταρκές is one. On αὐτάρκεια, note on c. 5, 3, ἢ δ' αὐτάρκεια τέλος καὶ  
 βέλτιστον. Pol. I 2, 1253 a 1.

ῥαόνων] 'easier' to do or to get, to effect or procure, πράττειν ἢ ποιεῖν  
 ἢ κτήσασθαι.

§ 11. καὶ ὅταν κ.τ.λ.] 'and any case in which one thing cannot exist  
 or be obtained (by acquisition or production) without some other, but the  
 other can without it'. As agriculture, compared with the other arts, Xen.  
 Econ. v. 17 (Victorius). Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. 13, *Peloponnesio bello multa  
 Thrasybulus sine Alcibiade gessit, ille nullam rem sine hoc*. Schrader.  
 He also quotes from Plutarch, Apothegm. Reg. § 84, a saying of Age-  
 silaus about the superiority of justice to virtue; it is the same example as  
 occurs in the Topics (quoted on § 10) Γ 2, 117 a 39.

ταρκέστερον δὲ τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ὥστε φαίνεται μείζον  
12 ἀγαθόν. καὶ ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή. καὶ ἡ αἴτιον,

§ 12. καὶ ἡ ἀρχή] supply τὸ μὲν, and with αἴτιον in the following topic. On the omission, see *Matth. Gr. Gr.* § 288, Obs. 4.

ἀρχή] in this topic, is used in its most general and popular sense, an 'origin', or 'beginning', or 'source'. In this sense it may be regarded as the fountain of all good. *ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν (ἡ εὐδαιμονία) καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιον τι καὶ θεῖον ἐτίθεμεν* (Eth. N. I. 13 ult.). God himself is an ἀρχή (Metaph. A 2, 983 a 8, *ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἀρχή τις*). The free will, one of the *ὀρέξεις* or impulsive faculties, the origin of motion in the human subject, and of moral action, the ἀρχή πράξεως, is an ἀρχή: the importance of this, as the origin of human action and the ground of moral responsibility, in moral philosophy and practical life, may be estimated by the perusal of the first seven chapters of the third book of the *Nicom. Ethics*. It is more comprehensive than αἴτιον; ἀρχαὶ are not all causes, (see in the following note), and therefore the two may be distinguished, as they are in these two topics. An origin or beginning necessarily implies that something follows, a consequence; it leads to something: in this respect it is 'greater', more important, superior to, anything that is *not* a beginning or origin, which leads to nothing. *Plat. Rep.* II 377 A, *οὐκοῦν οἷσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον; μεγάλην γὰρ εἰχουσιν (αἱ ἀρχαὶ) ῥοπήν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα*, Eth. Nic. I 7, sub fin. And the same applies to αἴτιον in the following topic. These two topics are well illustrated in *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 3 (4), 10, 11.

The importance of an ἀρχή for good or for evil is recognized by several proverbs. On the one side we have ἀρχὴ ἡμῖν παντός, (quoted in *Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 122, ἀρχὴ δέ τοι ἡμῖν παντός), *Arist. Eth.* N. I 7 ult. *δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἡμῖν παντός εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή*, *Pol.* VIII (V) 4, 1303 b 29, *ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἡμῖν εἶναι παντός*, de *Soph. El.* c. 34, 183 b 22, *μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός ὥσπερ λέγεται*. *Erasm., Adag.* 29, quotes *Soph. Fr. Inc.* (715, *Dind.*) ap. *Plut. Mor.* p. 16 A, *ἔργον δὲ παντός ἢν τις ἀρχηται καλῶς, καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκὸς ἐσθ' οὕτως ἔχειν*, *Anglice* 'Well begun is half done'. *Dimidium facti qui coepit habet*, *Hor. Ep.* I 2, 40. The first step: *Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coute*, see *Rhet.* II 19, 5, and note. On the other side, the importance of the ἀρχή in respect of the tendency to evil, we have *Ovid's* well-known line, become proverbial, *Rem. Am.* 91, *Principiis obsta, sero medicina paratur*. *Fast.* I 178, *Omina principiis, inquit* (*Phoebus*), *inesse solent*. (This is indifferent as to the issue.) *Herodotus*, after mention of the twenty ships which the Athenians on the solicitation of *Aristagoras* sent in aid of the Ionians, concludes the chapter, V 97, with the emphatic words, αὗται δὲ αἱ νεές, ἀρχὴ κακῶν ἐγένοντο Ἕλλησι τε καὶ βαρβάροισι. This phrase became proverbial, see *Rhet.* III 11, 7 bis, and *Isocr. Paneg.* § 119, there quoted.

On the different senses of ἀρχή in the Aristotelian philosophy consult *Metaph.* Δ 1, where they are enumerated and distinguished; and *Bonitz's Commentary*. They are thus summed up; *πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἢ ἐστὶν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται· τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν*

τὸ δ' οὐκ αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ αὐτό· ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσαι εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐκτός, 1013 a 17. 'Ἀρχαί are 'origins', heads or starting-points, of a series, of three kinds; (1) of being, οὐσία<sup>1</sup>, (2) of generation or growth, γένεσις, and (3) of knowledge, γνώσις. ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, Rhet. I 7, 12. The six senses in which ἀρχή may be employed are all reducible to these three. Of these some are inherent (as the στοιχείον, the mathematical point, the origin of the line, or the starting-point of anything, that out of which it grows and is developed<sup>2</sup>; the keel of a vessel, the foundation of a house; in animals the heart or the brain, or any other part which has been assumed to be the original seat of life); some external, the origin of motion or change, (as father and mother, of child; abusive language<sup>3</sup>, of a fight; or again the human will or deliberate purpose, and intellect, προαίρεσις and διάνοια<sup>4</sup>, in the case of 'governments' [ἀρχαί] and arts, all of which set things in motion and produce change). The origin or starting-point of knowledge is illustrated by the ὑποθέσεις, the assumed first principles of a demonstration, as the major premiss of a syllogism. Another 'external origin' is the οὐ ἔνεκα, or τέλος, the final cause, πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ τοῦ γνῶναι καὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν, a 21. Comp. de Anima Γ 10, 433 a 15, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἔνεκά του πάσα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὐτῇ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως.

ἀρχή is not identical with αἴτιον, though, as all αἴτια (all the four causes) are ἀρχαί, the two terms are frequently identified (Bonitz, *Comm.* p. 219; Waitz, *Org.* p. 458): but the converse is not true; as is shewn by some of the examples given above: the assertion therefore that ἰσαχώς (ταῖς ἀρχαῖς) καὶ τὰ αἴτια λέγεται· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια ἀρχαί (a 16) must be limited to what is *directly* stated, the converse is not included. On the point of difference between the two, and also the identification with στοιχείον, see Waitz, *Organ.* p. 458.

Another definition of ἀρχή occurs in de Gen. Anim. v 7, 23, 788 a 14, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὴν μὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι πολλῶν, ταύτης δ' ἄλλο ἀνωθεν μηδέν. See also Trendel. on de Anima p. 187.

On scientific and logical ἀρχαί or first principles, ultimate axioms, κοιναί and ἰδίαί, see note in Introd. p. 73. In the Eudemian Ethics, II 6, three kinds of ἀρχαί, general, moral, and mathematical, are distinguished, and some account given of them. [See also *Index Aristotelicus*, s.v. s.]

§ 12. κὰν ἢ αἴτιον κ τ.λ.] Top. Γ, 116 b 1, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίου, καθάπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς τύχης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν ἢ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου (τοῦ κακοῦ) κ.τ.λ.

τὸ δ' οὐκ αἴτιον] On οὐκ after ἀν, understood from the preceding clause, see Appendix (C) on εἰ οὐ, c. 15, 23.

<sup>1</sup> The ἀρχή as essence, origin of being, οὐσία, is the primal cause, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Bonitz.

<sup>2</sup> στοιχείον "hoc loco eum (Aristotelem) non tam elementi naturam cogitasse, quam principem illam rei alicuius partem, in qua primum continetur et destinata est ipsa rei natura, ex exemplis allatis facile cognoscas." Bon. *Comm.* p. 218.

<sup>3</sup> This is an ἀρχὴ κακῶν.

<sup>4</sup> καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ὄρεκτόν. de Anima I 10, 433 a 19.

ἀρχῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν  
τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος μείζον, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίουν τὸ ἀπὸ  
τοῦ μείζονος αἰτίου μείζον. καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δὴ δυοῖν  
ἀρχαῖν ἢ τοῦ μείζονος ἀρχὴ μείζων, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίουν  
13 τὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἴτιον μείζον. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν

καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν κ.τ.λ.] and again, of two origins or causes, the consequence and effect of the superior is greater. The following passage of the Topics will illustrate the preceding as well as the present topic. Γ 3, 118 a 29, ὅτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν ἐκείνο ᾧ ἂν παρῇ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ, τὸ ποιοῦν αἰρετώτερον, καθάπερ καὶ θερμώτερον τὸ θερμαίνον τοῦ μὴ. εἰ δὲ ἄμφω ποιεῖ, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν· ἢ εἰ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ κυριώτερον ποιεῖ ἀγαθόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν, τὸ δὲ τὸ σῶμα: c. 5, 119 a 17, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχον τοιόνδε, μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο ὅ ποτε ποιεῖ ἢ ὁ μὴ ποιεῖ. εἰ δ' ἄμφω ποιεῖ, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν τοιοῦτο.

καὶ ἀνάπαλιν] 'and conversely, of two origins; the origin of the greater consequence is greater...'

§ 13. δῆλον οὖν κ.τ.λ.] 'It is plain therefore from what has been said (§ 11, *κἂν δ' ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή*), that in both (the following) ways it may be said to be greater: for whether it be an origin (or beginning), and the other not a beginning, it may be shewn to be made to appear greater; or if it be not itself a beginning, but the other be a beginning (it may be equally shewn to be so), because the 'end' is greater (superior), and yet no beginning'. 'The end is greater', because *τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ ἵνα τὰ ἄλλα*: and if 'everything else' is but a mean to an end, the beginning must be included with the rest, and is therefore subordinate and inferior. *μείζον* is here 'greater', 'more important', superior in respect of influence or effective power; not necessarily 'better'. In the examples, first, the 'adviser' is the *ἀρχή*, the origin or originator of the plot; so in *Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 a 31, ὁ βουλευσας is an *αἰτίον*, namely the efficient cause, or origin of motion and change, *ἀρχή μεταβολῆς*. The adviser of a scheme is therefore according to this view the 'cause' of all that resulted from his advice, which is made to appear (*δοκεῖ*) by the argument more important than the result or actual crime (which is not 'the beginning'); and, secondly, the converse (*ἀνάπαλιν*) is proved, that the crime, the 'end' of the advice or deliberation, is the more important thing of the two, because it was for that, as a mean to attain that, that the whole scheme was undertaken. It appears from the expressions of this text that Callistratus devised the scheme and Chabrias carried it into execution.

Leodamas of Acharnae was a famous orator, an earlier contemporary of Demosthenes and Aeschines. The latter mentions him, c. Ctesiph. § 138, as having been sent as ambassador to Thebes, and as a speaker the rival of Demosthenes; indeed in his opinion even pleasanter to listen to. He is mentioned again in II 23, 25 (comp. the note there); in *Dem. adv. Lept.* 501 and 502, who also speaks of him as a distinguished orator, where allusion is made to a certain proposition of his to cancel the 'grant', especially the *ἀτέλεια*, made to Chabrias for his public services — *οὗτος ἐγράφατο τὴν Χαβρίου δωρεάν*<sup>1</sup>, a proposition which he failed to

<sup>1</sup> This cannot be the same accusation as that which Aristotle here refers to;

εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀμφοτέρως μείζον ἔστιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, δόξει μείζον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ τέλος μείζον καὶ οὐκ ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ὁ Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἔφη Καλλιστράτου τὸν βουλευσάντα τοῦ πράξαντος μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πραχθῆναι μὴ βουλευσαμένου· πάλιν δὲ καὶ

carry; and in other places of Aeschines. See Sauppe, *Fragm. Or. Att.* II 216; Fr. XVI, and p. 244; Fr. XXVI; Clinton, *F. H.* Vol. II p. 111, sub an. 372, 3.

Callistratus, son of Callicrates, of Aphidna, a distinguished Athenian orator and politician, of the earlier half of the 4th cent. B.C. His name first appears in history in the year 379 B.C. Aristotle refers to two speeches of his, *Rhet.* I 14. 1, and III 17. 14. Leodamas' accusation of him, here mentioned, seems to have been directed against his conduct in the affairs of Oropus, in 366, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* x p. 392; Smith's *Dict. Biogr.* Art. Callistratus; Clinton, *Fast. Hell.* II 396, note w. He was associated with Chabrias, the celebrated Athenian general, in the transactions with respect to Oropus, and with him was brought to trial; and it is most probable that both of the speeches referred to in the text were made by Leodamas on this occasion.

On Callistratus and Chabrias Mr Elder's articles in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* may be consulted. Callistratus' name occurs very frequently in the Attic orators. See Baiter and Sauppe, *Orat. Att.* Vol. III; Ind. Nom. p. 73.

βουλευσάντα, βουλευσαμένου, βουλευσάντος, ἐπιβουλευεῖν] are all applied to the same transaction, viz. Callistratus' 'advice' or 'device'. They express precisely the same thing, each from a somewhat different point of view. βουλευεῖν τι, is to give advice, to advise. βουλευεῖσθαι to give oneself advice, to deliberate; or secondly, of a number of people deliberating together, and giving one another advice, 'consulting in common'. So μὴ βουλευσαμένου here is, 'if he had not deliberated upon it'

ἐγράψατο δωρεὰν and τὸν πράξαντα, 'the man that carried into execution a nefarious scheme', are quite inapplicable to the same offence. Again Demosthenes, c. Mid. 535, tells us that Philostratus was the accuser of Chabrias, ὅτ' ἐκρίνετο τὴν περὶ Ὀρωποῦ τὴν κρίσιν θανάτου. Were there two accusers of Chabrias on his trial? Or two separate trials? (this seems improbable): or has Aristotle made a slip of memory in assigning the accusation of Chabrias to Leodamas? None of these suppositions is necessary to reconcile the, at first sight, conflicting statements. The accusation of Leodamas is directed against both parties; he takes the case of Callistratus first, and then secondly (πάλιν δέ) applies the converse of the argument which he had issued against the other to the offence of Chabrias. Philostratus, who took part in the same proceedings, was another and independent accuser. Mr Grote, p. 393, note 3, who does not refer to the passage of Aristotle, assigns the trial or trials of Callistratus and Chabrias to this period, 366 B.C., and the alleged misconduct about Oropus. The other speech of Leodamas against Chabrias, referred to by Dem. adv. Lept. I. c. was earlier, and had nothing to do with the affair of Oropus. [Arnold Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* I p. 96. s.]

Χαβρίου, τὸν πράξαντα τοῦ βουλευσάντος· οὐ γὰρ  
 ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων· τούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα  
 14 ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξωσιν. καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον  
 τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου ἀχρηστότερος ὢν  
 μέιζον γὰρ ἢ κτήσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπωτέραν εἶναι. ἄλλον  
 δὲ τρόπον τὸ ἀφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις

preparatory to 'suggesting' or 'advising' it. *ἐπιβουλεύειν* retains its proper sense of a *hostile design* (*ἐπὶ* 'against'); the advice, or scheme which resulted from it, and the deliberation which suggested it, are now represented as 'a plot', a hostile, aggressive, design. It appears therefore that there is no occasion to have recourse to the explanation of Victorius and Buhle, that *ἐπιβουλεύειν* is (or can be) put for *βουλεύειν* or *βουλεύεσθαι*. Gaisford prints these two notes of V. and B. without comment.

*εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων*] On this use of the definite article, indicating a member of a class or *γένος*, which we express by our indefinite article, see Buttmann, *Gr. Gr.* § 124, Obs. 2. Engl. Tr. p. 319. The two senses of the Greek definite article are, according to Schneider, on Pl. Rep. VIII 564 A, that it marks *quod praesens et in conspectu positum cogitatur*, and (2) the *genus*. 'Articulus definit indefinita, idque duobus modis: aut designando certo de multis, aut quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis' (the second describes the *generic* use). Herm. Praef. ad Iph. Aul. p. xv. Several examples of this usage of the def. art. are collected from the N. T. by Dean Alford, in a pamphlet in reply to Bishop Ellicott, p. 45 seq. I will only quote Matth. xiii. 3, ὁ σπείρων: xxv. 32, ὁ ποιμὴν. In a subsequent passage of this work, II 4, 31, Aristotle has quite unconsciously and unintentionally stated this grammatical distinction, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ κ.τ.λ.

*We* render ὁ πράξων 'anyone to do it', carry it out, put it in execution.

§ 14. τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου] 'The rarer, scarcer, is greater, more valuable or important, than the abundant'. This, as is implied in *ἀχρηστότερος ὢν* in the example, is only true *in a sense*; it is in fact a paradox, which may however be asserted in argument, since there is something to be said for it, and examples may be found in which it is true; as in the case of gold and iron. In the true and proper sense, in utility and real value, iron is greater and better than gold. Isocrates, *ἀντὶδ.* § 80, 81, on this ground of comparative rarity, *ὅσῃ πέρ εἰσι σπανιώτεροι καὶ χαλεπώτεροι*, thinks that, in his time at least, great orators and politicians 'who can speak worthily on behalf of their country's interests' are more valuable and to be more highly prized than legislators. A similar topic occurs in *Top.* Γ 2, 117 ὁ 28, τὸ ἐπιφανέστερον τοῦ ἥττον τοιούτου, καὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀγαπῶμεν ἔχοντες ἂ μὴ ἔστι ῥαδίως λαβεῖν. καὶ τὸ ἰδιαίτερον τοῦ κοινοτέρου.

*ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον*] This gives the true side of the alternative, that the value of a thing is in proportion to its usefulness. Estimated by this standard, 'water', as Pindar says, at the opening of his first Olympian ode, 'is the best of all things.' Böckh, who cites this passage of Aristotle

ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει·  
ὅθεν λέγεται

ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ.

- 15 καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ ῥάονος· σπανιώτερον  
γάρ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ῥᾶον τοῦ χαλεπωτέρου· p. 25.  
16 ἔχει γὰρ ὡς βουλούμεθα. καὶ ἡ τὸ ἐναντίον μείζων,  
καὶ οὐ ἡ στέρησις μείζων. καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς καὶ

in his note, evidently agrees with him in interpreting Pindar's *ἄριστον* as 'best' because most useful, or necessary to the support of human life<sup>1</sup>. Dissen thinks that Pindar had in his mind the great 'wholesomeness' of water, *ἄριστον dicitur τὸ ὕδωρ quia saluberrimum est*. A dry and hot climate and a parched soil would also readily suggest the notion that water is the best of all things. But I agree nevertheless with Böckh in his interpretation of Pindar's thought.

These two opposite topics represent two prevailing modes of estimating 'value', by *use* and *price*: Political Economy teaches us that the former is the true, the latter the false standard. In the one view air and water are the most valuable, in the other the least valuable, of all things. Plato, *Euthyd.* 304, 3, gives both sides: τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὃ Εὐθύδημ, τίμων· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐωνότατον, ἄριστον ὄν, ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος.

§ 15. ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον] See the passage of the Topics quoted in § 14. Anything harder to do or to attain may be said to have a higher value, when the value is estimated by the price. On the other hand measured by the standard of our own nature, of our own love of ease and comfort, and also of the extent of usefulness, that which is *easier* to do or to make or to obtain is more valuable.

§ 16. ἡ τὸ ἐναντίον μείζων] 'And one thing is greater than another when the opposite of the former is greater than that of the latter'. 'Exemplum accommodatum erit *valetudo ac divitiae*; quae ambo sunt bona: contraria eorum *morbus et paupertas*: maius autem malum corporis morbus quam paupertas; praestat igitur valetudo divitiis.' Victorius. On this, and the next topic, *στέρησις*, comp. *supr.* c. 6, 4, and § 18; and the passages of the Topics (*Γ* 2, 117 *b* 2,) and the Categories there referred to.

οὐ ἡ στέρησις μείζων] On the various applications of *στέρησις* in Aristotle's philosophy, see *Met.* Δ c. 22, and Bonitz's *Commentary*: *Categ.* c. 10, p. 12 *a* 26, and Waitz, *ad loc.* Trendel. *Kategorienlehre*, p. 103 seq.

The following illustration of the topic is given by Schrader. 'Peius est caecum esse quam surdum: ergo visus auditu praestantior est.

<sup>1</sup> Pindar's own view of the meaning may be readily seen by comparing the first three lines of the 10th Olympian Ode: note the word *χρήσις*. In a speech, quoted by Spedding (*Letters and life of Fr. Bacon*, Vol. III. p. 18), Bacon says: I liken this bill to that sentence of the poet (Pindar), who sets this as a paradox in the fore-front of his book, *first water, then gold*, preferring necessity before pleasure; and I am of opinion, that things necessary in use are better than those things that are glorious in estimation.



κακία μὴ κακίας μείζων τὰ μὲν γὰρ τέλη, τὰ δ' οὐ  
17 τέλη. καὶ ὧν τὰ ἔργα καλλίω ἢ αἰσχίω, μείζω αὐτά.

Gravius malum est fama quam pecunia privari; ergo bona existimatio praestat divitiis.' 'Things of which the privation is greater' or more deeply felt, are those which are most *necessary*, essential to our existence or comfort; as air and water again, in this point of view.

καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς—τέλη] 'and virtue is superior to non-virtue, and vice to non-vice; because the one is an end, and the other not'. The application of this seems to be to things compared as *positive* and *negative*: positive virtue and positive vice, which can be ends or objects to aim at, are in so far superior to mere negatives which can not<sup>1</sup>. Moral considerations are altogether laid aside, and Rhetoric is here permitted (not recommended) to take the immoral side of the question: vice may be regarded as an 'end' of human desire and exertion.

Bonitz, *Arist. Stud.* I. p. 87, proposes an ingenious alteration, which no one who is satisfied with the preceding explanation will consider necessary. It is to substitute for the existing text, καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ κακίας καὶ κακία μὴ ἀρετῆς μείζων, 'positive, downright, virtue is greater (better or worse) than mere absence of vice, and downright vice than mere absence of virtue': which he neither translates nor explains; but, it is to be presumed, it means that the superiority of the one to the other still rests upon its *positive* character. The *morality* remains constant; for vice is still represented as the object of men's aims: it is therefore no improvement in that respect. His reason for the change is, 'that it never could occur to any one to institute a comparison in respect of magnitude (*Grösse*) between ἀρετὴ and μὴ ἀρετῆ, and κακία and μὴ κακία.' Not perhaps if μείζων implied nothing but mere magnitude or quantity; but when it is extended to the general notion of superiority the comparison may very well be made between them. And besides, Bonitz's altered comparison appears to rest upon the very same distinction of the positive and negative; for in what other sense can vice be regarded as superior to non-virtue?

§ 17. The two topics of this section are founded upon the relation of the ἀρετὴ of anything to its proper ἔργον or function, the work that it has to do, described by Plato, *Rep.* I 352 E and foll., and taken up by Aristotle as the foundation of his theory of virtue, *Eth. Nic.* II 5, init. The virtue or excellence of everything, horse, dog, knife, axe, the eye, the ear, the mind, is shewn in and depends upon the due performance of its proper function (*supra* 2. 12; 5. 4; 6. 11). τὰ ἔργα therefore, though they extend beyond the moral virtues from which Victorius draws his illustration—the comparison of ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη and their opposites in respect of their results good or bad, the kinds of actions that they give rise to—and include the functions of all things that can be applied to any purpose, and everything which has a τέλος, to which the ἔργον must be subservient, and in the approach to which the ἀρετὴ is shewn; yet the epithets

<sup>1</sup> Victorius, perhaps rightly, explains μὴ ἀρετῆ and μὴ κακία as states of growth and development, which have not yet reached their 'end', the formed ἔξις, but are mere διαθίσεις, transient dispositions, and so far inferior.

καὶ ὧν αἱ κακίαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ μείζους, καὶ τὰ ἔργα  
μείζω, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὡς τὰ αἷτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ τὰ ἀπο-  
βαίνοντα, καὶ ὡς τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἷτια καὶ αἱ  
18 ἀρχαί. καὶ ὧν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ αἰρετωτέρα ἢ καλλίων,  
οἷον τὸ ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν αἰρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι·  
καὶ γὰρ ὄψις ὀσφρήσεως· καὶ τὸ φιλεταῖρον εἶναι P. 1364 b.  
τοῦ φιλοχρήματος μᾶλλον κάλλιον, ὥστε καὶ φιλε-  
ταιρία φιλοχρηματίας. καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν  
βελτιόνων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίους καὶ καλλιόνων καλ-  
19 λίους. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι καλλίους ἢ βελτίους· αἱ

καλλίω and αἰσχίω shew that Aristotle had the moral virtues uppermost in his mind.

καὶ ὧν αἱ κακίαι κ.τ.λ.] the converse of the preceding, the argument from the virtue or vice, excellence or defect, of anything, back again to its function or proper *work*. Virtues and vices, excellences and defects stand to 'works' in the relation of cause and origin to consequence and effect or result. Now as of the greater cause and origin, the one produces a greater effect, the other leads to a greater end, (§ 12,) and the less to a less, so in the case of excellence and defect the greater produces a greater work, the less a less, both in human action or comparative virtues, and in instruments of all kinds; in men and things.

§ 18. This topic is analogous to, not identical with, that in § 4. When anything in excess is preferable to, or finer and nobler than, the excess of something else, then the former *in its ordinary state* is preferable to the other. See the passage of Polit. IV (VII) 1, quoted in § 4. Top. Γ 3, 118 b 4, *ἔτι οὐ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς αἰρετωτέρα, καὶ αὐτὸ αἰρετώτερον, οἷον φιλία χρημάτων· αἰρετωτέρα γὰρ ἡ τῆς φιλίας ὑπερβολὴ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων. Omne maius continet in se minus.*

τὸ φιλεταῖρον...μᾶλλον κάλλιον] Victorius, followed by Buhle, and Waitz, *Org.* 116 b 24, understand μᾶλλον κάλλιον as a double comparative, a form of expression not unfamiliar to Aristotle (see Vict. on this place, and Waitz, *Org.* 116 b 24, II p. 465), but certainly not employed by him here. The μᾶλλον denoting the 'excess' of the two qualities, which is absolutely essential to the illustration of the topic, is added for that reason to φιλέ-ταιρον and φιλοχρήματος, the *comparison* being conveyed by κάλλιον: and thus the topic is exemplified. 'Excess in love of friends being fairer, and nobler than that in love of money, friendship in its average degree is to be preferred to a similar average of love of money'. See also note on II 8, 3.

§ 19. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι κ.τ.λ.] The objects of the nobler and better desires are themselves nobler and better: because all 'impulses' (*ἀρέξεις*, which include *ἐπιθυμίαι*, all *natural* desires and appetites, as well as *θυμός* and *βούλησις*, Eth. Eud. II 7. 2, de An. B 3, 414 b 2; see note on Rhet. II 2. 1), in proportion as they are higher or stronger, have for their objects

γὰρ μείζους ὀρέξεις μειζόνων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν καλ-  
 λιόνων δὲ ἢ καὶ βελτιόνων αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι βελτίους καὶ  
 20 καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιστήμαι καλλίους  
 ἢ σπουδαιότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπου-  
 δαιότερα· ὥς γὰρ ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές·  
 κελεύει δὲ τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη. καὶ τῶν σπουδαιωτέρων  
 δὲ καὶ καλλιόνων αἱ ἐπιστήμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ ταῦτα.  
 21 καὶ ὁ κρίνειαν ἂν ἢ κεκρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ πάντες

things 'greater', i. e. either better and higher in themselves, or more im-  
 portant. The stronger impulse is always towards the greater object—in  
 some sense. And the converse: 'the nobler and better the objects, the  
 nobler and better the desires, for the same reason'.

§ 20. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιστήμαι κ.τ.λ.] The same rule is now applied to  
 sciences or departments of knowledge, and their objects; τὰ πράγματα,  
 'their subjects'. ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη, τὰ ὑποκείμενα. Top. Γ 1, 116 a 21, ἔστι  
 δὲ ἀπλῶς μὲν βέλτιον καὶ αἰρετώτερον τὸ κατὰ τὴν βελτίω ἐπιστήμην, τινὲ δὲ τὸ  
 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν. The higher and nobler sciences deal with higher and  
 nobler materials; and in proportion to the dignity and value of the objects  
 that it treats, so is the dignity and value of the corresponding science:  
 ἀνάλογον, 'proportionally'; greater to greater, and less to less. 'For as  
 is the science, so is the (particular kind of) truth at which it aims: and  
 each of them is authoritative (lays down the law, prescribes what is to be  
 done, dictates, κελεύει) in its own special province'. On the order in  
 invention and dignity of arts and sciences, see the instructive chapter,  
 Metaph. A 1. ἐπιστήμαι includes here all arts as well as sciences, the two  
 terms being constantly interchanged. The word ἀληθές, from its strict and  
 proper sense (when the two provinces of philosophy are distinguished,  
 θεωρητικῆς τέλος ἀλήθεια, πρακτικῆς δὲ ἔργον, Metaph. A 1), might seem  
 to confine the application of the topic to science pure, or the 'theoretical'  
 department of philosophy, but it is plainly here employed in a wider and  
 more popular sense: truth, theoretical or practical, is the common object of  
 every kind of scientific or artistic pursuit. And the word κελεύειν, to pre-  
 scribe or dictate, is alike applicable to the necessary principles and neces-  
 sary conclusions of mathematical demonstration, and to a practical science  
 like Politics, which not only like the other prescribes the method in which  
 its investigations are to be carried on and rules of action, but 'orders and  
 arranges' διατάσσει<sup>2</sup>, determines, and limits at its pleasure the provinces  
 and extent of the operations of the subordinate sciences and arts. Eth.  
 Nic. I 1, 1094 a 26—b 7. On κελεύει, Victorius quotes Eth. Eud. II 3, τοῦτο  
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος.

§ 21. καὶ ὁ κρίνειαν ἂν κ.τ.λ.] 'the judgment or decision, upon any dis-

<sup>1</sup> The terms 'subject' and 'object' from different points of view may be applied  
 to express the same thing. The *object* of sense or of thought, material or mental,  
 quod sensibus vel menti obicitur, is when looked at from the logical side the  
*subject* of all that is or can be predicated of it.

<sup>2</sup> So printed in Bekker's texts.

ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ πλείους ἢ οἱ κράτιστοι ἀγαθὸν ἢ  
μείζον, ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἡ κατὰ τὴν  
φρόνησιν ἔκριναν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ κατὰ τῶν  
ἄλλων· καὶ γὰρ τὶ καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν οὕτως ἔχει  
ὥς ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις εἴποι. ἀλλ' ἐπ'  
ἀγαθῶν εἰρήκαμεν· ὥρισται γὰρ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὃ λα-

puted question, of... Top. Γ I, 116 a 14, καὶ ὁ μᾶλλον ἂν ἔλοιτο ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ, ἢ ὁ νόμος ὁ ὀρθὸς, ἢ οἱ σπουδαῖοι περὶ ἕκαστα αἰρούμενοι ἢ τοιοῦτοί (σπουδαῖοι) εἰσιν, ἢ οἱ ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει ἐπιστήμονες, ἢ ὅσα οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες, οἷον ἐν ἱατρικῇ ἢ τεκτονικῇ ἢ οἱ πλείους τῶν ἱατρῶν ἢ πάντες, ἢ ὅσα ὅλως οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες ἢ πάντα, οἷον τὰ ἀγαθὸν πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐφίεται. This passage will serve as a commentary on the topic of the Rhetoric. It describes the authority of φρόνησις (practical wisdom, the intellectual virtue which selects the proper means and directs them to the end, Eth. N. VI), and the impersonation of it in the φρόνιμος. In the definition of ἀρετῇ, Eth. N. II 6, init. the φρόνιμος is the measure or standard, which fixes the variable mean, in which virtue resides, for each individual character. In all arts and sciences it is the professional man, the expert, who has to decide, each in his own department. The ἀγαθὸς decides in moral questions, which is his special province. Comp. note on 6. 25.

ἢ πάντες—οἱ κράτιστοι] a descending scale of the φρόνιμοι, those who are competent to decide; all, or most (the many, the great mass of them, οἱ πλείστοι), or the (bare) majority, or the best and ablest amongst them (in point of judgment, and professional skill).

ἀγαθὸν ἢ μείζον] So the MSS and Edd., with the exception of one MS and Buhle's Ed., which omit ἢ, as does Muretus in his Transl. The omission certainly improves the sense; but Vater with some reason objects to this order of the two words, which he says should have been inverted, μείζον ἀγαθόν. ἀγαθόν, which Vater proposes to omit, is certainly wanted to explain κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων in the following clause.

ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν] 'either absolutely, universally, or in respect of their practical wisdom', specially and alone. κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν corresponds to ἡ τοιοῦτοι in the passage of the Topics, 'in so far as they are such' (φρόνιμοι), and in no other respect.

καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων] 'of everything else as well', as good. κατὰ with the genit. is very common in Arist. in the sense of 'of', 'in the case of'; derived from its proper and primary sense 'down upon', and hence, 'applying to', 'of'. This use of it seems to come through the intermediate sense of 'predication', κατηγορεῖν, κατηγορεῖσθαι τινος, 'to predicate, be predicated, of something'.—ἐπὶ, 'upon', 'applying to', 'in the case of', so and so, is similarly used (ἐπ' ἀγαθῶν) in the same section.

τί, ποσόν, ποιόν] are the first three categories; (1) the substance or true nature of a thing, (2) quantity and (3) quality. These, though properly falling under the domain of science or exact knowledge, may yet be dealt with by the 'practical judgment' which may convey a popular and practical acquaintance with them, sufficient for the purposes of the Rhetorician.

εἰρήκαμεν· ὥρισται γάρ] supr. § 3.

βόντα τὰ πράγματα φρόνησιν ἔλοιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον  
 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ μεῖζον, ὃ μᾶλλον ἢ φρόνησις λέγει.  
 22 καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίοσιν ὑπάρχον, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἡ βελ-  
 τίους, οἷον ἀνδρία ἰσχύος. καὶ ὃ ἔλοιτ' ἂν ὁ βελτίων,  
 ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἡ βελτίων, οἷον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ

ὃ μᾶλλον ἢ φρόνησις λέγει] If that is good in genera' which is pronounced to be so by the man of practical sagacity, then that must be a greater good which is pronounced by the same authority to be more so, to be so in a higher degree.

§ 22. καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίοσιν ὑπάρχον] 'Animi bona bonis corporis praevalent quia animus est corpore praestantior'. Schrader. Courage and strength is Aristotle's illustration; for the reason assigned by Schrader.

ἢ ἀπλῶς] 'ut viri' (man as the nobler animal) 'virtutes praestant multo simpliciter'. Schrader.

ἢ ἡ βελτίους] 'aut quatenus meliores sunt: viri effeminati actiones deteriores sunt actionibus virilis animi feminae'. Id. I prefer the other explanation, as more direct and natural, 'either *generally*, in respect of the entire character and qualities, or in respect of some *special* excellence'.

καὶ ὃ ἔλοιτ' ἂν ὁ βελτίων] The better man will make the better choice in general, ἀπλῶς, by virtue of his whole character; or 'in so far as he is better, in respect of that particular kind of excellence, as some special virtue, in which his superiority is shewn, ἢ βελτίων ἰστί. So Victorius; who proceeds (after Alexander) to distinguish between this and the preceding topic, § 21; in that the φρόνιμοι as a class choose between different *kinds of good*; here the comparison is between two different *kinds of choosers*, and the one who makes the better selection is the better in *moral character*.

οἷον] (sc. ἐλίσθαι, or εἰ τις ἔλοιτο). The higher and nobler choice is illustrated by the preference of being wronged to doing wrong. This, though cited here as a popular sentiment, was by no means the current and prevailing opinion at Athens. Plato, Rep. II 358 C, makes Glaucon say, speaking of the *opposite* view, ἀκούων θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων: and again, at the commencement of Glaucon's exposition of the *disadvantages* of justice and the superiority of injustice successful and unpunished, he uses the word *φασί*, which seems to imply that this was the general opinion. In fact one of the main objects of the Republic is to prove that the reverse of this is true; and the long and laborious process which he is obliged to go through in the establishment of his position is quite sufficient to shew how strong must have been the prejudices in favour of the adverse doctrine which must be surmounted before he could hope to make his own views acceptable. The Gorgias also is occupied with the solution of this same question, in the comparison namely of doing and receiving injury and wrong, on *which* side the advantage, when rightly estimated, really lies. The Sophists, as represented by Thrasymachus in the Republic, and Callias in the Gorgias, appear to have held the lower, and as we now hold it to be, immoral doctrine. Ast, in his *Comm.* on Pl.

- 23 ἀδικεῖν· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ δικαιοτέρος ἂν ἔλοιτο. καὶ τὸ  
 ἥδιον τοῦ ἡττον ἡδέος· τὴν γὰρ ἡδονὴν πάντα διώκει,  
 καὶ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἡδεσθαι ὀρέγονται, ὥρισται δὲ  
 τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος. ἥδιον δὲ τό τε p. 26.  
 24 ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον ἡδύ. καὶ τὸ  
 κάλλιον τοῦ ἡττον καλοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐστὶν ἡτοι  
 25 τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν. καὶ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς  
 ἢ φίλοις βούλονται αἵτιοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ταῦτα μείζω  
 26 ἀγαθὰ, ὅσων δὲ ἥκιστα, μείζω κακά. καὶ τὰ πολυ-  
 χρονιώτερα τῶν ὀλιγοχρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα

Rep. p. 391, has collected a number of references to authors who sided on this point with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

§ 23. ὥρισται δέ] in § 3.

ἥδιον δὲ τὸ ἀλυπότερον κ.τ.λ.] Pleasure is subject to two drawbacks to its enjoyment, which vary in different kinds of pleasure. Some pleasures are accompanied, preceded, or followed by pain (Plato held that this is the case with all bodily pleasures), and most of them are of a very transient character and very brief duration. This may in many cases afford a measure for the comparison of pleasure: those which are marked by the entire absence or lower degree of these qualifying circumstances are superior.

§ 24. τὸ γὰρ καλὸν κ.τ.λ.] This distinction of the two different kinds of καλόν, arises from its twofold aspect, physical and moral: in the former of the two senses it is the beautiful, in the latter the morally right and noble. The beautiful, to the sight and sense, is the 'pleasant' form or aspect of τὸ καλόν; the right is καλὸν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν, that which is desirable in and for itself and for no ulterior object, and therefore an end in itself. In this latter sense the τὸ καλόν may be regarded as the end of all moral action, Eth. N. III 7, 1113 b 8, c. 10, 1115 b 24, IX 8, 1168 a 34, 1169 a 6, seq. 21 to the end. In Rhet. I 9. 3, two definitions of it are given and the distinction of its moral and physical aspects again suggested: and again II 13. 9 it is contrasted with the expedient or profitable, the one being a relative the other an absolute form of good.

§ 25. καὶ ὅσων κ.τ.λ.] Things are shewn to be good by our desire of them, because all things universally desirable are good: and the more we desire anything for ourselves or our friend (the friend is the 'second self', the *alter ego*, and therefore his interest is our own,) and therefore to be the causes of it, to procure it for ourselves or our friends; the more we shew that we think it good: and the things we desire *least* to bring upon ourselves or our friends are by the same rule the worst and most mischievous things. The topics of Top. Γ 2, 118 a 1, are akin to this, not identical with it.

§ 26. τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα] Top. Γ 1, 116 a 13, 'more lasting and more secure, stable, safer'. One measure of the use or value

τῶν μὴ βεβαιωτέρων· ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν  
 μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν δὲ τῇ βουλήσει· ὅταν γὰρ βού-  
 27 λωνται, ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ βεβαίου. καὶ ὡς ἂν

of a thing is the length of time during which it remains in our possession; another, the security or stability of it, immunity from decay or corruption and the *fear* of losing it. The absence of these very much diminishes the value of any possession. The superiority in the value of a thing is shewn in, or measured by, either the duration or the amount of desire or wishing for it (*βουλήσει*) because our wishing for it shews that we consider it a *secure* possession, one of which we are little likely to be deprived, or which itself is not likely to be impaired, and so lose its value. A safe investment, which every one desires who has spare cash, is an example of this kind of security, and of the superiority in value that it carries with it.

§ 27. καὶ ὡς ἂν (*ἀκολουθοῖ*) *ἐκ τῶν συστοίχων*] as the consequences *would* follow (if, whenever the topic were applied) in general, so here 'in all the rest', in the particular case of the *rhetorical* application of them, the same consequences *do* actually follow. Perhaps the general application of this topic, which seems to be understood in the protasis, may have a tacit reference to the more *general* treatment of the same in the dialectical Topics. I think that only *one* topic is here intended; so far as *σύστοιχα* are distinguished from *πτώσεις*, the former includes the latter as the *genus* the *species*.

With this topic compare Rhet. II 23, 2, Top. Γ 3, 118 a 34—39. The instances of *πτώσις* there given are the substantive and corresponding adverb, *δικαιοσύνη δικαίως, ἀνδρεία ἀνδρείως*. *σύστοιχα* and *πτώσεις* are explained, distinguished, (quite unintelligibly, however, were our information derived solely from this place,) and the use of them illustrated, in Top. B 9, 114 a 26—b 5. *σύστοιχα* are coordinate logical notions, as *δίκαια* and *δίκαιος* with *δικαιοσύνη*, *ἀνδρεία* and *ἀνδρείος* with *ἀνδρεία*; and again a 38, *δικαιοσύνη δίκαιος δίκαιον δικαίως* are coordinates. Also, a 29, τὰ ποιητικά and τὰ φυλακτικά are coordinate with the things which they produce and preserve, as τὰ ὑγιεινά with ὑγίεια, τὰ εὐεκτικά with εὐεξία. *πτώσεις* are these same coordinates in their *grammatical aspects*—*terms* that can be similarly predicated, and applicable to the same things—and they are therefore sometimes identified with the others. The *πτώσεις* 'inflections' of the same word are not confined to the mere 'declension' of nouns, substantive or adjective, (the nominative is the *casus rectus*, or *πτώσις ὀρθή*, improperly so called, the noun in its upright or normal state or position, the *casus* or *πτώσεις* are fallings away, declensions, from that standard typical form by a change of termination<sup>1</sup>), but include adverbs,

<sup>1</sup> Περὶ ἑρμηνείας 2, 16 a 31, τὸ δὲ Φίλωνος ἢ Φίλωνι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ὀνόματος. Poet. 20. 10, 1457 a 18, πτώσις δ' ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἢ ῥήματος ἢ μὲν τὸ κατὰ τούτου ἢ τούτῳ σημαίνουσα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα (cases), ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς (numbers) ὅλον ἀνθρωποι ἢ ἀνθρώπος, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά, ὅλον κατ' ἐρώτησιν ἢ ἐπιταξιν (moods of verbs). Illustrated by ἐβάδισεν and βάδιζε, indicative and imperative. *πτώσεις* are referred to the general head of *παράγωμα*.

ἐκ τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων, καὶ  
τᾶλλ' ἀκολουθεῖ οἷον εἰ τὸ ἀνδρείως κάλλιον καὶ  
αἰρετώτερον τοῦ σωφρόνως, καὶ ἀνδρία σωφροσύνης  
αἰρετωτέρα καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι τοῦ σωφρονεῖν.  
28 καὶ ὁ πάντες αἰροῦνται τοῦ μὴ ὁ πάντες. καὶ ὁ οἱ P. 1365.

the generic and numerical terminations, masc. and femin., singular, dual, and plural, and the inflexions of verbs; in fact, as it appears, any change of termination which a root undergoes in passing into different parts of speech, and the inflexions of these: in Aristotle πῶσις is a 'declension' from a root. This logical signification of σύστοιχος and συστοιχία is 'transferred' by metaphor, from the *ranks* of an army or of a chorus in the theatre (like ἀντίστροφος), to logic or grammar: but in either of the two senses, they always denote things on the same level, coordinates. Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* 75, Bonitz ad Metaph. A 5, 986 a 23. Xenophon, Conv. 2, 20, has ἀντιστοιχεῖν in the sense of 'to be one's opposite, or partner in a dance'. Anab. V 4, 12, ἔστησαν διὰ ἑκατὸν μάλιστα, ὥσπερ οἱ χοροὶ, ἀντιστοιχοῦντες ἀλλήλοις, 'in opposite, corresponding ranks'. In Met. I c., and Eth. N. I 4, 1085 b 7, it is applied to the ten parallel rows or columns of the opposite ἀρχαί of the Pythagoreans, the two opposite members of the ten being in each case a συστοιχία, or pair of coordinate conceptions. Hence σύστοιχα are notions of the same order: as the four elements, which have the same rank, belong to the same *row*, i. e. order in nature, de Caelo 302 a 29; and hence, notions which fall under the same *genus*, as black and white, sweet and bitter; and even such as are under different *genera*, so long as they have something in common, de Sens. c. 7, 447 b 30, 448 a 14 and 16.

In Aristotle therefore σύστοιχα and πώσεις, though occasionally identified, are, when strictly and properly applied, distinguished thus: σύστοιχα are *logical* notions or conceptions corresponding to things of the same rank or order in nature, having a wider and more comprehensive sphere of application than the πώσεις, which are *grammatical* like the 'declensions', from which the name is derived, and include the various flexions or inflexions, expressed by changes of termination, from a root.

Cicero's *coniugata*, which are defined Top. III 12, correspond to Aristotle's πώσεις. *Coniugata dicuntur quae sunt ex verbis generis eiusdem. Eiusdem autem generis verba sunt, quae orta ab uno varie commutantur, ut sapiens sapienter sapientia. Haec verborum coniugatio συζυγία dicitur, ex qua huiusmodi est argumentum: si compascuus ager est, ius est compascere.*

Besides the authorities already referred to, see on this subject Waitz on *περί ἑρμ.* c. 2, 16 b 1; Anal. Post. II 15, 79 b 6; Trendel. *Kategorienlehre*, p. 27 seq.; Donaldson, *New Crat.* § 227.

§ 28. τοῦ μὴ (ἄντος) ὁ πάντες (αἰροῦνται)] The negative of the preceding: 'than that which is *not* what all prefer'.

Top. Z 10, 148 a 10, ὠφέλιμον, ὠφέλιμος, ὠφελικός are πώσεις. Ib. H 1, 151 b 30, 153 b 25—34, where several examples are given.



πλείους ἢ οἱ ἐλάττους· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἦν οὗ πάντες  
 ἐφίενται, ὥστε καὶ μείζον οὗ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ οἱ  
 ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἢ οἱ κρίνοντες ἢ οὓς  
 οὗτοι κρίνουσιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαῖεν  
 29 ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ εἰδότες. καὶ ὅτε μὲν οὗ  
 πάντες μετέχουσι μείζον· ἀτιμία γὰρ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν·  
 30 ὅτε δὲ οὗ μηδεὶς ἢ οὗ ὀλίγοι· σπανιώτερον γάρ. καὶ  
 τὰ ἐπαινετώτερα· καλλίω γάρ. καὶ ὧν αἱ τιμαὶ  
 μείζους, ὡσαύτως· ἡ γὰρ τιμὴ ὥσπερ ἀξία τις ἐστίν.  
 31 καὶ ὧν αἱ ζημίαι μείζους. καὶ τὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων

ἦν] 'was' as we have said, c. 6. 2.

οὗ μᾶλλον] (ἐφίενται).

οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες] 'rival claimants or competitors'.

ἢ οἱ ἐχθροὶ] c. 6. 24. This applies especially to contested superiority in personal excellences or accomplishments. If rivals and enemies, (τὸ μὲν) who are most interested in disparaging their adversary, and most inclined to do so, if even *these* admit his superiority, we may take it for granted that every one else will do so, and therefore this is equivalent to the universal admission of it (ὡς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαῖεν). If 'judges', those that have the right to decide by reason of special qualification, the artist or professor, the expert or adept in any pursuit or study, or those whom they select as qualified to pronounce a decision, if such as *these* decide in a man's favour, then it is the decision (τὸ δὲ) of 'authorities', as it were, men empowered and entitled, or who have *the right* (κύριοι) to judge and decide, and (or rather, 'because of') *the special knowledge* which the occasion requires (οἱ εἰδότες); and this decision is final. Compare notes on 6. 25, 7. 21.

Victorius and Schrader appear to confine κρίνειν to its judicial sense of deciding a legal cause, οὓς οὗτοι κρίνουσι being those who are selected or deputed to try a particular case when the ordinary judges are prevented from being present themselves. If there were any doubt between the two interpretations, the question would be decided by the following passage: ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. Eth. N. I 1, 1094 b 27.

ὡς ἂν εἰ] Note on κἂν εἰ, I 1. 5, p. 9.

§ 29. This topic also is best exemplified in personal advantages, accomplishments, or possession. It can be applied either way. Sometimes (ὅτε μὲν, ἔστιν ὅτε, ἐνίοτε), in some cases, the superior value of a possession of this kind is in proportion to its universality, because the greater the number of those who have the advantage, the greater the disgrace of being without it (a case of *στέρησις*, § 16): in other cases the reverse may be maintained on the principle that the scarcity of a thing lends it a superior value, § 14.

§ 30. καλλίω γάρ] § 24. Virtue is the only true object of 'praise', *ἔπαινος*. Introd. Appendix Bk. I, c. 9, p. 212 seq.

ὧν αἱ τιμαὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'and things (especially actions) may be regarded as

ἢ φαινομένων μεγάλων μείζω. καὶ διαιρούμενα δὲ

'greater', or superior in respect of their power or effect, of which the honours or rewards are greater; because honours and rewards are as it were (may be considered) a kind of valuation, estimate of the value, of a thing, *ἀξία*, which will afford a comparison, or measure of the comparative value of two things: and the opposite acts which involve a higher penalty, are superior in a sense, more important and effective. *ζημίαι*, not 'losses', *ἀποβουλαί*, as it has been understood, but 'penalties', directly opposed to *τιμαί* 'rewards'. So Victorius.

§ 31. Things which are, at first sight, or can be shewn to be, greater than others which are universally acknowledged to be great or are manifestly so, are seen to be so at once and without reflexion, present themselves at once as such, *φαινόμενα*. A conspicuous instance of this common sense of *φαινόμενος*, apparent, manifest to the eye, occurs Rhet. II 2, 1 (see note) in the definition of *ὄργη*. Comp. I 9. 32, 8. 6; III 2. 9.

καὶ διαιρούμενα κ.τ.λ.] This and the following are purely *rhetorical* topics, and belong rather to the third book, *On style*. One mode of exaggerating the importance of anything, of making it assume a magnitude which it does not really possess, is in the way of description, to break up into parts or describe in detail what might be stated summarily as a whole. 'The same facts or events', when thus individually represented, will 'seem greater' than if they were all summed up together in one statement; because in the former case the excess or superiority, in point of importance and interest, of the facts exhibited in detail over the summary statement, will *seem* to be shewn 'in more points', which are all brought severally into view. *πλειόνων ὑπερέχειν* is 'to exceed in a greater number of points', whether we understand the genitive as one of *quantity* 'in more things', which is probably right, or as the comparative genitive after *ὑπερέχειν*, 'to surpass more things', by which the meaning is not so distinctly expressed: in either case it is the *number* of things detailed that makes the superior impression. The use of this topic is well illustrated by Quintilian, Inst. Or. VIII 3. 61 sq., who however refers the strong impression produced by this detail to the *ἐνέργεια* or vividness of the picture. § 67, *sic urbium captarum crescit miseratio. Sine dubio enim qui dicit expugnatam esse civitatem complectitur omnia quaecunque talis fortuna recipit; sed in affectus minus penetrat brevis hic velut nuncius. At si aperias haec, et cet.* [then follows the description]. Majoragius refers to Cicero's description of Pompey's military experience in the speech *pro lege Manilia*, and Gaisford to Harris, *Philol. Inquiries*, p. 58 [on p. 62, this passage of the Rhet. is quoted]. He assigns this to 'accumulation' and 'concatenation'. Shakespeare, in the *Tempest*, will supply us with a brilliant example: The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, &c. [IV. i. 152]. Comp. Acts of the Apostles, ii. 9 seq., where the wonder of the gift of tongues is heightened by the enumeration in detail of all the different nations whose language was spoken; 'Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites,' Bacon's *Colours of Good and Evil* (Vol. VII p. 81, Ellis and Sped. ed.), No. 5, is a good commentary on this topic in its most general application.

εἰς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται· πλειόνων γὰρ  
υπερέχειν φαίνεται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς φησι πείσαι  
λέγουσαν τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστῆναι <sup>καὶ</sup>

ὅσσα κάκ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστῳ ἀλώη·  
λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει,  
τέκνα δέ τ' ἄλλοι ἄγουσιν.

καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι δὲ καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν, ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρ-

λέγουσαν] is omitted in MS A<sup>o</sup>, and consequently put in brackets by Buhle and Spengel. The latter adds, *Praef. ad Rhet. Gr.* p. vi, 'aliud excidisse videtur, v. c. παράκοιν.' ['Intellige τὴν γυναῖκα, quo aegre cares'. Spengel, ed. 1867. s.] 'Deest λέγουσαν in Cod. antiquissimo Victorii, et videtur sane illud interpolatum esse. Uncinos applicavi'. Buhle.

ὁ ποιητὴς φησι] Homer to wit, Il. ix 592. The reading of the Vulg. is κῆδε' ὅσ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστῳ ἀλώη' ἄνδρας μὲν κτείνουσι, and the rest as quoted by Ar. This example is the same as that given by Quintilian. Victorius thinks that he borrowed it from Aristotle. Spalding, ad Quint. viii 3. 67, quotes the following Schol. on Il. xv 496, referring to the other passage of Homer: ῥητορικῶς τὸ ἐν πρᾶγμα, τὴν πόρθησιν, εἰς πολλὰ κατεμέρισεν.

τὸ συντιθέναι καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν] are added to the preceding topic of 'detail' as closely akin to it. That the first at all events is so, may be inferred from the identification of 'detail' with 'accumulation' by Harris, p. 58, above quoted. The two figures are 'accumulation' and 'climax'. ἐποικοδόμησις is the building up of one phrase upon (ἐπὶ) another, one rising above another step by step, like the rounds of 'a ladder' (κλίμαξ), or the stages of a building. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 3 (4). 9, ἐποικοδομοῦντα τὸ ἕτερον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον αὖξιν τρόπον τοιῷδε, which is then illustrated. Arist. de Gen. An. I 18, 34, 724 a 28, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ὡς Ἐπίχαρμος ποιεῖ τὴν ἐποικοδόμησιν, ἐκ τῆς διαβολῆς ἢ λοιδορίας, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἢ μάχης, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἕκτινος ἢ ἀρχῇ τῆς κινήσεως. Eustath. ad Hom. Il. B, p. 181, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τοῦ ῥηθέντος χωρίου (verse 101) κλίμακα καὶ κλιμακῶν λέγουσιν οἱ παλαιοί, ἕτεροι δὲ ἐποικοδόμησιν. γίνεται δὲ σχῆμα κλιμακῶν ὅταν τὸ λῆγον τῆς φθασάσης ἐννοίας ἀρχὴ γένηται τῆς ἐφεξῆς, οἷον ὡς εἴ τις εἴπῃ, ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀγαθός, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖ, ὁ ἀγαθὰ ποιῶν εὐεργετῇ, ὁ εὐεργετῶν θεὸν μμεῖται, κ.τ.λ. Demetrius περὶ ἐρμηνείας § 270 (III 320, *Rhet. Gr.* Spengel) λαμβάνουσιν ἂν καὶ ἡ κλίμαξ (sic) καλουμένη, ὡς παρὰ Δημοσθένει, τὸ (de Cor. § 179, p. 288) οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ· οὐδ' ἔγραψα μὲν, οὐκ ἐπείσβευσα δέ· οὐδ' ἐπείσβευσα μὲν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ τοὺς Θηβαίους· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπαναβαίνουντι (mounting a staircase or a hill, from higher to higher) ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν ἐπὶ μείζονα. This figure by the Latin Rhetoricians is called *gradatio*. Cic. de Or. III 54. 207, Quint. ix 3. 54—7, where it is explained and illustrated by the same passage of Demosth. and from Latin authors. In Auct. ad Heren. iv 25, it is thus defined: *Gradatio est, in qua non ante ad consequens verbum descenditur quam ad superius consensum est*, and then illustrated. See Aquila Romanus, cited by Ernesti, *Lex. Tech. Gr. et Lat.* sub vv. κλίμαξ, et *gradatio*, and at length by Schäfer, *App. Crit. ad Demosth.* p. 288, 8, Vol. II p. 250. Aquila calls it *ascensus*.

μος, διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαιρέσει (ἢ γὰρ σύνθεσις  
ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλήν) καὶ ὅτι ἀρχὴ φαίνεται  
32 μεγάλων καὶ αἴτιον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ

[ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος] Besides the illustration of the figure climax from Epicharmus quoted above from the *de Gen. Anim.*, there is another and a more complete one in Athen. II 36 C. D, indicated by Schrader, ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοίνῃ, ἐκ δὲ θοίνης πόσις ἐγένετο, ἐκ δὲ πόσιος κῶμος, ἐκ κώμου δ' ἐγένετο θuanία, ἐκ δὲ θuanίας δίκη, ἐκ δίκης δὲ καταδίκη, ἐκ δὲ καταδίκης πέδαι τε καὶ σφάκελος καὶ ζημία<sup>1</sup>.

[διὰ τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαιρέσει] Two reasons are now given for the impression that these two figures make upon the hearer: the first, the same as that which accounts for it in the case of διαιρέσεις; the accumulation of particulars, and the rising by steps to a climax, have the same effect as the division or detail, in increasing the number of effective strokes, and so producing the impression of superiority, ἢ γὰρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλήν: and secondly, you make that which you are endeavouring to magnify *arête* to be the cause and origin of a number of important effects, which you seem to *magnify* by detailing them. The following passage of the *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 3 (4), §§ 10, 11, will serve as a commentary on this and the entire section: συλλήβδην δὲ, εἰαν πολλῶν αἰτίων ἀποφαίνης, εἰαν τε ἀγαθῶν εἰαν τε κακῶν, μέγала φανέται. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὑποῖον φανέται κατὰ μέρος διαιρούμενον ἢ καθόλου λεγόμενον, καὶ ὑποτέρως ἢ μείζον ἢ, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον αὐτὸ λέγειν. τὰς μὲν οὖν αὐξήσεις οὕτω μετῴν πλείστας ποιήσεις καὶ μεγίστας, ταπεινώσεις δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ τὸν ἐναντίον τρόπον μετῴν, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν ἐπὶ τῶν μεγάλων, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἂν μηδενὸς αἴτιον ἐπιδεικνύης, εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς ἐλαχίστων καὶ σμικροτάτων.

§ 32. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μείζον] *supr.* § 14. An exemplification of this topic is found in *Eth. Nic.* VIII 15, 1163 a 12, οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαυιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρεῖαις. The additional value or importance for good or for evil that things, especially actions, acquire at particular ages or times of life (illustrated in the *Topics*), in particular places, at particular times, at particular critical seasons and occasions (καιροί), or from the special nature of the powers or faculties that are called into exercise (δυνάμεις), is derived from the scarcity of such things and actions, and the difficulty of obtaining or performing them. The *καιρός* in two aspects is exemplified in the *Topics*, Γ 2, 117

<sup>1</sup> Müllach, *Fragm. Philos. Gr.* p. 143, gives these lines as corrected by Meineke, Dindorf, and Bochart.

A. ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοῖνα,  
ἐκ δὲ θοῖνας πόσις ἐγένετο. B. χαρίεν, ὥς γ' ἐμὴν δοκεῖ.  
A. ἐκ δὲ πόσιος κῶμος, ἐκ κώμου δ' ἐγενεθ' ὑανία,  
ἐκ δ' ὑανίας δίκαι, 'κ δίκας δ' ἐγένετο καταδίκαι,  
ἐκ δὲ καταδίκας πέδαι τε καὶ σφαλός (the stocks) καὶ ζαμία.

The other passage, in the *de Gen. An.*, Müllach attempts to correct himself, and produces this melodious verse, p. 144,

ἐκ διαβολῆς μῶμος ἐγένετο, πολλοῦ δ' ἐκ μῶμου μέγα.

σπανιώτερον μείζον, καὶ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα·<sup>1</sup> p. 27. εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ παρ' ἡλικίαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τόθ', ἔξει μέγεθος καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ Ὀλυμπιονίκῃ·

a 26—b 2<sup>1</sup>. Add Prov. xv. 23, *a word spoken in due season, how good is it.* χρόνοι is illustrated by the case, already quoted, of Sir Phil. Sidney, and the cup of cold water at the battle of Zutphen [p. 84]: δυνάμεις, as Aristotle himself tells us, applies to cases in which any one does something 'beyond his powers', above his ordinary level, and more than you would expect from him; and παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους is exemplified by the epigram and the saying of Iphicrates.

καὶ εἰ οὕτως κ.τ.λ.] 'and if *such* things be done (οὕτως), at particular places or times, they will acquire a magnitude and importance in things (i. e. actions) right, and good, and just, and their opposites'. οὕτως may however mean *under particular circumstances*.

τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ Ὀλυμπιονίκῃ] The substantive taking the same case as the verb from which it is derived is illustrated in the dative by Matthiae, *Gr. Gr.* § 390. Stallbaum on Phaedo 88 c. Soph. 252 D. and Euthyphr. 13 D, 15 A. Add, Aesch. Agam. 415, πτεροῖς ὀπαδοῖς ὕπνου κελεύθοις. Soph. Oed. Col. τὰ γὰρ δόλφ τῷ μὴ δικαίῳ κτήματ' οὐχὶ σώζεται. Trach. 668, Ἑρακλεῖ δωρημάτων. Aj. 696, Wunder ad loc. Eur. Ion, 508, τὰ θεόθεν τέκνα θνατοῖς. Iph. T. 1384, οὐρανοῦ πείσημα (i. e. τὸ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ πεπτωκός). Plat. Parmen. 128 c, Theaet. 177 A, Gorg. 522 D, Symp. 182 D, Rep. VI 493 D, 498 B. Ar. Pol. VII (VI) 5, 1320 a 32, βροθία τοῖς ἀπόροις. Some examples of an analogous construction, in which a substantive follows the ordinary construction of a verb, with prepos. and subst., are given by Stallbaum on Phaedo 99 B. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 354 A, Gorg. 472 E, Rep. II 378 D, Eur. Herc. Fur. 1334, στέφανος Ἑλλήνων ὑπο, Arist. Eth. N. X 9, 1179 a 25, ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ Θεῶν, Categ. 8 b 32, μεταβολὴ ὑπὸ νόσου, de Anima B. 8, 11, 420 b 27, ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ αἵρος ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς.

This epigram is expressly attributed to Simonides by Eustath. ad Hom. p. 1761, 24 (Buhle). It is found in the Anthol. I 80 (ed. Jacobs), No. 107 of the Epigrams attributed to Simonides. Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr.* p. 793 [p. 921, 2nd ed.], Simonidis Fragg. 166.

Eustathius l. c. explains ἀσπίλλα, σκεῦός τι ἰχθυηρόν. It is described by Hemsterhuis ad Hesychium s.v. δστυπολεῖ, as a *ιῦρην*, a sort of wooden yoke, which was carried over the two shoulders to support the fish-baskets.

<sup>1</sup> καιρός 'due season', 'the right time', 'occasion', 'opportunity', the time suitable, appropriate, to the performance of anything, is that form of good which comes under the Category of time, χρόνος; Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 a 26. On this the Paraphrast (Andronicus Rhodius) notes, ἐστι γὰρ ὁ καιρός ὁ ἐπιτήδειος ἐκδοτῷ χρόνος. Pind. Pyth. IX 82, ὁ καιρός παντὸς ἔχει κορυφάν. Ib. IV 286 (508). Soph. Electr. 75, καιρός ἀνθρώπιν μέγιστος ἔργου παντὸς ἐστ' ἐπιστάτης. Philoct. 837.

πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ' ὥμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν ἄσιλλαν  
 ἰχθῦς ἐξ Ἄργους εἰς Τεγέαν ἔφερον.  
 καὶ ὁ Ἴφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὧν  
 33 ὑπῆρξε ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυές τοῦ ἐπικτήτου  
 χαλεπώτερον γάρ. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς <sup>ἰκαλῶ</sup> φησιν  
 αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί.  
 34 καὶ τὸ μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος, οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν

Alciphron I, 1. p. 6, εὐθὺς οὖν ὁψῶναι πλῆσιον, καὶ τὰς ἀσίλλας ἐπωμίους ἀνελόμενοι, καὶ τὰς ἑκατέρωθεν σπυρίδας ἐξαρτήσαντες (quoted in Anthol.). Otherwise called τύλη. Arist. Ach. 860, 954. Diog. Laert. IX 53, of Protagoras, who πρῶτος τὴν καλουμένην τύλην, ἐφ' ἧς τὰ φόρτια βαστάζουσιν, εὔρεν, ὡς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ περὶ παιδείας φορμοφόρος γάρ ἡ; ὡς καὶ Ἐπικουρὸς πού φησι. So that Protagoras may be added to the examples of ἐξ οἷων εἰς ὅλα, I 9. 31, or ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρχε ταῦτα.

The exclamation of Iphicrates 'from what I rose to this' (from what an origin this my fortune was made) is repeated in a more correct form (Buhle) in c. 9. 31, ἐξ οἷων εἰς ὅλα, as is also part of the Epigram. Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. et Imp., under the head of Iphicrates, Nos. 1 and 5, has these notices of him. Ἴφικράτης δοκῶν υἱὸς εἶναι σκντοτόμου κατεφρο- νεῖτο· δόξαν δὲ τότε πρῶτος ἔσχε ὅτε τραυματίαν πολέμιον ἄνδρα μετὰ τῶν ὀπλων ζῶντα συναρπάσας εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τριήρη μετένεγκεν. No. 5, πρὸς δὲ Ἀρμόδιον τὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ Ἀρμοδίου ἀπόγονον εἰς δυσγένειαν αὐτῷ λοιδορού- μενον ἔφη, τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ γένος ἀρχεται, τὸ δὲ σὸν ἐν σοὶ παύεται.

§ 33. τὸ αὐτοφυές τοῦ ἐπικτήτου 'native superior to acquired talents and advantages (of person, mind or character), because they are harder to come by'; *nature* being rather chary of such gifts, and the *acquisition* of them comparatively easy. Top. Γ I, 116 δ 10, καὶ τὸ φύσει τοῦ μὴ φύσει, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τὸ δ' ἐπικτήτων. This topic has a wider scope than the rhetorical, and again, c. 4, 119 a 7—10. Comp. Pind. Ol. IX 152, τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἄπαν. II 155, σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ· μαθόντες δὲ λαβροὶ παγγλωσσίᾳ ἄκραντα γαρύμεν Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θείον. Nem. III 69, συγγενεὶ δὲ τις ἀρετῇ μέγα βρίθει· ὅς δὲ διδάκτ' ἔχει ψεφηνὸς ἀνὴρ. *Specie autem comparantur ut anteponantur quae propter se expetenda sunt iis quae propter aliud: ut innata atque insita assumptis et adventitiis et seq.* Cic. Topic. XVIII 69.

ὁ ποιητὴς] Homer. Odys. χ' (XXII) 347.

§ 34. οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον κ.τ.λ.] This celebrated simile does not occur, as is well known, in the funeral oration put into Pericles' mouth by Thucydides in his second book. Thucydides, who merely gives the general meaning of his speakers and never their actual words, may have omitted it intentionally, if Pericles really made use of it. But as Herodotus, VII 162, attributes nearly the same identical words to Gelo, it seems more probable that it was erroneously ascribed to the other: at all events it is quite clear that it could not have been original in his mouth. It appears, likewise, in a somewhat altered form, in Euripides (Suppl. 447, πῶς οὖν ἔτ' ἂν γένοιτ' ἂν λυχυρὰ πόλις, ὅταν τις ὡς λευκῶνος ἥρηνου στάχυν

ἐπιτάφιον λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνη-  
 ρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἐξαιρεθείη.  
 35 καὶ τὰ ἐν χρεῖα μείζονι χρήσιμα, οἷον τὰ ἐν γῆραι  
 καὶ νόσοις. καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους. καὶ  
 τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς. καὶ τὸ δυνατόν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου.

τόλμας ἀφαιρῇ κάπολωτίῃ νέους), who no doubt might have borrowed it from Pericles; and it is ascribed to Demades by Athenaeus, III 99 D. It is repeated in Rhet. III 10. 7.

§ 35. τὰ ἐν χρεῖα...μείζονι χρήσιμα (μείζω ἐστὶ) *A friend in need is a friend indeed.* 'Augēt manifesto vim beneficiorum tempus, angustiaeque eorum qui beneficium accipiunt, quod etiam Demosthenes in Leptinem significavit (p. 471, 1), πάντες μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἴσως ἄξιοι χάριν ἀναπολαμβάνειν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες τῷ ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς εὖ, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ παρὰ τὰς χρείας.' Victorius. Comp. Eth. N. VIII 15, 1163 a 16, in estimating the value of services to a friend, when you wish to make the most of them you say that they are τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς (the best you have to give), καὶ ἂ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρεῖαις.

δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους] This topic is distinguishable from those in §§ 9 and 16. There the comparison is between end and not-end: here it is between different degrees or orders of means to an end. Top. Γ 1, 116 b 22, quoted on § 9. Alexander, in his Comm. on that passage, illustrates this by the comparison of shaving and exercise as means to the end, health; the active exercise of ἀρετῇ (this is the definition of εὐδαιμονία in the Eth. Nic.) to the mere ἔξις of it, as nearer to the end, happiness; in practical arts, the higher and more comprehensive are superior to the narrower and subordinate in each department, the latter being mere means to some higher end; so horsemanship is superior to the saddler's art, both being subordinate, but the former nearer, to the end, the military art; the woodman's and carpenter's arts as means to shipbuilding; medicine and gymnastics as both tending to a healthy habit of body.

τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς] The comparison in the expression of this topic is left to be understood, and the two terms are merely placed in juxtaposition by καί, one *and* the other are laid before us, in order that we may choose between them. The topic is a comparison of absolute good, or good in general, and relative good. That which is absolutely good, or good in itself, καθ' αὐτό, or good in general, need not be the best for us ('to a man's own self'), any particular individual, αὐτῷ, though theoretically, from the higher point of view, it is superior to the other. Top. Γ 1, 116 b 8, τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τιμὴ ἀρετώτερον<sup>1</sup>. Alexander, in his Comm. on Top. p. 125 (Top. 116 b 26, τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἀδύνατον), illustrates this by the contrast of immortality and long life, which will apply as

<sup>1</sup> The comparison of these two topics well illustrates the difference of treatment in dialectical and rhetorical reasoning. In the former that which is generally and theoretically true is put forward: in the latter, looking at this same question from the practical side, we see that there are many exceptions, and that this other side is equally capable of being maintained.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' οὐ. καὶ τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ  
36 βίου· τέλη γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει. καὶ τὰ  
πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν. ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς P. 1365 b.

well to the ἀπλῶς and αὐτῷ as to that for which it is immediately intended: immortality may perhaps be absolutely the best, most desirable in itself, but it is out of our reach; for us therefore a long life, which may possibly be attained, is better: it is of no use to choose or prefer immortality. Another example is supplied by Heraclitus' dictum, quoted in Eth. Nic. x 5, 1176 a 7, that an ass would prefer any rubbish or refuse (σύρματα) to gold; because it is pleasanter to him. Comp. I 15. 12, τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἰρεῖται οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ.

αὐτῷ (al. αὐτῷ) [on p. 146] is the reading of Vict., Buhle, Gaisf., Bekker, Spengel, and Bonitz, *Arist. Stud.* I p. 88. It is the equivalent of τινί in the familiar antithesis of general and particular good, as in the passage of the Topics above quoted; comp. I 9. 17 αὐτῷ, I 15. 20, II 13. 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς: and as in the repetition of the antithesis, I 15. 12, it assumes the form of αὐτῷ, 'good to a man's own self', i.e. each particular individual, it is quite plain that the one form can in many cases be substituted for the other. On αὐτοῦ for αὐτοῦ and the rest, see Waitz, *Org.* p. 486, 54 a 14. Rhet. I 1. 12, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡτῆσθαι. Also, Buttm. *Excurs. X ad Dem. c. Mid.* p. 140, *de formis αὐτόν et αὐτόν*. ἢ for καί, which is adopted by Vict. and Gaisf., and suggested by Bonitz, l. c., is, as I have above endeavoured to shew, unnecessary.

τὸ δυνατόν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου] Top. Γ I, 116 b 26. See Alexander's example in the last note but one. Another occurs in II 2. 2, on anger, ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἰεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δ' ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται αὐτῷ. We deliberate, with a view to action, and that which is to be preferred of two courses of action, only about things which we believe to be possible, and possible to us; κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται...ἐὰν δὲ δυνατόν φαίνεται ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 b 25.

This topic is stated as a consequence from the preceding; the possible is to be preferred to the impossible, because the attainable good is the only good for us, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' οὐ.

τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βίου] The end in question is not the temporal end, but the final cause. The τέλος is in itself good, 7. 8, 9; 6. 2; the higher or nearer to the end (τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει) are any of the means employed for the attainment of it, the more they approximate in their character to the end itself; hence τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βίου, the means included in, or those which subserve, the end of life—happiness, or whatever else the end of life may be—are in so far superior, being nearer to that great and final end, than other means to other and lower ends. Top. Γ I, 116 b 23, τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεῖνον ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν.

§ 36. τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν] the real and the apparent or sham; τὸ εἶναι and τὸ δοκεῖν, τὸ ὄν and τὸ φαινόμενον; the solid, genuine, substantial reality contrasted with the mere outside show and 'appearance'; or truth as absolute certainty, and probable opinion. Top. Γ 3, 118 b 20,



δόξαν, ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔλοιτο. διὸ καὶ  
 τὸ εὖ πᾶσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν αἰρετώτερον  
 εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν λανθάνῃ αἰρήσεται, ποιεῖν δ'  
 37 εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἐλέσθαι. καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλ-  
 λον ἢ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον.

καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ διὰ τὴν δόξαν αἰρετόν (αἰρετώτερόν ἐστιν), οἷον  
 ὑγίεια κάλλους. (τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν δι' αὐτὴν αἰρούμεθα κἂν μηδεὶς εἴσεσθαι  
 μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ κάλλος διὰ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῇ δόξαν· μάταιον γοῦν δοκεῖ τὸ κάλλος  
 εἶναι μὴ γνωριζόμενον. Alex. Aphrod. ad loc.) Aesch. Sept. c. Th. 592, of  
 Amphiaras the just, οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν δίκαιος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει. This topic is  
 No. 3, in Bacon's *Colours of Good and Evil* (Works, ed. Ellis and Sped-  
 ding, VII 79). It is shewn to fail in the case of virtue; the virtuous man  
 'will be virtuous *in solitudine*, and not only *in theatro*'.

ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν κ.τ.λ.] Top. I. c. δ 21, ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν τὸ  
 μηδενὸς συνειδότης μὴ ἂν σπουδᾶσαι ὑπάρχειν. 'The distinguishing mark or  
 characteristic of that which is directed to mere opinion (is found in) any-  
 thing that a man would not choose if he were sure that it would not be  
 known or recognised by others'. And the same thing is expressed in the  
 Topics, 'anything which a man would not be anxious to possess if no  
 one else was to be privy to it'. It is the credit of possessing the thing,  
 in the eyes of others, and not the mere possession for its own sake, that  
 gives it its value and superiority. Compare with this ἂ μὴ λανθάνει κ.τ.λ.  
 § 40, which gives the other side of the question.

In the example, the superiority of receiving to conferring a benefit,  
 the words δόξειεν ἂν suggest that we need not take this for granted; it can  
 be 'made to appear' that it is true, but the real truth lies on the other  
 side of the question; from a higher point of view, to confer is better  
 than to receive a benefit.

§ 37. ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.] The difference between this and the pre-  
 ceding topic seems to lie in this. That lays down the *general* rule, and  
 refers to 'every thing' that comes under it; and is therefore appealed to,  
 πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον, as the warrant and foundation of this. The  
 second is a special variety of the first, 'what men wish *to be*'; the quali-  
 ties, such as virtues, which they desire to possess, or seem to possess.  
 Here again the reality is preferable to the mere credit and external  
 appearance of the virtue. 'And, therefore, it is a vulgar and popular  
 opinion (φασί, Plat. Rep. II 358 A; and not merely the doctrine of the  
 vulgar, οἱ πολλοί, but maintained also by would-be philosophers, as Thra-  
 symachus and Callicles) that justice is a thing of small value (mean and  
 contemptible), because the appearance of it is preferable to the reality,  
 whereas in the case of health it is the reverse'. Victorius quotes, in exem-  
 plification of φασί, two iambic lines from Plutarch de Aud. Poet. p. 18 D,  
 τοῦ μὲν δικαίου τὴν δόκῃσιν ἄρνεσο, τὰ δ' ἔργα τοῦ πᾶν δρώντος ἔνθα κερδανεῖς.  
 Eur. Ixion. Fr. 1. Dind. Quoted also in Stobaeus p. 30, 8. Another frag-  
 ment to the same effect is ascribed by Valckenauer (*Diatr. in Fragm. Eur.*  
 p. 166) to Euripides' Ixion.

διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φατὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν  
 38 ἢ εἶναι αἰρετώτερον· τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν οὐ. καὶ τὸ πρὸς  
 πολλὰ χρησιμώτερον, οἷον τὸ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν  
 καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ καλὰ. διὸ καὶ ὁ  
 39 πλούτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια μέγιστα δοκεῖ εἶναι· ἅπαντα  
 γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ<sup>1</sup> μεθ' ἡδονῆς·  
 πλείω γὰρ ἑνός, ὥστε ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν  
 καὶ ἡ ἀλυπία. καὶ δυοῖν ὁ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον  
 40 μείζον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ. καὶ ἂ μὴ λανθάνει παρόντ' ἢ  
 λανθάνει· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ τείνει ταῦτα. διὸ τὸ

<sup>1</sup> + τὸ *infra*, cum Bekker<sup>2</sup>. 'sed melius abest alterum τὸ quod pr. A<sup>o</sup> om. et auctore Vahleno Bekker<sup>2</sup>.' Spengel.

§ 38. τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμώτερον] Top. Γ 3, 118 b 27, εἰ διελέσθαι ποσαχῶς τὸ αἰρετὸν λέγεται καὶ τίνων χάριν οἷον τοῦ συμφέροντος ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος· τὸ γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἢ πρὸς τὰ πλείω χρήσιμον αἰρετώτερον ἂν ὑπάρχοι τοῦ μὴ ὁμοίως. Wealth and health are supposed to be of the highest value because they are serviceable in so many ways; for the support and preservation of mere life, and of a virtuous and happy life (for which they supply the means), also for pleasure and for good and noble actions.

§ 39. καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ μεθ' ἡδονῆς] Top. Γ 2, 117 a 23, καὶ ταῦτα μεθ' ἡδονῆς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς. καὶ ταῦτα μετ' ἀλυπίας μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ λύπης. The desirability of anything even which is desirable in itself or on other grounds, as things useful, is increased by the addition of any pleasure that accompanies such things; so the ἐνέργειαι are completed and perfected by the accompanying ἡδονή in each case, Eth. N. x 3, 4, 5. And likewise the absence of pain, as compared with its presence, may be regarded as a positive good. The topic in the Rhetoric *combines the two*, positive pleasure and negative relief from pain; these together being 'more than one' are superior to either of the two separately. καὶ is therefore 'together with'; and ὥστε ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ. 'and so (in the case supposed) we have (there are there, ὑπάρχει) the positive pleasure and the absence of pain, which may both be regarded as a good'.

καὶ δυοῖν...τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ] A + B is greater than A + C, therefore B is greater than C. Top. Γ 5, 119 a 22, εἰ ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον τὸ ὅλον μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτο, ἢ εἰ τῷ ἥττον τοιούτῳ προστιθέμενον τὸ ὅλον μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτο. In the second of these two cases, if the addition of a quantity to the less of two other quantities makes the sum total of the two greater than the sum total arising from the addition of another different quantity to the other, we may infer that the former of the two added quantities is greater than or preferable to the latter. 4 is less than 6: if the addition of 8 to 4 produces a total 12, which is greater than the total resulting from the addition of an unknown quantity *x*, to 6, and therefore less than 12, we may infer (by calculation) that *x* is less than 8.

§ 40. ἢ λανθάνει] ἂ has been omitted, either by the author or a tran-

41 πλουτεῖν φανείη ἂν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ p. 28.  
τὸ ἀγαπητόν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἄλλων.

scriber. A similar omission occurs in Plat. Phaedr. 275 A, *τὸν ἀντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται*. Similar examples quoted from Plato by Stallbaum (note ad loc.) make it probable that the oversight is due to the author. 'Things that do shew themselves, and are conspicuous, have a greater air of reality about them than those that do not (that lurk out of sight), and may therefore lay claim to the preference'.

διὸ τὸ πλουτεῖν φανείη ἂν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν] This, the vulgar reading, which Victorius found in all his MSS, is no inference or exemplification of the preceding rule, though it is supported by Schrader, who however does not explain the connexion. If it be applied to the rule, the show or appearance, τὸ δοκεῖν, of wealth is said *λανθάνειν*, not to be seen; which is absurd. It *does* follow from the topic in § 37, and may possibly have been thence transferred to this place. Some MSS and the Greek Scholiast give *πλουτεῖν...καὶ δοκεῖν*, but it seems unlikely that the two verbs, if the combination of the two was intended, should be so widely separated: also *καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν* would be required. This was corrected by Muretus, τὸ πλουτεῖν καὶ δοκεῖν φανείη ἂν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πλουτεῖν, which seems rather too violent an alteration. Brandis would adopt the reading of his anonymous commentator, διὸ τὸ πλουτεῖν καὶ δοκεῖν φανείη ἂν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν (Schneidewin's *Philologus* iv i p. 42), also conjectured by Vater, and confirmed by the Greek Schol., who explains it, καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν καὶ φαίνεσθαι μείζον τοῦ πλουτεῖν καὶ μὴ φαίνεσθαι. Another mode of correction had occurred to me, the interchange, viz. of τὸ and τοῦ, τοῦ πλουτεῖν...τὸ δοκεῖν. The meaning of this would be, that the appearance or outward show of wealth, together with the wealth itself which it manifested, might upon this principle be made to appear superior to the wealth without the show, because the possessor would lose all the credit of it—but this involves perhaps rather a non-natural interpretation of πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τείνει. I am indebted to Mr Munro for a suggestion that deserves attention: the substitution of τῷ, for τοῦ, δοκεῖν: the alteration is very slight, and gives an excellent sense; the value of wealth by this rule may be considered to be augmented by the addition of the prominent and conspicuous display of it. Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgate.

§ 41. τὸ ἀγαπητόν κ.τ.λ.] not here 'to be acquiesced in', 'that which one may be content with', (as in Eth. Nic. i, 1094 b 19); nor in the reputed Homeric sense of 'unique', 'only', but 'highly valued', 'dearly prized'

<sup>1</sup> Of the four places in which ἀγαπητός occurs in Homer, and is interpreted *μορογενής*, *unicus*, one, Od. β' 365, has the addition of *μόνος*, which seems to shew that there, at any rate, ἀγαπητός cannot mean *μόνος* or *μορογενής*; and in the others the translation 'dearly beloved' is just as suitable and probable. It is similarly explained (in the supposed Homeric sense) by many of the Interpp. of Matth. iii. 17, Mark i. 11, Luc. iii. 22, and other places where Christ is called ὁ ἀγαπητός υἱὸς Θεοῦ. Dr Lightfoot, in *Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philol.* Vol. III. p. 92, No. 7, thinks that from the primary notion of ἀγαπᾶν 'to welcome'—which is undoubtedly its original and Homeric sense—it expresses rather the external act than the inward feeling, and should be translated

διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἴση ζημία, ἂν τις τὸν ἐτερόφθαλμον  
τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δὴ ἔχοντα· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφή-  
ρηται.

1 ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς πίστεις φέρειν ἐν τῷ προ- CHAP. VIII.  
τρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, σχεδὸν εἴρηται· μέγιστον

(‘beloved’, something which one is very fond of. Comp. *unicus*, as in Catullus, Carmen 64, 215). So it is used in Eth. Nic. IX 12 init. *ὡς περ τοῖς ἐρώσι τὸ ὄρῳ ἀγαπητότατον*. In Pol. II 4, 1262 b 23, the meaning is more doubtful, and the sense of ‘unique’ possible. Here it cannot have this meaning, because in some cases it is *μετ’ ἄλλων*, and it is only by the addition of *μόνον* that the ‘great rarity’ which gives it its high value becomes the ‘solitary specimen’. Comp. Buttm. *ad Mid.* p. 567, note 398.

*ἐτερόφθαλμον*] Gaisford refers to a very pertinent passage of Dem. c. Timocr. p. 744, in which the orator tells with admirable conciseness a story of a one-eyed man of Locri, who under a law framed on the retaliatory principle (‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’) was threatened by an enemy with the loss of his solitary visual organ. ‘Vexed at this, and thinking life intolerable at the price, he is said to have ventured to propose a law, that if any one deprived a one-eyed man of an eye, he should lose both his own in return, that the loss of each might be equalized’. This is a case of *ἐπιείκεια*, the spirit of the law rectifying the imperfection of the letter. Rhet. I 13. 13—19.

This concludes the treatment of the *general* principles and topics from which arguments may be derived by the political rhetorician in the deliberative kind of Rhetoric: there remains one special subject under this head, which is indispensable to the orator who takes part in public business, and is sketched very briefly in outline in the next chapter, with a reference to the Politics for complete details.

#### CHAP. VIII.

§ 1. On the general connexion of this chapter with its context, on the two rhetorical uses of the study of Politics, and the various classifications of Constitutions by Aristotle in other works, by Plato and Polybius, see Introduction, p. 181—3, and Append. A, p. 208.

‘The subject, which is most important and effectual (is of the highest

in Homer rather by ‘fondled or caressed’, than ‘beloved’. Fritzsche, on Eth. Eud. III. 6, 1233 b 2, renders *τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, filii unice dilecti*. See the references in his note. Heinsius, *Exercit. Sacr. in Marc.* i. 11 (quoted by Gaisford), pronounces very decidedly in favour of this interp. *unicus, unigenitus, prader quem alius non datur*: referring to this passage (which is decisive against him), to Homer, and to Hesychius *ἀγαπητὸν, μονογενῆ*. Victorius more in accordance with facts says, “*carum* valet, ut puto, idque significare voluit Catullus cum inquit ‘*si quid carius est oculis*’ quo uno se aliquis consolatur, in quo omnem spem suorum gaudiorum collocatam habet, quo impetrato ac retento contentus vivere potest:” which exactly defines it. The use of the Latin *unicus* is precisely similar.

δὲ καὶ κυριώτατον ἀπάντων πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι πείθειν καὶ καλῶς συμβουλεύειν, τὰς πολιτείας ἀπάσας λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐκάστης ἔθνη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα διελεῖν. πείθονται γὰρ ἅπαντες τῷ συμφέροντι, συμφέρεει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κυρία μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφασις, τὰ δὲ κύρια

authority, carries most weight, *κυριώτατον*) of all in conferring the power and cultivating the faculty of persuasion and good counsel, includes the exact (*analytical διελεῖν*) knowledge of all the existing varieties of constitutions, together with the habits (i.e. the habits and manners which they severally engender in those who live under them), institutions, and interests (*συμφέροντα*) which respectively belong to them'. *Ad consilium autem de republica dandum caput est nosse rempublicam; ad dicendum vero probabiliter nosse mores civitatis, qui quia crebro mutantur, genus quoque orationis est saepe mutandum.* Cic. de Orat. II 82. 337.

§ 2. *ἔτι δὲ κυρία κ.τ.λ.*] Not only must the public speaker be acquainted with the manners and customs, institutions, and all that is expedient to or for the interest of these various forms of government, but also with the nature of the governing body (*τὸ κύριον*) in each; it is by the declarations or proclamations (*ἀποφάνσεις*) of this supreme authority that the law is given to the citizens and their conduct prescribed to them, and as these are various under the several constitutions (*τὰ δὲ κύρια διήρηται—ἀνρίά ἐστιν*), so he must be thoroughly acquainted with all the existing varieties.

*ἀπόφασις*] so the Vulg., retained by Bekker and Spengel: *ἀπόφανσις* is found in two MSS: *ἀπόφανσις* also occurs, with a *varia lectio ἀπόφανσις* in two MSS, in the sense of 'a declaration or utterance' (as here) in II 21. 2. *ἀπόφανσις* is no doubt used in the common language in two different senses, (1) 'denial, contradiction', as usually in Aristotle, from *ἀποφάναι*, and (2) 'a declaration', from *ἀποφαίνειν*<sup>1</sup>, as in Demosthenes and Polybius, VI 3. 1, *τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀπόφανσιν*, 9. 11; 12. 10. But Aristotle most expressly distinguishes the two words again and again in the *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, as c. 1, 16 a 1, *δεῖ θίσθαι...τί ἐστὶν ἀπόφανσις καὶ κατάφανσις* (negative and affirmative) καὶ *ἀπόφανσις* (an enunciation) καὶ *λόγος*. c. 5, 17 a 8, *λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφανσις, εἴτα ἀπόφανσις* c. 6, 17 a 25, *κατάφανσις δὲ ἐστὶν ἀπόφανσις τινος ἀπὸ τινος*: and in very many other places. Is it possible that the author of this treatise could use the one word for the other? On the other side it may be said that Aristotle is extremely hasty and careless in writing, and that the inconsistency is in this case justified and explained by his having for the nonce conformed to the ordinary usage of the language: and the evidence on either side seems so nicely balanced, manuscript authority included, that the question cannot be positively determined. Buhle is very emphatic on the point, 'equidem iure meo *ἀπόφανσις* reposui.'

<sup>1</sup> As *φάσις* is derived from *φαίνειν*, so of course may *ἀπόφανσις* be formed from *ἀποφαίνειν*.

διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας· ὅσαι γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι,  
3 τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύριά ἐστιν. εἰσὶ δὲ πολιτεῖαι  
τέτταρες, δημοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία ἀριστοκρατία μον-  
αρχία· ὥστε τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον τούτων τί  
4 ἐστὶν αἰὲ μόνιον ἢ ὅλον τούτων. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατία

§ 3. On the classifications of forms of government, see Appendix A, Introd. p. 208. On this ordinary, popular, fourfold division, see Pol. VI (IV) 7, init.

τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον κ.τ.λ.] 'the sovereign power, the highest authority', τὸ κύριον; or the 'power' which 'decides', τὸ κρῖνον, with which rests the ultimate decision, to which lies the ultimate appeal—this sovereign power 'is always either a part of one of these four or the whole of it'; the 'part' in the three latter cases of the forms named: the 'whole' in the democratical form alone.

§ 4. The distinctions of the four forms of government are determined, like everything else, by the object or end proposed to itself by each of them; this is the *ἔσος*, the characteristic *mark*, or determining *principle*, of each, that which severally 'characterizes' them; and this is in each case a special conception of political justice, τὸ δίκαιον. Pol. III 9, init.

Democracy is a form of government that is distinguished from the rest, (is characterised), by the distribution of offices amongst the people *by themselves* (διανέμονται, mid.) and *by lot*, each member of the entire body of citizens having an equal chance of obtaining them: this is equivalent to saying that the *ἔσος* of a democracy, its determining principle, that which gives its special character is 'equality', *ἰσότης*, which is the foundation of the *ἐλευθερία* (usually assigned as its *ἔσος*), and therefore its proper τέλος. This is laid down in Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 b 30 seq. 'Liberty' and 'equality' are the catchwords of a democracy. δύο γὰρ ἔστω οἷς ἡ δημοκρατία δοκεῖ εἶναι, τῷ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ἴσον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἴσον δ' ὁ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλεονεξῆναι τοῦτ' εἶναι κύριον, ἐλευθερον δὲ καὶ ἴσον τὸ ὁ τι ἂν βούληται τις ποιεῖν (Pol. VIII (V) 9, sub fin.). Liberty alone is not sufficient in the way of a distinction, (Ib. 1290 b 7 seq.), though it is commonly assigned as such, Ib. c. 8, 1294 a 10, ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ἔσος ἀρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμων δ' ἐλευθερία. Another current *ἔσος* of democracy is the will of the majority: where that is sovereign the state is democratical. Ib. VII (VI) 3, 1378 a 18, φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅτι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείουσιν<sup>1</sup>. But this again rests upon the notion of equality, because it implies that as all the citizens are individually equal, and have equal rights, the greater number has the higher right, and therefore prevails over the minority. The theory of democracy is, that all citizens are equal; not that all men are born equal, because all barbarians are *naturally* inferior to Greeks. The use of the 'lot',

<sup>1</sup> This however is common to all three, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy; in all of them alike, ὅτι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλείονι μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κύριον. Pol. VI (IV) 8, 1294 a 13.

μὲν πολιτεία ἐν ἣ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅλι-

which leaves the choice of the candidate to chance, is an exemplification of this, because it assumes the equality of the claims of all citizens to office. On the different kinds of democracy, see Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 b 14 seq.

The *ὅρος* of *oligarchy* is *πλοῦτος*: and therefore property, a census, *τίμημα* (estimated value of property), is necessary as a qualification for office, for that which confers authority or sovereignty, ἐν ἣ οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων (διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, they likewise distribute amongst themselves, keep to themselves, all offices of state, all the powers of government). Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1290 b 1: the different kinds of oligarchy, Ibid. c. 5, the first is τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. The oligarchical theory of 'justice' is therefore *ὅτι ἂν δόξῃ τῇ πλείονι οὐσίᾳ κατὰ πλῆθος γὰρ οὐσίας φασι κρῖνεσθαι δεῖν*, VII (VI) 8, 1318 a 19. A complete definition of *δημοκρατία* and *ὀλιγαρχία* is given, VI (IV) 4, 1290 b 17. In the popular Rhetoric *οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων* is the general designation of the privileged class: but in the exacter Politics VI (IV) 5, two kinds of *τιμήματα* are distinguished which characterise two different kinds of oligarchies; one in which the property qualification is only so high as to exclude the poor, and acquired property procures admission into the privileged class: the other in which the qualification is high, and the governing class, which is therefore small, fill up themselves the vacancies as they occur. Again, *ἀπὸ τιμημάτων* is too wide a term, and therefore not properly characteristic: it includes more than oligarchies, one form of democracy, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, βραχείων δὲ τούτων ὄντων, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 b 39. Plato has the same phrase to describe an oligarchy, ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, Rep. VIII 550 C. Legg. III 698 B, πολιτεία καὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων ἀρχαὶ τεττάρων, of the Solonian constitution.

The *ὅρος* of *aristocracy* is in the Politics *ἀρετή* and not *παιδεία*. The two following observations are added in the way of notes to explain the apparent discrepancy. 'Aristocracy is a kind of polity in which education is the qualification for a share in the government. By education, I mean that which is established by the law of the land: for it is those who have lived in constant obedience to the state institutions that bear rule in the aristocracy'. The virtue of a citizen is not one and the same; it varies under different forms of government. The system of education must therefore be fixed and controlled by the government and conformed to its established institutions. This is the 'education established by the law' of the text. On the absolute necessity of this kind of training in virtue under state direction for grown men as well as children, see Eth. N. x 10, 1179 b 32 seq., and the unfinished treatise on education in Bk. V (VIII) of the Politics. "Such men as these must necessarily appear 'best', and it is from them that this (form of constitution) has derived its name". Since *παιδεία* therefore is the necessary preparation for *ἀρετή*, either of them may be represented as the object of the state. Definitions of *ἀριστοκρατία* are to be found, Pol. III 7, 1279 a 34, where two explanations of the *ἀριστο-* in the name are given: either *διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν* (which is adopted here), or *διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωμένοις αἰετῇ*—c. 15, 1286 b 4, τῶν πλείονων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν, Ib. VI (IV) 8, 1294 a 9, δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς τιμὰς νε-

γαρχία δὲ ἐν ἣ οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐν ἣ οἱ κατὰ παιδείαν. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου κειμένην· οἱ γὰρ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις ἐν τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἄρχουσιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους φαίνεσθαι ἀρίστους· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα εἴληφε τοῦτο. μοναρχία δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τοῦνομα ἐν ἣ εἷς P. 1366 a. ἀπάντων κύριός ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν 5 τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δ' ἀόριστος τυραννίς. τὸ δὲ τέλος μῆσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν· ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὁρος ἀρετῆς. But, c. 15, 1299 b 25, ἐν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις (αἱ ἀρχαὶ) ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων.

μοναρχία] the sole government of one, includes βασιλεία κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ, a monarchy under certain fixed regulations or conditions, a limited, constitutional monarchy, ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασιν πατρικὴ βασιλεία, Thuc. I 13, and the 'indefinite', unrestricted, unlimited tyranny. The distinction between the two here rests upon the limitation of the sovereign power or the absence of it. So in Pol. III 14, 1285 a 27, οἱ μὲν γὰρ (βασιλεῖς) κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκόντων, οἱ δ' ἀκόντων ἄρχουσιν. The second of these two distinctions of the voluntary and involuntary obedience is repeated 1285 b 2 (βασιλειαὶ) διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικαὶ εἶναι δεσποτικάι, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἰρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόντων βασιλικάι. 'Usurpation', as the distinctive difference of tyranny as opposed to monarchy (Eth. N. VIII 12), is insufficient. The government of the hereditary monarchs of Persia is 'tyrannous' in respect of the nature and mode of exercise of their power, though these and other barbarian monarchies are κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικάι, Pol. III 14, 1285 a 18 and 22, ὁ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται, Eth. N. VIII 12. Lastly, the tyrant has a mercenary 'body-guard', φυλακή (this is distinctive of 'tyranny'; see Rhet. I 2. 19). The regular constitutional sovereign is protected, if at all, by a national guard of citizens, III 14, 1285 a 24. But the true distinction between them is determined by the *end* of the government of each: with the one it is his own interest, τὸ αὐτοῦ συμφέρον: with the other it is the interest of the governed, πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον, III 7, 1279 a 27—31, VIII (V) 10, 1311 a 2, ἡ δὲ τυραννίς...πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ἀφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν.

§ 5. The 'end' of each form of government may be identified with its *δρος*, because 'everything being *determined* by its end', the end *does* determine (ὁρίζεται) or characterise the special form which each kind of government assumes. These *δρος* or *τέλη* have already been considered in the preceding note. All choice is directed to some end: the end of the state, or its governing and guiding principle, must control and give a direction to all the choice and the consequent action of its citizens; and hence the necessity that the statesman and public speaker should be acquainted with it. 'Plainly therefore it is with a view to the end of each form of government that our analysis of its habits, institutions, and interests should be conducted, because it is to this that the motives and actions of the body of men that we have to address are ultimately directed'.



ἐκάστης πολιτείας οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν· αἰροῦνται γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατίας μὲν τέλος ἐλευθερία, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ τὰ πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὰ νόμιμα, τυραννίδος δὲ φυλακή. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα διαιρετέον, εἴπερ ὁ αἰροῦνται πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπαναφέροντες. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι' ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου

τυραννίδος δὲ φυλακή] φυλακή is here 'precaution', 'self-defence'—a form of *self-interest*. τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον, characteristic of 'tyranny'—and hence, as a means to this end, the φυλακή in its other sense, the mercenary body-guard, becomes a necessity, and distinctive of a tyranny. But as a φυλακή, in some sense, is equally required by any sole ruler or monarch, who is always in danger from the attempts of rivals, or rebels, or revolutionists,—the sole ruler has only one life to lose, and hence the *personal* danger; in governments of many, where the members are numerous, the attempt to get rid of them all would be difficult or impossible, and consequently it is not made—so here βασιλεία or μοναρχία is included under the general head of τυραννίς: so Schrader. Failing to see this, some transcriber, whose reading appears in the Greek Scholiast<sup>1</sup>, had inserted the clause βασιλείας δὲ τὸ ἐννόμως ἐπιστατεῖν, which being wanting in all the MSS, and not rendered by the Latin Translators, was deservedly rejected by Victorius. Vater, who does not agree with Victorius' and Schrader's view, thinks that some words descriptive of the τέλος of the βασιλεία have dropt out; and Spengel, by 'indicating a lacuna' (*Rhet. Gr.* Praef. vi), appears to be of the same opinion.

Upon the whole I think that Brandis' view of the question is to be preferred (*Philologus* iv i p. 43). It certainly is not likely, though possible, that Aristotle would have identified monarchy and tyranny, considering the treatment of them which he adopts in the Politics, and that he has already subdivided μοναρχία into βασιλεία and τυραννίς in § 4. Consequently, it appears that this division was adhered to in § 5, and something to represent the τέλος of βασιλεία has been lost.

§ 6. On this kind of ἔθη, one of the three by which an ethical character is conveyed to the speech, and which is employed as an indirect argument or means of persuasion, see Introduction on this passage, p. 182, and on the ἔθη in general, p. 110 seq.

The spirit and tone of the speech, and the expressions employed, must be in conformity with the national character of the audience, as determined by the end of their special form of government; a democratical tone and language must not be adopted in addressing an oligarchical audience, and *vice versa*.

<sup>1</sup> It is Brandis' 'Anonymus.' See his paper in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, iv i p. 43.

ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἠθικοῦ (τῷ γὰρ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα πιστεύομεν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἂν ἀγαθὸς φαίνεται ἢ εὖνους ἢ ἄμφω), δέοι ἂν τὰ ἥθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστης ἥθος πιθανώτατον ἀνάγκη πρὸς ἐκάστην εἶναι. ταῦτα δὲ <sup>p. 19.</sup> ληφθήσεται διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἥθη φανερά κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀναφέρεται πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

- 7 ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι προτρέποντας ὡς ἐσομένων ἢ ὄντων, καὶ ἐκ τίνων δεῖ τὰς περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος πίστεις λαμβάνειν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἡθῶν καὶ νομίμων διὰ τίνων τε καὶ πῶς εὐπορήσομεν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ σύμμετρον, εἴρηται· διηκρίβωται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς περὶ τούτων.

ταῦτα δὲ ληφθήσεται κ.τ.λ.] These 'political characters', he says, 'will be found by the same means', by the same kind of observation and study, as the other ἥθη, the individual characters: 'in both, the characters are manifested in the choice or purpose<sup>1</sup>, which is always directed to the end (which we desire to attain)'. As the individual character is shewn by the purpose or intention of every act, so the national character of the people, as a body, is manifested in *their* choice and purpose, which is directed to the general end, aim, and object, or the general pervading *principle*, of the state and its institutions: it is this common view and purpose which gives them their *national* character; and to this the speech must conform in order to be acceptable.

§ 7 gives a summary of the contents of the first division of the analysis of the three kinds of Rhetoric, the deliberative. 'We have treated of the general objects of the public speaker's aims and efforts, viz. of what is good or expedient in itself, and in relation to something else; and the topics from which arguments may be drawn on these subjects (in cc. 4—7); and we have further pointed out the channels and modes (διὰ τίνων καὶ πῶς) by which we may supply ourselves with materials for the treatment of the characters and institutions of the various forms of government; but only so far as was (commensurate with) suitable to the present occasion, because (γὰρ) exact detail (is not required here, and) is to be found (if required) in the Politics'.

<sup>1</sup> ἥθη φανερά κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. Rhet. II 21. 16, ἥθος δ' ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, (ἐν οἷς δὲ) ἡ προαίρεσις. Poet. VI. 24, ἔστι δὲ ἥθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποια τις· διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἥθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μὴδ' ὅλως ἔστιν ὃ τι προαίρεται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων. Schrader.

1     μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας CHAP. IX.  
καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὗτοι γὰρ σκοποὶ τῷ ἐπαι-  
νούντι καὶ ψέγοντι· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τού-  
των λέγοντας κακεῖνα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοὶ τινες ὑπο-  
ληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ  
τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνη-  
2     σόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαίνει καὶ

## CHAP. IX.

The following passage of Cicero, de Or. II 84. 342, will serve as a commentary on the treatment of 'good' and 'virtue' in this chapter and c. 6 ; and also on the distinction of virtues in respect of their utility, § 6 :

*Perspicuum est igitur alia esse in homine optanda, alia laudanda. Genus, forma, vires, opes, divitiae, ceteraque quae fortuna dat aut extrinsecus aut corpori, non habent in se veram laudem, quae deberi virtuti uni putatur; sed tamen quod ipsa virtus in earum rerum usu ac moderatione maxime cernitur, tractanda in laudationibus etiam haec sunt naturae et fortunae bona: [this is illustrated.] Virtus autem, quae per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudari potest, tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliae virtutes quae videntur in moribus hominum et quadam comitate ac beneficentia posita; aliae quae in ingenii aliqua facultate aut animi magnitudine et robore. Nam clementia, iustitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis communibus iucunda est auditu in laudationibus; omnes enim hae virtutes non tam ipsis qui eas habent quam generi hominum fructuosae putantur.*

§ 1. The subject of this chapter is the analysis of virtue and vice, the noble and disgraceful, moral right and wrong, as the objects of praise and blame, and therefore furnishing materials for the epideictic or encomiastic branch of Rhetoric, of which praise and blame are the characteristic functions.

We may also derive from this analysis topics of the ἦθος, characters or dispositions which serve to give the speech an ethical colour. This is to be effected by producing *by the speech* (artistically, not by any evidence of character previously acquired, 'authority') the impression upon the audience of our truthfulness and probity ; of our practical wisdom which will enable us to give them useful advice, and finally of our goodwill towards themselves ; this being 'the second mode of persuading' (ἦν 'was said', cf. c. 2 §§ 3, 4) : because the same materials can be employed in representing ourselves as well as others as 'trustworthy in respect of virtue', as men of such a character as can be depended upon.

§ 2 marks a division of panegyrics, the ordinary subjects of the ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος of Rhetoric. A panegyric may be written and delivered 'with or without a serious purpose (σπουδῇ)'; the latter are burlesques. On these, and the subjects of encomiastic speeches in general, see Introd. p. 121—123. In the burlesque kind, anything

χωρὶς σπουδῆς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐπαινεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸ τυχόν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς προτάσεις, ὥστε ὅσον παραδείγματος χάριν εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτων.

- 3 καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ὄν ἐπαινετὸν ἦ, ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὄν ἡδύ ἦ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν 4 εἶναι· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὄν ἐπαινετὸν ἐστίν. ἀρετὴ δ' ἐστὶ

however mean and trifling, 'inanimate things, or any insignificant animal', may be made the object of the panegyric. But as the materials, the topics which furnish the arguments, are the same in both, we may include the burlesque with the serious in our treatment of them in the way of examples or illustrations.

ἄψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸ τυχόν] Thus Polycrates, the Sophist, wrote in praise of pots, and pebbles, and mice (see note on II 24. 2); and others on humble-bees and salt (Isocr. Hel. § 12). As an extant specimen of these trifling productions we have the *μνίας ἐγκώμιον* of Lucian (cf. note on Isocr. Paneg. § 189). S.]

§ 3. καλόν] See note on c. 7, 24. Eth. Eudem. VII 15. 3, τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων γέλη ἐστίν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἰρετά. τούτων δὲ καλὰ ὅσα δι' αὐτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετά ἐστίν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐφ' ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά, δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις κ.τ.λ. It has either a moral aspect (marked by the characteristic ἐπαινετόν; on praise and blame, approbation and disapprobation, as characteristic of virtue and vice, see Introd. on ἔπαινος, Append. B, p. 212, seq.), what is right and noble, an end in itself, δι' αὐτό; or is physical and sensual, what is beautiful, in which pleasure always accompanies that which is otherwise good. The ugly may be good in the sense of useful, but gives no pleasure.

Virtue therefore must of necessity be καλόν, because it comes under the first definition of it, it is good in itself, beneficial to the individual and to society, and also has the stamp and seal of general 'approbation'.

§ 4. ἀρετῇ] The definition of virtue here given compared with the celebrated one of Eth. Nic. II 6, init., and the detailed treatment of the list of virtues and the meagre and incomplete account here given of them, contrasted with the elaborate and ingenious analysis of them in the third and fourth books of the same work, is a most striking illustration of the difference between the point of view and method of treatment in the popular Rhetoric and comparatively scientific Ethics. For example, the definition here given coincides in no single point with that of the Ethics. It regards virtue solely on the side of its usefulness, probably because this feature of it is likely to produce the greatest effect upon the popular mind. Instead of a *ἔξις* it is a mere *δύναμις*, an undeveloped faculty or power—this is most expressly denied in Eth. N. II 4, 1106 a 5,

μὲν δύνάμεις, ὡς δοκεῖ, ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακ-  
 τικὴ, καὶ δύνάμεις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων,  
 5 καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα. μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη,  
 ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία,  
 6 ἐλευθεριότης, πραότης, φρόνησις, σοφία, ἀνάγκη

—the *προαίρεσις*, the special moral element is omitted, as is also the doctrine of the mean in its application to virtue, and the standard by which this relative mean is to be determined.

Regarded as a δύνάμις, virtue is a practical faculty, employed in 'providing and securing or keeping good things'—for oneself, apparently, by the exercise of any ἀρετή, excellence or accomplishment bodily or mental—and secondly, 'a power of conferring benefits, or doing services, many and great, in fact *all in everything* (on all occasions)'. πάντων περὶ πάντα is doubtless, as Victorius intimates, a proverbial expression, more especially as it is found in a letter of Cicero to Cassius (ad Div. XV 17. 1, *sed expecta πάντα περὶ πάντων*<sup>1</sup>). This is the moral side of virtue so far as it appears in its usefulness to society.

§ 5. μέρη ἀρετῆς] Comp. 5 § 9. The list of virtues here given differs from that in the Nic. Ethics II 7, and III 9—IV 15, in the following particulars. All the moral virtues from δικαιοσύνη to πραότης inclusive appear in the Ethics, δικαιοσύνη being treated separately in Bk. v, and the two intellectual virtues of the speculative and practical parts of the intellect, φρόνησις practical wisdom, and σοφία speculative wisdom or philosophy, in Bk. vi. σοφία is omitted in the detailed explanation of the virtues, most likely because it has very little in common with Rhetoric, and would be useless to the rhetorician. πραότης, which in the Ethics is ranked, as well as here, amongst the virtues, which are there ἑξέεις, here δυνάμεις, in the second book of the Rhetoric becomes a πάθος, so that it belongs to all the three divisions of our moral nature distinguished in Eth. Nic. II 4. The anonymous mean between φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία is omitted in our list, as well as the three social virtues of an accomplished gentleman, viz. ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπέλεια, and φιλία, and also the two virtues of the πάθος, viz. αἰδώς and νέμεισις. No notice is taken here of ἐγκράτεια, the examination of which occupies the earlier part of Bk. vii, but this perhaps may be considered as an additional argument in favour of ascribing that book to Eudæmus, which on all grounds is most probable.

§ 6. The most useful virtues are the highest and greatest, by the foregoing definition. Of these, justice and courage, the one most serviceable in peace, the other in war, are for this reason most held in honour amongst mankind: and in the next degree liberality, because it is lavish, and does not enter into competition with others (ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι) for money, which everybody else covets more than anything besides.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero has altered the form and the application of the proverb. In the text it means 'all kinds on all occasions', in Cicero it is 'all the news about everything'.

δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις. εἴτα ἡ ἐλευθεριότης· προΐενται γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ἅν p. 30.  
7 μάλιστα ἐφίενται ἄλλοι. ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος, ἀδικία δὲ δι' ἣν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος. ἀνδρία δὲ δι' ἣν πρακτικοὶ εἰσι τῶν καλῶν

§ 7. Justice is the virtue which assigns to every one his due, and in this shews obedience to the law. This virtue and the two following, which are all specially characterised by 'obedience to the law', are thereby invested with a *political* and objective character, and distinguished from the remainder, which are rather subjective and individual. The end and object of the true statesman is to make the citizens good, and this must be effected by training them in obedience to the laws of that form of government under which they live; the type of the perfect citizen varying under various constitutions. *δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός περὶ ταύτην (τὴν ἀρετὴν) μάλιστα πεπονήσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοῖς πολίταις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους.* Eth. N. I 13, sub init.

ὡς ὁ νόμος] sc. λέγει, κελεύει, προστάττει; i.e. the law settles the legal rights of the citizens of a state, the observance of which is justice. Injustice is the cause of unfair distribution, to injustice it is owing that men take what does not belong to them, τὰ ἀλλότρια, and thus it acts or operates in disobedience to the law. Of the three kinds of justice distinguished in Eth. N. VI, this takes in only the first, δικαιοσύνη διανεμητική, c. 6; the other two are (1) διορθωτική or ἐπαπορθωτική 'corrective' justice, which ratifies and corrects wrong, and restores plaintiff and defendant to an equality, c. 7; and (2) reciprocal justice, τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός the *lex talionis*, the law of retaliation or reciprocity transferred to commercial justice, which regulates exchanges and contracts of all kinds, c. 8.

§ 8. ἀνδρία] In the chapter on this virtue of 'gratitude' in the Nic. Ethics, III 11, ἀνδρία (as it is there written) is first defined in general terms as a virtue residing in a mean state in things that inspire confidence, or encouragement, or boldness, τὰ θαρραλέα, on the one hand, and fear on the other: its sole object and aim in choosing a course of action and encountering danger being τὸ καλόν, the right and noble as an ultimate end, because it is so, and for no other reason; which implies also the opposite, the spurning of what is base and disgraceful. This is the general notion of fortitude, the endurance of pain, labour, danger, in the pursuit of an unselfish, honourable, high and noble object, when the opposite course would be base, mean, disgraceful<sup>1</sup>. From this are

<sup>1</sup> Acts of fortitude must likewise be deliberate and voluntary, θεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν (1116 b 2).

ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ  
 9 ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ· δειλία δὲ τούναντίον. σωφρο-  
 σύνη δὲ ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώμα-  
 τος οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ  
 10 τούναντίον. ἐλευθεριότης δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὐποιοι-

then distinguished five popular notions of 'courage', *ἀνδρεία* in a narrower sense, none of which can be properly called 'fortitude'. The first of these is *political courage*, the courage of a citizen, as a member of a state, and living under and directed by its laws, described in 1116 a 17—δ 2. And this seems to be the view of courage which is taken here, the terms employed in each corresponding very closely, δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους (this restricts the virtue to facing *danger* and gives it a narrower sense than 'fortitude') οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνειδῆ καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς, a 18. δι' αἰδῶ (it is due to a sense of honour) καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὀρεξιν, τιμῆς γάρ, καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος, a 28. Further, one of the characteristics of this form of *ἀνδρεία* reappears in Eth. Eudem. III 1. 13, as belonging to political courage, μία μὲν πολιτικὴ αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δι' αἰδῶ ὄψα, and another § 16, διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία. The prominence of the military character of this virtue is likewise marked in the description both of the Ethics and Rhetoric by ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους in the one, and by ἔργων ἐν κινδύνοις § 8, and ἡ...ἐν πολέμῳ § 6, in the other; so that it seems that there is sufficient warrant for the identification of the two; the duty to the state and obedience to its laws being again made the ground of the obligation to practise this virtue.

§ 9. The third virtue, *σωφροσύνη*, *temperantia*, is likewise represented under a *political* aspect. It is a virtue by which men's bodily appetites are regulated according to the dictates of the laws of the state, 'are so disposed towards bodily pleasures as the law enjoins'. In Eth. Nic. III cc. 13, 14, there is no regular definition of it; but we gather from the contents of the two chapters that it is a virtue of self-control, which consists in a mean state with regard to the indulgence in bodily pleasures, (pains having less to do with the virtue); and in a due *measure* or estimate of the value of them. It is thus a 'mean' between *ἀκολασία*, 'excessive indulgence in them', and *ἀναισθησία*, total 'insensibility'. II 7, 1107 δ 4.

- § 10. *ἐλευθεριότης*] The principal difference between the views taken of the virtues in the Ethics and Rhetoric respectively, is that in the latter they are regarded solely on the side of their utility to society—a political view—in the Ethics they are confirmed habits or states resulting from a due regulation of the elementary *πάθη* out of which they are formed and developed. They are 'relative means', *μεσότητες πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, mean states varying in individuals according to the special character of each, lying at a variable distance between two extremes of the *πάθη* out of which they grow, the proper mean in any given case being determined by the *φρόνησις* or practical wisdom, the objective standard being the collective judgment of those who are specially endowed with this faculty, the *φρόνιμοι*. Consequently here 'liberality' in expense is represented as a dis-

- 11 τική, ἀνελευθερία δὲ τούναντίον. μεγαλοψυχία δὲ  
ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων, μικροψυχία  
12 δὲ τούναντίον. μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανή-  
μασι μεγέθους ποιητικὴ, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικρο-  
13 πρέπεια τάναντία. φρόνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας,  
position or habit inclined to do good, to make oneself useful in dealing  
with money.

§ 11. *μεγαλοψυχία* 'high-mindedness' is represented in the same way as the preceding, as a virtue which is 'productive of benefits', shews its utility, 'on a large scale'; to which 'little-mindedness', meanness of spirit, is the opposite. This is a very different and much narrower view of the virtue than that which is conveyed by the description of it in Nic. Eth. IV 7—9, which is summed up in the brief phrase at the end of c. 9, *ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ μεγάλη*, and defined c. 7, 1123 b 2, *δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλοψυχὸς εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων ἄξιος εἶναι*. The *μεγαλόψυχος* of the Ethics is a man of high aims and lofty spirit, full of scorn and contempt for all that is beneath him, men and things, and with a pride which is justified by his deserts: pride without merits to support it is no longer proper pride, a virtue; but degenerates into vanity *χανρότης*, an undue sense of one's own merits.

*μικροψυχία δὲ τούναντίον* is put in brackets by the recent Edd. as a gloss. It certainly seems to be superfluous, as it is repeated in the following sentence; and also if it be retained, *μικροπρέπεια* and *μικροψυχία* are *δοκῇ* contrasted as opposites with *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, which in the latter case is certainly incorrect. At the same time if the words are omitted the repetition of *ἀρετὴ* is quite equally objectionable.

§ 12. *μεγαλοπρέπεια* 'magnificence' in expenditure, is distinguished from 'liberality' merely by this, that whereas the one is *περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρημασὶ πράξεις* (every kind of money transactions), magnificence is *περὶ δαπανηρὰς μόνον*, 'those alone in which a large cost is involved'. Eth. N. IV 4, sub init. It is only to men distinguished either by birth or reputation, or anything else that confers distinction, that this virtue is suitable—in others it is no virtue at all, 1122 b 30. Plato and his *dramatis personae* sometimes add *μεγαλοπρέπεια* to the four cardinal virtues, the classification which he usually adopts. Meno 74 A, 88 A. Rep. II 402 C, VI 490 E, 494 B, VII 536 A, VIII 560 E. It does not, however, exactly correspond with Aristotle's interpretation, but has a wider and more general signification. See Rep. VI 486 A, where it is applied to the *διάνοια*. It seems from the definition, (*ὅροι*, 412 E, *ἀξίωσις κατὰ λογισμὸν ὁρθὸν τὸν σεμνότεστον*), to be a nearer approach to Aristotle's *μεγαλοψυχία*.

§ 13. *φρόνησις* appears much in the same character here as in Eth. Nic. VI 5—9, where it is analysed at length. It is 'practical wisdom which shews itself in the discrimination between good and evil, and particularly moral good and evil, in general, *δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ εἶναι*, 1140 a 25. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλῆς καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ



καθ' ἣν εὖ βουλευέσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

- 14 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων εἴρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἱκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν· φανερόν γάρ

καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν εἶναι δὲ τοιοῦτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς, Ib. 1140 b 7. ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστίν καὶ οὐ τέχνη, b 24. δυοῖν δ' ὄντων μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἔχοντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετὴ, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ (or τοῦ λογιστικοῦ, i.e. the διάνοια or reasoning faculty, the discursive reason, as opposed to the νοῦς, the speculative, intuitive reason, the organ of the other intellectual virtue σοφία): ἡ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις, b 25. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ, c. 8, 1141 b 31. τῶν καθ' ἑκαστὰ ἐστίν ἡ φρόνησις, ἀ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, c. 9, 1142 a 14.

§ 14. τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν] 'the present (*instant*) time'. ἐνιστάμαι, 'to place in' a position: ἐνιστάσθαι, ἐνστήναι, ἐνιστηνέαι, ἐνεστάναι, 'to be placed, set in, stand in', a position. Hence (2) (I think) of things 'standing in the way', and so either (α) close by, 'present', 'instant', '*instans*' (*tempus, bellum*, &c.), 'impending', 'threatening'; (for *instans*, 'present', Quint. v 10. 42, *praeteritum, instans, futurum*). In grammar, ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, 'the present tense', ἐνεστῶσα μετοχή, 'the present participle', *instans tempus* (Facc. Lex. s. v.); or (β) 'to stand in the way' as an obstacle, impediment, or 'objection'; as the logical ἐνστήναι καὶ ἐνστασις, of an objection, or contrary instance, to a supposed conclusion; and hence also 'instance', something which stands in your way and so possibly attracts your attention, or as a generalisation of the logical 'instance' or objection. See Introd. p. 269, and note.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων] 'The rest are easily discerned'—'the rest' are what follows, the causes namely and consequences of virtue—'anything that is productive of, because it tends to or promotes (*πρός*), virtue, or that is the effect or result of it (τὰ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς γινόμενα), is estimable and an object of *praise* (καλόν). Such things are (the first) the 'signs', (the second) the works of virtue (and *therefore* praiseworthy). The σημεῖον (Introd. p. 161—163) is the *probable*—or, in the case of the τεκμήριον, *certain*—indication of the existence of the thing which it accompanies; from the 'signs' of virtue in a man we infer, with more or less probability, its actual existence. Schrader quotes the little tract περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν, printed as an appendix to the three Ethical treatises in Bekker's 4to ed. Vol. II p. 1249. It is an abridgment or epitome of Aristotle's account of the virtues in the third and fourth books of the Ethics, with a slight admixture of Platonism and other occasional alterations. ἐπαινετὰ μὲν ἐστί τὰ καλὰ, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ αἰσχροῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡγούνται αἱ ἀρεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχροῦ αἱ κακίαι. ἐπαινετὰ δ' ἐστί καὶ τὰ αἴτια τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς (these are the τὰ ποιητικά τῆς ἀρετῆς and 'signs'), καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, 1249 a 26.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων...ἰδεῖν] for the more usual τὰ ἄλλα ἰδεῖν. This substitution of a preposition with its case for the direct government of the

ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὰ τε ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καλὰ  
(πρὸς ἀρετὴν γάρ) καὶ τὰ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς γινόμενα,  
τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ τε σημεῖα τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὰ ἔργα.  
15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἂ ἔστιν ἀγαθοῦ

verb, has been noticed by Heindorf in the case of *eis*, on Plat. Lys. § 16, and in that of *περί* and *ἀμφί*, on Phaedo § 65, p. 250 C (in which place *περί* *κάλους* takes the place of the *nominative*); likewise of *περί* and *ὑπέρ* by Bremi on Dem. Olynth. I p. 14. 18 (ap. Schäfer *Appar. Crit. ad Demosth.* I 208); and a similar use of the Latin, &c. by Heusing, ad Cic. de Off. I 15. 3. Comp. Epist. ad Div. II 17. 1; III 12. 2 (Schäfer). But what has not been observed of this usage is, that it is almost exclusively *characteristic of a middle or later period of the Greek language*, viz. the fourth century B. C.

The earliest instances I have noted of it are Soph. Oed. Col. 422, *ἐν δέ μοι τέλος αὐτοῖν γένοιτο τῆσδε τῆς μάχης πέρι*, and Aj. 684, *ἀμφὶ τοῖτοισιν εὖ σχήσει*. In Plato it is not uncommon, Phaedo 231 D, *βούλεσθαι περί τινος*, Rep. IV 427 A, *εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας* (a good example), Ib. 436 B, *καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πρίττομεν*, Phaedo 249 C (this use of *καθ' ἕκαστον* for the simple accusative is found in various writers; see Stallbaum on Rep. II. cc.), Ib. VII 533 B, *περί παντὸς λαμβάνειν*, Theaet. 177 B, Gorg. 487 A. But in Demosthenes and Aristotle it becomes quite a usual mode of expression. In the *de Fals. Leg.* alone it occurs in §§ 6, 7, 64, 167, 239, and probably elsewhere in the same speech.

From Aristotle, with whom it is still more familiar, I will content myself with referring to Rhet. I 15. 1, *περί τῶν ἀτέχνων...ἐπιδραμεῖν*, Ib. § 27, *περί ὀρκῶν...διελείν*. II 4. 30; 5. 21, *τοιούτους περί ὧν* (i. e. οὓς) *φοβούνται*, a good example. 18. 4, *περί μεγέθους* (i. e. *μέγεθος*) *κοινόν* (ἔστι), Ib. 21, init., in both of which it stands for the *nominative*, as it does also in Pol. VI (IV) 2, 1289 a 11, and III 3, init. Pol. I 1 ult. I 9, 1257 a 5, II 1 init., Ib. c. 4, 1262 b 25, *περί τοῦ μεταφέρειν—πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν*. Eth. N. IV 4 init., *περί μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν*, X 1 sub init., 1172 a 26, *ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων—παρετόν εἶναι*, where it stands for the *accusative*. de Insomniis c. 2, 459 a 29, *ἐπὶ τῶν φερομένων—κινεῖται*, would be more regularly *τὰ φερόμενα*.

§ 15. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα κ.τ.λ.] An exemplification of the preceding rule, and application of it to the special virtues. 'Seeing that the signs of virtue, and all such things as are works (results, effects), or affections' (properties, qualities, attributes—on *πάθη* and its various senses see Introd. pp. 113—118; on the special sense here, p. 114) 'of it are καλὰ', the same rule will apply to each special manifestation of it, as *ἀνδρία*. The *πάθη* of virtue are illustrated in the examples by *ἀνδρείως*, *δικαίως*, *ἀδίκως*: these are *πάθη*, 'affections', of courage, justice, and injustice, in the sense of 'what happens to them', some change they have undergone, consisting in a modification of them in form and signification; as *δικαίως* 'justly', denotes a certain *mode of action*, viz. *just* acting. An exception occurs to the general application of the rule to the special virtues in the case of *δικαιοσύνη*: in this alone, though it is true of the *ἔργα*, it is not true of the *πάθη*: in other words, in the rest of the virtues the *πάθη* are

ἔργα ἢ πάθη, καλά, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε ἀνδρίας ἔργα ἢ  
σημεῖα ἀνδρίας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρακται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ  
τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα (πάθη δὲ οὐ· ἐν μόνῃ  
γὰρ ταύτῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν,  
ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦσθαι αἰσχροὺν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον  
ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως), καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἀρετὰς ὡσαύτως.  
16 καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις τὰ ἄθλα τιμῇ, καλὰ. καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις

σύστοιχα, the changes of termination represent true co-ordinates, all being terms referable to the same notion or class, viz. that of virtue, as ἀνδρία, ἀνδρείος, ἀνδρείως: all are equally καλὰ and praiseworthy (see note on c. 7. 27); but in the single case of justice this does not universally apply, for τὸ δικαίως ζημιοῦσθαι, just (deserved) punishment, is not equally praiseworthy with a just act, τὸ δικαίως πράττειν, but the contrary; since it is more disgraceful than an *unjust* punishment. (This seems to be a mere fallacy of ὁμωνυμία, ambiguity, *equivocation*, δικαίως not standing in the same relation to ζημιοῦσθαι and πράττειν: in the one case the 'justice' of the act lies in the intention of the actor; in the other it belongs not to the actor, but to the law and the judge who inflicts the punishment. A similar equivocal meaning lies in the word πάθος: in the rule and the general application of it, it stands for properties or attributes: in the special exception it denotes an 'affection' in the sense of suffering or punishment.)

§ 16. ἐφ' ὅσοις τὰ ἄθλα τιμῇ, καλὰ] The καλόν is an end in itself; it is independent of all ulterior considerations and aims: therefore any act of which honour alone, and not profit (ἐφ' ὅσοις τιμῇ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα) is the prize, is καλόν: the prize aimed at, or the *end* of the exertions and efforts, determines the character of those efforts or actions, which are therefore fair and noble like the end at which they aim. τιμῇ is an end of this kind. Eth. N. I 4, 1096 b 16, καθ' αὐτὰ (ἀγαθὰ) δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ (are they not?) ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. c. 3, 1095 b 22, τιμῇ is the end of the πολιτικός βίος, pursued by the *χαρίεντες* καὶ *πρακτικοί*, v. 30, δῆλον οὖν κατὰ γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. In IV 7—10, τιμῇ is represented as the end of the μεγαλόψυχοι and φιλότιμοι, the sphere in which these two virtues are exercised. c. 7, 1123 b 18, μέγιστον δὲ τούτ' ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμεμεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀζώωmati, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμῇ.

καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα κ.τ.λ.] The general characteristic of all the following topics (to § 19) is disinterestedness; *unselfish* acts, of which the object is the good of some one else, and not one's own. Any act of this kind, where there is no *ulterior end* of profit or advantage to oneself, which is done therefore for its own sake, and 'because it is in itself desirable', conforms to the definition, § 3, and is καλόν. So the highest and purest form of friendship or love is distinguished from the two lower forms, those whose end is profit and pleasure. Both of these are selfish; true

τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα. καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα  
17 πράττει τις τῶν αἰρετῶν. καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, ὅσα  
ὑπὲρ τε πατρίδος τις ἐποίησε, παριδὼν τὸ αὐτοῦ.  
καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ, καὶ ἃ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ. αὐτοῦ P. 1367.

friendship is disinterested, *οἱ βουλόμενοι τὰγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι*, Eth. N. VIII 4 init.; and the true friend is *ἕτερος αὐτός*, IX 9 init. and Ib. 1170 b 6, or *ἄλλος αὐτός*, c. 4, 1165 a 31, 'a second self' (not one's own self) *alter ego*. And on the other hand, *ἐπιτιμῶσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι*, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχροῖ φιλᾶντοὺς ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ μοχθηρότερος ἢ τοσοῦτ' ἄλλων' ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, κ.τ.λ. IX 8, init. And in the Politics, III 7, the distinction of the two classes of government, normal and abnormal, *ὀρθαί* and *παρεκβάσεις* (deviations from the true standard), is determined by the *end* of each, according as it is τὸ κοινόν or τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον: the public interest of others, or the private interest of the governors themselves, one or several; in other words, it is determined by the selfishness or disinterestedness of the governing powers of the state.

§ 17. ὅσα ὑπὲρ τε—τὸ αὐτοῦ] This clause seems certainly out of place here, though Schrader defends it as an example of τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ. 'Qui enim ut patriam iuvet commoda sua negligit, is bonum simpliciter praeferit illi quod *huic* bonum foret': that is, he prefers *general* to special or particular good, (his own). But this does not account for the *τε*, which if the words are retained in the received order is as superfluous as it is inexplicable. The sense would be improved and the particle accounted for by transferring the clause so as to follow τὰ τοιαῦτα (§ 17 ad fin.) The passage will then run thus: 'and all absolute (or general, see note on ἀπλῶς, c. 2 § 4) goods: and all natural goods (things which are naturally good, in themselves, and so good for all) and (therefore, or καί, 'that is') things which are *not* (specially and particularly) good to oneself (αὐτῷ), appropriated to particular individuals, because such things (things that are thus special and particular, and not common to others) carry with them the notion of selfishness or self-interest'. Here the clause comes in as the first example—'anything, namely, which a man does *either* (τε) for his country, to the neglect of his own interest, *or* (καί) anything that a dead man may have the benefit of, rather than one who is living (such as posthumous fame, funeral orations, monuments to his memory); because such honours paid (or advantages accruing) to a man while he is alive, involve or imply more self-interest', and are therefore less καλά.

τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ] 'Talía sunt quae absolute, citra respectum ad hunc hominem, locum, tempusve bona sunt. Unde τῷ ἀπλῶς, *illi quod simpliciter tale* dicitur, opponuntur τὰ αὐτῷ Rhet. I 7. 35, et III 13. 4, τὰ τοῦτοις III 19. 1, τὰ τινί Top. III 1 (116 a 21), τὰ ἡμῖν Magn. Mor. I 1, τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα de Gen. An. VII (sic); τὰ πῇ, ποῦ, ποτέ, πρὸς τι, de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 22.' Schrader. Add ἡ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις, Eth. N. I 11, 1101 b 3. οὐδὲ δ' ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς, Ib. II 4, 1106 a 1.

καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ] Comip. 7. 33, τὸ αὐτοφύει. 'Sunt profecto laudationibus minime incongruentes materiae, genus, parentes, patria, pul-

18 γὰρ ἔνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ὅσα τεθνεῶτι ἐνδέχεται p. 31.  
 ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα  
 19 μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζῶντι. καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων  
 ἔνεκα. ἦττον γὰρ αὐτοῦ. καὶ ὅσαι εὐπραγίαι περὶ  
 ἄλλους, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ αὐτόν. καὶ περὶ τοὺς εὖ ποιή-  
 σαντας· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ τὰ εὐεργετήματα· οὐ γὰρ  
 20 εἰς αὐτόν. καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνονται· τὰ  
 γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχύνονται καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦν-  
 τες καὶ μέλλοντες, ὥσπερ καὶ Σαπφῶ πεποίηκεν,  
 εἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀλκαίου

critudo, ingenii acumen, solertia, docilitas, tenax memoria, ingenua animi magnitudo, et quae a natura proveniunt bona alia.' Schrader.

αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ] 'good for him', that is, for this or that individual. See note on c. 7. 35, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and Schrader (quoted above on τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ).

§ 19. τὰ εὐεργετήματα] 'any benefits conferred', because they are necessarily conferred on others, and therefore, so far, more praiseworthy than acquisitions. These are distinguished from εὐπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους (*ante*), which are 'any good and noble deeds done in the service of others, and not for oneself', for the same reason as the preceding. Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1163 a 1, καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπᾶθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετῆσθαι.

§ 20. τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ κ.τ.λ.] 'for shameful things we are all ashamed of, when we say, do, or are intending to do them'. Sappho's verses, for instance, in answer to Alcaeus,—'something I would say, but shame prevents me'—she infers from this that it was something to be ashamed of, αἰσχροῦν, and replies, 'Hadst thou yearned after things good or fair, and had not thy tongue stirred up mischief to utter it, shame had not possessed thine eyes, but thou wouldst have spoken of the thing that is right'. The third line in particular of this Alcaic stanza requires correction, and there is not much help to be derived from the Aristotelian MSS. In the first, Blomfield, *Mus. Crit.* I p. 17, reads *ἴκε τ' εὐλῶν*: and Hermann (much better), *El. Metr. Gr.* III 16, de stroph. min. *ἴκε σ'* ('reached thee', the Homeric *ἴκειν*), from the reading *ἴκες* of one MS. Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr.* p. 607, follows MS A<sup>c</sup> in reading *ἦχε* and the Aeolic *ἔσλῶν*. The third line, which in the MSS appears as *αἰδῶς κέν σε οὐκ εἶχεν ὄμματ'*, without *varia lectio*, is written by Blomfield, u. s., *αἰδῶς κεν οὐχί τ' ὄππατ' εἶχεν*: by Hermann, *αἰδῶς κέ τευς οὐκ εἶχεν ὄππατ'*: and by Bergk, *αἰδῶς κε σ' οὐκ ἂν ἦχεν ὄππατ'* (surely *κε* and *ἂν* thus repeated in different forms and almost immediate juxtaposition is indefensible): none of these seems to be satisfactory, but I have nothing better to suggest. [In Bergk's 2nd ed. p. 674 the fragment is printed as follows: *αἰ δ' ἦχε ἔσλων ἡμερον ἢ κάλων, | καὶ μὴ τι φείπων γλῶσσ' ἐκύκα κάκων, | αἰδῶς κέ σ' οὐ κίχεν ὄμματ', | ἀλλ' ἔλεγες περὶ τῷ δικαίως.* S.]

The fact that the eye is the principal organ of the *manifestation* of

θέλω τι φειπῆν, ἀλλά με κωλύει  
αἰδώς,  
αἱ δ' εἶχες ἐσθλῶν ἥμερον ἢ καλῶν  
καὶ μή τι φειπῆν γλῶσσ' ἐκύκα κακόν,  
αἰδώς κέ σ' οὐκ ἂν εἶχεν ὄμματ',  
ἀλλ' ἔλεγες περὶ τῷ δικαίῳ.

21 καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι· περὶ γὰρ τῶν  
22 πρὸς δόξαν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν. καὶ  
αἱ τῶν φύσει σπουδαιοτέρων ἀρεταὶ καλλίους καὶ  
23 τὰ ἔργα, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναικός. καὶ αἱ ἀπολαυσ-  
τικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοῖς· διὸ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ  
24 ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλόν. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμω-

some of the feelings or emotions, as love, shame, fear, is here, as often elsewhere, expressed poetically by the phrase that 'shame has its seat in the eye'. Compare the proverb in II 6. 18, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ, where see note.

§ 21. καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι] 'and things about which we are excessively anxious or distress ourselves, without fear': the acquisition of which causes us a violent mental struggle (ἀγών), distress, or anxiety, 'agony' in our exertions to attain, or in the fear of losing, it. The addition of μὴ φοβούμενοι is made here, because fear is the usual concomitant of the emotion, and generally included in the notion. Probl. II 31, ἡ ὅτι ἀγωνία φόβος τίς ἐστι πρὸς ἀρχὴν ἔργου (Vict.). ἀγωνιᾶν belongs to that class of verbs which imply a diseased state or condition of the mind or body; see note on πνευστιᾶν, I 2. 18.

The anxious feeling is usually excited about the kind of good things that 'tend to our reputation'; and this is why they are praiseworthy.

§ 22. 'The virtues (excellences) and functions of men and things naturally worthier, are nobler and more praiseworthy, as in man than in woman'.

§ 23. αἱ ἀπολαυστικαὶ (ἀρεταί)] 'those which contribute to the gratification or enjoyment of others rather than of ourselves, of which justice is an instance'. ἀπόλαυσις is not here confined to sensual gratification, its proper meaning. In Eth. N. I 3, Σαρδανάπαλος, the type of sensuality, is taken as the representative of the βίος ἀπολαυστικός: note on I 5. 7. Here again it is the unselfishness that is laudable.

§ 24. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον] 'and the heavier vengeance on, punishment of, one's enemies' (μᾶλλον may be either to punish them in a higher degree, the more the better; or as contrasted with καταλάττεσθαι, 'rather than the reverse'), and 'refusing to be reconciled, come to terms, with them'. The reason being, that 'retaliatory' or 'reciprocal justice' (note on § 7) requires this, and therefore it is right, and of course laudable; and also because 'not to be beaten' (an unyielding resolution)

ρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι· τό τε γὰρ  
 ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καλόν, καὶ ἀν-  
 25 δρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν  
 καλῶν· αἰρετά τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα, καὶ ὑπεροχὴν  
 ἀρετῆς δηλοῖ. καὶ τὰ μνημονευτά, καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον  
 μᾶλλον. καὶ ἂ μὴ ζῶντι ἔπεται. καὶ οἷς τιμὴ ἀκο-  
 λουθεῖ. καὶ τὰ περιττά. καὶ τὰ μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα

is a sign of a 'manly character'. Comp. I 6. 26 (ἀγαθὰ) τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακά, and § 29. This was a constant article of the popular morality, and is cited as such here: see, for instance, Xen. Mem. IV 2, 14 seq. Rhet. ad Alex. I (2), 13, 14. Again in Aristotle's Rhet. II 5. 5, Eur. Ion 1045—7, Med. 808, Cic. de Off. I 7. 2.

§ 25. 'Victory and honour are noble and praiseworthy things; for they are desirable though unproductive (see c. 5. 7, note *infra* § 26), and manifest (are signs of) an excess, superiority, higher degree, of virtue', i.e. a higher degree than the virtues which they crown would attain without them: a man may be *good* without them; with them he must be *better*. Comp. Eth. N. IV 8 init. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. Comp. *infra* § 39.

μνημονευτά] 'things to be, capable of being, or that deserve to be, remembered'; as εὐμνημόνευτα (*infra*) is 'easy to be remembered'. μνημονεύματα, which Victorius adopts upon the superior authority of MSS, is *monumenta*, memorials, *elogia*, *et quae memoriam alicuius ornant*. He does not seem to have observed, what Bekker, who prefers the former, doubtless did, though he does not say so, that μᾶλλον can be construed with the adjective μνημονευτά, but hardly, or not so well, with the substantive μνημονεύματα.

ἂ μὴ ζῶντι ἔπεται] 'things that outlast life, that follow a man beyond the grave', as posthumous fame.

οἷς τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ] Honour itself, especially as contrasted with *profit* (*supra* § 16), imparts a praiseworthy character as the prize of action, and is itself καλόν and a thing to be praised (§ 25, *supra*). It must therefore convey this in some measure to everything, particularly actions, by which it is attended upon or accompanied.

τὰ περιττά] (see note on 6. 28) are καλὰ as well as ἀγαθὰ. They are thus illustrated by Schrader. 'Quae aliis sui generis praestant. Gellius I XIII P. Crassus Mucianus traditur quinque habuisse rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua, quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod iuris consultissimus, quod Pontifex Maximus. Velleius (de Pompeio), II 53, Vir in id evectus super quod ascendi non potest.'

τὰ μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα] τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἂ μηδεῖς, 6. 28. The difference between the two lies in this, that the topic of 6. 28 denotes positive good, as excellences, accomplishments, personal or intellectual advantages, which are peculiar to a man, and shared by no one else; here they rather refer to

26 καλλίω· εὐμνημονευτότερα γάρ. καὶ κτήματα ἄκαρπα· ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις δὲ ἴδια καλά, καὶ ὅσα σημεία ἐστὶ τῶν παρ' ἐκάστοις

peculiar actions, or qualities that can be manifested in action, which are more easily remembered, and therefore more the objects of praise, and in this sense καλλίω: ἐκ πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, § 32.

'In bibliotheca, quae prima in urbe ab Asinio Pollione publicata est, unius M. Varronis viventis posita imago est, Plin. VII 30. *L. Metello tribuit populus Romanus quod nunquam ulli alii ab condito aeo ut quoties in senatum iret curru veheretur ad curiam.* Plin. VII 43.' Schrader. I have quoted these instances because from Schrader's point of view they very well illustrate the topic. But I believe they are not exactly what Aristotle had in his mind when he wrote the words. These are not exactly subjects of 'praise', which the topics of this chapter deal with, exclusively or more immediately. τὰ περιττά and τὰ μόνῃ ὑπάρχοντα are to be taken together, the latter being a step higher in degree than the former. τὰ περιττά are distinguished and exceptional (as Schrader puts it) excellences, qualities, achievements. τὰ μόνῃ ὑπάρχοντα are a step beyond, 'unique'.

§ 26. κτήματα ἄκαρπα] note on 5. 7, ἵστι δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον. A pleasure-garden on this principle is a finer thing and more deserving of approbation than a market-garden from which you make a profit. The reason here given for this preference is different to that assigned in Eth. N. IV 9 (quoted in the note referred to). There it is accounted for by the self-sufficiency or independence (αὐτάρκεια) that it implies; here by its being more in accordance with the gentleman's character, in contrast with the vulgarity of trade and money-making.

τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις ἴδια] These are special pursuits, modes of action, manners, and customs cultivated in particular countries, 'national' and 'peculiar to them'. In England, for instance, special skill in cricket and other athletic exercises gains a man applause; in Greece, running, boxing, wrestling, chariot-racing, are the great games. In Europe a man is applauded for his skill in dancing, which the Chinese utterly contemn, and regard as a useless waste of labour. Quint. Inst. Or. III 7. 24, *Minus Lacedaemone studia literarum quam Athenis honoris merebuntur; plus patientia, fortitudo.*

ὅσα σημεία ἐστὶ τῶν παρ' ἐκάστοις ἐπαινουμένων] 'all signs, or distinctive marks, of habits (characters, actions), that are approved in particular countries, as the habit of wearing long hair in Lacedaemon. This is a 'sign' of a gentleman, a character very much approved in that country. It is a sign of this, because with long hair it is difficult to perform any menial task<sup>1</sup>, and therefore the wearing it shews that menial occupations are alien from that character. Gaisford quotes, Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. XI 3, ἐφῆκε δὲ (Lycurgus sc.) καὶ κομῆν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἡλικίαν, νομίζων οὕτω καὶ μείζους ἂν καὶ ἐλευθεριωτέρους καὶ γοργοτέρους φαίνεσθαι. [Aristoph. Aves, 1282, ἐλακωνομάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε, ἐκόμωον κ.τ.λ. S.]

<sup>1</sup> οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἐπιτεθεῖσθαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάρυτον η. θητικόν, Pol. III 5, 1278 a 20.



ἐπαινουμένων, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομᾶν καλόν· ἐλευ-  
 θέρου γὰρ σημεῖον· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ κομῶντα ῥάδιον  
 27 οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἔργον θητικόν· καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργά-  
 ζεσθαι βάνανσον τέχνην· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς

θητικόν] Θῆτες, θητεύειν, denote *hired service in agriculture*, but not *slavery*; the θῆς is πῶς δούλος. In this sense both words are used by Homer. The θῆτες formed the fourth and lowest class under the Solonian constitution. At Athens, in Aristotle's time, the θῆτες, τὸ θητικόν (πληθος), still denotes the class of paid *agricultural* labourers, as an order of the state or population; and is expressly distinguished from the βάνανσοι or τεγνῖται, *artisans and petty manufacturers*, who are still *hired labourers*, but work at *mechanical* employments, and in towns, forming with the others the lowest order of the population of the state. In Pol. III 5, βάνανσος and θῆς are several times thus distinguished. It is there said that in some constitutions (such as monarchies and aristocracies) neither of these classes is admitted into the governing body; in oligarchies the θῆς cannot, the βάνανσος can, be a citizen. In the account given, VI (IV) 4, 1291 b 14 seq., of the various kinds of population which form the bases of so many different varieties of democracy, we have in line 25 the term χερνητικόν, of precisely the same import, substituted for θητικόν: the other had been already mentioned. In Pol. VII (VI) 4, 1319 a 27, three classes of these lower orders are distinguished, τὸ πληθος τὸ τε τῶν βαναύσων (artisans) καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων (small tradesmen or retailers, buyers and sellers in the market, VI (IV) 4, 1291 a 4, λέγω δὲ ἀγοραίων τὸ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ὁδὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρίβον), καὶ τὸ θητικόν. Of all these it is said just before, ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς. θητικόν metaph. = δουλικόν, 'servile, menial', occurs again Eth. Nic. IV 8, 1125 i.

§ 27. μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάνανσον τέχνην] This again applies to Lacedaemon: Gaisford quotes Aelian, V. H. VI 6, βάνανσον δὲ εἰδέναι τέχνην ἄνδρα Λακεδαιμόνιον οὐκ ἐξήν. Xen. Oecon. IV 2, καὶ γὰρ αἱ γε βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι καὶ ἐπὶ ῥῆτοί εἰσι καὶ εἰκότως μέντοι πάνν ἀδοξοῦνται πρὸς τῶν πόλεων (add VI 5).

βάνανσον] Of the various kinds of population of a state, enumerated in Pol. VI (IV) 4, the first is the περὶ τὴν τροφήν πληθος, τὸ γεωργικόν: the second, τὸ βάνανσον· ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκείσθαι· τούτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς τροφήν ἢ καλῶς ζῆν, 1291 a 1. So that here the fine arts, as well as the necessary, indispensable, or mechanical arts, are all included in the class βάνανσοι. See on this subject Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* (Cab. Cycl. 2nd. ed.) c. 18, Vol. III p. 64, note. Pol. v (VIII) 2, 1337 b 8 seq., βάνανσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακείσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας· ἀσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινήν. I 11, 1258 b 37, (τῶν ἐργασιῶν) βαναύσισταται ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα. Eth. Eudem. I 4, 1215 a 30, λέγω δὲ

28 ἄλλον ζῆν. ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρ-

βαναύσους (τέχνας) τὰς ἐδραίας καὶ μισθαρνικάς (arts sedentary and mercenary). The ἐδραίας in this last passage explains the *bodily* degradation and injury of the preceding. Comp. Plato, Rep. VII 522 B, IX 590 B, Phileb. 55 C, Theaet. 176 (Heind. note § 85), (Legg. VIII 4, 846 D No native must learn or practise any handicraft. One art is enough for any man; and the natives or citizens must occupy themselves *exclusively* in statecraft or public duties). Arts are inferior in dignity in proportion to their necessity or utility, Arist. Metaph. A 1. Cic. de Off. I 42. 5.

ἐλευθέρου...τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν] 'to live with reference to, dependent upon, at the beck and call of, another'. Independence, αὐτάρκεια, is a characteristic of the ἐλεύθερος, the 'free and independent' citizen. Aristotle is writing at Athens, and for Athenians. So it is said of the μεγαλόψυχος, Eth. N. IV 8, 1124 b 32, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικόν γάρ. Metaph. A 2, 982 b 25, (Vict.) of ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, δηλον ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρεῖαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἑνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὄν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ μόνῃ ἐλευθέρᾳ οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνῃ γάρ αὐτῇ αὐτῆς ἑνεκὴν ἐστίν. Victorius also quotes, in illustration of πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν, Dem. (*pro Ctesiphonte*, as he calls it) de F. Leg. p. 411, τοῖς δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ζῶσι καὶ τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν τιμῆς γλιχομένοις. The import of the phrase is, to look to another in all that you say and do, to direct your life and conduct by the will and pleasure of another; in the relation (πρὸς) of servant or dependent to master.

It is to be observed that the reason here assigned for avoiding all mechanical occupations as disreputable, viz. that it destroys a man's independence, so that he cannot subsist *without looking to others*, places the objection to it upon a different ground to that assigned in the Politics (quoted in the last note), where it is that they disqualify a man for doing his duty to the state.

§ 28. ληπτέον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] 'and we may assume (or represent, substitute one for the other, on occasion) things (qualities, and the terms expressing them) that are very nearly related to the identical, both in commendation and censure, as that the cautious is cold and designing, the simple (simpleton) worthy and amiable, and the insensible mild and calm'. This lays down the general rule, of which the next topic is a special variety, ὑποκορισμός.

Quint. Inst. Orat. III 7. 25. *Idem praecipit* (Aristotle in this place) *illud quoque, quia sit quaedam virtutibus ac vitiis vicinitas, utendum proxima derivatione verborum ut pro temerario fortem, pro prodigo liberalem, pro avaro parcum vocemus: quae eadem etiam contra valent. Quod quidem orator, id est vir bonus, nunquam faciet, nisi forte communis utilitate ducatur.* To the same effect, Cic. Orat. Part XXIII 81 (Schrader). [Liv. XXII 12, (Fabium) *pro cunctatore segnem, pro cauto timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat.* S.]

χρηστός for ἡλίθιος is one of those ironical euphemisms which Plato is so fond of employing; as also are γλυκύς, ἡδύς, and εὐήθης, this last belonging also to the common language. γλυκύς, Hipp. Maj. 288 B; ἡδύς, in several places, Theaet. 209 E, Gorg. 491 E, Rep. I 337 D, VII 527 D, and elsewhere; Lat. *suavis, lepidus*. χρηστός, Phaedr. 264 B, Theaet. 161 A, 166 A, Rep. V 479 A, &c. Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 131. [On εὐήθεια, cf. note on Isocr. Paneg. § 169, and Rep. 400 E, quoted *infra*, p. 175. S.]

χουσιν ὡς ταῦτ' ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἔπαινον καὶ πρὸς  
 ψόγον, οἷον τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον καὶ p. 31.  
 29 τὸν ἡλίθιον χρηστὸν καὶ τὸν ἀνάλητον πρᾶον. καὶ  
 ἕκαστον δ' ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούτων αἰεὶ κατὰ τὸ  
 βέλτιστον, οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἀπλοῦν  
 καὶ τὸν αὐθάδη μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν. καὶ τοὺς P. 1367 i.

§ 29. καὶ ἕκαστον κ.τ.λ.] "and in every case from the accompanying, attendant, qualities (the qualities that come *next*, but always on the higher and better side; on ἀκολουθεῖν and its various senses, see note on c. 6. 3) derive (ἐκ) a term or expression always in the best direction (with the most favourable tendency, *interpretatio in melius*, putting the most favourable construction on the actual facts of the case); call, for instance, the irascible and insane, 'simple and straightforward', and self-will (headstrong, stubborn, obstinate temper; αὐθάδης, one who *pleases himself*, αὐθ-άδης, 'self-pleaser', and *will* have his own way), 'magnificence', or proper pride, and a due sense of dignity (σεμνόν)"<sup>1</sup>.

On ὀργίλος Victorius compares Hor. Sat. I 3. 51, *at est truculentior atque plus aequo liber: simplex fortisque habeatur*, with Cic. de Legg. I 7, *solent enim, id quod virorum bonorum est, admodum irasci*, and therefore an angry temper may be attributed to a virtuous disposition.

μανικός represents an excitable, violent, furious temper, which sometimes almost assumes the appearance of raving madness. In Plato it is applied to Chaerephon, Socrates' intimate (in the Charmides, init.), and to Apollodorus, Symp. 173 D, where it expresses a very impetuous, excitable temperament, inclined to extravagant and violent manifestations in feeling and utterance; which is illustrated by the conduct ascribed to him at Socrates' death, Phaedo 117 D.

On ἀπλοῦς, as expressive of character, see note I 2. 4.

αὐθάδης. In Eth. Eud. II 3, 1221 a 8, III 7, 1233 b 34, σεμνότης, proper pride, the due measure of personal dignity in one's bearing and behaviour to others, πρὸς ἑτερον ζῆν, is a mean between the two extremes, ἀρεσκεία the defect (over-complacency and obsequiousness), and αὐθάδεια the excess (undue contemptuousness καταφρόνησις, and disregard of their feelings and wishes). In the Magn. Mor. I 29, it is likewise the excess of σεμνότης, as ἀρεσκεία is the defect. It is exercised περὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, in the ordinary

<sup>1</sup> It seems to me nearly certain that μεγαλοπρεπῆ is a mistake, either of the author himself or one of his transcribers, for μεγαλόψυχον. The two have already been distinguished in this very chapter, §§ 11, 12, and μεγαλοπρέπεια, when it is distinguished from the other as by Aristotle, and not made to include it as by Plato (see the note on § 12), is altogether unsuitable to express the character of the αὐθάδης, being confined as it is to liberality in bestowing money on a large scale: whereas the virtue of μεγαλόψυχία is precisely what αὐθάδεια might be represented to be by the figure ὑποκορισμός, by bestowing on it a 'flattering' designation. I refer for the proof of this to the Nic. Eth. IV 7.8: it will be found that σεμνότης, another false interpretation which is here put upon αὐθάδεια, is also characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος. Plato points out the true ὑποκορισμός in the case of μεγαλοπρέπεια, Rep. VI 560 E, ὑποκοριζόμενοι... αἰσῶτιαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν.

ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν ἄσικτον ἐλευθέριον· δόξει τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἅμα παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς

intercourse of society, and manifests itself in the character οἷος μηδὲν ἐντυχεῖν μηδὲ διαλεγῆναι, in a wilful and stubborn reserve which repels all social converse. The character is represented in the name itself; which is αὐτο-άδης, 'self-pleasing'. So that when we give the name of μεγαλόφυχος and σεμνός to one who is really αὐθάδης, we are substituting a virtue for a vice, a mean state for an excess. αὐθάδεια is one of Theophrastus' 'Characters' defined by him as ἀπῆνευ ὁμιλίας, 'social brutality'.

The special form of this misapplication of names in praise and censure is called ὑποκορισμός, when it takes the *favourable* side, and *interpretatur in melius*. On this figure, the name of which is derived from the endearing terms used by nurses to children (πρὸς κόρην ἢ κόρον λέγειν ἀποσμιχροῦντα, Tim. Lex., lisping in imitation of them), compare Aesch. c. Timarch. p. 17 § 126, ταύτην ἐξ ὑποκορίσματος τιτθῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχω, Theophr. περὶ ἀηδίας: ὑποκορίζεσθαι πομπύζων (Ast ad loc.), or by lovers, Plat. Rep. V 474 E, ἡ θρασυτοῦ ὑποκοριζομένου, Arist. Plut. 1012, ηἱταρίον ἂν καὶ φάτιον ὑποκορίζο (whence it stands for a 'diminutive', Rhet. III 2. 15); hence it is transferred to flattering or endearing expressions in general, and especially such as, in describing the moral character of anything, substitute some nearly associated virtue for a vice; to palliate, extenuate, gloss over. Examples occur in Plat. Rep. VIII 560 E (already referred to), III 400 E, ἀνοῖαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐθείαν. Alexis, Tarantini Fr. 3, Meineke, Fragm. Comm. III 484, ἀρ' οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τὸ καλούμενον (ἦν τοῦτο διατριβῆς χάριν ὄνομ' ἐστὶν ὑποκόρισμα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μοίρας: Ovid, Ar. Am. II 657, *nominiuſ mollire licet mala*, followed by a long string of examples. Lucr. IV 1154 seq. Horat. Sat. I 3. 44—54. Thucydides, III 82, in a well-known passage, mentions this perversion of moral terms amongst the signs of demoralization prevalent in Greece at the period of the Corcyrean sedition, καὶ τὴν εἰωθίαν ἀξιώσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει κ.τ.λ. See Ruhnken, ad Tim. p. 266, 6; Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v.; Shilleto, ad Dem. de F. L. § 293; Stallbaum, Plat. Rep. VI l. c.—Quintilian calls it *derivatio verborum* in the passage above quoted; and V 13. 25, describes it, *si acri et vehementi fuerit usus oratione, eandem rem nostris verbis mitioribus proferre*; which he then illustrates from Cicero's speeches. The opposite practice is described II 12. 4, *est praeterea quaedam virtutum vitiorumque vicinia, qua maledictus pro libero, temerarius pro forti, effusus pro copioso accipitur*. [Farrar's *Chapters on Language*, p. 281 sqq. S.]

καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς κ.τ.λ.] The only difference between this and the preceding form of ὑποκορισμός is, that this is a special variety of the other, which substitutes the mean for the excess, but still according to the favourable interpretation of it. θρασύτης is the ὑπερβολὴ of ἀνδρεία, Eth. N. II 7, 1107 b 3, 8, 1108 b 20, 1109 a 3, and ἀσωτία, prodigality, the spendthrift's habit, c. 7, 1107 b 10, c. 8, 1108 b 24.

παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας] 'liable to lead to a false inference', Rhet. II 24. 4, *suberit fallacia manans ex causa*, Portus. 'The mis-reasoning

αίτίας· εἰ γὰρ οὐ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός, πολλῶ  
 μᾶλλον ἢ δόξειεν ὅπου καλόν, καὶ εἰ προετικός τοῖς  
 τυχοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ ἀρετῆς τὸ  
 30 πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ' οἷς ὁ ἔπαινος·

(*παραλογιστικόν*), or false reasoning, proceeding from the cause', is the identification of two different causes which must necessarily produce dissimilar effects or actions; these latter are confounded by the fallacy, and ascribed to the same cause. The *cause* of an action is the *προαίρεσις*, the voluntary and deliberate *purpose* of it, otherwise represented as the 'motive' (the efficient cause). Now this cause or motive is different in the case of an act of wanton rashness, where there is no necessity (obligation) to incur the danger (οὐ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός), and of an act of virtue, *true* courage, which *has* a noble end, τὸ καλόν, in view: they are prompted by different motives, one belonging to the class 'bad', the other that of the 'good'. This identification of the causes of the two actions leads to the 'false inference', that as the same cause produces the same effect, and the cause of both actions is the same, the effects are likewise the same, and both of them are acts of virtue. And then the further inference is drawn, that whatever a man will do from a less powerful motive, he will do *a fortiori* from one which is higher and more prevailing: the higher the motive or cause, the more powerful the impulse or effect. Similarly it is *inferred* that if a man is lavish to everybody, this must include his friends; by the rule, *omne maius continet in se minus*.

*ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς*] Cic. Tusc. Q. v 26. 105, *exsuperantia virtutis*. *ὑπερβολή* and *ὑπεροχή* are frequently employed to express an excess above a given standard, average, or mean; the general conception of 'excess', of mere 'superiority'; without the additional notion of a 'vicious' excess, a depravation or deviation from a *true* standard, which usually accompanies the word, and more especially in Aristotle's theory of virtue, where it stands for a class of moral *vices*. 'Non significat hic *nimum* sed *praestantia*.' Victorius. With the notion here expressed, comp. Eth. N. II 2, sub fin. 1105 a 9, *περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ*. The average standard of excellence is surpassed, 'good becomes better', in proportion to the degree of difficulty surmounted in accomplishing any task. Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 3, *κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν*, lines 8 and 14, *κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν*, c. 4, 1326 a 21, 1b. b 12, *τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος*, b 24. Pol. VI (IV) 12, 1296 b 19, *ποσὸν δὲ* (by 'quantity' I mean) *τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν*. This sense of the word is also common in Demosthenes, as de Cor. 291. 24, *ἐγὼ δὲ τοσαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ποιοῦμαι*, and the same phrase de F. L. p. 447. 25. c. Mid. 519. 24, *ἔστι δὲ ὑπερβολὴ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα· ὑπερβολὴ συκοφαντίας, κακίας, δωρεῶν, ἀναιδίας, ὀμότητος, ὕβρεως*, &c., in all which *ὑπερβολή* denotes not *the vice*, but merely the 'measure' of it.

§ 30. *σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ' οἷς ὁ ἔπαινος*] Compare III 14. 11. The same illustration of the topic, from Plato's Menexenus, is there repeated, with the addition of *ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ*, 'in the funeral oration', meaning the Platonic dialogue. Socrates, Plato's principal character, or hero, or

ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθη-  
ναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν. δεῖ δὲ τὸ παρ' ἐκάσ-  
τοις τίμιον λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ  
Λάκωσιν ἢ φιλοσόφοις. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ τίμιον ἄγειν  
31 εἰς τὸ καλόν, ἐπείπερ δοκεῖ χεινιᾶν. καὶ ὅσα κατὰ  
τὸ προσῆκον, οἷον εἰ ἄξια τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῶν

spokesman, is here taken *more Aristotelio* as a substitute for Plato him-  
self, whose opinions and sentiments he is supposed exactly to represent<sup>1</sup>.  
The passage of the *Menex.* 235 D runs thus, εἰ μὲν γὰρ δέοι Ἀθηναίους ἐν  
Πελοποννησίοις εὖ λέγειν ἢ Πελοποννησίοις ἐν Ἀθηναίοις, ἀγαθοῦ ἂν ῥήτορος  
δέοι τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὐδοκμήσοντος· ὅταν δὲ τις ἐν τοῦτοις ἀγωνίζηται  
οὕσπερ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ οὐδὲν μέγα δοκεῖ εὖ λέγειν.

On this passage, Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* III 7. 23, *Interesse tamen Ari-  
stoteles putat ubi quidque laudetur aut vituperetur. Nam plurimum  
refert qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio: ut illa  
maxime quae probant esse in eo qui laudabitur credant, aut in eo contra  
quem dicemus ea quae oderunt. Ita non dubium erit iudicium quod  
orationem praecesserit.*

τὸ παρ' ἐκάστοις τίμιον κ.τ.λ.] These are appeals to national and class  
prejudices and preferences. We should attribute to the object of our  
encomium the possession of any gift, quality, accomplishment which  
happens to be esteemed by the particular audience that we are address-  
ing; as in a company of Scythians it would be advisable to address our-  
selves to their national habits and modes of thinking, and to praise our  
hero for his skill in hunting or strength or bravery; at Sparta for patience  
and fortitude (Quint. u. 5.); at Athens for literary accomplishments.

'And in a word, (or, as a general rule), to refer (in praising any one  
before an audience of this kind) what *they* highly value to the καλόν, since  
they appear to border closely upon one another'. 'To refer τίμα to τὸ  
καλόν', is to invest them with a *moral* character, τὸ καλόν being the moral  
end, the right, the end of *action*. This is as much as to say that these  
things, which are so precious in their eyes, are not only valuable, but  
*right* in themselves, and therefore they do well to hold them in high  
esteem.

§ 31. ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον κ.τ.λ.] 'all that seems naturally to belong  
to a man in virtue of his birth or antecedents', qualities, actions, achieve-  
ments; 'such things as were *to be expected* from him'.

<sup>1</sup> Bp. Fitzgerald (ap. Grant, ad *Eth. N.* vi 13. 3) remarks, on *Eth. N.* III  
8. 6, that Aristotle in referring to Socrates prefixes the article when he speaks  
of him as Plato's interlocutor and representative, and omits it when he has the  
real historical Socrates in his mind. This is no doubt the general (Grant says,  
invariable) rule; but I have noted one exception in *Pol. V* (VIII) 7, 1342 b 23,  
where we find Σωκράτης without the article in a reference to *Plato's Republic*,  
III 398 E. The rule is extended to other Platonic characters borrowed from  
history, as τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην (*the Aristophanes of the Symposium*), *Pol. II* 4, 1262 b 11,  
and ὁ Τίμαιος (*Plato's Timæus*, not the real personage), *de Anima A* 3, 406 b 26.

προϋπηργμένων· εὐδαιμονικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλὸν τὸ προσ-  
επικτηᾶσθαι τιμὴν. καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον δὲ ἐπὶ  
τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἷον εἰ εὐτυχῶν μὲν μέ-  
τριος ἀτυχῶν δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, ἡ μείζων γιγνόμενος  
βελτίων καὶ καταλλακτικώτερος. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ  
τοῦ Ἰφικράτους, ἐξ οἷων εἰς οἷα, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμ-  
πιονίκου

πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ' ὥμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν,  
καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου

ἡ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὔσα τυράννων.  
32 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ

προϋπηργμένων] 'res antea virtute alicuius studioque possessas, laudes quas sibi quispiam labore suo comparaverit.' Victorius. 'his own previous acquisitions or possessions'; such as a stock of previous good, noble, great deeds, with which his new achievement, now the object of the encomium, is in accordance; as it ought to be. It is praiseworthy because it is the addition of a new honour, which, since honour itself is καλόν, must also have a tendency to happiness (εὐδαιμονικόν) and be right itself, and all that is right is praiseworthy.

But not only conformity with a man's antecedents may be adduced in praise of an action, but also the opposite, 'if he surpass them, namely, and improve upon' his own early condition and actions, or those of his ancestors, not acting *in accordance with* the past and what he was born to, but *contrary to* it, i.e. *beyond* it.

καταλλακτικώτερος] This does not necessarily contradict the topic of § 24; the irreconcilable temper there is only to be fostered against enemies, here it probably refers exclusively to friends: or if not, in Rhetoric either side may be taken as a subject of commendation, each suitable to a different kind or disposition of audience.

τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους—τὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιονίκου] Both of them already quoted, I 7. 32, q. v.

τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου] The epigram is given at length by Thucydides vi 59. Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr.* Simon. Fr. 115, p. 781 [p. 906, 2nd ed.]. 'Ἀνδρὸς ἀρισ-  
τεύσαντος ἐν Ἑλλάδι τῶν ἐφ' αὐτοῦ | Ἰππίου Ἀρχεδίκην ἦδε κέκυθε κόμισ. | Ἡ  
πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὔσα τυράννων | Παίδων τ' οὐκ ἤρθη νοῦν ἐς  
ἄτασθαλίην.

§ 32. ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος] 'praise is derived from actions', i.e. it is only (moral) actions that can furnish topics of ἔπαινος, in its proper application. Praise and blame, moral approbation and disapprobation (Butler), are the tests of virtue and vice. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς, Eth. N. I 12, 1101 b 32.

See on this subject, and upon what follows, the distinction of ἔπαινος, ἐγκώμιον, and εὐδαιμονισμός and μακαρισμός, Introd. App. B to c. 9 §§ 33, 34, p. 212 seq.

σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι  
πράττοντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολ-  
λάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα. διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώ-

ἴδιον τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν] On προαίρεσις, see note, c. 6. 26. The προαίρεσις, the deliberate moral purpose, is the distinctive character-istic of moral action. 'Acting in accordance' with this is consequently said to be 'peculiar to', the *proprium*, characteristic of 'the man of worth', or good man. In 'praising' any one, therefore, praise being, strictly speaking, confined to moral action, 'we must endeavour to shew that his actions are directed by a deliberate moral purpose'.

φαίνεσθαι] 'that he should *be shewn* to have'... 'that it should be made clear that he has'... Note on I 7. 31, p. 141.

διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα κ.τ.λ.] To establish a character for virtue in the object of your praise it is desirable to shew that his virtuous acts have been often repeated; and *therefore*, for the same purpose, to make an apparent addition to this number, we should assume as acts done with a moral purpose, *ὡς ἐν προαίρεσει*, any 'accidental coincidences' and 'pieces of luck' (which may have happened to him); 'for if a number of them can be brought forward 'resembling' the virtue or excellence that you wish to praise in him, they will be taken for 'a sign' of it and of the moral purpose or intention' (which constitutes virtue). The mere repetition of the actions, τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα, is serviceable in producing this impression, because it seems to shew an inclination or fondness for them, and thence a certain direction of the προαίρεσις or choice, and a certain *ἔξις* or moral state, which are indications of a virtuous habit. *σύμπτωμα* is a 'concurrence' or 'accidental coincidence' of one thing or act with another, between which there is no *necessary connexion*, and, like τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, *purely accidental*. 'σύμπτωμα est, cum quopiam aliquid agente, et quod nihil ad rem quae intervenit faciat, extrinsecus quippiam excitatum contingit; e.g. deambulante illo solem deficere: ἀπὸ τύχης vero, cum quopiam aliquid agente alicuius rei gratia, aliquid ex eo actu praeter propositum eveniret; ut scrobem facientem, ut arborem serat, thesaurum defossum invenire.' Victorius. On τύχη as an agent or supposed cause, see Introd. p. 218—224, Append. C to Bk. I. Both of Victorius's instances came from Aristotle [de div. per somn. *infra*, and Met. Δ 30, 1025 a 16. s.]

On σύμπτωμα (rare in ordinary Greek) Phrynichus, *χρὴ οὖν συντυχίαν λέγειν, ἢ λύσαντας αὐτῷ συνεπείσεν αὐτῷ τὸδε γενέσθαι. Δημοσθένης μίμντοι ἐν τῇ κατὰ Διονυσιοδώρου* (p. 1295, 21) *ἅπαξ εἴρηκε τοῦνομα*. The only other example of it, referred to by Lobeck, note ad loc. p. 248, in any writer earlier than Aristotle, is Thuc. IV 36, where it stands, like συμφορά, for an 'unfortunate accident'. In Dem. it is equivalent to τὸ συμβάν, which occurs in the same sentence. It occurs also in the Platonic Axiochus, 364 C, in the sense of 'a disease' (*morbis*, Ast), apparently as a special kind of 'calamity'. In Aristotle I have noted the following instances: Pol. VIII (v) 4, 1304 a 1 (where it means 'an accident', as in Dem. and Phryn.) [ib. 6, 1306 b 6; II 12, 1274 a 12]; Top. Δ 5, 126 b 36, 39, de div. per somn. c. 1, 462 b 27, 31, σύμπτωμα δὲ τὸ βαδίζοντος ἐκλείπειν τὸν



ματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον·  
 ἂν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅμοια προφέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς  
 33 εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἔστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος  
 ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν τὰς πράξεις  
 ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται. τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων  
 ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ κύκλω εἰς πίστιν, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ  
 ἥλιον (an accidental coincidence), 463 a 2, τῶν συμπτωμάτων οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἀεὶ  
 γίνεται οὐθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν (it is a mere occasional, unaccountable acci-  
 dent), de respir. 5, 472 b 26; de Gen. Anim. IV 4 § 10, 770 b 6 [and 777 b 8];  
 Hist. An. VII 6. 4, 585 b 25, σύμπτωσιν (accident), IX 37. 6, 620 b 35, 40. 41,  
 626 a 29. Categ. 8, 9 b 15; p. 199 a 1; p. 1093 b 17. The medical sense of  
 the word 'symptom' seems to be derived immediately from the Aristo-  
 telian 'accidental coincidence'. It is an attendant sign of the disease,  
 though a mere external indication, and not of *the essence* of it; like a  
 συμβεβηκός or 'accident'.

§§ 33, 34. See the Introd. p. 212 seq. Eth. Eud. II 1. 12, ἔτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοι  
 τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων... ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία  
 οὐκ ἐπαινείται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τὰλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι (Eth. N.  
 I 12) ἢ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμός καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ  
 ἐγκώμιον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργου, ὁ δ' ἔπαινος  
 τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου, ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμός τέλος.

τὰ δὲ κύκλω εἰς πίστιν] 'The encomium or panegyric is directed to deeds  
 done' (ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας, after they are done, the *results* of actions;  
 ἔπαινος being of the actions themselves) 'and the surrounding circumstances  
 (such as noble birth<sup>1</sup> and cultivation) serve for confirmation'. These  
 'surrounding circumstances' are a sort of setting of the gem, a frame for  
 the picture, of which the real subject is the 'deeds' of the hero of the  
 panegyric; what he has done *himself*;—*nam genus et proavos et quae non  
 fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco*. The 'confirmation' consists in this,—  
 'for it is natural and probable that the offspring of the good should be  
 good, and that one reared in such and such a way should turn out of  
 such and such a character (*fortes creantur fortibus et bonis: ὡς ἀληθὲς ἦν  
 ἄρα ἰσθλῶν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἰσθλὰ γίγνεσθαι τέκνα, κακῶν δ' ὅμοια τῇ φύσει τῇ  
 τοῦ πατρὸς*, Eur. Alc. Fragm. VII Dind.). But still the real object of our  
 praise is the *ἔξις*, the confirmed *habit* of virtue, the character and not the  
 mere act; 'because we should praise a man even if he had not done the  
 (praiseworthy) act, if we supposed that his character was such as to incline  
 him to do it'.

τὰ κύκλω occurs in the same sense, of 'surrounding' (or accompanying)  
 'circumstances', Eth. Nic. III 12, III 7 b 2, οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ δοξεῖεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ  
 κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδὲ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλω δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, where τὰ κύκλω  
 are τὸ λυπηρὸν καὶ πόνοι, 'the pains and dangers by which courage is sur-

<sup>1</sup> The topic of genealogy is put first of all and treated at length by the author  
 of the Rhet. ad Alex., c. 35 (36). 4, seq. in his chapter on the encomiastic and  
 vituperative kind of Rhetoric. This stands in marked contrast to the secondary  
 and subordinate place here assigned to it by Aristotle, who seems rather to have  
 agreed with Ovid l. c. as to its comparative value.

- παιδεία· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω P. 33.  
 τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι. διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πρά-  
 ξαντας. τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεως ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ  
 ἐπαινοῖμεν αὐν καὶ μὴ πεπραχότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι  
 34 τοιοῦτον. μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὐτοῖς  
 μὲν ταῦτά, τούτοις δ' οὐ ταῦτά, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαι-  
 μονία τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ ὁ εὐδαιμονισμὸς περιέχει ταῦτα.  
 35 ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί·  
 ἃ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλευεῖν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατε- P. 1368.  
 36 θέντα τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίνονται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν

rounded, while it looks through them to the pleasant end'; again, Rhet. III 14. 10, οἱ δοῦλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ κύκλῳ.

§ 34. μακαρισμὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὐτοῖς μὲν ταῦτά] It is quite true that the two terms are sometimes identified, (as in Eth. N. I 12, 1191 b 24, τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν); but they are also distinguished, and then μάκαρ and μακαρία represent 'blessedness, bliss', a higher degree of happiness than εὐδαιμων and εὐδαιμονία, which is the *human* form of happiness, while μακαρία is the *divine*. μάκαρες is specially applied to *θεοί* by Homer and Hesiod; as well as to the denizens of the μακάρων νῆσοι, the abode of the blessed after death.—αὐτοῖς is for ἀλλήλοισι.

τούτοις δ' οὐ ταῦτά] 'but not the same with the other two', viz. ἐπαινος and ἐγκώμιον: these are included in εὐδαιμονισμὸς as virtue is in happiness.

§ 35. ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος κ.τ.λ.] 'There is a community of *kind*' (the two may be referred to one species, *one* of the three kinds (*εἶδη*) of Rhetoric, c. 3. 1, either the *συμβουλευτικόν* or the *ἐπιδεικτικόν*, as the occasion requires) 'between praise and counsel or advice; for anything that you would suggest in advising may, by a mere change in the language, be converted into panegyric'. Quintilian has borrowed this, Inst. Or. III 7. 28, *totum autem habet (laudativum genus) aliquid simile suasoriis; quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi hic laudari solent*.

§ 36. 'And so, when we know what we ought to *do* in any given case, or to *be* in respect of character, we must then use the acquired knowledge (of the right course of action, and the right character) as suggestions, by changing and converting the language' (twisting so as to adapt it to our purpose; lit. *turning them* by the language). The example, and probably the topic itself, is taken from Isocrates, who in Panath. § 32 employs it as a suggestion or piece of advice, and in Evag. § 45 converts it into a topic of laudation—'Now when thus expressed, it amounts to (has the value of, may serve for,) a suggestion, but when thus, it becomes laudation, "Proud, not of the accidents of fortune, but of the distinctions due to himself alone"'.—The example in the laudatory form from the Evagoras runs thus in the original, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς δι' τύχην, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς δι'

ἀ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι, δεῖ ταῦτα ὡς ὑποθήκας λέγοντας τῇ λέξει μετατιθέσθαι καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι' αὐτόν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λεχθὲν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὡδὲ δ' ἔπαινον “μέγα φρονῶν οὐ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι' αὐτόν.” ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινῇ βούλη, ὅρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο, καὶ ὅταν ὑποθέσθαι, 37 ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσεις. ἡ δὲ λέξις ἔσται ἀντικειμένη ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὅταν τὸ μὲν κωλύον τὸ δὲ μὴ κωλύον μετατεθῇ.

38 χρυστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ αὐτὸν γιγνομένοις. Aristotle was probably quoting from memory, as seems to have been his common practice.

With the passages of Isocrates comp. Ovid. Met. XIII 140, *Nam genus et proavos et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco.*

δύναται Rhet. II 5. 1. δύνασθαι is often used in the sense of ‘having the value of, amounting to, equivalent to’, and is construed with the accusative. Herod. III 89, τὸ δὲ Βαβυλώνιον τάλαντον δύναται Εὐβοίδας ἑβδομήκοντα μνίας. Xen. Anab. I 5. 6, ὁ σίγλος δύναται ἐπὶ ὀβόλους, Thuc. VI 40, λόγοι ἔργα δυνάμενοι, Eur. Med. 128, τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλοντ' οὐδένα καιρὸν δύναται θνατοῖς (where Elmsley and Pflugk understand καιρὸν as used adverbially); also of the power, force, import, ‘meaning’, of a word, Ar. Met. Γ 6, 1011 a 7, δύνανται δ' αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτό. Thuc. I 141, τὴν αὐτὴν δύναται (is equivalent to) δούλωσιν. Id. VI 36, τοῦτο δύνανται (mean) αἱ ἀγγελίαι, VII 58, δύναται δὲ τὸ Νεοδαμῶδες εὐεύτερον ἦδη εἶναι. Ast's *Lex. Plat.* s. vv. δύναμις, δύναμις. The *power* or *force* which is contained in the primary sense of δύνασθαι is expressed in the secondary sense in which it appears in the above passages as a particular kind of force, the value of anything, and hence the amount, (of which equality or equivalence is a species), or the import, or meaning (which again is a kind of equivalence) of it. And the accusative is nothing but a cognate accusative. That *power* or *force* is the original notion from which the secondary meanings are derived, is proved, if proof were needed, by the parallel use of *ισχύειν* to express precisely the same notion; Eth. Nic. II 3, 1105 b 2, τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται. As we say δύνασθαι τι for τινὰ δύναμιν, this construction is merely extended to the new kind of power which constitutes the secondary sense of the verb.

§ 37. ἡ δὲ λέξις κ.τ.λ.] ‘The expression must be contradictory’ (the opposition of ἀντίφασις, κατάφασις and ἀπόφασις, positive and negative, Categ. c. 10, p. 11 b 19, the fourth kind of ‘opposites’ τὰ ἀντικείμενα), i.e. it must be positive in one, and negative in the other, ‘when the prohibitive and the non-prohibitive are interchanged’. This is the case in the two examples; the one forbids pride, the other recommends or praises it—in a sense, provided it be directed to proper objects: by ‘not forbidding’ it contradicts the other.

§ 38. τῶν αὐξητικῶν] *quae valent ad amplificandum.* These are the

μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα καλά. καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν· ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τὸ προσήκον. καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν· μέγα γάρ, καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν ἂν δόξειεν. καὶ εἰ τὰ

<sup>1</sup> + δ *infra*, *cum libris*. 'Recte Wolfius apud Valerum p. 109 δ delet.' Spengel.

various modes of αὔξησης, which with the opposite, μείωσις, constitutes the fourth of the κοινὰ τόποι. See Introd. p. 129, and (on II 26) p. 276.

Some of the special topics which follow as instances of αὔξητικά have been already mentioned in § 25, and appear again as giving a special importance or prominence to crimes in c. 14. 4, with the omission of the last. They, and others of the like kind, are included in the Rhet. ad Alex. 35 (36), 12, 13, under the general head of 'Comparison' with others for the purpose of laudation, to which they are all reducible. Comp. Cic. de Orat. II 85. 347—8, and Quint. Inst. Or. III 7. 16. With καὶ δ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν, εἰ πεποίηκεν must be supplied for the sense after καί.

τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν] 'circumstances of time and opportunity' give a praiseworthy character to particular actions at special times and seasons. This topic, equally applicable to comparative goods, has already occurred, c. 7. 32: and with παρὰ τὸ προσήκον, comp. c. 9. 31. If, for instance, a man performs an act of liberality, at a time of great pecuniary pressure, or in a case of emergency, or at a crisis of especial difficulty, he is then doing something παρὰ τὸ προσήκον, beyond what could naturally be expected from him, or any one else, and is entitled to especial credit for it. Similarly Victorius.

καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν] This topic is not to be confounded with τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα of § 32. That is a 'repetition of the act', *this* denotes the 'repeated success' in any attempt, the constant success is an indication—not infallible, or certain as a *proof*—of special skill: as if a man were to throw sixes several times running, even if it were by mere accident, the inference would be that he had a special knack or skill in throwing dice. 'The *constancy* of the success gives it importance, and it will seem *not* accidental but due to the agent himself'.

καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα κ.τ.λ.] 'And any one' (on whose account, in consequence of his actions and distinctions) 'to commemorate whom incentives, stimulants, to virtue ('encouragements' to do the like), or marks of respect for it, have been invented or were ever 'instituted', must be a praiseworthy character'. This is the general case of the invention or establishment of any public mark of honour in commemoration of the great deeds or distinctions of any signal public benefactor, and as an incentive or encouragement to others to follow his example.

The next clause, εἰς ὃν πρῶτον, is a particular example of the former of the two preceding cases, the 'invention', the first appropriation, of something in a person's honour. Victorius thinks that κατεσκευάσθη is especially applied to the *permanent* establishment of an enduring monument, as a temple.

This topic again is afterwards applied to crimes, in c. 14. 4.

προτρέποντα καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον εὐρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη. καὶ εἰς ὃν πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη,

εὐρηται...κατεσκευάσθη] We may note here the juxtaposition of the perf. and aor., apparently with no distinction of time intended. I have elsewhere noticed (Pref. to *Transl. of Gorgias*, pp. xv. xvi.) the difference of idiom between the Greek and English languages which *obliges* us sometimes to translate the Greek aorist by the English perfect. Other examples of the same inadvertence, confusion of tenses, or whatever else it is to be called, occur, I 3. 8, where *πραχθῆναι* in the same sense and in the same opposition is repeated in the form *πεπράχθαι*, Top. IX sub fin. p. 184 a 8, *βεβωθῆκε μὲν...τέχνην δ' οὐ παρέδωκεν*. Many instances are found in Sophocles, which in a writer so subtle in the distinctions of language might lead one to think that *he* at any rate distinguishes them with a meaning. I leave the reader to judge. Philoct. 664, 666, (Herm. 676), *λόγῳ μὲν ἐξήκουσ' ὅπῃα δ' οὐ μάλα*, 927—8, *οἶά μ' εἰργάσω, οἷ' ἠπάτηκας*. 1172, *τί μ' ὤλεσας; τί μ' εἰργασαι;* Antig. 406 (Dind.), present and aorist, *καὶ πῶς ὁρᾶται κἀπὶ Ληπτος ἡρέθη;* 1228—9, Aj. 31, Trach. 364, 5, Arist. Ran. 1010—11 (Dind.), *πεποιήκας...ἀπέδειξας*, Plat. Phaedr. 231 A, *ἃ τε καὶ διέθεντο, καὶ ἃ πεποιήκασιν εἶδ.* Dem. de F. L. § 228, *οὐτ' ἠνώχλησα οὔτε...βεβίασμαι*.

*εἰς ὃν πρῶτον...*] The *novelty* of the distinction, invented expressly for the occasion, marks a still higher sense entertained of the value of the service or the virtue of the act which it is intended to commemorate.

*ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη*] *ποιεῖν* is here loosely used, by the so-called figure *zeugma* (on c. 4. 6, note 1), in connexion with *ἐγκώμιον* and the statue of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in two different senses—as to Hippolochus, until we know who he was, and in what way commemorated, the application must remain uncertain—of *writing* the panegyric, and 'setting up the statue in the market-place'.

Of Hippolochus nothing is known. It seems that Aristotle intended the *ἐγκώμιον* to refer to him. We should therefore insert a semicolon, or at least a comma after *Ἰππόλοχον*, in order to connect the panegyric and the statue with those that they severally concern: *εἰς* is to be repeated after *καί*. 'And one (is especially praiseworthy) in whose honour a panegyric was first composed, as it was for Hippolochus; (and as the setting up of their statue *in the market* was 'done' first, *ἐποιήθη*, i.e.), and as the privilege of having their statue erected in the market was granted for the first time to Harmodius and Aristogeiton'. Thucydides in his episcodical account of the assassination and the circumstances that led to it, VI 54—59, makes no mention of the statue; nor Aristotle Pol. VIII (v) 10, where the attack on Hipparchus is spoken of. Pausanias, I 8. 5, says, *οὐ πόρῳ δὲ ἐστάσιν Ἀρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων οἱ κτείναντες Ἰππαρχόν αἰτία δὲ ἧτις ἐγένετο κ.τ.λ.* He is describing the *ἀγορά*, though he does not expressly name it. (See Smith's *Dict. of Geogr. Art. Athena*, p. 293 b.)

*ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων*] 'in the opposite cases', of men to whom any reproach or stigma, mark of disapprobation (the test of vice) was first attached. 'cum nempe quempiam aut solum aut primum aut cum paucis flagitium admisisse ostendemus, turpitudinem ipsius valde augebimus.' Victorius. On the topics of vituperation, Quintilian, Inst. Or. III 7. 19—22.

οἷον εἰς Ἰππόλοχον, καὶ δι' Ἀρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογέ-  
 τωνα τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σταθῆναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν  
 ἐναντίων. κἂν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸν εὐπορῆς, πρὸς ἄλλους  
ἀντιπαραβάλλειν· ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ την

κἂν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸν εὐπορῆς κ.τ.λ.] 'and if you have not enough to say  
 about your hero himself, and in his own person, then institute a com-  
 parison between him and others... only the comparison must be with men  
 of distinction, (reputation); because the amplifying power of the comparison  
 and the impression of nobility which it creates, arise from the superiority  
 which is attributed to him over those who are themselves worthy and  
 good'. The same topic is recommended in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4). 6.

ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης—δικολογίῃ] 'which was Isocrates' custom, owing to  
 his want of practice in forensic pleading'. Read *ἀσυνήθειαν* [with A'] for  
 two reasons. *First*, what is meant is that Isocrates cultivated the habit of  
 comparing his hero with others in consequence of his want of *actual*  
 practice in the law-courts. There the pleading is always direct, and the  
 arguments pointed at an adversary; comparisons with others are alto-  
 gether out of place, or only occasionally serviceable. If Isocrates had  
 had this practice, he would not have fallen into the habit of comparing,  
 into which he had been led by confining himself to the epideictic branch  
 of Rhetoric where they tell and are in point. *Secondly*, this is what  
 Isocrates himself tells us of his own habits and pursuits, Antid. §§ 2, 3,  
 ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰδὼς ἐνίοις τῶν σοφιστῶν βλασφημοῦντας περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς  
 καὶ λέγοντας ὡς ἔστι περὶ δικογραφίαν... αὐτὸς δὲ πᾶσι τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι  
 φανερόν· ὅτι προήρημαι καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων,  
 ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τηλικούτων κ.τ.λ. Panath. § 11, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τοῦ πολιτεῖν εἶναι  
 διήμαρτον ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν (i.e. literary labour, speech writing) καὶ ποιεῖν  
 καὶ γράφειν, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμεενος οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων  
 συμβολαίων οὐδὲ περὶ ὧν ἄλλοι τίνες ληροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν κ.τ.λ.  
 Ib. § 39 seq. ἡγοῦμαι δὲ χρῆναι τοὺς βουλομένους ἐγκωμάσαι τινὰ τῶν πόλεων  
 ἀκριβῶς καὶ δικαίως μὴ μόνον περὶ αὐτῆς ποιείσθαι τοὺς λόγους ἧς προσηρημένοι  
 τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ (here follows a simile) οὕτω καὶ ταῖς πόλεσι  
 παριστάναι μὴ τὰς μικρὰς ταῖς μεγάλαις, κ.τ.λ. [Cf. note on Paneg. § 11. S.]

Here we find, *first*, that he failed in public life; *secondly*, that he with-  
 drew from the law-courts and their ἴδια συμβόλαια, the cases arising out  
 of the 'private dealings' of the citizens with one another in their ordinary  
 business, in order to devote himself to philosophy and the study of public  
 affairs; and *thirdly*, that his ordinary practice in his Panegyrics was,  
 just as Aristotle describes it, to compare, παριστάναι, the object of his  
 laudation with others, whether men or cities, as great and distinguished  
 as themselves, πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν. The two first of these statements  
 seem to put the reading ἀσυνήθειαν beyond question, συνήθειαν being con-  
 trary alike to the known facts and the probabilities of the case. It is  
 nevertheless supported by Max Schmidt, in his tract on the date of the  
 Rhetoric, pp. 17, 18. With this reading, δικολογία must be confined to  
 speech writing for the use of parties in a legal process.

This is one of the passages of the Rhetoric on which Victorius founds

ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν· αἰζητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων  
 39 βελτίων. πίπτει δ' εὐλόγως ἡ αὔξησης εἰς τοὺς ἐπαί-  
 νους. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν  
 καλῶν. διὸ καὶ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδόξους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς p. 3+  
 τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖ παραβάλλειν, ἐπεὶ περ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ  
 40 δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετὴν. ὅλως δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν

his charge against Aristotle of jealousy and illwill towards Isocrates, whom he supposes the other to have lost no opportunity of assailing with open or covert censure and ridicule in his Rhetoric. See his commentary, pp. 154, 507, 586, 605, and elsewhere. Here at least, (with the reading ἀσυνήθειαν), there is neither one nor the other. I have already entered into this question in the Introd. p. 40—1, where I have given the opinions of later writers on the subject.

συγκρίνειν] Pol. VI (IV) 11, sub init. 12, 1296 b 24, Metaph. A 4, 985 a 24, 26, Top. A 5, 102 b 15, H 3, 154 a 5, 9, Θ 5, 159 b 25: σύγκρισις s. ἀδόκιμος φωνή. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ συγκρίνειν τόνδε τῶδε καὶ συνέκρινεν ἡμάρτηται· χρὴ οὖν ἀντεξετάζειν καὶ παραβάλλειν λέγειν.' Phrynichus. See Lobeck's note ad loc. p. 278. In all the passages quoted, except the two of the Metaph., συγκρίνειν and σύγκρισις denote comparison: in the other two it is a term of the early Physical Philosophy, meaning a composition of elements, opposed to διάκρισις.

Victorius quotes in illustration of πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν, Catullus, Carmen 64, 344, *non illi quisquam bello se conferet heros*, seq. Cic. de Or. II 85, 348, *est etiam cum ceteris praestantibus viris comparatio in laude praeclara*.

§ 39. The κοινὸς τόπος of αὔξησης or amplification naturally falls under the general head or class of laudatory speeches, is especially applicable to all forms of 'praise': because its object is to establish a certain 'superiority' of the person panegyricized over others, and this 'superiority' is an honourable end to aim at. And therefore if we do not compare our hero with the distinguished, it is at all events better to do it with the rest of the world (the average of mankind) because superiority in general, in itself, is thought to be an indication of 'virtue'. Eth. Nic. IV 8, sub init. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον πάντων ἐντιμότερον.

§ 40. It follows from this that of the three universal kinds of persuasion αὔξησης, or *amplificatio*, is most appropriate to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric (and the opposite μείωσις, *vituperatio*, to the censorious critical extenuatory kind of it<sup>1</sup>): for in this the actions are taken for granted (as admitted), and therefore all that remains to be done is to invest them with magnitude (importance) and honour (dignity, glory). To the deliberative orator examples are most serviceable; because people

<sup>1</sup> ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων (when these are held fast by us, when we have mastered these) τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ἃ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, § 41 infra.

ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις ἢ μὲν αὔξησης ἐπιτηδαιοτάτῃ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς· τὰς γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέγεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος· τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν· τὰ δ' ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικανικοῖς· αἰτίαν γὰρ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γεγονὸς διὰ τὸ ἀσαφές.

- 41 ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν οἱ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ψόγοι λέγονται σχεδὸν πάντες, καὶ πρὸς ποῖα δεῖ βλέποντας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια γίνονται καὶ τὰ ὀνειδή, ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν. περὶ δὲ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας, ἐκ

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are apt to draw inferences, to form a judgment or decision upon the future from the past by a sort of presentiment or anticipation. The enthymeme, direct logical argument, is most to the purpose in judicial oratory: in *that* there is most room for the application of direct proof, the tracing of cause and effect, and demonstration by deductive process, in clearing up the obscurity of 'past facts', which are the objects of forensic oratory, c. 3. 2. The substance of this is repeated in III 17. 3—5.

τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν] This seems to be a division, for the nonce, of rhetorical *πίστεις* as a *γένος*, into three *εἶδη* or species, each specially adapted to one of the three branches of Rhetoric. The division has no pretension to a regular scientific character: *αὔξησης* is not a logical kind of argument at all, and the three members of the division are not coordinate.

καταμαντευόμενοι] *μαντεύεσθαι* and *ἀπομαντεύεσθαι*, both of them not unusual in Plato and Aristotle, are the usual terms by which this kind of 'divination', the foreboding presentiment, dark undefined anticipation of the future is expressed. It occurs again (in the simple form) I 13. 2, III 17. 10, Eth. N. I 3, 1095 b 26, of a suspicion, or hypothesis, Ib. VI 13, 1144 b 25. Examples are to be found in Stallbaum's note on Rep. I 349 A, and many more in Ast's *Lex.* sub vv.—*καταμαντεύεσθαι*, besides this place [the only passage where it is used by Aristotle], is found in pseudo-Dem. *ἐπιτάφ.* p. 1400. 2, Polyb. II 22. 7, in Longinus and Athenaeus.

#### CHAP. X.

We now pass on to the treatment of the dicastic or forensic branch of Rhetoric, which occupies the remainder of the book; the *ἄρεχοι πίστεις*, being peculiar to this branch, (*ἴδιαι τῶν δικανικῶν*), 15. 1, are added as an appendix in the fifteenth chapter. For the general connexion of the contents of these chapters, and the illustration of some special subjects which seemed to require a more detailed explanation, I refer to the ana-



πόσων καὶ ποίων ποιῆσθαι δεῖ τοὺς συλλογισμούς,  
 2 ἐχόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τρία, ἐν μὲν  
 τίνων καὶ πόσων ἔνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς  
 αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι, τρίτον δὲ τοὺς ποίους καὶ πῶς  
 3 ἔχοντας. διορισάμενοι οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν λέγωμεν ἐξῆς.

ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα παρὰ  
τὸν νόμον. νόμος δ' ἐστὶν ὃ μὲν ἴδιος ὃ δὲ κοινός·  
 λέγω δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθ' ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται,

lysis of the Introduction, pp. 185—207, and the Appendixes to Bk. I, C. D. E.

§ 1. The first subject of inquiry in this branch is the number and nature (quantity and quality) of the materials or propositions (the premisses) of which our 'syllogisms' are to be constructed, in accusation and defence, the two functions of the dicastic branch of Rhetoric.

Schrader draws attention to the term 'syllogisms' as marking the especially logical character of the arguments which are employed in this branch as compared with the other two. On syllogism for enthymeme, see note on I. I. 11, p. 19.

§ 2. There are three subjects to be considered and analysed in order to furnish topics for the pleader's use; first, the number and nature of the motives and causes of injustice; secondly, the dispositions of the wrong-doers themselves; and thirdly, what characters and dispositions render men most liable to wrong and injustice.

§ 3. The first thing is to define justice, then to proceed with the rest in order.—ἔστω, of a *popular* or merely *provisional* definition; comp. 5. 3; 6. 2; 7. 2.

'Wrong' or 'injustice' is defined 'a voluntary injury contrary to law'. The two leading characteristics of a crime or punishable offence which are here brought into view are, that it is an act in violation of the law of the land—this is the *political* view of injustice—and that to be a *crime* the act must be intentional, done with malice prepense, and with full knowledge of the circumstances of the case and the probable effect of the action. It is thus distinguished from a merely *accidental* injury or harm done, which can hardly be considered voluntary at all, and again from a mere *mistake* or error of judgment arising from ignorance, not of *universals*, or general moral principles, but of the *particular* circumstances of the case (as of the absence of the button of the foil) where there is no evil or malicious purpose, no bad *προαίρεσις*, which constitutes the immorality of the act. See Eth. N. III 2, v 10. Rhet. I 13. 16.

νόμος δ' ἐστὶν ὃ μὲν ἴδιος ὃ δὲ κοινός] Comp. 13. 2, 11, 12, and Introd. p. 239, Append. E. to Bk. I.

λέγω δὲ ἴδιον κ.τ.λ.] 'by special<sup>1</sup> law I mean the written law under

<sup>1</sup> This application of the term ἴδιος to νόμος is to be distinguished from the ordinary meaning of it in this combination, as, for instance, Dem. de Cor. § 211,

κοινὸν δὲ ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι  
δοκεῖ. ἐκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγ-  
καζόμενοι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐκόντες, οὐ πάντα προαιρού-  
μενοι, ὅσα δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἰδότες ἅπαντα· οὐδεὶς  
4 γὰρ ὃ προαιρεῖται ἀγνοεῖ. δι' ἃ δὲ προαιροῦνται

which the government is conducted and the citizens live', the laws and institutions—which direct the policy of the government and the conduct of the citizens—the positive, written, law of the particular state: this is human, as opposed to divine and natural, law: 'by common (universal) law (I mean) all the unwritten principles that are supposed to be universally admitted'. This is the usual distinction taken between the two: these κοινά, ἄγραφα, are described, *Intro.* p. 239 seq.; for the further subdivision adopted in c. 13. 2, see *Ib.* p. 242.

ἐκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα κ.τ.λ.] 'a voluntary act is characterised by knowledge, and the absence of all external force and compulsion'. *Eth.* N. III 3, init. ὅντος δ' ἀκουσίον τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀπὸ ἐκαύσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα (i.e. with special knowledge of the particular circumstances) ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. I 13. 6, τὰ ἐκούσια, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσα εἰδότες.

ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐκόντες κ.τ.λ.] 'now all voluntary actions are not done with (do not imply) deliberate moral purpose, but all acts done with such a purpose imply knowledge, because no one can be ignorant of what he purposes'. *Eth.* N. III 4, 1111 b 7, ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτόν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλεόν τοῦ ἐκούσιον τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκούσιον καὶ παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῆα κοινωνεῖ, προαίρεσις δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγονται, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. Actions, for example, done under the impulse of violent excitement or passion, διὰ θυμὸν, or of appetite, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, are voluntary, but not κατὰ προαίρεσιν.

§ 4. δι' ἃ δὲ προαιροῦνται κ.τ.λ.] 'The impelling motive, cause, of this purpose to do mischievous and vicious acts in violation of the law, is vice and want of self-control. This general vicious habit takes various forms in particular cases, and shews itself in different special vices according to the circumstances which call it forth at the time, and give it its special direction. Thus vice and wrong (μοχθηρία καὶ ἀδικία) may take the form of illiberality in money matters, licentiousness in pleasure, effeminacy in respect of ease and comfort (ἀρθημία), cowardice in danger (when, for instance, the coward leaves his comrades in the lurch, and runs away out of mere terror); similarly the vice of ambition is shewn in the undue pursuit of honour, the passionate irascible temper in the over indulgence of angry feeling; victory is the motive to wrong in one that is over eager for victory, revenge with the vindictive; folly (the want of φρόνησις, practical wisdom, the special moral faculty) shews itself in the inability to distinguish (the liability to be deceived in distinctions of) right and wrong,

where it stands simply for *ius privatum*, relating to private (as opposed to public) affairs.

βλάπτειν καὶ φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκρασία· ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἔχωσι μοχθηρίαν ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους, περὶ τοῦτο ὁ μοχθηροὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, καὶ ἄδικοί εἰσιν, οἷον ὁ μὲν ἀνελεύθερος περὶ χρήματα, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ μαλακὸς περὶ τὰ ῥάθυμα<sup>1</sup>, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους (τοὺς γὰρ συγκινδυνεύοντας ἐγκαταλιμπάνουσι διὰ τὸν φόβον), ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ τιμὴν, ὁ δ' ὀξύθυμος δι' ὀργήν, ὁ δὲ φιλόνομος διὰ νίκην, ὁ δὲ πικρὸς διὰ τιμωρίαν, ὁ δ' ἄφρων διὰ τὸ

<sup>1</sup> ῥᾶθυμα *infra*.

the vice of the shameless man appears in his reckless disregard of the opinion of others'.—ὀξύθυμος 'quick-tempered', 'hasty'.

περὶ δὲ τοῦτο] Wolf, and with him Brandis, in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, IV i, p. 42, object to δέ, which is omitted by Brandis' 'anonymus' and one MS. See the note on δῆλον δέ, I i. 11, p. 20.

τὰ ῥάθυμα] are things and circumstances which tend to promote and encourage an easy, careless state of mind, 'things comfortable', which incline us to self-indulgence and inactivity. So ῥαστώνη in Plat. Gorg. 569 C, οὐκ οὐν πολλὰ ῥαστώνη γίνεται; 'isn't it a great comfort...?' Crit. 45 C, τὰ ῥασθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι, of 'careless, easy-going, indifference'.

ἐγκαταλιμπάνειν, 'to leave behind in the lurch', desert a comrade in danger [Cf. II 4. 26, 5. 7; III 16. 5.].—ἐν σκ. τῷ κινδύνῳ. Eupolis Δήμοι Fragm. VI (*Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Gr.* II 458), of Pericles' eloquence, μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροαμένοις, 'to leave the sting behind in the wound', (ἐν τῷ ἔλκει). Plat. Phaedo, 91 C, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχίσσεται.

πικρός] 'Translato a tristi sapore nomine, πικροὺς Graeci appellant qui accepta iniuria non facile placantur sed diu simultatem gerunt, de quibus accuratius egit noster, Eth. Nic. IV (11, 1126 a 20), οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλντοι, καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἢ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.' [Vict.] τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπίθει· αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνον δεῖν εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. The Latin *amarus*, as Victorius points out, is used in much the same sense. The distinguishing characteristic of the Aristotelian *πικρότης*, in which the particular 'bitterness' of this form of ὀργή is shewn, is its lasting and enduring quality—the wrath is nursed 'to keep it warm' (πέψαι τὴν ὀργήν)—and this gives it a malignant, spiteful, *implacable* character, exactly opposite to that of Horace, the irascible temper, *ὀργιλότης*, *irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem*.

ἀπατᾶσθαι] Ignorance of moral distinctions, and consequent wrong action, may be regarded as a kind of 'deception' or 'delusion'; when a man is too foolish (unwise) to be able to distinguish right from wrong,

ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, ὁ δ' ἀναί-  
σχυντος δι' ὀλιγωρίαν δόξης. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
ἐκαστος περὶ ἑκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

5 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων δῆλον, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ  
τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη  
ῥηθησομένων· λοιπὸν δ' εἰπεῖν τίνος ἕνεκα καὶ πῶς

6 ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ τίνας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διελώ-  
when he does not know and cannot perceive the difference between them  
(has no φρόνησις). Victorius quotes Top. Z (9, 148 a 6), τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχον  
ἐπιστήμην οὐ δοκεῖ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ διηπατημένον. Ignorance is not  
a mere στέρησις, the privation or absence of knowledge; which is shewn  
by our not applying the term 'ignorant' to inanimate objects and young  
children; it is something positive, and consists in a deception, mistaking  
one thing for another.

περὶ ἑκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων] τὰ ὑποκείμενα, *res subiectae*, *subiecta  
materies*; things that fall under the same head or general notion, and so  
are members or species of the same genus: Eth. N. II 2, 1105 a 1, πᾶσι  
τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν, 'all that fall under the choice', as its objects, or matter  
to operate upon. These are the six things previously mentioned, καλόν,  
συμφέρον, ἡδύ, and their opposites.

And so for the rest, the same rule holds in the case of every vice, 'each  
in the things which are specially subjected to it', which come under that  
particular head, as money is the 'subject-matter' of illiberality, dangers  
of cowardice, anger of quick, irascible temper, and so on. Victorius  
understands it as the 'object' of the aim or desire of each.

§ 5. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων] sc. in c. 9; ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη  
ῥηθησομένων sc. in II cc. 2—11. 'It remains now to describe the motives  
and dispositions or characters of wrong doers, and the dispositions and  
characters of their objects or victims'. In Polit. VI (IV) 11, 1295 b 9,  
there is a division of crimes based upon their respective magnitude or  
degree, into great and little, crimes on a great scale, acts of oppression,  
outrage, insolence, and crimes on a small scale, mean and paltry, which  
appear in fraud, cheating, and any paltry knavery or trickery. γίνονται  
γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὕβρισται καὶ μεγαλοπύνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικρο-  
πύνηροι λίαν· τῶν δ' ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίνονται δι' ὕβριν, τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν.

§ 6. First we have to distinguish or analyse the various motives and  
incentives, whether in the way of pursuit or avoidance which lead men to  
attempt (to undertake, take in hand, ἐγχειρεῖν) wrong doing: for it is  
plainly the accuser's business to inquire (how many and which kinds,) the  
number and the kinds of these universal incentives to wrong doing to  
which the adversary, whom he charges with a crime, is liable: and of the  
defendant, how many and what sorts of them are *not* applicable to his  
case. 'Hunc locum copiose persecutus est Cicero pro Milone et in crimi-  
nando Clodio et in Milone purgando: cuncta enim in Clodio fuisse  
ostendit quae persuadere ipsi potuerint ut insidias faceret Miloni;  
eademque a persona Milonis afuisse.' Victorius.

μεθα τίνων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ποῖα φεύγοντες ἐρχεῖσθαι  
 ἀδικεῖν· δηλὸν γὰρ ὡς τῷ μὲν κατηγοροῦντι πόσα  
 καὶ ποῖα τούτων ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σκεπτέον,  
 [ὧν ἐφιεμένοι πάντες τοὺς πλησίον ἀδικοῦσι,] τῷ δ'  
 ἀπολογουμένῳ ποῖα καὶ πόσα τούτων οὐχ ὑπάρχει.  
 7 πάντες δὲ πράττουσι πάντα τὰ μὲν οὐ δι' αὐτοὺς τὰ  
 δὲ δι' αὐτοὺς. τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δι' αὐτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ  
 τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
 τὰ μὲν βία τὰ δὲ φύσει· ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δι'  
 αὐτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ  
 δὲ βία. ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτοὺς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἵτιοι, τὰ P. 1369.  
 μὲν δι' ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν, τῶν δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν τὰ μὲν  
 8 διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλογον· ἔστι δ' ἡ

§ 7. This inquiry naturally leads to a classification of the sources or causes of human action, which are found to fall under seven heads; some of these have their origin in ourselves and are under our own control, others are external to us and independent of us, and exercise upon us and our actions the force of necessity and compulsion. To the causes whose origin is *without* us belong (1) chance or accident, (2) nature, and (3) external force or compulsion; over these we have no control: the causes which spring from *within* us, and are therefore more or less in our power to master and overrule, are (4) habit, (5) reasoning or calculation, (6) passion, (7) appetite or desire. These seven incentives to action have been carefully examined, and compared with other doctrines and opinions elsewhere expressed by Aristotle on the same subjects, in Append. C to Bk. I, *Introd.* p. 218 seq., to which I refer for further illustration of them.

This same classification of the causes or sources of actions is indicated or alluded to elsewhere, but nowhere else so completely made out. See, for instance, *Eth. Nic.* III 5, 1112 a 32, αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, and VI 4, in the definition of art, 1140 a 14, οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἡ γιγνόμενων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. And in I 10, 1099 b 20 seq. the same division is hinted at.

§ 8. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις κ.τ.λ.] *Comp. Eth. N.* III 4, 1111 b 26, ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανούμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μὲν βουλόμεθα καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. This is a qualification of the too unlimited statement of the unscientific Rhetoric. 'In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of adequately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the *nisus* or *conatus*—the tendency towards the realisation of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire

μὲν βούλησις, <βούλησις δ'> ἀγαθοῦ ὀρεξίς (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ' ἢ ὅταν οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), ἄλογοι δ' ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι' αἰτίας ἐπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι' ἔθος, διὰ λογισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, 9 δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. τὸ δὲ προσδιακρίσθαι καθ' ἡλικίας ἢ ἕξιος ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα τὰ πραττόμενα περιέρχον· εἰ γὰρ συμβέβηκε τοῖς νέοις ὀργίλοις εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμητικοῖς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητά πρᾶττουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. οὐδὲ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρημάτων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν· ἀλλὰ πράττουσι

a blind and fatal, tendency to action'. Sir W. Hamilton, *Lect. on Metaph.* XI Vol. I. p. 184—5. On this, the Editor refers in a note to this passage. But βούλησις here means not 'will', but 'wish', as appears from the definition ἀγαθοῦ ὀρεξίς—the 'will' is *not* always directed to good—and from the analysis of it in *Eth. N.* III 4. The term by which Sir W. H. proposes to designate the common quality of this family of faculties, and so separate them from the rest, is *Conative*. *Impulsive* means much the same thing, and has the advantage of being an English word.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται κ.τ.λ.] This question of the end and object of 'the wish' is discussed in *Eth. Nic.* III 6 (Bekk.), and the conclusion, *III 3 a* 23, is as follows: εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρίσκει (the two opposite views that it is τῶν ἀγαθῶν and τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν), ἀρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλήτων εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν.

§ 9. τὸ δὲ προσδιακρίσθαι κ.τ.λ.] What he says is superfluous (περιέρχον) here, is actually done in the six ethical chapters, 12—17, of Bk. II, and this apparent contradiction has raised a suspicion that some error has crept into the text. There is however in reality no inconsistency between the theory here laid down and the actual practice in Book II. *There* the treatment of these ἡθῆ is appropriate, as supplementary to that of the πάθη: *here* it would be out of place, because the present subject of inquiry is about the *causes of human action*; and though these states and conditions, youth, age, wealth, poverty and the rest, are as a general rule attended and characterised by certain tendencies or πάθη, yet these latter can be by no means regarded as *effects of causes*, but are mere συμβεβηκότα, separable accidents, which do not invariably accompany the states that they characterise. Youth and age, wealth and poverty, are *not* the causes of any particular classes of actions; in so far as they *do* accompany them they are accidental, not essential.

ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν] These are thus defined by Plato, *Rep.* VIII 12, 558D,

καὶ οὗτοι οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ ἄδικοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ λεγόμενοι κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις πράττειν, διὰ p. 36. ταῦτα πράξουσιν ἢ γὰρ διὰ λογισμόν ἢ διὰ πάθος· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δι' ἡθὴ καὶ πάθη χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰναν-  
 10 τία. συμβαίνει μέντοι ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἔξεσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ τοιαῖσδε τὰ τοιαῦδε· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἴσως τῷ μὲν σῶφρονι διὰ τὸ σῶφρονα εἶναι δόξαι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας χρησταὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσι περὶ οὐκοῦν ἄς τε οὐκ ἂν οἶοι τ' εἶμεν ἀποτρίψαι δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο, καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελούσων ἡμᾶς; τούτων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη, comp. Phileb. 72 E. They are therefore pleasures that are *forced upon us* by nature, and therefore 'necessary' or 'indispensable' to us. Of these the 'bodily pleasures', the gratification of the appetites, are the most necessary, and sometimes the latter are confined to them; for in Eth. N. VII 14, 1154 a the pleasures which are first called *σωματικαί*, in lines 7 and 9, afterwards, in line 11, receive the name of *ἀναγκαῖαι*, which is repeated in line 17. The Scholiast and Paraphrast both explain *ἀναγκαῖαι* by *σωματικαί*. Plato more frequently speaks of the *ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίας* in the same sense.

§ 10. Not however that I mean to deny—it *does* happen, *συμβαίνει*—that there is a connexion of certain particular results or qualities with particular moral states (but these classes and conditions of life are *not* 'states' in this sense): any virtue, I dare say, (ἴσως), as self-control, *does* generate a particular kind of opinions and desires about things pleasant, *good* ones namely; and the opposite vice of licentiousness the contrary in the same sphere.

This is a parenthetical note to avoid misunderstanding.

εὐθὺς...ἐπακολουθοῦσι] 'there is at once, from the very first, an immediate and close connexion (or consequence) between the *σῶφρων* in virtue of his self-control, and certain *good* opinions and desires in respect of pleasure'. εὐθὺς in the sense of 'at once', 'straight off', and corresponding sometimes to the Latin *statim* and *ultra*, passes into a variety of significations which take their colour from the context. Eth. N. V 14, 1137 b 19, *σuarpte natura*, εὐθὺς τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν; see Bonitz on Metaph. Γ 3, 1004 a 5, who cites Categ. 12, 14 a 32, Anal. Pr. I 16, 36 a 6, Eth. N. VI 5, 1140 b 18, εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται, *omnino non apparet*. Polit. III 4, 1277 a 15, τὴν παιδείαν εὐθὺς (from the very first) ἐτίραν. Ib. VI (IV) 11, 1295 b 16, καὶ τοῦτ' εὐθὺς οἰκοθεν ὑπάρχει παισὶν οὖσιν (from their very earliest home associations). Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1310 b 8, εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐναντίων (at once, from direct opposites). Ib. c. 10, ult. μὴ βουλομένων γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεὺς (he won't be king at all, *omnino*). Eth. Eudem. II 5, 1222 a 37, διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφίστηκε τοῦ μέσου. See Fritzsche, note ad loc. Phys. VII 4. 2, *dis*, 248 a 21, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη, and 23. Hist. Anim. II 13. 2, 17.7, καίται ὑπὸ τὸ διδῶμα εὐθὺς, *statim*, at once, immediately under. V 17. 5,

τῶν ἡδέων, τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ τῶν  
 11 αὐτῶν τούτων. διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαιρέσεις ἐα-  
 τέον, σκεπτέον δὲ ποῖα ποίοις εἴωθεν ἔπessθαι· εἰ μὲν  
 γὰρ λευκὸς ἢ μέλας ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός, οὐδὲν τέτακται  
 τῶν τοιούτων ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ δὲ νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης ἢ  
 δίκαιος ἢ ἀδίκος, ἤδη διαφέρει. καὶ ὅλως ὅσα τῶν  
 συμβαινόντων ποιεῖ διαφέρειν τὰ ἦθη τῶν ἀνθρώπων,  
 οἷον πλουτεῖν δοκῶν ἐαυτῷ ἢ πένεσθαι διοίσει τι, καὶ  
 εὐτυχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν,  
 νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπώμεν πρῶτον.

12 ἔστι δ' ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνόμενα,

de Gen. et Corr. II 11. 2, de part. Anim. IV 5. 1. Like ἦθη its connotation is transferred from time, its natural and proper signification, to place.

§ 11. 'And therefore', (because they are inappropriate as not assigning causes of human action,) 'such distinctions as these may be dismissed for the present; but still we are bound to inquire into the connexion which subsists between particular qualities and particular persons or classes'; (the general subject deserves investigation;) 'for though in respect of the qualities black and white or tall and short there is no fixed succession or accompaniment' (between them and any particular persons or classes), 'yet when we come to the connexion of young or old men with justice or injustice, *then* (by this time) there *is* a difference'. That is to say, that although in certain connexions of particular qualities with particular classes the establishment of such would be worthless or impossible, yet there are other cases, as in that of moral qualities, where it *would* be worth while to establish such a connexion, if it were possible. 'And in general, any accidental circumstance that makes a real difference in the characters of men; as the opinion a man has of his own wealth or poverty, or good or bad fortune, will make such a difference'. So after all it seems that it is possible to trace some such connexions between qualities and classes; but as this is not the proper place for such an inquiry—the reason being already given—'we will postpone it for the present', and wait till we come to the *πάθη*, where it will be in its proper place: 'And now let us proceed to what remains' of the subject on which we are at present engaged.

πλουτεῖν δοκῶν ἐαυτῷ is a reading of some MSS, followed by the old Latin Translation, and adopted by the recent Edd. The vulgate has πλουτεῖν δοκεῖ, which Buhle retains. δοκεῖ τῷ, a conjecture of Victorius, is also found in some MSS.

§ 12. On τύχη see Appendix C to Bk. 1. Introd.; on αἰτία δόριστος see ib. p. 221 seq. 'Illos eventus qui a causa quam nemo facile definiat oriuntur ad fortunam referimus. Arist. Phys. II 4, 196 b 6, εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἷς δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰτία μὲν ἡ τύχη, ἀδελφός δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ ὡς θεῖόν τι οὐσα καὶ δαιμονιώτερον.' Schrader. (Schrader quotes this as Aristotle's own definition.)



ὅσων ἢ τε αἰτία ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἕνεκά του γίγνεται  
καὶ μήτε αἰεὶ μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μήτε τεταγμένως·  
δηλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περὶ τούτων.

- 13 φύσει δέ, ὅσων ἢ τ' αἰτία ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τεταγμένη· P. 1369 b.  
ἢ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὡσαύτως ἀποβαίνει. τὰ  
γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, πότερα  
κατὰ φύσιν τινὰ ἢ ἄλλην αἰτίαν γίγνεται· δόξειε δ'  
14 ἂν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων. βίᾳ δέ,  
ὅσα παρ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνεται δι'  
15 αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων. ἔθει δέ, ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολ-  
16 λάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν. διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δο-  
κοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς  
τέλος ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν  
πράττηται· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι συμφέροντα  
πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ δι' ἡδονήν.  
17 διὰ θυμὸν δὲ καὶ ὀργὴν τὰ τιμωρητικά. διαφέρει δὲ

καὶ (δοῦν) μὴ ἕνεκά του...μήτε τεταγμένως] 'in any fixed, regular, pre-  
scribed order'.

§ 13. φύσει] Introd. p. 224.—ἢ αἰεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, 'either con-  
stantly, or as a general rule': the latter alternative allows for the possible  
objection of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν to the *perfect* regularity of the operations of  
Nature.

καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία] The καὶ admits that chance *as well as* Nature may  
be the cause of these unaccountable *monstra*, these deviations from the  
ordinary laws of nature; but leaves the question unsettled.

§ 14. βίᾳ] Introd. p. 225, anything that is done by our own instru-  
mentality, but in opposition to our desires and calculations, may be said  
to be done βίᾳ, by compulsion.

§ 15. ἔθει] Ib. p. 226—228.

§ 16. λογισμὸν] Ib. p. 229. Reasoning or calculation is a cause of  
action, when any of the goods already mentioned (c. 6) are presented to  
us as objects of our interest, as expedient and useful to us, (this is good  
under the aspect of *utility*; the other two forms of good are τὸ καλόν  
the moral end, 'the right', and τὸ ἡδύ: see Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 b 30,  
τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς ἀλρέσεις...καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος,) in the form  
of an end, or of means to that end; when, that is, *good* is the object of  
the action, (I add this qualification) because even the licentious (those  
who have lost all self-control, and therefore cannot act with a deliberate  
purpose to an end) do things that are expedient or for their interest, only  
not for that reason, but for mere pleasure.

§ 17. θυμός and ὀργή. Ib. p. 231.—τὰ τιμωρητικά, 'acts and feelings of

τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσ-  
χοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιούντος, ἵνα  
18 ἀποπληρωθῇ. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, δῆλον ἐσται p. 37.  
ἐν τοῖς περὶ παθῶν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράττεται ὅσα

revenge, are prompted by passion and anger'. I have translated *θυμός* 'passion' and *ὀργή* 'anger' to express the distinction that the one is a more general, the other a more precise and definite, term. Besides this, *θυμός* being the older and Homeric term to represent anger might by that very fact have conveyed to the ears of the more modern Greek a difference of meaning which had no real existence. *ὀργή*, if Damm's *Lexicon* is to be trusted, never occurs in Homer; [the word is not to be found in Mr G. L. Prendergast's (unpublished) *Concordance to the Iliad*. s.] Both of the terms as applied to emotions are in fact modifications and limitations of more general notions—*θυμός* the life or soul (Hom.) is limited to the most prominent and impressive outward manifestation of it, the expression of passion: *ὀργή* 'anger' is one, the most striking, of a class of animal impulses, *ὀργαί*. In Aristotle's psychology, the *θυμός* is one of the impulsive faculties (*ὀρέξεις*), together with the appetites and the (deliberate) wish, de Anima B 3, 414 b 2, and in the Platonic scheme the *θυμός* or *θυμοειδής* represents a whole class of impulses of which no doubt *ὀργή* is one—it is in fact the impulsive element of the human soul.

On the difference of *τιμωρία* and *κόλασις*, see Introd. p. 232. Compare I 14. 2. Of this theory of punishment as a preventive, a very good account is given by Protagoras, Plat. Protag. 324 B. Comp. also Eth. N. II 2, 1104 b 16, αἱ κολάσεις...λατρεῖαι γὰρ τινές εἰσι, αἱ δὲ λατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναγτίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

§ 18. For further particulars about *ὀργή* we are referred to the treatment of the *πάθη* in Bk. II: the chapter on anger is the second.

*ἐπιθυμία*. The last of the seven causes or stimulants of action is desire (Introd. p. 233), which excites all actions of which the object is pleasure. This pleasure may be either real or apparent, and therefore to include the latter we have *ὅσα φαίνεται* and not *ἐστίν*.

In the next two sentences the four incentives to action which originate in ourselves are shewn to be all referable in some sense to pleasure, real or apparent good, real or apparent as a motive cause. Of *ἐπιθυμία* it has been already stated that pleasure is the direct motive. Habit, again, is a kind of pleasure, for experience teaches that habituation and familiarity make actions not naturally agreeable pleasant to us—habit becomes a second nature. Of anger, revenge is the object, and revenge is proverbially sweet. And reasoning or calculation has always of course some good, real or supposed, for its object.

I have no doubt that Victorius is right in the distinction that he draws between *συνήθεις* and *ἐθιστόν*. The former represents a *natural* familiarity derived from familiar associations, with which, as I have pointed out on I 1. 2, the derivation, *σὺν ἡθος*, 'the haunting, herding together', the gregarious habit of some animals, is in exact accordance; so *συνήθεις*, of a man's 'familiar associates, habitual companions' I 11. 16;

-φαίνεται ἡδέα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθισ-  
τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ  
ἡδέων, ὅταν ἐθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιούσιν. ὥστε συλ-  
λαβόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅσα δι' αὐτοὺς πράττουσιν, ἅπαντ'  
ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινό-  
μενα ἡδέα. ἐπεὶ δ' ὅσα δι' αὐτούς, ἐκόντες πράττου-  
σιν, οὐχ ἐκόντες δὲ ὅσα μὴ δι' αὐτούς, πάντ' ἂν εἴη, ὅσα

the other is an *acquired* habit, a practice to which you *habituate yourself* by study and attention; of which virtue the settled *ἔξις* formed by *ἔθος* is the best example. 'In priore vero,' says Victorius, 'nulla industria aut cura, sed potius una cum aetate crevisse, eo verbo intelligitur; ut cum a puero quispiam in illis vixerit, inde factum sit ut ea ipsi iucunda videantur.'

[ἐθισθῶσιν] Spengel has adopted *συνεθισθῶσιν* from *συνεθίσωσιν*, the reading of MS A'. ['ἐθισθῶσιν *ceteri ut p.* 1370, 13' (c. II. 4). '*Restitui passivum.*' Spengel.]

πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] 'Perelegans est locus Agatharcidae p. 61 fragm. ed. H. Steph. οὕτως ἔχει τι φίλτρον μέγα πᾶσα συνήθεια· καὶ νικᾷ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος δυσχέρειαν ὁ χρόνος (it isn't the time, it is the association) ὁ τῇ πρώτῃ δεξιόμενος εἰς τὸν βίον ἡλικίαν.' Gaisford.

ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν] The dative is explained by supplying an imaginary τινί, 'as for one summing up to say'. An analogous phrase is ὥς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, Xen. Mem. III 8. 10, IV 3. 7. See note on I 7. 7, τὸ ποιητικῶς εἶναι, and Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388. Add Eth. N. I 5, 1097 b 13, ἐπεκτείνονται ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς...εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. In this and similar examples the dative may almost be regarded as an absolute case.

οὐχ ἐκόντες] Victorius here draws attention to Aristotle's well-known distinction, Eth. N. III 2, init., between οὐχ ἐκὼν and ἄκων. Acts due to ignorance, acts which would not have been done, had the doer been aware of all the circumstances of the case, cannot be called ἀκούσιοι, involuntary or unintentional, unless they bring after them regret or repentance; neither are they strictly speaking ἐκούσιοι, intentional, because no harm was intended; they lie between the two and must take the name of οὐχ ἐκούσιοι, 'not-intentional'; neither intentional nor 'unintentional'. I doubt if this distinction is applicable here; the only cases that it can be applied to are chance or accident, nature, and external compulsion, under which all actions are said to be involuntary, i.e. in which the will has no concern; and this is true. But in the Ethics, the actions there in question are not said to be involuntary—the doer meant to do what he did—but acting in ignorance, he acted unintentionally, in so far as he did not intend to do the mischief that followed. But this ignorance from which the unintentional character of the act is derived, essential in the Ethics, has no place here; ignorance is not included in an act done by chance, nature, or external compulsion.

Now as we act voluntarily in all these four cases in which the impulse is from within and action in our own power, it follows (from the preceding) that the object of all voluntary action is some form either of real or

ἐκόντες πράττουσιν, ἡ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἢ  
 ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα· τίθημι γὰρ καὶ τὴν τῶν κακῶν  
 ἢ φαινομένων κακῶν ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ ἀντὶ μείζονος  
 ἐλάττονος μετάληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (αἰρετὰ γάρ  
 πως), καὶ τὴν τῶν λυπηρῶν ἢ φαινομένων ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν  
 ἢ μετάληψιν ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλαττόνων ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν  
 ὡσαύτως. ληπτέον ἄρα τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα,  
 19 πόσα καὶ ποῖα. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν  
 τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ  
 ἡδέος εἴπωμεν νῦν. δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι τοὺς  
 ὅρους, εἰάν ᾧσι περὶ ἐκάστου μήτε ἀσαφεῖς μήτε  
 ἀκριβεῖς.

apparent good, or of real or apparent pleasure; including, in the good, real and apparent, the removal of evil and the substitution of a greater good for a less, because all these are *αἰρετά* (desirable), objects of choice; and in the case of pleasure, the entire removal of pain and the substitution of a less for a greater; both of which are like the others (*ὡσαύτως*) desirable in the sense of pleasurable.

§ 19. It is therefore (from the preceding considerations) the rhetorician's business to discover the number *and* kinds (so Aristotle, but the number *of* kinds will be sufficient,) of good in the form of utility or expediency, and of pleasure. And as the first has been already examined and analysed under the head of deliberative Rhetoric (cc. 6, 7, good, absolute, and comparative), it remains for us to bestow a similar treatment on pleasure. Meanwhile we are not to forget that definitions for *rhetorical* purposes are sufficient, provided they are neither obscure nor over-exact: in the one case they are not understood, in the other they are also apt to be unintelligible by the popular apprehension, but besides this they trespass upon an alien province and method of reasoning, the scientific, namely, or philosophical, I 4. 4—6, &c. Accordingly,

#### CHAP. XI

gives the analysis of pleasure, so far as it is of service to the rhetorician.

The general plan of this chapter, and the connexion of its contents, are as follows. First we have a definition of pleasure and a general description of its nature in §§ 1, 2. From this we learn that all that is in accordance with our nature is pleasurable, all that runs counter to it painful, §§ 3, 4. Consequently all *natural* desires and appetites produce pleasure by their gratification: and these fall into two classes, bodily appetites and mental desires, the former irrational and connected with the pleasures of sense, the latter rational, in so far as they are of an intellectual character, suggested and acquired by some kind of intellectual process of the nature of persuasion, § 5, and conveyed by a faculty, *φαντασία*, intermediate between sense and intellect. The analysis

- 1 ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τινα CHAP. XI.  
τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς  
 2 τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τούναντίον. εἰ δ'  
ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδὺ ἐστὶ τὸ P. 137a  
ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν  
ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν.  
 3 ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι

of these intellectual pleasures (which include the pleasures of imagination, memory and anticipation, of love and friendship, and its counterfeit, flattery) occupies §§ 6—20. In the remainder of the chapter other kinds of intellectual pleasures are distinguished, and referred to the principles implied in the definition.

§ 1. The first word of the chapter is a commentary upon the concluding observations of the last: *ὑποκείσθω*, 'let us assume', as a definition, 'take it for granted': there is no occasion to enter into details, or attempt to prove that it is what I am about to describe. Similarly *ἵστω*, 5. 3, 6. 2, 7. 2, 10. 3.

On the terms of this definition, and the comparison of it with other doctrines held by Aristotle himself and other critics on the same subject, see Introduction, Appendix D to Bk. 1, p. 234 seq.

*κατάστασιν...εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν*] This characteristic of pleasure, 'the resettlement of the soul', i.e. the vital and sensitive system, 'into its normal state' after a disturbance of the balance or harmony, which is pain, reappears in one of the special forms of pleasure, § 21, *ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι*. So that learning, as a pleasure, like pleasure in general, is, according to this view, the filling up of a vacuum, the supply of a want, the satisfaction of a craving, the restoration of a balance of the system, the re-establishment of a broken harmony. This is the Platonic conception of *pleasure*; not, so far as I remember, of *learning* in particular. See Appendix, p. 234. Lucretius takes the same view of pleasure, *de Rer. Nat.* 11 963 (there quoted).

§ 2. *καὶ ἡδὺ ἐστὶ τὸ ποιητικόν*] by the ordinary rule, 1 6. 2, and note: as all is good that is conducive to good; if the end, then the means; so all is pleasant that is productive of, or conducive to, pleasure. *Comp. Eth. N.* 1 4, 1096 b 10, quoted on the above passage.

*τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως*] *pleasure* is here properly called a *διάθεσις*, 'a temporary and passing disposition', as opposed to the 'confirmed, complete, and permanent state' which constitutes the *ἕξις*. On the distinction of the two, see *Categ.* c. 8, p. 8 b 27, *διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον. τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ τε ἐπιστήμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί...διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἃ ἐστὶν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ νόσος καὶ υγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα: διακίεται γὰρ πῶς κατὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γεγόμενος κ.τ.λ.*

§ 3. If pleasure is what it has been described to be, a return from a temporary disturbance or unnatural state into a state of nature (*φύσις*

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειληφότα ἡ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ' αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἔθῃ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ αἰεῖ, ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ αἰεῖ, 4 τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις. καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον· παρὰ

being here understood in one of the ordinary Aristotelian significations, the *normal nature*, nature in its best and complete condition), then all 'passing into a natural state' must be pleasant, 'and especially whenever what takes place in accordance with it has reached its own proper nature', i.e. its acme or maximum, the highest attainable point of its development, for instance, drinking, quenching the thirst is a pleasure, learning is a pleasure, but the acme or highest point they reach is still more pleasant in both. Schrader, who suggests these examples, expresses the later of the two stages in each, by *situm restinxisse, didicisse*, which not only does not give Aristotle's meaning correctly, but also, as I think, is not true as a matter of fact.

ἀπειληφότα ἦ] has attained to, acquired as its *due*, the opp. of ἀποδιδόναι, see note on I 1. 7. Gaisford cites in exemplification of this application of ἀπολαμβάνειν, Plutarch, de tuenda sanitate, II 130 E, τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἢ φύσις ἀπειληφειν (Nature has recovered, regained her own).

καὶ τὰ ἔθῃ κ.τ.λ.] 'and all habits, for in fact that which has become habitual now (by this time, now that it has reached this point) takes the form (γίγνεται) of something just like what is natural: for habit is a thing (τί) closely resembling nature; because frequent repetition makes a near approach to the constant and uniform, and nature belongs to the constant and uniform, and habit is a case of frequent repetition'. With this statement about habit, comp. de Memoria 2. 16, p. 452 a 27, ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἦδη τὸ ἔθος, and line 30, τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ. Gaisford refers to Plutarch, de tuenda sanit. 132 A, τὸ ἔθος τρόπον τινα φύσις τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν γέγονεν.

*Consuetudo altera natura*. Prov. ap. Erasm. (*Adagia*) p. 994. Eth. N. VII 11, 1152 a 30, ῥῆον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐηνος λέγει, φημι πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμμεναι φίλε, καὶ δὴ | ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

§ 4. καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον] 'and freedom from constraint, freedom of action' by the same rule; because all external force, compulsion or violence, is unnatural. 'And therefore all necessity (of every kind) is painful'. This marks the distinction of ἀναγκαῖον and βίαιον. Fate, for example, is ἀναγκαῖον, and Necessity ('Ἀνάγκη herself).

There is a chapter on τὸ ἀναγκαῖον which includes βίαιον as a species, in Metaph. Δ 5. There are four kinds of 'necessary' things'. The first is physical necessity, as breath and food are necessary to life: the second class consists of things necessary as means to an end, as taking medicine to get well, to take a voyage to Ægina to recover a sum of money: under this head comes βία (and τὸ βίαιον), an external force that controls us,

φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία. διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται

πάν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφν.

τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας p. 38.  
λυπηράς· ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ  
ἐθισθῶσιν· οὕτω δὲ τὸ ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ. τὰ δ' ἐναντία  
ἡδέα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμῖαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι  
καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὁ ὕπνος τῶν

something independent of ourselves and our own will, (here the external compulsion or violence is the necessary means to the attainment of its end, control). βίαιον is thus described, 1015 a 26, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐμποδίζον καὶ κωλυτικόν. τὸ γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται, διὸ καὶ λυπηρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐηνός φησι, 'πάν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφν.' καὶ ἡ βία ἀνάγκη τις, ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς λέγει 'ἀλλ' ἡ βία με ταῦτ' ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν' (this is incorrectly quoted; *memoriter*, as Bonitz thinks; the line runs, ἀλλ' ἡ βία γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀναγκάζει με δρᾶν, Electr. 256). The third species of ἀναγκαῖον includes τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν; and the fourth, which is somewhat unnecessarily distinguished from this, is the necessity of demonstration, ἀπόδειξις, of which the conclusion 'can only be in one way'—which shews that it ought to be included in the preceding. See also Waitz, ad Organ. 83 b 38, *Comm.* II p. 358.

καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται] 'Pentameter statim subsequens laudatur quoque ab Arist. in Met. IV 5, et in Ethic. ad Eud. II 7; necnon a Plutarcho in l. quod non suaviter vivit possit secundum *Epicurum*, 1102 C. Tribuitur utrobique Eveno Pario, poetae Elegiaco, Philisti historici praeceptor. Legitur tamen idem versus unica voce immutata ap. Theogn. 470 (472 Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr.* p. 382) πάν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφν.' Buhle.

'And all acts of attention or study, serious effort, vigorous exertion are painful' (supply ἀνάγκη εἶναι λυπηράς), 'for all these imply necessity and constraint, unless they become habitual; but *then* the habit makes them pleasant. The opposites are of course pleasant; all states of ease and comfort, and idleness and inattention, carelessness and indifference, and sports, and recreations, and sleep, belong to the family (or class) of things pleasant; for none of these is related to (or has a tendency to, *πρός*) necessity'.

τῶν ἡδέων (τι)] Comp. I 9. 25, νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν, I 11. 16 and 17. These are examples of a mode of expression, not unknown to earlier and contemporary writers, but more familiar to Aristotle. It is the substitution of a genitive case with *τι* omitted, for the direct predicate in apposition or agreement with the subject. In Aristotle *τι* or *ἐν* *τι* is sometimes expressed. I have not noted it in any writer earlier than Plato, but have no reason to suppose that he was the first to use it. Protag. 319 C, τῶν γενναίων. Theaet. 164 B, τῶν ἀδυνάτων *τι* ξυμβαίνειν φαίνεται. Phaed. 68 D, Rep. II 376 E (Stallbaum's note), Ib. IV 424 C, θὲς τῶν πεπεισμένων, 437 B, IX 577 B, ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν κρίναι. Æsch. c. Tim. § 143, ἐν *τι* τοῦτο

5 ἡδέων οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων. καὶ οὐ ἂν  
ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ, ἅπαν ἡδύ. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος

τῶν λυπηροτάτων. Demosth. c. Lept. sub init. ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δωρεάν τῶν ἀδίκων ἐστίν, Olynth. I 16, τῶν ἀποπωτάτων ἂν εἴη, Olynth. II p. 18. 13, ὥς ἐστι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων, de Fals. Leg. § 345, τῶν ἀπιοστούντων. ISOCT. κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν § 2, ἐν τούτῳ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστι. § 16, οὐκ εἶναι τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI 7, 1141 b 3, τῶν τιμωτάτων, VI 12, sub init. 1152 b 4, VIII I ult. τῶν καλῶν ἐν τι. Polit. I 2, 1253 a 2, τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, Ib. 5, 1254 a 22, c. 9, 1257 a 36, VI (IV) 4, 1291 a 9, ἐν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, Ib. c. 8, 1294 a 1, VIII (V) 3, 1303 a 19, τῶν ἀρχόντων γενομένου Ἡρακλεοδώρου, Ib. 7, 1306 b 28, IV (VII) 6, 1327 a 27, Ib. c. 9, 1329 a 9, Ib. c. 14, 1332 b 32, ἐν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων. de Anima A 1. 2, 402 a 10, c. 5, 411 a 15, τῶν παραλογωτέρων (*comparative*, very unusual). de Caelo, I 5. 1, sub init. II 12. 4, 292 a 12, τῶν ἀναριθμήτων εἶναι. Hist. An. III 11. 4, 518 a 2, τῶν συνεχῶν δὲ τὸ δέρμα ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς ζώοις. Topic. B 9, 114 b 18, 19, 21, Γ 6, 119 b 11, Z 3, 141 a 5, τῶν ἀτόπων, Θ 2, 157 a 25. Waitz ad Org. 121 b 36, Vol. II p. 473.

§ 5. καὶ οὐ ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ] Anything is pleasant of which the desire is innate in us, 'the object of any of our *natural* desires or appetites', the definition of desire being 'an impulse towards pleasure'. de Anima B 3. 2, 414 b 2, ὁρεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, b 5, τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὁρεῖς αὕτη (ἡ ἐπιθυμία). Ib. Γ 10. 4, 433 a 25, ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὁρεῖς τις ἐστίν; and compare the following sections on ἐπιθυμία and its congeners. Eth. N. III 15, 1119 b 6, κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παῖδια, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὁρεῖς. Similarly Plato speaks of desire as naturally associated with pleasure, Phaedrus 237 D, ἡ ἔμφυτος οὐσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν.

This leads to a distinction of desires into rational and irrational, corresponding severally to the two parts of our moral and intellectual nature, the λόγον ἔχον and the ἀλογον—the latter division is attributed to Plato by the author of Magna Moralia, I 1. 7, 1182 a 23.

The irrational appetites, the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν (Republic), are those which are not accompanied or guided by reason, which act naturally or by a physical necessity, ὅσαι λέγονται φύσει, (these are Plato's ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίαι; Rep. VIII 554 A, 558 D, 559 A, B, see the whole passage, IX 572 C, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους, ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλώπισμοῦ ἕνεκα γιγνομένας; and have corresponding ἡδοναί, Rep. VIII 558 D, Phileb. 72 E), and are not prompted by any 'supposition', ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι, any suggestion of ulterior advantage of any kind thereby accruing, but are forced upon us by the imperious demands of nature; such as bodily appetites (those which we have, which come to us, through the channel or *medium* of (διὰ) the body, sensual, αἱ σωματικαί, Eth. N. VI 6, sub init. ἀναγκαῖα τὰ σωματικά, compare the whole passage), for instance, that of food, thirst, and hunger, and the (special) desires of particular kinds of food (special tastes leading to particular kinds of pleasure); and those connected with taste in general, and with sex, and universally with touch (which includes *taste*, 'gustus,' with *feeling* in general, τὸ δὲ γευστὸν ἅπτόν τι, de Anima B 10 init.), and with smell (of fragrance), and hearing and sight. The rational, those which are accompanied with reason, are such as owe their origin to



ἐστὶν ὀρεξίς. τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἀλογοὶ εἰσιν αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. λέγω δὲ ἀλόγους μὲν ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι λέγονται φύσει, ὥσπερ αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσιν, οἷον ἡ τροφῆς, δίψα καὶ πείνα, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον [τροφῆς] εἶδος ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἀπτά, καὶ περὶ ὁσμὴν [εὐωδίας] καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ ὄψιν· μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκού-  
 6 σαντες καὶ πεισθέντες. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδεσθαι ἐν

'persuasion' of some kind—these are artificial and acquired tastes, as opposed to the natural and inborn τὰ ἔντονα, φυσικά—because the hearing (things praised and admired by others) and persuasion in general (the influence of fashion and association and instruction as well as direct persuasion) suggest to us a taste for, or desire of, seeing and possessing things.

The division accordingly resolves itself into (1) natural and necessary, (2) artificial and acquired, desires and tastes.

ὅσας ἐπιθυμοῦσιν] sc. ἐπιθυμίας, is a cognate accusative; ἐπιθυμῶν is construed only with the genitive case and infinitive mood.

§ 6. The received text followed by Bekker and Spengel puts a full stop at ἐλπίζει [p. 206, line 3]. (The latter editor has also adopted the reading of MS A' αἰεὶ ἐν for κἄν). With this punctuation, κἄν τῷ μεμνημένῳ—ἐλπίζει must be the apodosis, and the argument runs thus: 'If pleasure consists in sensation, and φαντασία is a kind of sensation, then (assuming that there is pleasure in memory and anticipation) memory and anticipation must be always accompanied by a mental impression of what is remembered or anticipated'—pleasure being the middle term, without which the supposed apodosis will not follow from the premisses. But this is not what Aristotle undertakes to shew; and also it assumes first what is proved in the next sentence, viz. that pleasure does accompany memory and anticipation. Surely Victorius and Vater are right in supposing the apodosis of the entire sentence, ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. to be δηλον ὅτι—καὶ αἰσθησις, which is in fact what Aristotle here wishes to establish. Substitute a colon for the full stop: retain κἄν (for καὶ ἐν) instead of αἰεὶ ἐν; and understand the first three clauses ἐπεὶ—ἐλπίζει, as three distinct and independent propositions, the basis of the conclusion which follows; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο is a repetition in sum of the foregoing, 'if all this, I say, be so', (δεῖ is appropriate in a *resumption* of what has been just said, note on I 1. 11); *if* pleasure is a mode of sensation, *if* φαντασία is a feeble kind of sensation, and *if* memory and hope are attended by a φαντασία or mental impression of that which is remembered or hoped (some phenomenon past or future, the former a fact, the latter an imagination), it follows that pleasure, which is sensation, accompanies the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future because φαντασία

τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν

does, which is a form of sensation, *ἐπεὶ περ καὶ αἰσθήσεις*<sup>1</sup>. In this case *καὶ* is to be retained in preference to *ἀλλ' ἐν*. The latter necessarily makes the clause that it introduces, the apodosis; *καὶ ἐν* merely couples this with the preceding premisses. The mood *ἀκολουθοῖ δὲ*, which might seem objectionable in the mere statement of a proposition, must be considered as a qualified statement of the fact, 'will be likely to attend'; only so much can be affirmed.

*φαντασία*] which is here called a 'sort of feeble sensation', is described otherwise in the psychology of the *de Anima*. It is defined Γ 3, 429 a 1, *ἡ φαντασία δὲ εἰς κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γυγνομένης* (for *γυγνομένης*, Trendelenburg and Torstrik), not, therefore, a mode of sensation as here, but a motion generated by sensation in active exercise: and again 428 d 1, *φαντασία καθ' ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίνεσθαι*: 'the presentative faculty' (Sir W. Hamilton). It is a faculty intermediate between sensation and memory, and thus becomes connected with the intellect; the seat of memory is τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν, viz. the heart, where the results of sensation are all collected in a focus, and thence transmitted to the mind. The memory is defined, *de memoria*, c. 1, ult. 451 a 15, *φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκότος οὐ φάντασμα, ἔξις*; which represents it as a state (in the heart, or the appropriate organ) of the impression *φάντασμα*, transferred by the faculty of *φαντασία* from the sensation itself, which (the impression) is the representation (the *εἰκὼν*) of the real object of sense, that of which it is the *φάντασμα*. The office of the *φαντασία* is therefore to convey the impressions of the actual objects of sense delivered to it by sensation, and to impress or print them on the organ fitted for their reception; when thus impressed or 'represented' they become memory, and so are passed on to the intellect. To compare with what is said in the *Rhetoric*, of this *φαντασία* being a sort of feeble sensation, we have in the *de Anima*, Γ 3, 428 b 11, what almost (not quite) justifies it, *ἐπειδὴ... ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησις τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἰσθήσις ἐστίν, ἵσоти δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη δὲ αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὐτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὐτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν... καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθὴ καὶ ψευδῆ*. Though thus closely allied with sensation, and dependent upon it, the *φαντασία* is not a faculty of mere sensation, but belongs equally to the intellect, *φαντασία ἀπασα ἡ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ*, *de Anima* Γ 10 ult. 433 b 29, (being apparently intermediate between them and partaking of the nature of both); of which (intellect), when we take the whole of it, the *διάνοια* as well as the *νοῦς*, into account, the *φαντασία*

<sup>1</sup> That pleasure is attendant upon every act of sensation is stated in *Eth. Nic.* x 4, 1174 b 21, *κατὰ πασῶν γὰρ αἰσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή*, and again, line 27, *καθ' ἐκάστην δ' αἰσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή δηλον*. But this is not the same thing as the statement of the *Rhetoric* which identifies the two, just as Eudemus in the 7th book of the *Nic. Eth.* identifies pleasure with the *ἐνέργειαι*, of which in Aristotle's 10th book it is only the concomitant. And there is a precisely similar overstatement here of the nature of the *φαντασία*, as compared with the description of it in the *de Anima*, where it is said to be a kind of sensation, instead of closely connected with it. See the following note, on *φαντασία*.

αἰσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, κἂν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπί-  
ζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὐ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπί-  
ζει<sup>1</sup>. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὁδὸν ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνη-  
7 μένοισι καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπέπερ καὶ αἰσθησις. ὥστ'  
ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι  
παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνησθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν τῷ  
ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα,  
μέμνηται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλ-  
8 λοντα. τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον P. 1370 b.

<sup>1</sup> ἐλπίζει· (see note on p. 204).

actually forms a part; c. 3, 427 b 28, τούτου δὲ (τοῦ νοεῖν) τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις. 'Imaginatio inter sensuum perceptiones et mentis cogitationes media intericitur, ut imaginatio sensibus, mens imaginatione egeat.' Trendelenburg ad de Anima III 3, 4, p. 453. On the various relations of the φαντασία, see the notes of the same Comm. ad de Anima, pp. 166, 462, 538, also Bonitz on Metaph. A 1, 980 b 26, p. 33, Waitz ad Org. 100 b 27, Vol. II, p. 440. [Ueber den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bei Aristoteles. J. Freudenthal (Göttingen) 1863, pp. 59. s.]

§ 7. Consequently all pleasures may be reduced to three classes, according as they are referred to things present, past, or future. The pleasures of the present are the immediate pleasures of direct sensation; those of the past are the 'pleasures of memory', the pleasures that accompany, or are revived by, association, in the way of recollection, of past facts; and those of the future are derived by a similar association from the anticipation of future pleasure. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἢ μνήμη· ἡδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν [Eth. N. IX 7, 1168 a 13]. Of memory, Ov. Heroid. XVIII 55, (Hero to Leander) *Nox erat incipiens; namque est meminisse voluptas; cum foribus patriis egrediebar amans*.

§ 8. Therefore everything that can be remembered is capable of giving pleasure; not only things that were pleasant at the time they happened, but some that were not, provided the after consequence of them was something right or good (right, morally; good, as tending to profit or advantage)<sup>1</sup>; whence the saying, 'nay truly, pleasant it is to remember past troubles after deliverance (escape) from them'. Fragm. Eur. Andromed. xv (Dind. xxxvi), Wagner, *Fragm. Poet. Trag. Gr.* Vol. II p. 75,

<sup>1</sup> When there has been no compensation of this kind, the remembrance of past suffering is painful. Ovid, *Metam.* IX 290, *quin nunc quoque frigidus artus, dum loquor, horror habet; pars est meminisse doloris*. XIII 283, (Ulysses) *me miserum, quanto cogor meminisse dolore temporis illius, quo Graium murus Achilles procubuit*. Virg. *Aen.* II 10, *sed si tantus amor casus cognoscere nostros...quamquam animus meminisse horret luctuque refugit, incipiam*. Dante, *Inferno*, c. V 121, *Nessun maggior dolore, che ricordarsi del tempo felice nella miseria*. Shakspeare, *Richard II.* Act. I Sc. 3, 300, *Oh no! the apprehension of the good gives but the greater feeling to the worse*.

ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ' ἔνια  
καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἃν ἡ ὑστέρον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ  
μετὰ τοῦτο· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηται,

ἀλλ' ἡδὺ τοι σωθέντα μεμνήσθαι πόνων,  
καὶ

μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνὴρ  
μνήμενος, ὅς τις πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πολλὰ ἑόργη.

9 τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακόν. τὰ

cited by Plut. Symp. II 1, p. 630 E, and translated by Cicero, de Fin. II 32. 105, *suavis laborum est praeteritorum memoria*. Cic. Ep. ad Fam. V 12. 2 *habet enim praeteriti doloris secunda recordatio delectationem*. Wagner adds, 'ex hoc loco et altero Archippi Comici apud Stobaeum LIX 7, profecisse Epictetum ap. Schweig. T. III, p. 104, scribentem, ὡς ἡδὺ τὴν θάλατταν ἀπὸ γῆς ὄρῃν, οὕτως ἡδὺ τῷ σωθέντι μεμνήσθαι πόνων, monuit Meinek. ad Menandrum p. 86.' Stobaeus quotes a second verse of Archippus, ὡς-ὄρῃν, δ' μήτ' ἔστι, μὴ πλείοντα μῆδαμόν, which supplies the link of association from which the pleasure is derived. It is from a contrast of past trouble with present immunity, and the feeling of security which it engenders; and it has for its foundation the same feeling as is suggested by the celebrated lines of the opening of the second book of Lucretius' poem, the famous *suave mari magno*. The same association, the sense of comfort and security derived from an uncomfortable contrast, is the foundation of the pleasure expressed in the exquisite lines of Sophocles, Fragm. Tymp. 563 (Dind.) apud Stobaeum LIX 12, φεῦ φεῦ, τί τούτου χάσμα μέϊζον ἂν λάβοις τοῦ γῆς ἐπιψύσσαντα καὶ ὑπὸ στέγῃ πυκνῆς ἀκούσαι ψεκᾶδος εὐδούση φρενί;—to make the land, and then, the fatigues and perils past, to sit safe and snug under shelter, listening in dreamy and drowsy mood to the fast-falling drops of rain overhead—sign of the storm still raging, reminiscence of the past, and contrast with the comfort within. Comp. Cic. ad Atticum II 7, *cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intueri; cupio, ut ait tuus amicus Sophocles, κἂν ὑπὸ στέγῃ et cet.*

Another illustration of this source of pleasure is taken from Homer Odys. ο' (xv) 399, which Aristotle, as usual, has misquoted. With this compare Virg. Aen. I 202, *revocate animos maestumque timorem miltite. Forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit*. Comp. again Cic. ad Fam. I c. *Nihil est aptius ad delectationem lectoris quam temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissitudines: quae etsi nobis optabiles in experiendo non fuerunt, in legendo tamen erunt iucundae*.

τούτου δ' αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.] 'and the reason of this is that there is pleasure even in the absence of evil'; that is, in the way of contrast with our former condition, from which we are now relieved; all relief, the removal of oppression and constraint, is pleasurable.

§ 9. τὰ δ' ἐν ἐλπίδι (ἡδέα ἐστίν) κ.τ.λ.] 'everything is pleasant in anticipation which appears to confer great delight or profit when present; and to do this without any accompanying pain', 'and in general, all that

δ' ἐν ἐλπίδι, ὅσα παρόντα ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἢ ὠφελεῖν p- 39-  
φαίνεται μεγάλα, καὶ ἄνευ λύπης ὠφελεῖν. ὅλως δ'  
ὅσα παρόντα εὐφραίνει, καὶ ἐλπίζοντας καὶ μεμνημέ-  
νους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἡδύ,  
ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο·

οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ φαινομένῳ τιμωρίας  
τυχεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῖς πολὺ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς τῇ δυνάμει, <ἀλλ>

10 ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἥττον. καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλείεσταις  
delights when present, delights for the most part in anticipation and  
recollection. Therefore even anger is pleasant—the prospect of ven-  
geance lends a solace and a charm even to anger; comp. II 2.2, πάσῃ ὀργῇ  
ἔπαισθαι τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι κ.τ.λ. and the  
same line of Homer, IL Σ 100, is quoted in illustration, 'for no one is  
angry with one who is plainly beyond the reach of his vengeance', (see  
the above passage of Book II,) 'or with those who are far above him in  
power; either not at all, or less'. ἀδικοῦμένοι τε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι  
μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι,  
τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι, Thuc. I 77. 5. On φαινόμενος  
= φανερός, see note on II 2. 1.

§ 10. Most appetites and desires are accompanied by a certain plea-  
sure: which is felt either in the recollection of the past, or in the antici-  
pation of the future, enjoyment; for instance, those who are suffering under  
(*litt.* held, possessed by) fevers feel a pleasure in the thirst (that attends  
them), either from the remembrance of former draughts, or the expectation  
of future; and lovers in talking of their beloved (in his absence), or  
painting his portrait, or drawing his likeness, from memory, and com-  
posing verses in his honour' (so Victorius and Vater; else, γράφοντες  
'writing of him', and ποιούντες τι δεῖ 'in anything that they ever do which  
has any connexion with him', περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου 'so as to recall him to  
their recollection'); for in all such cases the recollection appears to their  
fancy (*οἶονται*) to be like the (present) perception (by any of the senses) of  
the beloved.

All these last are pleasures of memory, agreeable *reminiscences*. The  
pleasures of memory are further exemplified in this, that when the love  
which has already arisen from the delight found in the actual presence of  
the beloved is retained by the memory in his absence, this is a sure sign  
of the commencement of a genuine and lasting passion. Bekker, ed. 3,  
followed by Spengel, has put ἐρώσιν in brackets: F. A. Wolf had pre-  
viously objected to it. It may be retained and explained as I have trans-  
lated it, but the text and the general meaning would not suffer by its  
omission. ἐρώσιν if retained implies that the passion is *already* conceived.  
Gaisford, after Victorius, quotes Eth. Nic. IX 5, 1167 a 4, ἔοικε δὲ (ἡ εὐνοία)  
ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἢ διὰ τῆς ὀψευς ἡδονῆς· μὴ γὰρ προησθελς  
τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐθεὶς ἐρᾶ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἶδει οὐθὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾶ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα  
ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ.

- ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις ἡδονή· ἥ γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς  
 ἔτυχον ἢ ἐλπίζοντες ὡς τεύξονται χαίρουσιν τινὰ  
 ἡδονήν, οἷον οἳ τ' ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς ἐχόμενοι ταῖς δί-  
 ψαις καὶ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔπιον καὶ ἐλπίζοντες πιεῖσθαι  
 11 χαίρουσιν, καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γρά-  
 φοντες καὶ ποιοῦντές τι αἰεὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαί-  
 ρουσιν· ἐν ἅπασιν γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἷον  
 αἰσθάνεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ ἐρωμένου. καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ  
 ἔρωτος αὕτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος  
 12 χαίρωσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος μεμνημένοι. διὸ καὶ  
 ὅταν λυπηρὸς γένηται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς  
 πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐγγίνεταί τις ἡδονή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ  
 λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονή δ' ἐν τῷ μεμνηθῆναι  
 καὶ ὁρᾶν πῶς ἐκείνον, καὶ ἃ ἔπραττε, καὶ οἷος ἦν. διὸ  
 καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκότως εἴρηται,

ὥς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἡμέρον ὥρσε γόοιο.

- 13 καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἡδύ· οὗ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν

*ἐχόμενοι*] Victorius inquires here whether *ἐχόμενοι* should be construed with ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς, as Plat. Phileb. 45 B, ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι, or with ταῖς δίψαις: the case is doubtful, either will do.

*ταῖς δίψαις*] *their* thirst, that which naturally belongs to them: the possessive use of the definite article.

§ 12. 'And this again is the reason why, even when (the beloved) (becomes painful) causes pain (to his admirer) by his absence, there is still some pleasure that finds its way *into* (grows up, is engendered, in) his lamentations and wailings; for the pain that he feels is at the want of him, but *with* that, there is a pleasure in the recollection and, in a sense, sight of himself, and what he used to do, and how to look and behave, (*οἷος* what sort of person he was, in external appearance, and character, i. e. conduct)'. The very absence, and the pain that it causes, and the expression of grief, have a charm in them which affords some compensation by the recollection of all that he is and does. 'Hence the appropriateness of the saying',—meaning especially the use of the word *ἡμερος*, which implies eager desire, in relation to γόος—'thus spake he, and in them all aroused longing desire for wailing'. This is a familiar phrase in Homer, and occurs several times both in the Iliad and Odyssey. See in Damm's *Lexicon*, s. v. *ἡμερος*. Andromache looking back at Hector as she was taking leave of him, *δακρύνει γελᾶσασα*, is a picture of the mixture of pleasure and pain (Il. Z 484).

§ 13. 'And revenge is sweet', by the logical theory of convertible

λυπηρόν, τὸ τυγχάνειν ἡδύ· οἱ δ' ὀργιζόμενοι λυ-  
 πούνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες  
 14 δὲ χαίρουσιν. καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλο-  
 νίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν φαντασία γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς γίγνε-  
 ται, οὗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἡρέμα ἢ μᾶλλον.  
 15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς παιδιαὶς ἡδεΐας

opposites, 'for where failure is painful, success must be pleasant; and angry men, whilst they are vexed beyond all measure if they miss their revenge, are equally delighted in the anticipation of it'. *ἀνυπερβλήτως*, 'unsurpassably', a rare word, found as adj. in Isocr. Paneg. § 71, Xen. Cyrop. VIII 7. 15, Plat. Defn. 412 B, Dem. Olynth. II 23. 11, Epitaph. 1389. 7, Lycurg. c. Leocr. § 101, and more frequently in Polybius. Of the adverb I find only this one example. [Cf., however, Rhet. ad Alexandrum, 12, 1430 b 25, *ἀνυπερβλήτως* τιμωροῦνται, *Index Aristotelicus*. S.]

§ 14. And victory is a source of pleasure—not only to those who have a special and peculiar 'fondness' for it (τοῖς φιλονίκοις), but universally, to everybody; because it gives rise to (γίγνεται, there arises) an impression (fancy or notion) of superiority, of which all feel the desire either in a slight degree or more strongly. Comp. I 9. 39, ἡ δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν... ἐπεὶπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ δοκεῖ μὲν εὖ ἀρετὴν. Superiority is a noble or right aim, or end of action; and indicative of 'virtue'. This is one of the modes in which the 'love of power' manifests itself, to which, as a purely selfish instinct, Hobbes sought to trace all our feelings and springs of action. The Emotion of Power is, in Mr Bain's Classification of the Emotions as sources of action, one of the most important of a family of eleven which together compose our moral constitution. Bain, *Emotions and Will*, p. 59, and the admirable analysis, 145—162. See also Dugald Stewart on this subject, there quoted p. 145. 'The objects of the sense of power may be described as the effects or consequences of our own agency surveyed under such a comparison as to set forth some kind of *superiority*.' This is the ὑπεροχὴ in question.

§ 15. This love of victory, as an evidence of *superiority*, is the foundation of the amusement derived from all sports and games into which competition enters; all, namely, that involve a contest either of bodily strength and skill (as cricket, athletic exercises, and all encounters of a *combative* character, *μαχητικὰς*, cock-fights, bear-baiting, pugilistic encounters, tournaments and sham-fights of all kinds), or 'wit-combats', intellectual and dialectical encounters (*ἐριστικὰς*); games of knuckle-bones, of ball, of dice, and draughts.

Three MSS Q, Y, Z<sup>1</sup> here add αὐλητικὰς, (τὰς *μαχητικὰς* καὶ τὰς αὐλη-  
 τικὰς καὶ *ἐριστικὰς*), to represent 'musical' contests, which spoils the  
 antithesis, and introduces a vicious classification.

On the zeal and eagerness and love of victory manifested by children in their sports, comp. Cic. de Fin. v 22. 61. On *παιδιαὶ ἐριστικαί*, Probl. XVIII 2 (referred to by Gaisford). Διὰ τί οἱ ἐριστικοὶ λόγοι γυμναστικοὶ εἰσιν; ἢ ὅτι ἔχουσι τὸ νικᾶν ἢ ἡττᾶσθαι πυκνόν; φιλονείκους οὖν εὐθὺς ποι-  
 οῦσιν καὶ γὰρ νικῶντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγονται μᾶλλον ἐρίζειν καὶ ἡττώ-

εἶναι τὰς μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἐριστικὰς (πολλάκις γὰρ P. 1371.  
ἐν ταύταις γίγνεται τὸ νικᾶν) καὶ ἀστραγαλίσεις καὶ  
σφαιρίσεις καὶ κυβείας καὶ πεττείας. καὶ περὶ τὰς

μενοὶ ὡς ἀναμαχοῦμενοι. καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγῶσι ταυτό· διὸ καὶ μαχόμενοι  
καὶ ἥττους ὄντες πολλάκις οὐ βούλονται διαλύεσθαι.

ἐριστική here in the Rhetoric means nothing more than the practice of dialectics, arguing against an opponent, and for victory. It has, however, almost always in Plato, and not unfrequently in Aristotle, the additional connotation of captious reasoning, quibbling and sophistry. In *Top.* IV (de *Soph. El.*) 11, 171 b 24, the *ἐριστικοί* are defined as οἱ πάντως νικᾶν προαιρούμενοι, and again 25, οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ ἀθροῦνται καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Here there is already the imputation of an over-disputatious habit implied by the word, but by and by, in lines 30, 32, it is associated with sophistry and sophists; but with this distinction—they both argue unscrupulously, ‘but the eristics do this to gain an apparent victory, the sophists to make a show of wisdom’; the definition of the sophist being, c. 1, 165 a 22, χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φανομένης σοφίας οὐσῆς δ’ οὐ. Again, c. 2, 165 b 7, they are distinguished from the genuine dialecticians, who deal with τὰ ἐνδόξα *real* probabilities, by this sophistical habit and mode of arguing, ἐριστικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὄντων δὲ συλλογιστικοὶ ἢ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί. ψευδὴς λόγος καλεῖται τετραχῶς· ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ὅταν φαίνεται συμπεραίνεσθαι μὴ συμπεραυνόμενος, ὃ καλεῖται ἐριστικὸς συλλογισμός. *Top.* Θ 12, 162 b 3. In *Rhet.* II 24. 10, τὰ ἐριστικὰ stands for the sophistical practice of unfair reasoning, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός ‘lead to an apparent, or fallacious, conclusion’.

ἀστραγαλίσεις] The game of ἀστράγαλοι, ‘knucklebones’, cut into rough dice with only four flat sides (*talus*), and so distinguished from the κύβοι (*tesserae*), which (as the name imports) had all six sides flat, is described in Rich, *Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Antiq.* p. 64, Smith, *Dict. Antiq.* s. v. *talus*, p. 1095 (ed. 2), Becker, *Gallus*, Exc. II, p. 499 (Engl. Tr.), *Charicles*, Exc. III, p. 354. And for an account of the other games mentioned see the same authorities (reff. in Index); [also K. F. Hermann’s *Lehrbuch der Griechischen Privatalterthümer*, ed. 2, § 55. S.]

σφαιρίσεις] *Theaet.* 146 A, *Athen.* A 25, 26, p. 14 D—15 C, πολὺ δὲ τὸ σύντονον καὶ καματηρὸν τῆς περὶ τὴν σφαιριστικὴν ἀμίλλης κ.τ.λ.

κυβείας καὶ πεττείας] often go together, *Plat. Phaedr.* 274 D, *Rep.* II 374 C, (on the difficulty of these two games); *Soph. Naupl. Fragm.* 4, πεσσοὺς κύβους τε. *Fragm.* 380, 381 (Dindorf). *Plut. (Cap. Descr.) Qu. Rom.* p. 272 F, Ζάκορος τις...ἀπολαύων σχολῆς ἔθος εἶχεν ἐν πεττοῖς καὶ κύβοις τὰ πολλὰ διημερεῖν. The πεττοί in particular was an old and favourite game, which appears from the constant allusions to it in Greek literature. The earliest mention of it occurs in Homer, *Od.* α’ 107. The corresponding Latin game, *latrunculi*, is described by Ovid, *Ars Am.* II 208, III 357.

The same is the case with ‘serious’ games (games that require study and attention, such as chess, and πεττεία and κυβεία, according to Plato, l. c.)—the only difference between serious games and games of mere amusement, in respect of the pleasures they afford, is that the pleasure in



ἐσπουδασμένας δὲ παιδίας ὁμοίως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαι γίγνονται, ἂν τις ἢ συνήθης, αἱ δ' εὐθύς ἡδεῖαι, οἷον p. 4a.  
 κυνηγία καὶ πᾶσα θηρευτική· ὅπου γὰρ ἄμιλλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ νίκη ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ  
 16 ἐριστικὴ ἡδεῖα τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ δυναμένοις. καὶ  
 τιμὴ καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἡδίστων διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι φαν-

the one case must be *acquired*, and arise from habit and cultivation, whereas others are *naturally* agreeable, lit. *at once* (εὐθύς, from the very first); to this latter class belong hunting with dogs, and every kind of chase.

Various 'kinds of chase' are enumerated in the Politics, I 8, in the description of the 'hunting stage', the second, according to Aristotle, in the development of human civilization. He takes occasion from this to distinguish the several kinds of hunting. οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἔτεροι ἑτέρας, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ ἀλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἑλη καὶ ποταμούς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην (i.e. of the same kind as the lakes, marshes and rivers, namely, fish-producing) προσοικοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων, piracy, man-hunting, fishing, fowling, and hunting wild animals, hunting proper.

Wherever there is rivalry or competition, there is also victory, the opportunity of shewing one's superiority. And this is what makes practice at the bar and in the law courts (where there is a perpetual struggle and contest for the victory going on between the two rival pleaders), and that of dialectics (what is avowedly and technically a contest between two opposites), pleasant occupations.

§ 16. This quasi-sensation, the *φαντασία*, is again employed to explain the pleasure we derive from honour and fair fame, the favourable opinion of others. These are pleasant because every one who possesses them always acquires an impression or fancy that he must be such an one as is the good (such as ὁ σπουδαῖος, to whom alone such things are really *due*), and a *φαντασία*, being a form of sensation, always carries pleasure with it, § 6; and this pleasure is still greater (the *φαντασία* becomes still more vivid, and its effect greater) when he believes that those who say so (οἱ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος) are likely to be right in what they say. Such (οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀληθεύειν) are near neighbours who know a man better, and are therefore better judges, than those (friends) that live at a distance; intimates (familiar, habitual associates, *συνήθεις*, note on I 1. 2, 10. 18), and fellow-citizens rather than strangers afar off, (who only know him by report); contemporaries rather than posterity (to whom the same reason applies); wise men rather than fools; many rather than few. This is because (γάρ; i.e. the preference, expressed by the *μᾶλλον* in each case, is due to the fact that) those (first) mentioned are more likely to arrive at the truth than the opposite; for when a man has a great contempt for any one, as children and beasts, he cares not at all for their respect and good opinion, at least on account of the opinion itself, but, if at all, for something else.

τῶν ἡδίστων] Note on § 4, *σὺντα*.

τασίαν ἐκάστω ὅτι τοιοῦτης οἷος ὁ σπονδαῖος, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν φῶσιν οὐς οἶεται ἀληθεύειν. τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον τῶν πόρρω, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις καὶ οἱ πολίται τῶν ἀπωθεν, καὶ οἱ ὄντες τῶν μελλόντων,

τῶν ἀπωθεν] The *fact* that words (substantives, adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns, Διόθεν οὐρανόθεν οἰκόθεν, ἀλλόθεν παντόθεν, ἐντοσθεν ἔξωθεν πρόσωθεν ἴσωθεν, ὅθεν σίθεν ἐμέθεν) with the old genitive termination -θεν, are often substituted for the primitive forms, particularly with the definite article as οἱ αὐτόθεν (see many instances of this idiom in Index to Arnold's *Thucyd.* s. v.), οἱ ἔξωθεν, οἱ ἀνωθεν, κάτωθεν, οἰκόθεν, ἐκείθεν, and such like, in phrases where the termination *seems* to have entirely lost its force, has been long known and noticed: see examples in Wunder's note, *Antig.* 519, and Lobeck, *Phryg.* p. 128: but the explanation of this usage, so far as I know, is still wanting. It is to be found in an observation of Hermann, on Soph. Electr. 888, ἰσχάτης δ' ὀρῶ πυρᾶς νεωρῇ βόστρυχον, and 882, ὀρῶ κολώτης ἐξ ἄκρας νεοῖρύτους πηγὰς γάλακτος, 'solent Graeci spatia non a vidente et audiente ad id quod ille videt et audit, sed ab isto ad hunc metiri': they reverse *our* order of proceeding; we measure from ourselves to the object, the Greeks from the object to themselves. The application of this simple fact to all the cases resembling those above given solves the whole mystery of the idiom, which, as Lobeck says, *olim vel barbatus magistros obstupescit.* (Lobeck is speaking merely of the knowledge of the *fact*; he himself assigns no reason.) Rhet. I 15. 16, οἱ δ' ἀπωθεν, II 6. 23, τοὺς ἀπωθεν. In Eurip. Ion 585—6 (Dind.) both points of view are taken, οὐ ταῦτόν εἶδος φαίνεται τῶν πραγμάτων πρόσωθεν ὄντων ἐγγύθεν θ' ὀρωμένων, unless, as is at least equally probable, the interpretation of ἐγγύθεν ὀρωμένων be, 'seen' not 'from a near point' where *we* are, but 'seen', the sight of them proceeding, from a near point, where *they* are. Arist. Pol. VII (VI) 4, 1319 a 8, gives an excellent illustration of this difference between the Greek and our point of view: Aristotle is speaking of some restrictions on the occupation of land: ἡ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτῆσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρου πρὸς ἢ ἀπὸ τινὸς τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἀστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν—or, as we say, 'within a certain distance *from* the city'. Plat. Theaet. 165 D, ἐγγύθεν ἐπίστασθαι πόρρωθεν δὲ μή (not, as in English, *at* a distance, but *from* a distance, *as seen* from a distance), Rep. VII 523 B, τὰ πόρρωθεν φαινόμενα, Ib. C, εἴτ' ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν. Ib. 514 B, εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, φῶς πυρὸς ἀνωθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καόμενον ὀπίσθεν αὐτῶν. Soph. Oed. Col. 505, τοῦκείθεν ἀλσους, Philoct. 27, δοκῶ γὰρ ὅλον εἶπας ἄντρον εἰσορᾶν. 'Οδ. ἀνωθεν, ἢ κατωθεν; οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. Eur. Iph. T. 41, σφάγια δ' ἄλλοισιν ἄρρηγ' ἴσωθεν τῶνδ' ἀνακτόρων θεᾶς. Tyrtaeus, Fraggm. 8. 38, 9. 12 (Bergk, *Fr. Lyr. Gr.*), ἐγγύθεν ἰστάμενοι. Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

As regards ἀπωθεν and ἀπόθεν, the former is condemned as formed on a false analogy from an imaginary ἀπω by Göttling on Ar. Pol. II 1, p. 311.—See Lobeck on *Phryg.* p. 8—10, who shews that both forms are good. The MSS vary in the prose form, but ἀπωθεν is found *in verse* (Eurip. and Aristoph.), which guarantees its existence.

καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι ἀφρόνων, καὶ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων· μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰκὸς ἀληθεύειν τοὺς εἰρημένους τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐπεὶ ὧν τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἢ θηρίων, οὐδὲν μέλει τῆς τούτων τιμῆς ἢ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς  
 17 γε τῆς δόξης χάριν, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, δι' ἄλλο τι. καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων· τό τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ (οὐδεὶς γὰρ φίλινος μὴ χαίρων οἴνω) καὶ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἡδύ· φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὗ παντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· τὸ δὲ  
 18 φιλεῖσθαι ἀγαπαῖσθαι ἐστὶν αὐτὸν δι' αὐτόν. καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδύ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ τιμαῖσθαι. καὶ τὸ κολα-

§ 17. ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων] § 16, τῶν ἡδίστων, note on § 4 *supra*.

τό τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ...οἴνω] Friendship or a friend belongs to the class of pleasant things—the term φίλος or φιλεῖν, ‘to be fond of’ anything, implies pleasure; no one is said for instance to be fond of wine who does not *take pleasure* in it; and the converse, ‘to be liked’ is also pleasant—for here again comes in the ‘impression’ or fancy that the thing liked or loved (φιλεῖν has just the same double sense as the French *aimer*, the stronger ‘love’, and the feebler ‘liking’) must have some good in (belonging to) it, good in some form or other being the universal object of desire of all sentient beings; i.e. of all creatures that are capable of appetites and affections, which capacity depends on sensation, the power of feeling pleasure and pain, de Anima B 3, 414 b 1—5, line 4, φ δ' αἰσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὁρεξίς αὕτη. This φαντασία &c. belongs to, and is meant to illustrate, the active liking, τὸ φιλεῖν ἡδύ. Every one who likes anything always has the impression that the object of his liking has something good about it, which is the reason for his liking it, since good is the universal desire. ‘And being liked or loved is to be valued, esteemed, for one’s own sake and for nothing else’. This is what may be called the ‘passive’ liking, said of the recipient of the action or liking; and is opposed to the active form of liking or love in this respect; that it is an end or ultimate object in itself, whereas the other looks to some further end beyond itself, namely, some good which it seems to see in the object of its affection. It is probable that little or no distinction is here intended to be made between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν, since it is the end and not the process that is here in question, and they seem to be used pretty nearly as synonyms. They represent two different aspects of love, as a natural affection or emotion, and as an acquired value, which we express by ‘esteem’. See further, in Appendix A at the end of this Book.

§ 18. καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι] ‘And admiration is a source of pleasure, due to the very honour or respect (that it carries with it or implies)’. αὐτό the honour itself, alone, and nothing else: notwithstanding that there is no more substantial benefit derived from it (Victorius). τιμή is pleasant, § 16.

κεύεσθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδύ· φαινόμενος γὰρ θανμαστικής  
 19 καὶ φαινόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ ταῦτα  
 20 πράττειν πολλάκις ἡδύ· τὸ γὰρ σύνηθες ἡδὺ ἦν. καὶ  
 τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἡδύ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται μετα-

Flattery is pleasant, because it is accompanied by the *φαντασία* (which is always capable of conveying pleasure, § 6) the pleasant impression (not reality) of admiration and friendship in the flatterer.

§ 19. The frequent repetition of the same acts is pleasant, because they become habitual and familiar; as we were told (*ἦν*) in c. 10. 18. Probl. XIX 5, ult. *ἔτι καὶ τὸ σύνηθες ἡδὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀσυνήθους.*

§ 20. And change is pleasant; by the definition, because change is a relapse into the normal condition of our nature: 'the constant repetition of the same thing causing a (vicious) excess of the settled state'. It is this vicious excess which is represented in the proverbial *μηδὲν ἄγαν, ne quid nimis, 'toujours perdrix.'* When we have reached a 'settled state', as a state of health finally established by a gradual course of medical treatment, the medical applications which were repeatedly employed during the cure should be at once discontinued or the state of body will be vitiated: and so in all cases when a state has reached its acme or normal condition anything that causes it to exceed this is injurious. Eating and drinking too much are other cases in point; when the system is settled or satisfied, the repetition of the acts of eating and drinking disturbs the harmonious balance and produces discomfort or disease. The same expression occurs in Eth. N. VII 13, 1153 a 4, *ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας*, where from the contrast of the two participles the first plainly signifies the state of progress towards satisfaction, and the second the complete or satisfied state; and so the Paraphrast explains it, *πληρωθέντες ἡδόμεθα* κ.τ.λ.: and similarly *ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ*, Thuc. II 36, means, a confirmed and settled, mature and vigorous time of life, when the age of growing is over.

And in general, *all* excess is vicious; as the Pythagoreans and Plato (Philebus) held, and Aristotle himself proves by induction in the establishment of the doctrine of the mean, in the Nicom. Ethics, II. The concluding words of the seventh book of the Nic. Eth. may serve as a commentary on this topic; *μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά* (i. e. imperfection: we are always wanting a change, because we never are in a 'complete state'). *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβυλος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῇ οὐδ' ἐπιεικῆς.* The 'poet', referred to here and in the Rhetoric, is Euripides, Orest. 234, *ἡ κατὰ γαίης ἀρμόσαι πόδας θέλεις χρόνον ἔχνος θεῖς*; *μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.* The 'changeableness' of the bad man in the illustration, is deduced, I presume, from the axiom that right is one, error and wrong infinite, *ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί*: see the whole passage from which this apothegm is taken, Eth. Nic. II 5, ult. 1106 b 29, *ἔτι τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν πολλὰχῶς τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς* κ.τ.λ.

It is this pleasure which is felt in change that makes men and things pleasant that present themselves to us or happen 'after an interval';

βάλλειν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθε-  
στῶσης ἕξεως· ὁθεν εἴρηται

μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ διὰ χρόνου ἡδέα ἐστί, καὶ ἄνθρωποι  
καὶ πράγματα· μεταβολὴ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστίν,  
21 ἅμα δὲ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνου. καὶ τὸ μανθά-  
νειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· ἐν μὲν

‘because they bring a change from our present condition or circumstances, (this is a di-version or a-musement,) and at the same time that which can be used (or enjoyed) only at intervals is rare’: but rarity makes things ‘better’, c. 7, 14, 29, 32, or gives them a preference over others in value and importance—not necessarily however in the amount of pleasure which may be derived from them; though in many cases, such as the possession of any rare object, print, coin, gem, in a collection, it certainly does.

§ 21. And learning and wondering are pleasant for the most part; wonder, because in it is contained, manifested, the desire of learning; and therefore the wonderful is an object of desire (every desire is directed to some pleasure, § 5) and consequently pleasant; and learning includes, implies, a settlement into our normal condition’. φύσις here stands for the true and highest nature, the normal perfect state, of anything, see Grant, on Eth. N. II 1. 3, Polit. I 2, 1252 b 32, *ὅλον γὰρ ἑκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκαστοῦ, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας*. This highest condition of our nature is θεωρία, philosophy, the contemplation of truth, which is also the highest form or ideal of happiness, Eth. Nic. X 8 and 9. A state of knowledge, to which learning leads, may therefore be regarded as a settled or complete state, and to be the ‘normal condition of the intellect’, the noblest part of the entire ψυχή. A settlement into this condition must therefore by the definition, § 1, be a form of pleasure.

On wonder, or curiosity, as the origin of learning, of all speculative inquiry or philosophy, compare Plato, Theaet. 155 D, to whom the observation is due, μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, κ.τ.λ. From Plato it is borrowed by Aristotle, Metaph. A 2, 982 b 12, διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν...ὁ δὲ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγορεῖν, Poet. IV 4, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῶν, and Coleridge again, *Aids to Reflection*, on spiritual religion, Aph. IX., has thus improved upon Plato and Aristotle, ‘In wonder all philosophy began: in wonder it ends: and admiration fills up the interspace.’ See also Sir W. Hamilton’s *Lect. on Metaph.* Lect. IV. Vol. I. p. 77 seq. Ar. Met. init. πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει, κ.τ.λ. Here (in the Met.) as elsewhere, the pleasure of learning or knowledge is assumed. The reverse of this is the cynical Horatian *Nil admirari*, &c., followed by Pope, “‘Not to admire is all the art I know, To make men happy and to

γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστίν, ὥστε  
τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μαθάνειν εἰς τὸ  
22 κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι. καὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ εὖ  
πάσχειν τῶν ἡδέων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πάσχειν τυγχά- P. 1371 b.  
νειν ἐστίν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ  
ὑπερέχειν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίενται. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺν P. 41.  
εἶναι τὸ εὐποιοητικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθοῦν ἡδὺν τοῖς  
ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τοὺς πλησίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἑλληνῶν ἐπι-  
23 τελεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μαθάνειν τε ἡδὺν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν,  
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τό τε μιμού-

keep them so.' Plain truth, dear Murray, needs no flowers of speech, So take it in the very words of Creech." [Epist. I, 6. 1.]

§ 22. The pleasure of conferring and receiving benefits and favours is made to arise, in the case of the reception of good, or good treatment, from the gratification of our desires which this implies, any gratification of a desire being pleasant, § 5; and the other, the pleasure of *conferring* favours, is due to the gratification of our love of power (Hobbes again, cf. p. 210); the power, namely, evinced in our having (*ἔχειν*) the means of bestowing them, and of shewing our superiority (*ὑπερέχειν*) by doing so. Aristotle, neither here nor elsewhere, takes any account of the benevolent affections as elements of human nature.

Similarly τὸ ἄρχειν is said to be ἡδιστον, § 27.

From the pleasure of doing service in general is derived the particular pleasure of 'setting our neighbours right' (rectifying, restoring their *fallen* fortunes or character to its normal or *upright* state) either in their property, when their *affairs* have gone *wrong*; or in their judgment, when they have made a mistake; or in their conduct, when they have deviated (*παρεκβαίνειν*) from the *right* path: and also of supplying their deficiencies (as before, pecuniary, intellectual, and moral) and bringing them up to a complete or satisfactory condition. *ἐπιτελεῖν* is 'to put the end upon', (as *ἐπιστῆφειν*, *ἐπισφραγίζειν*, *ἐπιγράφειν*, *ἐπιχρωματίζειν* Plat. Rep. x 601 A, *ἐπιτιθέναι*, et sim.), hence, to finish, complete, or 'fill up'.

§ 23. The pleasure derived from the 'imitative arts' is next traced to the same sources, the pleasures, namely, of learning and wonder. These being assumed, it follows that every work of imitation, as of painting, sculpture, poetry—especially dramatic poetry—(we must either read here with Vater *γραφικῇ* &c. in the dative, as had occurred to myself, or suppose that the 'art' in the three cases is carelessly substituted for the 'product' or result of the art); and especially any *exact* imitation, even when the object imitated is not pleasant in itself; the pleasure lies in the *mere imitation*, and arises from exercise of the intellect in drawing an inference or 'conclusion (*συλλογισμός*) from this to that'; which is a reasoning process, and a kind of learning.

The *inference* is from the copy to the original, which must have been

μενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιη-

seen before, if any pleasure is to be derived from the imitation; and the learning arises from the observation of the two and the comparison of them whereby we acquire some knowledge of what the things really are. This explanation is found in Poet. c. 4. 5. I will quote the entire passage from the beginning of the chapter, as a complete commentary on the passage of the Rhetoric, which indeed seems to be directly taken from the other. In the Poetics, as here in the Rhetoric, the love of imitation is ultimately based upon the love of learning; § 4, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου κ.τ.λ. *infra*. The faculty or power of imitation which attends us from our very birth, σύμφυτον, and the love of imitation which accompanies it, both natural, are the two causes of poetry, §§ 1 2, and also of the other mimetic arts. Ἐοίκασι δὲ γενήσθαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινές, καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρώμεν τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἡκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων (the lowest and most degraded) καὶ νεκρῶν. (§ 4) αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου ὅτι μαρθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὀρώντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μαρθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκείνος, ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ προεωρακὼς οὐ διὰ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν (the execution, elaboration, finish, Plat. Rep. VI 504 D) ἢ τὴν χροιάν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν. In the first three chapters of this treatise it is assumed that all the fine arts, painting, sculpture, music, and poetry in all its branches—architecture, except so far as the sculpture employed in decoration is concerned, does not appear in the list—are *imitative*, and derived from the love of imitation and the power of imitation characteristic of humanity; and it is upon the various modes of imitation that the division of the fine arts is founded.

In the same way the pleasure which we derive from metaphors consists in tracing the resemblance—a process of learning, μάθησις τίς—between the word 'transferred' and the thing it, sometimes remotely, resembles; so that here again the natural pleasure which attends all acquisition of knowledge, τὸ γὰρ μαρθάνειν ῥαδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστί, is assumed as the foundation of the love of imitation. Rhet. III 10. 2. Comp. III 8. 2, ἀηδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἀπειρον. III 9. 2, 11. 9. And in Probl. XIX 5, the same principle is applied to music: διὰ τί ἡδιον ἀκούουσιν ἀδόντων ὅσα ἂν προεπιστάμενοι τυγχάνωσι τῶν μελῶν ἢ ὧν μὴ ἐπίστανται;..... ἢ ὅτι ἡδὺ τὸ μαρθάνειν; τούτου δὲ αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ μὲν λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίζειν ἐστίν.

Twining in his note on Poet. IV 4 (note 22, p. 186 seq.) in describing and illustrating this doctrine of Aristotle, remarks that 'he does not see how any *information* can be said to be acquired by the spectator' (or listener) from the mere *identification* of two objects, the inference that 'this is that'. And this remark is true if this were all that Aristotle means by his doctrine. The mere identification of an object compared with one already known conveys no *new* knowledge, which is essential to

τική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, κἂν ᾗ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ  
τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ  
συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν  
24 τι συμβαίνει. καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν  
σώζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων· πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ

the notion of *learning*. But what seems to be Aristotle's real meaning is (as I have expressed it above) that by the comparison of the representation with the original, whether it be a picture, or a trait of character in a tragedy, or a metaphor, you *learn* something *new* in this respect; that the representation, in proportion to its accuracy and finish (the number of *details* introduced), enables you to *discover* or *observe* by the comparison something new in the object which you had never observed before: and this is the 'inference' from the resemblance, which the *συλλογισμός*, here and in the *Poetics*, is intended to express. On the love of imitation, and the pleasure derived from the imitation of objects in themselves disagreeable, Schrader quotes de Part. Anim. I 5, δ 45, α 5. [καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἀτοπον εἰ τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικὴν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. διὸ δὲ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτέρων ζῴων ἐπίσκεψιν.]

§ 24. From the love of wonder arises the pleasure that we derive from (tragic) 'catastrophes' and 'narrow escapes from danger', which are all objects of wonder. Poet. XI init. ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή, ... καὶ τοῦτο δὲ... κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον. The term *περιπέτεια* therefore expresses merely the 'sudden change or revolution of fortune' of the actors in the drama; the later appellation *καταστροφή* (Polybius) conveys the same notion of 'revolution' (*στροφή*), with the additional annotation of a 'downward' tendency (*κατά*) or downfall, to degradation or ruin.

*παρὰ μικρόν*] The preposition, which in this and similar phrases, *παρὰ βραχύ*, *παρ' ὀλίγον*, *παρ' οὐδὲν* (*ἀγειν, τίθεσθαι, ἡγεῖσθαι*), is usually translated in English by 'within', 'within a little of', 'within an ace or an inch of', in reality implies comparison; two things when set 'side by side' being more easily compared together. (Rhet. II 23. 30, *παρ' ἄλλα φανερά... μᾶλλον*, III 2. 9, *διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι*, Ib. 9. 8, II. 9, 17. 3.) The comparison in these phrases is expressed in terms of quantity, 'about as much as, amounting to'; and so *παρὰ μικρόν* becomes 'nearly about, closely approaching to, or within a little of'. A few instances of a very common idiom are given in Jelf's *Gr. Gr.* § 637 on *παρά*, Vol. II, p. 301, [Kuhner's *Ausführliche Grammatik*, § 440, Vol. II, p. 445] and Matth. *Gr. Gr.* 588 α, who does not properly explain it. Victorius quotes from Phys. B 5, 8, 197 α 27, a sentence which conveys a sort of explanation of *παρὰ μικρόν*: διὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν μέγα λαβεῖν ἢ δυστυχεῖν ἢ εὐτυχεῖν ἐστίν, ὅτι ὡς ὑπάρχον λέγει ἢ διά-  
ροια· τὸ γὰρ παρὰ μικρόν ὥσπερ οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν δοκεῖ.



25 ταῦτα. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῇ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῇ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ καὶ νέος νέῳ. ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, ὡς ἤλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον, καὶ ἔγνω δὲ θῆρ θῆρα, καὶ αἰεὶ κολοῖος 26 παρὰ κολοῖόν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ

§ 25. καὶ...τὰ συγγενῇ δέ] Note on I 1.11, p. 20. συγγενῇ are things that belong to the same γένος or family, congeners of all kinds, 'all things akin to and resembling one another': the συγγενῇ, besides the examples given directly, man, horse, youth, are also indirectly illustrated by the things mentioned in the proverbs: they are 'class fellows', any thing of the same *kind* with another. All that is natural is pleasurable—by the definition—things belonging to the same class have a natural connexion, ('κατὰ φύσιν inter se esse dicit quod eiusdem naturae participes sint,' Vict.)—therefore all συγγενῇ are ἡδέα; but only 'for the most part', not always: for sometimes 'a man's greatest foes are those of his own household', and 'two of a trade can never agree'; κεραμεὺς κεραμαῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, Hes. Cp. et D. 25. The two sides are given, Eth. Nic. VIII 2 init.

ἤλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει] *Crabbed age and youth cannot live together.* Hence ἡλικιώτης is 'a companion and friend', as Arist. Nub. 1006. The Schol. on Plat. Phaedrus 240 C, ἡλικά γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπει τὸν ἡλικά, gives the remainder of the line, ἤλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει, γέρον δὲ τε τέρπει γέροντα. The proverb occurs again in Plato, Gorg. 510 B, Symp. 195 B, Lys. 214 A, and is alluded to Rep. I 329 A, πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθα τινας εἰς ταῦτὸ παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασώζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν. Eth. Nic. VIII 14, 1161 b 35, μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν...τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν ἤλιξ γὰρ ἡλικά, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἐταῖροι. Eth. Eudem. VII 2, 1238 a 34, where another of these proverbs of association is quoted from Eur. Belleroph. Fr. VIII (Dind.) κακῷ κακὸς τε συντέτηκεν ἡδοναῖς. Cic. de Senect. c. 3. Ast and Stallbaum's notes, *ad ll. cc.*

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον] ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον, Hom. Od. ρ' (XVII) 218. Eth. N. VIII 2, init. IX 3, 1165 b 17, Eth. Eud. VII 1, 1235 a 7, Magn. Mor. II 11, 1208 b 10, Theophrastus περὶ φιλοπονηρίας, ult. καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, τὸ ὁμοῖον πρὸς τὸ ὁμοῖον πορεύεσθαι.

ἔγνω δὲ θῆρ θῆρα] Eth. Eud. u. s., ἔγνω δὲ φῶρ τε φῶρα καὶ λύκος λύκον. κολοῖος παρὰ κολοῖόν] *Birds of a feather flock together.* Eth. Eud., u. s., καὶ γὰρ κολοῖος παρὰ κολοῖόν. Magn. Mor. II 11, 1208 b 9, καὶ γὰρ κολοῖος παρὰ κολοῖόν ἰζάνει ('perch together'), Eth. N. VIII 2, u. s. Theocr. Id. IX 31, τέττιξ μὲν τέττιγι φίλος, μύρμακι δὲ μύρμαξ, ἴρηνες δ' ἴρην. Epicharmus, apud Diog. Laert. III 1. 16 (quoted by Gaisford), καὶ γὰρ ἀ κύων κυνὶ κάλλιστον εἶμην φαίνεται, καὶ βούς βοί, ὕψος δ' ὕψος κάλλιστόν (ἐστὶν Gaisford; Mullach, *Fragm. Phil. Gr.* p. 142; ὕς δὲ θὴν υἷ, Cobet, Diog. L.), ὕς δ' υἷ. Three of these proverbs are illustrated by Erasmus, *Adagia*, pp. 1642—44.

§ 26. Next from the principle of the 'fondness of like for like' is

ὁμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἡδὺ ἐαυτῷ ἅπαν, μάλιστα δ'

deduced the universality of 'self-love'. τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἡδὺ ἐαυτῷ stands for τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ ἡδέα ἀλλήλοις ἅπαντα; 'since all things that are like and akin (closely related) are agreeable to one another, and a man stands in the highest degree in this relation to himself, (τοῦτο πέπονθεν, 'suffers this', has this affection, i. e. relation to...) all men must be more or less fond of self (self-lovers); because all such relations (ὁμοιότης and συγγένεια) belong to him (ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ), most of all to himself; i. e. he stands in these relations more nearly to himself than to any thing or any body else. In the discussion of τὸ φιλαντον, the subject of Eth. Nic. IX 8, two kinds of self-love are distinguished; the one low and vulgar, characteristic of the πολλοί, which consists in τὸ ἐαυτοῖς ἀπονέμειν τὸ πλεόν ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς...τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀφείγονται...οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς—διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γέγνηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος, 1168 b 16, seq.; and it has therefore got a 'bad name': but τὸ φιλαντον in its true sense, when this desire of superiority over others, and consequent preference of self—this grasping spirit, πλεονεξία, in a good sense—manifests itself in a desire to excel them in honour and virtue, *then* becomes praiseworthy and right. ἐν πάσι δὲ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἐαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλεόν νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φιλαντον εἶναι δεῖ καθάπερ εἴρηται' ὥς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή, 1169 a 35. Comp. Pol. II 5, 1263 b 2, τὸ δὲ φιλαντον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως' οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἐαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσι γὰρ πάντες ὥς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. So we say 'fond of money' or anything else, meaning 'over-fond' of it. The natural fondness is in all cases to be distinguished from the vicious over-fondness.

This love of self will naturally be extended to all that immediately belongs to, or is closely connected with, oneself, τὰ αὐτῶν, as our 'words' and 'works'. λόγῳ all that we 'say'—and, as we should now add in this our 'reading age', 'read and write'—all our talk, studies, habits of thought, theories, arguments and such like, everything in which *intellect* is expressed; and ἔργα, all that we *do*, or *produce*, all our actions and works; in which latter is included the propagation of children, αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. Comp. Plat. Rep. I 330 c, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι ταύτην τε καὶ οἱ χρηματιστάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὥς ἔργον ἐαυτῶν, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. This natural fondness for our own 'works' is assigned in Eth. Nic. IX 7 as the reason why benefactors usually feel more affection for those on whom they have conferred their favours than these are inclined to return. The compensation principle, the debtor and creditor account between the two parties, belongs to justice, and has nothing to do with this natural affection, φιλία. δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον, καὶ οὐχ ὁμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας, 1167 b 29; and then follows the true explanation, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν' πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου. μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει' ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα.

It is this love which men feel for what is specially their own in word

αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα. ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἷον ἔργα καὶ λόγους. διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ φιλερασταὶ καὶ φιλότιμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι· αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. καὶ τὰ ἐλλιπῇ ἐπιτελεῖν ἡδύ· αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται.  
27 καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἡδιστον, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι

or work that is the foundation of their liking for flattery, for the love of others, and for honour, the external tokens of respect—all of which are recognitions of their merit in word or deed in some shape or other, and evidence of respect, admiration, and regard; from the flatterer a mere pretence, with the others a reality. It is also the explanation of the parental affection, children being in a special and peculiar sense a man's own work.

And this accounts also for the pleasure which we find in supplying a defect, or bringing anything to a state of perfection (see on § 22), 'because *now* (by this time, not before, ἤδη) the work becomes our own': the *perfection* of it is due to ourselves, and we get the credit of the whole. Victorius remarks upon this, that the difference between this form of pleasure and that which is expressed in the same words in § 22, lies in the difference of the source of the pleasure and the motive of the action in either case. In the former the motive is benevolent, and the pleasure is that of doing good to others; here the motive is selfish, and the pleasure that of gratifying oneself.

§ 27. ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἡδιστον] 'ut res plana certaque ponitur'. Victorius. However, it may most readily be deduced from the innate love of power, already indicated in §§ 14, 22, *q. v.* To this natural impulse or emotion is traced the pleasure that is derived from 'wisdom', or the reputation of it—this is not the same as the pleasure of learning or acquiring knowledge, but that of possessing and exercising it, or the influence which the reputation of it carries with it—Now 'wisdom' may be understood in two senses; 'practical wisdom', *φρόνησις*, τὸ φρονεῖν, which is pleasant to possess and exercise because it implies power, in the shape of influence over the actions of others; and 'speculative wisdom', *σοφία*, which gratifies our love of wonder, § 21, because it brings with it the knowledge of all sorts of things that are interesting and curious (and therefore objects of wonder). One would have supposed that the love of taxing, censuring, or finding fault with our neighbours and friends, *ἐπιτιμᾶν*, is *directly* traceable to the pleasure of exercising power so frequently noticed before. Here however an intermediate step is introduced between the feeling and its real origin. This is the love of honour. Censuring and finding fault implies an advantageous contrast between ourselves and those whom we thus 'tax', a superiority in judgment or virtue, which gives us the right to

ἡδύ· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἔστι δ' ἡ σοφία πολλῶν  
καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμη. ἔτι ἐπεὶ φιλότιμοι ὥς ἐπὶ  
τὸ πολὺ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέλας ἡδὺ  
28 εἶναι. καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ βέλτιστος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ,  
ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ

κάπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,  
νέμων ἐκάστης ἡμέρας πλεῖστον μέρος,  
ἴν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὢν.

find fault; and the honour we all love is reflected upon ourselves by the contrast. But the pleasure lies ultimately not in the honour itself, but in the superiority that respect and the outward signs of it indicate.

MS A\* here adds *καὶ τὸ ἀρchein* after *ἡδὺ εἶναι*, adopted by Spengel. It would mean of course the general exercise of authority, an extension of the special *ἐπιτιμᾶν*, and analogous to it, as manifested in various modes of punishment or correction by word and deed. And herein would lie the distinction. The private citizen can only find fault (*viz.* with his tongue); the ruler can inflict actual penalties, personal or pecuniary.

§ 28. There is pleasure again in 'dwelling upon', lingering in (passing one's time in, *διατρίβειν*) any pursuit or occupation in which one is 'at one's very best'. *διατρίβειν* is by a similar metaphor applied to dwelling on, brooding over, nursing, the prospect of vengeance, 11 2. 2. This same topic is also applied to 'good', 1 6. 29; the difference being in the 'ends' or motives severally proposed, which stimulate the action in each; in the one it is success, a form of good; in the other, pleasure; the skill or degree of excellence shewn in the exercise of any faculty, bodily or mental, is the same in both. To dwell on that in which our superiority is shewn is of course pleasant, by the preceding rule. Problem XVIII 6, quoted by Gaisford, raises the question suggested by this topic. The solution which corresponds to the explanation here given, is the second: *ἡ ὅτι ἐν οἷς οἴεται ἕκαστος κρατιστεύειν ταῦτα προαιρείται, ὃ δὲ αἰρεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται* (here follows the quotation from Euripides; and it is added,) *ὅτι δ' ἂν τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλωνται, κἂν οἷς ἂν συνεθισθῶσιν, οὐδὲ κρίνουν δύνανται τὰ βελτίω· διέφθαρται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια διὰ φάυλας προαιρέσεις*: that is, men in these cases choose a lower kind of pursuit instead of a higher, in consequence of a depravation of judgment arising from the familiarity created by constant exercise of those practices in which their special skill lies.

*αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ βέλτιστος*] Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 460. The superlative in these phrases seems to be substituted for the comparative, and to belong to the rather large family of misuses of the former, which are found in our own language no less than in the Greek.

This fragment of Euripides' *Antiope* (Fr. XX Dind., XXVII Wagner) is quoted also in Plato's *Gorgias* 484 E, &c., with one or two trifling variations. The second line there runs thus, *νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τοῦτῳ μέρος*; which, with *αὐτῷ* instead of *τοῦτῳ*, is also the reading of the Problem. The third line is quoted in *Alcib.* 11 146 A, with *κράτιστος*. In the Problem also, *κράτιστος* stands for *βέλτιστος*. In the two following

29 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ῥ. 41.  
 ἄνεσις, καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα  
 ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα· διώ- Ρ. 1371.  
 ρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ  
 ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις φανερά.

pages of the *Gorgias* a good deal more of the same passage has been incorporated in Callicles' speech as prose. Of the attempted restorations of this I have given an account in Note A, Appendix to *Translation of Gorgias*, p. 134. [On p. 64 the lines here quoted are translated as follows: 'Each shines in that, to that end presses forward, Devotes to that the better part o' the day, Wherein he chanceth to surpass himself.']

§ 29. τῶν ἡδέων] Note on I 11. 4.—ἄνεσις, 'relaxation', metaphor from unscrewing and thereby relaxing the strings of the lyre, and so lowering the tone; and ἐπιτάσις the opposite: ἐπιτείνειν and ἀνίναυ are hence extended to denote 'intensification' and 'relaxation' in general. See note on I 4. 12. The undue propensity of people in general to the enjoyment of 'the ridiculous' is noticed in *Eth. Nic.* IV 14, 1128 a 13 (on *εὐτραπεία* the mean in the use of the γελοῖον), *ἐπιπολάζοντας δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαϊρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκάπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.* The discussion of τὸ γελοῖον here referred to as existing in the *Poetics*, and again in *Rhet.* III 18. 7, where we are told that the 'kinds' of it are enumerated, cannot possibly mean the passage which we actually find there in c. 5. 2, which is a mere definition. The subject was probably treated in the second book of the two of which the *Poetics* originally consisted<sup>1</sup>; and most likely formed part of the treatise on Comedy, which the author promises at the commencement of the sixth chapter of the extant work. Such are the opinions of Heitz, the latest writer on the question; *Verlorene Schriften Arist.* pp. 87—103.

On the 'ludicrous', see Cicero de Orat. II 58 seq. *de ridiculo*; Quint. Inst. Orat. VI 3. Demetr. *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* in the chapter—*περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις χαρίτων*, ap. Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 298 seq. Bain, *On the Emotions and Will*, pp. 282—285; and Herbert Spencer, *Essays &c.*, 2nd Series, Essay III, *The Physiology of Laughter*.

*εἰρήσθω*] This is the first instance in the Rhetoric of the use of this most familiar Aristotelian form of expression (a verb in the third person of the imperative passive), which in some of his works occurs sometimes at the end of nearly every chapter. It expresses the completeness and sufficiency of any action or process, that a thing has been completely gone through and finished, and that that is sufficient, and no more need be said or done about it. Thus *εἰρήσθω*, 'let so much have been said upon the subject', means, let it suffice to have said so much, let this be considered sufficient, and the subject closed; and let us now 'have done with it', and go on to something else. It is not peculiar to Aristotle, though very much more common in him than in other writers. It occurs

<sup>1</sup> The two lists of the Aristotelian writings differ. Diogenes v. 26 has Πιη-ρικῶν. α'; the *Anonymus*, ap. Buhle, Vol. I p. 63, τέχνης ποιητικῆς, β'.

1 ὦν μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, ταύτ' ἐστίν. πῶς δ' ἔχοντες καὶ τίνας, λέγωμεν νῦν. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅταν CHAP. XII.

for instance in Xenophon, Mem. IV 2.19, *δμως δὲ εἰρήσθω μοι*, 'be satisfied with my saying so much', let it suffice to have said so much: Plato, Phileb. 57 C, *εἰρήσθω*, 'let it be said once for all', and no more about it. Ib. 62 E, *μεθείσθω*, and Stallbaum's note on Phaedr. 278 B, *πεπαίσθω*, 'enough of this joking', Ib. 250 C, *κεχαρίσθω*, Theaet. 197 D, *πεποιήσθω*, Euthyd. 278 D, *πεπαίσθω ὑμῖν*, Rep. VIII 553 A, 562 A, IX 588 D, *πεπλάσθω*. Thucyd. I 71, *ῥίρσθω*, 'let this definition suffice'. Ar. Eth. Nic. I 1 ult. *πεφροιμάσθω*, 'let so much suffice by way of preface'; Top. A 8, 103 b 1, and 13, 105 a 21, *διωρίσθω*: *et passim*.

This notion of a completed, perfected, concluded, fixed and permanent, and sufficient action, belongs to the perfect tense in general, and appears, not only in the imperative of the passive, but also in the indicative, perfect and future (the *paulo post futurum*, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 498). Of the indicative, instances are, Soph. Trach. 586, *μειρηχῆσθαι τοῦργον*, Philoct. 1280, *πέπαυμαι*, Eur. Hippol. 1457, *κεκατέρηται τῶμά*, my powers of endurance are exhausted, the play is played out, all my endurance and sufferings are over, and this is the end: compare *πεπόνθασι γάρ*, Rhet. II 8.2; Aesch. Eum. 680, and Aesch. S. c. T. 1050, *διατετίμηται* (Paley's notes on both passages). Fragm. Phryx (Fr. Aesch. 263), *διαπεφρούρηται βίος*. Eur. Orest. 1203, and Phoen. 1019, *ἔληται λόγος*. Plat. Phileb. 62 D, *μεθεῖνται*. Ar. Rhet. I 14 ult. II 5 ult. *καὶ περὶ μὲν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἔρηται*, 'so much for', where the perf. ind. pass. in summing up at the end of the chapter, plainly differs only in form from the ordinary imperative. *Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium*.

Of the *paulo post futurum* a good instance occurs Theaet. 180 A, in the humorous description of the Heraclitean philosophers, 'and if you look for an explanation of the meaning of this, *ἴτρωφ* *πεπλήξει* *καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ*, you will be instantly shot with (*lit.* another phraselet, *ῥηματίῳ*) another brand new word coined for the occasion', i.e. you will have been shot already, as it were; almost before you know where you are.

The observation on this use of the tense in Jelf's Gr. Gr. § 399, obs. 1, is quite inadequate, and not quite correct: Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 500, p. 841, is somewhat more satisfactory.

## CHAP. XII.

§ 1. Such are the motives and incentives that stimulate men to injustice and wrong, which have been found to be so many varieties of pleasure: we next proceed to examine and classify, for the use of the forensic practitioner, the dispositions and characters of wrong-doers and of their intended victims, those who are most likely to be exposed to wrong.

First of all, the 'possibility' of effecting it must always be taken into account by any one who contemplates the perpetration of a wrong: and not only the *general* possibility, as whether so and so is possible to a human being (physical or absolute possibility), but a *special* possibility to

οἶωνται δυνατόν εἶναι τὸ πράγμα πραχθῆναι καὶ ἐαυτοῖς δυνατόν, εἴτε ἂν λαθεῖν πράξαντες, ἢ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην ἢ δοῦναι μὲν ἄλλ' ἐλάττω τὴν  
 2 ζῆμίαν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους ἐαυτοῖς ἢ ὧν κήδονται. ποῖα μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ φαίνεται καὶ ποῖα ἀδύνατα, ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται (κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν λόγων), αὐτοὶ δ' οἶονται δυνατόι εἶναι μάλιστα ἀζήμιοι ἀδικεῖν οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἔμπειροι πολλῶν ἀγώνων, κἂν πολὺφιλοι ὦσιν,  
 3 κἂν πλούσιοι. καὶ μάλιστα μὲν, ἂν αὐτοὶ ὦσιν ἐν

themselves, καὶ ἐαυτοῖς δυνατόν; in other words, the *moral* possibility, when the act is done in such a way or under such circumstances as shall render it worth their while; such that the prejudice or injury sustained by the action or its consequences shall not outweigh the prospective benefit; an act done in spite of these considerations may be regarded as morally 'impossible'.

εἴτε ἂν (οἶωνται) λαθεῖν πράξαντες] 'whether, that is, the intended wrongdoers think the crime will never be detected at all; or be detected, but remain unpunished; or if it be punished, that the loss or injury so sustained will be less than the gain resulting from it to themselves'.

§ 2. ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον] The subject of 'general probability and improbability' shall be considered hereafter, that is, in II 19, where the *δυνατόν* and *ἀδύνατον* (one of the four *κοινὰ τόποι*) are analysed. This is expressed by the *κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν λόγων* of the parenthesis: 'because they are common to all kinds of speeches', (viz. the three kinds of Rhetoric, which is here taken as the basis of their *κοινότης*, elsewhere it is their opposition to the *εἰδη*, see Introd. on *τόποι*, p. 128), 'therefore they shall be considered hereafter', viz. with the rest in II 19. We now proceed to the subject of the special or moral probability, which affects would-be wrongdoers themselves (*αὐτοὶ δ' οἶονται δυνατόι εἶναι...*), and under the circumstances of any particular case.

The first class of persons that rely on this kind of possibility, in the sense of a possible exemption from punishment if they do wrong, are able speakers and men of action—the one capable of defending themselves against attack with their tongues by plausible argument, the other of carrying through the business or transaction in the best and completest way, so as to secure all possible advantage; and men already practised in many forensic contests—and so with acquired experience of the resources available for defence against an accuser in a court of justice; and men with many friends, having an extensive or influential connexion, or well befriended,—these will be well helped; and the wealthy—who can buy off an accuser or antagonist, and corrupt the judges.

§ 3. The possibility of doing wrong with impunity is greatest when the parties themselves answer to any of the foregoing descriptions; and

τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οἷονται δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὑπάρ-  
χωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι φίλοι ἢ ὑπηρέται ἢ κοινωνοί·  
διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται καὶ πράττειν καὶ λανθάνειν  
4 καὶ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην. καὶ ἐὰν φίλοι ὥσι τοῖς ἀδικου-  
μένοις ἢ τοῖς κριταῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ φίλοι ἀφύλακτοί τε  
πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ προσκαταλλάττονται πρὶν

if not, (in the next degree), when they have friends, or servants and follow-  
ers, or associates of these kinds; for these circumstances and capacities  
make it possible for them (διὰ, the cause, the power is due to these) to *do*  
the things (this applies specially to the *πρακτικοί*), and to escape either  
detection or punishment.

§ 4. Again, the possibility is increased, the attempt becomes easier,  
if they are friends either of the objects of the wrong, those whom they  
propose to injure, or of the judges who would have to try the case if  
brought before them: for friends are off their guard (*lit.* unguarded), and  
thereby particularly exposed to injury and wrong, and moreover are in-  
clined to come to terms or to be reconciled without 'prosecuting' the  
case, or bringing it before a court of justice; and judges are ready to  
oblige their friends, and either let them off altogether, or inflict a very  
slight penalty (so fair and upright were the Athenian dicasts).

οἱ...φίλοι ἀφύλακτοι κ.τ.λ.] This sounds very atrocious, and certainly  
has a highly immoral appearance on the face of it. But we are to  
recollect that the author told us in his apology for Rhetoric in the preface  
that such suggestions are to be regarded only as exemplifications of the  
*theory* of the art, which argues each side of every question indifferently  
without regard to moral considerations: but in *practice*, though the  
rhetorician as such *can* employ immoral arguments, no *honest* rhetorician  
would have recourse to them. Rhetoric does not profess to teach virtue;  
that must be learned *aliunde*. This is *Aristotle's* view of the matter: the  
Sophists, who, as we are expressly told, identified the study of Rhetoric  
with a general, political education, had no such excuse or justification  
for the immoralities of *their* Rhetoric, which they inculcated without alloy.

προσκαταλλάττονται] 'καὶ πρὸς, *et praeterea*. pessime vulgo *προσ-*  
*καταλλάττονται*'. Gaisford. Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgate, to  
which there is no possible objection. *καταλλάττεσθαι* alone, it is true,  
conveys all that is *necessary* to the sense, the reconciliation namely; but  
*πρὸς* is very often added to a verb, simple or compound, to express  
'direction' to an object, as *προσεντίνειν* *πληγὰς*, Dem. c. Mid. 528. 25;  
*προσενθύνειν*, Ar. Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1322 b 9; and particularly with verbs  
that imply conciliation or reconciliation, as *προσχωρεῖν* Thuc. I 103, IV 71,  
'to come over to a side', *προσάγεσθαι*, 'to bring over to one, to conciliate'.  
Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, *θεραπείας προσάγεσθαι*. Thuc. III 43, *ἀπάτη προσά-*  
*γεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος*, III 48, *μήτε οἴκῳ μήτ' ἐπιεικείᾳ, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐὼ προσάγεσθαι*  
(to be won over). *προσιεσθαι et similia*. So here the compound verb  
*καταλλάττεσθαι* denotes the mutual *settlement* of the disputed points, and  
the additional *πρὸς* the conciliation, being won over, which attends it.



ἐπεξελθεῖν, οἱ δὲ κριταὶ χαρίζονται οἷς ἂν φίλοι  
 5 ὦσι, καὶ ἢ ὅλως ἀφιασιν ἢ μικροῖς ζημιούσιν. λαθη-  
 τικοὶ δ' εἰσὶν οἳ τ' ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν, οἷον  
 ἀσθενὴς περὶ αἰκίας καὶ ὁ πένης καὶ αἰσχροὺς περὶ  
 μοιχείας. καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερώ καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς·

<sup>1</sup> δ *infra cum libris*. [ὲ] Spengel.

§ 5. Persons likely to escape detection are those whose personal and moral or mental character is opposite (this is the 'opposition' of 'contrariety', the extremes under the same genus, as black and white in colour, bitter and sweet in taste, hot and cold in touch or feeling, and such like) to that which the charge necessarily implies; as when a man of feeble bodily frame is charged with 'assault and battery', or a poor and ugly man with adultery.

The *ἀσθενής* charged with *αἰκία* was a stock example of the *τόπος* of τὸ εἰκός in the early rhetorical treatises. This *τόπος* was the staple of Corax's *τέχνη*, Rhet. II 24. 11; and the case of the 'weak man' is quoted by Aristotle as one of the examples there used. The application of the argument of 'probability' to the treatment of it, shewing how Rhetoric *τὰναντία συλλογίζεται*, is there illustrated. It appears again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37). 6, and Pl. Phaedrus 273 B, as an extract from Tisias' *τέχνη*, where the *τόπος* of τὸ εἰκός is represented as somewhat differently treated. Victorius cites Quint. v 10. 26, speaking of the same mode of inference; the probability namely of the conformity of a man's actions to his bodily condition and ordinary character. These are 'personal' topics of argument, *argumenta a persona*, § 23, inferences from personal conditions, qualities, habits, employed to determine the probability of a certain action, as proceeding from *him*: one of these is, *habitus corporis: ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae; his contraria in diversum*—the two cases given by Aristotle.

ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρός, the definite article marking the genus, *the* member of a certain class. See note on I 7. 13 εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων, p. 130. In this and the next topic there is a change from persons to things, which are resumed as the objects of analysis in § 32.

καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερώ] 'And things, i. e. acts, that are excessively conspicuous, open to observation and under people's eyes'. τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς, 'things in sight', *qui sautent aux yeux*. Polit. VII (VI) 4, 1319 b 18, ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸν παροράται, πολὺ δὲ γινόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλον ἐστίν. Such glaring acts are not guarded against (*ἀφύλακτα* here occurs in a different sense to *ἀφύλακτοι φίλοι* in § 4: *that* is 'unguarded', from *φυλάττεσθαι*, the direct *passive*; this is 'not guarded *against*', the passive of (the middle) *φυλάττεσθαι τι* 'to guard oneself against anything', comp. §§ 6 and 21), no precautions are taken to prevent them, 'because no one would suppose that any one was likely to attempt them'. Supply to complete the sense *τιν' ἂν ποιῆσαι αὐτά, or ἐπιχειρῆσαι αὐτοῖς*. This is a return to the original topic of ἂ δύναται πράττειν 'possible actions'. τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερώ are therefore *acts* which are likely 'to be carried into effect'—*νοί*, 'to escape detection', *λαθητικά* from the preceding clause, which is in some sort parenthetical.

6 ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν οἶεσθαι. καὶ τὰ  
 τηλικαῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἶα μηδ' ἂν εἶς· ἀφύλακτα  
 γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα· πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰωθότα ὥσπερ ἀρρω-  
 στήματα φυλάττονται καὶ τὰδικήματα, ὃ δὲ μηδεὶς  
 7 πω ἠρρώσθηκεν, οὐδεὶς εὐλαβεῖται. καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς  
 ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἶονται λήσειν διὰ τὸ  
 μὴ φυλάττεσθαι, οἱ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν  
 ἂν ἐπιχειρῆσαι φυλαττομένοις, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν

§ 6. And acts again which are of such a magnitude (τηλικαῦτα) and of such a kind as no one (else) would ever think of doing (supply ποιή-σειε); for these too (like the preceding) are not guarded against, (viz. novel and audacious attempts and enterprises which people are unprepared for, and which therefore take them by surprise): for it is only against customary offences, just like sicknesses, that people are on their guard; against diseases hitherto unknown, (which no one has ever yet had,) no one ever takes precautions. ἀρρώστημα, ἀρρώστια, ἀρρώστεῖν properly denote 'want of strength', bodily weakness, and hence any infirmity, such as sickness. Hence Thucydides applies it, III 15, to want of strength of will, or of inclination, ἀρρώστια τοῦ στρατεύειν; and VII 47, to weakness of mind; the mental prostration or despondency which prevailed amongst the Athenian troops before Syracuse: and again in VIII 83, to Tissaphernes' weakness of will or inclination, as shewn in his 'remissness' or 'disinclination' to supply pay to the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels; which Arnold well expresses by 'he was sick of it'. In Plat. Rep. II 359 B it represents nothing more than the defect or weakness of a faculty. In Xenophon the three words usually denote some form of disease or sickness: Demosth. OL II p. 24, ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἡμῶν, ὥς μὲν ἂν ἐρρωμένοις ἢ τις, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθάνεται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα σαθρῶν, ἐπὰν δὲ ἀρρώστημά τι συμβῇ, πάντα κινεῖται, κὰν ῥῆγμα κὰν στρέμμα κὰν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπάρχοντων σαθρὸν ἢ, any disease or other imperfection and unsoundness of body, including fractures, sprains, &c.

§ 7. καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί] is a return to the original construction of § 3. Supply οἶονται δύνασθαι πράττειν κ.τ.λ. or simply οἶονται δύνασθαι ἀδικεῖν. And also those (are disposed to do wrong, or think they can do it undetected or with impunity) who have no enemy at all or a great many: the former think they will escape undetected because there is no one (no enemy) to take precautions against them (and their attempts); the latter pass undiscovered, because they are not likely (ἄν) to be suspected of assailing people when they are on their guard against them (as enemies), διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρῆσαι 'because they would not be thought (lit. seem) likely to assail', 'because no one would think them likely to assail'; and also, if they are suspected or detected (so Victorius), (and brought before a court of justice), they have a defence ready that they never would have made, were not at all likely to make, such an attempt; that is, that their guilt is *highly improbable*; Corax's topic of τὸ εἰκός again.

8 ἔχειν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐνεχέρησαν. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει κρύψις p. 43.  
 ἢ τρόπος ἢ τόπος ἢ διάθεσις εὐπορος. καὶ ὅσοις μὴ  
 λαθοῦσιν ἔστι δίωσις δίκης ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἢ  
 διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν. καὶ οἷς, εἰ ἂν γένηται ζημία, ἔστι  
 δίωσις τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνιος. ἢ <εἰ> δι'  
 9 ἀπορίαν μηδὲν ἔξει ὅ τι ἀπολέσῃ. καὶ οἷς τὰ μὲν

§ 8. And those again who have any means of concealment (either of themselves, or of the goods they have stolen,) or any 'mode' (of changing it, so that it shall not be recognised, Victorius, or more generally, 'any contrivance or device') or any place (of refuge for themselves, or for stowing away the stolen property) or are of an inventive disposition, or habit of mind', (suggestive of *τρόποι* in the second sense, and *μηχαναί*).

Victorius confines the whole of this topic to the one crime of robbery, *de furibus ac latronibus*; and interprets κρύψις *qui possunt quae sustulerint nullo negotio occultare*; *τρόπος quibus modus viaque facilis est illa immutandi. Quod aut figuram aut colorem variare possint; aut artificio denique suo aliquo modo facere ne ipsa agnoscantur*. I should prefer giving it the wider sense of contrivances, devices of all kinds, tricks, artifices, any 'ways' or 'modes' of getting out of a scrape, and escaping the consequences of a criminal act. In Plat. Phileb. 16 A, it has a nearly similar sense, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστιν καὶ μηχανή. Lastly, confining *διάθεσις* to the same subject, he translates it *vendere*, as we say to *dispose of* a thing; adding, *διάθεσιν enim hic alienationem valere arbitror*, and quoting, in support of the interpretation, Plut. Solon, p. 91 E, τῶν δὲ γενομένων διάθεσιν πρὸς ξένους ἐλαίου μόνον ἔδωκεν ἄλλα δὲ ἐξάγειν ἐκώλυεν. Demosth. Olynth. II, p. 22, οὗθ' ὅς' ἂν πορίσων οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δύνωνται ταῦτ' ἔχοντες διάθεσθαι. Isocr. Paneg. § 42, τὰ μὲν ὅπου χρὴ διάθεσθαι τὰ δ' ὁπόθεν εἰσαγαγεσθαι, (the word in this sense implies 'distribution', and so, 'disposing or setting out for sale.' Similarly ib. § 9, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διάθεσθαι 'to set out, or forth, in words'; and several of the best authors use it of 'disposing of' a variety of different things, property, one's own person, a daughter, goods for sale).

It seems to me preferable to extend the meaning; as in the other cases, beyond the mere 'disposal' of stolen goods, to *any* disposition or habit of mind, which is at all events the usual meaning of *διάθεσις*. And there is this further reason for rejecting Victorius' limitation of the topic, that if it is adopted no difference whatsoever is left between κρύψις and τόπος here and afterwards in §§ 33, 34.

καὶ οἷς, εἰ ἂν γένηται ζημία κ.τ.λ.] And those who, if they don't escape detection, have the means of getting rid of (*lit.* pushing off) the trial altogether, or postponing it, or of bribing the judges. And those who, if a penalty be actually imposed have the means of getting rid of the payment of it, or postponing it for a long time, or who from poverty have nothing to lose: (in the last clause the relative οἷς, which is convertible with εἴ τις, must be supposed to take that form when joined with εἴ τις).

§ 9. Another class of cases in which men are disposed to do wrong,

κέρδη φανερά ἢ μεγάλα ἢ ἐγγύς, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι μικραὶ  
 ἢ ἀφανεῖς ἢ πόρρω. καὶ ὧν μὴ ἔστι τιμωρία ἴση τῇ<sup>P. 1372 b.</sup>  
 10 ὠφελείᾳ, οἷον δοκεῖ ἡ τυραννίς. καὶ ὅσοις τὰ μὲν  
 ἀδικήματα λήμματα, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι ὀνειδὴ μόνον. καὶ  
 οἷς τούναντίον τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα εἰς ἔπαινόν τινα,  
 οἷον εἰ συνέβη ἅμα τιμωρῆσασθαι ὑπὲρ πατρός ἢ  
 μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνωνι, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι εἰς χρήματα ἢ  
 φυγὴν ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι· δι' ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ ἀδικοῦσι καὶ

and think wrong deeds possible, is where the profit likely to accrue is evident, or certain (patent to all, free from all doubt or obscurity), or great, or immediate; and the penalties to which they are liable small, or obscure and uncertain (not such as to attract attention, and so deter from the intended wrong; *quae obscurae admodum et caecae sunt ut perspicere nequeant*: Victorius), or remote.

Or again, where no possible punishment is equal to the prospective benefit; as is supposed (δοκεῖ) to be the case with absolute sovereignty or tyranny. On *τυραννίς*, and the distinction between it and *μοναρχία*, see note on I 8.4 and 5, p. 155.

§ 10. 'And cases in which the offence, and the profit or result of it, is a substantial, solid gain, and the penalty mere disgrace'.—*λήμματα* refers perhaps to pecuniary gain (*lucrum*).

'And the reverse; where the (legal) crime tends to any kind of praise (is directed to, as its meed or reward; i. e. where what is a crime in *one* point of view, is likely to meet with *praise* in another), as, for instance, if the crime was accompanied by vengeance for father or mother, as it was in Zeno's case; whilst the penalties are all directed against a man's purse or person, as fine, imprisonment, banishment, or anything else of the same kind (not affecting his character or reputation): for both circumstances and both dispositions may be motives to wrong acts, only not in the same persons and the same characters'.

Men of different characters are influenced by different motives in the commission of crime. Some care more for honour and glory and reputation than for their money and personal ease and comfort, and these, like Zeno, will be ready to commit what may be construed as a crime and render them liable to punishment, provided it be attended with something which leads to praise: the others, who value their personal well-being more than their good name, will be induced rather to do wrong acts which lead to substantial gain, and affect only their reputation. The one are virtuous, though they err; the others, sordid, mean, and vicious.

Of Zeno's case, here referred to, nothing is known, and we are reduced to conjecture. Of the two best known of this name, Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, whose death is placed in B.C. 263 (Clint. *Fast. Hell.*), would, if alive, have been too young when Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric to have attracted public attention: it is just possible that the other, Zeno the logician, of Elea, Parmenides' follower, may be the person

ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντες, πλὴν οἷχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλ' οἱ ἑναν-  
 11 τίοι τοῖς ἤθεσιν. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἢ λεληθότες ἢ μὴ  
 ἐζημιωμένοι. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἀποτετυχηκότες· εἰσὶ  
 γάρ τινες καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πο-  
 12 λεμικοῖς, οἷοι ἀναμάχεσθαι. καὶ οἷς ἂν παραχρῆμα  
 ἦ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρόν ὕστερον, ἢ τὸ κέρδος, ἡ δὲ

here meant. Of this Zeno we learn from Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Diodorus (see the reff. in Brandis' Art. in Smith's *Dict. Biogr.*) that he joined in an attempt to rid his native country of her tyrant: and if the attempt was successful (of which we are not informed) and the tyrant slain, Zeno may *possibly* have mixed personal considerations with his public and patriotic motives, just as Harmodius and Aristogeiton did, as Aristotle tells us in the Politics (VIII (v) 10), in their attack upon the Athenian tyrant. Only it seems unlikely that if this were the true explanation of the allusion that Aristotle would have spoken of tyrannicide as an *ἀδίκημα*, a 'wrong', either legal or moral: and besides this, the act itself, as well as the attendant circumstance, would have been regarded as praiseworthy.

πλὴν] 'only', an exception or reservation; see note on I 1. 14, p. 26.

§ 11. 'And those who have often in previous attempts escaped either detection or punishment. And, on the other hand, those who have often failed in their attempts' (the opposite to the last); 'because there is a class of people who in such matters as these, as well as in actual fighting, are inclined (have a disposition) to renew the fight'. οἷοι for οἷον is due to Victorius *in addendis*. Victorius quotes in illustration of this pugnacious character, Problem XVIII 2, *de Sophistis*, καὶ γὰρ νικῶντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγονται μᾶλλον ἐρίζειν καὶ ἡττώμενοι ὡς ἀναμαχοῦμενοι.

§ 12. καὶ οἷς] is no doubt masc., as it is through the whole series of these topics, and in accordance with οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι that follows. Otherwise it would be more naturally and conveniently translated in this and the following section as neuter, 'in all cases where'....

'And all those who have the pleasure (consequent on their action) immediately, and the pain comes afterwards; or the profit at once and the penalty later: because this suits the character of the ἀκρατεῖς who are devoid of self-control, and this vice extends (beyond mere pleasure) to every object of man's aims and aspirations', to profit as well as pleasure. And therefore wherever there is immediate pleasure or profit, and only subsequent pain or loss, the ἀκρατεῖς whose character is to be tempted by present pleasure and profit, though at the expense of future pain and loss, are naturally in all such cases prone to wrong-doing. What is here said of ἀκρατεῖς and ἀκρασία is confirmed by Eth. Nic. VII 2, ult. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους, though, as the λέγονται shews, this is only a popular way of speaking (and therefore suited to Rhetoric): and in VII 6, 1147 b 31, seq. we are told that these are not ἀπλῶς ἀκρατεῖς, ἀκρασία proper being περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, limited to the same class of objects as ἀκολασία; and ὁ τῶν τε ἡδύων διώκων τὰς υπερβολὰς καὶ

ζημία ὕστερον· οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἔστι δ'  
 13 ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται. καὶ οἷς ἂν  
 τούναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἤδη ἢ ἢ ἢ ζημία, τὸ δὲ  
 ἡδὺ καὶ ὠφέλιμον ὕστερα καὶ χρονιώτερα· οἱ γὰρ  
 ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ φρονιμώτεροι τὰ τοιαῦτα διώκουσιν.  
 14 καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐνδέχεται διὰ τύχην δόξαι πρᾶξαι ἢ δι'  
 ἀνάγκην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ἢ δι' ἔθος, καὶ ὅλως ἀμαρτεῖν  
 15 ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ἢ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τυχεῖν.  
 καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὦσιν. διχῶς δ' εἰσὶν ἐνδεεῖς· ἢ

τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλείας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν  
 περὶ ἀφῆν καὶ γεύσιν, παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται.

§ 13. 'And also the opposite characters to these are equally prone to  
 wrong-doing in cases where the pain or loss is for the moment (*ἤδη*), and  
 the pleasure and profit later and more lasting: for this is the character of  
 the *ἐγκρατεῖς*, those that have acquired the habit of self-control, and of the  
 wiser sort (men of more practical wisdom, *φρόνησις*), who pursue them in  
 this order'.

§ 14. 'And those whose actions may possibly be thought to be due  
 to chance, or to necessity, or to nature, or to habit, and who in general  
 may be thought to have been guilty of error rather than of crime'. There  
 is a variation here in the classification of these impelling causes of action  
 from that laid down in c. 10. 7, 8, which is singular even in a rhetorical  
 treatise, considering that they stand so near together. In the former  
 there are three (of the seven) which are independent of ourselves and our  
 own will, (1) *τύχη*, and *δνάκη* subdivided into (2) *βία* and (3) *φύσις*. *ἔθος* in  
 the other list is classed with the voluntary sources of action, where we are  
 ourselves the causes of them. Here *ἔθος* is referred to the other class,  
 doubtless because habit when confirmed becomes a 'second nature', and  
 action from habit is so far involuntary. Rhet. I 11.3, and de Memoria,  
 c. 2, *φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος*.

*ἀμαρτεῖν* and *ἀδικεῖν*] refers to the well-known threefold gradation of  
 wrong or criminality, (1) *ἀτύχημα*, accidental injury, (2) *ἀμάροημα*, a mistake  
 or error arising from ignorance of the circumstances of the case (Eth. N.  
 III 2), and (3) *ἀδικία*, in which the *προαίρεσις*, the deliberate purpose,  
 enters and constitutes an *intentional* wrong or crime, malice prepen-  
 se. In Eth. Nic. V 10, a fourth degree is added, *ἀδίκημα*, distinguished from *ἀδικία*  
 in this, that though the act is voluntary and intentional at the moment,  
 the intention is not preconceived and deliberate, the malice is not pre-  
 pen-  
 se; it is without *προαίρεσις*, *deliberate* purpose; as an injury or death  
 inflicted in a sudden fit of passion.

§ 15. 'And those that have the prospect of, anticipate, a merciful con-  
 struction being put on their act by the judges'. On *ἐπιείκεια*, see I 13. 13,  
 and Introd. on that passage, pp. 190—193. It is thus defined in Eth. Nic.  
 V 14, 1137 b 12, *δίκαιον μὲν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐνανόρθωμα νομίμου*  
*δικαίου*, a rectification, 'supply of the deficiencies, of the strict letter of the

- γὰρ ὡς ἀναγκαίου, ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες, ἢ ὡς ὑπερ-  
 16 βολῆς, ὥσπερ οἱ πλούσιοι. καὶ οἱ σφόδρα εὐδοκι-  
 μούντες καὶ οἱ σφόδρα ἀδοξούντες, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐ  
 δόξοντες, οἱ δ' ὡς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον δόξοντες.
- 17 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἀδι-  
 κοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἔχοντας  
 ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἢ εἰς τὰναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς  
 18 ἀπόλαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ τοὺς ἐγγύς· τῶν μὲν  
 γὰρ ἡ λήψις ταχεῖα, τῶν δ' ἡ τιμωρία βραδεῖα, οἶον p. 44

law, legal justice, ἡ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθῶλου, Ib. v 27, ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, 1138. 1. Soph. Oed. Col. 1127 (Oedipus), ἐπεὶ τό γ' εὐσεβεῖ μόνοις παρ' ὑμῖν εὖρον ἀνθρώπων ἐγὼ καὶ τοῦπικέες, *milde gesinnung, humanität, gegenüber starrem recht*, Schneidewin ad loc. Soph. Fragm. Inc. 699 (709, Dind.) δαίμονα, δε οὔτε τὰπικέες οὔτε τὴν χάριν οἶδεν, μόνον δ' ἵστερξε τὴν ἀπλῶς δίκην.

'Any deficiency which a man feels may incline him to commit wrong—for the purpose of supplying it. Such deficiency is of two kinds; either deficiency in what is necessary, as poverty, or in some excess, as wealth'. Rich men often feel a craving for something over and above their wealth, something superfluous, as power, honour, license. Thuc. III 45. 4 reads like a commentary on this topic, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ' ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι 'great resources and the consequent license breed the grasping spirit (their natural progeny, τὴν) by insolence and pride'. Comp. also Pol. II 7, quoted in § 17.

§ 16. 'And those in excessively high and in excessively low repute, the one as altogether unlikely, the other as no more likely than before, to incur the imputation of crime'. The first rely upon their character, either for the success of their attempt, which will put their victims off their guard, or for impunity by escaping suspicion; the second, having no character to lose, are emboldened by this to make new attempts, by which they *may* gain and cannot lose, because they cannot be in a worse position in the eyes of the world than they are already.

§ 17. 'Such are the dispositions which lead men to attempt wrong'. We now turn to the characters and dispositions, qualities and circumstances which most expose men to wrong; these are as follows:

§ 18. 'First, people that have what we want, either in respect of necessity or excess (superfluity), or of sensual enjoyment, whether remote or near; for the acquisition of the one is speedy, the vengeance of the other tardy: as when we Greeks spoil the Carthaginians'. 'We Greeks' are *pirates*. Comp. Pol. II 7, 1267 a 2, οὐ μόνον δ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὰναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ... ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι (this is the craving after superfluities out of mere wantonness of appetite) ... οὐ τοῖνον διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖεν ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; κ.τ.λ. The difference of the two last of these lies in this, that the one is the desire caused by the painful gap to supply the

19 οἱ συλῶντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλα-  
βεῖς μηδὲ φυλακτικούς ἀλλὰ πιστευτικούς· ῥάδιον γὰρ  
πάντας λαθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς ῥαθύμους· ἐπιμελοὺς γὰρ  
τὸ ἐπεξελεθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυνητούς· οὐ γὰρ  
20 μαχητικοὶ περὶ κέρδους. καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικη-  
θέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελεθόντας ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν

deficiency; the other is a desire of pleasures which have no such painful craving attendant upon them, such are the pleasures of taste, learning, knowledge, and, in general, intellectual pleasures. The cure recommended for this vicious desire is philosophy, which may be obtained from within and δι' αὐτοῦ, without any extraneous aid. It seems therefore that this division does not exactly coincide with that of the Rhetoric, though there is a strong resemblance between them.

§ 19. 'And those who are not inclined to caution or precaution, but are of a confiding temper; for they are all easy to take by surprise' (λαθεῖν, *lit.* it is easy for the wrong-doer to escape their notice in attacking them).

And the careless (indolent, easy-tempered); because the prosecution of an offence belongs to (the opposite character) the careful, anxious attentive.

So Leech, in *Punch*, Aug. 2, 1862. *Infuriate Captain*. 'You scoundrel, I'll have you up as sure as you are born'. *Cabman*. 'What, summons me! Oh no, you won't, my Lord. You'll never take the trouble'. (*Exit* Cabman with 3s. 6d. over his fare.)

And the sensitive, timid, retiring, shamefaced; because they are not 'combative', inclined to contest the point, to stand out, in the matter of gain. αἰσχυνητός, II 6. 27, 12. 10, it is characteristic of young men: whereas Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 b 20, πρεσβύτερον οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνητός. Plat. Charm. 158 c, Legg. II 665 E, αἰσχυνητῶς ᾗδοντες. Vict. cites Aristoph. Equit. 264, καὶ σκοπεῖς γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν, πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα.

§ 20. 'And those who have been wronged by many and yet never prosecuted, or taken vengeance on, the aggressors, these being what the proverb calls *Mysians' spoil*, that is, an easy prey. Μυσῶν λεία *dicitur de possessione quae defensore caret et obnoxia est direptori cuivis*, Dissen ad Dem. de Corona, § 72; of anything that may be plundered with impunity, Liddell and Scott, *Lex.*; *von allem durchaus preisgegebenen*, Rost u. Palm, *L.* Harpocration and Suidas, s. vv., both explain the origin of the proverb to be the defenceless state of Mysia during the absence of their king Telephus, the famous beggar-hero of Euripides, and Horace's type of a pauper. See also Stallbaum's note on Gorgias 521 B, who quotes Olympiodorus (on the passage of Plato), ἡ παροιμία αὕτη ἐκ τοῦ Τηλέφου ἐστὶν Εὐριπίδου, ἐκεί γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Whatever may be the origin of this proverb, it certainly was not *derived* from Euripides' play: for Harpocration expressly says that it is to be found in Strattis (the Comic poet) and Simonides ἐν λάμβοις. This last is probably Simonides of Amorgos, a



- 21 παροιμίαν τούτους Μυσῶν λείαν. καὶ οὐς μηδεπώποτε καὶ οὐς πολλάκις· ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι,  
 22 οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι. καὶ τοὺς

very early writer; but if it be the other Simonides, of Ceos, it is equally impossible that he could have *derived* it from Euripides, since he died when Euripides was a child.

The above explanations seem to be founded upon the *helpless condition* of the Mysian people under some special circumstances which deprived them of their ordinary means of self-defence. I should rather suppose that the proverb implies an imputation upon their *national character*, because *another* proverbial expression, at least as common as this, represents the Mysians, as sharing with the Carians, the reputation of being the vilest and most contemptible of mankind; the property of such mean and cowardly wretches would naturally be *an easy prey* to any one who chose to take it. This imputation of cowardice or weakness is directly conveyed by Aristotle in the passage before us. This brings the two proverbs together as the expression of the same features of national character. This will furnish a sufficient explanation of Gorg. 521 B, εἰ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, and we need not have recourse with Stallbaum and Heindorf (ad loc. § 162) to the Μυσῶν λείαν to interpret it. This proverbial contempt for the Mysian character appears in Rhes. 251, Pl. Theaet. 209 (Schol. in Heindorf and Stallbaum), Magnes, (Com.) Fr. Poastriæ (in Meineke's *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* II 11), Philemon, Sicel. fr. 3 (Meineke u. s. IV 25), Menand. Androg. VII (Schol. Gorg. u. s., and Mein. IV 86), and Menand. Fr. Inc. 481 (Mein. IV 327), all in the words Μυσῶν ὁ ἔσχατος, 'the last and lowest—even of the Mysians', worthlessness can go no further. Cic. pro Flacco, 27. 65, *quid in Graeco sermone tam tritum et celebratum est, quam si quis despiciatui ducitur, ut 'Mysorum ultimus' esse dicatur.* Ib. 2. 3; 40. 100; Orat. VIII 27, *quonam igitur modo audiretur Mysus aut Phryx Athenis, quum etiam Demosthenes, &c.* ad Quint. Fratr. I 1. 6 *hominis ne Graeci quidem, at Mysii aut Phrygii potius.* (Erasm. Adag. *Mysorum postremus*, p. 354.) The other form of the proverb occurs in Dem. de Cor. p. 248, § 72, τῇ Μυσῶν λείαν καλουμένην, in Strattis, Medea, (fr. Harpocr.) Mein. II 776. (Erasm. Adag. *Mysorum praeda*, p. 1774.)

§ 21. καὶ οὐς μηδεπώποτε καὶ οὐς πολλάκις] sc. ἡδικήκασιν. Both those who have never yet been injured and those who have been often injured (by the proposed wrong-doer) are proper objects of wrong: both of them are likely to be unprepared or taken off their guard (see on ἀφύλακτα, § 5, *supra*), the one because they feel secure and are careless from ignorance of all injurious treatment, and the others because they have already had so much of it that they think they must now be exempt from it for the future; that fortune or the Gods must be tired of persecuting them.

οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι] sc. ἀδικοῦμενοι. The participle will suit both constructions. Soph. Oed. Col. 965, τάχ' ἂν τι μνηστῶν εἰς γένος πάλαι expressing 'likelihood', and convertible with οἱ τάχ' ἂν τι μνηστῶν. (Hermann ad loc. 969.) Matth., *Gr. Gr.* § 599 C, quotes this passage as an illustration of ἂν with a participle signifying 'mere possibility

διαβεβλημένους ἢ εὐδιαβόλους· οἱ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οὔτε  
προαιροῦνται, φοβούμενοι τοὺς κριτάς, οὔτε δύνανται  
23 πείθειν· ὧν οἱ μισούμενοι καὶ φθονούμενοι εἰσίν. καὶ  
πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν ἢ προγόνων ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ P. 1373.  
φίλων ἢ ποιησάντων κακῶς ἢ μελλησάντων ἢ αὐτοῦς

or probability, a conjecture or a modest indefiniteness', distinguishing this from the general case which is exemplified in § 598 δ. There is no ground for this distinction; the particle in both alike has its usual conditional signification; and the likelihood or probability and the rest is only one of the conditions under which the act is conceived. Here it expresses the opinion or expectation (ὥς) that they would be no longer likely to be exposed, or under such conditions or circumstances as would expose them, to wrong.

§ 22. And those that have already been the subjects of hostile charges, suspicion, calumny (all included in διαβάλλειν, 'to set one man at variance with, or against, another'), and such as are especially exposed or liable to it (easily calumniated, &c.); for such as these have neither the will (to prosecute) from fear of the judges (who are prejudiced against them), nor are they able to persuade (the judges, for the same reason, if they brought this case before a court of law): and to this class belong all that are hated and envied.

φθονούμενοι] On the *irregular passive*, see Appendix B (at the end of this Book).

§ 23. καὶ (ἀδικοῦσι τούτους) πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν] 'and those again are liable to injury against whom there is (*lit.* others have) any available pretext' (real or supposed for attacking, or doing them wrong) 'of injury received or threatened by their ancestors or themselves or their friends against *themselves* or *their* forefathers, or those whom they care for, (are interested in); because, as the proverb has it, villany only wants a pretext'.

For μελλησάντων Brandis' *Anonymus* (ap. Schneidewin's *Philologus*, IV, 1, p. 44) read μελετησάντων; no great improvement.

μέλλειν, to be about to do, hence of something *impending* or *threatening*. Plat. Theaet. 148 E, of the intention; see Stallbaum's note; of a *threatening* attitude or posture, μέλλεις. Thuc. I 69, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τιμὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, and IV 126, Brasidas (of the *threatening* demonstrations of the barbarians before the battle), οὔτοι δὲ τὴν μάλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβερὰν.

The proverb 'any pretext will serve a knave' is thus expressed by Menander, Thettale, Fr. 1. (Meineke IV 133), μικρὰ γε πρόφασίς ἐστι τοῦ πρᾶξαι κακῶς, ap. Stob. Flor. IV 40. To the same effect, Eurip. Iph. Aul. 1180, ἐπεὶ βραχείας προφάσεως ἐνδεὶ μόνον, ἐφ' ἣ σ' ἐγὼ καὶ παῖδες αἱ λελειμμένα δεξόμεθα δέξιν ἣν σε δέξασθαι χρεών.

Victorius refers to a story of Agathocles tyrant of Sicily, in Plutarch, as an illustration of this topic. It is told (in the *de sera numinis vindicta* 557 B) of the Corcyreans, Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Συρακοσίων τύραννος καὶ σὺν γέλῳ χλευάζων Κερκυραίους ἐρωτῶντας, διὰ τί πορβοίῃ τὴν νῆσον αὐτῶν,

ἡ προγόνους ἡ ὧν κήδονται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία,  
 24 προφάσεως δεῖται μόνον ἡ πονηρία. καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς  
 καὶ τοὺς φίλους· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ῥάδιον, τοὺς δ' ἡδύ.  
 καὶ τοὺς ἀφίλους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ δεινούς εἰπεῖν ἡ  
 25 πρᾶξαι· ἡ γὰρ οὐκ ἐγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξιέναι, ἡ καταλλάτ-  
 τονται, ἡ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν. καὶ οἷς μὴ λυσিতেλεῖ

ὅτι, νῆ Δία, εἶπεν, οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ὑπεδέξαντο τὸν Ὀδυσσεά· and then of the people of Ithaca, καὶ τῶν Ἰθακησίων ὁμοίως ἐγκαλούντων ὅτι πρόβατα λαμβάνουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ στρατιῶται, ὁ δὲ ὑμέτερος, ἔφη, βασιλεὺς ἐλθὼν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν ποιμένα προσεξετύφλωσεν. And the last is repeated, Apophth. 176 F.

§ 24. 'And friends as well as enemies; the former from the ease, the latter from the pleasure, of the undertaking and its success'. Theognis 1219, ἐχθρὸν μὲν χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσμενεῖ ἐξαπατήσαι, Κύρνε· φίλον δὲ φίλῳ ῥάδιον ἐξαπατᾶν. Lysias, κατ' Ἀνδοκίδου § 7, p. 103 ult. (of Andocides), ὅς τε τέχην ταύτην ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς μηδὲν ποιεῖν κακόν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ὅτι ἂν δύνηται κακόν. Victorius.

'And the friendless. And those who have *no* skill and practice in speaking or action (business)'; (the opposite of them, οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοί, are opposite also in disposition; they are of those that are inclined to do wrong, § 2); 'for these either make no attempt at all to prosecute, or if they *do* make the attempt, soon come to an agreement, or if they *do* carry on the prosecution, produce no effect (bring it to no conclusion, make nothing of it)'. These are the ἀπράγμονες, the ordinary victims of the Cleons, and public informers, the συκοφάνται, and all other troublesome and mischievous people, who, like fever-fits or nightmares, τοὺς πατέρας τ' ἡγῶν νύκτωρ καὶ τοὺς πάππους ἀπέπνιγον, κατακλινόμενοι τ' ἐπὶ ταῖς κοίταις ἐπὶ τοῖσιν ἀπράγμοσιν ὑμῶν ἀντωμοσίας καὶ προσκλήσεις καὶ μαρτυρίας συνεκόλλων (Arist. Vesp. 1039), and, κἂν τιν' αὐτῶν γνῶς (Cleon) ἀπράγμον' ὄντα καὶ κεκηνότα καταγαγὼν ἐκ χειρὸν ἡσού σου διαλαβὼν ἡγκύρισας... καὶ σκοπεῖς γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν, πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα, Equit. 261. On the impossibility of leading a quiet life at Athens, see Criton's case in Xen. Mem. II 9. 1, οἶδα δὲ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ Κρίτωνος ἀκούσαντα ὡς χαλεπὸν ὁ βίος Ἀθηνησιν εἶη ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. νῦν γάρ, ἔφη, ἐμέ τινες εἰς δίκας ἀγούσιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἀδικοῦνται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅτι νομίζουσιν ἡδίων ἂν με ἀργύριον τελέσαι ἢ πράγματα ἔχειν. It ends by Criton's taking one of these 'sycophants' into his own service, like a dog, as he describes him, to keep off these wolves from his flocks.

§ 25. And those to whom it is unprofitable to waste their time in waiting for the trial or payment of the fine or penalty, such as strangers and farmers (who live in the *country*, and are so completely occupied in the cultivation of their land, that they cannot afford to waste time in attending the law-courts in the city); such as these are inclined to settle their differences on easy terms (διαλύεσθαι, to dissolve, break off, put an end to, and so make up, a quarrel), and readily leave off (drop) the prose-

διατρίβειν ἐπιτηροῦσιν ἢ δίκην ἢ ἔκτισιν, οἷον οἱ ξένοι  
καὶ αὐτουργοί· ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γὰρ διαλύονται καὶ  
26 ῥαδίως καταπαύονται. καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἡδίκηκόςτας,  
ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἀδικοῦνται· ἐγγὺς γάρ τι δοκεῖ τοῦ  
μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον ἀδικηθῇ τις οἷον  
εἰώθει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον εἰ τις τὸν

cution. 'Strangers', who are merely passing through Athens, and incessantly occupied either with business or sight-seeing, have of course no time to spare in dancing attendance at the law-courts; and 'farmers', 'cultivators of their *own land*', just as little, for the reason already mentioned. These αὐτουργοί, 'independent cultivators', constitute the δῆμος γεωργικός, and are the best sort of democratical population, Pol. VII (VI) 4, init. βέλτιστος δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός ἐστίν, a statement often repeated. One of the reasons for this is, 1318 a 12, διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἀσχολος, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν, and the same would prevent them from waiting at the courts of law. This is confirmed by Eurip. Orest. 919, ὀλιγάκις ἄστου ἀγορᾶς χραίνων κύκλον, αὐτουργός, οἵπερ καὶ μόνου σώζουσι γῆν. To the same effect, Pol. VI (IV) 6, sub init., the γεωργοί, ἔχουσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύναται δὲ σχολάζειν. Comp. Eur. Suppl. 420, γαπόνος δ' ἀνὴρ πένης ... ἔργων ὑπο οὐκ ἂν δύνατο πρὸς τὰ κοιν' ἀποβλέπειν. The praises of agriculture and agriculturists are sung by Xenophon, Oecon. VI §§ 8, 9, 10, XV 9, and elsewhere. In Rhet. II 4. 9, the αὐτουργοί are distinguished from the γεωργικοί, the latter being confined to farmers and agricultural labourers, αὐτουργοί being extended to all that work with their own hands. See Thuc. I 141. 3, and Arnold's note. Thucydides does not observe Aristotle's distinction, the αὐτουργοί here are γεωργοί in the next chapter.

§ 26. And those who have committed either many wrongs themselves, or wrongs of the same kind as they are now suffering: for it seems almost no injustice at all, when a man has the same wrong inflicted on him as he himself was in the habit of inflicting (upon others); an assault, for instance, committed on a man who is habitually guilty of wanton insolence or outrage.

*αἰκία* and *ὑβρις* are thus legally distinguished. *αἰκία* is *personal* violence, a blow, or an assault, *εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκίζεσθαι πληγαῖς*, Pol. VII (V) 10, 1311 b 24, and is the subject of a *δίκη* or private action between citizen and citizen. *ὑβρις* is threefold, (1) *δι' αἰσχροurgerίας*, (2) *διὰ πληγῶν* (this is further defined *μετὰ προσηλακισμοῦ*, which distinguishes it from *αἰκία*), *διὰ λόγων*; that is, a violation of the feeling of personal dignity and sense of honour, humiliating, degrading, scornful, wanton, language or acts; the *mental* injury constituting a great part of the offence. This appears in Aristotle's definition of it, Rhet. II 2. 5, τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνῃ ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ (not for any profit to himself) ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡσθῇ (out of mere wantonness and pleasure in the insult itself). So that *ὑβρις* is a mixture of intentional insult and wantonness or 'wanton insult'. To the same effect is the observation in I 13. 10, that it *προσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν*, 'implies deliberate intention'. This then is the

27 εἰωθότα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσαιτο. καὶ τοὺς ἢ πεποιηκότας  
 κακῶς ἢ βουλευθέντας ἢ βουλομένους ἢ ποιήσοντας·  
 ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ  
 28 ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ οἷς χαριούνται ἢ φίλοις ἢ  
 θαυματομένοις ἢ ἐρωμένοις ἢ κυρίοις ἢ ὅλως πρὸς οὓς  
 ζῶσιν αὐτοί. καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔστιν ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν.

ground of the distinction between *αἰκία* and *ὑβρις*, and the reason for the latter being made the object of a *γραφή*, or public prosecution, the honour of the state being considered as compromised in the insult to one of its members. See further on this subject, Meier und Schömann *Der Attische Process*, p. 319 seq.

Hippodamus, the legislator of Miletus, who drew the plans and laid out the Piraeus, and was the architect of Thurii on its foundation, and of Rhodes, divided crimes into three kinds, as we learn from Pol. II 8, 1267 b 38, *περὶ ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὑβριν, βλάβην, θάνατον*, i.e. (1) crimes by which the feelings are wounded and the sense of personal dignity wantonly outraged, (2) those which involve loss or damage to person or property, and (3) murder and homicide.

§ 27. And (in the way of retaliation) those who have either already done, or have intended, or are intending, or will certainly do, us mischief: because this retaliation or compensation carries with it (*ἔχει*) not only pleasure (sensual or intellectual, chiefly the latter in this case) but also (a sense of) right (the *moral* object of conduct), and so it seems bordering upon almost no wrong at all. 'Retaliation' or 'compensation' is *right* upon principles of justice, τὸ δίκαιον; of which the 'reciprocal' or 'retaliatory' is one of the three kinds, Eth. Nic. v c. 5, arising from the subdivision of the original two, *διανεμητική*, 'distributive', and *διορθωτική*, 'corrective'; the latter having two divisions, (1) rectification of, or compensation for, *frauds* and *crimes*, *διορθωτική* proper, and (2) τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός (c. 8) the justice that regulates exchanges and commercial transactions.

The difference between this topic and that of § 23, καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι — κήδονται is, according to Victorius, that the motive or occasion of the wrong in either case is not the same. In the one the wrong-doer seeks a pretence or pretext for injuring his neighbour, in the other the occasion comes unsought; the wrong would not have been done had it not been provoked by previous injury.

§ 28. καὶ οἷς χαριούνται] and those by whom, i.e. by whose injury, they will oblige either their friends, or those whom they admire and respect, or love, or their masters (any one who has power over them) or those by whose opinions or authority they direct their life and conduct.

πρὸς οὓς (ῶσιν) in reference to whom they live, who are their guides and authorities in life and action: or, on whom they depend, to whom they look for support or subsistence; as a 'dependant' does. To which is opposed in I 9. 27, ἐλευθέριον τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν, 'independence', αὐτάρκεια, where you *don't* look to any one else but yourself. See the note there, p. 173.

29 καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐγκεκληκότες ὥσι καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες,  
οἶον Κάλλιππος ἐποίει τὰ περὶ Δίωνα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ

καὶ πρὸς οὓς] 'those, in reference to whom', that is in our relations (or dealings) with whom, it is possible (we may expect) to meet with indulgence or merciful consideration. On ἐπιείκεια, see Introd. p. 190—93.

Victorius, followed by Vater, would connect this clause immediately with the preceding, πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν αὐτοί, καὶ πρὸς οὓς κ.τ.λ. in order to avoid a supposed repetition of a former topic, § 14, καὶ οἷς ἂν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τυχεῖν. Vater, who supplies this explanation, forgets that the two topics are differently applied; in § 14 the *expectation* of indulgent consideration is assigned as a motive of action in the agent; in this section it is a *disposition* in the *patient* which subjects him to wrong: though it is true that the feeling or tendency itself resides in both cases in the same person. Besides this, the union of these two seems to be an improper conjunction of two heterogeneous dispositions, a sort of moral ζεύγμα; taking a man for the guide of your life or depending upon him, and relying upon his merciful consideration, are not closely enough connected to warrant their being classed together. I have therefore retained Bekker's punctuation, which makes them separate topics.

§ 29. And if we have had cause of complaint against any one, or a previous difference with him, (we do to him) as Callippus did in the affair of Dion; for things of that kind (a wrong deed done under such circumstances) *appear to us* (personally and at that time, not always or in general,) to border upon, bear a close resemblance to, acts altogether innocent.

προδιακεχωρηκότες] διαχωρεῖν is used here as the neuter of διαχωρίζειν, to separate. In this sense it is almost a ~~ἀπαξ λεγόμενον~~. No authority for this use of the word is given by Stephens or any other Lexicon earlier than Arrian. It represents morally and metaphorically a 'split', or 'separation', 'parting asunder' of intercourse and interests between two friends.

ἐποίει] The *imperfect* here seems unmeaning, as the act is only one. Spengel, in his Edition, 1867, has adopted without remark ἐποίησε from MSS Q, Y<sup>b</sup>, Z<sup>b</sup>.

Κάλλιππος...τὰ περὶ Δίωνα] Plutarch. Vit. Dion. 1982, de Sera Numinis Vindicta c. 16. The story is thus told by Victorius. Callippus was an Athenian, friend and companion of Dion during his stay at Athens, and the partner of his expedition to Sicily for the liberation of his native country. By his conduct and services he had ingratiated himself with Dion's mercenaries, whom he incited to murder their general, and thereby made himself master of Syracuse. Before this, he had spread calumnious reports about Dion and excited the citizens against him. Dion being informed of this took no precautions for his own safety; partly in scorn of the attempt, and partly because he was unwilling to preserve his own power and life at the expense of the destruction of his friends: the scheme accordingly took effect, and Dion was shortly after put to death. Aristotle says upon this that Callippus justified the act by arguing that as Dion had now knowledge of his designs, and his own life

30 τοιαῦτα ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ τοὺς  
 ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἂν μὴ αὐτοί, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐνδεχό-  
 μενον βουλεύσασθαι, ὥσπερ λέγεται Αἰνεσιδήμος

was in danger, this anticipation of the other, was a mere measure of precaution or retaliation, and no crime at all. This suspicion of Callippus is the ground of his *complaint* and the occasion of the *previous difference*, or sundering of their apparent friendship. [Arnold Schaefer, *Demo-sthenes und seine Zeit*, III 2. p. 159, 160.]

§ 30. καὶ τοὺς ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας (ἀδικεῖσθαι), ἂν μὴ αὐτοί (ἀδικῶσιν αὐτοῖς)] Another motive in the aggressor to commit a wrong, another circumstance which renders its intended object especially liable to it, arises, when the victim is in such a position that the wrong *will* be done by somebody else (ὑπ' ἄλλων) if we don't do it ourselves, or take the initiative—this seems to us a justification of the act of aggression which in other circumstances would be a gross wrong—and the necessity of immediate action allows no time for deliberation. That this is a sort of justification of such an act appears in the conduct attributed to Aenesidemus towards Gelo: the latter (tyrant of Syracuse) had anticipated him (the tyrant of Leontini) in reducing and enslaving some state that was neighbour of both: Aenesidemus sends a present to Gelo of eggs, cakes, and sweetmeats, the ordinary prize of the game of κότταβος, as a prize, in acknowledgment of his superior foresight, quickness and dexterity, shewn in his 'anticipation' of himself, *ὅτι ἔφθασεν*, admitting at the same time that he had had an eye to it himself. This shows that Aenesidemus thought it 'hardly a crime', ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, a justifiable act; and also illustrates the extreme liability to aggression and wrong involved in the position of this 'neighbouring state', which would have been wronged in any case by some one else, ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας, at any rate, even if Gelo (who here represents the αὐτοί, the man who takes the initiative) had not done it himself.

As Casaubon has observed, there is some object understood after ἀναποδισαμένῃ. The simple *τινὰς* or *τινὰ πόλιν*, will answer the purpose. Nothing more is known about the circumstances of the case.

The person here called Αἰνεσιδήμος, in Herod. Αἰνησιδῆμος, and in Pindar Αἰνησιδάμος, is mentioned twice in Herodotus, VII 154 as the son of one Patäicus, and a member of the body-guard of Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, and in c. 165, as the father of Thero, sovereign (μούναρχος) of Agrigentum, to whom Pindar's second Olympian Ode is dedicated. In Pindar his name occurs three times, but only as the father of Thero, OL II 46, III 9, and of him and Xenocrates, Isthm. II 41. To reconcile Herodotus' statement about him with that of Aristotle here, we may perhaps suppose that Aenesidemus had made himself master of Agrigentum, on the throne of which he was succeeded by his son Thero, before the period to which this story belongs. Aristotle's narrative certainly represents him as a sovereign prince, and not as a mere mercenary in another's service. Victorius, followed by Schrader, calls him 'tyrant of Leontini', but gives no authority.

Γέλωνι πέμψαι κοττάβια ἀνδραποδισαμένῳ, ὅτι  
 31 ἔφθασεν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων. καὶ οὐς ἀδικήσαντες  
 δυνήσονται πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς ῥαδίως ἰασό-  
 μενοι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια,  
 32 ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν. καὶ ἅ πάντες  
 ἢ πολλοὶ ἀδικεῖν εἰώθασιν· συγγνώμης γὰρ οἶονται

κοττάβια] On the game of κότταβος, the modes of playing it, and its varieties, see Becker, *Charicles, on the Greek Games*, Excursus III to Sc. VI, p. 349. Our information upon the subject is principally derived from Athen. xi 58, p. 479 C—E, and xv 1, 665 seq., and Pollux vi 109. We learn from Athenaeus, on the authority of Dicaearchus (479 D) that it was a Sicilian invention and most fashionable in that country, (cf. xv 666 B), ἡ τῶν κοττάβων εὗρεσις Σικελικὴ ἐστὶ παιδιὰ, ταύτην πρῶτων εὐρόντων Σικελῶν. Further we are told that the winner at the game received a prize, 667 D, ὅτι δὲ ἀθλον προῦκειτο τῷ εὐ προεμένῳ τὸν κότταβον προεῖρηκε μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀντιφάνης· φά γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ περμάτια καὶ τραγήματα. Similarly from Hegesander, 479 D, τοσαύτη δὲ ἐγένετο σπουδὴ περὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ὥστε εἰς τὰ συμπόσια παρεισφύρειν ἄλλα κοττάβια καλούμενα. From Gaisford's observation that the form κοττάβεια occurs in at least three *verses*, in Ath. xv 666 E, 667 F, it seems that both this and κοττάβιον were in use. Gaisford unnecessarily infers from it that there was only one, and that κοττάβειον.

§ 31. And those to whom the wrong can be readily compensated, or more than compensated by just acts, because such wrongs admit of an easy cure;—an instance of this is the saying of Jason of Pherae, that we are bound to commit some wrongs in order that we may have the opportunity of doing justice on a larger scale. The saying itself is to be found in somewhat different words in Plutarch, πολ. παραγγέλμ. 817 F (Buhle), it was always applied, ἐφ' οἷς ἐβιάζετο καὶ παρηνώχει τινας ἀεὶ λεγομένην, to his various acts of oppression and annoyance, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀδικεῖν τὰ μικρὰ τοὺς βουλομένους τὰ μέγαλα δίκαιοπραγεῖν. This is in fact Robin Hood's plea, that he robbed the rich to give to the poor. This topic may be further illustrated by Bassanio's appeal to the judge, *Merchant of Venice*, Act IV. Sc. 1, line 209, *And I beseech you, Wrest once the law to your authority: To do a great right do a little wrong, And curb this cruel devil of his will.*

§ 32. Victorius observes that we here enter upon a new division of the chapter. The analysis has been hitherto confined to *persons* prone to wrong and liable to wrong: it is now applied to certain classes of *things* or circumstances which increase the liability to wrong. These are kinds of ἀδικήματα. It is in fact a transition to the subject of the next chapter. Such are offences of very common occurrence; men are tempted to commit such because they think they shall meet with indulgence: people have become so familiar with the offence by constant association (συνηθεία) that it has lost its repulsive character; and also they may argue that if 'all or many' are guilty of it, it must be a human infirmity, and being a *natural* defect is hardly to be called a vice.



- 33 τεύξεσθαι. καὶ τὰ ῥάδια κρύψαι· τοιαῦτα δ' ὅσα  
ταχὺ ἀναλίσκεται, οἷον τὰ ἐδώδιμα. ἢ τὰ εὐμετά-  
34 βλητα σχήμασιν ἢ χρώμασιν ἢ κράσεσιν, ἢ ἅ πολλα-  
χοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὐπορον· τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ εὐβάστακτα  
35 καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τόποις ἀφανιζόμενα. καὶ οἷς ἀδιάφορα  
καὶ ὅμοια πολλὰ προὔπηρχε τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. καὶ ὅσα  
αἰσχύνονται οἱ ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἷον γυναικῶν  
οἰκείων ὕβρεις ἢ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἢ εἰς υἱεῖς. καὶ ὅσα φιλο-

§ 33. Crimes and the products of them that are easy to conceal, especially in the case of stealing, which is here most prominent in the author's thoughts. Such are things that are soon consumed, as eatables, or things that can be easily changed (in their appearance, without losing their value; so that they shall not be recognized, and the theft escape detection), in respect of their shape (as plate and coin by melting), or colour (cloth or silk by dyeing), or mixture (as liquids of all kinds). Victorius refers to Cic. de Fin. v 25. 74, of the Stoics, *Atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum quas ceperunt signa commutant, sic illi ut sententiis nostris* (sc. Academicorum) *pro suis uterentur nomina tanquam rerum notas mutanturunt*. There is about the same amount of resemblance in this topic to that of § 8, as we found in § 28 (q. v.) to that of § 14; the circumstance is nearly the same, the application different.

§ 34. Or things that are easy to make away with, put out of sight (*effacer*, cause to disappear) in many different ways; such are things portable, which can be hid away in holes and corners (*lit.* small places).

§ 35. And things (stolen goods), *like* others, of which the thief has already a good many in his possession, either exactly like (with no difference at all between them) or nearly like (bearing a general resemblance, and so not easy to distinguish). The first is the case of coins or medals, and in general, things that are made in sets, one exactly like another.

*ἀδιάφορος*, which in the sense here assigned to it seems to be a *ἁπλᾶς λεγόμενον*, is not to be confounded either with the logical signification of it—Anal. Post. II 13, 97 *b* 31, *ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις*, Top. A 7, *ἀδιάφορα τὸ εἶδος, ἀνθρώπος, ἵππος*; this is 'without *specific* difference', 'an individual'—or with the meaning it bears in the Stoic philosophy, things 'indifferent', without any *moral* differences, neither good nor bad; from which our sense of the word is derived.

'And things which the injured party is ashamed to reveal: as any outrage committed upon the women of one's own family, or one's self or one's children'. Victorius quotes Lysias, c. Simon. § 3, *μάλιστα δ' ἀγανακτῶ, ὃ βουλῇ, ὅτι περὶ τοιούτων πραγμάτων εἰπεῖν ἀναγκασθήσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐγὼ αἰσχυρόμενος, εἰ μέλλοιεν πολλοὶ μοι συνεῖσεσθαι, ἤνεσχύμην ἀδικούμενος*.

καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖν] ὅσα cognate accusative for ὅσας δίκας; or perhaps the local accus., 'the cases in which (as the seat of them) the litigious spirit is shewn', Appendix B, note 1, at the end of this Book.

δικεῖν δόξειεν ἂν ὁ ἐπεξιὼν τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ τε μικρὰ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς συγγνώμη.

- 1 ὥς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ ποῖα καὶ ποίους CHAP. XIII.  
P. 1373 b.  
καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· τὰ δ' ἀδικήματα  
πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι πρῶ-  
τον ἐντεῦθεν. ὥρισται δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα  
2 πρὸς τε νόμους [δύο] καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἐστι, διχῶς. λέγω  
δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν ἴδιον τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν τὸν

'And all cases in which prosecution would seem to indicate a litigious spirit in the prosecutor': that is, where the offence is trifling, or, again, in the case of acts that deserve indulgence—some of which are mentioned in c. 13. 16, 17. Victorius refers to Lysias, κατὰ Θεομνήστον Α § 2, ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ με ἀπεκτονέειν ἠτύγτο, συγγνώμην ἂν εἶχον αὐτῷ τῶν εἰρη-  
μένων· οὐδ' εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἤκουσα, οὐκ ἂν ἐπεξῆλθον αὐτῷ, ἀνε-  
λεύθερον γὰρ καὶ λίαν φιλόδικον εἶναι νομίζω κακῆγορίας δικάζεσθαι.

The chapter concludes with a summary enumeration of its contents. 'So now of the characters and dispositions that incline men to crime, the several kinds of those crimes, the characters that invite crime, and the motives that incite to crime, we have given a tolerably complete (σχεδόν) account', or analysis.

#### CHAP. XIII.

A connected sketch of the contents of the following chapter, a particular account of ἐπιείκεια or equity, and of the relations of the different kinds of 'law', will be found in the Introduction, p. 187—193, and on p. 239 (Appendix E to chap. XIII).

It analyses and classifies actions right and wrong, first from the *strictly legal*, and secondly from the *equitable* or moral point of view. Equity is the principle of merciful consideration, that indulgent view of men's actions which makes allowance for human infirmities, looks rather to the intention than the act, and thus mitigates or corrects (ἐπανορθοῖ) the strict rigour of the 'written law'.

§ 1. 'In distinguishing or analysing wrong and right acts, let us commence with the following consideration' (or, let us take the following for our starting-point). On δικαίωμα here 'an ~~un~~just act', the opposite of ἀδίκημα, and its various senses, see note on I 3. 9, p. 56. 'Accordingly the definition of justice and injustice has reference to two kinds of "law" (§ 2), and two kinds of persons (§ 3)'. The divisions of just and unjust depend upon their relation to two kinds of law, and two kinds of persons: πάντα ὁρίζεται τῷ τέλει.

§ 2. 'I distinguish therefore two kinds of law, the special and the universal; and by special, I mean that which is determined in each people or nation (separately or individually) by themselves, (*lit.* that which has for each class of people or nation its definition directed or referred to themselves,) by their own peculiar habits, customs, feelings, opinions, form of government, and this either unwritten or written' (see

ἐκάστοις ὠρισμένον πρὸς αὐτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν  
ἄγραφον τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ  
φύσιν. ἔστι γάρ, ὃ μαντεύονται τι πάντες, φύσει  
κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, καὶ μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς  
ἀλλήλους ἢ μηδὲ συνθήκη, οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους  
Ἀντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένον  
θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύσει ὄν τοῦτο δίκαιον·

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κάχθές, ἀλλ' αἰεί ποτε

ζῇ τοῦτο, κούδεις οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη.

καὶ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ

in explanation of this, *Introd. Appendix E p. 242—243*; 'and by universal law, the "law of Nature".' For there is, as all are instinctively convinced, a natural and universal notion of right and wrong, quite independent of any mutual communication (association, intercourse) or compact, such as Sophocles' *Antigone* evidently alludes to, when she says that it is just, (right), though forbidden, (by the *positive* law of Creon's enactment) to bury Polynices, implying (ὡς, on the supposition that) that this is naturally right.

*Not of today nor yet of yesterday*

*Is this, but everlasting is its life,*

*And none doth know what time it came to light.*

And, as Empedocles says about killing living animals; for this is not right for some and *not* right for others, 'but this same law for all (this universal law) spreads without break or flaw' (*ἡνεκίως*, usually *διηλεκῶς*, 'continuously') 'over the wide ruling sky and again over the boundless earth'.

*Law universal of no human birth*

*Pervades the sovereign sky and boundless earth.*

On the distinction of the *κοινός* and *ἴδιος νόμος* here taken, compare *Eth. N. v 10* (*Eth. Eud. iv 10*) 1134 b 18 seq. quoted in *Introduction*, p. 241. The same distinction is found *supra* 1 10. 3. On 'natural law' see Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, § 380 seq. Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, *Definitions of Law*, c. 2.

μαντεύονται] of a presentiment or foreboding, or as here an instinctive conviction, a sort of divination; see note on 1 9. 40, *καταμαντεύεσθαι*.

Ἀντιγόνη...λέγουσα] *Soph. Antig.* 456.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει] *Empedocles*, *Fragm.* lines 404—5. Karsten ad loc. p. 281 says, 'Scaliger ad vocabulum αἰγῆς in margine annotavit lect. αῖ γῆς. Codices variant (the best including A° appear to give αἰγῆς); hoc perperam recepit Bekkerus, quem plures sunt secuti, qui loci sensum parum habuerunt perspectum.' Spengel follows Bekker in reading αῖ γῆς. In illustration of the doctrine alluded to in the lines quoted, Karsten cites *Diogenes Laertius*, de *Pythag.* VIII 13, *qui dicit, eum velare ἀπεισεῖν τῶν ζῶν, κοινὸν δίκαιον ἡμῖν ἐχόντων τῆς ψυχῆς*; and *Sextus Empiricus* *adv. Math.* IX 127, who says that the entire school of Pythagoras and

ἐμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δ' οὐ  
δίκαιον,

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διὰ τ' εὐρυμέδοντος  
αἰθέρος ἡνεκέως τέταται διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐ γῆς.

3 καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει Ἀλκιδάμας...πρὸς οὓς  
δέ', δίχα ὥρισται· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς ἓνα p. 46.

<sup>1</sup> + διώριται *infra*.

Empedocles, and all the Italians, assert that we have intercourse not only with the Gods and one another, but that this extends also to irrational animals; ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ πάντος τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἐνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα· διόπερ καὶ κτείνοντες αὐτὰ... ἀσεβοῦμεν. On the interpretation of αὐγῆς Karsten has this note. 'Ergo commune illud ius pertinet διὰ τ' αἰθέρος i. e. *per aerem* (cf. annot. ad v. 105) quo omnes animantes vescuntur, διὰ τ' αὐγῆς *per lucidum caelum* (ut vs. 127) in quo Dii degunt'. The verse cited by Karsten in support of his interpretation of αὐγῆς seems insufficient for its purpose; the word there seems to have no other meaning than its ordinary one, 'sunbeam or sunlight'; I doubt if αὐγή could stand for 'heaven'; and perhaps it may be better to accept Bekker's reading.

On Alcidas, see the article on the Sophistical Rhetoric, in the *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, Vol. III. No. 9, p. 263 seq. and on the Μεσσηνιακὸς λόγος, ib. p. 257. It is quoted again, II 23. 1. Vater, and Spengel (*Artium Scriptores* p. 175), cite the anonymous Scholiast, who supplies the missing quotation thus; ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας ὁ Θεός, οὐδένα δούλον ἢ φύσις πεποίηκεν. It seems to be totally inapplicable to the topic which it professes to illustrate, and if it comes from the speech at all is at all events quite out of place here. Spengel (*Praef. ad Rhet. Gr.* I vi) says of it, *factum non verum*; but being as it is so utterly inappropriate, it can hardly have been 'manufactured' for an occasion to which it is not suitable.

Of the 'Messeniatic declamation' the Schol. says that it was a μελέτη ὑπὲρ Μεσσηνίων ἀποστησάντων Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ μὴ πειθομένων δουλεύειν. Conf. Sauppe, ad Alc. Fragm. 1, *Oratores Attici* III 154. [Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas*, (*Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Academie der Wissenschaften*, Vienna, 1863, pp. 491—528, esp. p. 505). S.]

§ 3. πρὸς οὓς δὲ διώριται, δίχῳς διώριται, Vulg.—δίχα ὥρισται A\*, adopted by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], omitting the first διώριται: in *Rhetores Graeci* [1853] he reads [διώριται] δίχῳς διώριται, in conformity with § 1. (I do not myself see why the first διώριται need be omitted without manuscript authority.) 'In respect of the persons to whom it is referred, this division of law is twofold, for the right and wrong, justice and injustice, in acts, are referred to (severally determined by, divided in relation to) either the public, society in general, the whole community (against whom the offence is supposed to be directed), or an individual member of it. And therefore just and unjust acts are divided into two classes, according as they are directed against a single and definite individual, or the community at large. Adultery and assault are injuries or wrongs to the indi-

τῶν κοινωνούντων, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν. διὸ καὶ τὰδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἓνα καὶ ὠρισμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ὠρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν.

- 4 ἀπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διηρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινόν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαμβάνοντες τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν

viduals, refusal to serve, or desertion, is a wrong to the entire community or nation'. This is the basis of the distinction in Attic jurisprudence between the *δίκη*, the private civil action or suit of man against man, and the *γραφή*, or public, criminal prosecution; since the latter is a state offence, common to the whole community, a public prosecution may be conducted by *ὁ βουλόμενος*, 'any one that pleases', provided, that is, he be a qualified Athenian citizen. See further on this subject, in *Introd.* I 13, p. 187, and Meier u. Schömann, *Der Attische Process*, Bk. III. § 2. Buttmann ad *Dem. Med.* § 9.

Accordingly *ὁ τύπων* is liable to a *δίκη αἰκίας*; *ὁ μὴ στρατευόμενος*, one that either declines to serve altogether, and so fails in his duty to society and his country, or a deserter, to a *γραφὴ ἀστρατείας* or *λειποταξίου*. *μοιχεία* is here included with *αἰκία* in the class of wrongs that are the subject of a *δίκη* or *δική ἰδία*; under the ordinary classification it exposed the offender to a *γραφή*, a criminal prosecution, which, as it could be carried on by the husband or one of the near relations, might also properly be called *ἰδία*. Meier u. Schömann, u. s., p. 163—4, 327 seq. In this case the state, as well as the husband, considered itself aggrieved as the guardian of public morals. In illustration of this twofold aspect of a crime, Victorius quotes Cic. in *Verrem*, v (III) 69, 161, *quibus in rebus non solum filio, Verres, sed etiam reipublicae fecisti iniuriam: suscepas enim liberos non solum tibi sed etiam patriae*.

§ 4. 'After this division, or classification, of wrong acts, some of which are directed against the entire community, and the others against one or more *individuals*, let us first repeat our definition of τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, that we may know what being treated unjustly, or suffering wrong, is; and then proceed to the rest'.

The introduction of ἄλλους here leads to a new distinction: a civil action between parties in their private capacity may be brought either against one or several, as when an action is brought against a club or commercial company or the partners in a firm: in either case the offence which is the subject of it is private and particular, and directed against individuals, and both of them are distinguished from state offences.

ἀναλαμβάνοντες] to repeat or resume (take up again) seems to be a reference to I 10. 3, where ἀδικεῖν, the exact opposite of ἀδικεῖσθαι, was defined,

5 τὰ λοιπά. ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος  
τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὤρισταί πρότερον  
6 ἐκούσιον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον  
βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλά-  
βαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραὶ εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ  
καὶ τὰ κακὰ διήρηται καθ' αὐτὰ πρότερον, καὶ  
7 τὰ ἐκούσια, ὅτι ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη  
πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ

and the latter can readily be inferred from the former. This may be called a resumption, or, in a sense, a repetition of the preceding definition, or at all events of the same subject; and this seems to be confirmed by the reference, in the next sentence, to this very definition. On the entire question of the voluntary character of *ἀδίκημα* and *ἀδικία* see Eth. Nic. V 11 (Bekk.): and that of vice in general is discussed in the same work, III 7 (Bekk.). The conclusion in the two chapters of the Ethics is that which is here assumed to be the fact.

§ 5. 'To be wronged then is to be unjustly treated by a voluntary agent, for to do wrong has been previously defined to be voluntary', I 10. 3. And since 'doing' and 'suffering', action and passion, are opposites, and opposites fall under the same *γένος*, we may infer at once that if doing wrong is voluntary, suffering wrong is voluntary too—not in the patient of course, but in the agent. Comp. Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 a 15, *ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ όταν ἑκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττη· όταν δ' ἄκων οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὐτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ... ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὤρισταί τῷ ἑκούσιῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ... ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἀδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὐπώ, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προση.*

§ 6. 'Now injury, and injury against one's will, being both of them necessary to the notion of injustice or wrong, it will be clear from what has preceded, what the injuries are (*αἱ βλάβαι* *the* injuries of different kinds which are contained in the notion); for things good and bad *in themselves* (as opposed to the comparative goods of c. 7) have been previously analysed (in c. 6), and of things voluntary it has been stated (c. 10 § 3) that they are things done with the full knowledge' (of the special circumstances of the case. Eth. Nic. III 2). Spengel has adopted *εἴρηται* from MS A', for *διήρηται* the Vulg., which Bekker retains.

§ 7. 'So that all charges (accusations, complaints of wrong) of every kind must be referred to two different distinctions, the first that of the persons offended, whether individuals and private persons, or the community at large; and the second (*ἢ καί*, 'or again'), in the nature of the act, whether it was done in ignorance or unintentionally (i.e. under compulsion, by a superior *external* force), or intentionally and with full knowledge; and of these last (*ἐκόντος καὶ εἰδότες*) either with *deliberate* purpose, malice prepense, or under the influence of passion or excited feeling'. Bekker and Spengel have omitted *καί* with MSS Q, Y, Z, *before*

ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἐκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ρηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, 9 εἴρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις . πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ

<sup>1</sup> ἢ καὶ ἀγνοοῦντος ἢ *infra*.

ἀγνοοῦντος, or rather changed the order of ἢ καὶ into καὶ ἢ, and substituted καὶ for ἢ *after* ἀγνοοῦντος. This is certainly unnecessary, though perhaps preferable. The sense is perfectly good as I have translated, following MS A\*, which appears to give the vulg. reading. The first καὶ is 'again', the *second* distinction: ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος of course corresponds to ἢ ἐκόντος: ἀγνοοῦντος ἢ ἄκοντος is quite defensible, the two don't always go together; τὸ ἀκούσιον includes other things besides ignorance, *δῖτος τοῦ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν*, Eth. N. III 3 init., the involuntary is due to external force or compulsion as well as to ignorance. This does not apply to ἐκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, because knowledge and voluntary action always do go together; voluntary action implies full knowledge of the circumstances of the case, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἢ ἀρχῇ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἢ πράξις. Eth. N., u. s., and see the preceding chapter on ignorance as the justification of an act. Of the two last classes of acts liable to ἐγκλήματα, τὰ προελομένου and τὰ διὰ πάθος, the former are acts done with *προαίρεσις*, the deliberate purpose or enlightened and deliberate intention which alone gives them their virtuous or vicious character, and stamps them as morally good or bad; the latter are acts due to the two impulses, here called πάθος, appetite and desire (*ἐπιθυμία*), and 'passion', any sudden and violent, especially angry, excitement (*θυμός*). Acts of this latter kind cannot properly be said to be involuntary, οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, Eth. N. III 3, III 1 a 24, because though they are done *in ignorance* (*ἀγνοῶν πράττει*), or in the temporary blindness of a fit of passion, they are not *due* to ignorance, δι' ἀγνοίαν, ignorance is in no sense the cause of them, and therefore no justification, Ib. III 2. These are in fact the four degrees of criminality of Eth. Nic. v 10, on which, and on this subject in general, see Introd. p. 181—9. They are afterwards reduced to the ordinary three in § 16, *infra*.

§ 8. Of *θυμός* we shall have to speak when we come to treat of the *πάθη* or emotions in II 2—11, where the second chapter gives the analysis of *ὁργή*, as it is there called. The motives and incentives to crimes and the intentions and dispositions of the criminals have been already dealt with (in cc. 10 and 12).

§ 9. On this and the two following sections, which refer to what were subsequently called *στάσεις*, *status*, the legal issues of cases, and by Aristotle *ἀμφισβητήσεις*, see Introd. p. 189, 190.

'But whereas it frequently happens that men when called to account for an imputed criminal act, admit the *fact*, but refuse to admit either the *title*, or name that has been applied to it' (by the prosecutor namely, who

ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ κλέψαι, P. 1374· καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ

has had it registered under a certain name or title whereby it is referred to a certain class of crimes, and some particular tribunal, and has a special penalty attached to it: this is the *στάσις ὀρική*, *status finitiuus*, *nomen*, or *finilio*, of the subsequent classifications), 'or that which is contained under the title' (that is, the description of the act which is *supposed* to correspond to the title, but may not actually do so): 'a man may say, for instance, that he 'took' the thing but did not 'steal' it, or that he struck the first blow but was not guilty of wanton outrage, or that there was intercourse but no adultery, or that he was guilty of theft but not of sacrilege (because the thing stolen belonged to no god), or that he had committed a trespass but not on public lands, the state domains, or had conversed (held communication) with the enemy but was guilty of no treachery—from the frequent occurrence of these and similar distinctions it becomes necessary that it should be determined what theft *is*, and what *δβρις*, and what adultery, and so on; in order that if we want to prove that the fact *is* so, or the reverse, we may be able to set in a clear light the real merits or rights (τὸ δίκαιον) of the case'.

The distinction of the *ἐπίγραμμα* and *περὶ ο τὸ ἐπίγραμμα* I have already indicated. The one is the *στάσις ὀρική*, the *name or title* by which the act should be designated, which determines the court that it shall be tried in, and is represented in all the examples given except the case of trespass: the other is the *description given of the act*, as may be seen in the instance that illustrates it, the *trespass* (the *name*) is acknowledged, but the *detailed account* described it as a trespass upon the *public land*, which is denied. This, if it corresponds to any of the *στάσεις* when they were regularly classified (on which see Introd. p. 397 seq. in Appendix E to Book III), must be the *στάσις* of quality, *ποιότης*, *quale*: but it seems certain that in Aristotle's time they had not yet been systematised and arranged under constant technical names. At all events, in this passage in the two last cases it seems that no very clear distinction is made out; or apparently intended, as appears from the mixing up together of the examples of both. Quint. III 6.49, where Aristotle's division of *στάσεις* is noticed, must be referred, not to this passage, but to Rhet. III 16.6, and 17. 1.

*πατάξαι πρότερον*] to be the aggressor in an affray. It is otherwise termed *ἄρχειν χειρῶν ἀδίκων*, II 24. 9, Rhet. ad Alex. 26 (37). 39.

*ἐπεργάσασθαι*] Donaldson, *New Cratylus* § 174, has introduced this passage amongst his examples of a large family of verbs compounded with *ἐπί*, in which the preposition corresponds to the Latin (and English) *inter* (in composition), implying *reciprocity*, or mutual right or association, as *ἐπικοινωνία*, *inter-communion*, *ἐπιγαμία*, the right of *inter-marriage*, Rhet. I 14. 5. It is quite true that *ἐπεργασία* and *ἐπεργάσασθαι* (see the examples in Donaldson, p. 296, and the *Lexicons*) are both used in this sense



δημόσια, ἢ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ' οὐ προ-  
δύναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι αὖ καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι,  
τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως εἰάν τε ὑπάρχειν  
εἰάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύναι, ἔχῳμεν  
10 ἐμφανίζεω τὸ δίκαιον. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα  
περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἄδικον<sup>1</sup> ἢ ἀμ-

<sup>1</sup> + περὶ οὗ libri deteriores.

for the right of inter-cultivation of land, just like ἐπινομία the right of mutual pasturage, as on a border territory. But here ἐπεργάσασθαι must mean to encroach or trespass, otherwise it is no offence: and so the word is used by Aeschines, Ctesiph. § 113, of the Locrians of Amphissa who 'encroached upon' the sacred soil of Crissa, by cultivating, Thucyd. I 139, and elsewhere; as well as ἐπινομία and ἐπινέμειν, for a similar trespass on the pasturage of some one else. The primary sense must be no doubt that of reciprocal right or occupation, the interchange of cultivation. Perhaps the notion of going backwards and forwards over a border to cultivate land may have suggested the notion of trespassing, by extending the original signification to cases where there was no such right existing, or only in the trespasser's imagination.

I will add some instances of similar formations which are not given in the *New Cratylus*.

ἐπαλλάττειν, Eur. Heracl. 836, ποῦς ἐπαλλαχθεὶς ποδί, 'interchanged, interlaced': common in Aristotle, Pol. I 6 (quoted by Donaldson), c. 9, 1257 b 35, ἐπαλλάττει ἢ χρῆσις κ.τ.λ. Ib. VI (IV) 10, 1295 a 9, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν, Ib. VII (VI) 1, 1317 a 1, ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν. Parva Naturalia, de longitate et brevitae vitae, c. 1, 464 b 28, ἐπηλλάττει τὰ νοσῶδη τὴν φύσιν σώματα τοῖς βραχυβίοις, de ortu anim. II 1, 732 b 15, ἐπάλλαξις, 733 a 27, ἐπαλλάττουσιν ἀλλήλοις κ.τ.λ. de insomniis II 18, 460 b 20, καὶ τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἐν δύο φαίνεται, Theophr. Hist. Pl. I 3. 2.

ἐπιμίσγεσθαι, Thucyd. I 2 and 13, ἐπιμυγνύντες, ἐπιμυγόντων; Herod. I 68, ἐπιμυξίη; Thuc. v 78, Xen. Cyr. VII 4. 5, Ar. Pol. IV (VII) 6, 1327 a 39: ἐπέρχεσθαι, Thucyd. IV 120, ἐπέρχοντο, 'were going backwards and forwards paying one another visits': ἐπικοινωνεῖν, ἐπικοινωνία, Plat. Gorg. 464 C, Soph. 251 D, 252 D, ἐπικοινοῦσθαι, Protag. 313 B, Ar. Top. Δ 2, 123 a 6, ἐπικοινωνοῦσι γὰρ οἱ τόποι, Anal. Post. A 11, 77 a 26, ἐπικ. πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπιστήμαι ἀλλήλαις, Rhet. ad Alex. 5 (6). 5.

§ 10. 'In all such cases the issue (the dispute, question in dispute, disputed point) turns upon this, whether namely (the accused party) is criminal and vicious or not; for the vice and injustice (ὁφ the act) lies in the deliberate purpose or intention, and names of this kind, such as wanton outrage and theft, connote (signify in addition to their direct and literal meaning) the deliberate intention or purpose; for the act of striking is not in every case (co-extensive with) wanton outrage, but only if it was done with a particular object or purpose, of insulting the other for instance, or for his own gratification (the wanton pleasure in the insult itself and in the humiliation it inflicts, ὅπως ἡσθῇ, Rhet. II 2. 5). Nor is

φισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε, πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκείνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. οὐδὲ πάντως, p. 47.

surreptitious appropriation in every case theft, but only if the theft was for the injury of the other and for the thief's own private use and advantage. And so the same rule that applies to these cases holds in like manner of all the rest'.

περὶ οὗ. These words, suspected from Victorius downwards, omitted by A\* and three other MSS, and finally rejected by Bekker and Spengel, were probably inserted by some transcriber or commentator who was doubtful about the construction. If they are omitted, the accusative, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, will be, as Victorius says, equivalent to κατὰ πάντα, 'in all such cases'; which is thus grammatically to be explained. The accusative here follows the analogy of that class of accusatives which indicate the *local seat* of any 'affection' in its widest sense, and follow passive and neuter verbs and adjectives, (τερφθεῖς τοῦτο, Eur. Ion 541, ὅτα κατεαγόντες, Plat. Gorg. 515 E, τὰ ὅτα κατὰγνυται, Protag. 342 B, ἀλγείν τὴν κεφαλὴν, νοσεῖν ὀφθαλμούς, βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος, πόδας ἐκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς) and are themselves probably nothing but extensions of the ordinary cognate accusative; which passes *first* from the direct expression of the *same notion* as that in the verb, μαίνεσθαι μανίαν, τέρπεσθαι τέρψιν, to the indirect and general and indefinite *neuter*, μαίνεσθαι τάδε, τέρπεσθαι τοῦτο or ταῦτα (see Wunder on Oed. R. 259), and *secondly* into the expression of any *equivalent* notion almost without limit, of which the *seat of the affection* is one form. This is the explanation of Kühner [§ 410 *anmerk.* 5 of 2nd ed.], Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* §§ 545, 6, and I think probably the true one. Here therefore πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 'all such instances' are represented locally as the seats of the several ἀμφισβητήσεις, the points on which each case turns, or legal issues: *in them* the points in dispute or issue are said to reside.

ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία] See note on I 1. 14, and the passage there cited. One of them is Top. Z 12, 149 b 29, οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτῃς ἐστίν. Add Eth. Nic. III 4, init. περὶ προαιρέσεως...οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. Ib. 1112 a 2, τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τάχαθ' ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῖ τινὲς ὁρμεν. Ib. v 10, 1135 b 25, οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη, ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. 1136 a 1, ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ ἀδικεῖ. Rhet. I 14. 1, 5 (implied).

προσσημαίνει] περὶ ἑρμηνείας c. 3, 16 b 5, ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον. Ib. lines 8, 9, 13, 18, 24; ubi Ammonius, προσσημαίνειν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τῷ πρώτῳ δηλουμένῳ κατὰ δεύτερον λόγον καὶ ἄλλο τι συνεμφαίνειν. Eth. Eudem. II 3, 1221 b 18 seq. (where much the same thing is said as in this passage of the Rhetoric in many more words).

ὕβρις] See note on I 12. 26.

εἰ λάθρα ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

- 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἶδη (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ' ἄγραφα), περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἀγράφων δύο  
12 ἐστὶν εἶδη· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν

*σφετερισμός* is 'the making a thing one's own', appropriating it to one's self, and one's own use. Plato has *σφετερίζεσθαι*, and Arist. Pol. VIII (v) 11 sub fin. 1315 b 2, *σφετεριστής*. The meaning of the genitive *ἑαυτοῦ*, which *looks* as if it meant 'appropriation of oneself', must be interpreted by the opposite *βλάβῃ ἄλλου*, with which it is contrasted. As *ἄλλου* after *βλάβῃ* is the objective genitive, injury to another, so *ἑαυτοῦ* after *σφετερισμός* is the appropriation to yourself and your own benefit, appropriation for your own use and advantage.

§ 11. *ἦν* 'there are, as we said', viz. in § 2. This however was *not* 'said' precisely as it is here; *there*, laws were divided into universal and special, and then the special subdivided into written (or positive law) and unwritten: and we now learn that the universal law is also unwritten, and that the special branch of the unwritten law, which must now be distinguished from the other, is to be found in that spirit of fairness and mercy and consideration, which consists in an inclination to relax the unnecessary rigour of the written code arising from its own imperfections, and at the same time to make due allowance for human errors and infirmities: all which is contained in the principles of equity, the unwritten law which prescribes such a course of conduct in matters of doubt. I have observed in the Introduction p. 244 that we are probably to extend this subordinate kind of *ἄγραφοι νόμοι* so as to include all the prevailing feelings and opinions as to propriety and right and wrong in general which prevail in each *special* state (and are therefore a kind of *ἴδιος νόμος*, distinguished from the universal): of which indeed the views and feelings represented by equity form a very considerable part.

§ 12. The two kinds of unwritten law are, first the universal law, the precepts of which suggest higher considerations and higher duties than mere legal obligations to pursue virtue and avoid vice, (this is what is meant by the 'excess, or higher degree, of virtue and vice' above the legal standard, expressed in καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, quod eximiam virtutem aut vitium inde continet, Victorius), obedience to which law is rewarded by praise and honour and gifts (the two kinds of rewards; the 'gifts' in this case being conferred of course not for their value as a pecuniary compensation, but in so far as they are signs of moral approbation) and the breach or violation of it punished by (not fine or imprisonment or any personal penalty, as the violation of a legal enactment, but by) censure, reproach, dishonour (not deprivation of civil rights, which is a legal penalty): of such precepts examples are, gratitude to benefactors, the return or repayment of obligations (differing from the feeling of gratitude),

ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἐφ' οἷς ὀνειδῆ καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί, οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ ἀντενποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα.

13 τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ἐπιεικὲς

the inclination and readiness to aid and defend one's friends, and such like. It is remarkable that amongst the precepts of the universal law which we are all bound to obey Aristotle should have here omitted the duty of interring and paying honour to the dead, so strikingly exemplified by the appeal of Antigone against Creon's tyrannous proclamation in the play to which he himself had just called our attention (comp. Eur. Suppl. 16—19, 526, 538), and still more so perhaps in the trial of the eight generals after Arginusae.

The *second* kind of unwritten law is that which belongs to law special, and is what is omitted by (i. e. intended to supply the deficiencies of) the written law.

Some of these universal principles of the popular morality are occasionally mentioned by the poets and other non-scientific writers: they are the most general rules of conduct which every one everywhere is supposed to recognise and obey. A short list of the most fundamental of them is given in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2). 6, 7, which almost coincides with Aristotle's in the Rhetoric, δίκαιον μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν πάντων ἢ τὸ τῶν πλείστων ἔθος ἀγραφον, διορίζον τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γονίας τιμῶν καὶ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις χάριν ἀποδιδόναι· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοῦτοῖς ὅμοια οὐ προστάττουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἱ γεγραμμένοι νόμοι ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀγράφῳ καὶ κοινῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται. Eurip. Antiope, Fragm. XXXVIII (Dind.), τρεῖς εἰσιν ἀρεταὶ τὰς χρεῶν σ' ἀσκεῖν, τέκνον, θεοὺς τε τιμῶν, τοὺς τε φύσαντας γονεῖς, νόμους τε κοινούς· Ἑλλάδος. Comp. Xen. Memor. IV 4. 19—24, where the same are mentioned with one or two additions. On the unwritten law in general, see Plato, Legg. VII 793 A, B, C; he says *ἡτὲρ αἰσία*, οὓς πατρίους νόμους ἐπονομάζουσιν, δεσμοὶ οὗτοι πάσης εἰσὶ πολιτείας μεταξὺ πάντων ὄντες τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι τεθεσμομένων, ἀτεχνῶς οἷον πάτρια καὶ παντάπασιν ἀρχαῖα νόμιμα, ἀ καλῶς μὲν τεθέντα καὶ ἐβισθέντα πάση σωτηρίᾳ περικαλύψαντα ἔχει πρὸς τοὺς γραφέντας νόμους, and he finally classes with the unwritten law the *ἔθῃ* καὶ ἐπιδεύματα, Aristotle's second class of ἀγραφοὶ νόμοι, as I have mentioned in p. 243 of the Introduction.

§ 13. On what follows, see Introd. pp. 191—2, on equity; and the 14th chapter of the Nic. Eth. Book v. 'For equity appears to be just (or a kind of justice), and it is the supplement to the written law that is equity (equitable)'. Comp. Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 b 8, τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον τινὸς ὅν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὅν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δίκαιου. Ib. line 12, τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δίκαιου. Line 26, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἢ ἑλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου.

τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἀκόντων τὰ δὲ ἐκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ, ἐκόντων δ' ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ἢ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ἢ δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. καὶ ὅσα μὴ ῥᾶδιον διορίσαι δι' ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ καὶ ποιᾶ τινί. ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν  
 14 διαριθμοῦντα. ἂν οὖν ἢ ἀδιόριστον, δέη δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε καὶ δακτύλιον

'This is done sometimes unintentionally, sometimes intentionally, on the part of the legislators, unintentionally when the omission escapes their notice, intentionally when they find it impossible to define or determine every thing (to provide by their definitions or determinations for all possible cases in detail), and are therefore obliged to lay down the rule as absolute (to pronounce universally), though it is not so in fact, but only true and fair for the most part'; and so fail to provide for exceptional cases. Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 b 15, ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἥττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῇ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῇ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστι· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. Pol. III 11, 1282 b 2, so in the administration of government, and in enforcing obedience to the laws of the state, the sovereign power assumes the office of equity in the administration of justice; δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἂν τε εἰς ἂν τε πλείους ᾴσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὧν ἐξαδυνατούσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾶδιον εἶναι καθόλου δηλώσει περὶ πάντων. In Magna Moralia, II 1, the author, in treating of ἐπιεικεία, says, ἃ γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαδυνατεῖ καθ' ἕκαστα ἀκριβῶς διορίζει, ἀλλὰ καθόλου λέγει, ὁ ἐν τοῖς παραχωρῶν, καὶ ταῦθ' αἰρούμενος ἃ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐβούλετο μὲν τῇ καθ' ἕκαστα διορίσαι, οὐκ ἠδυνήθη δέ, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικής, and concludes, τῶν μὲν γὰρ φύσει καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντων δικαίων οὐκ ἐλαττοῦται, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ νόμον, ἃ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαδυνατῶν ἀπέλιπεν. On the defects of the written law, see also Rhet. I 1. 7.

And not only is the legislator unable to provide for all exceptional cases to general rules, but also the infinity of particular circumstances which distinguish human actions and crimes precludes the possibility of his enumerating in detail all those varieties which in justice should have different degrees of punishment apportioned to them; as for instance, in enacting the prohibition of 'wounding with an iron instrument', to define the size and the kind of instrument in every case; for life is too short, and would fail a man in the attempt to reckon them all up in detail (on this case, which is given also by Quintilian, VII 6. 8, see Introd. p. 191).

§ 14. If then it be thus impossible to determine all these particular and exceptional cases, and yet there is a necessity for legislation, the law *must* be expressed in general terms; so that if a man wearing an iron

ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξῃ, κατὰ μὲν τὸν  
γεγραμμένον νόμον ἐνοχὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ P. 1374 b.  
15 τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτο ἐστίν. εἰ  
δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, φανερόν ποῖά ἐστι  
| τὰ ἐπιεικῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῇ, καὶ ποῖοι οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄν-  
16 θρωποι· ἐφ' οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῇ  
ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ  
τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ δὲ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχή-

ring lift his hand (to threaten) or strike another, by the *written* law (the *letter* of the law) he is liable (to the penalty), and has committed a crime, but in truth and in fact he is not guilty of a crime, and herein (τοῦτο, in this fair interpretation of the act) lies equity'.

§ 15. 'If then equity be such as we have described it, it is plain what sort of things (i.e. charges, imputed crimes) are equitable (i.e. suitable for equitable treatment), and the reverse, and what sort of men are not equitable'. And hence to the end of the chapter we have an analysis of the popular objects of equitable treatment, and the characteristics of it, or of the absence of it, the negative which may be inferred from the positive, in these subjects.

§ 16. '(The first of these), the kinds of actions which are suitable objects of equity are such as these. Cases which ought to be treated with indulgence, and mistakes or *errors* (implying *ignorance in particulars*, Eth. Nic. III 2, on involuntary ignorance) and mere misfortunes, *accidental*, which should be carefully distinguished from actual crimes, and not visited with equal penalties: the latter of the two, accidental misfortunes, are such acts as are sudden and unexpected, or beyond calculation, and do not spring from a vicious habit or evil intention; errors are such as are not accidental, in the sense of unexpected and beyond calculation, and yet do not proceed from vice (in the same sense as before); but crimes are acts that are not without calculation (i.e. deliberate), and are prompted by a vicious habit or inclination, because all wrong acts that are due to desire, proceed from this depraved will and moral judgment'. This is the usual classification of the degrees of criminality in actions; for acts, of which the mischievous consequences are purely accidental, and therefore altogether beyond our own control, and for mischievous acts committed under some mistake as to the particular circumstances of the case (not of general moral principles, for which we *are* responsible), as when a man is killed with a gun that was not known to be loaded, we are *not* responsible: what makes us responsible for an act is not only the harm or injury that is its consequence, but the deliberate intention or purpose with which it was done (and in all cases where the wrong was prompted by desire, this is sure to be an evil one, τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πομπίας) and full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case. In the treatment of this subject in Eth. Nic. v 10, a fourth degree is introduced between the error and the crime.

ματα· ἔστι δ' αὐτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ  
 ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα  
 καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παρά-  
 λογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τ' ἐστίν· τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν  
 17 ἀπὸ πονηρίας. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν  
 ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν  
 νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς p. 48.  
 τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν πράξιν  
 18 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ μέρος  
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ ποιός τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ ποιός

This is the case of a wrong act, as a homicide, done in a fit of passion *δ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ὁ ὀργισας*: this being done by a spontaneous impulse, and not after deliberation with malice prepense (*οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας*), is only 'an *ἀδίκημα*, a wrong no doubt, and a thing which ought not to have been done, but not punishable like the deliberate act; a homicide not a murder. Compare the treatment of this topic in *Rhet. ad Alex.* 4 (5). 9—11. It seems to have been one of the stock topics of the rhetorical books. The degrees of criminality are there, as here, only three.

§ 17. *καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν* 'the indulgent consideration of human accidents and infirmities', especially errors, in mitigation of the application of the strict letter of the law. On *τὰ ἀνθρώπινα*, see note on I 2. 7, p. 34. These *human* errors and infirmities in the culprit should be met by a corresponding *humanity* on the part of the judge, the opponent, and indeed *men* in general. Victorius quotes 'Ter. Adelph. III 4. 24, *persuasit nox amor vinum adolescentia: humanum est.*' τὸ δ' ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις αὐτυχεῖν οὐ μόνον εἶναι αὐτῷ ἴδιον (φάβη), ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τῶν δικασόντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, *Rhet. ad Alex.* u. s. § 10.

§§ 17—18. 'And to look (in interpreting the offence and the amount of the penalty), not to the law, but to the legislator, and not to the mere words (the letter) of the law, but to the mind (the intention) of the legislator'; (*ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἁλλειφθέν, ὃ κὰν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς οὕτως ἂν εἴποι ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾗδε ἐνομοθέτησεν ἄν.* *Eth. Nic.* v 14, 1137 b 20); 'and (to look) not to the act (of the accused) but to the deliberate purpose or intention, and not to the part but to the whole' (i. e. not to take a narrow view of the criminality of the act by confining yourself to the consideration of the bare naked fact, or of some particular part or circumstance of it, which gives it a specially vicious appearance; but to look at it *as a whole*, to take into account the general character of the doer and all the attendant or surrounding circumstances which will throw light upon the intention of it, the purpose with which it was done), 'and not merely to the *present* character of the offender but to the constant or usual character that he bore (to what sort of man he was, always or usually)'.

τις ἦν αἰεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν  
 μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὧν  
 ἔπαθε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικού-  
 μενον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἐθέλειν κρίνεσθαι ἢ ἔργῳ.  
 19 καὶ τὸ εἰς δίαιταν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς δίκην βούλεσθαι ἰέναι·  
 ὁ γὰρ διαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπεικὲς ὀρᾷ, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς τὸν  
 νόμον· καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα διαιτητὴς εὐρέθης, ὅπως τὸ  
 ἐπεικὲς ἰσχύῃ.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον

§ 18. 'And to remember rather the good than the ill treatment you may have received, and the benefits that you have received rather than those that you have conferred'.

μᾶλλον ἢ (ὧν, attracted, or ἀ) ἐποίησεν.—τὸ δίκαιον, strict justice, the letter of the law, requires an even balance of benefits on both sides, on the reciprocal (retaliatory, tit for tat, *par pari*) principle, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, Eth. N. v 8.—ἐπεικεία, merciful indulgent consideration, remembers only the benefits and forgets the injuries; remembers kindnesses received, forgets those that it has bestowed. *ἀγῶ νομίζω τὸν μὲν εὖ παθόντα δεῖν μεμνησθαι τὸν πάντα χρόνον τὸν δὲ ποιήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐπιλελῆσθαι, εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν χρηστοῦ τὸν δὲ μὴ μικροψύχου ποιεῖν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου. τὸ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας εὐεργεσίας ὑπομνησκειν καὶ λέγειν μικροῦ δεῖν ὁμοίων ἔστι τῷ ὀνειδίζειν.* Dem. de Cor. p. 316. Victorius.

καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον κ.τ.λ.] 'and to put up with injury or injustice', to endure it without retaliation, 'and, the disposition or inclination, to have a matter decided rather by word than deed'.

λόγῳ κρίνεσθαι] to decide a dispute by an amicable settlement, by *talk- ing* the matter over with the opposite party, or reasoning with him, rather than proceed *ἔργῳ*, appeal, that is, to the *ultima ratio*, the *voie du fait*, and actually fight out the quarrel: or (in the case to which Victorius would confine it, that of a quarrel between two neighbouring states) an appeal to arms. '*Omnia prius consilio experiri quam armis sapientem decet.* Ter. Eun. iv 7. 19. Apoll. Rhod. iii 185.' Victorius.

§ 19. 'Or again'—a particular case of the same kind of general disposition—'to be more inclined to refer a matter to arbitration than to a court of law: for the arbitrator always takes the equitable view of the case, whereas the judge looks to the law' (the letter, or literal interpretation of the law, which *he is bound by oath* strictly to carry out and interpret to the best of his judgment). 'In fact the very motive or intention of the invention of arbitration (the introduction of it into jurisprudence and social relations in general) was that equity should prevail'.

διωρίσθω] note on *εἰρησθω*, I 11. 29 ult.

'And so let this manner' (this rough, hasty, popular sketch or outline) 'of describing (marking out the boundaries in detail, determining the boundaries of the whole and the several parts, defining, analysing,



Ι τοῦτον, ἀδίκημα δὲ μείζον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀπὸ μείζονος ἢ ἀδικίας· διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα, οἷον ὁ Μελα-  
νώπου Καλλίστρατος κατηγορεῖ, ὅτι παρελογίσατο

describing, διωρίσθαι) equity suffice' for the occasion; for the use, that is, of the rhetorician, who requires no scientific treatment of the subject.

#### CHAP. XIV.

This chapter, a continuation of the preceding, contains the application of the 'common topic' of degree, 'greater and less', to the offences or crimes which formed the subject of the other.

§ 1. 'The magnitude of a *wrong* varies with the degree of the *injustice* that prompts it'. There is here the same distinction taken between ἀδίκημα, a wrong done—an abstract wrong, regarded independently of the motive or intention—and the confirmed habit (the bad *εἶς*), depraved will and disposition implied in ἀδικία. The deliberate purpose, προαίρεσις, is the measure of moral worth, and distinguishes virtue from vice, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 b 20, ὅταν δὲ εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δὲ (πράττει τις), ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικημάτ' ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι πῶς ἀδικοὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβην· ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀδικος καὶ μοχθηρός.

'And therefore (sometimes) the smallest things are greatest', acts apparently most trifling are sometimes indicative of the worst intentions and dispositions, 'as is exemplified in Callistratus' charge against Melanopus, that he cheated the temple-builders of three consecrated half-obols'. Such a charge subjected the offender to a γραφή ἱερῶν χρημάτων, Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 335 [= p. 435 § 293]. The exact nature of the offence imputed to Melanopus cannot be ascertained: it was probably some fraud (possibly an error construed as a crime,) in the settlement of accounts between himself and the persons charged with the building or restoration of a temple, the ναοποιοί.

The word ναοποιοί appears to be an ἀπαξ λεγόμενον. Stephens, *Thesaurus* s. v., gives no other example. On the same analogy are formed τεicho-ποιός, μηχανοποιός, ἀγαλματοποιός. The office is described in Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1322 b 19, οἷον ἱερεῖς καὶ ἐπιμελῆται τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. The word ἱεροποιοί, which follows immediately, in line 24, is referred by Stahr (erroneously however) to this office of curator of sacred buildings, where he translates it 'temple-baumeister'.

The magnitude of the vice is argued in this case from the trifling amount of the profit; if a man would commit so great a sin as sacrilege for three halfpence, how great must be the depravity of his character and intentions. Melanopus and Callistratus, as Victorius notes, are mentioned together as ambassadors to Thebes by Xenoph., Hellen. VI 2 and 3; and by Plutarch, Vit. Demosth. (p. 851 F), represented as political rivals and opponents. On Callistratus, see note on I 7. 13.

παρελογίσατο] This verb has two different applications in conformity with the double sense of λογίεσθαι and λογισμός; the two senses, though closely connected and often identified, are at all events distinguishable;

τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἱερὰ τοὺς ῥαποιοῦς· ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης δὲ τούναντίον. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐννύαρχειν τῇ δυνάμει· ὁ γὰρ τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἱερὰ κλέψας κἂν ὅτιοῦν ἀδικήσειεν. ὅτε μὲν δὴ οὕτω τὸ μείζον, ὅτε δ' ἐκ

(1) 'reasoning' and (2) 'calculation'; the *παρά*, which conveys the imputation of *fraud* (*παρά*, amiss, awry, *wrong*), being common to both. Here (as in Dem. c. Aphob. α', p. 822. 25, where it stands for simple 'misreckoning', and Isocr. Panath. § 243, for 'cheating', '*fraudulent* miscalculation' in accounts) it has the latter sense. Elsewhere, and *usually*, (at all events in Aristotle, as Rhet. I 9. 29, II 23. 3; 25. 10 *bis*, III 12. 4, *et passim*;) it denotes 'wrong, fallacious, false, *reasoning*', a 'fallacy' in argument. Lastly *ἱερά* means 'consecrated to sacred uses; devoted to the service of the gods or religion'.

'In the case of justice, the opposite is true'. That is, 'the magnitude or strength of the just and virtuous disposition, inclination, resolution, is shewn, not now in the trifling character of the temptation or motive by which it is led astray, but in the greatness of the temptation which it withstands. 'Ut qui ingentem vim auri, apud se nullo teste depositam, cum infitriari impune possit, reddidit, iustior sit necesse est quam si idem in exigua pecunia fecit.' Victorius. Injustice varies inversely with the magnitude of the profit or advantage to be derived from it, the less the temptation the greater the sin; justice directly, the greater the profit and the consequent temptation to do wrong, the higher the virtue in foregoing it: as, the greater the deposit, the greater the justice in restoring it.

'The reason of this' (ταῦτα is τὸ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα εἶναι) 'is, that (the greater crime) is virtually latent (in the less); for one who could steal (*lit.* stole) three half-obols consecrated to religious uses would be capable of any other iniquity whatsoever'. The *δύναμις*, the indefinite latent capacity of vice, is tacitly opposed to the *ἐνέργεια*, any possible enormity, to which it may, or may not, be developed. If a man will commit a crime which may be interpreted as sacrilege for such a trifle as three half-obols, he is plainly 'capable' of sacrilege in any degree of atrocity, where the profit and temptation are greater.

On the subject of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, physical, moral, and metaphysical, the fundamental and all-pervading antithesis of the Aristotelian Philosophy, a commentary on Rhetoric is not the place to enter. It is explained by Trendelenburg, *Comm. on de Anima*, II 1, *Elem. Log. Arist.* § 6, p. 61. *δύναμις* is treated in *Metaph.* Θ 1—5, and *ἐνέργεια*, *ib.* 6—9, on which consult Bonitz's *Commentary*. Grant, *Essays on Ethics*, Essay IV, pp. 181—201, 1st [or 2nd] ed., gives a full and clear account of the relation between them, and the doctrine in general, especially in its application to Moral Philosophy. Aristotle himself nowhere gives a complete and intelligible description of this antithesis and its bearings, but assumes the knowledge of it in all his writings.

'Now sometimes the degree of crime, the comparative criminality, may be determined in this way; in other cases it is decided, or estimated, by the (actual amount of the) harm or injury done'. ἐκ 'from', means

τοῦ βλάβους κρίνεται. καὶ οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἴση τιμωρία,  
 2 ἄλλὰ πᾶσα ἐλάττων. καὶ οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἴσας· χαλε-  
 πὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀδύνατον<sup>1</sup>. καὶ οὐ μὴ ἔστι δίκην λαβεῖν  
 τὸν παθόντα· ἀνίατον γάρ· ἢ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις  
 3 ἴσας. καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν καὶ ἀδικηθεὶς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν  
 μεγάλως ἐκόλασεν· ἔτι γὰρ μείζονι ὁ ποιήσας δίκαιος  
 κολασθῆναι, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ὑπὲρ Εὐκτῆμονος συνηγο-

<sup>1</sup> *Coniect F. Portus.* χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον *infra cum libris.*

that the decision or estimate of the amount of criminality *proceeds* or *is derived* from the comparison of the injury or consequences resulting from the two acts.

§ 2. 'And when there is no punishment (in use) equal or adequate (to the offence), but any one (that exists or can be devised) is too slight for it'; supply *ἀδίκημα μείζον ἔστι*.

'And where the mischief done is incurable: for it is hard (or grievous), or indeed impossible'. To fill up the sense either repeat *ἴσθαι*, 'to find any adequate remedy or compensation'; or, from οὐ μὴ ἴση τιμωρία, 'to devise any adequate punishment'. Otherwise it may be supposed (though it is unnecessary) that Aristotle wrote *ἀδύνατον*, having *ἀμήχανον* or some similar adjective in his mind, meaning 'a helpless, hopeless, irremediable' case.

'And again crimes for which no legal redress is to be obtained by the injured party: for such a wrong is incurable: because 'justice' (trial and sentence) and punishment are so many *remedies*'. On this doctrine of punishment, and the difference between *κόλασις* and *τιμωρία*, see above I 10. 17, and *Introd.* p. 232. Cf. *Ar. Eth. Nic.* II 2, 1104 b 16, *μητύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων* *λατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ λατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι*.

'And if (in consequence of the wrong done) the sufferer and the victim of the wrong inflicted some heavy punishment on himself; for the perpetrator of the act deserves a still severer punishment (than that which he thus unintentionally brought upon his victim): as Sophocles, in pleading the cause of Euctemon—after he had killed himself in consequence of the outrage he had sustained—said that he would not lay the penalty at a less amount than the sufferer had estimated it at for himself, i. e. Euctemon by his suicide had virtually fixed the penalty of the offence at death.

§ 3. *δίκαιος κολασθῆναι*] On this idiomatic usage of *δίκαιος*, and similar constructions—in which the adjective, instead of being expressed impersonally in the neuter, as *δίκαιόν ἐστι*, is attracted as it were to the subject of the sentence—especially with *δῆλος* and its compounds, *φανερὸς*, *γελοῖος*, and such like, see *Matth. Gr. Gr.* § 297, comp. 549. 5. It is to be observed that the case of *δίκαιος* is peculiar; this takes the infinitive, whereas all the rest are construed with the participle. To *Matthiae's* examples add *ἄξιος*, similarly constructed in *Thuc.* I 70, sub init. *ἄξιοι νομίζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλαι ψόγον ἐπενεγκεῖν*; some Platonic examples in

ρῶν, ἐπεὶ ἀπέσφαξεν ἑαυτὸν ὑβρισθεὶς, οὐ τιμήσειν P. 1375.  
4 ἔφη ἐλάττονος ἢ οὐ ὁ παθὼν ἑαυτῷ ἐτίμησεν. καὶ ὁ

Stallbaum's note on Gorg. 448 D; Soph. Aj. 634, κρείσσων γὰρ Ἰδῶα κεύθων, and Lobeck's note; the proverb μὴ κίνει Καμάριαν, ἀκίνητος γὰρ ἀμείνων: Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 641, ἡδῖους ἴσεσθε ἀκούσαντες; Arist. Nub. 1241, Ζεὺς γελοῖος ὀμνύμενος: Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 ὁ 34, γελοῖος φαίνεται ὁ μεγάλῳ ψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν: Pl. Phaedrus 236 D, γελοῖος ἴσομαι... ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων.

Σοφοκλῆς] Not the poet, but a statesman and orator advanced in life at the close of the Peloponnesian war. He was one of the ten πρόβουλοι, Rhet. III 18. 6, appointed by the Athenians, after the Sicilian disaster in 413 B.C., to devise measures for the public safety, Thuc. VIII 1, Grote's *Hist. Gr.* Pt. II, ch. 61, Vol. VII, p. 499, and note: and afterwards one of the thirty tyrants, Xen. Hellen. II 3. 2. This Sophocles is doubtless the same who is again mentioned, Rhet. III 15. 3. He is there described as an old man, which agrees with the statement of Thucydides, u. s., that the πρόβουλοι were an ἀρχὴ πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν; and the 'charge' brought against him (Rhet. I. c.) was probably connected with his conduct as a member of 'the thirty'.

τιμήσειν, ἐτίμησεν] In all causes civil as well as criminal which could be brought before an Athenian law-court, one point to be considered in the judgment was the τίμημα or estimate, assessment, either of the kind or amount of the penalty in criminal prosecutions, or of the damages in civil actions. This gives rise to the division of all legal processes into ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι and τιμητοί. In the former of these the penalty and damages are already fixed by law or by previous private arrangement (C. R. Kennedy), and are therefore 'unassessable' by the judges; in the τιμητοὶ ἀγῶνες of all kinds, the amount of the damages or penalty to be awarded is at the discretion of the judges, who τιμῶσιν, estimate, assess, or fix the amount. This is the explanation of Harpocration, and Ulpian, followed by Meier & Schömann, *Attischer Process*, p. 171 note, Böckh *Publ. Econ.* Bk. III, c. 11 (p. 371 Engl. Transl.), and Hermann *Pol. Antig.* § 143. 7—12. Suidas, and other ancient writers, invert this distinction, and make τιμητοὶ ἀγῶνες the cases in which the penalty is already fixed, and ἀτίμητοι those in which it is open to adjudication. See Meier & Schömann, u. s., p. 171 note.

On the whole subject see Meier & Schömann u. s. et seq. and Mr C. R. Kennedy's article in Smith's *Dict. Antig.* p. 970 (1st ed.) [p. 1131, 2nd ed. and cf. note on Dem. *Select Private Orations*, Part II, Or. 55 § 18. s.]

The accuser in a criminal process, where the penalty was not already fixed by law, himself in the first instance assessed its amount, which the judges confirmed or not as they thought proper. The first was called τιμᾶσθαι, the second τιμάν, in accordance with the usual distinction of the active and middle voice, as marking by their contrasted significations the functions of the judge and the parties in the case, δικάζειν and δικάζεσθαι, κρίνειν and κρίνεσθαι, &c.; the one administering justice and deciding the question, whilst the others 'get this done for them' by the intervention of another. Aristotle has here neglected this ordinary distinction, for reasons best known to himself. As far as the phrase ὁ παθὼν ἐτίμησεν

μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων πεποίηκεν. καὶ τὸ  
πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμαρτάνειν μέγα. καὶ δι' ὃ ἂν  
ζητηθῇ καὶ εὐρεθῇ τὰ κωλύοντα καὶ ζημιούντα, οἷον  
ἐν Ἀργεὶ ζημιοῦται δι' ὃν ἂν νόμος τεθῇ καὶ δι' οὓς τὸ

is concerned, the reason might be, that the accuser is supposed to represent the estimate by the deceased of his own wrongs as of equal authority with a judicial decision: but this will not apply to *τιμήσειν*, Sophocles' own estimate. At the same time as *τιμᾶν* and *τίμημα* may denote an 'estimate' in general, the use of the verb here must be regarded rather as a departure from ordinary usage, than as a solecism, or violation of the laws of the language.

On the *συνήγοροι*, see Schneider's note on Pol. VI 5. 10, vol. II, p. 391, and *addenda*, pp. 502—4. *συνηγῶν* here is not technical: there is no reason to suppose that it denotes one of the public *συνήγοροι*, appointed by the state.

Lastly, the entire topic, καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν—*ἐτίμησεν*, is thus illustrated by Schrader: 'Sexti Tarquinii flagitium ideo maius est, quod illius foeditate inducta Lucretia sibi ipsi vim intulit. (This is suggested by Victorius.) Et Appii Claudii decemviri sceleraturn de L. Virgini filia iudicium eo sceleraturn est, quoniam pater illo commotus filiam interfecit (Liv. III 48).'

§ 4. 'And any crime that is unique, or the first of its class (that has been committed), or has been seldom paralleled'. These three cases of especial prominence have been already applied to acts as topics of praise, I 9. 38. See in illustration the references there given.

'And the frequent commission of the same offence magnifies it': because this shews the depraved *habiti*, or confirmed state, the *ἔξις* which constitutes vice. 'Nec enim is casu aut affectu, sed habitu et pravitate animi, delinquit.' Schrader.

'And any crime for which any checks and preventives or penalties have been sought and found (invented or discovered), as, for instance, at Argos a penalty is incurred by any one on whose account a law has been enacted (i.e. one of the *κωλυτικοί*, or (if I may coin a word for the occasion) *ζημωτικοί*, νόμοι), or on whose account the prison was built': supply *ἐζημώθησαν*. This same topic has been already employed in the opposite sense, to heighten the praise due to an action, c. 9 § 38. Schrader quotes in illustration Lysias, Or. XXII § 16 (*κατὰ τῶν σιτοπάλων*), οὕτω δὲ πάλαι περὶ τῆς τοῦτων πανουργίας καὶ κακονοίας ἡ πόλις ἔγνωκεν, ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὥνιοις ἀπασι τοὺς ἀγορανόμους φύλακας κατεστήσατε, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ τῇ τέχνῃ χωρὶς σιτοφύλακας ἀποκληροῦτε; the appointment of a special board of officers for the control of the corn-market signals the special rascality of the dealers.

§ 5. 'And the more brutal the crime is, the worse'; that is, the nearer approach it makes to the conduct and instincts of a mere animal or brute, who is incapable of virtue and self-control; and the more cruel, savage, 'inhuman' it is, more degraded below the level of humanity.

There are three degrees in the scale of natures, moral and intellectual, (1) the beast, (2) the man, and (3) the god. Thus, Pol. I 2, 1253 a 27, it is

5 δεσμωτήριον ἀκοδομήθη. καὶ τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδί-

said of a man that is incapable of society, or is in want of nothing, being all-sufficient to himself, that he is ἡ θηρίον ἢ θεός: in respect of this complete independence he is either below or above all the various wants, instincts, affections, desires, aims, and aspirations that characterize humanity. Precisely the same view appears in the little disquisition on *θηριότης* at the opening of Book VII of the *Nicom. Ethics*, except that here the distinction between the three natures is made to rest solely upon intellectual and moral virtue: this is human, whereas the beast and the god are alike incapable of it, the beast, from the defects already stated, being below the human standard, the gods above it.

On this superiority of the gods to the practice of moral or human virtue and their entire independence of it, see *Eth. Nic. x 8*. A fine fragment of Cicero's lost dialogue *de Philosophia sive Hortensius*, quoted by Augustine, *de Trinitate* XIV c. 9, is manifestly borrowed, not translated, from this passage of Aristotle. It is printed in Nobbe's edition of Cicero, p. 1171, fragm. 35.

Here therefore 'brutality' consists in the absence of all capacity for virtue, moral and intellectual, and is consequently opposed to τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν, ἥρωικὴν τινα καὶ θείαν. This brutal nature, like the divine, is extremely rare amongst mankind. (This statement is qualified in *Pol. III 11, 1281 b 19, καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν; ἀλλὰ περὶ τι πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς κωλύει τὸ λεχθῆναι*.) It is found chiefly in 'barbarians'. 'Barbarous' and 'barbarity' in fact express pretty nearly the same notion of character.) Again, the absence of all moderation in the indulgence of our desires and emotions and general want of self-control is characteristic of the 'brutal' nature; *Ib. c. 6, 1148 b 34, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης*. And again, *1149 a 4, πᾶσα ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσιν*. And these are then illustrated, *ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν ψόφησιν μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός...καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις*. (*αἰσθησις* is the characteristic of 'animal life' in general; that which distinguishes *animals* from *plants*. *de Anima*.) Brutal 'tastes' or instincts are illustrated a little earlier in the same chapter, *1048 b 20 seq.* Brutal (or animal) pleasures are those which we have in common with the lower animals, the pleasures of feeling and taste; in the over-indulgence of which, this form of bestiality lies, *III 13, 1118 a 23—b 4*. Gaisford refers to *Magna Moralia II 5 init.*, *ἔστι δὲ ἡ θηριότης ὑπερβάλλουσα τις κακία*· *ὅταν γὰρ τινα παντελῶς ἴδωμεν φαῦλον οὐδ' ἀνθρωπὸν φαμεν εἶναι ἀλλὰ θηρίον, ὡς οὐσάν τινα κακίαν θηριότητα*. ἡ δ' ἀντικειμένη ἀρετὴ ταύτη ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμος, ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπον οὐσα, οἷον ἥρωικὴ τις καὶ θεία: expressions directly taken from the passages of *Eth. N. VII* just quoted. Finally, the instinctive *δρέξεις* (*θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*) belong to this animal part of our nature, and are therefore not always under our control; *Pol. III 16, 1267 a 28*; where the divine part of our nature, the controlling, regulating, intelligent *νοῦς*, is contrasted with the lower instincts of the brute elements of our nature, the emotional and appetitive.

κημα μείζον. καὶ ὃ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβούνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ρητορικά ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀγήγηκε δίκαια ἢ <sup>ἡντινέν</sup> ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἷον ὅρκους δεξιὰς πίστεϊς ἐπιγαμίας·

‘And when it arises from or is due to malice aforethought’. *προνοία* is the ‘forethought’, the *deliberate* vicious *purpose* which constitutes ‘malice prepense’, aggravates a wrong act in proportion to its intensity and the length of time during which the evil intent has been nursed; and converts an act otherwise innocent into a crime. The *προνοία* is that which distinguishes murder from homicide. It is in fact the moral *προαίρεσις*, distinctive of vice and virtue, of which an account has been already given in the first note on this chapter. See the passage of *Eth. Nic.* v 10, there quoted. *Comp. Rhet.* I 13.10. There *ἐκ προνοίας* is identified with the (in *Ethics*) more ordinary *ἐκ προαιρέσεως*. *ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως* (ἢ βλάβῃ) *ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός*. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ (actions which are done in a state of violent excitement, under the impulse of overpowering passion, are considered as involuntary, and exempted from the penalty of crimes) *οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται*. The case quoted by Schrader from *Magna Moralia* I 17, of a woman who had caused the death of her lover by a love-potion which she had sent him only with the view of inflaming his passion, and was consequently acquitted by the court of Areopagus on the charge of murder, because the act was done without deliberate malevolent intent, is a case of *ἀμάρτημα* (one of those in which the wrong done does not amount to a crime), in which the mischief is done without due knowledge of the circumstances of the case. In *Demosth. c. Aristocr.* p. 634, there is a similar distinction between two kinds of *ἀνδροφονία*: in one sense the name is applied *ἐπ’ ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ*, and to acts of this kind ‘a wise and humane law’, *νόμος ἀνθρωπίνως καὶ καλῶς κείμενος*, does not apply the name of murder; from this are immediately afterwards distinguished *οἱ ἐκ προνοίας (φονεύσαντες)*. *Aeschines c. Ctesiph.* § 212, *ἐλήφε τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας γραφὰς γραφόμενος*. *Dinarch. c. Demosth.* § 6, *τῶν ἐκ προνοίας φόνων*. Compare *Cic. de Off.* I 8, sub fin. *Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest utrum perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogitata fiat iniuria. Leviora enim sunt quae repentino aliquo motu accidunt quam ea quae meditata ac praeparata inferuntur.*

‘And any act, or wrong done, which inspires the hearers rather with terror than compassion’. An act which tends to consequences which inspire terror, the stronger emotion, in those who may be exposed to the like treatment, must plainly be more striking in its character and important in its social effects, more noxious and prejudicial, and worse in general, than one which excites mere pity or sympathy with the sufferer, without raising alarm on account of what may follow to oneself. That which excites terror must be terrible; formidable and dangerous to the individual or society. An atrocious crime makes men tremble, and fear expels pity; the stronger emotion overpowers the weaker. *Comp. Rhet.* II 8. 5 and 12, ‘Amasis shed no tears when he saw his son led away to

6 πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων ὑπεροχή. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα οὐ κολάζονται οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ ψευδο-

death, but wept when his friends asked an alms': τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν· τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλείου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον. Victorius quotes Cic. Tusc. Qu. III 27, *Constabat eos qui concidentem vulneribus Gn. Pompeium vidissent, quum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil tum aliud egisse nisi ut remiges hortarentur, et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga: posteaquam Tyrum venissent tum afflicti lamentarique coepisse.*

'And the rhetorical artifices or exaggerations' (such as αὐξήσεις, δεινώσεις, rhetorical tricks for giving extra importance and interest to a subject; or for magnifying, exaggerating, intensifying the atrocity, enormity, of a crime), 'for instance, that the accused (whose crime you desire to magnify) has subverted many principles (or obligations) of justice at once, or transgressed them; for instance, oaths, the right hand (pledge of faith, καὶ δεξιά ἥς ἐπέπιθμεν, II. B 341), 'all confidence or good faith, all the laws of intermarriage, and the rest; for this is an excess of many crimes over the one which has really been committed'; or 'a multiplication of one crime into many'.

The exaggeration of this rhetorical fallacy lies in the enumeration, and apparent accumulation, of offences by division of the single offence into its parts, or the repetition—as in the instance—of the same offence under different names, which seems thus to swell its bulk and magnify its enormity. This is the reverse application of the same rhetorical artifice of exaggeration as has been already referred to in I 7. 31 (see note), the methods of διαίσεις εἰς τὰ μέρη, συντιθέναι, and ἐποικοδομεῖν applied to the 'amplification' of good things; the object and use of them being stated in nearly the same words, πλείονων γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται.

ἀναρρεῖν, 'to take up, so as to remove, annul, or destroy'; here *tollere*, *subvertere*. The simple verb, as well as the phrase ἀναρρεῖν ἐκ μέσου—comp. Lat. *de medio, e medio tollere* (Cic., Liv.) is common in Demosth., Aesch. and the Orators, and occurs occasionally in other writers, as Plato and Xenophon, with words like νόμους, τὸ δίκαιον, διαθήκην, ὑποθήσεις (Plato), or πόλιν, πολιτείαν, ὀλιγαρχίαν (Xenoph.).

Gaisford illustrates the various forms of pledges or guarantees here mentioned by a corresponding passage in Arist. Acharn. 306, πῶς δ' ἂν ἂν καλῶς λέγοις ἂν, εἴπερ ἐσπέσω γ' ἀπαξ οἷσιν οὔτε βιωμὸς οὔτε πίστις οὐδ' ὄρκος μένει.

ἐπιγαμία, *ius connubii*, the right of intermarriage between different states, together with the rules and obligations which it entails, which are here in question. On the 'reciprocal' ἐπι, 'inter', see note on ἐπεργάσασθαι I 13. 9, p. 251.

§ 6. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα (ἀδικεῖν) οὐ κ.τ.λ.] 'and to commit a crime in the very place where offenders are punished' is an aggravation of the criminality; 'which is the case with perjurers or false witnesses: for where would a man *not* commit a crime if he is ready to do it even in the very court of justice?' This is the *argumentum a fortiori*; the rule, *omne*



μαρτυροῦντες· ποῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀδικήσειεν, εἴ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ; καὶ ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνῃ μάλιστα. καὶ εἰ τοῦτον ὑφ' οὗ εὖ πέπονθεν· πλείω γὰρ ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι  
 7 τε κακῶς ποιεῖ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ εὖ. καὶ ὁ παρὰ τὰ ἄγραφα δίκαια· ἀμείνωνος γὰρ μὴ δι' ἀνάγκην δίκαιον εἶναι·

*maius continet in se minus.* 'Hinc P. Clodii culpam amplificavit Cicero, cum insidiis Gn. Magnum per servum tollere eum voluisse pro Milone dicens criminatus est: *Insidiator erat in foro collocatus, atque in vestibulo ipso senatus*' [pro Milone § 19], Victorius. (Victorius has forgotten the still more striking *Etiā in senatum venit*, &c. of the first speech against Catiline, § 2.) The sanctity of the place converts theft into sacrilege. The atrocity of the murder of 'Zacharias the son of Barachias' was heightened by the circumstance of its occurrence 'between the temple and the altar' (Matth. xxiii. 35).

'Another aggravation of an offence is, where it is attended by disgrace (to the victim); and this in proportion to its amount (μάλιστα)'. This, together with the wantonness, the unprovoked character of the aggression, is what converts a mere assault, *αἰκία*, into an act of ὕβρις, a wanton outrage. See Rhet. II 2. 5, definition of ὕβρις, and I 13. 10; also note on I 12. 26, p. 239. The wound inflicted on a man's pride and sense of dignity, the injury to his feelings and honour, constitute a great aggravation of the offence. ὕβρις is, τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνῃ ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι κ.τ.λ. In II 6. 2, αἰσχύνῃ is defined, λύπη τις ἡ παραχῇ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων...ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄνθρωπῳ φροντίζει.

καὶ εἰ τοῦτον (ἡδίκηκέ τις)] 'and another is, when the victim of his wrong has been his benefactor; for his offence is thereby multiplied; in that he not only *does* what is wrong (positive wrong, a sin of commission), but also fails, omits, to do what is right (negative wrong, a sin of omission). The last explanatory clause is thus illustrated by Victorius from Cicero's criticism of the third Stoic Paradox, § 25 ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. *Illud tamen interest quod in servo necando, si adsit iniuria, semel peccatur; in patris vita violanda multa peccantur; violatur is qui procreavit; is qui aluit: is qui erudit; is qui in sede ac domo atque in republica collocavit: multitudo peccatorum praestat (ὑπερέχει), eoque poena maiore dignus est.*

§ 7. 'And an offence against the unwritten laws of right' (is worse than the violation of a written or positive law): 'because it is indicative of a better character and disposition, of a higher degree of virtue, to do right without compulsion'. (Any external force destroys the voluntary character of an act, and therefore its virtue. And if this voluntary obedience to the unwritten law implies a more virtuous disposition than that which is enforced by the positive enactments which have power to compel it, then the *opposite* is true, an act of disobedience to the unwritten law is a worse offence, and a sign of a more vicious disposition,

τὰ μὲν οὖν γεγραμμένα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δ' ἄγραφα οὐ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον, εἰ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα· ὁ γὰρ τὰ φοβερά ἀδικῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπιζήμια καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐπιζήμια ἀδικήσειεν ἄν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀδικήματος μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος  
 1 εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων CHAP. XV.

than the violation of the other.) 'Now the written laws are compulsory, the unwritten are not'.

'From another point of view', (in another way of arguing or looking at the case; Rhetoric συλλογίζεται πάντα, I § 12) the crime is worse 'if it be a breach of the written law: for (it may be argued) if a man does wrong when it is dangerous (fearful) and liable to penalty, (*a fortiori*) he would do it when it is not'. This again is by the rule *omne maius continet in se minus*; the greater and more powerful inclination to wrong necessarily involves the less.

φοβερὰ] acts fearful, alarming, formidable, from the probable consequences. Supply the cogn. accus. ἀδικήματα.

ἐπιζήμια] Note on I 4. 9, ἐπίδοξον, p. 66.

εἴρηται] 'so much for', 'enough of', 'no more of': note on εἰρήσθω, I 11. 29.

#### CHAP. XV.

The general sense and connexion of the contents of this chapter upon the ἀτέχνοι πίστεις of the practice of Rhetoric, those adjuncts of proof and external supports of the case, which consist in the various kinds of evidence which can be adduced by the pleader in confirmation of his statements and arguments, have been already given in the Introduction to this Commentary, pp. 193—207, to which I now refer and which I need not here repeat. They are called 'unartistic' or 'inartificial' because they are not due to the artist's inventive skill, but are supplied to him from the outside, as it were, of his art; and all that he has to do is to use them to the best advantage. Rhet. I 2. 2. It is this distinction of two kinds of proof or modes of persuasion which explains the application of the term *inventio* by the Latin rhetoricians to that part of the art to which Aristotle first gave the name of ἐντεχνοὶ πίστεις, and the title of one of Cicero's rhetorical treatises, the *de Inventione*. The author himself, l. c., applies the term εὐρεῖν to the ἐντεχνοὶ πίστεις.

In commenting therefore upon this chapter we shall have to occupy ourselves principally with the details of language, argument, and allusion, and so fill up the outline which has been sketched out in the Introduction.

§ 1. 'Next to the subjects already discussed' (the ἐντεχνοὶ πίστεις, the logical or dialectical proofs of Rhetoric and their topics in cc. 4—14), 'we have to run over (give a hasty sketch, or summary cf) what are called the unartistic proofs, or modes of persuasion, *because*' (γὰρ, this is the appropriate place for them, *because* we have just been engaged upon the

ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιδραμεῖν ἴδιαι γὰρ  
 2 αὐται τῶν δικανικῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν,  
 3 νόμοι μάρτυρες συνθῆκαι βάσανοι ὄρκος. πρῶτον μὲν  
 οὖν περὶ νόμων εἵπωμεν, πῶς χρηστέον καὶ προτρέ-  
 ποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπο-  
 4 λογούμενον. φανερόν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντίος ᾗ  
 ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ νόμῳ χρη-  
 5 στέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπεικέσιν ὡς δικαιότεροις. καὶ ὅτι  
 forensic branch of Rhetoric, and 'these are peculiar to law proceedings (or forensic practice)'. On the treatment of these *ἄτεχναι πίστεις* by other writers on the subject see *Introd.* 205—207.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων...ἐπιδραμεῖν] See note on I 9. 14; on the redundant use of *περί*, *ὑπέρ*, &c.

ἐχόμενόν] with *genit. partitive*, 'holding, hanging, on by (lit. to a *part* of,)', 'clinging to', 'connected with', 'in succession to', 'following'. Very frequent in Herodotus.

ἐπιδραμεῖν] 'to run over', commonly in its literal signification takes the accusative, sometimes the dative. Here we may suppose that *περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστει* is substituted for the accusative: as it is also in pseudo-Demosth. *περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν*, 217. 7, *μικρὰ ἐπιδραμοῦμαι περὶ αὐτῶν πολλῶν ὄντων*. This passage and Xen. *Oecon.* XV 1 are the only two instances that are given by the Lexicons of the *metaphorical* sense in which it occurs here. [Cf., however, Pol. III 15, 1286 a 7, *θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας*, *Index Aristotelicus*. s.] Compare a similar use of *ἐπελθεῖν* of 'pursuing an inquiry' or 'going over, reviewing, a subject'. Pol. I 13, 1260 b 12, *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν*. Ib. VI (IV) 2, ult. *πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ κ.τ.λ. et passim*.

§ 3. *χρηστέον προτρέποντα*] i.e. *πῶς δεῖ τινα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς προτρέποντα*. The verbal adjective can be resolved into *δεῖ* with an indefinite object, with which the participle is made to 'agree'. Demosth. *Olynth.* β. 21, 24, *πολλὴν δὴ τὴν μετέστασιν καὶ μεγάλην δευκτέον τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰσφέροντας ἐξιώντας*. Other examples in Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 447. 4.

It appears from the addition of *προτρέποντα* and *ἀποτρέποντα* that the first of the *ἄτεχναι πίστεις*, the laws, are not confined to *forensic* practice, but can also be used by the *deliberative* orator in addressing a public assembly: and this is true also of some kinds of witnesses, viz. the 'authorities' appealed to in support of a statement, which may be as serviceable in enforcing considerations of public policy, the *συμφέρον* ἢ *ἀσύμφερον*, as the *δίκαιον* ἢ *ἄδικον* of a legal process in a court of justice; see § 16. The original statement therefore of § 1, *ἴδιαι γὰρ αὐταὶ τῶν δικανικῶν*, requires modification.

§ 4. *ἐναντίος τῷ πράγματι*] 'opposed to the facts on our side, to our view of the case'. Comp. *infr.* § 12.

§ 5. With *ὅτι* here, and in the following topics, *λεκτέον* or something similar must be supplied from *χρηστέον*, §§ 3—4.

τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς  
6 χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς  
αἰεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ὁ κοινὸς  
(κατὰ φύσιν γάρ ἐστιν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολ-  
λάκις· ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη·  
ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος  
νόμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἄγραφον·

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' αἰεί ποτε.

P. 1375 δ.

ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός.

7 καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τι καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ'  
οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν· ὥστ' οὐ νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ

τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη] Supply κρίνειν or δικάζειν; the former is expressed in Rhet. II 25, 10, τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη κρίνειν. This was the dicasts' oath, taken when they entered the court. The usual form was γνώμη τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὁμωμόκασιν (οἱ δικασταί), ἡ δὲ τῆς γνώμης δόξα ἀφ' ὧν ἂν ἀκούσωσι παρίσταται... πᾶς γὰρ ὁ μῖτε δι' ἔχθραν μῖτε δι' εὐνοίαν μῖτε δι' ἄλλην ἄδικον πρόφασιν μηδεμίαν, παρ' ἧς γινώσκει, θέμενος τὴν ψῆφον εὐσεβεῖ... ἀλλ' εἴ τις εἰδὼς ἐκείνους προδίδωκεν ἢ ἐξαπατᾷ, οὗτος ἐστ' ἔνοχος τῇ ἀρᾷ· c. Boeot. de Nom. 1006. 27, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ' ἂν μὴ ᾧσι νόμοι γνώμη τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὁμωμόκατε. adv. Lept. 493. 1. Ar. Pol. III 16, 1287 a 25, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπιτηδὲς παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμη κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, which explains the meaning and object of the oath.

The form of the oath is found in Pollux VIII 10 [ὁ δ' ὅρκος ἦν τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσὶ, ψηφιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσὶ, γνώμη τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ]; see Meier & Schömann, *Attischer Process*, p. 128; comp. p. 135.

τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις] The meaning of the oath is, 'that the judges are not to employ, i. e. to enforce, to its full extent, in its strict and literal interpretation, the rigour of the written statute'.

§ 6. 'And that equity and the universal law are constant and unchangeable, like the laws of nature whose operation is uniform; to which the appeal is made in Sophocles' *Antigone* (line 450 seq.); for her defence is, that the burial (of her brother) was indeed against Creon's law, but not against that which is unwritten'. οὐδ' ὁ κοινὸς (μεταβάλλει).

§ 7. ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν] δίκαιον ἀληθές ἐστι κ.τ.λ. 'and that justice is something real, genuine, and salutary, but this sham, apparent justice (the rigorous interpretation) is not. And therefore the written law, the letter of the statute, is not; because it sometimes—and this is one of the cases—does not do the proper work of the law', which is to do substantial, not merely apparent and fallacious justice, that which *seems* to be,

ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνη τὸ κίβδηλον  
 8 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ  
 τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐμ-  
 9 μένειν. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ εὐδοκιοῦντι ἢ καὶ  
 αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· οἷον ἐνίοτι ὃ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἄττ' p. 5a  
 ἂν συνθῶνται, ὃ δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συντίθεσθαι παρὰ

but is not justice. On the superiority of natural justice to positive enactments, see Cicero, de Legg. I 15, referred to in Introd. p. 194.

'And we may further argue that the judge is like an assayer of coin and appointed for the purpose of distinguishing *base* justice from *genuine*'.

[ἀργυρογνώμων] Moeris, Lex. Attic. (p. 50, ed. Koch) ἀργυρομοιβοί, 'Ἀττικῶς' κολληβυσταί (money-changers, who change large coin for small, κόλλυβος), 'Ἑλληνικῶς' ἀργυρογνώμονες, 'Ἀττικῶς' δοκιμασταί, 'Ἑλληνικῶς', and Pierson's note, who refers to the pseudo-Platonic dialogue περὶ ἀρετῆς, 378 D (Zurich ed. p. 867), ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ περὶ τὸ χρύσιον καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον εἰσὶν ἡμῖν δοκιμασταί, οἵτινες ὁρῶντες κρίνουσι τὸ τε βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον; βλίσιν. Τίνας οὖν τούτους καλεῖς; 'Ἀργυρογνώμονας. Pollux, VII § 170. To the same family of words belong προβατογνώμων Agam. 768 (see Blomfield's Glossary) a 'discerner of the flock', one that can distinguish the several sheep of a flock; hence 'a judge of character'; ὑπογνώμων in the same metaphorical sense, Aesch. Fragm. Tox. 224 Dind. Cf. φυσιογνώμων, Ar. de Gen. Anim. IV 3. 32, and on φυσιογνωμονεῖν, as an art (the study of character from the indications of the features and other external peculiarities), see Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 b 7—38; and the treatise φυσιογνωμονικά, printed with Aristotle's works, Bekk. Vol. II. p. 805. Compare Cic. de Fato, 5. 10 (quoted in Blomfield's note, as 'De Nat. Deor. I 8'), *Quid? Socratem nonne legimus, quemadmodum notarit Zopyrus, physiognomon, qui se profitebatur hominum mores naturasque ex corpore oculis vultu fronte permoscere?* Compare, lastly, the simple γνώμων, Xen. Memor. I 4. 5 (ap. Blomfield), of the tongue as distinguishing between sweet and bitter, and Agam. 1099, θεσφάτων γνώμων ἄκρος.

§ 8. See Introd. p. 194. Correct there the second line of the quotation, Hor. I Ep. 16, 52, which should be, *tu nihil admittes in te formidine poenae*: 'tu' is addressed to men in general, and therefore the second line speaks as generally as the first. Schrader appears to refer this topic to c. 7 § 12, καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος μείζον, for its authority; the topic of § 16, καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς...τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέλος, τὸ δ' οὐ τέλος, is equally applicable.

§ 9. 'Or if the (written) law (which is against us) chance (πον) to be contradictory, either to any other law of repute, or to itself; as, for example, in some cases one law enacts the validity of all contracts whatsoever, whilst the other (of the two opposite laws) forbids the contracting of any engagement contrary to the law (except those that the law allows)'. On this Victorius, 'Exemplum hoc est legis legi repugnantis; ἀντινομία

10 τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν καὶ  
 ὁρᾶν ἐφ' ὅποτέραν τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρ-  
 11 μύσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἴτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. καὶ εἰ τὰ  
 μὲν πράγματα ἐφ' οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ  
 δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτη  
 12 πρὸς τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἦ πρὸς τὸ

autem id vocatur. Alterius vero exemplum, cum lex aliqua secum ipsa discordat, omisit, ut rei sua vi satis notae.

§ 10. This very elliptical sentence must apparently be thus filled up. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος (ὁ νόμος, χρηστέον αὐτῷ from §§ 3, 4, or λεκτέον), ὥστε (so as to, in such a way as to...) στρέφειν (αὐτόν) καὶ ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. 'and if the law (which we have to interpret) be ambiguous, (we must deal with it, treat it, or interpret it) in such a way as to wrest (twist) it (in either direction according as it suits our purpose) and to see to which of the two constructions either strict justice (the *letter* of the law) or expediency, i. e. equity, (whichever of the two we are arguing for) will adapt itself, and then employ *that*'. τὸ συμφέρον here stands for 'equity', because by accommodating itself to the varying circumstances of particular cases it is more 'generally serviceable' than the stiff unbending letter of the law. ἀγωγὴ (τοῦ νόμου) 'leading', 'guiding' of the law. This 'leading of the law' represents the law itself as leading those who have to use it by the 'interpretation' or 'construction' that may be put upon it in one or another direction, and corresponds exactly to *ductus* in the phrase *ductus litterarum*. The following passage of the Politics, VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, throws light upon this use of ἀγωγή, and as they mutually illustrate one another I will quote it entire. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεῖσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ' ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ' ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθουσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. Here again the ἀγωγή is τοῦ νόμου, the leading, direction given to, or interpretation put upon the law in the actual practice of the society. The difference which sometimes arises between the *theory of the constitution* as laid down in the laws, and the *actual administration* and conduct of the government, is accounted for, first, by the character and habits of the people, either natural to them or as cultivated and formed by education; and secondly, by the 'direction' they give to, or the 'interpretation' they put upon, the actually existing laws, in accordance with the character which *they* wish to give to the practical administration of the government. Compare καθ' αὐτοὺς ἄγουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, c. 11, 1296 a 26, and Thuc. II 65, of Pericles' direction of the state policy, καὶ οὐκ ἦγετο μᾶλλον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ (τοῦ πλήθους) ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε.

ἀμφίβολος] III 5. 4, ἀμφίβολα, 'ambiguous phrases'. Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26). 1, διαφεύγων τὸ ἀμφίβολον, opposed to οἰκεία ὀνόματα. Ib. 36 (37). 22, 29. Comp. note on III 5. 4.

§ 12. The highly condensed contents of this section, which gives the other side of the foregoing arguments for the treatment of laws, shewing

πρᾶγμα, τό τε γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἔνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιорκῇ. καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἰρεῖται οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κείσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ἱατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἢ ἁμαρτία τοῦ ἱατροῦ ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται.

- 13 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω· περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσι διττοί, οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου οἱ δ' ἐκτός. λέγω δὲ παλαιούς μὲν τοὺς τε

how to argue when the written law is in our favour, have been developed *in extenso* in the Introd. p. 195—6, and we may now proceed to the details.

πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα] 'in favour of our case' as τῷ πράγματι § 4.

τὸ ἀπλῶς, τὸ αὐτῷ] I 7. 35, καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and note there.

παρασοφίζεσθαι] 'to attempt to outdo (to go beyond, παρὰ) the physician (note the *generic τόν*; one of the two uses of the definite article, to mark the *member of a class*) in skill and subtlety, ingenuity and cleverness'. The proverb, 'to be wiser than your physician', is applied to *ιδιώται* who pretend to rival the professors, *τεχνῖται* or *σοφοί*, men of special knowledge, skill, and experience in any art or science. In Athen. p. 137 F, quoted by Victorius, the verb stands for 'over refining' in the art of cookery, τὸν δὲ ἐν τῷ Λυκίῳ κρέας ταριχηρὸν εἰς τάριχος διασκευάσαντα μαστιγωθῆναι, ὡς παρασοφίζομενον ποτηρῶς.

τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Cleon ap. Thuc. III 37, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι...καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις: and a little before, πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ...μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χεῖροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείστων ἐστίν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετ' ἀκολασίας, κ.τ.λ. Bacon, *de Augmentis*, Lib. VIII. Aphor. 58 (Vol. I. p. 816, ed. Ellis and Spedding), quotes this maxim as proverbial, '*licet enim non male dictum sit, neminem oportere legibus esse sapientiore*;' on which Ellis has this note, 'Bacon refers perhaps to D'Argentré's maxim, *Stulta videtur sapientia quae lege vult sapientior videri*. In the passage from which these words are taken he is condemning the presumption of judges *who depart from the text on the pretence of equity*—which is precisely what the advocate is supposed to be doing here.'

§ 13. διωρίσθω] See on I II. 29, p. 224.

ποιητὰς καὶ ὅσων ἄλλων γνωρίμων εἰς κρίσεις φανεραί, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι Ὀμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος καὶ Τενέδιοι ἑναγχος Περιάνδρῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ πρὸς Σιγείει. καὶ Κλεοφῶν κατὰ Κριτίου

κρίσεις φανεραί] ‘decisions, judgments, published, or notorious’. Quint. v 11. 36, *Adhibetur extrinsecus in causam et auctoritas. Haec secuti Graecos, a quibus κρίσεις dicuntur, iudicia aut iudicationes vocant ... si quid ita visum gentibus, populis, sapientibus viris, claris civibus, illustribus poetis (all γνώριμοι,) referri potest.*

οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι Ὀμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος] Quint. u. s. § 40 (as an instance of the appeals to ‘authorities’ mentioned in § 36), *Neque est ignobile exemplum, Megareos ab Atheniensibus, quum de Salamine contenderent victos Homeri versu, qui tamen ipse non in omni editione reperitur, significans Aiace[m] naves suas Atheniensibus iunxisse.* The ‘versus’ or rather two verses here in question are, Il. B 557—8, [Αἴας δ’ ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας, στήσε δ’ ἄγων, ἦν’ Ἀθηναίων ἴσαντο φάλαγγες] which were quoted by Solon (and said to have been interpolated by him in the text of Homer for that purpose, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Sol. § 48) as an ‘authority’ in favour of the Athenian claim to the possession of Salamis. See Heyne, Paley, and Trollope’s notes on the passage of Homer, Plut. Vit. Sol. c. 10, Strabo, Attica, IX 1. Plutarch says that the current opinion in his time attributed the interpolation of the line (the second of the two) to Solon, though the Athenians denied it: in Strabo’s time it was condemned by the critics: he enters at length into the question, and gives the reasons for rejecting the verse. Another well-known instance of the authority of a γνώριμος, or distinguished man, is the proverbial αὐτὸς ἔφα, *ipse dixit*, of the disciples of Pythagoras.

καὶ Τενέδιοι ἑναγχος κ.τ.λ.] Of this event, ‘recent’ at the time of Aristotle’s writing, nothing more is known than we learn from this passage. ‘Ex verbis his colligo’, says Victorius, ‘Tenedi insulae incolas cum Sigeensibus disceptantes usos et ipsos prisco teste Perianandro: qui, quamvis multis antea saeculis mortuus esset, poema reliquerat quo praecepta quaedam ad beate vivendum, ὑποθήκαι vocatae a Graecis, continebantur. Laertius qui vitam ipsius scripsit hoc narrat: in eo autem, ut suspicari licet, aliquid fuit quod causam Tenediorum adiuvaret.’

Κλεοφῶν] a mischievous profligate demagogue, who took a leading part in public affairs at Athens during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War. He was tried and condemned by the Council during the siege of Athens in 405 B.C. One of the results of the political rivalry between him and Critias, one of the leaders of the opposite party, was this charge which he brought against him, at some time not ascertained. The various references to him in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and the Orators, will be found in the article on him in Smith’s *Dict. of Biography*, and other particulars respecting his habits and character in Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Graec.* I p. 171 seq, in the account of the play bearing his name, which Plato the Comic poet wrote to assail him.

Κριτίου] The person accused by Cleophon was the well-known oli-



τοῖς Σόλωνος ἐλεγείοις ἐχρήσατο, λέγων ὅτι πάλαι  
ἀσελγῆς ἡ οἰκία· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἐποίησε Σόλων  
εἰπεῖν μοι Κριτία πυρρότριχι πατρός ἀκούειν.

garchical leader, one of the thirty tyrants, maternal uncle of Plato the philosopher, and great-grand-nephew of Solon, Plat. Charm. 155 A. He was son of Callaeschrus, ibid. 153 C, who was the son of another Critias, son of Dropides, brother of Solon. Comp. Tim. 20 E.

Cleophon, in his accusation, took occasion to quote 'as from an authority' some elegiac verses of Solon from whose family he was descended, to shew that reckless licentiousness was hereditary in the race.

ἀσελγῆς] Hesychius ἀκόλαστος, ἀκάθαρτος. Gram. ap. Bekk. *Anecd.* I 451, ἀσελγίς, πᾶν τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ βίαιον. καὶ ἀσελγεία ἡ μετ' ἐπιπρασμοῦ καὶ θρασύτητος βία. καὶ ἀσελγῆς ὁ ἀνάγωγος (intractable, unmanageable, like 'unbroken' horses and dogs, Xenophon, from ἀγειν, 'to train or educate'). Δημοσθένους (c. Mid. 521. 2), καὶ ὁ κωμικός. Ὡσπερ ἀνέμου ἐξαίφνης ἀσελγούς γενομένου (Eupolis, Fr. Inc. XXV. Meineke, Vol. II. p. 558). οὐκ αὐτίκηνγος (or τὸ πνίγος) ὡς ἀσελγῆς (Pherecr. Fragm. Inc. XXIX. Meineke, II 348). ἀσελγῆς σκῶμμα, Eupolis, *dis*. Hence it appears that the primary sense of the word is 'untamed or untameable', from α and θέλγειν (on the analogy of ἀμιγῆς 'unmixed', one who cannot be soothed, charmed, tamed; hence violent, extravagant, excessive—Arist. Plut. 559, παρὰ τῷ μὲν (πλούτῳ) γὰρ ποδαγρῶντες καὶ γαστροῦδεις καὶ παχύκνημοι ἐξαίφνης ἀσελγῶς, 'extravagantly fat'—and specially in the indulgence of the appetites and passions, reckless in character and conduct; licentious, profligate to excess. Arist. Pol. VIII (V) 5, sub init. διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσελγειαν, 'license' in conduct; ib. c. 6, 1305 b 40, γίγνεται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς, 'by a life of reckless extravagance'. Plat. Rep. IV 424 E (the word is rare in Plato). Demosth. Olynth. II 23. 19, Phil. IV. 131. 11, c. Mid. 521. 2 u. s., ap. eundem ἀσελγῶς ζῆν, διακίεσθαι, διάγειν τὸν βίον, χρῆσθαι τινι.

εἰπεῖν μοι] This, and the following line of Solon's elegy, is quoted, with two variations from Aristotle's version, by Proclus ad Tim. 20 E,

εἰπέμεναι Κριτίῃ ξανθότριχι πατρός ἀκούειν

οὐ γὰρ ἁμαρτινόφ' πείσεται ἡγεμόνι,

the father of Critias being Solon's brother, Dropides. These verses, which were probably intended by the author as a compliment to the father, are misconstrued by the malicious Cleophon into a reflection on the son, whose recklessness and licentiousness had brought upon him his father's displeasure: the authority of Solon is appealed to to shew that the grandson inherited his grandfather's vices. Whether πυρρότριχι is another malicious perversion of Cleophon, on the hypothesis that red hair implies a licentious disposition, or depravity in general—as seems to have been the opinion of the Normans, who had the proverb, *entre poil roux et félonie s'entreportent grant compagnie*, (Wace, *Roman de Rou*, quoted by Sir F. Palgrave, *Hist. of Norm.* II 721)—or Aristotle, quoting from memory, has misquoted, *more suo*, cannot now be ascertained. At all events it is unlikely that *Solon* intended any such imputation on Critias' character, whatever may have been the case with Cleophon; for

14 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάρτυρες, P. 1376.  
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι, οἷον  
Θεμιστοκλῆς, ὅτι ναυμαχητέον, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος  
λέγων. ἔτι καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, μαρ-

Critias is evidently considered as a boy or very young man from the tone of the address or message, and Victorius shews from Theocr. Id. VIII. 3, ἄμφω τῷ ἤτην πυρρότριχον, ἄμφω ἀνάβω, that red hair in a boy in the eyes of the Greeks was a beauty and not a deformity. It seems to me that Solon wrote ξανθότριχί, as Proclus gives it, and that the other reading is due either to Cleophon's malice if we interpret it *in deterius*, or to Aristotle's want of memory, if we take it as synonymous with ξανθότριχί. The evidence of Critias' ἀσέλγεια derived from the verses is plainly a false inference of Cleophon and not really contained in the original: the statement in Plat. Charm. 157 E, that Solon wrote Elegies in praise of 'the house of Critias', and spoke of its members as 'distinguished by personal beauty and virtue and all other so-called happiness', is altogether against any such supposition. Victorius, who regards the inference drawn by Cleophon as justified by the language of the verses, endeavours to reconcile this with the eulogistic character of the elegy, by the remark that Critias may have been an exception to the general good character of his family. Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* p. 331, follows Proclus' version. The other variation, εἰπεῖν μοι, and εἰπέμεναι, may be either another slip of Aristotle's memory, or εἰπεῖν μοι a mere false reading of εἰπέμεναι, the one being very easily mistaken for the other.

Lastly, μοί, if it were retained, would be a good example of the *dativus ethicus* corresponding in Greek to the familiar use of 'me' in the earlier English writers: as Shakespeare, Rob me the treasury; He smiled me in the face (Dame Quickly of Falstaff); See how this river comes me cranking in (Hotspur). [Abbott's *Shaksp. Gr.* § 220. S.]

§ 14. χρησμολόγοι] amongst whom Themistocles is included as the interpreter of an oracle which referred to future events, περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων, here denotes not merely professional soothsayers, but amateurs also who followed the diviner's craft. Herod., VII 141, gives the oracle here quoted: the verses run thus, τεῖχος Τριστογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοὶ εὐρύσιπα Ζεὺς μούνον ἀπόρθητον τελίθειν, τό σε τέκνα τ' ὀνήσει. c. 143 gives Themistocles' interpretation. The professional interpreters of the oracles are called χρησμολόγοι by Herodotus.

αἱ παροιμίαι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται] These words will not bear the ordinary interpretation of ὥσπερ εἴρηται, 'as has been already said', because this is not true. Therefore Victorius and Vater propose to render ὥσπερ as if it were οἷαπερ, *huiuscemodi*, 'proverbs are also used as evidence, such as has been mentioned', viz. evidence of the future: and Muretus proposed καὶ τὸ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, "and the 'as has been said,'" any general remark that has been habitually made, whether proverbial or not. We may follow Victorius in his explanation, without however supposing that ὥσπερ is used in any but its literal and proper meaning 'proverbs are evidence, in the way that has been stated', evidence (that is) of the future.

τυρια ἐστίν· οἷον εἴ τις συμβουλεύει μὴ ποιῆσθαι  
 φίλον γέροντα, τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παροιμία,  
 μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα.

p. 51.

καὶ τὸ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀναιρεῖν ὧν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,  
 νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

15 πρόσφατοι δ' ὅσοι γνώριμοί τι κεκρίκασιν· χρήσιμοι  
 γὰρ αἱ τούτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφισβη-  
 τοῦσιν· οἷον Εὐβουλος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἐχρήσατο

μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα] Suidas, s. vv. ἄχρηστα et μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν, quotes the proverb at length, in two different forms, both of them corrupt. The proverb conveys the maxim εἰς ἄχρηστα μὴ ἀναλίσκειν. Gaisford from the materials supplied by Suidas has put together the following lines, μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα, μηδὲ παῖδα βάσκανον· μὴ λαλητικὴν γυναῖκα, μηδὲ γείτονος κύνα· μὴ κυβερνήτην φίλυννον, μὴ λάλον κωπηλάτην.

νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει] The verse is taken from Stasinus' *Cypria*: quoted by Clemens, Strom. vi 747. Düntzer, *Fragm. Epic. Gr.* p. 16. It is repeated II 21. 11. Herod. I 155, Cyrus to Croesus, on hearing of the revolt of the Lydians, ὁμοίως γὰρ μοι νῦν γε φαίνονται πεποιημένοι, ὥς εἴ τις πατέρα ἀποκτείνας τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ φείσεται. Liv. XL 3, of Philip king of Macedon, father of Perseus, *Postremo negare profectum coepit satis tutum sibi quicquam esse nisi liberos eorum, quos interfecisset, comprehensos in custodia haberet, et tempore alium alio tolleret* (Victorius). Eur. *Androm.* 518, καὶ γὰρ ἀνοία μεγάλην λείπειν ἐχθροὺς ἐχθρῶν, ἐξὸν κτείνειν καὶ φόβον οἴκων ἀφελίσσθαι. Comp. Toup. *Emend. in Suid.* II 185 (G.). Comp. Heracl. 1005, where it is put in the mouth of Eurystheus; and Herc. Fur. 168, in that of Lycus. Plutarch has the proverb, νεκρὸς οὐ δάκει.

§ 15. Εὐβουλος] Ἀναφλύστιος (ψήφισμα ap. Dem. de Cor. § 29), a demagogue (so Harpocration and the Schol.), orator and political opponent of Demosthenes, who mentions him very frequently in de Cor., de F. Leg., and elsewhere. This Eubulus is omitted in Smith's *Dict. of Biogr.*; but Baiter and Sauppe, in their excellent *Index Nominum (Orat. Att. III. Ind. Nom. pp. 48, 9)*, have furnished a complete list of all the references to him from the Greek Orators, Scholiasts, and Lexicographers, which in some degree supplies the place of a biography. See also Ruhnken, *Hist. Crit. Or. Gr.* p. 146 [and especially Arnold Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, I 173—191. s.]. He is attacked and apostrophized by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. §§ 290—293, and a passage of one of his speeches is referred to in § 292. 'Eubulus in the law-court (at the trial) employed against Chares the saying of Plato (the Comic poet) against Archibius, that "the avowal of knavery (rascality) has grown in the city."' Meineke, in his *Fragm. Comm. Gr.* (Plat. *Fragm. Inc.* XLI.) Vol. II 692, merely quotes this passage without attempting to restore the verse or explain the allusion. In his *Hist. Crit. (Fr. Com. Gr.* I 161, note) he had proposed to substitute Ἀγύρριον for Ἀρχίβιον in the text of

κατὰ Χάρητος ᾧ Πλάτων εἶπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι  
ἐπιδέδωκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ ὁμολογεῖν πονηροὺς εἶναι.  
 16 καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἂν δόξωσι ψεύδεσθαι.  
 οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι τῶν τοιούτων μόνον μάρτυρές  
 εἰσιν, εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ  
 ποῖον οὐ μάρτυρες, οἷον εἰ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εἰ συμ-  
 17 φέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον· οἱ δ' ἄπωθεν καὶ περὶ τούτων  
 πιστότατοι. πιστότατοι δ' οἱ παλαιοί· ἀδιάφθοροι  
 γάρ. πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν  
 μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτ'  
 ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπα-  
 τῆσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀλίσκεται

Aristotle, an opinion which is afterwards retracted in the other place referred to.

§ 16. καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες...ψεύδεσθαι] 'Those who share the danger' (with the person for whom they give evidence, i. e. are liable to the penalties of *ψευδομαρτυρία*, as the other is to those of the offence with which he is charged) 'if they be suspected of falsehood', sc. *πρόσφατοί εἰσι*, are reckoned amongst 'recent' or contemporary witnesses. That they are so is shewn by their actual presence in court, and the risk they consequently run. See Introd. p. 196, for the explanation of the remainder of the section. *δόξωσι*. 'quia si *credantur* etiam mendaces falsique, non tantum si fuerint, plectuntur.' Victorius.

With *εἰ συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον*, which recognises this kind of *ἄτεχος πίστις* as available also in deliberative speaking, comp. § 3, and the note.

§ 17. οἱ ἄπωθεν] i. e., according to the Greek usage, those who give their evidence, not *at* a distance (as we say) but *from* a distance, measuring the distance *from* the object *to* the subject. See note on I II. 16, p. 213.

*πιστότατοι οἱ παλαιοί*] Living witnesses may be corrupted, bribed to give false evidence: the ancient witnesses or authorities, appealed to in confirmation of statements or opinions, are inaccessible to corruption, and therefore most to be relied on.

*πίστωμα*, which seems to occur only in Aeschylus (Pers. 171 *γῆρά τε πιστώματα*, *abstr. pro concr.*, for *πιστοὶ γέροντες*, and Choeph. 977, Eumen. 214, in the sense of 'pledge, guarantee, assurance') and in Empedocles and Clearchus and one or two late authors, is here no doubt connected with the rhetorical *πίστεις*, and means the assurances that are produced in the minds of the audience by the rhetorical proofs alleged. It can hardly be identifiable with the *πίστεις* themselves, though 'proofs' of some kind is the meaning required.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι—*ψευδομαρτυριῶν*] Compare Hermogenes, *περὶ στάσεων* (Speng. *Rhet. Gr.* II p. 144), ὁ δὲ κατηγορῶν ἀποφανεῖ τὸν διὰ

τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν· ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει  
 18 μαρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι. εἰσὶ  
 δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι αἱ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ  
 ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ  
 δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους, ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι οὐδέποτ' ἔστιν  
 ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ  
 πράγματος ἢ αὐτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισβη-  
 τοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους ἢ αὐτοῦ εἰς  
 19 ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα. τὰ

τῶν πραγμάτων ἔλεγχον ἀξιοπιστότερον τοῦ διὰ τῶν μαρτύρων· οὔτε γὰρ πεπεισμένα τὰ πράγματα οὔτε χαριζόμενά τῃ λήξει ὥστε οἱ μάρτυρες πολλάκις, ἀλλ' ὅλα ἐστὶ φύσει, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐξεταζόμενα φαίνεταί. Cic. pro Caelio, c. 9 (quoted by Victorius), *Equidem vos abducam a testibus: neque huius iudicii veritatem, quae mutari nullo modo potest, in voluntate testium collocari sinam; quae facillime effingi, nullo negotio flecti ac detorqueri potest. Argumentis agemus; signis omni luce clarioribus crimina refellemus; res cum re, causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione pugnabit.* 'Probabilities can't be bribed to cheat (the judges), as witnesses can'.

οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα] 'probabilities are not responsible (liable to trial and penalty) like witnesses, and therefore less to be trusted'. ὑπόδικος, formed upon the analogy of ὑπεύθυνος, ὑπαίτιος, ὑπόσκιος, ὑπόσπονδος, ὑποσμος (Ar. de Anima, II 9. 5), ὑπαίθριος, ὑπόστεγος, ὑπόφορος; and following that of ὑπαίτιος, ἐπιζήμιος, ἐπικαίρος or -καίριος, ἐπίνοστος, κ.τ.λ. (liable or exposed to so and so); from ὑπό *sub*, 'under', 'subject to', either literally as ὑπόσκιος, or metaphorically as ὑπεύθυνος, ὑπόδικος. It occurs in the Orators, frequently in Plat. Leges, Aesch. Eumen. 250, ὑπόδικος θέλει γενέσθαι χερῶν, and Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 6.

§ 18. αἱ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος] 'Evidence (may be brought) either *for* ourselves or *against* the opposite party'; the indeterminate περὶ, 'about', 'concerning', takes its specific meaning from the words with which it is immediately joined; like the chameleon its colour from the objects round it. περὶ τοῦ πράγματος...περὶ τοῦ ἥθους, 'either to facts or character'; to support our own, and to invalidate and depreciate those of the opposite party.

εἰ μὴ γάρ] (εὐπορεῖ τις, or ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν, μαρτυρίας, with which ὁμολογουμένης is supposed to agree). ἀλλά (at any rate, at least) *subaudi* εὐπορεῖ γε... 'For if we have no evidence as to the fact, either in agreement with our own side of the case, or opposed to that of the adverse party, at all events (we shall be sure to find plenty) as to character, (*eis*, tending to, bearing on,) to establish, that is, either our own respectability or the opponent's worthlessness'. ὁμολογῶν μέλη *in agreement with*, comp. II 22. 15, ὁμολογούμενα and (the opposite) ἀπομολογούμενα. In § 21 of this chapter, the sense is different, 'admitted', as in Plato and Arist. Rhet. I 13. 9 *bis*.

δ' ἄλλα περὶ μάρτυρος ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξὺ, ἢ  
εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἢ ἀδοξοῦντος ἢ μεταξὺ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι  
τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων λεκτέον ἐξ  
οἷων περ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.

20 περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τοῦ λόγου χρῆσις <sup>P. 1376 b.</sup>

ἐστὶν ὅσον αὔξειν ἢ καθαιρεῖν ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀ-  
πίστους, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας,

21 ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τὸναντίον. πρὸς μὲν  
οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν δια- <sup>p. 31.</sup>  
φέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγματείας· ὅποιοι  
γὰρ ἂν τινες ὦσιν οἱ ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες,

§ 19. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων...λέγομεν] '(the arguments on these subjects)  
must be drawn from the same topics (i.e. the *εἶδη*) as those from which  
we derive our enthymemes also'. See *Introd.* p. 198.

§ 20. περὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν] *On συνθήκαι* see note on I 1. 9, *περὶ τὰ συναλ-  
λάγματα*. They are contracts, bonds, engagements, agreements of any  
kind between two or more parties. They are probably intended to  
include documentary evidence of all kinds, which is expressed by the  
Latin *tabulae* of Cicero and Quintilian. See on this head *Quint.* v 5.

αὐτῷ] 'for oneself'. Add this to the instances of αὐτοῦ, &c. for  
αὐτοῦ and the rest, in notes on I 1. 12; I 7. 35; and see the references  
there given.

'On the subject of contracts, arguments may be so far employed as to  
magnify or reduce (pull down, met. extenuate, depreciate, disparage  
their value and importance), or (in other words) confirm or destroy their  
credit (or trustworthiness); if we have them (to produce) (*χρησις ἐστι  
ποιῶν*) we must argue for their credit and validity (*κυρίας*, their *authori-  
tative* character); in the case of (if they *ἄρῃσι* to, are on the side of) the  
opposite party, the reverse'.

§ 21. κατασκευάζειν] is a technical term of dialectics, denoting the con-  
structive process and object of argumentation or syllogism, viz. to esta-  
blish some *positive* conclusion, to maintain or confirm a thesis; and  
opposed to ἀνασκευάζειν, which represents the 'subversive', 'destructive'  
(ἀνασκευάζειν 'to undo', comp. λύειν 'to break up, or dissolve a thing into  
its elements'), 'refutative' syllogism or reasoning which proves a nega-  
tive. On these terms see further in *Introd.* p. 268, and note (on p. 267)  
on the same page.

'Now in regard of establishing their credit or discrediting them, the  
treatment of this in no respect differs from that of the witnesses; for  
according to the character of those whose names are attached to, sub-  
scribed to, (inscribed *ὑφ' οὗ*, as *ἐπίγραμμα*, the *title* of a crime or a legal  
prosecution, I 13. 9,) the document, or contract, or who have it in their  
keeping, the measure (degree) of credit or trustworthiness of the contract  
is determined (*lit.* by them are the contracts made trustworthy)'.

τούτοις αἱ συνθήκαι πισταί εἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης δ' εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὔσης αὐξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθήκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὰς κατὰ τὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἐστίν, ὥστε ὅς τις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναι-  
 22 ρεῖ συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια κατὰ

τούτοις πισταί] is a somewhat irregular expression, meaning τοσοῦτ' πιστοτέραι εἰσὶν αἱ συνθήκαι or τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ συνθήκαι τῷ πισταί εἶναι.

The degree of integrity of those who have the document in their custody is a measure of the probability of its having been tampered with or not.

'The existence of the contract being admitted, if the document be our own (§ 26), we must *magnify* it (cry it up; *increase*, exaggerate, its value and importance); for the contract (we may say) is a law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that give authority, or validity, to the law, but the laws to the contracts which are made in conformity with them (legally)'. Either of these arguments may be urged to shew that a covenant has the sanction of law, and shares its authority. 'And, speaking generally, the law itself is a kind of contract, and therefore any one who violates (disobeys) the provisions (understand *συνθήκη* after *ἀπιστεῖ*) of a contract or makes away with it, is in fact subverting, doing away with, the laws'. This doctrine has already been stated in other words, c. 13. 2, νόμον...ἴδιον μὲν τὸν ἐκάστοις ὀρισμένον πρὸς αὐτοὺς. This is therefore the positive, written, local or national law, varying in different societies, and enacted by each of them severally for mutual convenience, under an implied contract to observe and maintain them.

Analogous to this view of law as a contract is the theory, in Politics, of the *Social Contract*, which has been maintained by Locke, Rousseau, and many others. This view of the origin of the social organization and of government, is founded upon the natural freedom and equality of men; and assumes a common agreement amongst the members of a state to live and act together for purposes of self-defence and mutual advantage in obedience to laws and an executive authority which the theory supposes to have emanated originally from themselves, and to be invalid without their consent. Similar to this are the 'laws of war', which give the conqueror certain rights over the conquered, amongst them that of enslaving, and result from a sort of international compact, or universal agreement. Polit. I 6, sub init. ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τις ἐστίν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν. Compare also Pol. III 9, 1280 ὁ 10 seq. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη, καὶ καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας.

§ 22. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται κ.τ.λ.] Transl. in Introd. p. 199. πράττεται 'are transacted'. On συναλλάγματα, 'the ordinary dealings' of men with

ἢ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύρων γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ τᾶλλα δὲ ὅσα 23 ἀρμόττει, ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν. ἂν δ' ἐναντία ἡ καὶ

one another, especially in trade and exchange of commodities, see note on I 1.9.

καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια] 'all voluntary transactions', in general, is added because συναλλάγματα may include τὰ ἀκούσια, frauds, crimes, offences, which may arise in men's dealings with one another: Eth. Nic. v 5 sub fin., 1131 a 2, τῶν μὲν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ' ἀκούσια· ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πῶσις, ὥνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρήσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις· ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος, τῶν δ' ἐκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαβραία, οἷον κλοπή, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προσαγωγία, δουλαπατία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἀρπαγή, πῆρσις, κακῆγορία, προσηλακισμός.

χρεία] 'usus' as χρῆσθαι 'uti', 'intercourse', the use that men make of one another.

ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν] This phrase occurs again, Rhet. II 16. 1, and Hist. Anim. IX 38. 2, ἡ μὲν οὖν μυρμηκῶν ἐργασία πᾶσιν ἔστιν ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν. In Rhet. II 23. 30, τὸ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι expresses 'superficiality'. It seems to be said of things that 'lie on the surface, things prominent and conspicuous, so as to be seen by every one', ὥστε τινὰ or πάντας ἰδεῖν αὐτά. This explanation is confirmed by the substitution of εὐθεώρητα, to express the same notion, in § 25 *infra* (so Victorius). If this be so, the verb should be written ἔστιν, and not ἔστιν (for ἔξεστιν) as in Bekker's text.

ἐπιπολῆς] is the genitive of a substantive ἐπιπολή 'a surface', only used by later and non-Attic writers; 'veteribus illis...ἐπιπολῆς adverbii vicem fuit, Herod. I 187, Arist. Plut. 1207, Eccles. 1108, Thucyd. VI 96, et compluribus Xenophon. Neque eius substantivi alius tunc casus in usu fuit'. Lobeck ad Phryn. p. 126—7. It is an adverb of *place* or *position*, after the analogy of Ἀθηνῶν 'at Athens', λαίης χειρός (Aesch. P. V. 720) 'on the left hand', &c.; see Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 377: (this seems to be omitted in Jelf's *Grammar*, though there are articles on the 'genitive of position'; §§ 524—528, which however is illustrated only by the genitive of relative position, not that which expresses place itself. The genitive, it is to be presumed, is in both cases *partitive*, denoting a *point in space*;) it is also after the analogy of the local adverbs, οὐ, ὅπου, ὁμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ, ποῦ and πού, ἀγχοῦ, ἐγγυθεν, πανταχοῦ. ἐπιπολή itself not being in use, the substantive 'surface, superficies' is formed by the addition of the definite article, as Plat. Philib. 46 D, (ὅπου) τὸ...ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέη. Ar. περι ἐνυπνίων 2. 8, τὸ ἐπιπολῆς τοῦ ἐνοπτροῦ, 'the surface of the mirror'. Its derivatives ἐπιπολαῖος and ἐπιπολάζειν (to be on the surface), have three different senses all arising from the properties attributable to things on the surface; either (1) 'popular', 'prevalent', 'fashionable', 'current', like things that come to the top, come uppermost, and so 'prevail' over the rest, as δόξαι μάλιστα ἐπιπολάζουσαι, Arist. Eth. N. I 2, 1096 a 30, ἐπιπολάζοντος τοῦ γελοίου, ib. IV. 14, 1128 a 13, Hist. Anim. IV 1. 26, τὸ μάλιστα ἐπιπολάζον 'the most abundant kind', VI 37. 2, de Gen. Anim. I 20. 11, οὐ μὲν ἐπιπολάζουσί γε αἱ καθάρσις ὅσπερ ἀνθρώποις: or (2) (if indeed there be any difference between this



μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μὲν, ἅπερ ἂν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιοτο, ταῦθ' ἀρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὥσιν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἴομεθα δεῖν πεί-  
24 θεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἴθ' ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶ βραβευτῆς ὁ δικαστής· οὐκ οὖν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἀλλ' ὡς δικαιότερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστι μεταστρέψαι οὔτ' ἀπάτη οὔτ' ἀνάγκη (πε-

and the preceding) 'conspicuous', 'prominent', compared with such as are deep down, or buried, out of sight; Rhet. *dis*, Hist. Anim. quoted above on ἐπιπολῆς; and (3) 'superficial', opposed to βαθύς; either literally, de Insoinn. (περὶ ἐνυπνίων) 2. 12, οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσδύεται ἡ κηλὶς ἀλλ' ἐπιπολαιότερον, or metaph., as Rhet. III 11. 10, ἀληθὲς καὶ μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον. II 23. 30, above referred to. III 10. 4, τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, followed by the explanation, ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἃ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι, is doubtful; for an enthymeme may be too easy to follow and therefore unacceptable, either because it is intellectually 'superficial' (this I think is the more probable meaning, because more applicable to an intellectual process) or because it is 'prominent and conspicuous', *saute aux yeux*, and therefore is δῆλον πᾶσιν, Top. A 1, 100 b 27. Similarly in Pol. III 3, 1276 a 19, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιότης τῆς ἀπορίας ζητήσις (the most obvious and apparent, the clearest and plainest) περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν, and again, ib. c. 12, 1282 b 30, ἡ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; (evident on the surface). In these two last instances the literal sense of the word is uppermost.

§ 23. 'But if the contract or document be opposed to us, and (on the side) of the adverse party, first of all, the same arguments are suitable as may be used in *contending* against an adverse *law*'. ἅπερ is a cognate accusative extended by analogy from the direct cogn. acc. ἤνπερ μάχην μάχεσαιοτο, for which the neuter plural, expressing the details of the contention, or the arguments employed in it, is substituted. 'For it is absurd to suppose that we are not bound to obey the laws, if their constitution is defective and the framers of them have been led into error, and yet that (in like cases) contracts are necessarily binding (that it is necessary to obey or observe them)'. [For κείμενοι...τιθέμενοι compare note on I 1. 7, p. 10. S.]

§ 24. εἴθ' ὅτι] The gist of the topic is to be found in Introd. p. 200.

βραβευτής] the umpire in the games, who awards the prize to the successful candidate, i. e. to the most deserving, is here used as an image of the judge who dispenses justice to the competitors in a court of law. It is he that is to be appealed to, not a mere contract, which has no regard for the general principles of justice. Justice (ὡς δικαιότερον) must prevail over contracts when they are in conflict. Dem., Cl. III 36. 7, has the verb in the same sense, τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δίκαια βραβεύειν. βραβευτής is the prose form; βραβεύς belongs to the Poets.

τοῦτο] is 'what we are talking about', 'that which is before us', δεικτικῶς; the contract, namely, and its contents.

25 φυκὸς γάρ ἐστιν), συνθῆκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἐξαπα-  
τηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκο-  
πεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστὶ τινὶ ἢ τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ  
τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ  
τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέραις  
ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ εἰ ὑστέραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ' αἱ  
πρότεραι, ἢ αἱ πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ' ὑστέραι ἡπα-  
τήκασιν, ὅποτέρως ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον. ἔτι δὲ τὸ συμ-  
φέρον ὁρᾶν, εἴ πῃ ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα  
ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.

26 αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές εἰσιν, ἔχειν δὲ  
δοκοῦσι τὸ πιστόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσσεστιν. οὐκ-  
ουν χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐνδεχό-  
μενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε ὑπάρχωσιν οἰκεῖαι αὖξιν ἔστιν,  
ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσὶν αὗται· ἐάν τε P. 1377.  
ὑπεναντία ὧσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, δια- P. 53.  
λύοι ἂν τις τὰληθῇ λέγων καθ' ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν

§ 25. 'And again, justice cannot be perverted (have its nature altered) by fraud or compulsion like a contract, because it is natural (constancy and uniformity are characteristic of *nature*); whereas contracts are undertaken, entered into, under the influence of deceit (under false pretences) and compulsion.' The two genitives in construction follow *συνθή-  
και*, 'contracts of men deceived are made'.

*οἰκείοις ἢ ἀλλοτρίοις*] 'domestic or foreign'.  
τὸ συμφέρον] In arguing against the validity of a contract, you may take into account the consequences of carrying its provisions into effect, so far as they affect the judges, whose 'interest' or 'advantage' (or the reverse) may be involved in them: when these results happen to be adverse to the judges' interest, arguments from this source may be employed to invalidate the contract; 'and all other topics of the same kind, (may be used) (which need not be enumerated) because they are equally easy to observe (with the preceding)', too clear to need enumeration.

§ 26. *οἰκεῖαι*] 'of one's own', 'on our side', *supr.* § 21.

*διαλύοι ἂν τις*] or *λύειν* and *διαλίειν*, see *Introd.* p. 267 note.

*τὰληθῇ λέγων*] These words have been variously interpreted. Muretus omitted *τὰληθῇ*, as contrary to Aristotle's opinion on the subject of torture—which however must be gathered from the words of the text, and not assumed *a priori*, and the text altered in conformity with the hypothesis—evidently supposing that if retained it must be construed with *διαλύοι* and not with *λέγων*. There can be no doubt that the latter is right, and that the words *δο* express Aristotle's opinion upon the use of

βασάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδῇ λέγουσιν ἢ τάληθῇ, καὶ διακαρτεροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τάληθῇ, καὶ ῥαδίως κατὰ ψευδόμενοι ὡς παυσόμενοι θᾶπτον. δεῖ δ' ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα παραδείγματα ἃ ἴσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες.<sup>1</sup>

27 περὶ δ' ὄρκων τετραχῶς ἔστι διελεῖν· ἢ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνει, ἢ οὐδέτερον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τὸ δ' οὐ,

[<sup>1</sup> + δεῖ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς αἱ βάσανοι· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ παχύφρονες αἱ καὶ λιθοδέρμοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντες δυνατοὶ γένναίως ἐγκατεροῦσι ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, αἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ εὐλαβεῖς πρὸ τοῦ τὰς ἀνάγκας ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν καταθαρρῶσιν ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔστι πιστὸν ἐν βασάνοις. A<sup>c</sup>].

torture, by asserting the truth and right of the arguments directed *against* the use of it. [On 'torture' see C. R. Kennedy's *Demosthenes*, Vol. IV., pp. 382—391, appendix. S.]

διακαρτεροῦντες] (thoroughly, διά,) obstinately, resolutely, persisting, (holding out).

καὶ ῥαδίως καταψευδόμενοι] 'and ready to make false accusations (κατὰ 'against others') in the expectation of a speedier release'.

On the passage which in MS A<sup>c</sup> concludes this section, and is printed in the note of the Oxford reprint of Bekker's 1st ed., see in *Intro.* p. 201, and the note. It is omitted by Bekker. Spengel, *On the Rhetoric*, in *Bav. Trans.* 1851, p. 51, thinks that it is an extract from some other treatise on Rhetoric, introduced by the transcribers. The last sentence at all events must be corrupt, being as it stands devoid of meaning and connexion with the preceding. Brandis in his tract in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, IV i. p. 43, informs us that his Anonymous Annotator found the passage in the MSS that he used, though he thinks that Victorius was right in rejecting it as an interpolation. Victorius, a man whose judgment is to be relied on, writes thus. 'Delevi autem quia adulterinos putavi; aut enim ex alio scriptore artis haec pars sumta est (so Spengel), aut Scholion olim fuit quod importune post in contextum verborum Aristotelis translatum sit;... Qui accurate quae supra a philosopho iam tradita erant perpendit ipsius haec non esse manifesto intelligit; cuncta enim ille quae ad quaestiones pertinentia dicere vollerat iam explicaverat; sententia vero quae his viribus exponitur superioribus continetur; vox etiam iuncta illic est quae sermonem Aristotelis non redolet, viz. λιθοδέρμος (this applies still more strongly to καταθάρρειν); et omnis denique haec locutio, e. c. ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντες δυνατοί, locutionis Aristotelicae dissimilis videtur'.

§ 27. περὶ ὄρκων... διελεῖν] On *περὶ*, and other prepositions, redundant in the later Greek writers, see note on I 9. 14, 'oaths admit of a fourfold division'.

On oaths, see the corresponding chapter of Quintilian, V 6. *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 17 (18). A full explanation of the connexion and general meaning of this and the following sections to the end of the Chapter will be found in the *Intro.* pp. 202—205, to which the reader is referred; so

καὶ τούτων ἡ δίδωσι μὲν οὐ λαμβάνει δέ, ἡ λαμβάνει  
μὲν δίδωσι δ' οὐ. ἔτι ἄλλως παρὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ὁμώ-  
28 μοσται οὗτος ἡ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ ὑπ' ἐκείνου. οὐ δίδωσι  
μὲν οὖν, ὅτι ῥαδίως ἐπιорκοῦσιν, καὶ διότι ὁ μὲν ὁμό-  
σας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὁμόσαντος οἶεται κα-  
ταδικάσειν. καὶ ὡς οὗτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων ὁ ἐν  
29 τοῖς δικασταῖς· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει τῷ δ' οὐ. οὐ  
λαμβάνει δ', ὅτι ἀντὶ χρημάτων ὅρκος. καὶ ὅτι εἰ ἦν  
φαῦλος, κατωμόσατο ἂν κρείττον γὰρ ἕνεκά του

that we may confine ourselves here as before to the *details* that require notice. One puzzling circumstance which pervades this Chapter, tending to confusion, and adding to the difficulties arising from the extreme brevity of the expression ('*brevis esse laborat obscurus fit*'), is especially true of Aristotle here, as indeed in most of his writings,) it may be worth while to draw attention to; and that is, that throughout it both plaintiff and defendant are made to argue in the *third* person; to avoid this, *you* may be substituted for Aristotle's *he* to designate the person who is in immediate possession of the argument, whichever side of the case he may be at the time maintaining.

On the technical expressions belonging to ὅρκοι, see *note* in *Introd.* p. 202, *διδόναι ὅρκον*, in Aristotle and the Orators, is to *offer* or *tender* an oath, *λαμβάνειν* (or *δέχεσθαι*, in the Orators), to accept, or *take* it.

εἰ ὁμώμοσται οὗτος] 'when *this* (the oath above mentioned) has been already taken by one or other of the two parties'. ὁμώμοσται here is represented by γεγενημένος in § 32.

§ 28. οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι] Supply τὰ χρήματα (the deposit, or something else which the opponent is unjustly withholding), which is added in three MSS, apparently from a marginal gloss.

The case is: you refuse to tender the oath to the adverse party because it is of no use; he is so little embarrassed by scruples of conscience that he will take the oath and keep the money, so that you gain nothing by your motion. τοὺς δὲ 'but the judges, *you* think, if he do *not* swear, will decide against him'.

Another reason, or topic, for refusing to tender the oath is, that 'this form of risk', the risk that one runs by leaving the matter to, by throwing oneself upon, the judges (ὁ κίνδυνος οὗτος ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς), is to be preferred (κρείττων), viz. to the risk incurred of losing your suit by tendering oath to the adversary, who will probably perjure himself: you therefore refer your case to the decision of the judges, because you can trust them, but not the other.

§ 29. ἀντὶ χρημάτων] is, setting a pecuniary value upon the oath (estimating it *against* money, at so much money value), which is degrading to the dignity and sanctity of the oath, and *therefore* it is that you refuse to take it, and not from any baser motive.

κατωμόσατο] κατομνύναι (ὅρκον) occurs in Arist. *Ran.* 305, 306, appa-

φαῦλον εἶναι ἢ μηδενός· ὁμόσας μὲν οὖν ἔξει, μὴ ὁμόσας δ' οὐ.<sup>1</sup> οὕτω δὲ δι' ἀρετὴν ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἐπιτορκίαν τὸ μή·<sup>2</sup> καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἀρμόττει, ὅτι οὐκ ἴση πρόκλησις αὕτη ἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβῇ, ἀλλ' ὁμοῖα καὶ εἰ ἰσχυρὸς ἀσθενῇ πατάξαι ἢ πληγῆναι

<sup>1</sup> οὐ. *infra*.<sup>2</sup> μή. *infra*.

rently as a mere synonym of the simple verb, Δ. καὶ θεις κατόμοσον. Ξ. νῆ Δ'; Δ. ὁμοσον. Ξ. νῆ Δία. With ὅρκον and a second accus. of the thing sworn by, Eur. Hel. 835, ἀλλ' ἀγνὸν ὅρκον σὸν κᾶρα κατόμοσα. The middle voice is found again in Herod. vi 65, but in a different sense 'to swear against', with a genitive following. Here, and in the two other cases quoted above, the κατὰ seems to have an intensive force, expressing the 'binding force' of an oath. This sense of κατὰ comes from the original, physical, notion of 'keeping down'.

For the interpretation of this obscure topic, see *Introduct.* p. 203. The obscurity is a little heightened by Bekker's punctuation, and may be very slightly cleared up by reading μὴ ὁμόσας δ' οὐ (with colon instead of full stop) and at the end of the next clause τὸ μή. (with full stop instead of colon). There is a considerably closer connexion between the two clauses which he separates by a full stop, than there is between the two which are divided only by a colon.

The intention of the topic is to shew the purity and disinterestedness of the speaker's motives in refusing to take the oath.

καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους] Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic school of Philosophy (Plat. Soph. 242 D, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους...ἀρξάμενον)—of which Parmenides his follower was the most distinguished representative, who converted the theological conception of universal being, represented by Xenophanes as God, into the metaphysical conception of the Universe as One, ἐν τὸ ὄν—appears to have conveyed his philosophical doctrines in hexameter verse, an example subsequently followed by Parmenides and Empedocles. He also wrote elegies and iambics, the latter directed against Homer and Hesiod, whose manner of speaking about the Gods he disapproved. Diog. Laert. IX 2. 18. The verse quoted *here* is a trochaic tetrameter; on which Mullach remarks, *Fragm. Phil. Gr.* Xenoph. Fr. 25, p. 106, note, 'cuius versiculi hiatus in voce αὕτη caesurae excusationem habet, prima autem syllaba in ἀσεβεῖ producitur ad aliorum nominum velut ἀθανάτος similitudinem'. So Karsten, *Xenophanes*, p. 79. The work which contained this verse is unknown. Mullach and Karsten agree in the opinion that this verse is all that belongs to Xenophanes in Aristotle's reference; the succeeding illustration is his own. All that is repeated in the converse of Xenophanes' maxim, § 30, is what is contained in the verse itself. I have no doubt they are right. On Xenophanes and his philosophy, besides the two works already referred to, which contain collections of the surviving fragments, see the histories of Greek Philosophy, by Brandis, Zeller, Ritter, Butler, with Dr Thompson's notes and the rest; also Grote's *Plato*, Vol. I. pp. 16—19.

30 προκαλέσαιο. εἰ δὲ λαμβάνει, ὅτι πιστεύει αὐτῷ,  
ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα  
φατέον οὕτως ἴσον εἶναι ἂν ὁ μὲν ἀσεβὴς διδῶ, ὁ δ'  
εὐσεβὴς ὁμνύῃ· δεινόν τε τὸ μὴ θέλειν αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν  
31 ἐκείνους ἀξιοῖ ὁμόσαντας δικάζειν. εἰ δὲ δίδωσιν, ὅτι  
εὐσεβὲς τὸ θέλειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν  
δεῖ αὐτὸν ἄλλων κριτῶν δεῖσθαι· αὐτῷ γὰρ δίδωσι  
32 κρίνειν. καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλειν ὁμνύναι περὶ ὧν

ἀλλ' ὁμοία καὶ εἰ] In this illustration of Xenophanes' dictum, the parallel case proposed by Aristotle, the strong man is the unscrupulous or godless man, who is ready to swear anything, true or false; he has the same advantage over the scrupulous, godfearing man, in a challenge to swear, as the strong man would have over the weak in a challenge to fight.

πατάξει ἢ πληγήναι] These forms are in general use in Attic Prose as the aorist active and passive of τύπτω. Eth. N. v 5. 4, p. 1132 b 28, εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. Ib. v 4. 4, p. 1132 a 8, ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτεῖνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ. de Anima, B, 8, p. 419 b 15, τὸ τύπτων καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον followed by ἂν πληγῇ, ib. p. 420 a 24, τυπτόμενον καὶ τύπτων followed by ἂν πατάξῃ. For further illustrations see Dem. Select Private Orations, II. pp. 207—211, *Excursus on the defective verb τύπτω*. S.]

§ 30. ὅτι πιστεύει αὐτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐ] 'that he can trust *himself* (not to swear to what he knows to be false), but not the other'. (In this case, if you *accept* the oath, or consent to swear) 'Xenophanes' dictum may be inverted (turned round to the other side), and you may say, that this is the fair way of proceeding, for the godless man to tender the oath, and the godfearing to take it'; (because the latter won't perjure himself, the other will). μεταστρέψαι, in § 25, was used in a somewhat different sense 'to pervert' justice; 'and (you may add) it is monstrous for you to refuse to take it *yourself*, in a matter in which (ὑπὲρ ὧν) you<sup>1</sup> require *those* gentlemen (the judges, namely,) to take an oath before they decide'. The judges were sworn upon entering the court to decide 'according to the best of their judgment', § 5, *supra*.

§ 31. 'If you tender the oath, (you argue) that to entrust the case to the decision of heaven is an act of piety; and that (your opponent) ought to require no other judges than himself; and therefore (*lit.* you say this *because*, γάρ) you offer him the decision of the matter'. Comp. Quint. v 6. 4, *At is qui desert alioqui agere modeste videtur quum litis adversarium iudicem faciat, et eum cuius cognitio est onere liberat, qui profecto alieno iureiurando stari quam suo mavult*. Victorius thinks that this is borrowed from Aristotle.

<sup>1</sup> I have translated this 'the adversary' in the Introd. p. 203, but I now think that it should rather be referred to the same person as αὐτόν.

ἄλλους ἀξιοῖ ὀμνύναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον δῆλον πῶς λεκτέον, καὶ συνδυαζόμενον πῶς λεκτέον δῆλον, οἷον εἰ αὐτὸς μὲν θέλει λαμβάνειν διδόναι δὲ μὴ, καὶ εἰ δίδωσι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνειν καὶ διδόναι θέλει εἴτε μηδέτερον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνάγκη συγκεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγκη συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐὰν δὲ ἡ γεγενημένος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐναντίος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιорκία· ἐκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δ' ἐπιорκεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἐστί,  
 33 τὰ δὲ βία καὶ ἀπάτῃ ἀκούσια. ἐνταῦθα οὖν συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιорκεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ στόματι. ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ἡ ὁμωμοσμένος, ὅτι

§ 32. ὑπ' αὐτοῦ] 'by yourself', *σμήνα*, § 20, note on I i. 12, I 7. 35.

ἐκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν] On the 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' as affecting the character of actions, see *Eth. Nic.* III cc. 1, 2, 3, where the subject is thoroughly discussed; and on the degrees of criminality, and the distinction of wrong actions done with malice prepense, *ἐκ προνοίας*, or with deliberate purpose, *προαιρέσει*, and those which are due to accident, mistake, *ἀπατή*, or the momentary blindness of passion, see *Eth. N.* v 10, both of which passages have already been more than once referred to. On *βία* as a supposed source of action, I 10. 14, and the Appendix 'On the seven sources of action', *Introd.* p. 225.

The term 'injustice' or 'criminality' can only be applied to actions voluntary in the proper sense of the word: the pleader who has executed two contracts, one conflicting with the other, and thus violated his engagements, argues that this was done in one or the other instance, either by force or fraud, compulsion or mistake, and that this exempts him from responsibility.

§ 33. συνακτέον] *συνάγειν* like *συλλογίζεσθαι*, *συλλαμβάνειν*, *συλλέγειν*, *συνορᾶν*, *συνιδεῖν*, *συνιέναι*, &c., and similarly *comprehendere*, *colligere*, all convey the notion of 'gathering' facts together, for the purpose of comparison, and so drawing a conclusion of *some kind*. *συνάγειν* and *συλλογίζεσθαι* are to 'draw logical inferences', from facts or premisses which you put together, and so by comparison are led to infer some general conclusion respecting them.

τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ στόματι] This is the famous *ἡ γλῶσσ' ὁμῶμος' ἡ δὲ φρήν ἀνώματος*, *Eur. Hippol.* 612. The success of Aristophanes, and the vulgar misapprehension arising chiefly therefrom, have brought on Euripides a most baseless charge of immorality, so far at least as it is grounded upon this line. Cicero, *de Off.* III 29, has seen and exposed the fallacy. All the moralists without exception admit that the essence of a lie resides not in the words, but in the intention and moral purpose; and the verse when properly interpreted asserts no more than this.

πάντα ἀναιρεῖ ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων οἷς ὥμοσεν διὰ γὰρ  
τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὁμόσαντες. καὶ “ὕμᾱς  
μὲν ἀξιοῦμεν ἐμμένειν οἷς ὁμόσαντες δικάζετε, αὐτοὶ  
δ’ οὐκ ἐμμενοῦμεν.” καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἄλλα αὖξων τις  
εἴπειεν.

[περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων εἰρήσθω  
τοσαῦτα.]

See Paley's note. It seems to me that the Hippolytus in its second and altered form, as we now have it, is, with the exception of the one fatal blot of Phaedra's false charge which brings about the death of the hero, one of the most moral and high-toned, as it certainly is one of the very best, of the extant tragedies of Euripides.

ἀναιρεῖ] *μηδρα* § 21, ἀναιρεῖν συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους.

καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὁμόσαντες] ‘the laws also (as well as other things) are not enforced till an oath has been taken’, ‘the laws in particular are only enforced after an oath has been taken’.

καὶ ὑμᾶς μὲν] On the explanation of this topic, and of the var. lect. ἐμμενοῦμεν and ἐμμένουσιν, see *Introd.* pp. 204—5. MS A\* has ἐμμένουσιν; the rest ἐμμενοῦμεν, which Bekker retains.

εἰρήσθω] See on I 11. 29.



## APPENDIX (A)

ON

A 11 § 17.

στοργή, ἔρως, φιλεῖν, ἀγαπᾶν.

[The following Appendix has already appeared as an article in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1868), pp. 88—93. s.]

THERE are four terms in Greek which represent different states or degrees of affection, fondness, liking, love, in its most general acceptation. Of these *στοργή* and *ἔρως* are co-ordinate terms, in this respect, that they both designate what Aristotle calls *πάθη*, instinctive affections, implanted in sentient beings by nature.

*στοργή* is the natural and instinctive affection that subsists between parent and child; irrational, but moral; an *ἄλογον πάθος*, but *ἠθικόν*. *ἡδύ γε πατήρ τέκνοισιν εἰ στοργήν ἔχει*, Philem. ap. Stob. Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* iv 63. Fr. Inc. 108. *στέργειν*, Oed. R. 1023, *ἰστέργειν* of *parental* affection, Oed. Col. 1529. Plat. Legg. vi 754 B, *καθάπερ παῖς...στέργει τέ καὶ στέργεται ὑπὸ ῥῶν γεννησάντων*. Ar. Eth. N. ix 7, 1168 a 2, *στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα*: ib. line 7, *στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν*, which describes an *instinctive* feeling, though not here the specially parental; comp. viii 14, 1161 b 18, *οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα...τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς*: and line 25, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν*, for which immediately afterwards *φιλεῖν* is twice substituted, lines 27, 28. But the verb is by no means confined to this special sense, and passes readily into the more general signification of 'liking' in the modified form of 'acquiescence' and 'toleration' (to acquiesce in, put up with, as *αἰνεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*); and is even applied to the sexual affection, as Xen. Symp. viii 14 and 21; and in Ar. Eth. N. viii 5, 1157 a 29, it is used to express the instinctive liking or love which children feel for one another, *δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες*: *ἔρως*, again, the other form of instinctive or animal affection, is sometimes substituted for *στοργή*, as Eur. Fragm. Erechth. 19 (Dind.), ap. Stob. 77, p. 454, *ἐράτε μητρὸς παῖδες ὥς οὐκ ἔστ' ἔρως τοιοῦτος ἄλλος, οἷος ἡδίῳ ἐρᾶν*.

ἔρως differs from the preceding only in respect of its special direction and the absence of *moral character*: otherwise it is an *ἄλογος ὄρεξις*, a natural, animal impulse; the sexual form of *ἐπιθυμία*, or natural appetite. *ὅτι ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως παντὶ δῆλον*, Plat. Phaedrus 237 D. *ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ μεμιγμένον* (the characteristic of *ἐπιθυμία*) *ἔρωτα*, Tim. 42 A; and though it is doubtless applied metaphorically, in the sense of a 'passionate desire' *similar* to the animal appetite, to represent intellectual and moral desires, as when Plato says *ἐρᾶν μαθήσεως, φρονήσεως, τῶν καλῶν*, yet I believe that when directly and literally applied to its object, it seldom or never means anything else. Arist. Eth. N. IX 10, 1171 a 12, *ἐρᾶν...ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἑνα*, is an exception; here *ἐρᾶν* is said to be a kind of *φιλία*: the individual passion opposed to 'affection' or 'love' in general. The reverse of this—the ordinary distinction of the two words—appears in Pl. Phaedrus, 231 C, *τούτους μάλιστα φασὶ φιλεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐρώσι*, that is, they feel the highest (moral) affections for those who have inspired them with the sensual passion. Comp. 255 E, *καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἶται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι*. Symp. 179 C, *ὑπερβάλλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα*, where *ἔρως* represents the *στοργή*, or natural affection. Ib. 182 C, *φιλίας, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν*. Ar. Polit. II 4, 1262 b 12, *ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφύναι*, Eth. N. IX 5, 1167 a 3, *ἔοικε δὲ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἢ διὰ τῆς ὀψέως ἡδονῆς*. The distinction of *ἔρως* and *φιλία* appears very clearly in Eth. Nic. IX 1, sub init., 1164 a 3 seq., *ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ κ.τ.λ.* The application of the word to a higher and purer love, in such passages as Eur. Fragm. Dict. VIII (Dind., Wagner), *ἀλλ' ἔστι δὴ τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως, ψυχῆς δικαίως σῶφρονός τε κάγαθῆς, καὶ χρῆν δὲ...τῶν εὐσεβούντων οἰτινές γε σῶφρονες ἐρᾶν*: and Fragm. Oedip. III (Dind.), VII (Wagn.), *ἐνὸς δ' ἔρωτος ὄντος οὐ μὴ ἡδονῆς οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἐρώσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ σῶφρον ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ἄγων ἔρως ζηλωτὸς ἀνθρώποισιν*. This is no exception, for here it is still the animal impulse which is represented as sublimed and purified, and transformed (by a metaphor) into a moral appetite, just as the *ἔρως* in Plato's Phaedrus and Symposium is converted by the same process into a passion of philosophical enthusiasm.

*φιλεῖν* and *φιλία* are designations of 'love' in its widest and most comprehensive sense. The verb may even stand as a synonym of *ἐρᾶν*, as Topic. A 15, 106 b 2, *τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδέν*, where the *τὸ φιλεῖν κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν* is of course equivalent to *ἐρᾶν*. It also includes the whole family of likings and fondnesses, natural and acquired, which are attached to special and particular classes of objects, expressed by compound adjectives; as *φιλοσοιούτος*, 'one

who is fond of so and so', φίλινος, φίλιππος, φιλότιμος, φιλόνικος, φιλέταιρος, φίλαυτος, &c. In the eighth and ninth books of the Nic. Eth. *φιλία* embraces every kind of moral and intellectual affection, instinctive or acquired, and is identified both with *στέργειν* (VIII 14, 1161 a 27, 28) and *ἀγαπᾶν*—see for example VIII 3, where all three are employed as equivalent terms (1156 a 14, 16), *ἐρᾶν*, the sensual appetite being expressly distinguished from them by its own name, b 2, 4. In Plato, Phaedrus 241 c, d, it comprehends even *ἔρως*, τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν, followed by ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί: and in the same verse *ἀγαπᾶν* is used in the same sense (ὡς λύκοι ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ', ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί). In the Ethics therefore it expresses every shade and variety and gradation of the feeling of love in its moral and intellectual aspects from the instinctive affection of the parent, to the highest and ideal form of love; which according to the Greek notion was not that which subsists between the two opposite sexes, but that between two members of the superior sex; and again within that the *friendship* of two *good* men. The definition of *φιλία* in the Rhetoric, II 4. 2, is 'the wishing any one what you think good, for his sake and not for your own' (this is repeated from the Ethics), 'and the inclination or tendency to do such things to the best of your power'. This is disinterested affection, love in its moral aspect, and also in some degree intellectual, in so far as it implies choice: and in this respect corresponds with the Latin *diligere*, or *deligere*, to choose the object of your affection, which implies a *judgment* of his value. The analysis as well as the definition of the *πάθος* in the Rhetoric excludes all consideration of *ἔρως*, and in fact it is treated rather as *friendship* than as *love*.

We next come to the distinction between *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*. Döderlein, *Lat. Syn.* p. 103, and Rost and Palm in their *Lexicon*, connect *ἀγαπᾶν* with the root of *ἄγαμαι* and its congeners: this would make the distinctive character of *ἀγαπᾶν* an intellectual form of love derived from 'admiration' or a high *estimate* of the merits of the person loved. Whether this be the true derivation of the word or not, this notion of selection or affection, conceived, on the ground of admiration, respect, and esteem, certainly enters into its meaning. Xen. Mem. II 7. 9 is decisive on this point. Speaking of the relations of a master to his female servants, Socrates says, ἐὰν δὲ προστατήσης ὅπως ἐνεργοὶ ὦσι, σὺ μὲν ἐκείνας φιλήσεις ὁρῶν ὠφελίμους σεαυτῷ οὕσας· ἐκείναι δὲ σε ἀγαπήσουσι αἰσθόμεναι χαίροντά σε αὐταῖς. The same conception of value (*estimation*) and hence *esteem*, as the foundation of love—complete *φιλία*—appears in a passage of Plato's *Lysis*, 215 A, B, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ὑπ' ἄλλήλων ἀγαπηθεῖη μηδεμίαν

ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα (the service rendered or benefit conferred is the ground of the esteem and affection); ὁ δὲ μὴ του δεόμενος οὐδέ τι ἀγαπήσῃ αὖν. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπήσῃ οὐδ' αὖν φιλοῖ.

I have looked over, with the help of an index, the instances of the word which occur in the Nicomachean Ethics, and find that in every case it may, and in many must, have this sense of an acquired affection, founded upon the judgment or intellectual faculty, which is indicated by the term 'esteem', and thereby distinguished from the irrational appetite ἔρως, and the purely emotional, and usually moral affection, *φιλία*. In I 3, init. 1095 b 17, the *esteem* which the vulgar have for a life of sensual enjoyment is represented as the result of a *judgment* about pleasure: and the same is the case with δι' αὐτὰ ἀγαπᾶται at the end of the Chapter, 'they are valued, prized, esteemed, in and for themselves'. In III 13, 1118 b 4, it is distinguished from χαίρειν, the instinctive affection, in the sense of to 'estimate or prize'; and at the end of c. 14 there is a very marked and decisive exemplification of this sense of the word, ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας, where the ἀξία, 'their value', shews clearly what determines the particular character of the affection. In further illustration of this I will merely refer to other places of the Ethics. In IX 7, from 1167 b 32 onwards, four examples of the word in this signification occur nearly together: in one of them it is actually contrasted with φιλεῖν: and X 7, 1177 b 2, and 9, 1179 a 28, where it is placed in juxtaposition with τιμῶντας, another word which conveys the notion of 'value', are two clear instances. ἀγαπᾶν therefore as contrasted with ἐρᾶν and φιλεῖν represents the Latin *diligere* as opposed to *amare*<sup>1</sup>.

It may be questioned whether this is the primary and original sense of ἀγαπᾶν, since the meaning that appears most prominently and conspicuously in the Homeric use of it and ἀγαπάζειν is that of the external manifestations and signs of affection shewn in 'welcoming' a friend or stranger, or in fondling and caressing as a father his child, Odys. π' 17: and the word is the precise counterpart of ἀσπάζεσθαι. See the examples in Damm's *Lexicon*, which all have this character; except Odys. φ' 289, where it bears the sense, common in the later language, and shared with αἰνεῖν and στέργειν, of acquiescing in, putting up with, contentment. But as it seems easier and simpler to derive the notion of the external indications of

<sup>1</sup> Ernesti, Clav. Cic. s.v. *diligere magis ad iudicium, amare vero ad intimum animi sensum pertinet*. See Döderlein, *Lat. Syn.* p. 97 seq., and Trench, *New Test. Syn.* p. 43 seq.

<sup>2</sup> Dr Lightfoot in *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, No. 7, Vol. III (1857) p. 92, regards this usage of Homer as determining the primary and original sense of the word.

welcome from an internal sense or judgment, previously acquired, of the worth or value of one whom you receive so kindly, than the reverse process, the derivation of the feeling, whether it be esteem or affection, from the external manifestations of it, I prefer regarding the intellectual judgment as the basis of the distinction between it and the other forms of affection, and 'esteem' as its primary and original signification. If Döderlein's derivation from *ἀγαμαι*, and words of that family, could be depended upon, no doubt would be left upon this question.

In common usage, however, it is, like *φιλεῖν*, by no means confined to a single sense. In Plato's *Sympos.* 180 B, it takes the place of *ἐρᾶν* in the representation of the lowest and most sensual form of the passion or appetite of love, *ὅταν ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ ἢ ὅταν ὁ ἐραστὴς τὰ παιδικά*. In Lucian, *Ver. Hist.* II 25, we find similarly, *ἐπιμανῶς ἀγαπῶσα τὸν νεανίσκον*.

We therefore arrive at the conclusion in respect of these terms, expressive of different kinds of love or affection, that, although they are all of them more or less interchangeable in the ordinary language, yet in the strict and proper application of them they may be thus distinguished:—

*στοργή* and *ἔρως* are alike in that they are natural, spontaneous, and instinctive; but *ἔρως* is properly a *sensual appetite*, and *στοργή* a *moral affection*.

*φιλία*, the most comprehensive (in its ordinary use) of the four, belongs to the *emotional* part of our nature, includes all grades of the natural instinctive affection from a liking for wine to the perfect friendship (the highest form of love) between good man and good man; and in this its highest and normal sense acquires a *moral* aspect.

*ἀγαπᾶν* (*ἀγάπη* does not appear in any writers earlier than those of [the Septuagint and] N. T.) gives the *intellectual* aspect of love, in the shape of esteem; no longer a mere *emotion*; but an affection acquired and conceived after an exercise of judgment, consisting in a valuation or estimate formed of the *worth* of the object of preference.

## APPENDIX (B)

ON

A 12 § 22.

### *On an irregular formation of the Greek passive verb.*

[The following Appendix has, like the last, already been allowed to appear in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. I No. 1 (1868), pp. 93—97. The additions in square brackets are taken from the margin of Mr Cope's own copy of the *Journal*, now in Mr Sandys' possession. s.]

φθονεῖσθαι, φθονούμενοι, is an example of the irregular formation of the passive, which is not seldom found in other Greek authors, but is so much more frequent in Aristotle's writings that it may perhaps be regarded as one of the characteristics of his style. In the Greek Grammars that I have consulted, with the exception of that of Dr. Donaldson, who only bestows on it a passing observation<sup>1</sup>, it is left unnoticed, and I will therefore illustrate it by some examples that I have collected.

The best account of it that I have found is given in Madvig's *Latin Grammar*, Ch. III. on the dative case, § 244 b, and Obs. 3, 4, Engl. Transl. ; his explanation of the Latin usage will apply equally well to the Greek.

The transitive verb, which expresses a *direct* action of subject on object—the relation of the two being inverted in the passive, in which agent becomes patient and patient agent, I strike A, A is struck by me—is the only kind that according to strict grammatical rule admits of the passive formation: verbs neuter, in which the action ends in itself, to walk, to run, and verbs which transmit the action, but *indirectly*—these are verbs which in Greek and Latin 'govern' other cases than the *accusative* (the case which expresses the direct action)—cannot, properly speaking, be converted into passives.

<sup>1</sup> *Greek Gram.* § 431. Obs. h h, i i.

Speaking of the dative case, 'the object of reference', in Latin, Madvig says, § 244 b, "this cannot, like the proper object, become the subject with the passive, and such verbs (like those that are intransitive) can only be used impersonally in the passive, *invidetur, nemini nocetur*." (I am not sure that there is any exact analogy to this in Greek, ἀμαρτάνεται is a doubtful case.) Obs. 4 gives a few exceptions. "To make such a dative the subject, and to use the verb of it personally in the passive, is a rare irregularity; *invidetur*, Horace, A. P. 56, *credor*, Ov. Trist. III 10. 25, *medendis corporibus*, Liv. VIII 36," add *regnari*, Tac. Hist. I 16, *virginibus bacchata Lacaenis Taygeta*, Virg. Georg. II 487, *regnata*, Hor. Od. II 6. 11, III 29. 27, Ovid. Heroid. x 69. 2, *imperator*, Hor. Ep. I 5. 21. Heusinger ad Cic. de Off. II 4 gives a list of neuter verbs which become passives, but does not make the necessary distinctions: most of those which he quotes are used as *impersonals*. [On Latin participles of this formation, see Munro, on Lucr. II 156, 363.]

Obs. 2, "Some few verbs are used both with the accusative and the dative (in applying this to the Greek, for *dative*, must be substituted, 'some other case with or without a preposition'), without any perceptible difference in their signification, *adulor, aemulor, despero, praestolor*." In Greek *θορυβεῖσθαι* (ἡμᾶς *θορυβεῖν* τω, Plat. Phaedr. 245 b), *ἀμελεῖσθαι* (*ἀμελεῖν* with accus. Herod. VII 163) are analogous.

In English a similar license is admitted, particularly in verbs which are constructed with prepositions, 'do as you would be done by', or 'done unto', Locke; *Essay*, Bk. I ch. 3, §§ 4 and 7, 'to be sent for', 'gone for', 'looked for', 'to be relied upon' (hence the vulgar reliable, unaccountable, and similar irregularities). See an observation on this subject in Marsh's *Lect. on the Engl. Language*, Lect. XVIII § 14. "The rejection of inflexions, and especially the want of a passive voice, have compelled the use of some very complex and awkward expressions...such a thing *has been gone through with, to be taken notice of, to be lost sight of*, are really compound, or rather agglutinate, passives, &c." [See Thring, *Exercises in Grammar*, p. 3, 'I am told'.]

I subjoin some instances of this irregular passive from various Greek authors. Euripides, *Ion* 87, *Παρησιαῖδες δ' ἄβατοι κορυφαὶ καταλαμπόμεναι*, ib. 475, *χορευομένην τρίποδι*, *Iph. Taur.* 367, *αὐλείται δὲ πᾶν μέλαθρον*.

Thuc. I 126, *ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακὴν*, ("even the dative or genitive of the person, which had formed the object of the active verb, may become the subject of the passive. Thuc. I 126. Xen. *Anab.* II 6. 1, *ἀποτρηθέντες τὰς κεφαλὰς*," &c." Donaldson, *Gr. Gr.* u. s.).

<sup>1</sup> I rather think that this is not the right explanation of the construction in these two cases; at all events it may be otherwise explained. The verbs *ἐπιτρέ-*

The deponents αἰρεῖσθαι and ὠνεῖσθαι are converted into passives in Xen. Memor. III 2. 3, Ar. Pol. VI (IV) 45, 1299 *a* 19, αἰρούνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί (this may possibly be justified by the transitive use of αἰρεῖν, but in a different sense, the *middle* being necessary to the notion of 'choosing', or 'taking for oneself'). Plat. Phaedr. 69 *B* (in Ast's note several other examples of ὠνεῖσθαι pass. from Xenoph. and Plat.) sim. ἀπαρνείσθαι, passive, Ar. Anal. Pr. I 32, 47 *b* 2, 3, 4. ἀναβαθεῖς, Xen. de re equest. III 4, of a horse that is mounted (the regular constr. is ἀναβαίνειν ἐφ' ἵππον, or ἐφ' ἵππου). ἀναβαίνειν in Hom. with the accus. has a diff. sense, 'to go up to'.) ἀπειλείσθαι, Conv. IV 31. χαλεπαίνεισθαι, to be regarded, or treated, with angry feeling, Plat. Rep. I 337 *A*. σπονδάξασθαι, to be eagerly pursued, (several other examples in Ast's Lexicon s. v. ἐσπονδασμένους, Isocr. Panath. § 1 44) ib. VI 485 *E*, ἀμελείσθαι (see above) VIII 551 *A*, καταφρονείσθαι, ib. 556 *D*, καταγελασθῆναι, Euthyphro. 3 *C*, πημμελείσθαι, Phaedr. 275 *E*, Dem. de Cor. § 155, (in a law). σπονδάξασθαι, καταφρονείσθαι, Ar. Rhet. II [2. 16], 3. 7, ὑπερέχειν τι or τινά do occur, but rarely). θορυβεῖσθαι, I 2. 10, II 23. 30, Topic. A 12, 105 *a* 16, Isocr. Panath. ἐπηγημένος καὶ τεθορυβημένος (on θορυβεῖσθαι see above). βοηθεῖσθαι, Rhet. II 6. 6, ἐπικεχίρηται, III 1. 3. ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι, Pol. VIII (V) 10, 1311 *b* 35, φθονεῖσθαι, ib. 11, 1313 *a* 23, πιστεύεσθαι, ib. 10, 1310 *b* 16. Xen. Symp. IV 29, Isocr. c. Demon. § 30, πιστευθέντες, π. εἰρήν. § 76, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 622, § 4. μετέχεσθαι, 'to be participated in', Arist. Metaph. A 9, 990 *b* 30, Top. Δ 121 *a* 12, τοῦ μετεχομένου λόγου, 126 *a* 18 and 21, Eth. End. I 8. 2. προστάττεισθαι, Top. E 129 *a* 14, ἐπιτάττεισθαι, Metaph. A 2, 982 *a* 18. ἐνυπάρχεσθαι (an unusually strange form), Anal. Post. I 4, 73 *b* 18. (Waitz ad loc.) κατηγορεῖσθαι passim ap. Arist. (Waitz ad Anal. Pr. 47 *b* 1.) [βοηθεῖσθαι, Rhet. II 6. 6; παρημελημένος, Eth. N. x 4, 1175 *a* 10; Plato, Crat. 404; ἐντεθυμημένος (Heindorf) Phaedrus, 246 *C* (with Thompson's note); ἀνάσσειται, Soph. Phil. 140; Homer, Od. IV 177; παραλογίζεται, de Soph. Elench. 165 *a* 169. κεχαρίσθω in Plato, Phaedrus, 250 *C*, τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, Rep. II. 375 *A*.]

πειν and ἀποτρίμναι are both transitive, and therefore the *passive form* is regular. The accusative is the *local* accusative, which expresses the *seat* of any affection or quality, and follows adjectives and verbs neuter and passive; Jelf (Kühner), *Gr. Gr.* § 545. 6, supposes with great probability that this is a mere extension of the ordinary cognate accusative and its varieties, ἀγαθὸν τὴν ψυχὴν, τὰ πολιτικά, ἀρετὴν, &c. (Plat.), καλὸς τὸ πρόσωπον, ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλὴν, τὰ ὄμματα, δέρεσθαι τὸ ὥσπον, τῶν τὰ ὅλα καταγόντων; Gorg. 515 *E*. βοὴν ἀγαθὸν Μενέλαος, πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς, and so on. By the same rule, τὴν φυλακὴν after ἐπιτετραμμένοι expresses the *seat* of, the place as it were in which it is deposited or lodged; the trust (viz. the watch) committed to them. [Similarly πιστεύεσθαι τι, to be entrusted with something, the thing being the *local seat* of the trust, that in which the trust resides.]



*ἁμαρτάνεσθαι* certainly occurs as a pass., frequently in Sophocles and Plato, Eurip. Troad. 1028, Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 9, 1125 *a* 19, in the form *ἡμαρτημένος*; and in some other forms which are undoubtedly passive; Xen. Mem. I 2. 9, *ἁμαρτανόμενα*, *bis*, Arist. Eth. Nic. III 3, 1111 *a* 35, *ἁμαρτηθέντα*, (also *ἁμαρτάνεται*, as II 5, 1106 *b* 26, and elsewhere, which in this place from the opposition to *καταρθούται*, line 30, seems more likely to be passive than middle): but in those cases where the choice between passive and middle is open, and the form does not determine it, as *ἁμαρτάνεται ἁμαρτανόμενος*, it is often difficult to decide between the two. Homer certainly employs the middle, Od. IX 512, *ἁμαρτήσεσθαι*; and there seems no positive objection to the interpretation of some of the forms employed by Plato and Aristotle as middle. (Ast in his Lexicon ranks all of them in Plato amongst the passives.) If the forms in question, *ἁμαρτάνεσθαι* &c., are regarded as passive, the accusative, which *in this case* becomes the nomin. to the passive verb, is the *cognate*, and not the *direct*, accusative. The *object* of the erroneous proceeding is the *mistake* that is made, *ἁμαρτάνειν ἁμάρτημα*; which becomes the subject to the passive.

## APPENDIX (C)

ON

A 15 § 23.

*On εἰ οὐ.*

Hermann on Viger, p. 833, n. 309, followed by Matthiae on Eur. Med. 87, defends this combination of *εἰ* with the direct negative instead of *μή* against Elmsley, who holds it to be inadmissible, on the ground that, when it occurs, the negative does not belong to the hypothetical conjunction, but is attached closely to the word which it negatives, so as to combine with it one negative notion; as in Soph. Aj. 1131, *εἰ τοὺς θανόντας οὐκ ἔῤῥε θάπτειν παρών*; where *οὐκ ἔῤῥε* is equivalent to *κωλύεις*: in which cases the direct and not the hypothetical form of the negative is properly used to express an *abstract negation*.

But this explanation, though it is well adapted to the passage of the Ajax<sup>1</sup> quoted in support of it, is not universally applicable, and requires therefore to be supplemented by another and a different solution. For example, in Plat. Phaedo 62 A, we have in two consecutive sentences, first *εἰ οὐδέποτε*, and secondly *εἰ μὴ ὄσιόν ἐστι*, and both after the *same word* *θαυμαστόν*. Now according to Hermann's rule this *μὴ ὄσιον* should be *οὐχ ὄσιον*, because the negative here is just as much an abstract negation of *ὄσιον* as *οὐκ ἔῤῥε* is of *ἔῤῥε* in the Ajax, the one 'unhallowed' as the other 'to forbid': the same rule ought to be equally applicable to both; but it is not, and therefore this explanation of the distinction in this case breaks down.

The explanation, that I would add, as more generally applicable, is this. It is universally acknowledged that *εἰ* does not always pre-

<sup>1</sup> Eur. Ion, 388,

*ὥς εἰ μὲν οὐκέτ' ἐστιν, ὀγκωθῇ τάφῳ,*

*εἰ δ' ἐστιν, ἔλθῃ μητρὸς εἰς ὄψιν ποτέ,*

can doubtless be explained on this principle. And the same may be said of *εἰ δ' οὐκ ἦν*, quoted by Herm. on Med. 348 (on Elms.) from Antiphan. ap. Athen. III 99 A.

serve its hypothetical force, but may be put in the place of *ὅτι* or *ὥς* to express a simple fact; or of *ἐπεὶ*, 'since', as a hypothetical consequence, where however no *doubt* is implied; or of *πότερον* 'whether', as an alternative, after *ἐρωτᾶν* and similar verbs of questioning. See Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 617. 2; Viger, p. 504, c. VIII § 6. 3, and the passages quoted by Hoogeveen and Zeune in the note; Jelf (Kühner), *Gr. Gr.* § 804. 9; Buttm. *Ind. to Mid.* *εἰ pro ὅτι post εἰδέναι, αἰσχύνεσθαι* (Buttm. does not mean that the usage is confined to these two verbs, but merely that these happened to be the only two instances of it in this speech of Dem.); Id. in *Ind. ad Plat. dial.* IV 'εἰ in re certa, et *citra hypothesin*, valet *siquidem* (da) Men. c. 3. d (p. 72 A) *εἰ ἀνεύρηκα*.' Now it seems to me that whenever *εἰ* is used in this non-hypothetical sense, it naturally and properly is construed with the direct negative, just as *ὅτι* and *ὥς*, or *ἐπεὶ* or *πότερον*, would be, and in the same sense. And I appeal again to the passage of the *Phaedo*, where, as I think, in default of this explanation, there is no reasonable way of accounting for the variation of *οὐ* and *μή* in the two cases after the *same word*, *θαυμαστόν*. In the first sentence the hypothesis is altogether discarded, and the translation is, 'perhaps it will be surprising to you *that* this alone...and that it never happens, &c.': in the second, the hypothetical *form* is retained, though the sense is lost, and *εἰ* is still 'if'; 'it seems perhaps surprising *if* (as is the fact nevertheless, of which *however* there is no doubt) it is not allowed to these same men to do themselves a service'. Now there is a special class of words, like *αἰσχρόν*, *δεινόν*, *ἄτοπον*, *θαυμαστόν*, *θαυμάζειν*, which are habitually followed (especially in the Orators) by *εἰ* in the sense of *ὅτι*, and are sometimes accompanied by its attendant *οὐ*: still, although exact accuracy seems to require the direct negative in these cases, the ordinary fondness for indefinite and hypothetical expressions, which has been noticed as characteristic of Greek habits of thought and speech (the use of the indefinite *μή*, with relatives for instance, *ἃ μή ποιεῖ, ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο μή ποιοῦσιν*, Dem. c. Lept. 464, et sim.), prevails so far that in the great majority of cases the *μή* is retained. In *Medea* 87 (one of the lines on which Herm. writes his note) *εἰ τοῖσδε γ' εὐνῆς οὐνεκ' οὐ στέργει πατήρ; εἰ* is certainly equivalent to *ἐπεὶ*, and *οὐ* technically correct (though Hermann's rule might also apply; as is *εἴπερ* in the verse quoted Rhet. II. 23. 1, *εἴπερ γὰρ οὐδέ κ.τ.λ.* This is so clear, that Elmsley, who condemns *εἰ οὐ* altogether, proposes to read here *ἐπεὶ* for *εἴπερ*. (Note ad Med. 87.) Hermann's example from Thucyd. I 121, *δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ οἱ μὲν...οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ...οὐκ ἄρα δαπανήσομεν*, which, according to him, are equivalent to *καρτερήσουσιν* and *φεισόμεθα*, is much more reasonably and naturally explained on the other principle; of the two verbs, the first being in fact no part of the hypothesis at all, and with the second *οὐ* being justified by the meaning of *εἰ*, which is

equivalent to *δι*. Herm. adds, however (note on Elms. Med. 87), "Obiter adicimus, etiam ubi *εἰ* *an* significat ('whether or no', a common signification of the particle; where again no hypothesis is implied, not merely an alternative) recte sequi οὐ, ut apud Plat. Protag. 341 B, si nulla est negationis ad affirmationem oppositio." *εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι*. On Elms. Med. 348, he quotes, as exemplifying his rule, Hom. Od. β' 274, *εἰ δ' οὐ κείνου γ' ἔσσι γονός καὶ Πηνελοπείης*. This seems to me no instance of it at all; and as it is equally unexplained on my principle, it must be regarded as an exceptional case, and remain without explanation. All the rest of the examples quoted by Herm. l. c. from Herodotus and the Orators, in illustration of his theory, (with one exception) are instances of *εἰ* 'that' after *δεινόν*. The exception is Andoc. *περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων* § 33, *εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἡμάρτημαι ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ.* How this can be brought under Hermann's rule I am quite at a loss to perceive; but on the other principle the explanation is most clear and satisfactory. Andocides is defending himself, and offers an alternative; *εἰ μὲν τι ἡσέβηκα ἤ...ἀποκτείναντί με. εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἡμάρτηται μοι κ.τ.λ.* Who can doubt that in the latter member of the alternative the speaker means to represent this as no admissible hypothesis—in fact he says so himself, *καὶ τοῦτο ὑμῖν ἀποδείκνυμι σαφῶς*—and therefore no hypothesis at all? It is therefore to be rendered, 'but the fact being that I have committed no offence', and is a signal example of the inapplicability of Hermann's rule.

In Dem. c. Mid. 581. 1, we have *εἰ δὲ καταγνοὺς ἀδικεῖν τότε διαταῦτ' οὐχ ὑπήκουσε κ.τ.λ.*, where *οὐχ ὑπήκουσε* forms no part of the supposition, but is stated as a fact of past time, and *contrasted* with what he may *possibly* do at present. The same applies to Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 250, *ἣ οὐ δεινὸν δοκεῖ ὑμῖν...οὐ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων...ταῦτά τινες οὐκ ἐξαρνοῦνται κ.τ.λ.* Arist. Pol. II 111, 1273 b 3, *ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὦν...φauλότερος δ' ὦν οὐ βουλήσεται δαπανήσας*.

I will conclude this note with two examples of a parallel case in which *ἂν* with the optative is found following *εἰ*, contrary to the ordinary rule of Greek grammar. One occurs in Dem. c. Lept. p. 475, *εἰ μέλλοντες μὲν εὖ πάσχειν συκοφάντην ἂν τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἡγοῖσθε, ἐπὶ τῷ δ' ἀφελέσθαι κ.τ.λ.*, where the contrasted *μὲν* and *δέ* (on which Buttm. *Gr. Gr.* and *Index to Mid.*) shew that the first of the two members is independent of the supposition: the other in Aesch. c. Timarch. § 85, *ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ μηδὲν μὲν...καὶ μὴ γενομένης μὲν κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἤλω ἂν κ.τ.λ.*













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
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


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# ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

## ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

### Β.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ὁς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῇ τέχνην  
ῥητορικὴν διδῶ, πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσῃ ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἐν  
καὶ ὅμοιον πέφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές. τοῦτο γὰρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι  
δεικνύναι. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν  
ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν. ΦΑΙ. Τί μὴν; ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ  
λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα, δεισὶ τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων  
ἕκαστον ἐκάστῳ, καὶ διδάσκων ὅσα οὖσα ὑφ' οἷων λόγων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ μὲν  
πείθεται, ἢ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ. ΦΑΙ. Καλλίστα γοῦν ἂν, ὥς ἔοικ', ἔχοι οὕτως. ΣΩ. Οὗτοι  
μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλως ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνη ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφή-  
σεται οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο.—PLATO, *Phaedrus*, p. 271.





# ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

## ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β.

Ι. Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι

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### CHAP. I.

In the following chapter we have a very brief account of the second kind of rhetorical proof, viz. the ethical, the *ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*. The treatment of it is cursory; and we are referred *backwards* to the analysis of virtue moral and intellectual in Book I c. 9<sup>1</sup>, for further details of the topics from which are to be derived the enthymemes whereby the speech and the speaker may be made to assume the required character of *φρόνησις*, *ἀρετή* and *εὐνοία*; and *forwards* to the chapter on *φιλία* and *μίσος* (II 4), in the treatise on the *πάθη*, where the indications of these affections are enumerated, which will enable the speaker to convey (always by *his speech*) the good intentions and friendly feeling by which he is affected towards his audience. As supplementary and auxiliary to the direct logical arguments this indirect ethical mode of persuasion is indispensable to the success of the speech. People are hardly likely to be convinced by a speaker who sets them against him.

On the order of the subjects of the work in general, and the connexion of the contents of this Chapter, I refer as before to the Introduction [p. 245].

§ I. *ἐκ τίνων...ταὐτ' ἐστίν*] This is a confusion of two constructions; the grammar requires either *ἐκ τίνων εἶρηται* (or something similar), or else *ἐξ ὧν ταὐτ' ἐστίν*. The *ποῖαι* in the second clause shews that the first of the two was the one predominant in the writer's mind, which is carelessly varied at the end.

*δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις*] These two are in fact the same. The current popular opinions are converted by the artist into premisses of rhetorical enthymemes. They are united again, c. 18 § 2, comp. Topic. A 10, 104 a 12, *εἰσὶ δὲ προτάσεις διαλεκτικαὶ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ὁμοία...καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσὶ τὰς εὐρημένας*. And c. 14, init. *τὰς μὲν προτάσεις ἐλεγκτέων...καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσίν*.

'Now the sources from which we must derive our arguments in

<sup>1</sup> The connexion of this chapter with the subject of the Rhetorical *ἦθος* is marked at the opening of the chapter itself: *συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κάκεῖνα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοῖ τινες ὑποληφθῆσόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν*.

πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, ταῦτ' ἐστίν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον 2 εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστίν ἡ ῥητορική (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλάς κρίνουσι καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιῶν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευά-

exhorting and dissuading, in panegyric and censure, in accusation and defence, and the sort of opinions and premisses that are serviceable for (rhetorical) proof in them, are these: for these are the materials and sources of our enthymemes, specially, so to say, in each kind of speeches'; i.e. using a special treatment according to the kind of speech on which we are engaged. If the text is right here, ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων—Bekker retains it unaltered, and Spengel<sup>1</sup> accepts it in his last edition, though he formerly proposed εἰπομεν—this must be the translation of it. ὡς εἰπεῖν 'so to speak', (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὡς τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι, Plat. Phaedr. 230 B, et sim.).

§ 2. The commencement of this section is repeated and dwelt upon at the beginning of c. 18, where, after the parenthetical account of the πάθη and the six special ᾗθη, a break occurs, the subsequent contents of the work are enumerated in their order, and the logical part of Rhetoric resumed.

On the extension of the signification of κρίνειν, κρίσις, κριτής, to include decisions or *judgments* of all kinds, moral, political, (as in deciding upon a course of policy to be pursued), literary, (criticism, in matters of taste, works of art, written compositions, and such like), as well as the ordinary application of it to the judicial decisions of the judges in a court of law, compare I 1. 7, p. 10, and Introd. p. 137, note 1.

ἀποδεικτικός] 'demonstrative', improperly applied to *rhetorical* proof. See note on I 1. 11, p. 19.

τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν] (or the audience in general) Quint. v 12. 9, *probationes quas patheticas vocant, ductas ex affectibus*. There is a sort of ζεύγμα in the application of κατασκευάζειν to αὐτὸν ποιῶν τινα, and again to τὸν κριτὴν. In both cases it means 'to establish' or 'constitute', but is applied in two slightly different senses; in the first it is to make himself out to be, to establish a certain character in and by the speech, and in the other to establish a certain feeling or disposition in the minds of the judges.

<sup>1</sup> In his treatise on the Rhetoric in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 39, note, he translates the passage thus: *wie man jedes genus der reden für sich behandeln soll*: understanding ὡς εἰπεῖν, if I do not mistake him, in the sense of ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν (?) 'according as we have to speak', which seems to me to be hardly allowable. ὡς εἰπεῖν can, I think, in conformity with ordinary Greek usage, have no other sense than that which I have attributed to it. See, for illustrations of ὡς thus used with an infinitive, Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 545.

3 ζειν· πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἴτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις, τὸ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἔχειν πῶς αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἂν καὶ 4 αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πῶς τυγχάνωσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς συμβουλὰς ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ διακείσθαι πῶς τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ

§ 3. πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν κ.τ.λ.] Comp. I 2. 4, 5. Quint. IV 5, 6, *interim refugienda non modo distinctio quaestionum est, sed omnino tractatio: affectibus perturbandus et ab intentione auferendus auditor. Non enim solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet.* This goes beyond Aristotle: Quintilian however is speaking rather of the πάθος, of the τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα κατασκευάζειν, than of the ἦθος. He sets the πάθος above the ἦθος in point of its importance and value to the orator as a means of persuasion; Aristotle, admitting this in forensic speaking, takes the opposite view in the deliberative kind; § 4<sup>1</sup>. But compare I 2. 4, where a decided preference for the ἦθος is expressed.

‘For the assumption of a certain character by the speaker himself, and the supposition (of the audience) that he is disposed in a particular way (has certain feelings towards themselves), makes a great difference in respect of the persuasive effect of the speech, first and foremost in counselling or deliberation, and next in legal proceedings (ἦθος); and besides this, whether they (the audience) are *themselves* in some particular disposition (feeling, frame of mind) (towards him) (πάθος)’.

ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς] ‘consultations’. Plat. Gorg. 455 A, ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως περί...συμβουλὴ ᾗ.

§ 4. τὸ δὲ διακείσθαι πῶς τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας] Comp. I 2. 4, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν...οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες...πρὸς ὃ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαι φάμεν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογούντας, who wrote only for the use of pleaders in the courts of justice, I 1. 9, 10.

οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Orat. II 42. 178, *nil est enim in dicendo maius quam ut faveat oratori is qui audiet, utique ipse sic moveatur ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis quam iudicio aut consilio regatur. Plura enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe*

<sup>1</sup> The reason of this is, that when a man has to recommend or dissuade a certain course of action, his character and the opinion entertained of it must give great weight to his advice: and it is not in the law-court, but in public life, in quelling the seditious riot, that Virgil’s *vir pietate gravis ac meritis* (in the famous simile, Aen. I. 149) exhibits his ‘authority’: whereas in a court of justice, where *facts* are in question, the speaker’s assumed character has either no weight at all, or in a far less degree.

μισοῦσιν, οὐδ' ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πρᾶως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ P. 1378.  
 τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἕτερα· τῷ μὲν  
 γὰρ φιλοῦντι, περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ οὐκ ἀδι-  
 κεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τοῦναντίον P. 55.  
 καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, εἰν ἢ τὸ

*aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus.* And on this importance of εὐνοια, that is, the conciliation of it in the audience by making your own good will apparent in the speech, compare Demosth. de Cor. § 277, p. 318, κἀκεῖνο δ' εἶ οἷδ', ὅτι τὴν ἐμὴν δεινότητα—ἔστω γάρ· καίτοι ἐγώ· ὁρῶ τῆς τῶν λεγόντων δυνάμεως τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὸ πλείστον μέρος κυρίως ὄντας· ὡς γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς ἀποδέξησθε καὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον ἐχητ' εὐνοίας, οὕτως ὁ λέγων ἔδοξε φρονεῖν κ.τ.λ.

τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα...τὸ μέγεθος ἕτερα] ('either *altogether* different', different in *kind*; 'or in magnitude and amount', different in *degree*.) This clause (to τοῦναντίον) is explanatory of the effect of the πάθη upon the audience, (not of the ἦθος), as appears from the example chosen, φιλία and μῖσος being πάθη, II 4: and it belongs especially, though not exclusively—for in such cases as the *public* speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines it might be usefully, and in fact was, employed—to *forensic* practice; the result being in this case either complete acquittal from a charge (οὐκ ἀδικεῖν) or a lenient construction of it, and a mitigation of the penalty (ἢ μικρὰ ἀδικεῖν). The next (after τοῦναντίον) refers principally to the *deliberative* branch of Rhetoric, as is shewn by the future *time*—the *time* of the deliberative speaker is the *future*, I 3. 2—τὸ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι; and accordingly for the use of speakers in this branch the emotions appealed to must be different and adapted to a different purpose. The two which will be most serviceable to the public speaker are desire (ἐπιθυμία) and hope (ἐλπίς): those who are under the excitement of such feelings will be more likely to assent to the course of policy proposed, and so ensure the success of the speaker who recommends. It is singular however that neither of these is found in the list of πάθη which follows: ἐπιθυμία occurs amongst them in Eth. Nic. II 4; and hope may possibly be included under θάρσος, as the opposite of φόβος, in the analysis of τὸ θαρρᾶλεον and θάρσος, Rhet. II 5. 16, to the end. This is partially confirmed by II 5. 16; after telling us that *confidence* is the opposite of *fear*, he adds ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ἐλπίς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων, as if 'the hope of near approaching safety' were convertible with, or the ground of, confidence, and therefore a πάθος opposed to φόβος. In the same way εὐνοια, in the three 'ethical' virtues to be exhibited in the speech, is included in φιλία.

'And to one who feels a desire for anything, or is in a sanguine frame of mind, the future result (announced by the speaker), if it be pleasant, appears to be both certain and good; whilst to any one who has no (such) feeling, or is in a bad humour, the contrary (is true, is the case).'

ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται, τῷ δ' ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τούναντίον.

- 5 τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἷτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι δι' ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐνοία· διαψεύδονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἢ συμβουλευούσιν ἢ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ  
6 τούτων τι· ἢ γὰρ δι' ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσιν, ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δο-

§ 5. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐνοία] On Whately's comparison (*Rhetoric*, c. 2) of these three qualities as constituting the ethical character of the speech, with the character of Pericles, as drawn by himself, in Thuc. II 60, see *Introd.* p. 246, note 1. The explanation of them, and the reason of their selection, are there given. φρόνησις is the *intellectual* virtue of 'practical wisdom', essential above all to a statesman; ἀρετὴ is *moral* virtue, of character and conduct; εὐνοία is required in the speaker himself (or rather in his *speech*) as part of the *ἦθος*, and in the audience as a *πάθος*. In the *Politics* VIII (V) 9, *init.* the correspondence is exact, and the three same qualities or virtues are selected as the special qualifications of the statesman: τρία δὲ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄρξειν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν πολιτείαν (this is something rather different from the εὐνοία of the *Rhetoric*: but the *purpose* of *Rhetoric* and of *Politics* is different), ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς (this is 'ability', corresponding to φρόνησις in *Rhet.* and the combination of knowledge and eloquence in Thucyd.), τρίτον δ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἐκάστη πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. It seems not unlikely that Arist. may have borrowed this from Thuc., altering however and perhaps improving the classification and the expression, and adapting it to his immediate purpose in the *Politics* and the *Rhetoric*.

διαψεύδονται] '(the speakers) make mistakes, or false statements', whether intentionally or unintentionally; ψεύδεσθαι can bear either sense. In the *Nic. Eth.* where it occurs several times, VI 3, 1139 b 18, *ib.* c. 6, 1140 b 4, c. 13, 1144 a 35, IX 3, 1165 b 8, and in the ordinary usage of other authors, it appears to be always 'to be deceived', implying an unintentional error, accordingly here also the mistakes and false statements must be represented as unintentional, so far as the word is concerned; though the alternative διὰ μοχθηρίαν—the second case, when ἀρετὴ is lacking—shews that it is also possible to make them intentionally and with intent to deceive. The fact is that here again is a sort of ζεῦγμα, and διαψεύδεσθαι (as interpreted by the ordinary usage of it) will only apply properly to the first of the three cases; in the other two it requires some modification. The concluding observation, διόπερ ἐνδεχέται...γιγνώσκοντας, 'it is possible to do this with one's eyes open', looks as if it was meant to supply this.

κοῦντα λέγουσιν, ἢ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσὶν  
 ἀλλ' οὐκ εὖνοι, διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα  
 συμβουλευεῖν γιγνώσκοντας. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν.  
 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτ' ἔχειν εἶναι  
 7 τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν. ὅθεν μὲν τοίνυν φρόνιμοι  
 καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανείν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διη-  
 ρημένων ληπτέον· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ κἂν ἕτερόν τις  
 κἂν ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον· περὶ δ' εὐνοίας  
 8 καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον νῦν. ἔστι  
 δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς

§ 6. διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν] i. e. from corrupt motives do not state their real opinions. Whately's parallel from Thucydides, above referred to, though not precisely corresponding to the three virtues of the speech here described, is yet sufficiently close to serve as a commentary on this passage of Aristotle; and as portraying, in terse and vigorous language, the character of an upright and independent statesman, such as were rare at Athens, it is sufficiently striking in itself, to deserve quotation on its own account. καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίξεσθε, says Pericles, ὃς οὐδενὸς οἶμαι ἥσσω εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα φιλοπόλις (Aristotle's εὖνοια) τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων. (This illustrates the μοχθηρία, the *malus animus*, of the other, which consists in suppressing your convictions or making false statements from corrupt or interested motives.) ὃ τε γὰρ γινῶς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθῃ· ὃ τ' ἔχων ἀμφοτέρω, τῇ δὲ πόλει δύσνους, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράζοι· πρόσσοτος δὲ καὶ τοῦδε, χρήμασι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ξύμπαντα τούτου ἐνὸς ἂν πωλοῖτο, Thuc. II 60.

§ 7. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διηρημένων] 'from the analysis of the virtues', in I 9. περὶ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας, in II 4.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γάρ κ.τ.λ.] κατασκευάζειν here again has the same double sense and application as before, § 2. It is to make *oneself* out, make to appear, in the speech; and to put others in such and such a frame of mind. Both of these can be done, he says, by the use of the same topics, namely those of I 9. The topics there applied to panegyric under the epideictic branch, can be here transferred to the representation of the speaker's own character in and by his speech.

§ 8. τὰ πάθη] Of the various senses and applications of *πάθος*, and also of its special signification in Aristotle's ethical system, an account is given in the Introduction, p. 133 seq.; together with a comparison of the two lists here and in the Nic. Ethics. These two it will be seen differ materially. I have further referred (p. 246, note 1, on the summary of this chapter) to Mr Bain's work *On the Emotions and the Will* for a complete and scientific explanation of the actual facts of those which are also included in Aristotle's lists, either here or in the Nic. Eth., viz. anger, resentment, righteous indignation, terror and confidence or courage, love and hatred.

τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργή  
 ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις  
 9 ἐναντία. δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία·  
 λέγω δ' οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς, πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι  
 εἰσὶ, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ  
 γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἧ τὰ δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ  
 μή, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἶη τὴν ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν ὁμοίως δὲ

What is here said of them, that they are characterised, as parts of our moral nature, by being always attended by pleasure and pain—one or both, as anger—is found likewise in *Eth. N. II 4*, sub init. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θράσος (so written here; more correctly θάρσος, *II 5. 16*), φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη. In *Eth. Eudem. II 2*, 1220 *b* 12, it is said of them, λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ ἐπιθυμίαν, (this is of course not intended for a complete list: αἰδῶς and ἐπιθυμία come from the *Nic. Eth.*, the former from the end of Book IV., where it appears with νέμεις as an appendage to the list of virtues; it is found likewise in the *Rhet. II 6*, under the name αἰσχύνῃ. ἐπιθυμία is absent in the *Rhetoric*), ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (this is a modification of Aristotle's statement) ἢ αἰσθητικὴ (this also is an addition) ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ' αὐτά. In *Magn. Mor. A 7, 8*, there is a summary account, borrowed directly from Aristotle, of the three elementary divisions of man's moral nature, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις. Of the first we find, πάθη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὀργὴ φόβος μῖσος πόθος ζῆλος ἔλεος, τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷς εἰώθε παρακολουθεῖν λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, 1186 *a* 12, which is afterwards thus modified, *c. 8*, 1186 *a* 34, τὰ δὲ πάθη ἧτοι λύπαί εἰσιν ἢ ἡδοναί, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἡδονῆς. These πάθη proper are therefore distinguished from other πάθη, feelings or affections of like nature, such as the appetites, hunger and thirst (which are also attended by pleasure and pain), not by pleasure and pain in general, as seems to be implied in the above statements, but by the particular kinds of pleasures and pains that severally accompany them; bodily in the one case, mental and moral in the other. So that the appetites belong to the body or material, the 'emotions', as they are now called, to the mind and the moral, immaterial, part of man; and feeling (the general term) and emotion (the special term) are thus distinguished: all emotions are feelings, all feelings are not emotions. μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι] (differ by change) 'are brought over to a different state of mind or feeling'. πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις 'in respect of their decisions', of *all* kinds; but especially judicial decisions and those of national assemblies on questions of policy or expediency.

§ 9. For rhetorical purposes we must divide the examination of each πάθος into three parts; the nature of them, what the disposition is in one who feels the emotion; the ordinary objects, against whom the emotion is directed (as the ordinary objects of anger); and the ordinary conditions, the occasions and circumstances which give rise to them. Without the knowledge of all three in each case, it is impossible to excite in the mind of anyone the feeling or emotion required.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρη-  
μένων διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τού-  
των ποιήσωμεν καὶ διέλωμεν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον.

I ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὀρεξίς μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινο- CHAP. II.

διαγράφειν, *de-scribere, de-lineare*, to *describe*, lit. draw in detail, with all the divisions (διά) marked: comp. διάγραμμα, of a mathematical *diagram*: applied to a descriptive analysis of a subject.

On this part of Aristotle's Rhetoric, the treatise on the *πάθη*, Bacon has the following remarks, *de Augm. Scient.* VII 3, Vol. I. p. 736, ed. Ellis et Spedding: 'Et hic rursus subiit nova admiratio, Aristotelem, qui tot libros de Ethicis conscripsit, Affectus ut membrum Ethicae principale in illis non tractasse; in Rhetoricis autem ubi tractandi interveniunt secundario (quatenus scilicet oratione cieri aut commoveri possint) locum illis reperisse; (in quo tamen loco, de iis, quantum tam paucis fieri potuit, acute et bene disseruit)'. I quote this with the more pleasure, as one of the few fair statements of Aristotle's merits to be found in Bacon's writings.

#### CHAP. II.

§ 1. ἔστω δὴ] said of a *provisional* definition, suitable for rhetorical purposes, but without scientific exactness. Comp. I 5. 3, and note, 6. 2, 7. 2, 10. 3. On rhetorical definitions, see *Introd.* p. 13.

ὀρεξίς μετὰ λύπης—μὴ προσήκοντος] This definition of anger occurs likewise in the *Topics*, Θ 156 a 30, ἡ ὀργὴ ὀρεξίς ἐστὶν τιμωρίας διὰ φαινόμενῃν ὀλιγωρίαν, as an average specimen of a *dialectical* definition; whence no doubt it was imported into the *Rhetoric*. Another definition similar to this is again spoken of as popular and dialectical, and opposed to a true 'physical' definition, *de Anima* I, 403 a 29, διαφερόντως δ' ἂν ὀρίσαιντο φυσικὴς τε καὶ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀρεξιν ἀντιληψέως ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέειν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ; the latter is the 'appropriate' form of definition. And *Plutarch*, *de Virt. Mor.* p. 442 B, speaks of ὀρεξίς ἀντιληψέως in terms which seem to imply that Aristotle had himself employed as his own definition. This, says *Seneca*, *de Ira*, I 3. 3, very nearly corresponded with his own, (*cupiditas iniuriae ulciscendae* I 2. 4,) *ait enim* (Arist.) *iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi*; which appears to be a translation of ὀρεξίς ἀντιληψέως. A passage of the *Eth. Nic.* VII 7, 1149 a 30, will illustrate some points of the definition of the *Rhetoric*. ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτήτα...ὀρμῇ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγορία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δι' εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὀρμῇ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. Here two elements of anger are distinguished. And the pain lies in the struggle which the *θυμός* undergoes, whilst the pleasure is caused by the satisfaction of the *ἐπιθυμία*, the *appetite* or *desire* of satisfaction or compensation for the injury inflicted, which is the object of the *τιμωρία*. *Victorius* quotes the Stoic definition of anger, *τιμωρίας ἐπιθυμία τοῦ δοκούντος ἡδικηκέναι οὐ προσηκόντως*, which is derived probably from this of Aristotle.



μένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν

ὄρεξις as a general term denotes a class of ὀρέξεις, instinctive and impulsive faculties of the soul or immaterial part, intellectual as well as moral, the ultimate origin of all action in the human subject. Sir W. Hamilton, *Lect. on Metaph.* I p. 185, laments the want of any corresponding word in modern psychology, and proposes to supply it by the term 'conative' faculties. The ὄρεξις, so far as it is described at all, is noticed in *de Anima* II 3, sub init., and afterwards more at length in III 9 and 10; compare also *Eth. N.* VI 2. The first of these passages enumerates the ascending stages or forms of life which characterise and distinguish the ascending orders of plants and animals. The first, τὸ θρεπτικόν, the life or principle of growth and nutrition, is the lowest form, and is characteristic of plants, which have no other. The second stage in the development of life is τὸ αἰσθητικόν, with which τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, the ultimate origin of motion in the living animal, is inseparably connected; (sensation implies impulse) both of them being instinctive and both together constituting animal as distinguished from plant. But the lowest animals have no power of motion; consequently the next stage in the upward course is τὸ κινητικόν, local motion, or locomotion in space, κατὰ τόπον. The last, which is peculiar to humanity, is τὸ διανοητικόν, the intellectual element, divided into νοῦς and διάνοια. The ὀρεκτικόν is here divided, 414 b 2, into three classes of faculties, ἐπιθυμία (the appetites, or sensual desires)<sup>1</sup>, θυμός (the passions, anger, love, hatred, and all the more violent and impetuous emotions, the angry passions especially—the word is as old as Homer, a relic of antiquity, and as a psychological term very vague and indistinct), and lastly βούλησις, which seems here to include 'will' as well as 'wish'. The will is more directly implied, though never disengaged and distinctly expressed, in the προαίρεσις the moral faculty of deliberate purpose: this consists of an intellectual, and also of an impulsive element, the spontaneous origin of moral action which it is the office of the intellectual part to direct aright; the προαίρεσις accordingly is ὄρεξις βουλευτική, *Eth. N.* VI 2, 1139 a 24, or again, ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, ib. b 4. These two elements in combination, (the προαίρεσις), are the ἀρχὴ πράξεως, ib. a 32, of which the ὄρεξις (and so *de Anima* III 9. 2, 3, ἐν δὲ τὸ κινεῖν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν,) is the

<sup>1</sup> This reference of ἐπιθυμία to the class of ὀρέξεις indicates, as Plutarch, *de Virt. Mor.* c. 3 (ap. Heitz, *Verlor. Schrift. Arist.* p. 171), has pointed out, a change in the Aristotelian psychology, from the Platonic tripartite division of the human nature, intellectual and moral, which he originally held—ὡς δὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν, i.e. in the lost dialogue περὶ δικαιοσύνης, according to Heitz: the θυμοειδὲς and ἐπιθυμητικόν are actually distinguished, *Topic* B 7, 1113 a 36—b 3, and Δ 5, 126 a 8—13, where we have the three, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδὲς, τὸ λογιστικόν (in both passages τὸ θυμοειδὲς is assigned as the seat of ὀργή); and the division is certainly implied in *Polit.* IV (VII) 7, 1327 b 36, seq., where the author is criticising the Republic to the views expressed in the *de Anima*, in which the Platonic division is criticised, condemned, and rejected. Plutarch, l. c., p. 442 B, after the statement above quoted, continues, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσέειπεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμῶν τὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀντιληπῆσθαι.

original moving agent: and this, though not expressly so called, is in fact the will. In *de Anima* III cc. 9, 10, are repeated the statements of II 3, with the addition of further details. Of the three component elements of *δρεξις*, the second, *θυμός*, is omitted: and the five stages of life of the former passage still remaining five, the intellectual is now divided into two, τὸ νοητικόν, and τὸ βουλευτικόν (the speculative and practical reason), and the *κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον* has disappeared. How this division of the *ψυχή*, soul or life, is to be reconciled with that of the *Ethics* II 4, into *πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις*, Aristotle has not told us, and no one I believe has yet discovered. Of the three sets of *δρέξεις* above mentioned *ὀργή* must belong to the *θυμός*.

μετὰ λύπης] all the *πάθη* being attended by pleasure or pain; or sometimes both, as *ὀργή*. Note on c. 1. 8.

*φαινομένης* and *φαινομένην*] are both emphatic; not merely 'apparent' and unreal, but 'manifest, conspicuous, evident'. *φαινομένη τιμωρία*, 'a punishment of which the effect can be perceived', (comp. II 3. 16, and note; II 4. 31, *αἰσθесθαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*) and διὰ *φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν*, 'due to a manifest slight'; a slight which is so manifest that it cannot escape observation; and therefore because it *has* been noticed by everybody, requires the more exemplary punishment in the way of compensation. It is because anger is an impulse towards this punishment or vengeance *that can be seen*, and accompanied with pain until this impulse is quieted by satisfaction, that we are told in I 11. 9, 'that no one is angry with one who appears to be beyond the reach of his vengeance, or with those who are very far superior to him in power'.

With *φαινομένης*, for *φανερὰς*, comp. I 7. 31 (note), 8. 6; 9. 32; II 10. 1; II. 1; III 2. 9, διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι, compared with II 23. 30, where the same phrase occurs with *φανερὰ εἶναι* for *φαίνεσθαι*. Topic. H 3, 153 a 31, *ὅποῖον ἂν μάλιστα φανῇ ὁ ἐναντίος ὀρισμός*. Eth. Nic. III 7, 1113 b 19, *εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται, καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν κ.τ.λ.* Parv. Nat. de Long. Vit. c. 5, sub init. *φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως*. Compare also, alike for the sense and the expression, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 b 28, *ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικία ἡ ὀργή ἐστίν*: and Top. B 2, 109 b 36, the parallel case of envy, *εἰ γὰρ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ λύπη ἐπὶ φαινομένη εὐπραγία τῶν ἐπικεικῶν τινός*. Plato Phaedo 84 C, *ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο*, (as *plainly* appeared in his face and gesture). Eth. Eudem. III 1, 1229 b 12 (quoted in note on II 5. 1), is a good instance.

*ὀλιγωρίαν*] 'slight esteem or regard', 'slight'. The cause of anger is stated so nearly in the same terms in *Rhet. ad Alex.* 34 (35). 11, *ὀργὴν δὲ (ἐμπούησιν), εἴαν ἐπιδεικνύμεν παρὰ τὸ προσήκον ὀλιγορημένους ἢ ἡδικομένους, ἢ τῶν φίλων ἐκείνων, ἢ αὐτοῦς ἢ ὧν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν αὐτοί*, that one might almost suppose that the two explanations are derived from some common source, perhaps a definition of anger current in the earlier treatises on Rhetoric, Thrasymachus' *ἔλεος* (*Rhet.* III 1. 7, Plat. Phaedr. 267 c), and the like.

A valuable commentary on this explanation of the cause of anger, the coincidence between the two being manifestly accidental, is to be found in Prof. Bain's work on *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 166, ch. ix. § 3, on the 'irascible emotion'. "These two facts both pertain," he says, "to the nature of true anger, the discomposure of mind from the circumstance of

2 αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ'

another man's intention in working evil against us, and the cure of this discomposure by the submission or suffering of the agent." I will only add one remark upon this interesting subject; that when Aristotle assigns ὀλιγωρία, the contempt and indifference to our feelings and sense of personal dignity implied in the notion of 'slight', as the main cause of the emotion of anger, he is thinking only of the angry passion as excited against a fellow man. Yet we are angry with a dog that bites, or a cat that scratches us<sup>1</sup>, and here there cannot in all cases be any sense of undeserved contempt or indifference to provoke the angry feeling; though perhaps sometimes it may be increased by such an act of aggression, if the animal happen to be a pet or favourite, in which case we may extend (by analogy) human feelings to the brute, comparing him unconsciously with a *friend* who has injured us, and forgetting the intellectual and moral differences of the two, which aggravate the offence in the *human* subject. Seneca denies the capacity of anger to all but man: de Ira, 1 3. 4, *dicendum est feras ira carere et omnia praeter hominem*.

τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ('him' i. e. αὐτόν, 'himself') ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ] This phrase, which is unusually elliptical—even for Aristotle—must it seems be thus filled up and explained. τῶν εἰς αὐτόν means τῶν ἀδικηθέντων or simply *πραχθέντων εἰς αὐτόν*, 'offences or acts committed against oneself', and ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν is, 'slight or contemptuous indifference of', i. e. shewn in, evidenced by, offences &c.: in supplying the ellipse in the other part of the phrase, ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, we are guided by a similar expression, c. 8 § 7, *συμβεβηκότα ἢ αὐτῷ* (so the MSS here) ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ; in both of them the indef. pronoun is omitted, ἢ *τινα* τῶν αὐτοῦ in c. 2. 1, and *τινί* in the two other places.

τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος<sup>2</sup>, the last term of the definition, adds to

<sup>1</sup> On the manner in which anger vents itself upon all sorts of objects indiscriminately, see Plut. de cohibenda ira, p. 455 D, *θυμῷ δ' ἄδικτον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἀνπιχειροῦν· ἀλλ' ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ πολεμίοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γονεῦσι, καὶ θεῶς νῆ Δία, καὶ θηρίοις, καὶ ἀψύχοις σκεύεσι*, which is further illustrated by some examples.

<sup>2</sup> This appears likewise in the Stoic definition quoted above. I believe it has not hitherto been noticed that the four terms usually employed in Greek to express the notion of duty or obligation may be distinguished as implying four different sources of obligation, and represent appeals to four different principles by which our actions are guided. The four are *προσῆκει*, *δεῖ*, *χρή*, *πρέπει*. The first, *τὸ προσήκον*, expresses a natural connexion or relationship, and hence a law of *nature*, the prescriptions of *φύσις*; as *οἱ προσήκοντες* are our *natural relations*. This, therefore, is the form of obligation that nature imposes upon us, or natural propriety. The second, *δεῖ*, is of course connected with *δεῖν*, 'to bind', and *δεσμός*, and denotes the 'binding nature of an obligation', which is equally suggested by the Lat. *obligatio*. *τὸ δεῖν* is therefore the *moral bond*, the *binding* engagement, by which we are *bound* to do what is right. The third, *χρή*, *τὸ χρεῖν*, appeals to the principle of utility or expediency, *χρησθαι*, *χρεῖα*, by which human conduct is directed as a principle of action, and accordingly expresses the obligation of a man's duty to himself, and the necessary regard for his own interest which the law of self-preservation requires. Besides these, we have *πρέπει*, *τὸ πρέπον*; *decorum*, *quod decet*, Cic. de Off. 1. 27, *quod aptum est in omni vita*; the befitting,

ἔστιν ἡ ὀργή, ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι αἰεὶ

the offence at the slight which provokes anger the consciousness or feeling that the slight is something which is not our *due*: by a slight the sense of personal dignity is offended: we know that we do not deserve it, and are the more enraged. This is a necessary qualification—a συμβεβηκὸς καθ' αὐτό, and therefore added to the *definition*—because there may be cases in which an insult or injury arouses no angry feeling, when the person insulted is very far inferior in rank and condition to the offender or of a very abject and submissive temper, or if the power of the aggressor is so great and imposing, that the injured person is terrified and daunted instead of angry, II 3. 10. So at least Aristotle: but I am more inclined to agree with Seneca on this point, who to a supposed objection to his definition, *cupiditas ulciscendi*, replies thus, de Ira, I 3. 2, *Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenae exigendae, non facultatem: concupiscunt autem homines et quae non possunt. Deinde nemo tam humilis est, qui poenam vel summi hominis sperare non possit: ad nocendum potentes sumus*. And anger is apt to be blind and unreasonable. This is an answer to I 11. 9, already referred to.

The definition therefore of anger in full, is as follows: 'an impulsive desire, accompanied by pain (and also pleasure, as is afterwards added), of vengeance (punishment of, and compensation for, an offence) visible or evident (in its result), due to a manifest (and unmistakable) slight (consisting, or shewn) in (insults, indignities, wrongs) directed against ourselves, or (any) of our friends, when (we feel that) the slight is undeserved'; or literally, 'is not naturally and properly belonging to us', not our *due*, in consideration of our rank and importance or of our personal merits and qualifications.

Bacon's Essay, *Of Anger*, has one point at least in common with Aristotle's delineation of it. "The causes and motives of anger are chiefly three. First to be too sensible of *hurt*; for no man is angry that feels not himself hurt... The next is, the apprehension and construction of the injury offered to be, in the circumstances thereof, full of *contempt*: for contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself." "For raising and appeasing anger in another; it is done chiefly by choosing of times, when men are forwardest and worst disposed, to incense them. Again, by gathering all that you can find out to aggravate the contempt."

§ 2. Anger is directed against the individual, not the *genus* or *species* (comp. c. 3. 16): that is, it is excited by a definite, concrete, single individual, and by a distinct provocation, not by a mere mental abstraction, or a whole class of objects. This is one of the characteristics which distinguish it from *μῖσος* or *ἔχθρα*; *infra* c. 4, καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ αἰεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ'

the becoming; which represents the general notion of *fitness* or *propriety*: that principle of *ἁρμονία* or *κοσμιότης* (and the *κόσμος*), of harmony and adaptation, which Dr Clarke selected as the basis of all morality, and styled 'the fitness of things'. Our English words *ought* and *duty*, expressive of moral obligation in general, are both of them borrowed from the notion of 'a debt,' which is 'owed' in the one case, and 'due' from us in the other, to our neighbour; comp. *ὀφείλειν*, *ὀφελον*. "Owe no man any thing, but to love one another."

τῶν καθ' ἑκάστον τι, οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά τι πεποίηκεν ἢ ἡμελ- P. 1378 b.  
p. 56.  
λεν, καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἐπεσθαί τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρῆσασθαι· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἶεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνατῶν ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δ' ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὐτῷ. διὸ καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο  
ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσιν ἀέξεται·

ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλία ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτῃ μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας. [For Κλέωνι, see III 5. 2.] Add to these; national antipathies, family feuds, class prejudices, religious and political enmities, the *odium theologicum*, &c. On the ordinary objects of anger, Prof. Bain says, *Emotions and Will*, p. 163, "The objects of irascible feeling are chiefly persons; but inanimate things may occasionally cause an imperfect form of it to arise." Aristotle omits this. Mr Bain, more correctly than Aristotle, includes under the same head, 'the irascible emotion', hatred, revenge, antipathy and resentment, or righteous indignation (*νέμεσις*) with anger, as mere varieties of the same *πάθος* or emotion.

Again, it is provoked by any injury (or insult) committed or intended, ἢ πεποίηκε τις ἢ ἡμελλεν, either against ourselves, or any of our relations, friends, dependants, anyone in whose welfare we are interested.

'Thirdly, (as we gather from the terms of the definition, *ὄρεξις τιμωρίας*,) every angry emotion is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, that, namely (τὴν Bekk. τῆς A'), which arises from the hope of vengeance upon, or of punishing (both are included in *τιμωρία*), (the person who has offended us)'. First of all revenge is in itself pleasant: καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν λυπηρὸν τὸ τυγχάνειν ἡδύ· οἱ δ' ὀργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες δὲ χαίρουσιν. Comp. Eth. Nic. IV 11, 1126 a 2, ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γενομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν. 'For it is pleasant to think that we shall attain to the object of our desire', (the pleasure of hope or anticipation, I 11. 6, 7,) 'and no one ever aims at what is evidently impossible for himself (to attain), and the angry man's desire always aims at what he (believes to be) possible for himself'. He always supposes that he *shall* obtain the object of his desire, the punishment of the offender, and *therefore* even in his anger he feels pleasure in the prospective satisfaction. The first of the two following lines of Homer, Il. 2 109, has been already quoted in illustration of the same topic, the pleasure of anger in the prospect of revenge, I 11. 9. In the passage quoted above from Seneca, de Ira, I 3. 2, what is here said, οὐδεὶς τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, may seem at first sight to be contradicted. The two statements are however different: Seneca says that a man may *wish* for what is quite beyond his reach; Aristotle says that he never *aims* at it, never uses any exertion to attain to that which he knows to be

ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἡδονή τις διὰ τε τοῦτο καὶ διότι  
διατρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ· ἡ οὖν  
τότε γινομένη φαντασία ἡδονὴν ἐμποιεῖ, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν  
3 ἐνυπνίων. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια δόξης

unattainable: which is equally true. No one ever deliberates about things which are not under his own control. (For a list of such things see Eth. Nic. III 5, sub init.)

But this anticipation of the *future* is not the only source of the pleasure which we feel in an angry mood: 'it is accompanied by yet another pleasure, the *present* pleasure of dwelling in the mind on the prospective vengeance: it is the fancy that then arises (presents itself) that produces the pleasure in us, just like that of dreams'. On the pleasures of the *φαντασία*, and the *φαντασία* itself, see again I 11. 6, 7, and the notes there.

Schrader refers to an excellent illustration of this pleasure of dwelling on the prospect of vengeance, in Terent. Adelph. III 2. 12, seq. beginning, *me miserum, vix sum compos animi, ita ardeo iracundia*<sup>1</sup>.

§ 3. ἐπεὶ δ' has either no apodosis at all—which is highly probable in itself, and seems to be Bekker's view, who retains the full stop at ὑπολαμβάνομεν: or else we may suppose with Vater that the apodosis is *τρία δ' ἐστίν...*; in which case δὲ may be added to the examples of the apodotic δὲ in note on I 1. 11, or omitted with MSS Q, Y<sup>b</sup>, Z<sup>b</sup>. According to Vater's view the connexion will be, that whereas *ὀλιγωρία* is an expression of contempt for somebody or something supposed to be worthless, whether it be so or not in reality, there are accordingly three kinds of *ὀλιγωρία* each expressing contempt, but in three different forms, or modes of manifestation. To the three kinds of *ὀλιγωρία* here distinguished ἀναι-

<sup>1</sup> See also 'on the pleasure of irascible emotion,' Bain, *Emotions and Will*, c. ix. § 4. Mr Bain acknowledges, though he regards it as anomalous, the painful fact that pleasure at the sight of suffering inflicted, especially under circumstances of violent excitement when the passions are already inflamed, as at the sack of a captured town, is in reality a phenomenon of human nature. Other examples of this are the notoriously cruel habits of children in their treatment of animals, and in their ordinary sports; the pleasure found in gladiatorial combats, bull fights, bear baiting, cock and quail fights, and all the other cruel exhibitions which have *amused* the most civilized as well as barbarous spectators. He traces this to three sources, of which the principal is the love of power. I will venture to add three more possible elements of the emotion, which may contribute, without superseding the others, to the production of it. First, the sense of contrast between the suffering which we are witnessing in another and our own present immunity: this is the principle implied in Lucretius' *Suave mari magno*, and is illustrated in I 11. 8, of this work. Secondly, it may be partly traced to curiosity—the pleasure of learning, as Aristotle calls it—and the stimulus of surprise or wonder which we feel at any exciting spectacle; another source of pleasure mentioned by Aristotle in the same chapter. And thirdly, *perhaps*, a distorted and perverted sympathy (this is an ordinary source of pleasure), which gives us an *independent interest* in the sufferings of any creature whose feelings, and consequent liability to suffering, we share—that is, of all *animated* beings; with inanimate objects there can be no sympathy.

περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰγαθὰ ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα πρὸς αὐτά· ὅσα δὲ μηδέν τι ἢ μικρόν, οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὑπολαμβάνομεν. τρία δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη ὀλιγωρίας, 4 καταφρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμὸς καὶ ὕβρις· ὃ τε γὰρ καταφρονῶν ὀλιγωρεῖ (ὅσα γὰρ οἶονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ καταφρονου-

σχυντία is added in c. 6 § 2. In Dem. de F. L. § 228 it follows ἀναιδεία as its ordinary companion (compare Shilleto's note).

ἐνέργεια δόξης] represents the opinion, hitherto dormant or latent, as roused into active exercise as a realised capacity, a δύναμις become an ἐνέργεια. The mere opinion of the worthlessness of so and so, has now become developed into ὀλιγωρία, and assumed the form of an active or *actual* expression of the contempt by the outward token of 'slight regard'.

ὀλιγωρία therefore shews 'indifference', as to something that we do not care for at all, or regard as something so contemptible, so devoid of all positive character, that it is not worth forming an opinion about: what is positively good or bad is always worthy of 'earnest attention', or 'serious anxiety.' On σπουδῇ 'earnest', as opposed to παιδιά 'sport' (Plat. Phaedr. 276 D, compared with E, Rep. X 602 B, alibi), and on σπουδαῖος 'serious', 'earnest', 'of solid worth or value', opposed to φαῦλος 'light', 'trifling', 'frivolous', 'unsubstantial', 'worthless', and hence *morally* 'good' and 'bad', see note on I 5. 8.

καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα] 'as well as everything that has that tendency'; viz. to good and bad. 'There are three kinds of slight, or contemptuous indifference, contempt, spite and wanton outrage'. First, 'contempt involves ὀλιγωρία; because people *despise* men and things that they regard as *worthless*, and ὀλιγωρία, slight esteem, contemptuous indifference, is directed to the same objects', whence it appears that they have a common element, and that καταφρόνησις is ὀλιγωρία τις, a *kind* of slight.

§ 4. A second kind of ὀλιγωρία is ἐπηρεασμός, spiteful opposition to, *wanton* interference with, the plans and wishes (ταῖς βουλήσεσι) of others, in order to thwart them, where you gain no advantage to yourself by doing so; where the motive is the mere malicious pleasure of disconcerting some one, and thereby shewing your power over them: which is the root of the wanton love of mischief inherent in human nature: comp. § 6. 'This is an inclination to *thwart* or interfere with the wishes of another, not for any advantage that you expect to derive from it yourself, but merely for the mischievous satisfaction of depriving him of it. The slight regard therefore is shewn in the wantonness of the offence; for it is plain that there is no intention (*lit.* supposition) of injury in a slight—that would imply fear, not merely indifference—nor of doing him any service, none at least worth speaking of' (ὀλιγωρία excludes the notion of good as well as bad, it is mere indifference; § 3, καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰγαθὰ ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς εἶναι κ.τ.λ.); 'for *this* (doing him service) would imply care for him, solicitude for his welfare, and *that* again

μένων ὀλιγώρουσιν) καὶ ὁ ἐπηρεάζων [φαίνεται καταφρονεῖν]. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμός ἐμποδισμός ταῖς

friendship,' *lit.* 'for (in that case) he would have shewn that he cared for him, and therefore (so that ὥστε, it would follow) that he was his friend'. The argument of ἐπεὶ οὖν—φίλος εἶναι is this. The wantonness of the mischief which is the effect of ἐπηρεασμός, (spiteful interference with your neighbour's inclinations,) shews that ὀλιγωρία enters into it in this, that it must proceed from a contemptuous indifference as to the person and character of the victim; for the very wantonness of the act, that it is done for mere amusement, and without any prospect of advantage, shews the slight regard that the perpetrator has for the sufferer; that he neither fears him as he must have done if he wished to hurt or injure him by thwarting his schemes, nor esteems and respects him as a friend, as would necessarily be the case if he intended to interfere with and oppose his plans and inclinations for the other's benefit: and therefore the indifference that he does manifest must be indicative of contempt.

ἐπηρεασμός] appears to be almost a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον; only two examples are given in Steph. Lex., one from Diodorus and the other from Pollux—no great authorities. [It is also found *infra* c. 4 § 30.] The usual form of it in the ordinary language is ἐπήρεια, which occurs in much the same sense; as also ἐπηρέαζεν frequently in Demosthenes, and less frequently elsewhere, as in Xenophon and the Comic Poets. Thucyd. I 26 is a good instance as a commentary upon Aristotle's text, and illustrative of his interpretation: of the Corcyreans, during their war with the Corinthians, it is said that after the surrender of their colony Epidamnus to the Corinthians, they took this to heart, and despatched a force of 25 ships, to demand amongst other things the restitution of the Epidamnian exiles; and this they did κατ' ἐπήρειαν, 'they bade them out of mere spite and wantonness' without any prospect of benefit to themselves, merely for the purpose of annoying the others. Comp. ἐπηρέαζεν, Dem. c. Mid. p. 519, of Midias' vexatious annoyance, ἐπήρεια ib. p. 522 ult. where it is distinguished from ὕβρις, the wanton outrage on the sacred *person* of the choragus. See also de Cor. p. 229, lines 8, 14 in both of which it is applied to spiteful, wantonly offensive *language*; whereas in Aristotle it is ἐμποδισμός ταῖς βουλήσεσιν, and in Plut. Reip. Ger. Praec. p. 816 C, it is applied to *acts* of this character, ἡ πράξις ἐχούσαις φιλοτιμίαν ἐπηρέαζον; as in Ar. Pol. III 16, 1287 a 38, πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασιν πράττειν; which also marks the 'wantonness' characteristic of it by the addition of πρὸς χάριν. In Plut. Coriol. 334 D, οὐκ ἐπὶ κέρδεσιν ἀλλὰ δι' ὕβριν καὶ περιφρόνησιν τοῖς πένησιν ἐπηρέαζον, which marks the wanton character of the acts of oppression. These passages from Plutarch with some others from the same author are to be found in Wytttenbach's note on Plutarch, p. 135 D. He renders *It vexantes, infestantes, per invidiam et contumeliam*. The only other instance that I will refer to, occurs in Herod. VI 9, where the word seems at first sight to bear a different meaning, 'threatening': τάδε σφι λέγετε ἐπηρέαζοντες τὰ περ σφίας κατέξει, (and so Schweighäuser's Lexicon 'minitari'). But by comparing the word as here used with its use and explanation in other authors, we see that the sense of *the threat* is only



βουλήσεσιν οὐχ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐκείνῳ. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἵνα αὐτῷ τι, ὀλιγωρεῖ· δηλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε βλάψειν ὑπολαμβάνει, ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ οὐκ ὀλιγώνει, οὔτ' ὠφελῆσαι ἂν οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου, ἐφρόντιζε γὰρ ἂν ὥστε φίλος εἶναι. καὶ ὁ ὑβρίζων δ' ὀλιγωρεῖ· ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνῃ ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡσθῇ· οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποι-

implied, and that the prominent and characteristic signification is, as elsewhere, 'insult or spite them by telling them the fate that will overtake them'.

ὥστε φίλος εἶναι] is an instance of a not unfrequent attraction of a substantive or adjective, ordinarily in the accusative, within a grammatical bracket, as it were, to the subject of the verb without it—here ἐφρόντιζε—and hence expressed in the nominative. Plat. Euthyd. 273 A, ὑβριστῆς διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι. [Arist. de part. Anim. IV 8. 2, χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸ λαβοῦσαι προσφέρεσθαι τὴν τροφήν. Plat. Phaedo 83 D, ὥστε...καὶ ὥστερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

§ 5. ὕβρις] which corresponds with the preceding in some points, while it differs in others, is 'an injury or annoyance inflicted, involving disgrace to the sufferer; for no *benefit* that is expected to accrue to the aggressor except the mere fact of its having been done, in other words the *pleasure* of doing it: for *retaliation* is not wanton outrage but vengeance or punishment'. This is the *locus classicus* for the explanation of ὕβρις, so important in the Orators and the Athenian law. See note on I 12. 26, where it is examined from this point of view. The outraged personal dignity, the wounded honour, which gives its special sting to an act of ὕβρις, and distinguishes it from a mere assault, αἰκία, is noted in the text by the phrase ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνῃ ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, and the rest of the definition describes the 'wantonness' of the aggression, which ὕβρις has in common with ἐπηρεασμός, and in which the *δλιγωρία* is shewn. Compare I 13. 10, where the two same characteristics of ὕβρις reappear; οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκείνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. ὕβρις therefore is wanton outrage, an insult or injury which disgraces and humiliates its victim, and is prompted by no motive but the mere momentary gratification of humiliating another and therein indulging the love and the sense of power. Some illustrations of acts of ὕβρις are to be found in Polit. VIII (V), 10, 1311 a 33. Personal outrage, ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα, is one of the causes of conspiracy and revolution. τῆς δ' ὕβρεως οὕσης πολυμεροῦς, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον γίνεται τῆς ὀργῆς· τῶν δ' ὀργισομένων σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς, οἷον κ.τ.λ. and then follows a number of examples. It is plain however from a comparison of this with what immediately follows in the Rhet. § 6, where ὕβρις is traced to the love of ὑπεροχή, that the ὕβρις here spoken of is confined to insults or outrages of a particular kind, offered to the *person*, εἰς τὸ σῶμα.

6 οὖντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. αἵτιον δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῖς ὑβρίζουσιν, ὅτι οἴονται κακῶς δρῶντες αὐτοὺς ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον. διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι

§ 6. 'The cause or source of the pleasure which men feel in wanton outrages is that they think that by the illtreatment of (by doing mischief to) others they are shewing in an unusual degree their superiority over them'. μᾶλλον 'more than they otherwise would'. Superiority, or excess in merit and good qualities, is a mark of virtue, I 9. 39, ἡ δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν. ... ἡ ὑπεροχὴ δοκεῖ μὴνύειν ἀρετὴν; and a source of pleasure, I 11. 14, τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ... φαντασία γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς γίγνεται, οὐ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἥρεμα ἢ μᾶλλον, and the corollaries of this, § 15. τὸ ἄρχειν ἡδιστον, ib. § 27. On the 'emotion of power' and its ramifications, the various modes in which it exhibits itself, see Mr Bain's excellent chapter (VIII), *Emotions and Will*, p. 145 seq. and the quotation from Dugald Stewart in the note at the commencement [chap. x. p. 192, ed. 1875].

διὸ οἱ νέοι ὑβρίζουσι] Comp. II 12. 15, καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν καὶ οὐ κακουργίαν. This character and tendency of youth is also expressed in one of the two opposite senses of the derivatives νεανίας, νεανιεύεσθαι, νεανικός. The two last convey, in different contexts, the two sides of the youthful character, and the good and bad qualities by which it is specially distinguished. On the one hand, they represent the gallant, spirited, vigorous, impetuous, nature of youth (εὖ καὶ γενναίως, αἶε νέος ὢν, Plat. Soph. 239 B), on the other the petulosity, wantonness, insolence, which sometimes characterises it—*protervus, ferox, superbus*, Ast, *Lex. Plat.* s. v. νεανικός. Both senses are abundantly illustrated in Plato. I will only quote Soph. 239 D, τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ (this audacious, impertinent, youngster) πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινεῖται. See Heindorf ad loc. who refers to Eur. Suppl. 580, Arist. Vesp. 1333, and interprets the word 'de homine feroci insolentique'; and νεανιεύεσθαι, as exemplified in Lysias' speech (Phaedr. 235 A), which 'ran riot', 'passed all bounds of moderation' in the endeavour to shew, &c.; and (according to Callicles, Gorg. 482 C) in that of Socrates, who had been talking like a mob-orator, 'running riot, luxuriating in language full of exaggeration, extravagance.' So that 'to play the youth, act like a young man', sometimes means rash and arrogant, wanton, insolent, overbearing, extravagant, licentious conduct. The examples of both these words in Demosthenes display a leaning towards the more favourable view of the youthful character. —Plat. Euthyd. 273 A, ὑβριστὴς δὲ διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι (Gaisford).

οἱ πλούσιοι] II 16. 1, τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἃ ἔπεται ἢ ἡ ἐπιπολὴς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ἅπασιν ὑβρίζουσι γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, and the reason of this. And again § 4, like the νέοι, ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ κακουργικά ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικά τὰ δὲ ἀκρατευτικά. In applying the doctrine of the 'mean' to the various orders of population, with the view of determining the best form of government, Aristotle makes the following remark, Polit. VI (IV) 11, 1295 b 6, all excess and defect is injurious; ὑπέρκalon δὲ ἢ ὑπερίσχυρον ἢ ὑπερευγενὴ ἢ ὑπερπλούσιον, ἢ τάναντία τούτοις, ὑπέρπτωχον ἢ ὑπερασθενὴ καὶ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, χαλεπὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθεῖν. γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρίζουσι καὶ μεγαλοπύνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπύνηροι λίαν τῶν δ' ἀδικημάτων.

ὑβρισταί· ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἶονται ὑβρίζοντες. ὕβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὃ δ' ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ· τὸ γὰρ μηδεὶν ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμὴν, οὐτ' ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ. διὸ λέγει ὀργιζόμενος ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς

ἠτίμησεν· ἐλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπούρας  
καὶ

ὥς εἴ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην,  
7 ὥς διὰ ταῦτα ὀργιζόμενος. προσήκειν δ' οἶονται πο-

των τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δι' ὕβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν: where we have again the same distinction of crimes as in the two passages of the Rhetoric already quoted, II 12. 15, and 16. 4; and a third time 13. 14, where the opposite —εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν—is said of old men. Crimes are hereby divided into two classes, crimes on a great and on a petty scale; high-minded crimes of violence and audacity, outrages which imply a sense of power and superiority in those who commit them; and sneaking, underhand crimes, of fraud and low villany, which are the crimes which the poor and mean are especially inclined to.

ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἶονται ὑβρίζοντες] This, as we have already seen, is a general tendency of human nature: but besides this general inclination, there is in the case of the young a special desire and a special inclination to assert their superiority to others, which is shewn in the love of *victory*, or getting the better of an opponent in the mimic combats and contests of their *games*; and also in their love of honour or spirit of ambition; ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχὴ τις, II 12. 6.

'Again, ὕβρις is a mark of disrespect, inflicts disgrace or indignity, and this again is a mark of slight esteem; and this feeling of disrespect, and the disgrace and dishonour to the sufferer that accompany it, shew that the object of them is considered of no worth or value, because he has no *honour* (but the contrary), which is as much as to say that he is of no *value* (τιμὴ having the double sense), worth nothing either for good or for evil', and *therefore* is the object of the contemptuous *indifference* which is the sting of ὀλιγωρία.

This disgrace and indignity is then illustrated by two lines of Homer Il. A 356, repeated in I (IX) 367, and I (IX) 648 (644), in which the angry Achilles expresses his indignation at the *slight* put upon him by Agamemnon, 'who had taken and kept for himself (αὐτὸς ἔχει) the present (gift of honour, one of the μέρη τιμῆς; see note on γέρα, I 5. 9, p. 85) of which he had deprived him'; and had treated him 'like some despised alien or vagabond'. μετανάστης, comp. Il. II (xvi) 59, where the line is repeated, properly a 'settler in a foreign land', like the μέτοικοι at Athens, a despised class without civil rights, and therefore ἀτίμητοι; Ar. Pol. III 5, 1278 a 36, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὀμηρος ἐποίησεν "ὥσει τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην". ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. And Herod. VII 161, where the Athenians boast that they are μόνον οὐ μετανάσται Ἑλλήνων.

§ 7. 'Now men think they have a natural claim' (προσῆκειν, note on II 1 p. 11, μὴ προσήκοντος) 'to especial respect and consideration (πολυωρεῖσθαι)

λυωρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡττόνων κατὰ γένος, κατὰ δύναμιν, κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἂν ταύτῃ ὑπερέχη P. 1379. πολὺ, οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ πλούσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ῥητορικὸς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν καὶ ἄρχων ἀρχομένου καὶ ἄρχειν ἄξιος οἰόμενος τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι ἀξίου. διὸ εἴρηται

θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλῶν  
καὶ

ἀλλὰ γε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον·

8 ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν. ἔτι ὑφ' ὧν τις οἶεται εὖ πάσχειν δεῖν· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οὓς εὖ πεποίηκεν

(and therefore are all the more angry, the slight is felt more deeply, when they fail to receive it) from their inferiors in birth, power, virtue (i.e. merit), and generally in anything in which they far surpass (him who slights them) when it is of the same kind (falls under the same γένος or class) (as that in which they themselves excel); as in money the rich man (claims respect) from the poor, the accomplished orator from one that has no faculty for speaking, the governor from the governed, or one who thinks he has the right to bear rule from one who only deserves to obey'.

πολυωρεῖν, a rare word, found once in Aeschin. c. Timarch. § 50, in a copy of evidence, 'to pay attention to', but chiefly in later writers, (πολυωρία a Stoic term). It is opposed to, and formed upon the analogy of ὀλιγωρεῖν, and therefore appropriate here.

ῥητορικὸς] 'vocantur ῥητορικοὶ disertī et eloquentes homines. Isocr. Nicocl. § 8, καὶ ῥητορικοὺς μὲν καλοῦμεν τοὺς ἐν τῷ πλήθει δυνάμενους λέγειν.' Victorius.

This is illustrated by two more lines of Homer, Il. B 196, 'great is the wrath of divine-bred kings' ('in Homeri Il. B 196, singulare Διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος legitur. Sed cum haec sententia in proverbium abiisset, universe pronuntiandum erat plurali numero.' Vater); and, Il. A 82, 'Yet it may be that even hereafter he keeps a grudge'—here the endurance of the wrath indicates its original violence and the magnitude of the slight that provoked it (ἀλλὰ γε καὶ, the vulg., is retained by Bekker. MSS A<sup>c</sup>, Y<sup>b</sup>, Z<sup>b</sup> have τε, as also Mr Paley's text).—ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For the lasting vexation (this is in explanation of the μετόπισθεν κότον of the last quotation) is owing to their superiority'.

§ 8. 'Another aggravation of anger and the sense of slight arises, when the insult or injury proceeds from those from whom, as he conceives, kind and courteous treatment is due; such are those who are indebted to him for benefits past or present, bestowed either by himself or on his account (such as are due to him) or by one of his friends, or those to whom he wishes well (wishes to benefit) or ever did (wish well)'. For the antecedent to ὑφ' ὧν, and the supplement of the context, we may,

ἢ ποιεῖ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ δι' αὐτόν τις ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τις, ἢ βούλεται ἢ ἐβουλήθη.

- 9 φανερόν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἥδη πῶς τ' ἔχοντες ὀργίζονται αὐτοὶ καὶ τίσι καὶ διὰ ποῖα. αὐτοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὅταν λυπῶνται· ἐφίεται γάρ τινος ὁ λυπούμενος· ἐάν τε οὖν κατ' εὐθυωρίαν ὁτιοῦν ἀντικρούσῃ τις, οἷον τῷ

understand (as I have done) ὀργίζονται μᾶλλον from what has preceded, or possibly ἀναγκαστοῖσιν from the immediately preceding clause: otherwise repeat οἷον πολυωρεῖσθαι from the beginning of § 7.

§ 9. 'From what has been said it is by this time clear (we may now infer from the preceding statements) what the angry disposition or state of mind is, what sort of persons it is directed against or provoked by, and (what sort of things it is due to) what sort of offences or acts provoke it'.

'As to the first, we are angry when we are vexed or annoyed; because one who is vexed is always aiming at, eagerly bent on, something; if then he be *directly* crossed or thwarted (ἐὰν ἀντικρούσῃ τις) in anything whatsoever,—a thirsty man, for example, in his effort to drink,—or not (i.e. if he be crossed, not directly, but *indirectly*), the act in either case appears to be just the same (the act *in its effect* or *in the intention* is the same; the act itself is not the same); or again if any one offers any opposition, or refuses to help, or troubles, bothers, throws obstacles in the way of, a man in this state of mind (i.e. in a state of eager desire, and 'aiming at something', ἐφίμενόν τινος), with all these he is angry'.

κατ' εὐθυωρίαν] is 'in a straight line', -ωρεῖν, -ωρος (this must be a mere termination in this word, as in *θεωρός*, *τιμωρός*, *σινάμωρος*, and the Latin -urus and -osus, *plagosus*, *generosus*, *animosus*, *bellicosus*; ὦρα, as in *Πυλωρός*, can form no part of the derivation). The phrase, which is equivalent to ἐξ εὐθείας or κατ' εὐθείαν (γραμμὴν), occurs elsewhere, in Plat. Rep. IV 436 E, τὴν εὐθυωρίαν (in a straight line, or straight) is opposed to ἀποκλίνειν, and κατὰ τὸ περιφερὲς κύκλῳ. Ar. Metaph. A 2, init. 'in a straight line', (see Bonitz ad loc.), de part. Anim. II 8.7, τὴν δὲ σχίσιν ἔχει τῆς σαρκὸς οὐ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν ἀλλὰ κατὰ κύκλους διαιρετὴν (Vict.). Ib. c. 10. 16, ἀκούει γὰρ οὐ μόνον κατ' εὐθυωρίαν ἀλλὰ παντόθεν, ἢ δ' ὅψις εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, ὁρᾷ γὰρ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν (directly forwards, in a straight line) (Gaisford), Probl. XI 58, εὐθυωρεῖν, Eth. Eudem. VII 10, 1243 b 15, τοῖς μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν (φίλοις), of *indirect* friendships, where the two friends are not of the same kind, but associated from different motives; Fritzsche, note ad loc. (who refers also to Tim. Loc. p. 94 B, τῷ μὴ πῶ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν νοεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, and to this passage of the Rhetoric). Add Arist. de part. Anim. IV 9.6, ἡ εὐθυωρία τῶν ἐντοσθιδίων, and de Anima a 3, 406 b 31, τὴν εὐθυωρίαν εἰς κύκλον κατέκαμψεν. περὶ Ἑνπνίων c. 2. 5, κατ' εὐθυωρίαν ἢ συμβαίνει τὴν ὄψιν ὁρᾶν.

ἀντικρούειν, 'to strike or knock against', 'to come into collision with', hence metaphorically, to interfere with, interpose an obstacle, to hinder or thwart a man's designs or efforts. The word is not common: it occurs in Dem. de Cor. § 198, and ἀντίκρουσις (a check, sudden stoppage), Rhet. III

διψῶντι πρὸς τὸ πιεῖν, ἐάν τε μή, ὁμοίως ταὐτὸ φαίνεται ποιεῖν· καὶ ἐάν τε ἀντιπράττη τις ἐάν τε μὴ συμπράττη ἐάν τε ἄλλο τι ἐνοχλῇ οὕτως ἔχοντα, **10** τοῖς πᾶσιν ὀργίζεται. διὸ κάμνοντες, πενόμενοι, <πολεμοῦντες>, ἐρώντες, διψῶντες, ὅλως ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ μὴ κατορθοῦντες ὀργίλοι εἰσὶ καὶ εὐπαρόρμητοι, μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς τοὺς τοῦ παρόντος ὀλιγωροῦντας, οἷον κάμνων μὲν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν νόσον, πενόμενος δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πενίαν, πολεμῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἐρῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· προωδοποιῆται γὰρ ἕκαστος πρὸς τὴν

9. 6. In the neuter sense in which it is here employed it follows the analogy of *συγκρούειν*, *προσκρούειν*, and hundreds of other transitive verbs which by the suppression of the reflexive pronoun pass from active to neuter—a process common, I should suppose, to most languages, and certainly found in our own.

*ἐνοχλεῖν*, 'to mob' (*ἔχλος*), only once in Plato: but frequent in Demosth., Xenoph., Aristoph.; applied to troublesome and vexatious annoyances and to vexatious conduct in general; 'to trouble, annoy, bother'.

§ 10. 'And therefore in sickness, in poverty (and distress), in love, thirst, or any appetite and desire in general, which is unsatisfied' (in the satisfaction of which they are unsuccessful *μὴ κατορθοῦντες ἐν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ*), 'men are irascible and easily excited to passion (provoked) especially against those who shew a contemptuous indifference to their *present* condition (who wantonly obstruct them in the efforts they are making to obtain the immediate object of their wishes, or in the gratification of this particular appetite or desire of which they are under the influence at the moment) as a sick man against those who slight and thwart him in his efforts to cure his disease', *οἷον κάμνων ὀργίλος ἔστι τοῖς* (*ὀλιγωροῦσιν αὐτοῦ*) *πρὸς τὴν νόσον*—(*πρὸς*, 'in respect of', 'those who *direct* their obstruction and annoyance to' his disease, i.e. to interference with the progress of his cure: and the same explanation may be applied to the remaining cases):—'a poor man when his poverty (and efforts to relieve it) is at stake, and a man in a battle against those who interfere with his fighting (or if a *general*, with his manœuvres and warlike operations), or if in love, with the affairs of his love, and so on for all the rest: for in each case the way is ready prepared beforehand for the anger of the individual by the existing affection (passion, or state of feeling)'.

*ὀργίλος*, 'irascible'. *ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης...τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης*, Eth. N. II 7, 1108 a 40, IV 11, 1125 b 29, and 1126 a 13, *οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὁ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν κ.τ.λ.*

*προωδοποιῆται*] See note on *ὁδοποιεῖν*, I 1. 2. *προκόπτειν*, Eur. Hippol.

11 ἐκάστου ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος πάθους. ἔτι δ' εἰν τάναντία τύχη προσδεχόμενος· λυπεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τέρπει τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, εἰν γένηται ὃ βούλεται. διὸ καὶ ὥραι καὶ χρόνοι καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ ἡλικίαι ἐκ τούτων φανεραί, ποῖαι εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε, p. 58.

23 (and elsewhere), 'to advance' by clearing away (κόπτειν), before an advancing army, wood and other obstacles to its progress, presents the same metaphor in a somewhat different form.

§ 11. Disappointed expectation is also provocative of anger: 'if a man happen to have expected the contrary (to that which does actually occur); for the pain of disappointment is increased in proportion to its unexpectedness, just as the joy in the opposite case is increased by an unexpected success. And so, by applying these principles to the different seasons, times, dispositions, and ages (in which anger chiefly manifests itself), it will be easy to see what sorts of them (the two last named) are easily moved to anger, and in what places and at what times, and also that the more they are under these circumstances (in these conditions) the more easily they are moved'. That is, the nearer they are to the critical moment in the times and seasons and to the central point or acme in the age of life, and the more they are under the influence of the particular dispositions which prompt the angry feeling—the higher the *degree* in each case—the greater will be the proneness to anger.

Schrader supplies a very apt illustration of the ὥραι from Theocr. Id. I 15: 'ut cibi et somni horae; caprarius ap. Theocr. Οὐ θέμις, δ ποιμάν, τὸ μεσαμβρινόν, οὐ θέμις ἄμμιν Συρίσθεν' τὸν Πᾶνα δεδοίκαμες· ἡ γὰρ ἀπ' ἄγρας Τανίκα κεκμακῶς ἀμπαύεται· ἔντι δὲ πικρός, καὶ οἱ αἰεὶ δριμεία χολὴ ποτὶ ῥινὶ κάθηται.' Of the three ἡλικίαι, II 12. 2, Seneca, on the contrary, de Ira I 13, ult., *iracundissimi infantes senesque et aegri sunt, et invalidum omne naturae querulum est* (Schrader). νεότης is the one which is most liable to anger, Ib. § 5, com. 9. As regards times and seasons, one man might be more inclined to be angry in hot, and another in cold, weather—though perhaps this should rather be referred to the διαθέσεις or bodily temperaments; constitution, or habit of body or mind, comes under the denomination of διαθέσεις—the διάθεσις or 'passing temporary disposition' being apparently not here distinguished (as it ought to be, Categ. 8, p. 8 b 27, comp. II a 22) from the confirmed, settled, permanent, ἔξις or 'state'. On the διαθέσεις Schrader notes, 'Affectiones animi corporisve: ut morbus, maeror, pudor, metus. Sen. de Ira II 19, *vinum incendit iram, quia auget calorem*. III 10, *vetus dictum est, a lasso rixam quaeri* (fatigue). *Aequae autem et ab esuriente et a sitiente, et ab omni homine quem aliqua res urit: nam uti ulcera ad levem tactum, deinde etiam ad suspicionem tactus, condolescunt* (this describes a state of irritation or inflammation); *ita animus affectus minimis offenditur. Adeo ut quosdam salutatio, epistola, oratio, et interrogatio in litem evocent*'. Every situation or condition of pain, discomfort, malaise, constraint, &c. makes a man irritable.

καὶ ὅτι ὅτε μᾶλλον ἐν τούτοις εἰσί, μᾶλλον καὶ εὐκίνητοι.

- 12 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργήν, ὀργίζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσι καὶ σκώπτουσιν· ὑβρίζουσι γάρ. καὶ τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα

§ 12. So far of the *subjects* of anger; next of its *objects*.

First, anger is provoked by ridicule (contempt expressed in laughter), mockery, jeering; all of which imply ὕβρις, a wanton unprovoked attack upon a man's feelings and personal dignity.

χλευάζειν, probably connected with χείλος or χέλος (χελὺν) 'the lip' (so Valck.), 'to shoot out the lips' in mockery and derision. Compare the analogous ἐρεσχελεῖν which may possibly be ἐρίσσειν χέλος expressing the same action. χλευάζειν, χλευασμός and χλευασία, appear frequently in Demosth. and occasionally in other authors: in Rhet. II 3. 9 we find χλευαστής. In Top. Z 6, 144 a 5, we have καθάπερ οἱ τὸν προσηλακισμὸν ὕβριν μετὰ χλευασίας ὀρίζόμενοι· ἡ γὰρ χλευασία ὕβρις τις, ὥστ' οὐ διαφορά ἀλλ' εἶδος ἡ χλευασία. χλευασία therefore is a 'kind' of ὕβρις, which exactly corresponds with the view of it taken here.

σκώπτειν, is not easily distinguished from the preceding, except by the greater frequency of its occurrence. It expresses an ill-natured joke, sneering, taunting, gibing at, another, for the purpose of bringing him into ridicule. This is the 'scornful jest', which, as Pope says, is 'most bitter'. σκῶμμα or σκῶψις is therefore opposed to εὐτραπελία, the easy well-bred pleasantry which distinguishes the conversation and composition of the accomplished gentleman. The ill-natured intention implied in σκώπτειν appears incidentally in the phrase λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον, which indicates that it is always attended with pain to the object of it, Eth. N. IV 14, 1128 a 7: and again this its ordinary character appears Ib. line 25, seq. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὀριστέον τῷ λέγειν ἢ πρῆπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; (neither of which evidently belonged to the ordinary character and operation of the σκῶμμα), and again, line 30, τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λουδῶρημά τι ἐστίν. I suppose that the difference between this and χλευασμός must be something of this kind: χλευάζειν 'mockery' may be conveyed by the gesture or tone of voice or the manner as well as by the actual words, and is therefore the more general expression of contempt as conveyed by language or manner: in σκῶμμα the contempt is conveyed or embodied in a joke or taunting phrase. It occurs, as might be expected, constantly in Aristophanes, who dealt more largely in the commodity itself than most other writers. An examination of the passages where it is used by this author will help to confirm what I have said of the ill-natured use of it; for instance, Pac. 740, ἐς τὰ ράκια σκώποντας αἰεὶ καὶ τοῖς φθειρσιν πολεμοῦντας, Nub. 540, οὐδ' ἔσκωπτε τοὺς φалаκρούς, and so of the rest.

A second class of persons who are special objects of angry feeling, are 'those who inflict such injuries as bear upon them the marks of wanton outrage. These must be such as are neither in retaliation (for an injury already inflicted on the aggressor) nor beneficial to those who inflict them;



βλάπτουσιν ὅσα ὑβρεως σημεία. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἂ μὴτε ἀντί τινος μὴτ' ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ποιουσιν.  
 13 ἤδη γὰρ δοκεῖ δι' ὑβριν. καὶ τοῖς κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσι περὶ ἂ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα σπονδάζουσιν, οἷον οἱ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ ιδέᾳ ἐάν τις τὴν ιδέαν,  
 14 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ταῦτα δὲ πολλῶ μάλ-  
 λον, ἐὰν ὑποπτεύσωσι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, ἢ ὅλως ἢ

for when this is the case' (by this time, now at length; note on ἤδη, I I. 7) 'then (and not till then) they are thought to be due to a wanton, malicious, unprovoked, intention to offend'—ὑβρις, the worst of the three kinds of ὀλιγωρία by which anger is provoked; §§ 3, 5.

§ 13. A third are 'those who revile and express contempt for things in which the aggrieved parties are themselves most interested (or, to which they are earnestly devoted, or in which they most desire to distinguish themselves, or in which they most value themselves; the last of the four referring to such things as ιδέα, personal beauty, the second example); as those who are eager and ambitious of distinction in the pursuit of philosophy are especially indignant at any slight, any slur cast upon their favourite study; or those who value themselves upon their personal appearance, if that be called in question; and similarly in all other cases'. This topic expresses the specially angry feeling that is called forth by any ridicule or contempt directed against a man's profession, his studies, his order, any class or society to which he belongs, and is carried even to the extent of a national feeling: any reflexion, in short, upon what he is particularly interested in and attached to or values himself upon, any association with which he is bound up, and on whose credit his own credit and importance in some measure depend. "*Je me suis souvent despité, en mon enfance,*" says Montaigne (*du Pédantisme*, Livre I Ch. 24), "*de veoir en comedies italiennes tousiours un Pedante pour badin, et le surnom de Magister n'avoir guères plus honorable signification parmy nous: car leur estant donné en gouvernement, que pouvois-je moins faire que d'estre jaloux de leur reputation?*"

τῇ ιδέᾳ] 'the form', the primary sense of the word<sup>1</sup>, Plat. Protag. 315 E, τὴν ιδέαν πάνιν καλός, Phaed. 73 A, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει, Ib. D, τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός, 76 C, ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει, 109 B, περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντόδαπα καὶ τὰς ιδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, Pind. Olymp. 10 (11). 123, ιδέα καλός, et alibi. So εἶδος, Arist. Pol. I 2, 1252 b 26, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη εἰσὶν ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

§ 14. 'But this angry feeling is much aggravated, if he suspect that this, whatever it may be, on which he prides himself, does not really belong to him, either not at all or in no great force (ἰσχυρῶς), or that if it does, at all events other people don't think so (*lit.* it does not appear so,

<sup>1</sup> The following is Buhle's note on ιδέα, 'Cogitandum est de ideis Platonis!' and this is quoted by Gaisford without a remark.

μὴ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ μὴ δοκεῖν· ἐπειδὴν γὰρ σφόδρα οἶων- P. 1379 b.  
 ται ὑπάρχειν [ἐν τούτοις]<sup>1</sup> ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φρον-  
 15 τίζουσιν. καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις·  
 οἶονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ' αὐτῶν  
 16 ἢ μή. καὶ τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τιμᾶν ἢ φροντίζειν, ἐὰν

<sup>1</sup> ἐν τούτοις *sine uncinis*.

μὴ δοκεῖν): for whenever people have a strong conviction that they really possess the assumed advantage' (supply, ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς ἐφ' ᾧ φιλοτιμοῦνται from the last §, or ὁ οἶονται ἔχειν, or ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, from οἶονται ὑπάρχειν) 'in those particular things (studies, personal qualities, accomplishments, rank and position, before enumerated) at which the taunt is levelled', (ἐν οἷς 'in which', represents the sphere, or circumstances, the 'locality' as it were of the joke in which it resides), 'they care nothing about it'. A very acute observation. F. A. Wolf has a note upon ἐν τούτοις, for which he proposes to substitute αὐτοῖς or αὐτοῖς. He *insists* upon connecting σφόδρα ὑπάρχειν, and pronounces that to be bad Greek or unintelligible. σφόδρα οἶονται, if it required any justification, would be sufficiently defended by Phaedo 73 A, σφόδρα μέμνημαι. I think that the translation above given shews that the vulg. is correct, and there is no manuscript authority for any alteration. σφόδρα and ἰσχυρῶς (above) are used here in the same sense, 'in a high degree'. Wolf's conjecture is supported by Brandis' *Anonymus*, in Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV i p. 46.

ἰσχυρῶς] 'fortiter', 'strongly', 'vigorously', means here 'in a high degree'. "ἰσχυρῶς, strongly, very much, exceedingly, Herod. IV 108, ἔθνος μέγα καὶ πολλόν, γλαυκόν τε πᾶν ἰσχυρῶς κ.τ.λ. Ib. 183, ἔθνος μέγα ἰσχυρῶς, Xen. Anab. I 7. 17, διῶρυξ ἰσχυρῶς βαθεία; ἰσχυρῶς ἡδεσθαι, ἀνιάσθαι, φοβεῖσθαι, Ib. Cyr. VIII 3. 44, &c." Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon*.

§ 15. 'Again anger is more readily excited against those who are dear to us, than against those who are not; because we think we are naturally entitled to expect from them kind treatment rather than the reverse' (ἢ μὴ εὖ). Comp. Polit. IV (VII) 7, 1328 a 1, σημείον δὲ πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle adduces this as a proof that (in the Platonic psychological division) the seat of φιλία, love, is the θυμός or τὸ θυμοειδές, the passionate element of the human composition, in which all the noble, generous impulses, zeal, enthusiasm, righteous indignation, resentment, courage, and with them anger, reside. Aristotle is here criticising Plato's scheme, while he recognises its general validity, who assigns (Tim.) φιλία to the belly, with the other ἐπιθυμίας. A few lines further on the author adds, τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον· παρ' οἷς γὰρ ὀφείλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν. ὅθεν εἴρηται "χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἀδελφῶν", (this line is more correctly given by Plutarch, de Frac. Amor. 480 D, χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν, ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκεν, Dind. Eur. Fr. Inc. 57: it is in fact a *paroemiac* verse, the proper vehicle for 'proverbs'), καὶ "οἱ τοι περὰ στέρξαντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ περὰ μισοῦσιν."

§ 16. 'And similarly against those that have been accustomed to pay

πάλιν μὴ οὕτως ὁμιλῶσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων οἶον-  
 17 ται καταφρονεῖσθαι· ταῦτ' αὖ γὰρ ἂν ποιῇν. καὶ τοῖς  
 μὴ ἀντιποιοῦσιν εὖ, μηδὲ τὴν ἴσιν ἀνταποδιδούσιν.  
 καὶ τοῖς τάναντία ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἥττους ᾖσιν·  
 18 μὲν ὡς ἥττόνων οἱ δ' ὡς παρ' ἥττόνων. καὶ τοῖς ἐν  
 μηδενὶ λόγῳ οὔσιν, ἂν τι ὀλιγωρῶσι, μᾶλλον· ὑπό-

respect and attention to them, if they afterwards cease (to associate or live with them on the same terms) to treat them in the same way: for from such, this seems to imply contempt, otherwise (if their feeling towards them had *not* changed) they would have gone on doing as they used to do'.

καταφρονεῖσθαι] passive, see Appendix B, on I 12. 22 [at the end of Vol. I].

§ 17. τὴν ἴσιν] sc. μοῖραν, Bos, *Ellipsis*. pp. 306—7, cites many instances of the omission of this subst. with various words, as numerals, δεκάτη, τριακοστή (Dem. c. Lept. § 32), ἡμίσεια. Analogous to τὴν ἴσιν here, we have ἐπ' ἴσης, ἐπὶ ἴσιν, ἐξ ἴσης, ἐκ τῆς ἴσης, τὴν ὁμοίην (Herod. IX 78), ἐπὶ τῇ ὁμοίᾳ, ἐκ τῆς ὁμοίας. With πεπρωμένη, it is a still more frequent ellipse. With this word μοῖρα is sometimes expressed; as it is likewise in Hom. II. I (IX) 318, ἴση μοῖρα μένοντι καὶ εἰ μᾶλα τις πολέμιζοι. At the same time in § 23, we have τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδούσιν; and Bos himself in a subsequent article on χάρις (p. 523) refers to this, Herod. VI 21, οὐκ ἀπέδωσαν τὴν ὁμοίην Συβαρίται; to which Schäfer adds, IV 119, τὴν ὁμοίην ὑμῖν ἀποδίδουσι. However μοῖραν is just as natural a supplement as the other, and the more numerous analogies, by shewing that the ellipse of it was more usual than that of χάριν, are in favour of the former explanation.

καὶ τοῖς τάναντία—παρ' ἥττόνων] 'And against those that do things contrary to our interests, if they are our inferiors' (from *inferiors* opposition was not to be expected, from *equals* or *superiors* it might be; therefore in the former case it is more provoking); 'for from all such, opposition seems to imply contempt; either because (in opposing us) they seem to regard us as inferiors' (*quis enim contra potentiores sponte contendit praelia-turque*, Victorius; with ὡς ἥττόνων repeat καταφρονεῖν φαίνονται); 'or else as if (these benefits had proceeded) from inferiors' (and therefore need not be repaid; either not at all, or not in full). These belong to the class described in the preceding topic, 'those who do not repay a benefit at all, or inadequately'; from which the ellipse in ὡς παρ' ἥττόνων must therefore be filled up; by this non-repayment or inadequate repayment of the benefits received they shew their contempt.

Those who fail to repay benefits received, altogether or in part, seem to express contempt for their benefactors as inferiors; for they would not neglect such a manifest duty, or do what they know must give offence, unless they thought that it was not worth while to keep on good terms with them. So Victorius. With παρ' ἥττόνων, εὐεργετούμενοι, or εὖ ποιοῦ-μενοι, is to be understood.

§ 18. 'The angry feeling is aggravated against those who are of no

19 *κεῖται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ τῆς ὀλιγορίας πρὸς τοὺς μὴ προσ-  
 ἦκοντας, προσήκει δὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι μὴ ὀλιγωρεῖν. τοῖς  
 δὲ φίλοις, ἐὰν τε μὴ εὖ λέγωσιν ἢ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἔτι  
 μᾶλλον ἐὰν τάναντία, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθάνωνται δεο-  
 μένων, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀντιφώντας Πλήξιππος τῷ Μελεά-*

account, no repute at all, if they are guilty of any slight, any contemptuous indifference, to us and our pretensions'. This topic goes a step beyond the preceding. In that the offenders were only *relatively* contemptible, *inferior* to ourselves. Here they are *absolutely* contemptible and worthless, of no repute at all in *any one's estimation*—'For anger is assumed to be (referring to the definition, § 1) provoked by the *slight* against those who have no natural claim (to treat us in this way): the natural duty of inferiors is *not* to slight (their betters)'.

On *προσῆκει*, and the several kinds of obligation from which the terms expressive of 'duty' are derived, *δεῖ, χρή, πρέπει, προσήκει*, see on *μὴ προσηκόντως*, II 2. 1, note 2 on p. 11.

§ 19. *τοῖς φίλοις*] Comp. § 15, and note. 'We are angry with friends if they *don't* speak of us, and treat us, well, and still more if they do the contrary; and if, when we are in want of anything, they *don't* perceive it (*don't* find it out before we tell them of it)'—this manifests their *indifference* to us and our wants, which is a kind of *contempt*, and the sting of *ὀλιγορία*—'as Antiphon's Plexippus was (angry with, *ὀργίζετο*) with his (τῷ) Meleager: for this want of perception (or attention) is a token of slight; because, when we do care for any one, (things of this kind) *don't* escape us'. *ὦν γὰρ φροντίζομεν (ταῦτα) οὐ λανθάνει*. This is expressed in the *abstract* neuter of all *things*; meaning of course *persons*. There were two poets named Antiphon: one a writer of the New Comedy, (Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* I 489, *ποιητὴς κακῆς κωμῳδίας* Ἀντιφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, Böckh, *Corp. Inscr.* I p. 767): and the other, a tragic writer, mentioned by Athenaeus as a *τραγωδοποιός*, together with his character, Plexippus, xv 673 F. This second Antiphon is again referred to, *Rhet.* II 6. 27, Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής, and his play Meleager, *Ib.* 23. 20, where two lines are quoted from it. Besides Antiphon's play, there were several others with the same title, and on the same subject, the Calydonian boar-hunt and its tragic consequences, by poets comic as well as tragic, Sophocles, Euripides, Sosiphanes, (Wagner, *Trag. Gr. Fragm.* III 179,) Antiphanes, and Philetaerus, *Mein.*, u. s., I 315, 349. (The Meleager of Antiphanes is doubtful, the names of Antiphon and Antiphanes being often interchanged, *Mein.*) See also Wagner, *Trag. Gr. Fragm.* III 113.

Victorious notes on this allusion: 'Plexippus was brother of Althea, Meleager's mother, and with his brother Toxeus was put to death by Meleager, because they expressed indignation at his bestowing the prize, the boarskin, which he had received for the destruction of the Calydonian boar, upon his mistress Atalanta. Perhaps it was this very circumstance that Antiphon indicated: he may have represented Plexippus as expressing his vexation at Meleager's *insensibility to his want*, to his great anxiety, namely, to possess the boarskin, which his nephew (Meleager) had,

γρῷ· ὀλιγορίας γὰρ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι σημείον· ὧν  
 20 γὰρ φροντίζομεν, οὐ λανθάνει. καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχαίρουσι  
 ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καὶ ὅλως εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν  
 ἀτυχίαις· ἢ γὰρ ἐχθροῦ ἢ ὀλιγορουντος σημείον. καὶ  
 τοῖς μὴ φροντίζουσιν ἐὰν λυπήσωσιν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς  
 21 κακὰ ἀγγέλλουσιν ὀργίζονται. καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἀκούουσι P. 59.  
 περὶ αὐτῶν ἢ θεωμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν φαῦλα· ὅμοιοι γάρ  
 εἰσιν ἢ ὀλιγοροῦσιν ἢ ἐχθροῖς· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναλ-

regardless of the claims of consanguinity, bestowed nevertheless on Atlanta'. (I have altered the second sentence for the sake of clearness.)

The story of Meleager and the Caledonian boarhunt, is told by Ovid, *Metamorph.* VIII. The offence of the Thesiadae, Toxeus and Plexippus, and their death by the hand of their nephew, are described in 428—444: from which Victorius apparently derived his account.

§ 20. 'We are angry also with those that rejoice at our misfortunes or in general maintain a cheerful demeanour in the midst of our distresses: for this is a mark either of downright enmity or of contemptuous indifference'. ὅλως, without any *special* indications of joy, yet maintain a most provoking air of serenity and indifference whilst they cheerfully contemplate our vexations and annoyances—everyone who has ever had experience of this (and who has *not*?) knows well how provoking it is.

'And with those who don't care (who exhibit no solicitude, or sympathy; comp. *infra* § 21, οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναλοῦσιν) when they give us pain; and this is why we are angry with the messengers of evil tidings' (ingenious solution). Or the explanation might be, that the first surprise and annoyance at the unwelcome intelligence *associates* the bearer with his news. That messengers of unwelcome news are liable to a rough reception from those to whom they communicate them, is noticed also by Aesch., *Pers.* 255, ὅμοι κακὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἀγγέλλειν κακὰ, *Soph. Antig.* 277, στέργει γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄγγελον κακῶν ἐπῶν.

Shakespeare, *Henry IV.* Pt. II. Act I, sc. 1. 100, *Yet the first bringer of unwelcome news hath but a losing office.* *Antony and Cleop.* II 5, *Though it be honest it is never good to bring bad news.* *Macbeth*, V 5, *Liar and slave*—(to the messenger, who comes to announce the moving of Birnam wood).

§ 21. 'And with such as stand quietly, calmly, listening to an account of (περὶ), or looking on at (any painful exhibition of) our faults and weaknesses (τὰ φαῦλα), (without offering either help or sympathy); this looks like either contemptuous indifference, or actual enmity: because *friends* sympathise with us (*feel pain* as we do ourselves), (and these do not); and every one *feels pain* at the spectacle, the contemplation, when he witnesses the exposure, of his own infirmities'—the *friend*, being ἕτερος αὐτός or ἄλλος αὐτός, 'a second self' (*Eth. Nic.* IX several times repeated), must regard the exposure of his friend's weaknesses just as he would of his own.

γοῦσιν, θεώμενοι δὲ τὰ οἰκεῖα φαῦλα πάντες ἀλγοῦ-  
 22 σιν· ἔτι τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσι πρὸς πέντε, πρὸς οὓς φιλο-  
 τιμούνται, πρὸς οὓς θαυμάζουσιν, ὑφ' ὧν βούλονται  
 θαυμάζεσθαι, ἣ οὓς αἰσχύνονται, ἣ ἐν τοῖς αἰσχυνομέ-  
 νοις αὐτούς· ἐν τούτοις ἐάν τις ὀλιγορῇ, ὀργίζονται  
 23 μᾶλλον. καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀλιγωροῦσιν ὑπὲρ  
 ὧν αὐτοῖς αἰσχρὸν μὴ βοηθεῖν, οἶον γονεῖς, τέκνα,  
 γυναικας, ἀρχομένους. καὶ τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδού- P. 1380.

§ 22. 'And further, with those who shew slight to us before (in respect of) five different kinds of persons; (1) to those whom we are ambitious of rivalling<sup>1</sup> (in the race for distinction; φιλοτιμείσθαι expresses the ambitious views, and πρὸς οὓς the competition, comp. c. 4. 24, 6. 15, 10. 5, &c.); (2) πρὸς (τούτους) οὓς, to those whom we respect and admire; (3) those by whom we wish to be respected and admired; (4) those of whom we stand in awe; (5) ἣ (τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἡμῶν, or αὐτῶν as Ar. writes it), or, (we are angry with those who slight us) when *in the company* of (ἐν) those who hold us in awe. In the society of any of these, a slight offered is provocative of a greater degree of anger (than it would be elsewhere)'.

αἰσχύνεσθαι, with the accus. of the *person*, means to 'be ashamed in a man's presence, or before him; to be afraid to look one in the face, from reverence; to stand in awe of him'. Soph. Phil. 1382, οὐ κατασχύνει θεούς; τὸν προστρόπαιον τὸν ἰκέτην; The accusative is the *local* accus., an extension of the *cognate* accus., the person, whose presence causes the shame or awe, being represented as the *seat* of it, as when we say ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλὴν. Matth., Gr. Gr. 441, has given a few examples of this use of αἰσχύνεσθαι and αἰδεῖσθαι—four from Eur. Ion, 353, 379, 952, and 1093, αἰσχύνομαι τὸν πολυῦμνον θεόν, and one from Xen. de Rep. Lac. II 11. Add Hom. Il. A 23, αἰδεῖσθαί θ' ἱερῆα, Z (VI) 442, αἰδεόμην Τρῶας καὶ Τρώαδας ἑλκεσιπέπλους; so αἰδεῖσθαί ἰκέτην, as Hom. Il. X (XXII) 124. Aesch. Agam. 362, (Dind.), Δία τοι ξένων μέγαν αἰδοῦμαι. Aristoph. Thesm. 848, 903, Eccles. 381, Plut. 1077. Plat. Theaet. 183 E, Μέλισσον... ἤττον αἰσχύνομαι. Symp. 216 B, 218 D, Protag. 312 A, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο σαντόν; Rep. VIII 562 E, αἰσχύνεσθαι τοὺς γονεάς, κ.τ.λ. Comp. Lat. *puđere, suppuđere, aliquem alıcıus*, Cic. Ep. ad Fam. IX 1 *sed quod eorum me suppuđebat*. Orator 155 'Patris mei, meum factum (i.e. meorum factorum) *puđet*.'

§ 23. 'And those whose slight is offered to such objects as it would be a disgrace to us not to help and protect, such as parents, children, wives, rulers and governors', such as have a natural claim upon our help and protection. 'And those that have failed to make a due return (for a benefit received); for in this case the slight (neglect, contemptuous *indifference to moral obligation*) is a violation of the *natural*

<sup>1</sup> The phrase has been otherwise understood, 'those whom they are anxious to stand well with'. But to say nothing of its not properly representing the Greek, this interpretation leaves no difference between this first class and the third.

- 24 σιν· παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον γὰρ ἡ ὀλιγωρία. καὶ τοῖς  
 εἰρωνευομένοις πρὸς σπουδάζοντας· καταφρονητικὸν  
 25 γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία. καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων εὐποιοητικοῖς,  
 ἐὰν μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καταφρονητικόν,  
 26 τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ὧν πάντας καὶ αὐτόν. ποιητικὸν δ'  
 ὀργῆς καὶ ἡ λήθη, οἷον καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὕτως  
 οὔσα περὶ μικρόν· ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ λήθη  
 σημεῖον εἶναι· δι' ἀμέλειαν μὲν γὰρ ἡ λήθη γίγνεται,  
 ἡ δ' ἀμέλεια ὀλιγωρία ἐστίν.  
 27 οἷς μὲν οὖν ὀργίζονται καὶ ὡς ἔχοντες καὶ διὰ  
 ποῖα, ἅμα εἴρηται· δῆλον δ' ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευά-

claim, duty, or obligation. The *nature* or *fitness* of things requires (under this theory, which is that of justice, the *lex talionis*) such a *compensation*, or the repayment of the favour.

§ 24. 'And those (are provoking) who use irony to (*πρὸς*, in reply to, or conversation with) us when we are in serious earnest (whether merely talking, or engaged in some serious pursuit: either of these is provoked by untimely levity; which is construed as a kind of contempt), for irony is expressive of contempt'. This characteristic or construction of irony is not noticed in the analysis of it in Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 b 22 seq. In IV 8, 1124 b 30, it appears as a trait in the character of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, and is part of the *contemptuous* bearing (1124 b 5 ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ) to the vulgar which is suitable to his dignity, *εἰρωνὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς*. On irony and its uses in Rhetoric, besides the passage from the Ethics already quoted, see Rhet. ad Alexandrum 22. 1, Cic. de Orat. II 67. 269 seq., III 53. 203, Quint. VIII 6. 54, IX 2. 44 seq. Socrates was probably one of those whose constant use of *εἰρωνεία* was construed as contempt, and contributed to his unpopularity.

§ 25. 'And (again we feel ourselves slighted) by those who are naturally or habitually disposed to acts of kindness, if they don't extend their kindness to ourselves: for this has the air of contempt, to consider us (*αὐτόν* is 'an individual' opposed to *πάντας*) unworthy to be treated in the same way as every one else'.

§ 26. 'Forgetfulness too is provocative of anger, even, for instance, forgetting your friend's name, though it be (shewn) in such a mere trifle: for *even* forgetfulness (trifle though it be, *καί*) is construed as a sign of contempt: because this oblivion is due to neglect, and neglect is slight'. Falconbridge, in *King John*, Act I, sc. 1. 187, *And if his name be George, I'll call him Peter; For new-made honour doth forget men's names*.

§ 27. 'So the objects, dispositions, and provocatives of anger have been all treated together'. On the grammar of *οἷς*.. *εἴρηται*, see note, II 9. 11 (at the end).

The following sentence is a note upon the mode of applying the foregoing analysis to the conduct and management of the speech, for the

ζειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιούτους οἷοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ' οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἷοις ὀργίζονται.

I ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐναντίον τῷ πραῦνεσθαι CHAP. III.  
καὶ ὀργὴ πραότητι, ληπτέον πῶς ἔχοντες प्रााοί εἰσι

benefit of the student of Rhetoric: how, namely, to excite and direct this passion in conformity with the interests of the speaker, and it is plain that what is required is, to bring the audience by the speech into such a state of mind as men are in, when they are irascible (so that their anger may be brought to bear upon the opponent); and to represent the adversary as liable to the imputation of such feelings and acts as provoke men to anger, and of such character or disposition as men are angry with. *κατασκευάζειν* has the same double meaning, or at least application, as we noticed on II I. 2, q. v. In the one case, it is 'to establish', or produce the feelings in the minds of the audience; in the other, to produce in their minds by the speech an impression of the state of feeling of the adverse party, to establish, i.e. to *represent* in the speech. *αὐτὸν* after *δίου* *δν*, the reading of most MSS, is rightly omitted by Bekker with A<sup>c</sup>.

#### CHAPTER III.

Analysis of *πραότης*, patience; the opposite of *ὀργή*, as it is *here* stated. In the Nic. Eth. IV 11, init. the statement is different. *πραότης* is there the mean state, or virtue, lying between *ὀργιλότης* irascibility, the *excess* of angry emotion, and *ἀοργησία* want of spirit, insensibility (to provocation or wrong), the *defect*; τὸ δὲ προπηλακίζομενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. *ὀργή* is the basis of the whole, the *πάθος* in general, the natural emotion in respect of provocation, capable of modification so as to assume three different forms: its three *εἴδεις* are *περὶ τὴν ὀργήν*, c. 12 init. *πραότης* then, *here*, as a *πάθος*—in the Ethics it is a *εἴδεις* or virtue—is this instinctive *affection*, feeling, emotion, in a mild, calm, subdued state (opposed to *ὀργή* an emotion in a state of excitement); placidity of temper. As a virtue (in the Ethics) it is as described by Grant (Eth. Nic. *Plan of book*, IV p. 150, first ed.) 'the virtue of the regulation (or control) of the temper'. In the de Anima, I 1, 403 a 16, it is still only a *πάθος*, together with *θυμός*, *φόβος*, *ἔλεος*, *θάσος*, *χαρά*, *φιλία*, and *μῖσος*. Again *πραότης*, the feeling, stands in the same relation to *πράυνσις*, the quieting, calming, lowering *process* of the excited, angry emotion, as *ὀργή* does to *ὀργίζεσθαι*, (and *would* to *ὀργισις* if the word were in existence). And lastly, as *ὀργή* is a *κίνησις* (setting in motion in the way of stirring up and exciting) de Anima, I 1, 403 a 26, τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι *κίνησις τις τοῦ τοιουτοῦ σώματος ἢ μέρους κ.τ.λ.*, so *πράυνσις* is a *κατάστασις*, a process of settling down, and *ἡρέμησις*, a passing to a state of rest—*ἡρεμεῖν* the regular opposite of *κινεῖσθαι*. The fifth book of the Physics is on these two opposites, *κίνησις* and *ἡρεμία*; see especially ch. 6. 'And whereas growing angry is opposite to growing calm, and anger to calmness, (and we rhetoricians are bound to be equally acquainted with both sides of every question), we must now proceed to ascertain the several



καὶ πρὸς τίνας πρῶως ἔχουσι καὶ διὰ τίνων πρᾶν-  
 2 ται· ἔστω δὴ πρᾶνσις κατάστασις καὶ ἡρέμησις ὁρ-  
 3 γῆς. εἰ οὖν ὀργίζονται τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν, ὀλιγωρία  
 δ' ἔστιν ἐκούσιον, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν τούτων  
 ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀκουσίως ποιοῦσιν ἢ φαινομένοις τοιούτοις  
 4 πρᾶσι εἰσίν. καὶ τοῖς τάναντία ὧν ἐποίησαν βουλο-  
 μένοις. καὶ ὅσοι καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς αὐτοὺς τοιούτοι· οὐ-  
 5 δεῖς γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ δοκεῖ ὀλιγωρεῖν. καὶ τοῖς ὁμο-  
 λογοῦσι καὶ μεταμελομένοις· ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες δίκην τὸ  
 λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπονημένοις παύονται τῆς ὀργῆς.  
 σημεῖον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν κολάσεως· τοὺς μὲν p. 6o.  
 γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας καὶ ἀρνούμενους μᾶλλον κολάζο-  
 dispositions of calmness (in the *subject*), the states of mind (in the *objects*)  
 which are regarded with calmness (*sang-froid*), and the means of bringing  
 them into this state'.

§ 2. *ἔστω*] See note on I 5. 3, 6. 2, &c. 'Let it be assumed then (as suffi-  
 cient for our purpose) that the process or growth of this even and indifferent  
 state of mind is a subsiding or *settling down*, and a process tending to  
 rest (a quieting process) of the *motion* (i.e. excitement, ferment, ebullition)  
 of anger'. "In V. Nat. Ausc. [φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως, E p. 230 a 4,] (32, ἡ γὰρ  
 εἰς αὐτὸ κίνησις ἐν ᾧ ἔστηκεν, ἡρέμησις μᾶλλον ἐστίν) valet Aristoteli ἡρέμησις,  
*via progressusque ad quietem*". Victorius.

§ 3. 'If then anger is roused by slight, and slight is voluntary (i.e.  
 intentional), it plainly follows that to those who do none of these things  
 (the *various kinds* of ὀλιγωρία enumerated in this last chapter) or do it  
 unintentionally, or have that appearance (though they may in reality  
 have intended a slight), men are calm (quiet, placable, take no offence)'.

§ 4. 'And to those who offer a slight without intending it (with  
 the contrary intention). And to those whose feelings or dispositions and  
 conduct' (both included in τοιούτοι) 'are alike to themselves and to the  
 others (*lit.* who behave in the same way themselves to themselves); for  
 no one is ever supposed to slight himself'.

§ 5. 'And to those who offer a slight, and then repent of it; for, accept-  
 ing as a sort of satisfaction the pain felt at what has been done, their  
 anger ceases. A sign of this is what happens in the punishment of slaves;  
 for those that *answer*, or contradict us, and deny the fault, we punish  
 more severely, whilst we cease to be angry with those that admit the  
 justice of their punishment'.

μεταμελομένοις] ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπ' ἄλυσιν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ..... τοῦ δὴ δι'  
 ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Eth. Nic. III 2 init. p. 1110 b 18.  
 So that repentance is a sign that the act was unintentional, and from  
 ignorance of the probable effect.

ἀντιλέγοντας] Arist. Ran. 1072, λαλίαν καὶ στωμυλίαν ἢ ἑκένωσεν τὰς  
 τε παλαιότητας, καὶ τοὺς παρόλους ἀνέπεισεν ἀνταγορεύειν τοῖς ἀρχουσιν.

μεν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας δικαίως κολάζεσθαι, πανόμεθα θυμούμενοι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀναισχυντία τὸ τὰ φανερά ἀρνεῖσθαι, ἢ δ' ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία καὶ καταφρόνησις· ὧν γοῦν πολὺ καταφρονούμεν, οὐκ 6 αἰσχυνόμεθα. καὶ τοῖς ταπεινουμένοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἀντιλέγουσιν· φαίνονται γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν ἥπτους εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἥπτους φοβοῦνται, φοβούμενος δὲ οὐδεὶς ὀλιγωρεῖ. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ταπεινουμένους παύεται

πρὸς τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας] Schrader refers in illustration to Terent. Andr. III 5. 15, Pamph. *annon dixi esse hoc futurum?* Dav. *dixti*. Pamph. *quin meritis?* Dav. *crucem*.....Pamph. (who is mollified by the admission) *hei mihi, cum non habeo spatium ut de te sumam supplicium, ut volo.* *Jul. Caesar*, IV 3, 116, Brut. *When I spoke that, I was ill-tempered too.* Cass. *Do you confess so much? Give me your hand.* 'The cause of this (of the heavier punishment of those that aggravate their offence by denying it), is that to deny evident facts is effrontery' (ἀναισχυντία is a want of respect for the opinions and feelings of others), 'and effrontery implies slight regard and contempt—at all events we feel no respect for' (αἰσχυνεσθαί τινα, note on II 2. 22) 'those whom we greatly despise'. This is an argument in support of the assertion that ἀναισχυντία implies ὀλιγωρία and καταφρόνησις. ἀναισχυντία is 'disrespect'; now as experience shews that we do treat with disrespect those whom we very much despise, it follows from this that disrespect, effrontery, impudence, must carry with it, as its outward expression, the feeling of contempt. Comp. c. 6 § 2, ἢ δ' ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις.

ἀναισχυντία τὸ τὰ φανερά ἀρνεῖσθαι] The sausage- (or black-pudding-) monger in the Knights (296) is a perfect model of this kind of effrontery. Cleon, who is represented as not overburdened with modesty, candidly admits his thefts, ὁμολογῶ κλέπτειν· σὺ δ' οὐχί. The other lays his hands upon something under the very eyes of the bystanders, and then swears that he never touched it: νῆ τὸν Ἑρμῆν τὸν ἀγοραῖον, κάπιορκῶ γε βλεπόντων.

§ 6. What follows, though put forward as an independent topic, may also be regarded as the explanation of the second member of the alternative, the mitigation of the penalty consequent upon the admission of the offender.

'And to those who humble themselves before us, and do not answer or contradict us; for in doing so they seem to admit their inferiority, and (conscious) inferiority implies fear, (not contemptuous indifference), and no one in that state of mind is ever guilty of a slight'. (Fear and anger cannot coexist, § 10.) 'That our anger does cease towards those who humble themselves before us, is shewn also by the habit which dogs have of not biting those that sit down (when they attack them)'. This fact in the natural history of dogs is attested not only by Homer—Od. ξ 26 ἐξαπίνης δ' Ὀδυσῆα ἴδον κύνας ὑλακόμωροι· οἱ μὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπὶ δῖραμον, αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔζετο κερδοσύνη, σκῆπτρον δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός—but also by the experience of modern travellers in Albania [see esp. Mure's *Tour in Greece*

ἡ ὀργή, καὶ οἱ κύνες δηλοῦσιν οὐ δάκνοντες τοὺς καθ-  
 7 ἵζοντας. καὶ τοῖς σπουδάζουσι πρὸς τοὺς σπουδά-  
 ζοντας· δοκεῖ γὰρ σπουδάζεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ καταφρο-  
 8 νεῖσθαι. καὶ τοῖς μείζω κεχαρισμένοις. καὶ τοῖς  
 9 δεομένοις καὶ παραιτουμένοις· ταπεινότεροι γάρ. καὶ  
 τοῖς μὴ ὑβρισταῖς μηδὲ χλευασταῖς μηδ' ὀλιγώροις, ἢ  
 εἰς μηδένα ἢ μὴ εἰς χρηστὸν μηδ' εἰς τοιούτους οἰοί  
 10 περ αὐτοί. ὅλως δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ  
 πρᾶυντικά. καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται ἢ αἰσχύνονται· ἔως

I 93—100 or De Quincey's review XIII 301—9]. I myself heard of it there.  
 In illustration of καθίζοντας, *sitting* as a *suppliant* posture, Victorius cites  
 Soph. Oed. R. init. τίνας ποθ' ἔδρας τάσδε κ.τ.λ. Arist. Plut. 382, ὁρῶ τιν  
 ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος καθεδόμενον, ἱκετηρίαν ἔχοντα. Demosth. de Cor. § 107 οὐκ  
 ἐν Μουνυχίᾳ ἐκάθεζετο (took sanctuary at the altar of Artemis in Munychia).

§ 7. 'And to those who are serious with the serious' (earnest in any-  
 thing—the opposite 'of those who joke παίζοντες, or use irony, when you  
 are disposed to be serious, which makes you angry; c. 2 § 24); 'because  
 then you consider yourself to be treated seriously' (which implies *respect*,  
 that you are worthy of serious consideration), 'and not with contempt'  
 (as in the other case, in which people seem to 'make a joke' of you).

σπουδάζεσθαι and καταφρονεῖσθαι] On this formation of the passive,  
 see Append. B on I 12. 22 (at the end of the notes to Book 1).

§ 8. 'And to those who have done us more kindness and service (than  
 they have received from us)'. The explanation of this is not given  
 because it is too clear to require one. It is that this superiority in con-  
 ferring favours constitutes a *debt* and an *obligation* on the part of the  
 inferior in this social commerce, whose account is on the debit side in the  
 books of the other; who is therefore *obliged* to him, and disinclined to  
 resent any real or supposed offence: the gratitude overpowers the sense  
 of slight.

'And those who beg for anything and deprecate our wrath or resent-  
 ment'—both of these are confessions of inferiority, we acknowledge that  
 we are in want of something, a deficiency which they can supply, and  
 this shews superiority—'for they are humbler' (than they would otherwise  
 be, if they *didn't* want anything).

§ 9. 'And those who are not given to wanton outrage, or to mockery,  
 or slight'—the opposite dispositions and conduct being of all the most  
 provocative of anger, C. 2 §§ 3, 5, 12—'either such as never indulge them  
 against any one, or never against the good and worthy, or never against  
 those who are like ourselves'.

§ 10. 'And as a general rule, the things (words or deeds) that are  
 productive (in our intercourse with others) of a calm temper' (a quiet,  
 indifferent, unexcited state of feeling; *πραότης* is purely negative; I believe,  
 strictly speaking, that it is no true *páthos* at all, and is better represented  
 as a virtue or mean state in the Ethics) 'may be ascertained from their

γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἔχωσιν, οὐκ ὀργίζονται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ  
 11 ἅμα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι. καὶ τοῖς δι' ὀργὴν  
 ποιήσασιν ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἥττον ὀργίζονται· οὐ  
 γὰρ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πράξαι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργι-  
 ζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία ἄλυπον, ἢ δ'  
 12 ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης. καὶ τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς. P. 1380 b.  
 καὶ ἔχοντες δὲ ἐναντίως τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι

opposites' (viz. the *exciting* topics of ὀργή in c. 2). Buhle objects to this clause, *ὅλως ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων* as interrupting the analysis and out of place, and pronounces it an interpolation. It is however a not unnatural observation to make here. Up to this point Aristotle has been going over very nearly the same ground as the topics of the last chapter; when he has got thus far, the resemblance strikes him, and he says by way of a note: "but in fact this is true as a general rule, *all* the topics of *πραότης* may be derived by merely reversing them from those of ὀργή". I do not mean to say that he was previously unaware of this fact, but only that it struck him more vividly at the moment, when he had the preceding examples written down on his parchment or papyrus (probably the latter) before his eyes.

After this little digression we return to the topics of *πραότης*.

'The presence of those that we are afraid of, or stand in awe of, makes us calm: for as long as we are in this state of mind we cannot feel anger; because fear and anger cannot coexist in the mind'.

§ 11. 'At offences committed under the influence of passion we either feel no anger at all, or in a less degree; because in this case the offence appears not to be due to slight; for no one when angry with another can feel indifferent about him and his proceedings; because a contemptuous and indifferent state of mind, or slight, implies the absence of pain, whereas anger is always accompanied by it'. ὀργὴ ὀρεξίς μετὰ λύπης, defin. II 2.1. "Eodem argumento Eth. Nic. III (4, IIII b 17,) *distinxit προαίρεσιν a cupiditate: καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις οὐτε λυπηροῦ οὐθ' ἡδέος*". Victorius.

τοῖς δι' ὀργὴν ποιήσασιν] As here the influence of passion mitigates the offensiveness of an act, and the amount of provocation caused by it, so in Eth. Nic. v. 10, 1135 b 19, *ὅταν εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἶον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, it diminishes its criminality. The supposition is, that a man who kills another, for instance, in a fit of passion, is *blinded* by it, deprived thereby of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of the case, which is necessary to constitute *guilt*, Eth. N. III 2, and the want of which exempts in some degree from responsibility; there is no malice prepense which makes the complete crime. The question of the degree in which acts of this kind can be properly called *involuntary* is briefly discussed in c. 3 of the same book.

§ 12. 'Again, an offence from one who stands in awe of us', does not provoke us to anger, because we know or guess that from one who

πραοὶ εἰσίν, οἷον ἐν παιδιᾷ, ἐν γέλωτι, ἐν ἑορτῇ, ἐν  
 εὐημερίᾳ, ἐν κατορθώσει, ἐν πληρώσει, ὅλως ἐν ἀλυ-  
 πῖᾳ καὶ ἡδονῇ μὴ ὑβριστικῇ καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ.  
 13 ἔτι κεχρονικότες καὶ μὴ ὑπόγυιοι τῇ ὀργῇ ὄντες· παύει

habitually regards us with awe or reverence the offence is unintentional, being inconsistent with his ordinary feeling toward us. 'Also it is plain that men are calm and placable when they are in any state (in any condition or circumstances, internal or external) which is antagonistic to angry feeling, as when engaged in any sport or amusement, when they are laughing, at a feast, in fine weather (or in a prosperous state), in success, in a state of repletion or satisfaction; in short, in any condition of freedom from pain (negative pleasure), or (positive) pleasure—except that of wanton outrage (ὑβρις is always ὅπως ἦσθῃ, II 2. 5)—and of virtuous, good hope'. Of ἐπιεικής it is said, Eth. N. v. 14, init. μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. It can be *substituted*, by metaphor, for ἀγαθός. The *bad* state of mind implied by a *vicious* hope does *not* exclude the feeling of anger.

εὐημερία] It is hard to say whether this is meant for a 'fine day', 'fine weather', like εὐδία, which certainly tends to placidity of temper, and general εὐθυμία and εὐκολία—in which sense it is actually used in Hist. Anim. VI 15. 6, ὅταν εὐμερίας γενομένης ἀναθέρμαινται ἡ γῆ, and again § 7, ὅταν εὐημερία ᾖ, and Xenoph. Hellen. II 4. 2, καὶ μάλ' εὐημερίας, οὔσης, Soph. Aj. 709, λευκὸν εὐάμερον φάος—or *metaphorically*, for a 'state of prosperity, health and happiness', in which sense εὐήμερος, εὐημερεῖν and εὐημερία are employed. See again Hist. Anim. VIII 18. 1, εὐημεροῦσι δὲ (are in a flourishing condition) τὰ ζῷα κατὰ τὰς ὥρας κ.τ.λ. v 11. 5, πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην τοῦ σώματος εὐημερίαν. Pol. III 6, 1278 b 29, ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ (τῷ ζῷῳ) καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς. IV (VII) 2, 1324 a 38, ἐμπόδιον τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ (of the prosperity of a country). VII (VI) 8, 1322 b 38, εὐημερούσας πόλεις, VIII (V) 8, 1308 b 24, τὸ εὐημεροῦν τῆς πόλεως. And in the same sense εὐετηρίας γενομένης δι' εἰρήνην κ.τ.λ., of a *state*, as before, VIII (V) 6, 1306 b 11. De Gen. An. IV 6. 16, εὐημερεῖν τοῖς σώμασιν. Eth. Nic. I 9, sub fin. τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, including all the elements of happiness or prosperity, according to the vulgar notion. In Aristotle at all events the preponderance of usage is decidedly on the side of the *metaphorical* application.

§ 13. 'Further (men are brought to a calm or placid state of mind) by lapse of time when they are no longer fresh in their anger (when their anger is no longer fresh); for time brings anger to an end'.

χρονίζειν is 'to pass' or 'spend time', κεχρονικότες, men that have 'already passed some time', since the angry fit came on. For examples of the use of the word see the Lexx. ὑπόγυιοι, 'fresh, recent', of things still *under the hand* of the workman. See note on I 1. 7.

Gaisford quotes in illustration of the topic, Thucyd. III 38, (Cleon) θαν-  
 μάξω μὲν τῶν προθέντων αὐθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν, καὶ χρόνου διατριβὴν  
 ἐμποησάντων ὃ ἐστὶ πρὸς τῶν ἡδικοκτόων μᾶλλον. ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι  
 ἀμβλυτέρα τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται. And Eustath. ad Il. Ω, p. 1342. 46, ὁ διὰ  
 μέσου καιρὸς μαλάττει τὴν ἐν τοῖς θυμουμένοις σκληρότητα, ὥστε ἀληθεύειν τὸν

γὰρ ὀργὴν ὁ χρόνος. παύει δὲ καὶ ἐτέρου ὀργὴν μείζω  
ἢ παρ' ἄλλου ληφθεῖσα τιμωρία πρότερον· διὸ εὖ  
Φιλοκράτης, εἰπόντος τινὸς ὀργιζομένου τοῦ δήμου “τί  
οὐκ ἀπολογεῖ;” “οὐπω γε” ἔφη. “ἀλλὰ πότε;”  
“ὅταν ἄλλον ἴδω διαβεβλημένον.” πρᾶοι γὰρ γίγ-  
νονται ὅταν εἰς ἄλλον τὴν ὀργὴν ἀναλώσωσιν, οἷον

εἰπόντα ὅτι (Soph. Electr. 179) χρόνος εὐμαρὴς θεός. Virg. Aen. v 781, *Iunonis gravis ira, nec exsaturabile pectus, quam nec longa dies pietas nec mitigat ulla* (Victorius), describes the implacability, the lasting nature, of Juno's anger, which is the direct opposite of *πραότης*. This is *πικρότης*: οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται, Eth. N. IV 11, 1126 a 20: likewise *κότος*, rancorous, vindictive wrath, said of one who *πέττει τὴν ὀργὴν*, (*nurses his wrath to keep it warm*. Burns,) Ib. line 25. And opposed to these are the *ὀργίλοι* (irascible), *ῥεῖς*, *ἀκρόχολοι*, (ita Bekk.) Ib. line 18; these *ταχέως ὀργίζονται* and *παύονται ταχέως*, lines 13, 15.

‘And again a more violent animosity conceived against one person is appeased by punishment previously exacted from another (who may not have excited it so strongly): and therefore the saying of Philocrates was to the point, when some one asked at a time of popular excitement against him, ‘why do not you defend yourself?’ ‘No, not yet’, he replied. ‘Well, but when?’ ‘As soon as I have seen some one else under accusation’, (or ‘under a similar suspicion’: *διαβάλλειν*, ‘to set two people at variance’, being specially applied to ‘calumny’). ‘For men recover their calmness and evenness of temper, as soon as they have expended their anger upon another object’. So Eth. N., u. s., 1126 a 21, *παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα*. “Tanta enim est primi impetus in ira vis, ut cupiditatem fere omnem effundat.” Schrader. He also cites from Plutarch's Life of Alexander the case of Alexander the Great, who expended his anger against the Greeks on the destruction of Thebes, and afterwards spared Athens. Victorius supplies a very pertinent passage from Lysias, Or. XIX *ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων* §§ 5, 6, *ἀκούω γὰρ ἔγωγε...ὅτι πάντων δεινότατόν ἐστι διαβολή· μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο ἔχει ἂν τις δεινότατον, ὅταν πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ αἰτίᾳ εἰς ἀγῶνα καταστῶσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἱ τελευταῖοι κρινόμενοι σώζονται· πεπαυμένοι γὰρ ὀργῆς αὐτῶν ἀκροῶσθε, καὶ τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἥδη ἐβέλοντες ἀποδέχσθε*.

On Philocrates, of the Attic deme Hagnus (Ἀγνούσιος), a contemporary and political rival of Demosthenes, see two columns of references from the Orators, chiefly Demosthenes and Aeschines, in Baiter and Sauppe's excellent *Index nominum*, appended to their edition of the Greek Orators, III 137 seq. [See also Arnold Schaefer's *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, II 345 and elsewhere. S.]

‘As happened in the case of Ergophilus; for though they (the Athenian assembly) were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they let him off, because they had condemned Callisthenes to death the day before’. Callisthenes and Ergophilus were both of them Athenian generals commanding in the Chersonese, B. C. 362. See Grote, *Hist. of*

συνέβη ἐπὶ Ἐργοφίλου. μᾶλλον γὰρ χαλεπαίνοντες p. 61.  
 ἢ Καλλισθένει ἀφείσαν διὰ τὸ Καλλισθένους τῇ προ-  
 14 τεραία καταγνῶναι θάνατον. καὶ ἐὰν ἐλεῶσιν, καὶ  
 ἐὰν μείζον κακὸν πεπονθότες ὥσιν ἢ οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι  
 ἂν ἔδρασαν· ὥσπερ εἰληφέναι γὰρ οἴονται τιμωρίαν.  
 15 καὶ ἐὰν ἀδικεῖν οἴωνται αὐτοὶ καὶ δικαίως πάσχειν· οὐ  
 γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι  
 παρὰ τὸ προσήκον οἴονται πάσχειν, ἢ δ' ὀργὴ τοῦτο  
 ἦν. διὸ δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ προκολλάζειν· ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ  
 16 ἥττον κολαζόμενοι καὶ οἱ δοῦλοι. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθή-  
 σεσθαι οἴωνται ὅτι δι' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνθ' ὧν ἔπαθον· ἢ

Gr. x 508, 511, and the references in Baiter and Sauppe, u. s. pp. 45 and 73 [also A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I 134]. The former is to be distinguished from Callisthenes the contemporary Orator. Of Ergophilus, Demosthenes says, de Fals. Leg. § 180, καὶ ὅσοι διὰ ταῦτ' (corruption and treachery in the exercise of military command) ἀπολώλασι παρ' ὑμῖν, οἱ δὲ χρήματα πάμπολλ' ὠφλήκασιν οὐ χαλεπὸν δεῖξαι, Ἐργοφίλος, Κηφισόδοτος, Τιμόμαχος, κ.τ.λ. To reconcile this passage with that of Aristotle, we must suppose that Ergophilus was one of those that were fined, but acquitted on the capital charge; which is not quite accurately expressed by ἀφείσαν: or possibly the two cases may be distinct.

§ 14. 'Sympathy or compassion calms angry feeling; and if the offence (which has aroused their indignation) has been visited by a heavier punishment than those who are thus angry would themselves have inflicted (their anger is appeased); for they think they have received a sort of (ὥσπερ) satisfaction (for the injury)', or 'exactd as it were a penalty (for the offence)'.

§ 15. 'Or again, if they think that they are themselves in fault, and are suffering no more than they deserve; for justice, 'reciprocity', or fair retaliation, excites no anger: and so they no longer think that the treatment they receive is in violation of their natural rights, and this, as we said, is essential to (or the notion of) anger'. ἦν 'was—when we said it': that is, in the definition II 2. 1. On προσήκον, the appeal to *nature* as the basis of *obligation*, see note on μὴ προσήκοντος (on II 2. 1 at the end). 'And therefore punishment should always be preceded by *the* (appropriate, τῷ) explanation (of the nature of the offence and the justice of the punishment); for even slaves are less vexed at being punished (when treated in this way)'. This is Muretus' interpretation, against Victorius. It is no doubt the natural and correct explanation. ['Decet verbis castigare, antequam puniamus.' Spengel.]

§ 16. '(And men in anger are more easily pacified) if they think that (those that they desire to punish) will never find out that the punishment is due to them (that they are the authors of it) and that it is in compensation for their own injuries'; (this is the φαινομένη δλιγωρία of the defi-

γὰρ ὀργὴ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστόν ἐστιν· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ. διὸ ὀρθῶς πεποιήται

φάσθαι Ὀδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον,  
ὥς οὐ τετιμωρημένος εἰ μὴ ἦσθετο καὶ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ  
ἀνθ' οὗτου. ὥστε οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι μὴ αἰσθάνονται  
ὀργίζονται, οὔτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ἔτι, ὥς πεπονθόσι  
τε τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ οὐκ ἀλγήσουσιν οὐδ' αἰσθησομένοις,  
οὗ οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφίενται. διὸ εὖ περὶ τοῦ Ἐκτορος  
ὁ ποιητής, παῦσαι βουλόμενος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα  
τῆς ὀργῆς τεθνεῶτος,  
κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων.

nition: see note on p. 10.), 'for anger is always directed against individuals, (II 2. 2, *infra* 4. 31, where this is made the characteristic of *anger*, as opposed to *hatred*), as appears from the definition'. This *inference from the definition* is drawn from the *φαινόμενη τιμωρία* which is the object of the angry man. If the punishment is to be such as *can be actually seen*, the anger cannot be directed against abstractions like classes or kinds, but must have a single, palpable, concrete, and also animated object; something that can *feel*, and *show* that it is hurt.

'And therefore (the trait of character, the representation, in) the verse' (of Homer, *Odys.* IX 504) 'is right and true (to nature, rightly conceived and expressed), "Tell him that it is *Ulysses* waster of cities (that blinded him)"—as though his revenge was not complete' (i. e. the revenge of Ulysses, or of the character in Homer; which is the suppressed nomin. to *πεποιήται*, and with which *τετιμωρημένος* agrees: *lit.* the character is rightly represented in the verses as not fully avenged) 'unless the other (the Cyclops) was aware by whom and for what' (the blindness was inflicted).

The passage runs thus: Κύκλωψ, αἶ κέν τις σε καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀφθαλμοῦ εἴρηται ἀεικελίην ἀλαωτύν, φάσθαι Ὀδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον ἐξαλαῶσαι, ἰδὼν Λαέρτew, Ἰθάκῃ ἐνὶ οἰκί' ἔχοντα. 'So that men are not angry with *all the rest* (all besides those who are actually within reach), who are out of sight (far away, for instance), nor any more with the dead' (*εἴτι*, they do not *retain* their anger beyond the grave) 'as with those who have endured the last extremity, and are no longer susceptible of pain, nor indeed of any feeling, which (to give the other pain and to make him *feel*) is what the angry man aims at. And therefore the poet (Homer, *Iliad*, Ω 54) has well said of Hector, wishing to represent Achilles as ceasing from his anger against the dead (*lit.* wishing to put a stop to his anger, i. e. *represent it as ceasing*): "For in truth it is but dumb (senseless) earth that he is outraging in his wrath." Or rather, *παῦσαι βουλόμενος* means to suggest or assign a reason or motive for Achilles' ceasing from his anger: the words being those of Apollo, who is haranguing the



17 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τοῖς καταπραΰνειν βουλομένοις ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων λεκτέον, αὐτοὺς μὲν παρασκευάζουσι τοιοῦτους, οἷς δ' ὀργίζονται, ἢ φοβεροὺς ἢ Gods on the propriety of permitting Hector's body to be buried, and concludes his speech very emphatically with this line.

παῦσαι βουλόμενος] These words, applied to the poet himself instead of the character Apollo, *represented* in the poem, are an instance of a not unfrequent confusion in expressions of this kind. It is the substitution of the author himself for his personage or character; or the conversion of the doctrine of a given philosopher or school into the philosopher or school that holds it. Plat. Rep. II 363 D, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους...κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἄιδου, καὶ κοσμίῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν, of Musaeus and the Orphics, who '*represent them as buried*, and compelled to carry...' Theaet. 183 A, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ, the Heracliteans to wit, 'that we may not represent them as *stopping*'—contrary to their doctrine of the universal flux. Similarly the Eleatics, Ib. 157 A, are called οἱ ἴσταντες, 'the stationers', meaning those who represent every thing as stationary or at rest. So Soph. 252 A, the opposition *school*, of Heraclitus, receives the name of οἱ ῥόντες, 'the fluent philosophers', 'the flowing gentry', instead of their theory: and compare Theaet. 181 A, τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. A good example is Thuc. I 5, οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλέοντων...ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λησταί εἰσιν, making their characters put these questions. Arist. Ran. 15, if the vulg. be retained (Meineke omits it), Ib. 833, ἐτεραπεύετο, 911 (Aeschylus), πρῶτιστα μὲν γὰρ ἓνα τιν' ἂν καθίσεν (introduced in a sitting position) ἐγκαλύψας. In Aristotle it is still more common: de Gen. Anim. 722 b 19, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς γεννᾷ. Metaph. A 8, 989 b 34, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι...γεννῶσι τὸν οὐρανόν, de Anima I 2, 405 a 25, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος...ἐξ ἧς τὰλλα συνίστησιν, 'of which he represents, holds theoretically, everything else to be composed'. Ib. 404 b 16 and 24, (certain philosophers) τὴν ψυχὴν συνιστᾷσιν. De Gen. et Corr. I 1, 314 a 9, ὅσοι πάντα ἐξ ἐνὸς γεννῶσιν, and b 1, τοῖς ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα κατασκευάζουσιν. De part. Anim. I 1. 21, 640 b 11, οὕτως τὸν κόσμον γεννῶσιν, and § 22, 640 b 17, ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων συνιστᾷσι τὴν φύσιν πάντες. See Dr Lightfoot's notes on Ep. ad Gal. vi 13, οἱ περιτεμνόμενοι, 'the Circumcisionists', the advocates of Circumcision. Similarly in Latin, Juven. VII 151, *quum perimit saevos classis numerosa tyrannos*. Hor. Sat. II 5. 41, *Furius hibernas cana nive conspuet Alpes*.

§ 17. 'It is plain therefore that those who want to soothe a man down (bring him down to a placid state from the *exaltation* of his passion) must derive their propositions (or the traits of character) from these topics, presenting *themselves* in such a light—assuming such a character *themselves*—(as is represented in the foregoing analysis), and the objects of their anger as either formidable, or worthy of high respect, or benefactors, or involuntary agents, or as excessively afflicted at what they have done'. αἰσχύνῃ here is the feeling of reverence or awe which is felt in the presence of any one who is entitled to unusual respect or admiration (see note on c. 2. 22); and αἰσχύνῃς ἀξίους is equivalent to τοιοῦτους πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνεσθαι δεῖ: and ὑπεραλγοῦντας is the representative of the μεταμελόμενοι of § 5.

αἰσχύνης ἀξίους ἢ κεχαρισμένους ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ ὑπεραλ-  
γούντας τοῖς πεπονημένοις.

- 1 τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν CHAP. IV.  
2 φιλίαν καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ὀρισάμενοι λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ  
τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαι τινι ἃ οἶεται ἀγαθὰ, ἐκείνου

I have already hinted a doubt in the notes on the preceding chapter whether *πραότης* is properly ranked amongst the *πάθη*. I think that it can be made plainly to appear that it is not. It is introduced no doubt for the purpose of giving the opposite side to the topics of anger, because the student of Rhetoric is in every case required to be acquainted with both sides of a question. And this purpose it may answer very well without being a real opposite of *ὀργή* or indeed a *πάθος* at all. If we compare *πραότης* with the other *πάθη* analysed in this second book, we find that it differs from all of them in this respect—that the rest are emotions, instinctive and *active*, and tend to some positive result; whereas *πραότης* is inactive and leads to nothing but the allaying, subduing, lowering, of the angry passion, which it reduces to a particular state, the right or mean state of temper. It seems plain therefore that it is in reality, what it is stated to be in the Ethics, a *ἔξις*, not a *πάθος*, of the *temper*; an acquired and settled state of one of the *πάθη*, viz. *ὀργή*, in the mean state (or due measure) of which (the *πάθη*) all virtue resides. It is accordingly represented in the Ethics as a virtue, the mean between irascibility and insensibility, the due measure of the passionate element or emotion of our nature; and as a virtue it is the control or regulation of our temper. The true *πάθος* is the *ὀργή*, the instinctive capacity of angry feeling, which may be cultivated by habit and education and developed in either direction, for good or evil; till it becomes *ὀργιλότης* irascibility, or *ἀοργησία* insensibility—if it take a *wrong* direction—or else settles into the mean state of a calm and placid temper. And this is the view that is taken of it in Nic. Eth. IV 11, init. *πραότης* is *μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς*; Ib. 1125 ὁ 30, τὸ μὲν γὰρ *πάθος* ἐστὶν *ὀργή*; line 34, βούλεται γὰρ ὁ *πρᾶος* ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ *πάθους*, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. This is doubtless the correct view; and the other, though no doubt *subsequent* to that of the Ethics, is adopted in the Rhetoric merely for convenience, philosophical accuracy not being required. Compare the introductory note to this Chapter.

#### CHAPTER IV.

1. 'Let us now proceed, after having first defined love and loving, to analyse its *objects, motives or occasions*'.

§ 2. *ἔστω*] as usual, in the *popular* Rhetoric. See note on I 5. 8, &c.

'Let love then be assumed to be, the wishing to another whatever we think good, for *his* sake, not for our own, and the inclination to do such things (to do him good) to the utmost of our power'. Eth. Nic. VIII 3, sub init. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται ἀγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. This makes the nearest approach to a regular definition of *φιλία* in the Ethics, and is constantly recognised as the principle of love through-

ἐνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύνามιν πρακτικὸν  
 εἶναι τούτων. φίλος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλοῦ- P. 1381.  
 μενος. οἶονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι  
 3 πρὸς ἀλλήλους. τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον  
 εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα  
 τοῖς λυπηροῖς μὴ διὰ τι ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκείνον. γιγ-  
 νομένων γὰρ ὧν βούλονται χαίρουσι πάντες, τῶν  
 ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως σημείον p. 61.

out the treatise on *φιλία*, in Books VIII and IX. It represents the desire or the inclination of doing good to the object of your affection, which is naturally, or has become by habit, instinctive, and therefore a *πάθος*. In both definitions *βούλεσθαι* is prominent and characteristic. Love is a feeling, a sort of appetite, the wish to do good; the power and the means of doing good being alike accidental and non-essential, though it is true (which is here added to the definition) that the inclination is always present, and will be gratified when the means are forthcoming. The words *ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ* express the unselfishness, the disinterested character, of the emotion. *ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινα χρήσιν* (Eth. Nic. IX 5 sub fin.). Cicero, de Nat. Deor. I ult. (quoted by Schrader), has the same remark. He adds, '*Prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo quod fructus ex iis capiuntur. Hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est.*'

'And a friend is one that loves, and is beloved in return. And those that have this disposition, or entertain this feeling to one another'.  
*εὖνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονησὶ φιλίαν εἶναι.* Eth. N. VIII 2, 1155 b 34.

§ 3. 'From this assumption the necessary consequence is that a friend is one who sympathizes with us in our joys and sorrows, rejoicing at the good that befalls us, and grieved at that which gives us pain, not with any ulterior motive; but solely on our friend's account. For all feel joy in obtaining the object of their wishes, and pain at the reverse, so that the pleasures and pains that they feel are an indication of the nature of their wish'. The pleasure or pain felt on the occasion of a friend's good or bad fortune is the test of the nature of their wishes, and therefore of their friendship or hatred. And also, as every one feels pleasure at *his own* success and pain at disappointment, so by the rule *φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός, ἕτερος αὐτός*, 'a friend is a second self', (Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 31, 9, sub init. et 1170 b 6), the test of friendship is this community of pleasure and pain between friend and friend. *Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum firma amicitia est*, says Sallust. This same principle of 'fellow-feeling' as the basis of friendship (which is here principally in question) runs through the following sections to § 7. Zeno, the Stoic, *ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί ἐστι φίλος; ἄλλος, ἔφη, ἐγώ.* Diog. Laert. VII 1, (Zeno) § 23.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The reverse of the medal is presented by the cynical La Rochefoucauld, *Maxime* 81, "*Nous ne pouvons rien aimer que par rapport a nous, et nous ne*

- 4 αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. καὶ οἷς δὴ<sup>1</sup> ταῦτ' ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοι, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροί. ταῦτ' γὰρ τούτοις βούλεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ὥστε ἅ περ αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βουλόμενος, τούτῳ φαίνεται  
5 φίλος εἶναι. καὶ τοὺς πεποιηκότας εὖ φιλοῦσιν, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κήδονται. ἢ εἰ μέγала, ἢ εἰ προθύμως, ἢ

<sup>1</sup> ἤδη

§ 4. 'And those who have *now* (by this time, ἤδη) learnt to regard the same things as good and bad (to each)', 'id est, qui eandem fortunam subiere, et in eum statum ac conditionem vitae venere, ut quod aliis molestum sit ipsis quoque incommode, et quod alios iuvet eodem pacto ipsos sublevet' (Victorius); 'and those who have the same friends and the same enemies; for between such there must needs be a community of wishes, (good to the common friend, harm to the common enemy,) and therefore, by wishing for another the same things that he desires for himself, a man plainly shews that he is that man's friend'. See the illustrations from the Eth. N. quoted in the preceding note. For καὶ οἷς δὴ (A<sup>c</sup> and Bekker), Q, Y<sup>b</sup> and Z<sup>b</sup> have ἤδη, which is the reading of Victorius, and is supported by Vater. The latter notes (as I had myself observed) that δὴ 'you know', 'to be sure', to attract attention, is not at all in Aristotle's manner (it is Platonic, not Aristotelian) in a mere enumeration like this. I doubt if there is another instance of it in the Rhetoric. ἤδη on the contrary, which Victorius has represented in his explanation, is quite in point, and in fact *adds* something to the sense.

§ 5. 'And men love their benefactors in general, (those who have done good) either to themselves or to those whom they care for; or those who have done them great and important services, or have shewn forwardness; readiness, in doing them; or if they were done on similar, i.e. great, occasions (when the need was urgent, or the benefit signal), and for their sakes alone; or those whom they suppose to wish to do them good': the manifest inclination, τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων, § 2, being, as a test of friendship, equivalent to the actual performance. For ἢ οὐκ ἂν, Muretus, Wolf, and Brandis' *Anonymus* (in Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV. i. p. 46) read καὶ οὐκ, as the commencement of a new topic.

*faisons que suivre notre goût et notre plaisir quand nous préférons nos amis nous-mêmes; c'est néanmoins par cette préférence seule que l'amitié peut être vraie et parfaite,*" and 83, "*Ce que les hommes ont nommé amitié n'est qu'une société, qu'un ménagement réciproque d'intérêts, et qu'un échange de bons offices; ce n'est enfin qu'un commerce où l'amour propre se propose toujours quelque chose à gagner.*" The author of the *Leviathan* takes an equally low view of human nature, and derives from self-love, in some form or other, all our emotions and desires. They are all reducible to 'appetite' or 'desire'. "That which men desire they are also said to *love*: and to *hate* those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object; by love most commonly the presence of the same." Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Pt. I. ch. 6. For a philosophical analysis of the 'Tender Emotion,' its origin and varieties, see Bain, *Emotions and Will*, Ch. VI [Ch. VII, ed. 1875].

εἰ ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα· ἣ οὐς ἂν  
6 οἶωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὖ. καὶ τοὺς τῶν φίλων  
φίλους καὶ φιλοῦντας οὐς αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσιν. καὶ τοὺς  
7 φιλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν φιλουμένων ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ τοὺς  
τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μισοῦντας οὐς αὐτοὶ μισοῦσιν,  
καὶ τοὺς μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῖς μισουμένων  
πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ταῦτ' ἀγαθὰ φαίνεται εἶναι καὶ  
ἐαυτοῖς, ὥστε βούλεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ, ὅ περ ἦν  
8 τοῦ φίλου. ἔτι τοὺς εὐποιοητικούς εἰς χρήματα καὶ

τοιούτοις] 'such as, similar to' the before-mentioned, i.e. *μεγάλοις*. With this use of *τοιούτος* comp. Pl. *Phaedo* 59 A, 67 A, 79 C, 80 C, *ἐάν τις χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ*, 'at a similar period of life', like the preceding, i.e. *χαριέσση*. (See Stallbaum's note.) Thuc. III 58, Πανσανίας *ἔθαπτεν αὐτοὺς νομίζων ἐν γῇ τε φιλία τιθέναι καὶ παρ' ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις* 'and amongst men of the same sort', i.e. *φιλίοις*. Demosth. de F. Leg. § 103, καὶ *τοῦναντίον ὀργῇ, ἃν τοιαῦτα φαίνεται πεποιηκώς*, sc. *ὀργῆς ἄξια*. Arist. Pol. I 8, 1256 a 36, οἱ δ' *ἀφ' ἀλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοικοῦσιν*, 'who live by a sea of the same kind', i.e. of the same kind as the before-mentioned lakes, marshes, rivers, in which *fish* are to be found. Ib. II 4, 1262 b 1, *ἦττον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία.....* δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, sc. *ἦττον φίλους*. Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1310 b 12, ἡ καθ' *ὑπεροχὴν τοιούτου γένους* 'a similar family', to the preceding.

§ 6. 'And friends' friends, that is (*καὶ*) the friends of those whom we love ourselves. And those who are beloved by those that are beloved by ourselves'. If friendship is *mutual*, surely this is a 'vain repetition'.

§ 7. 'And those who have the same enemies, or hate the same people that we ourselves hate, and those that are hated by the same people as we are hated by: for all such persons suppose the same things to be good as we do ourselves, and therefore they *wish* the same things as we do; which was the definition of a friend'. § 2, *βούλεσθαι τινὶ ἃ οἶεται ἀγαθὰ*. These common hatreds, founded on the principle of *idem velle atque idem nolle*, and expressed in the proverb *κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*, are one of the strongest bonds of union by which religious and political parties, for example, are held together. On *κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*, see Plat. *Legg.* v 10, 739 C, a passage worth comparing on this subject of 'communism': *Rep.* IV 424 A, v 449 C, Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VIII 11 sub init. and the entire chapter, on this topic; καὶ ἡ παροιμία "*κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*" ὁρθῶς, ἐν *κοινωνίᾳ* γὰρ ἡ φιλία, 1159 b 32. And on the same, IX 8, 1168 b 6, καὶ αἱ παροιμῖαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ "*μία ψυχὴ*" καὶ "*κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*" καὶ "*ἰσότης φιλότης*" καὶ "*γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον*" κ.τ.λ.

τοῦ φίλου] *Anglice*, 'a friend'; on the *generic* use of the Greek definite article see note on § 31 of this Chapter.

§ 8. 'Again, those who are capable of and inclined to' (both of which are contained in the termination *-ικός*) 'do service to others in the way of assist-

εἰς σωτηρίαν· διὸ τοὺς ἐλευθερίους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους  
 9 τιμῶσι καὶ τοὺς δικαίους. τοιοῦτους δ' ὑπολαμβάν-  
 νουσι τοὺς μὴ ἀφ' ἐτέρων ζῶντας· τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ ἀπὸ  
 τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν  
 10 ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα. καὶ τοὺς σῶφρονας,  
 ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοι. καὶ τοὺς ἀπράγμονας διὰ τὸ αὐτό.

ance, either pecuniary, or tending to their personal safety : and this is why the liberal, and brave, and just are held in honour'. The liberal aid them with money; the brave defend them from personal injury (*εἰς σωτηρίαν*); and the just are always ready at least to pay their debts, and if they don't do them any *positive* service, at any rate can be depended upon to abstain from fraud and wrong. This is the utilitarian view of virtue, which we have had already very prominently brought forward in I 9; see for instance §§ 4, 6. Comp. I 6. 6.

§ 9. The connexion between this topic and the preceding is thus given by Victorius. 'The truly just are not easy to recognise, and we are apt to be deceived by the outside show and to mistake unreal for real justice. Consequently, in default of better evidence of justice in men, they assume (*ὑπολαμβάνουσιν*) those to be just who mind their own business, and live upon their own resources or labour, and do not prey upon others, *μὴ ἀφ' ἐτέρων ζῶντας*. Such are those who work for their bread, and amongst these especially, those who live upon (from the produce of) agriculture; and of all *the rest*<sup>1</sup> (or else), those most of all who labour with their own hands'.

οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας αὐτουργοί] See note on I 12. 25. Hesych. αὐτουργός, ὁ δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἐργαζόμενος. In the Oeconomics, attributed to Aristotle, I 2, 1343 a 25, agriculture is described as the first (in the natural order), and the greatest and most virtuous of all employments, κτήσεως δὲ πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια ἢ κατὰ φύσιν· κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ἡ γεωργικὴ προτέρα, καὶ δεύτεραι ὅσαι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἷον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη τοιαύτη. ἡ δὲ γεωργικὴ μάλιστα ὅτι δικαία· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων οὐθ' ἐκόντων, ὥσπερ καπηλεία καὶ αἱ μισθαρνικαί, οὐτ' ἀκόντων ὥσπερ αἱ πολεμικαί. This explains the *μὴ ἀφ' ἐτέρων ζῶντας* of the text. Agriculturalists do not make their profit of *men*, but of the *land* which they cultivate.

§ 10. 'And the temperate' (those who exercise self control), 'because they are not inclined to wrong'. Being temperate, and their passions under strict control, they are not tempted by any licentious and ill-regulated desires to gratify these by wrong doing. The import and extent of the virtue of *σωφροσύνη* are best set forth by Plato in the Gorgias. It is the principle of order and moderation in the human composition, and is hardly distinguishable from the conception of *δικαιοσύνη*, the virtue that regulates the entire human machine, in the Republic.

<sup>1</sup> This redundant ἄλλος with the superlative—the superfluous union of the comparative with the superlative—may be illustrated here by two parallel examples from Shakespeare. *Mids. Night's Dream*, v. 1. 250, *This is the greatest error of all the rest*. *Macbeth*, v. 8. 4, *Of all men else I have avoided thee*.

- 11 καὶ οἷς βουλόμεθα φίλοι εἶναι, ἐὰν φαίνωνται βουλό-  
μενοι· εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἱ τ' ἀγαθοὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ  
οἱ εὐδόκιμοι ἢ ἐν ἅπασιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς βελτίστοις ἢ ἐν  
τοῖς θαυμάζομένοις ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμάζουσιν  
12 αὐτούς. ἔτι τοὺς ἡδεῖς συνδιαγαγεῖν καὶ συνδιμε-  
ρεῦσαι· τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ εὐκόλοι καὶ μὴ ἐλεγκτικοὶ

Dr Whewell in his Transl. of the Gorgias thinks that the character assigned to it by Plato is best expressed by the term 'self-control'.

'And those who abstain from business', lead an easy quiet life, and don't meddle with *other people's* business, 'for the same reason'. ἀπράγμων is opposed to πολυπράγμων, a meddler, or busy-body.

§ 11. 'And those we should (otherwise, on general considerations) like to be friends, provided they manifest the same inclination—make it clear' (φαίνωνται emphatic), 'that they wish it (on their side); and such are the good in respect of moral virtue', (men may be *good* or excel in other things, as the βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος excellent in shouting, and πύξ ἀγαθὸς Πολυδεύκης in boxing); 'and men who are held in repute, either by every one, or by the best, or by those whom we ourselves admire and respect, or by those who respect and admire us'. If we read ἐν οἷς θαυμάζουσιν αὐτούς (Bekker retains τοῖς) with A<sup>c</sup>, Q, Y, Z, which Spengel adopts, these four last particulars will be all neuters. 'And those who are distinguished, either in every thing ('admirable Crichtons'), or in the best things (qualities, pursuits, studies, accomplishments, or rank, wealth, power, according to taste), or in things which we ourselves respect and admire, or in those things which they admire in us (*lit.* in those things in which they admire us)'.

§ 12. 'And further, those who are pleasant to pass our life, or spend the day, with; such are men who are good-tempered and cheerful', (εὐκόλος contrasted with δύσκολος, transferred from good and bad digestion κῶλον, to the temper and character; Arist. Ran. 82, of the good-tempered, genial Sophocles), 'and not inclined to find fault with any accidental error or mistake (not critical and censorious), and not quarrelsome, or contentious: for all such are combative, pugnacious; and people that contend with one (in word or act, by contradiction, or interference with and opposition to our tastes and wishes) appear to have wishes contrary to ours'—and as to have *the same* wishes is characteristic of friendship, § 4, it is plain that people of this sort cannot be our friends. Comp. Eth. Nic. VIII 6, 1157 b 15, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεῖν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ. These two words are joined together again in Eth. Nic. VIII 6, 1157 b 21, Ib. c. 15, 1162 b 14, 16.

συνδιαγαγεῖν, συνδιμερεῦσαι] This form of verb, principally with the prepositions ἐν and σύν—also in two or three cases with ἐπί—which assumes for its explanation the dative of the indefinite pronoun, αὐτῷ or αὐτῇ, αὐτοῖς or αὐταῖς, as the case may be, (the repetition of some substantive immediately preceding *in which* the person or thing resides, or with which it is associated,) as understood after the preposition, is expressed in our idiom by adding the preposition at the end

τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων καὶ μὴ φιλόνηκοι μηδὲ δυσέριδες·  
πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχητικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι  
13 τάναντία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι. καὶ οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ

of the phrase. Thus, the two verbs here in question are represented in English by 'to pass one's life with', 'to spend the day with', the phrase at full length being, τοὺς ἡδεῖς ὥστε τινὰ συνδιαγαγεῖν αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς being the persons previously mentioned. Porson, *Advers.* p. 265, has referred to notes of various Commentators, who have illustrated this idiom, and Elmsley has supplied four examples, on Eur. Bacch. 508, ἐνδυσυγχῆσαι τοῦνομ' ἐπιτήδειος εἶ. Add the following, Soph. Oed. Col. 790, χθονὸς λαχεῖν τοσοῦτον, ἐνθανεῖν μόνον, 'earth enough to die in'. Phoen. 727, ἐνδυσυγχῆσαι δεινὸν εὐφρόνης κνέφας (comp. Shakspeare, *Lear*, III 4. 116, *a naughty night to swim in*). Ib. Erechth. Fragm. xx v 22 (Dind.) ἦθθ, λαμπρὰ συγγελᾶν μόνον. Arist. Nub. 422, ἐπιχαλκεύειν παρέχοιμ' ἄν, 'I would lend myself to be forged on' (παρέχοιμ' ἄν supply ἐμάντον, as Aj. 1146, πατεῖν παρείχε τῷ θέλοντι ναυτίλων, 'lent himself to be trodden on'); Id. Equit. 616, ἄξιόν γε πᾶσιν ἐπολολύξαι, 'to shout at', Pac. 1127, ap. Elms. Thuc. III 23, οὐ βέβαιος ὥστε ἐπελθεῖν, 'ice, not firm, unsafe, to tread on'. And the false antithesis in II 44, καὶ οἷς ἐνευδαμονησαί τε ὁ βίος ὁμοίως καὶ ἐντελευτῆσαι ξυνεμετρήθη. II 74, γῆν...εὐμενῇ ἐναγωνίσασθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν 'a land propitious for the Greeks to fight in'. I 2, ὅσον ἀποζῆν, 'enough to live off' or 'on'. Xenoph. Symp. II 18, οἶκημα ἐνιδρῶσαι, Ib. III 8, (γῆν) ἱκανῶς γένοιτο ἐγκονίσασθαι. Memor. III 8. 8 (οἰκία) ἡδίστη ἐνδιατᾶσθαι. Plat. Polit. 302 B (πολιτεία) ἥκιστα χαλεπὴ συζῆν, 'by no means hard to live with'. Ib. E, βαρυνάτη ξυνοικῆσαι. Phaedr. 228 E, ἐμάντον σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν. Phaedo 84 A, παραδιδόναί ἐαυτήν (τὴν ψυχὴν) πάλιν αὐτὴν ἐγκαταδεῖν. Herod. VII 59, ὁ χώρος ἐπιτήδειος ἐνδιατᾶσαι τε καὶ ἐναριθμῆσαι. Comp. VI 102, IX 7, quoted by Elmsley. Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 12, 1331 b 12, ἀγορὰ ἐνσχολάζειν 'a market-place to lounge in'. Lucian, Ver. Hist. I 31, ἱκανὸν μυριάνδρῳ πόλει ἐνοικεῖν. Albian, Hist. Anim. VI 42, στιβάδα ἐγκαθεύδειν. Dem. de Cor. § 198, τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀτυχήματα ἐνευδοκίμειν ἀπέκειτο. ἐγκαταλείπειν, *passim*. Matth. Gr. Gr. 533, obs. 2.

§ 13. καὶ οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι] Arist. has changed his construction from the accus. to the nomin., from the *objects* to the *subjects* of *liking*—for *love* is here out of the question: these are men who are popular and agreeable in society. We may supply φιλοῦνται, or ραδίως φίλοι γίνονται. 'And those who are dexterous at replying and submitting to raillery—who can take, as well as give, a joke, gibe—' (for here again there is community of sentiment, another instance of fellow-feeling ταὐτὸ φαίνεται ἀγαθόν, the foundation of friendship) 'for the mind of each party is set upon (their efforts are directed to, σπεύδουσι) the same thing (mutual amusement, a friendly reciprocity in amusing each other) as (that of) his neighbour, (the *opposite* in the 'wit-combat' or jesting-match), and each of them is equally capable of taking a joke, and returning the taunt, but *neatly*, gracefully, with propriety'.

ἐπιδέσιος is one of those adjectives compounded with ἐπί, in which the preposition expresses either the *tendency* or inclination (*lit.* direction), or the *liability* to anything, which is defined in the second part of the



τῳθάσαι καὶ ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ ταυτὸ γὰρ ἀμφοτέροι

compound. ἐπιδέξις is a man that has a tendency to the use of his *right hand*, the sign of skill and *dexterity*; the right and left hand being severally the symbols of dexterity or cleverness and awkwardness; *dexter, laevus*; δεξιός, δεξιότης, σκαῖός, ἀριστερός; *gauche*.

Another secondary notion, propitious and unpropitious, belonging to these terms, is derived from the observations of augury, according as the omens appear on the right or left hand: but in Latin, at all events, the notion of 'awkwardness' conveyed by *laevus*, and the opposite by *dexter*, cannot have been suggested by this, because in their practice omens *on the left, laeva, sinistra*, were *favourable*.

ἐπιδέξις is therefore one who has a tendency to δεξιότης, and follows the analogy of ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπιθάνατος (liable to danger and death), ἐπαίτιος, ἐπίδικος, ἐπικαίρος or ἐπικαίριος, ἐπιλήσμων, ἐπιζήμιος, ἐπιμομφος, ἐπίλυπος, ἐπίνοσος, ἐπικόπος, ἐπιμελής, ἐπίμαχος, ἐπαναγκής, ἐπεικής, ἐπίδοξος ('one who is expected to'... *liable to that expectation*, Isocr. Areop. § 48). ὑπό in comp. has very nearly the same signification, derived from the 'subjection' which it implies. So ὑπεύθυνος (subject or liable to a scrutiny), ὑπόδικος, ὑπόλογος (amenable to an account, accountable, responsible), by metaphor from the analogy of ὑπόσκιος 'under the shade of', ὑποσμος, Arist. de Anima, II 9, 421 b 12. ὑπόστεγος, ὑπαίθριος, ὑπομβρος, ὑπόφορος, ὑπόσπονδος.

τῳθάζειν is a variety of σκώπτειν, to gird at, mock, jeer at, some one in particular; both of them (as well as others of the same class) being distinguished from other forms of wit or pleasantry by their personal direction, or *personality*. The word occurs in Plato and Aristophanes, Vesp. 1362 and 1368, and once in Herodotus [II 60]. It is plain from the application of it, for instance in the passages of Aristophanes, that its special meaning is what we now call 'chaffing' or 'poking fun at', the repartees, or witticisms, mostly of a highly personal character, which pass between the combatants in what is also nowadays called 'a slanging match'. This is confirmed by the use of the word in Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 17, 1336 b 17. The author is there condemning the practice of αἰσχρολογία, 'indecent language', which should not be tolerated in a model state. An exception however is made in favour of certain seasons of especial licence, as at the Eleusinian mysteries, and the orgies of particular deities to whose worship this τῳθασμός 'licentious raillery' was appropriate, and permitted by law, οἷς καὶ τὸν τῳθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος: such were Dionysus during the celebration of the Bacchanalia, Aphrodite, Priapus, Hermaphroditus, Ilythia, and others; see Schneider ad loc. Comp. Addenda p. 509, and Eaton.

All this is abundantly illustrated in the Chorus of the Ranae, 316—430. It is descriptive of the wild license that prevailed, and of the indecent language of the τῳθασμός that was then allowed—see particularly the *application* of the τῳθασμός, in the shape of *indecent personalities*, 416—430; and the τῳθασμός is there represented by various phrases indicative of its character, τὰν ἀκόλαστον φιλαπαίγμονα τιμάν, 334; βωμολόχοις ἔπεισι, 'scurrilous' phrases, 358; κάπισκώπων καὶ παίζων καὶ χλευάζων, 375; παίσαντα καὶ σκώψαντα; and finally (as already mentioned) by the

σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον, δυνάμενοί τε σκώπτεσθαι καὶ  
 14 ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες. καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινούντας τὰ ὑπάρ-  
 χοντα ἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἃ φοβούνται μὴ  
 15 ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς. καὶ τοὺς καθαρῖους περὶ ὄψιν, περὶ

*specimen* given at the end. Comp. Vesp. 1362, ἢν αὐτὸν τωθάσω νεανικῶς οἷοις ποθ' οὗτος ἐμὲ πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων. This license of language, allowed during the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, reached its height at the bridge over the Cephissus, which was crossed and recrossed by the initiated on their way to and from Eleusis; where they were doubtless also awaited by a very numerous mob quite ready to take part in the fun. Hence γεφυρίζειν and γεφυρισμός, ἐξ ἀμάξης λέγειν. Bentl. Phal. I p. 335, Monk's Ed. [p. 307, ed. Wagner]. See on this also Müller, *Hist. of Gk. Lit.* c. XI § 5, p. 132, Engl. Tr.

A similar license of language and conduct was permitted at the Roman Saturnalia, 'the slaves' holiday': and was also illustrated by the *Fescennina*, or Fescennine verses (Liv. VII 2), in which the countryfolk (and afterwards the townsfolk) assailed and ridiculed one another in extemporaneous verses. *Fescennina per hunc inventa licentia morem, versibus alternis opprobria rustica fudit*, Hor. Ep. II I. 145; *procax Fescennina locutio*, Catull. 61. 124; Victorius ad Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 17, u. s. quotes Athenaeus, XIV 622 E, of the φαλλοφόροι, εἰτα προστρέχοντες ἐτώθαζον οὓς προέλουτο.

§ 14. 'We like also those that praise our virtues and accomplishments (the goods we have, and those in particular of which the possession is doubtful (which we are afraid we do *not* possess)'. Praise is the test of virtue, (I 9, and Introd. Appendix B, p. 212,) and the acknowledgment of others that we do actually possess the excellences of which we are ourselves in doubt. This confirmation of our hesitating opinion as to our own merits must of course be gratifying, and we accordingly like those that praise us.

§ 15. 'Cleanliness and neatness in the face and general appearance, and in the dress, and in fact (as it is exhibited) in the whole life'; in a man's habits, and all that he does in his daily life. "Cleanliness" is said to be "next to Godliness"; and there is no doubt that neat and cleanly habits and appearance in person and dress, some of which also heighten personal attractions, are *prepossessing*, and apt to inspire a *liking* for a man. We (English) also apply the same terms to the build or frame of the body of men and animals—to denote the absence of all *impurity* and imperfection, the superfluities, excrescences, deformities, which, like the dirt that overlies and disguises and deforms the true surface underneath, mar the symmetry and harmonious proportions of the body—'clean built', 'clean made', 'neatly built and made'. This form of 'cleanness' is also *prepossessing*, and an element of comeliness, which tends to *liking*. It is the *apta compositio membrorum quae movet oculos, et delectat hoc ipso*, &c. Cic. de Off. I 28. And besides this, cleanliness of person and neatness in dress, implying a regard for personal appearance, imply also thereby attention to and regard for the opinion of

- 16 ἀμπεχόνην, περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὄνει- P. 1381 δ.  
διστὰς μήτε τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων μήτε τῶν εὐεργετη- p. 53.  
17 μάτων· ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ ἐλεγκτικοί. καὶ τοὺς μὴ μνη-  
σικάκους, μηδὲ φυλακτικούς τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ'  
εὐκαταλλάκτους· οἷους γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν εἶναι

others—whereas a solitary or savage would never think it worth while—and thus establish a sort of claim upon our regard. The excess of this attention to the person, shewn in the coxcomb and the *petit maitre*, is a sign of egotism and vanity, and consequently displeasing.

*καθάριος* is Lat. *mundus*. Of personal appearance, *καθάριος* ἀκολουθίσκος, 'a neat little footboy', Posidon. ap. Ath. XII 550 A; ἡ σκενασσία *καθάριος*, Menand. Fr. Phasm. ap. Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* IV 218, 'de coquorum artibus dicens', Meineke ad loc., 'neatness and cleanliness in dressing and serving a dinner'. In two Fragments of Eubulus,—Τίτθαι, Fr. I, (Meineke, u. s. III 258,) and Ephippus, Obeliaph. Fr. I (Meineke u. s., III 334), in both of which the same verse is found, μὴ πολυτελῶς, ἀλλὰ καθαρείως ὅτι ἂν ᾖ, ὅσας ἔνεκα,—*καθαρείως* (another form of *καθαρίως*) is applied to *cleanliness* in a religious sense. The subject is the purchase of fish. The same opposition of *καθαρείως* and *πολυτελῶς* occurs again in Nicostr. Antyll. Fragn. 3 (Meineke, III 280) where Meineke notes, "His locis *καθαρείως* fere munditiae cum frugalitate coniunctae notionem habet, ut apud Strabonem III p. 154 α, *καθαρίως* καὶ λιτῶς." In Athen. III 74 D (ap. Liddell and Scott), *καθάριος βίος* has the sense of 'a frugal life', opposed to *πολυτελής*, as in the Comic Fragments, and in Diod. V 33 (ap. eosdem), *καθάριος τῇ διαίτῃ*. Xenoph. Memor. II i. 22, of virtue, in Prodicus' apologue, *κεκοσμημένην τὸ μὲν σῶμα καθαριότητι* (to make her *attractive*) τὰ δ' ὄμματα αἰδοί. Herod. II 37 of the Egyptian practice of circumcision 'for cleanliness' sake', *καθαριότητος εἵνεκε*. Such are the examples of this attractive *καθαριότης*, in habits of life, manners, dress and personal appearance, as they appear in the ordinary language and in common life.

§ 16. 'And we like those who are not inclined to reproach us either for trifling faults and errors, or for the benefits (they have conferred on us); for both of these are censorious, (faultfinders).'

§ 17. 'And those who don't bear malice' (this is one of the characteristics of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, Eth. Nic. IV 9, 1125 α 2, οὐδὲ μνησίκας· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχον τὸ ἀποκημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μάλλον παρορᾶν), 'and are not retentive' (if *φυλάττειν* be 'to guard, keep in possession', as Xen. Mem. III 4. 9, *ad servandum idoneus*, Sturz, *Lex.*: or 'observant', 'on the watch for', if 'to be on the look out for'; so Xen. Mem. III i. 6, *φυλακτικὸν καὶ κλέπτην*: opposed to *ἀφύλακτος*, and *ἀφύλαξία*, Hier. VI 4) 'of complaints and accusations, but easily reconciled'. Instead of keeping in mind the complaints and accusations to which our errors and faults, though perhaps trifling, will give rise, and so prolonging the estrangement and the quarrel between the two friends, these are ready at any moment for a reconciliation. And this is, 'because they think themselves equally liable (to these faults and errors, and equally requiring forgive-

18 πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς οἴονται. καὶ τοὺς  
 μὴ κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε τὰ τῶν πλησίον  
 κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰγαθὰ. ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς  
 19 τοῦτο δρᾷ. καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτείνοντας τοῖς ὀργιζο-  
 μένοις ἢ σπουδαζουσιν μαχητικοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι.  
 καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς σπουδαίως πως ἔχοντας, οἷον  
 θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπουδαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας  
 20 καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα πεπον-  
 θότας περὶ ἃ μάλιστα βούλονται αὐτοὶ ἢ θαυμά-  
 21 ζεσθαι ἢ σπουδαῖοι δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἡδεῖς. καὶ τοὺς

ness) with the others', *lit.* because such as they suppose themselves to be to the rest of mankind, (i. e. such as is their liability to give unintentional offence to others,) such they think others are to them: that others are no more liable to them than themselves.

§ 18. 'And those who are not inclined to evil-speaking', (those who are constitute a topic of ὀργή, c. 2. 13,) 'and don't know (don't notice) what is bad in their neighbours, nor in themselves, but only what is good (all their good points); for this is the conduct of the good man'. Comp. Plat. Theaet. 173 D, of the wise man, εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τι γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῳ κακὸν ἐστὶν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. An indisposition to evil-speaking is also a characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος, Eth. N. IV 9, 1125 a 8, διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. (This is from no wish to avoid offence, but because he is so supremely indifferent to all others, that he abstains from blaming, as from praising, them.)

§ 19. And people are liked 'who do not strive against, try to thwart, offer opposition to, those who are angry, or in earnest' (earnestly, seriously, occupied with anything); 'for all such are pugnacious'. Comp. § 12, πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχητικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι τὰναντία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι, which is the opposite to friendly feeling. 'And we have a liking for any one that has a good feeling of any kind towards us, such as admiration, and respects us; and thinks well of us, and delights in our society; and this most especially when it happens in the case of any thing for which we wish to be admired ourselves, or thought well of, or to be agreeable'. The first of the two is also a topic of ὀργή, 2. 17.

§ 21. 'And those who resemble one another (have a mutual liking), and those who are engaged in the same pursuits'; (the pleasures of similarity are noticed and illustrated in I 11. 25, see the notes there); 'provided their interests don't clash', (they don't trouble or annoy one another. ἐνοχλεῖν, see note on I 2. 9; παρά in the compound here, expresses an aggravation of the annoyance, the going still further astray from the right path,) 'and they are not competitors for their livelihood, (as all tradesmen are;) whence the proverb (of rival artists or tradesmen) κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ', 'two of a trade', Hesiod, Op. et D. 25. On this and the opposite proverbs, see note on I 11. 25.

ὁμοίους καὶ ταῦτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντας, εἰ μὴ παρενοχ-  
 λῶσι μὴδ' ἀπὸ ταύτου ἢ ὁ βίος· γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω  
 22 τὸ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ. καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμούν-  
 τας, ὧν ἐνδέχεται ἅμα μετέχειν αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μὴ,  
 23 ταῦτ' οὕτω συμβαίνει. καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὕτως  
 ἔχουσιν ὥστε μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, μὴ  
 24 καταφρονούντες. καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ πρὸς

§ 22. 'And those who desire the same things, so long as there is enough for them to share them together: otherwise, the case is the same here again'. Here again, as in the preceding topic, the competition is fatal to friendship.

§ 23. 'And those (we like) with whom we are on such terms as to feel no shame in betraying our (apparent) conventional faults before them, provided, however, that this does not arise from contempt'; provided that they are not so far our inferiors that we totally disregard their presence. That is, those who are so intimate that we can afford to *take liberties* with them. Such are the members of a domestic circle, or any very intimate friend, who knows our ways, and from habit has learned to overlook any slight mark of disrespect. Schrader has illustrated this by an epigram of Martial, x 14, which though rather coarse is too apposite to be passed over: *Nil aliud video quo te credamus amicum Quam quod me coram pedere, Crispe, soles.*

αἰσχύνεσθαι] See note on II 2. 22.

τὰ πρὸς δόξαν] opposed to τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν (= τὰ καθ' αὐτά) in the next topic, 'the apparent or conventional' faults which violate the rules of society and good-breeding—and 'the real', moral and legal offences, Rhet. II 6. 23, 12. 10. τὸ πρὸς δόξαν in this opposition is defined, Topic. I 3, 118 a 21, ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν τὸ μηδενὸς συνειδότος μὴ ἂν σπουδάσα. ὑπάρχειν, which is an exact description of the conventional and unreal, τὸ διὰ τὴν δόξαν αἰρετόν. The same distinction of the conventionally and really disgraceful occurs in Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 b 23, εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐθέν διαφέρει, οὐδέτερά γὰρ πρακτέα. The conventionally disgraceful is illustrated by Aspasia ad locum, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐσθίειν (and this by Theophr. Char. XI ὁ βδελυρός, who goes in full market, πληθούσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς, to the fruit-stalls, and stands chattering with the vendor, and eating the fruit). Dancing was another of these conventional solecisms. See the story of Cleisthenes and Hippocleides in Herod. VI 129, which gave rise to the proverb οὐ φροντὶς Ἰπποκλείδῃ (διὰ τὴν ὀρχησιν καὶ τὴν ἀναιδείην): and of Socrates in Xenoph. Symp. II 17, see note 6 p. 152 of *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, Vol. I No. 2 on 'The Sophists'.

Compare also I 7. 36, where τὸ πρὸς δόξαν is defined much as in the Topics, ὁ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔλοιτο. See note ad loc.

§ 24. 'And the reverse, those before whom we are ashamed to exhibit our real faults'. Those whom we respect and stand in awe of, and whose good opinion we value.

ἀλήθειαν. καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἢ ὑφ' ὧν  
 ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ  
 25 φιλοῦσιν ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι. καὶ οἷς ἂν τάγαθὰ  
 συμπράττωσιν, ἐὰν μὴ μέλλῃ αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω  
 26 κακά. καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς  
 παρόντας φιλοῦσιν· διὸ καὶ τοὺς περὶ τοὺς τεθνεώτας  
 τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν. καὶ ὅλως τοὺς σφόδρα  
 φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας· μάλιστα γὰρ  
 27 φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοὺς φιλεῖν ἀγαθοὺς. καὶ τοὺς  
 μὴ πλαττομένους πρὸς ἑαυτούς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ  
 φαῦλα τὰ ἑαυτῶν λέγοντες. εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς

‘And those with whom we vie (in friendly rivalry, for distinction; see note on I 2. 22.), or by whom we wish to be emulated—not envied (which is destructive of friendly feeling)—we either love (already from the very first sight of them) or conceive the wish to become friends with them’.

§ 25. ‘And those whom we help to secure any good for themselves (so Victorius)—provided in so doing we do not ourselves incur greater evil’. The joint efforts are a bond of sympathy, and fellow-feeling (*συνπάθεια*) makes men friends: but this community of feeling would be destroyed if we were to be losers by our help; for then the other's feeling would be pleasurable but our own painful.

§ 26. ‘Another amiable quality which secures regard, is the remembrance of and continued affection to friends absent as well as present; and this is why everybody likes those who extend this feeling to the dead. And in general, all (are liked by others) that shew a strong affection for their friends, and never leave them in the lurch, never desert them in distress and difficulty; for of all kinds of good men those are most liked who shew their goodness in the strength of their affections’. Eth. Nic. VIII 1, sub fin. τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν; and c. 10, init. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικε, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. Victorius refers to Terent. Phorm. III 3. 30, *solus est homo amico amicus*, and Apollodorus, from whom Terence translated it, *μόνος φιλεῖν γὰρ τοὺς φίλους ἐπίσταται*; (this is Apollodorus of Carystus in Euboea, a poet of the New Comedy, to be distinguished from another of the same name, of Gela; his play *Ἐπιδικασόμενος* is represented in Terence's Phormio, Prolog. 25). Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr. Hist. Crit.* Vol. I 464—6, Vol. IV 447.

§ 27. ‘And those who don't assume an artificial character in their intercourse with us’; (who are open, sincere, frank, straightforward: this is the social or conversational virtue of ἀλήθεια, Eth. Nic. IV 13, the mean between *δλαζονεία* and *εἰρωνεία*. ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὧν ἀληθευτικός καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν

τοὺς φίλους τὰ πρὸς δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα· εἰ οὖν ὁ  
αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι  
ἔοικεν. καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβερούς, καὶ οἷς θαρροῦμεν·  
28 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ. εἶδη δὲ φιλίας ἐταιρεία  
29 οἰκειότης συγγένεια καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ποιητικὰ δὲ p. 64.  
φιλίας χάρις, καὶ τὸ μὴ δεθθέντος ποιῆσαι, καὶ τὸ  
ποιήσοντα μὴ δηλώσαι· αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὕτως ἔνεκα φαί-  
νεται καὶ οὐ διὰ τι ἕτερον.

εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. 1127 a 24. The *ἔρων* of the Ethics, the self-depreciator—like Socrates—who affects humility, is here ὁ πλαττόμενος of the example); ‘and such are those who are always talking about their own weaknesses and failings’.

πλάττειν, properly said of a sculptor, who moulds a clay model, is extended to moulding or fashioning in general, and hence to any *artificial* production; *artificiose fingere*: and so here. It is hence applied to the training of the body, σώματα πλάττοντες, Plat. Phaedo 82 D (Heindorf ad loc.), Tim. 88 C, and of the mind, Rep. II 377 C, καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν πολλὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν. Ib. V 466 A, of a society; VI 509 D, of general education; Gorg. 483 A, of moral training.

‘For it has been already said that in the company of friends we are not ashamed of any little violation of conventional propriety (§ 23): consequently, if one who *is* ashamed is no friend, one who is *not* ashamed in such cases is likely to be a friend’.

‘And those who are not *formidable* to us, and in whose society we feel confidence; for no one loves one of whom he is afraid’. 1 Ep. St John iv 18, “*There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear; because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in love,*” gives the reverse; no one can fear one whom he perfectly loves<sup>1</sup>.

§ 28. ‘The kinds of friendship are, (1) companionship (the mere fact of being often together, implying no high degree of friendship—*sodalitas eorum qui saepe una versantur*, Schrader), (2) intimacy, familiarity, (constant and intimate, ‘domestic’, association, like that of members of the same family, οἰκειότης from οἶκος; a higher degree of friendship, confirmed by habit and long association), (3) actual relationship, and all other connexions, relations, of the like nature’. These are three degrees of association; and, ἐν κοινωνίᾳ πᾶσα φιλία ἐστὶ, Eth. N. VIII 14, init. The whole chapter is upon the various degrees and relations of friendship or love, of marriage, of parent and offspring, the several bonds of connexion, and the foundations of them. The same principle lies at the root of all, συνέχει τὸ κοινόν.

§ 29. ‘Affection and love are produced by a favour or benefit conferred, and conferred without solicitation, and never disclosed, by the benefactor: under these conditions the recipient construes it as

<sup>1</sup> A striking contrast in the point of view between the Philosopher illustrating a rhetorical topic, and the Christian Apostle illustrating the love of God.

- 30 *περὶ δ' ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ μισεῖν φανερόν ὡς ἐκ τῶν* P. 1382.  
*ἐναντίων δεῖ θεωρεῖν. ποιητικὰ δ' ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπη-*  
 31 *ρεασμός, διαβολή. ὀργή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς*  
*ἐαυτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς ἐαυτόν· ἐὰν γὰρ*

conferred for his sake alone, and from no other motive'; which is the definition of *φιλία*, § 2. The plural *ποιητικά* includes the *χάρις* and its two qualifications.

§ 30. 'The affections of enmity and hatred may plainly be studied from the opposites (of the preceding topics of *φιλία*)'. On *περὶ ἔχθρας θεωρεῖν*, see note on I 9. 14. 'Productive of enmity are anger, spite, calumny'. [On *ἐπιρεασμός*, see note on II 2. 3.]

§ 31. 'Now anger is excited by personal offences, but enmity without personal offence as well; for if we suppose a man to be of such and such a character we hate him. And anger always deals with individuals, as Callias or Socrates' (*ὀργή* is here made to govern the same case as its verb *ὀργίζεσθαι*<sup>1</sup>. With the statement comp. II 2. 2); 'but hatred is directed also against classes; for every one hates a thief or an informer'. On *τὸν κλέπτην*, the def. art. denoting a member of a class, which we render by the *indefinite*, see note on I 7. 13. 'And the one is curable by time, the other incurable. And the one is desire (*ἐφesis* subst. of *ἐφίεσθαι* 'to aim at'<sup>2</sup>) of (inflicting temporary) pain, the other of (permanent) mischief; for the angry man wishes to see (the effect of his vengeance), to the other this makes no difference (whether he see it or not)'.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Pl. Phaedo 88 C, ἀπιστίαν τοῖς προειρημένους λόγοις; Euthyphr. 13 D, ἡ λατροῖς ὑπηρετικῇ; 15 A, τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς; Theaet. 177 A, τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα; 176 B, ὁμοίωσις θεῶ; Soph. 252 D, ἀλλήλοις ἐπικοινωνίας; Gorg. 622 D, βοήθεια ἑαυτῶ; Parmenid. 128 C, βοήθεια τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ (Arist. Polit. VII (VI) 5, 1320 a 32, ἡ βοήθεια τοῖς ἀπόροις); Symp. 182 D, ἡ παρακλινεῖσι τῷ ἐρώντι παρὰ πάντων; Rep. VI 493 D, πόλει διακονίαν; Ib. 498 B, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ; Aesch. Agam. 415, πτεροῖς ὁπαδοῖς ὕπνον κελεύθοις; Soph. Oed. Col. 1026, τὰ δόλῳ τῷ μὴ δικαίῳ κτήματα; Trach. 668, τῶν σῶν Ἡρακλεῖ δωρημάτων; Aj. 717, θυμῶν Ἀτρεΐδαις μεγάλων τε νεικέων; Eur. Ion 508, τὰ θεόθεν τέκνα θνατοῖς; Iph. T. 1384, οὐρανοῦ πέσημα (i.e. τὸ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ πεπτωκός). On a similar constr. of ὑπὸ and other prepositions with the genitive after a passive *substantive* (instead of *verb*) see Stallbaum on Pl. Phaedo 99 C, δίνην ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. Add to the examples there gi in the following: Eur. Herc. Fur. 1334, στέφανος Ἑλλήνων ὑπο; Thuc. VI 87, ἐπικουρίας ἀφ' ἡμῶν; Pl. Protag. 354 A, τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν λατρῶν θεραπείας; Gorg. 472 E, τυγχάνειν ὀκνῆς ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων; Rep. II 378 D, Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοῖς ὑπὸ νιέος καὶ Ἡφαιστου ῥίψει ὑπὸ πατρός; Arist. Eth. Nic. X 9, 1179 a 25, ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν; Categ. 8, 8 δ 32, μεταβολὴ ὑπὸ πόντου; de Anima II 8. 11, 420 δ 27, ἡ πλῆγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀερός ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις μορίοις ψυχῆς.

<sup>2</sup> *ἐφesis*, a rare word. It occurs twice in Plat. Legg. IV 717 A, where the metaphor is thus illustrated; σκοπὸς μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν οὗτος, οὗ δὲ στοχάζεσθαι· βέλῃ δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅλον ἡ τοῖς βέλεσιν ἐφesis κ.τ.λ. Ib. IX. 864 B, ἐλπιδῶν δὲ καὶ δόξης τῆς ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὸ ἀρίστον ἐφesis. Defin. 413 C, βούλησις ἐφesis μετὰ λόγου ὀρθοῦ. [So also in Eth. Nic. III 7, 1114 δ 6, ἐφesis τοῦ τέλους. For its *legal* sense, 'appeal', see Dem. Or. 57, ἐφesis πρὸς Εὐβουλίδην, § 6, τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐφesis, and Pollux 8. 62 and 126. S.]



ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ αἰεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἶον Καλλία ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰατὸν χρόνῳ, τὸ δ' ἀνίατον. καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· αἰσθῆσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, τῷ δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ ἤκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ' οὐ μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὔ. καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἂν γενομένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ

Comp. def. of ὀργή II 2. 1, ὄρεξις τιμωρίας φαινομένης, and the note. 'Now all *painful* things (all things that give pain) are things of sense, (pain is conveyed to us only by the senses,) but the most *evil* things are least perceptible, wickedness and folly; for the presence of *evil* (of this kind) causes no (sensible) pain. And the one is accompanied by pain (in the *subject* of the affection, by definition), but the other is not: for one who is angry feels pain himself, but one who hates does not. And the one might under many circumstances feel compassion (for the offender, and remit the punishment), the other never; for the angry man only requires compensation (for his own suffering) in the suffering of the object of his anger, but the other his utter destruction (annihilation).'

With τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης κ.τ.λ., compare Pol. VIII (V) 10, 1312 b 32, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης πάρεστιν, ὥστε οὐ ῥάδιον λογίζεσθαι, ἢ δ' ἔχθρα ἀνευ λύπης.

ἐλεήσειεν] Victorius refers in illustration to Soph. Aj. 121, where Ulysses says of Ajax, ἐποικτεῖρω δὲ νιν δύστηνον ἔμπης καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ. This shews that the feeling by which he was affected towards his rival was not a long-standing grudge or hatred, but a temporary animosity arising out of the contest for Achilles' arms.

Plutarch in his little treatise, περὶ φθόνου καὶ μίσους, p. 536 D, Wytténbach, Vol. III p. 165, gives an account of μῖσος from which something may be added to Aristotle's description. In c. 2, it is said that hatred is due to a sense of injury either to oneself, or to society at large, and sense of wrong to oneself: μῖσος ἐκ φαντασίας τοῦ ὅτι πονηρὸς ἢ κοινῶς ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστὶν ὁ μισούμενος· καὶ γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι δόξαντες αὐτοὶ πεφύκασι μισεῖν κ.τ.λ. In c. 3, the author remarks that hatred may be directed against irrational animals; some people hate cats, or beetles, or toads, or snakes; Germanicus could not abide either the sight or the crowing of a cock, and so on; *envy* however arises only between man and man. This is not the case with anger; which is sometimes excited even by inanimate objects—Bain [quoted on p. 13]. c. 5; Hatred may be praiseworthy, as

δ' οὐδενός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ᾧ ὀργίζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι.

- 32 φανερόν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύειν καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας διαλύειν, καὶ δι' ὀργὴν ἢ δι' ἔχθραν ἀμψι-σβητοῦντας ἐφ' ὁπότερ' ἂν προαιρηταί τις ἄγειν.

- 1 ποῖα δὲ φοβοῦνται καὶ τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ᾧδ' CHAP. V.  
ἔσται φανερόν. ἔστω δὲ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται

μισοπονηρία—as also anger, in the shape of *νέμεσις*, righteous indignation, or of moral disapprobation—envy never can. In the last chapter, 538 D, he thus defines it; *ἔστι δὲ μισοῦντος μὲν προαίρεσις κακῶς ποιῆσαι* (Arist. *ἔφεσις κακοῦ*)· καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὕτως ὀρίζονται, *διάθεσιν τινα καὶ προαίρεσιν ἐπιτηρητικὴν τοῦ κακῶς ποιῆσαι* (on the watch to do him mischief) *τῷ φθόνῳ δὲ τοῦτο γοῦν ἀπεσι.* The distinction between envy and hatred, in respect of the amount of mischief which they would do to their respective objects, is then described, and the treatise ends.

§ 32. This section points out the application of the contents of the preceding chapter to the purposes of Rhetoric. 'It is plain from all this that it is possible, in respect of enmity and friendship, either, when men are enemies or friends, to prove it; or if not, to represent them as such; or if they assert or maintain it, to refute their assertion; or, if there be a dispute (about a feeling or an offence), whether it be due to anger or enmity, to refer it, trace it, to either of the two which you may prefer'.

*διαλύειν*] sc. *τὴν φάσιν*, *diluere*, *dissolvere*, *argumentum*, *obiecta*, *argumentationem*, 'to break up, dissolve', and so metaph. 'answer, refute' an opposing *argument*. See *Introd. on λύειν*, p. 267, note. This seems the most natural interpretation of *φάσκοντας διαλύειν*. However, in II 11.7, it is applied to the breaking up, dissolution, or extinction of the *emotions* themselves: so that it is *possible*—I think, not *probable*—that here also it may be meant 'in case of their asserting that they are friends or enemies to proceed to destroy those relations in them'—only, I don't quite see the use of this for rhetorical purposes; and the other is certainly not only easier to effect in itself, but also more to the point here. If they assert that they are friends or enemies, and you wish to shew the opposite, you must refute their arguments, or *destroy their case*, which the preceding analysis will enable you to do.

#### CHAP. V.

On Fear. Compare Bain, on the 'Emotion of Terror'; *Emotions and Will*, c. 5 [c. VIII, ed. 1875].

§ 1. 'What sort of things, and what persons, are the objects of fear, and how it is manifested, will be plain from what follows'.

*ἔστω*] as before; see note on I 5.3.

ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς  
δύνανται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαί-  
νηται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φο-

'Let fear be defined, a pain or disturbance arising from a mental (presentation or) impression (*φαντασία*, note on I 11. 6) (a vivid presentiment) of coming evil, destructive or painful: for it is not *all* evils that men are afraid of, as for instance of the prospect of being wicked or dull (slow, stupid), but only those that amount to great pain or ruin: and this too only if they appear to be not far off, but close at hand, so as to be imminent or threatening. For things very remote are not subjects of alarm: for every one knows that he must die, but by reason of death not being actually impending, people care nothing at all for it'.

It is the *proximity* of danger that causes fear. Gaisford quotes a poetical illustration from Pind. Nem. VI 94, τὸ δὲ πὰρ ποδὶ ναὸς ἐλίσσόμενον αἰεὶ κυμάτων λέγεται παντὶ μάλιστα δονεῖν θυμόν.

On fear, and its proper objects, see Eth. Nic. III 9. At the commencement of the chapter it is said, φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακὰ· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. But of evil in general, all *moral* evil is to be shunned, and the fear of *it* is right, and to be encouraged: in the control of *this* kind of fear, courage is not shewn. It is in overmastering the sense of danger, in controlling the fears that interfere with the exercise of our duties, and especially the dread of death (the most fearful of all things) in battle, that true courage resides—ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερά λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς· it is not the anticipation of pain of all kinds, as the pain of envy, of rivalry, of shame, that is entitled to the name of 'fear', ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται, ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετική τοῦ ζῆν.....ὁ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ᾖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος ὅταν πλησίον φαίνεται. Eth. Eudem. III 1, 1229 a 33, which is in exact conformity with Aristotle's definition. Comp. *infra* § 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός.

δύνασθαι, to have the *capacity*, *power*, the *force*, and hence *value*, of; to *amount to*; becomes thus equivalent to *ισχύειν* or *σθένειν*, Elmsley ad Med. 127, οὐδὲνα καιρὸν δύναται θνητοῖς. Thuc. I 141, τὴν αὐτὴν δύναται δοῦλωσιν. VI 40, λόγοι ἔργα δυνάμενοι. Similarly it denotes the value of money, Xen. Anab. I 5. 6, ὁ σιγλὸς δύναται ἐπὶ ὀβόλους καὶ ἡμιόβολιον Ἀττικοῦς: or the general *force* or *effect* or *amount* of anything. Rhet. III 14. 5, τὰ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια ταῦτ' δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι, 'amount to much the same', 'have much the same effect'. It also expresses in particular the *value* or *meaning*, *signification*, of a word, or anything else (like the Latin *valere*), Herod. II 30, δύναται τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος οἱ ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς χειρὸς παριστάμενοι βασιλεῖ. Ib. IV 192, τὸ οὐνομα δύναται κατὰ Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν, βουνοί. Ib. VI 98. Thuc. VII 58, δύναται δὲ τὸ νεοδαμῶδες εὐεύτερον ἤδη εἶναι. Aristoph. Plut. 842, τὸ τριβώνιον τί δύναται; (What's the meaning of this thread-bare cloak?). Plat. Protag. 324 A, Crat. 429 D, ἀρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; Euthyd. 286 C, δύναται ὁ λόγος. Xenoph. Anab. II 2. 13. Demosth. de Cor. § 26, τί δὲ τοῦτ'

βούνται· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ'  
 2 ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. εἰ δὲ ὁ φόβος  
 τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά εἶναι ὅσα  
 φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθεῖρειν ἢ βλάπ-  
 τειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην συντείνουσας. διό p. 65.  
 καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά· ἐγγύς γὰρ φαί-  
 νεται τὸ φοβερόν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ  
 3 πλησιασμός. τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔχθρα τε καὶ ὀργή δυνα-  
 μένων ποιεῖν τι· δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται, ὥστε ἐγ-  
 4 γύς εἰσι τοῦ ποιεῖν. καὶ ἀδικία δύναμιν ἔχουσα· τῷ  
 5 προαιρεῖσθαι γὰρ ὁ ἄδικος ἄδικος. καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑβρι- P. 1382;  
 ζομένη δύναμιν ἔχουσα· δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι προαιρεῖται  
 6 μέν, ὅταν ὑβρίζηται, αἰεί, δύναται δὲ νῦν. καὶ φόβος

ἡδύνατο; 'What did this mean?' Arist. Metaph. Γ 6, 1011 a 7, δύναται  
 δ' αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτό.

§ 2. This being the definition of fear, *fearful* things, the objects of fear, must needs be such as appear' (fear being ἐκ φαντασίας) 'to have a great power of destroying, or doing mischief, all kinds of mischief, that is, which tend to, take the direction of, great pain'. συντείνειν is 'to send together', said properly, of several things which conspire or converge to one focus or centre of attraction; or metaph., which have a common aim or tendency. 'And therefore the signs or indications of such things (the symptom of the approaching fever or death, the clouds gathering before the storm, the first threatenings or indications of any great calamity, as impending ruin, the death of a dear friend, and so forth) are themselves fearful: because they announce the proximity of the object of dread, that it is near at hand; for this is the meaning of danger—the near approach of anything that is dreaded'.

§ 3. 'Examples of such things are the enmity or anger of those that have this power of doing mischief: for as it is quite clear that they desire it, it follows that it must be close at hand'. That they *desire* it, we know from the definitions of ὀργή and ἔχθρα: the former being an ὀρεξίς τιμωρίας, the other an ἔφεσις κακοῦ, II 4. 31.

§ 4. 'A second is wickedness or vice armed with power; for it is the inclination, the deliberate purpose, the evil will, which is characteristic, is involved in the very notion, of vice or wickedness (as of virtue)'. And therefore injustice, the desire of unfair advantage, or any other vice, when it has the power will be certain to exercise it, in order to gratify this constant inclination.

§ 5. 'Again, outraged virtue, if it have the power' (of avenging the wrong: revenge is a virtue, I 6. 26, I 9. 24), 'is formidable; for it is plain that she has always the inclination when outraged (to right herself by retaliation, τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς δίκαιον), and now she has the power'.

τῶν δυναμένων τι ποιῆσαι· ἐν παρασκευῇ γὰρ ἀνάγκη  
7 εἶναι καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ πολλοὶ χείρους καὶ  
ἥττους τοῦ κερδαίνειν καὶ δειλοὶ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις,  
φοβερὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ αὐτὸν εἶναι,  
ὥστε οἱ συνειδότες πεποιηκότες τι δεινὸν φοβεροὶ ἢ  
8 κατειπεῖν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν. καὶ οἱ δυνάμενοι ἀδικεῖν  
τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀδικεῖσθαι ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀδι-

§ 6. 'And fear in those that have the power of doing mischief' (φοβερός *ἔστι*, is to be dreaded); 'because any such also (as in the two preceding cases) must always be on the watch, ready to act in a state of preparation'. He is always prepared to anticipate the attack of others, which he dreads, by attacking them as a precautionary measure; but he also has the power of executing his designs against them; his *fear* therefore is formidable.

§ 7. 'And as the majority of mankind are no better than they should be (inclined to the worse; χείρους τοῦ δέοντος, 'worse than they ought to be', or τοῦ εἰωθότος, 'below the mean standing of morality', 'rather bad'), and slaves to their own interest, and cowardly in all dangers, it is for the most part a formidable thing to be dependent upon any one else (at the mercy of, in the power of; ἐπὶ *φenes*, see note on I 1. 7, ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι); and therefore the accomplices in any deed of horror are to be feared as likely either to turn informers' (if they are ἥττους τοῦ κερδαίνειν, especially; though cowardice might have the same effect), 'or to leave their comrades in the lurch' (ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις namely, in which their cowardice is shewn); run away and leave them to bear the brunt of the danger.

That the 'majority are worse' is proverbial; οἱ πλείους κακοί.

ἐγκαταλιπεῖν] See note on συνδιαγαγεῖν καὶ συνδημερεῖσαι, II 4. 12, ib. § 26.

§ 8. 'So are those that have the power of doing wrong, to those who have the capacity of (are particularly liable, or exposed to) being wronged; for, for the most part, men do wrong whenever they can'. With the doctrine of man's fallen nature we have here of course nothing to do. But the imperfection and frailty of man, his weaknesses and liability to error, are recognised by the popular philosophy of the multitude and confirmed by the proverbs that convey it, οἱ πλείους κακοί, *errare humanum est*, and the like. Compare the observations on equity, the merciful or indulgent consideration of these human infirmities, in I 13. 15—17, and the ordinary language on the subject illustrated in the note on the αἰτίαι ἀνθρωπικάι, I 2. 7—all of which belongs properly to Rhetoric. Victorius quotes Arist. Plut. 362, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς ὑγιές ἐστὶν οὐδενός, ἀλλ' εἰς τοῦ κέρδους ἅπαντες ἥττονες. Plato seems to be nearer the truth on this point, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

'And those who have already been wronged, or think they are wronged at the time; for these are always on the watch for an opportunity' (of avenging the wrong received). 'And those that have already *done* a wrong, if they have the power (of doing an injury), are to be

κούσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὅταν δύνωνται. καὶ οἱ ἡδικημένοι  
 ἢ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι· αἰεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσι καιρόν. καὶ  
 οἱ ἡδικηκότες, εἰ δύνανται ἔχωσι, φοβεροί, δεδιότες  
 τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν· ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο φοβερόν.  
 9 καὶ οἱ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνταγωνισταί, ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται  
 ἅμα ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοῖν· αἰεὶ γὰρ πολεμοῦσι πρὸς τοὺς  
 10 τοιούτους. καὶ οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν φοβεροί·  
 μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο βλάπτειν αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ τοὺς  
 κρείττους. καὶ οὐς φοβοῦνται οἱ κρείττους αὐτῶν,  
 11 διὰ ταυτό. καὶ οἱ τοὺς κρείττους αὐτῶν ἀνηρηκότες.  
 καὶ οἱ τοῖς ἥττοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπιτιθέμενοι· ἢ γὰρ ἤδη  
 φοβεροί ἢ αὐξηθέντες. καὶ τῶν ἡδικημένων καὶ ἐχθρῶν

dreaded, because they are afraid of retaliation (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, Eth. N. v 8, init.); for it was previously laid down that anything of that kind is to be feared'. § 6, καὶ φόβος τῶν δυναμένων τι ποιῆσαι. *Proprium humani ingenii est odisse quem laeseris*, Tacit. Agric. c. 42. Seneca, de Ira, II 23, *Hoc habent pessimum animi magna fortuna insolentes: quos laeserunt et oderunt* (Lipsius ad locum). Ennius ap. Cic. de Off. II 7, *Quem metuunt oderunt; quem quisque odit periisse expetit*.

§ 9. 'And rivals in the same pursuits, for the same objects, (are afraid of one another)—rivals, I mean, for those things which they cannot both enjoy together; for with such, men are always at war'.

§ 10. 'And those who are evidently formidable to our superiors (must necessarily be so to us; the *a fortiori* argument, or *omne maius continet in se minus*), because they must have more power to hurt us, if they have it also to hurt our superiors. And also those who are feared by our superiors (must also be formidable to us) for the same reason'. The difference between these two cases lies in the φοβεροί and φοβοῦνται. The first are those who are *evidently* and notoriously objects of dread by reason of their rank, power, station on the one hand, and their *manifest* hostility on the other: the second are *secret* enemies, men of no apparent resources for mischief, whose real character and designs are known to our superiors, though not to the world at large. This is the substance of Victorius' explanation.

§ 11. 'And those who have ruined or destroyed our superiors'; again the *a fortiori* argument; 'and those who assail our inferiors; for they are either already formidable to us, or (will be so) when their power has increased. And of those that have been injured (by us), and our acknowledged enemies, or rivals, not the quick-tempered and out-spoken', (the μεγαλόφυχος is παρρησιαστής, one who freely and frankly speaks his mind to and about his neighbours, without mincing his language, Eth. N. IV 9, 1124 b 29; παρρησία 'frankness', between friends and brothers, Ib. IX 2, 1165 a 29), 'but the calm and composed, and dissemblers, and cunning;

ἡ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλ' οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἰρωνες καὶ πανοῦργοι· ἄδηλοι γὰρ εἰ  
12 ἐγγύς, ὥστ' οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω. πάντα δὲ τὰ φοβερὰ φοβερώτερα ὅσα, ἂν ἀμάρτωσιν, ἐπανορθώσασθαι μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅλως ἀδύνατα, ἢ μὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. καὶ ὧν βοήθειαι μὴ εἰσιν ἢ μὴ ράδιαι. ὡς δ' ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν,

for these leave us in doubt whether their attack is imminent, and consequently never make it evident that it is remote'. Cf. definition, in § 1. πρᾶοι, such as hide under a calm exterior resolution and a deliberate, vindictive purpose: 'still waters' that 'run deep'.

εἰρωνες] is here employed in its primary and proper sense, of dissimulation or cunning, Philemon. Fab. Inc. Fragm. III 6, οὐκ ἔστ' ἀλώπηξ ἡ μὲν εἰρων τῇ φύσει ἢ δ' αὐθέκαστος, Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* IV 32; not in the special meaning which Aristotle has given it in *Eth. N.* II 7, and IV 13, sub fin., where εἰρωνεία stands for the social vice or defect in *προσποίησις*, (pretension) 'self-depreciation', undue remissness in asserting one's claims; and is opposed to ἀλαζονεία, excessive self-assertion, braggadocio and swagger.

ἄδηλοι, φανοροί] attracted to the subject of the sentence, instead of ἄδελόν ἐστι μὴ εἶναι. The participle is used instead of the infinitive in most of these cases, δηλός εἰμι ποιῶν. Other adjectives follow the same rule; Aristoph. Nub. 1241, Ζεὺς γελοῖος ὀνύμενος, Pl. Phaedr. 236 D, γελοῖος ἔσομαι αὐτοσχεδιάζων, Arist. *Eth. N.* X 8, 1178 b 11, οἱ θεοὶ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες κ.τ.λ. *Comp.* IV 7, 1123 b 34. Thucyd. I 70, ἀξιοὶ νομίζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλας ψόγον ἐπενεγκεῖν. Other examples are given in *Matth. Gr. Gr.* § 279, *comp.* 549. 5. Stallbaum, ed. Gorg. 448 D.

§ 12. 'And all fearful things are more fearful, in dealing with which (Victorious) any mistake we happen to make cannot be rectified, i. e. remedied—when the consequences of an error of judgment in providing against them are fatal, and can never be repaired—where the remedy (of the error and its consequences) is either absolutely impossible, or is not in our own power but in that of our adversaries'. When we are threatened with any formidable danger, from the machinations (suppose) of an enemy, if we make any fatal or irreparable mistake in the precautions we take to guard against it, the danger is greatly aggravated: our precautions and defences have failed, and we lie unprotected and exposed to the full weight of the enemy's blow. 'And those dangers which admit of no help or means of rescue, either none at all, or not easy to come by. And, speaking generally, all things are to be feared which when they happen in the case of others, or threaten them, excite our pity'. *Comp.* c. 8. 13, ὅσα ἐφ' αὐτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ' ἄλλων γιγνόμενα ἐλεοῦσιν.

'Such then are pretty nearly, as one may say, the principal *objects* of fear, and things that people dread: let us now pass on to describe the state of mind or feelings of the *subjects* of the emotions themselves'.

φοβερά ἐστὶν ὅσα ἐφ' ἐτέρων γιγνόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστὶν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, καὶ ἃ φοβοῦνται, σχεδὸν ὡς p. 66. εἰπεῖν τὰ μέγιστα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι  
 13 αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται, νῦν λέγωμεν. εἰ δὴ ἐστὶν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσδοκίας τοῦ πείσεσθαι τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος, φανερόν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν οἰομένων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἴονται παθεῖν, οὐδὲ τούτους ὑφ' ὧν μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἴονται. ἀνάγκη

ἐλεεινός, as Aristotle, according to the MSS, is accustomed to write it, violates Porson's rule, *Praef. ad Med.* p. viii, that ἐλεῖνός and not ἐλεεινός is the Attic form of the word.

§ 13. 'If then fear is always accompanied with the expectation of some destructive suffering':—the necessary alternative ἢ λυπηροῦ of the defin. § 1 is here omitted and left to be understood: as it stands, the assertion is untrue; fear *can* be excited by something short of absolute ruin or destruction. A general who had seen hard service replied to one who was boasting that he had never known the sensation of fear, *Then sir you have never snuffed a candle with your fingers* (this was in the days of tallow):—'it is plain that no one is afraid who thinks that he is not likely (ἄν) to suffer anything at all, (that he is altogether exempt from the possibility of suffering,) or of those (particular) things that *they* think themselves unlikely to suffer; nor are they afraid of those (persons) whom they think incapable of doing them harm', (μὴ οἴονται, sc. παθεῖν ἄν: and ὑφ' ὧν is allowed to follow παθεῖν, because a passive sense is implied in it, 'to be hurt or injured by'<sup>1</sup>), 'nor at a time when they don't think them likely to do so'.

As an illustration of ὑφ' ὧν μὴ οἴονται, Victorius quotes Homer Od. i (IX) 513, where the Cyclops expresses his disgust at having been blinded by a contemptible little fellow, 'weak and worthless' like Ulysses: νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἄκις οφθαλμοῦ ἀλάσων ἐπεὶ μ' ἔδα- μάσσατο οἶνω.

<sup>1</sup> This is one of the very numerous varieties of the σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαίνον, and is especially common after neuter verbs, but also occurs with transitives, or indeed any verb which is capable of being interpreted in a passive sense. Such are θανεῖν, Eur. Ion 1225, φυγεῖν 'to be banished', ἀναστῆναι, γεγονέναι, Gorg. 515 E, πάσχειν (very common), ἐκπίπτειν, ἐκπλεῖν, Dem. c. Aristocr. 678, ἐστάναι (to be stopped) ὑπό; Arist. Top. E 4, 133 δ 4, κείσθαι; Herod. i. 39, vii. 176, τελευτᾶν, παρῆναι; Plat. Rep. vi 509 B, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ Μήδων; Ib. Legg. 695 B, ὑπὸ φόβου τε δέσαντες; Rep. iii 413 C, οἰδοῦσαν ὑπὸ κομπασμάτων; Arist. Ran. 940, &c. &c. And so with ἐκ, ἀπό, πρὸς, especially in the Tragic poets: Soph. Oed. Rex 37, 429, πρὸς τούτου κλύειν ὀνειδίζεσθαι; 516, πρὸς γ' ἐμοῦ πεπονθέναι; 854, παιδὸς ἐξ ἐμοῦ θανεῖν; 970, 1454, ἵν' ἐξ ἐκείνων...θάνω, 1488. Aj. 1253, βούς ὑπὸ σμικρᾶς μάστιγος...εἰς ὁδὸν πορεύεται, and 1320, οὐ κλύοντές ἐσμεν...τούδ' ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἀρτίως.



τοῖνυν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, καὶ  
 14 τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε. οὐκ οἶονται P. 1383.  
 δὲ παθεῖν ἄν οὔτε οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μεγάλαις ὄντες καὶ  
 δοκούντες, διὸ ὑβρίζται καὶ ὀλίγωροι καὶ θρασεῖς  
 (ποιεῖ δὲ τοιούτους πλοῦτος ἰσχὺς πολυφιλία δύνα-  
 μις), οὔτε οἱ ἤδη πεπονθέναι πάντα νομίζοντες τὰ  
 δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεψυγμένοι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ὥσπερ οἱ  
 ἀποτυμπανιζόμενοι ἤδη· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινὰ ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι

‘Fear therefore necessarily implies, or is a necessary consequence of, the expectation of probable suffering in general (the opinion that they *might* suffer, of the *likelihood* of suffering), and (suffering) from particular persons (τούτων), and of particular things, and at particular times’.

§ 14. Consequently also, the following classes of persons are *not* liable to fear.

‘Exempt from (not liable to) the expectation of probable suffering are those who are, or think they are, in a condition of great prosperity’, (the plural of the abstract noun indicates the various items or kinds of success, prosperity, or good luck, represented by εὐτυχία,) ‘and therefore they are insolent (inclined to wanton outrage) and contemptuous (prone to *slight*—contemptuously indifferent to—the opinions and feelings of others) and audacious or rash—men are made such by, (such characters are due to), wealth, bodily strength, abundance of friends, power—and (on the other hand) those who think that they have *already* endured all the worst extremities (all that is to be dreaded, πάντα τὰ δεινὰ) and have been thus cooled down (frozen, their sensibilities blunted, all the animal heat, and its accompanying sensibility, has been evaporated) (to apathy and indifference) as respects the future (possibility of suffering) like those who are already under the hands of the executioner (ἤδη, in the very act of undergoing the sentence of death); but (that fear may be felt) there must be at the bottom’ (of Pandora’s box, as a residuum; or underlying, as a *basis* or *ground* of confidence, ὑπεῖναι,) ‘a lurking hope of salvation remaining, (περὶ οὗ about which is concerned) to prompt the anguish’ (of the mental struggle, ἀγών, implied in fear). Romeo and Juliet, v i. 68, *Art thou so base and full of wretchedness, and fear’st to die?* and foll. King Lear, iv i. 3, *To be worst, The lowest and most dejected thing of fortune.....lives not in fear.*

ἀποτυμπανιζόμενοι] τυμπανίζειν denotes a punishment—often capital, as it is here—of somewhat uncertain signification. It is generally understood to mean flogging or beating, sometimes to death, with cudgels; so much is certain; and the τύμπανον, the drum, or instrument made to resemble it, probably served as the block. So Alford explains it, note on Ep. to Hebr. xi. 35, q. v. “an instrument like a wheel or drumhead on which the victim was stretched and scourged to death.” (It was not *scourging*, but beating to death with sticks). It is sometimes called τροχός, Schol. ad Arist. Plut. 476, ὃ τύμπανα καὶ κύφωνες· τύμπανα ξύλα ἐφ’ οἷς

σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν. σημείον δέ· ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικούς ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται

ἐτυμπάνιζον· ἐχρῶντο γὰρ ταύτῃ τῇ τιμωρίᾳ. "Non infrequens verbum" (ἀποτυμπανίζειν: it is *commun* only in Plutarch; Wytttenbach supplies several instances; and it appears in the Septuagint, Maccab. III 3. 27, IV 5. 32, 9. 20, *where the instrument is called τροχός*, in the Epist. to the Hebrews, l.c., and in Josephus) "nec tamen eadem ac diserta significatione; nam universe est *verberare*, ut τυμπανίζειν, sed addita praepositio adfert notionem *ad finem verberare*; quod est vel eiusmodi ut verberatus inter verbera moriatur, *fustuarium*: vel ut vivus dimittatur, quae *fustigatio* quibusdam dicitur:" and then follow some examples. Wytttenbach, ad Plut. Mor. 170 A de Superst., item ad 60 A. Hesych. τυμπανίζεται, ἰσχυρῶς τύπτεται. τύμπανον, εἶδος τιμωρίας. Phot. Lex. τύμπανον, τὸ τοῦ δημίου ξύλον, ᾧ τοὺς παρατιδομένους διεχειρίζετο. Comp. Bretschneider, *Lex. Nov. Test.* s. v.

ἀπο-τυμπανίζειν, as Wytttenbach observes, denotes the *fatal character* of the beating, ἀπό 'off'; that the punishment was 'finished off', 'brought to an end'. So ἀπεργάζεσθαι 'to complete a work', ἀποτελεῖν, ἀποκάμνειν, ἀπομάχεσθαι ('to fight it out', Lysias, πρὸς Σίμωνι § 25), ἀποπειράσθαι, ἀποπολῶν, ἀποθνήσκειν (to die off, die away), ἀποκναίειν (grate away), ἀποτρίβειν (rub away, to an end), ἀπόλλυσθαι and ἀπολλύναι. The same notion of carrying *out*, or completion, is conveyed by ἐκ in composition, as ἐκτελεῖν, ἐξικέσθαι, ἐκβαίνειν, and others; the difference between the two prepositions being, that ἀπό is 'from a surface', 'off', ἐκ is 'from the inside', 'out of', 'out'. The verb ἀποτυμπανίζειν in this form denotes the *aggravation* of an ordinary beating; and corresponds to the Roman *fustuarium*, which is confined to *capital* punishment by *beating with sticks* for desertion in the Roman army; Cic. Phil. III 6, Liv. V 6 ult. *Fustuarium meretur qui signa deserit aut praesidio recedit*; and is opposed, in its severity and fatal termination, to the ordinary *flagellatio* or *verbera*. The verb is found in Lysias, κατ' Ἀγοράτου, § 56, (Ἀγοράτου) τῷ δημίῳ παρέδοτε, καὶ ἀπετυμπανίσθη, 57 and 58. Demosth. Phil. Γ 126. 19, ἀντὶ τοῦ τῷ μὲν βοηθεῖν τοὺς δὲ ἀποτυμπανίσαι. Rhet. II 6. 27.

σημείον δέ—οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων] 'an indication' (*a sign*, not an absolute proof, or conclusive sign, ἀπόδειξις or τεκμήριον) 'of this is, that fear inclines men to deliberation, and yet no one deliberates about things that are hopeless', or beyond the sphere of expectation. On the objects of βουλευσις, see Eth. Nic. III 5. We do *not* deliberate about things eternal and unchangeable; or about the *constant* motions of the heavens, or of the processes of nature; or about things that are constantly varying; or about things accidental and due to chance. We deliberate only about things which concern ourselves and human affairs in general, and of these only such as are in our own power, in which the event can be controlled by our own agency; and this is repeated throughout the chapter. Comp. VI 2, 1130 a 13, οὐθεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν, things necessary and invariable; over which therefore we have no control. It is plain therefore that these things which we do *not* deliberate about are ἀνελπίστα; they are beyond our

- 15 *περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων. ὥστε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν ἢ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιούτοί εἰσιν οἷοι παθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον· καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ἢ πεπονθότας, καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφ' ὧν οὐκ ᾔοντο, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ᾔοντο.*
- 16 *ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φόβου φανερόν τί ἐστι, καὶ τῶν φοβερῶν, καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔχοντες δεδίασι, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὸ θαρρεῖν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ ποῖα θαρραλέοι καὶ πῶς διακείμενοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν· τό τε γὰρ θάρσος ἐναντίον τῷ φόβῳ καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον τῷ φοβερῷ· ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ἐλπίς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων, τῶν δὲ φοβερῶν ἢ μὴ ὄντων ἢ*
- 17 *πόρρω ὄντων. ἐστι δὲ θαρραλέα τά τε δεινὰ πόρρω*

knowledge and control, and cannot therefore be the objects of future expectation.

§ 15. This is now applied to the *practice* of the rhetorician. 'And therefore they (the audience) must be made to think, or feel, whenever it is better (for you, the speaker) that they should be afraid, (when the occasion requires you to excite this emotion in your hearers,) that they are themselves liable to suffering; for in fact (as you suggest) others greater than they have suffered (and therefore *a fortiori* they are liable to it); and you must shew that their equals and those like them (in position, character, and circumstances) are suffering or have suffered, and *that* from such as they never expected it from, and in the particular form, and at the particular time, when it was unexpected'.

*παρασκευάζειν*] 'to bring into a frame of mind, or excite a feeling is used here as above, II 1. 2 and 7. See the notes there.

§ 16. 'From this explanation of the nature of fear and things fearful, and of the several dispositions that incline us to fear individually, we may plainly gather what confidence is, and the sort of things that inspire confidence, and the dispositions or habits of mind that incline us to confidence: because confidence is the opposite of fear, and that which inspires the one, the object of the one, is opposite to that which inspires, the object of, the other: and therefore, the hope (which *θάρος* implies, *its* hope) of what is conducive to security, is attended by a fancy' (or mental representation, or impression, derived from and connected with sense, see on I 11. 6) 'of their being close at hand, and the expectation' (*ἐλπίς* in its alternative, general, sense) 'of things to be dreaded by a fancy of either their non-existence or remoteness'. This latter fancy being characteristic of fear, defin. § 1, we may infer that the opposite fancy is characteristic of confidence.

ὄντα καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἐγγύς. καὶ ἐπανορθώσεις ἐὰν  
 ᾧσι καὶ βοήθειαι, ἢ πολλαὶ ἢ μεγάλαι ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ  
 μήτε ἡδικημένοι μήτε ἡδικηκότες ᾧσιν, ἀνταγωνισταί  
 τε ἢ μὴ ᾧσιν ὅλως, ἢ μὴ ἔχωσι δύναμιν, ἢ δύναμιν  
 ἔχοντες ᾧσι φίλοι ἢ πεποιηκότες εὖ ἢ πεπονθότες.  
 ἢ ἐὰν πλείους ᾧσιν οἷς ταῦτα συμφέρει, ἢ κρείττους,  
 18 ἢ ἄμφω. αὐτοὶ δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντες θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, <sup>p. 67.</sup>  
 ἐὰν πολλὰ κατωρθώκεναι οἶωνται καὶ μὴ πεπονθέναι,  
 ἢ ἐὰν πολλάκις ἐληλυθότες ᾧσιν εἰς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ δια-

§ 17. 'Things that inspire confidence are (therefore) things dreadful or dangerous when at a distance'—it is the remoteness of them, not the things themselves as the text *seems* to say, that inspires the confidence—and things that embolden us (cheering, inspiriting) when close at hand. And if there be means of rectifying, setting right again, repairing, remedying, the mischief we dread (*after* it is done), or of helping, defending ourselves against it, rescuing ourselves from it, (*before* it is done; comp. § 12, where Schrader thus distinguishes the two, *correctio mali praeteriti, auxilium mali imminantis*,) numerous or effective, or both, and we have neither been already injured ourselves nor injured others—the first on the principle on which the proverb is founded, "the burnt child dreads the fire," what we have already suffered we fear to suffer again; and the second, because when we have done no injury we fear no retaliation—or again if we have either no rivals and competitors at all, or such as we have are powerless; or, if they have power, are our friends or benefactors or indebted to us for services'. All these are topics opposite to those of fear, comp. §§ 8, 9, 10, 12; from which it appears that the rivalry of the ἀνταγωνισταί consists in the competition for the same things, where there is not enough of them for both the competitors; the rivalry, which naturally engenders ill-feeling, makes you afraid of some injury from your competitor, a fear which is exchanged for confidence, as far as the other is concerned, when there is no rivalry between you. 'Or if those who have the same interests are more numerous or more powerful, or both, (than those whose interests are different, our rivals or competitors)'.

§ 18. This is an answer to the question πῶς διακείμενοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν § 16. 'The feelings and dispositions in ourselves indicative of confidence, are, the opinion which we entertain of great success in our previous undertakings, and of having hitherto been exempt from injury, or if we have often run into danger and escaped': all of these are apt to make men sanguine as regards the future. Comp. Virg. Aen. I 198, *O socii, neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum, O passi graviores, dabit deus his quoque finem. Vos et Scyllaeam rabiem...revocate animos maestumque timorem mittite, forsitan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit...illuc fas regna resurgere Troiae. Durate et vosmet rebus servate secundis*. Hor. Od. I 7. 30, *O sortes, peioraque passi mecum saepe viri, nunc vino*

πεφευγότες· διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθείς γίγνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τῷ μὴ πεπειρᾶσθαι ἢ τῷ βοηθείας ἔχειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν κινδύνοις οἱ τε ἄπειροι χεიმῶνος θαρροῦσι τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ οἱ βοηθείας ἔχοντες  
 19 διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. καὶ ὅταν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἢ μὴ φοβερὸν, μηδὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι καὶ ὧν κρείττους οἶονται εἶναι· οἶονται δέ, ὧν κεκρατήκασιν ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν

*pellite curas, cras ingens iterabimus aequor.* 'For there are two things which make men insensible (to danger), either never to have experienced it (from ignorance, which inspires confidence) or to have plenty of helps, resources, means of defence, to resist and overcome it; as in dangers at sea, those who have never had experience of a storm are confident as to the future, and those who have derived from their experience plenty of resources'. What is said here of the inexperience of men at sea tending to confidence seems to be contradicted by the observation in *Eth. Nic.* III 9, 1115 b 1, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπειγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δ' εὐέλπιδες εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. Victorius thus reconciles the apparently conflicting statements: in the passage of the *Ethics* the brave men, who have had no experience, *do* keep up their courage though they despair of safety, and are indignant at such a death as that of drowning; the death which they covet being death on the field of battle: the sailors on the contrary are sanguine by reason of the resources which their experience has taught them. Still the contradiction is not removed by this explanation; for in the *Rhetoric* the inexperienced are confident, in the *Ethics* they are in despair, though their courage may not fail. In fact the two cases are not identical, nor intended to be so. In the *Ethics* the virtue of courage is displayed in the extremest danger, in the other there is no virtue at all; the ignorance of the danger inspires confidence—not courage—and that is all. The passage of the *Rhetoric* is explained by another in *Magn. Mor.* I 21, quoted by Schrader, ὅτι γὰρ καὶ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τις ἀνδρείος, οἷον οἱ στρατιῶται· οὗτοι γὰρ οἶδασιν δι' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι ἐν τοιούτῳ τόπῳ ἢ ἐν τοιούτῳ καιρῷ ἢ οὕτως ἔχοντι ἀδύνατόν τι παθεῖν... πάλιν οὖν εἰσιν ἀνδρεῖοι ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τῆς ἐμπειρίας· οἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι τῶν ἀποβησομένων οὐ φοβοῦνται διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν.

διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθείς] 'Tritum apud Graecos proverbium a priore horum modorum pendet, quo affirmatur, *suave esse bellum inexperio*: γλυκὺς ἀπείρῳ πόλεμος.' Victorius.

§ 19. Comp. § 10. 'And whenever (the danger apprehended) is not an object of apprehension to our peers (those resembling us in rank, station, wealth and resources), or to our inferiors, or to those whose superiors we *suppose ourselves* to be; this opinion (of superiority) is entertained toward those whom we have overcome (in some previous competition, or contest for the mastery), either themselves, or their superiors or equals'.

20 κρειττόνων ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων. καὶ ἐὰν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς  
 οἴωνται πλείω καὶ μείζω, οἷς ὑπερέχοντες φοβεροί P. 1383 b.  
 εἰσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πληθος χρημάτων καὶ ἰσχύς  
 σωμάτων καὶ φίλων καὶ χώρας καὶ τῶν πρὸς πόλεμον  
 21 παρασκευῶν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν μεγίστων. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ  
 ἡδικηκότες ὦσιν ἢ μηδένα ἢ μὴ πολλοὺς ἢ μὴ τοιοῦ-  
 (21) τούς περὶ ὧν φοβοῦνται<sup>1</sup>. καὶ ὅλως ἂν τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς  
 αὐτοῖς καλῶς ἔχη, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ σημείων

<sup>1</sup> φοβοῦνται·

§ 20. Another ground of confidence is, 'the supposition that we possess in greater quantity or in a higher degree those points of superiority which make (our enemies) formidable: such are wealth, bodily strength', (carry on *πληθος* and *ἰσχύς* to the three following genitives,) 'number and power (force) of friends, of territory, of military provision, (the last) either of every kind, or the most important and valuable.

§ 21. 'And if we have done no injury, either to no one at all, or to few, or if those few are not the sort of persons that are feared'. Compare § 8, which supplies the reason: it is, because they don't fear retaliation. On *περὶ ὧν* (= οὗς) *φοβοῦνται*, see note on I 9.14.

'And, in general, if our religious relations are in a favourable state (our account with Heaven stands well), and especially' (τὰ τε ἄλλα καί, 'not only in everything else, but especially in this': comp. ἄλλως τε καί, καὶ δὴ καί) 'in the communications of' (τὰ ἀπό, 'what proceeds from' the intimations as to our future conduct derived from them) 'omens' (*signs* from heaven, to direct us) 'and oracles'. Victorius quotes Cicero (who calls *σημεῖα* sometimes *notae*, indications, sometimes *signa*), and Plutarch to shew that *λόγια* means 'oracles'. *λόγιον* and *χρησμός* are used indifferently by Herodotus for 'oracle', and the word is also found, though rarely, in other writers; Thucydides, Aristoph. Eq. 120, Eurip. Heracl. 405.

'For the angry feeling is accompanied with confidence, and to abstain from wrong oneself and yet to be wronged by others is provocative of anger, and the divine power is supposed to aid (side with) the injured'. The argument is this, Innocence of wrong is a ground of confidence: but this may be extended to the general (ὅλως) case of the divine favour, and the feeling of confidence is heightened if we believe that we have heaven on our side, which we argue from favourable omens and oracles. This divine authority strengthens our conviction of our innocence, of our having right on our side (so Victorius), and therefore our confidence. Another reason for this increase of confidence is the *angry feeling* which is excited in us by the sense of unjust treatment from others to whom we have done no wrong, for anger always implies confidence; and at the same time we feel ourselves under the protection of heaven, which is always supposed to take the part of the innocent and injured. *θαρραλέον ἢ ὀργή*. Comp. Cic. Acad. Pr. II 44. 135, *ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant* (veteres Academici), referred to by Victorius and Majoragius.

καὶ λογίων· θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὀργή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν  
ἀλλ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ὀργῆς ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπολαμ-  
22 βάνεται βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις. καὶ ὅταν ἐπι-  
χειροῦντες ἢ μὴδὲν ἂν παθεῖν μὴδὲ πείσεσθαι ἢ κατορ-  
θώσιν οἴωνται.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται·  
I ποῖα δ' αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, καὶ πρὸς CHAP. VI.

§ 22. The last ground of confidence is 'the thought or opinion, in undertaking any enterprise, that we are not likely to, or (certainly) shall not, meet with any disaster, or that we shall succeed. And so much for objects of fear and confidence'.

#### CHAP. VI.

On shame or modesty, and shamelessness or impudence and effrontery.

Prof. Bain's remarks on shame—*Emotions and Will*, p. 142—are so brief that they may here be quoted entire. It falls under the general head of Emotions of Self, and in the subordinate division under that of self-love. "The feeling of shame is resolved by a reference to the dread of being condemned, or ill-thought of, by others. Declared censure and public infliction, by inviting the concurrent hostile regards of a wide circle of spectators, constitute an open shame. One is also put to shame by falling into any act that people are accustomed to disapprove, and will certainly censure in their own minds, although they may refrain from actually pronouncing condemnation. This is the most frequent case in common society. Knowing the hard judgments passed upon all breaches of conventional decorum, it is a source of mortification to any one to be caught in a slip; they can too easily imagine the sentence that they do not actually hear. The character of the pain of all such situations exactly accords with the pains of expressed disapprobation." [Chap. XI § 16, ed. 1875.]

§ 1. 'The exciting causes of shame and shamelessness, the objects of them, i. e. the persons to whom they are directed, and the dispositions or states of mind that they represent, will be clear from the following analysis'. ποῖα here is generally expressed by ἐπὶ τοιοῖς, of the exciting causes, which occurs in § 3.

On αἰδώς, as a πάθος, the sense of shame, see Arist. Eth. Nic. II 7, and more at large, IV 15. There, as here, no distinction is made between αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη. On the distinctions which may and may not be made between them, see Trench, *N. T. Syn.* [§ XIX] p. 73; and on αἰδώς contrasted with σωφροσύνη, ib. § XX. p. 76. They differ as the Latin *verecundia* (αἰδώς), and *pudor* (αἰσχύνη): the first is a subjective feeling or principle of honour, Germ. *scheu*; the second presents this in its objective aspect, as the fear of disgrace (from others, external) consequent on something already done, Germ. *schaam* and *schande*. Döderl. *Lat. Syn.* Vol. III. p. 201. αἰδώς precedes and prevents the shameful act, αἰσχύνη reflects upon its consc-

2 τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ἔστω δὴ

quences in the *shame* it brings with it. This latter conception of *αἰσχύνη* corresponds to Aristotle's definition here, and in *Eth. N. IV 15* init. *φόβος τις ἀδοξίας*. On *αἰδώς*, as a principle of action, and *νέμεσις*, the two primary notions of duty, duty to oneself, and duty to others or justice, see an interesting note of Sir A. Grant, on *Eth. N. II 7. 14*. In *Soph. Aj.* 1073—1086, the two fundamental principles, by which human conduct should be regulated, the foundations of law, justice, and military discipline, are *αἰδώς* or *αἰσχύνη*, and *δεός* or *φόβος*. *δεός γὰρ ᾧ πρόσσεστιν αἰσχύνῃ θ' ὁμοῦ σωτηρίαν ἔχοντα τόνδ' ἐπίστασο*. See Schneidewin's note on line 1079.

Aristotle both here and in the *Ethics* represents *αἰδώς* or *αἰσχύνη*, and consequently the opposite, as *πάθη*, instinctive emotions; and Bain by classing shame amongst the emotions takes the same view. *Eth. N. IV 15*, init. *περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινας ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει*. *ὀρίζεται γοῦν φόβος* (which is a *πάθος*) *τῆς ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελείται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον*. *ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνομένοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχρῶσιν*. *σωματικὰ δὲ φαίνεται πως εἶναι ἀμφοτέρω, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι*. This view of 'shame' or 'modesty' as a *πάθος* and not a *ἔξις*, an emotion and not a moral state or virtue, is commented on and criticized by Alexander Aphrodisiensis in his *ἀπορία καὶ λύσις*, Bk. Δ c. κα' (21), *περὶ αἰδοῦς*. The chapter opens with a reference to the two passages of the *Nic. Ethics* in which the subject is treated, and after an examination and criticism of the definition, he proceeds thus; *ἡ γὰρ αἰδώς οὐκ ἔοικεν ἀπλῶς εἶναι φόβος ἀδοξίας, ἀλλὰ πολὺν πρότερον ἀλλοτριότης πρὸς τὰ αἰσχυρά, δι' ἣν οἱ οὕτως ἔχοντες φοβούνται τὴν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀδοξίαν*. *εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τοιούτων ἡ αἰδώς, οὐκ ἔτ' ἂν οὐδὲ πάθος ἀπλῶς εἴη, ἀλλ' ἔξις τις καὶ διάθεσις, ἥ τὸ προειρημένον ἔπεται πάθος*.

The character of the *ἀναίσχυτος*, as depicted by Theophrastus, *Character. c. θ'*. *περὶ ἀναίσχυντίας*, has not much in common with the analysis of Aristotle. One common feature appears in § 6 of this chapter, *τὸ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἢ ἀπ' αἰσχυρῶν*; Theophrastus' definition of *ἀναίσχυντία* being *καταφρόνησις δόξης αἰσχυροῦ ἕνεκα κέρδους*. But the completest portrait of the *ἀναίσχυτος* that Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us, is doubtless the *ἀλλαντοπώλης* of Aristophanes' *Knights*. In this character the ideal of 'shameless impudence' seems to be reached, and human nature can go no further.

§ 2. *ἔστω*] marking the popular nature of the definition, which may be assumed for the occasion, though perhaps not strictly exact and scientific, has been already noticed several times, and will occur again in the definitions of the next two chapters.

'Let it be assumed then that shame is a kind of pain or disturbance (of one's equanimity, or the even balance of the mind, which is upset for the nonce by the emotion) belonging to' (*περὶ*, arising or manifested in) 'that class of evils which seem to tend to discredit' (loss of reputation—*φόβος τῆς ἀδοξίας*, the *popular* definition, in *Eth. N. IV 15*, init.)—'present past or future' (this marks the confusion or identification of *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη*, see above), 'and shamelessness a kind of slight regard of, con-



αἰσχύνῃ λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαι-  
 νόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων  
 ἢ μελλόντων, ἢ δ' ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ  
 ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν αἰσχύνῃ  
 3 ἢ ὀρισθεῖσα, ἀνάγκη αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις  
 τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχυρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ὧν φρον-  
 τίζει· τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα ἀπὸ κακίας ἔργα ἐστίν,  
 οἷον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν ἀσπίδα ἢ φυγεῖν· ἀπὸ δειλίας  
 γάρ. καὶ τὸ ἀποστερηῆσαι παρακαταθήκην· ἀπ' ἀδι-  
 4 κίας γάρ. καὶ τὸ συγγενέσθαι οἷς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅπου οὐ  
 5 δεῖ ἢ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ· ἀπ' ἀκολασίας γάρ· καὶ τὸ κερ-

temptuous indifference to' (on ὀλιγωρία, note on II 2. 1, comp. II 2. 3), 'and an insensibility to these same things'. On the connexion of ἀναισχυντία and ὀλιγωρία, comp. Demosth. de F. L. § 228, τίνα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει φήσας· ἂν βδελυρώτατον εἶναι καὶ πλείστης ἀναιδείας καὶ ὀλιγωρίας μεστόν (see Shilleto's note); adv. Canon. 1268 and 9, §§ 38, 39, ὁ τοῖνυν πάντων ἀναιδέστατον...τὴν δὲ τοῦτον πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀλιγωρίαν κ.τ.λ.

§ 3. 'From this definition of shame it follows of necessity that we are ashamed of all evils which are of such a kind as are thought to bring disgrace either on ourselves, or those we care for: and of this kind are all deeds or acts that proceed from any form of vice, throwing away one's shield for instance, or running away; for these proceed from cowardice. Or to defraud (a friend) of a deposit, for this proceeds from injustice'.

ἀποστερεῖν, as distinguished from other varieties of the confusion of *meum* and *tuum*, is applied to the meaner vices of cheating and defrauding, as opposed to robbery and theft accompanied with violence. It is particularly appropriate to withholding a deposit, from the preposition with which the verb is compounded: you not only deprive your friend of his loan, but you keep *back* from him something which is his due: as ἀπό in ἀπαιτεῖν, ἀποδιδόναι, ἀπονέμειν, et sim. Comp. I 7.5 and note (1). Cic. Tusc. Q. III 8, *Sed quia nec qui propter metum praesidium reliquit, quod est ignaviae; nec qui propter avaritiam clam depositum non reddidit, quod est iniustitiae*...Victorius.

§ 4. 'And sexual intercourse with forbidden (improper) persons, or in forbidden places (as a consecrated building), or at forbidden times; for this proceeds from licentiousness'. ὅπου οὐ δεῖ, ὅτε μὴ δεῖ. This variation of the negative, where no difference is intended, is by no means unusual. If translated strictly, οὐ denotes *particular* places, and μὴ times *in general*, any indefinite or hypothetical times; *lit.* 'at times, if any, when it is forbidden'.

§ 5. 'And to make a profit of mean and trifling things, or of things base and vile, or from the helpless and impotent, as the poor or the dead; whence the proverb *to rob* (even) *a corpse of its winding-sheet*;

δαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἢ ἀπ' αἰσχυρῶν ἢ ἀπ' ἀδυνάτων, p. 68.  
οἷον πενήτων ἢ τεθνεώτων· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ  
κὰν ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν· ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας γὰρ καὶ

for this arises from sordid greediness and meanness'. Hor. Ep. I i. 65, *Rem facias; rem Si possis recte; si non, quocunque modo rem.*

κερδαίνειν ἀπ' αἰσχυρῶν] is illustrated by the well-known story of Vespasian, Sueton. Vesp. c. 23, *Reprehendenti filio Tito, quod etiam urinae vectigal commentus esset, pecuniam ex prima pensione admovit ad nares, sciscitans, num odore offenderetur? et illo negante, at qui, inquit, e lotio est?* Erasm. *Adag.* p. 199, '*e turpibus, velut ex lenocinio quaestusque corporis.*' Another illustration of profit derived from a disgraceful source was (in the opinion of the Athenians of the 4th cent. B.C.) the practice of the λογογράφος, or δικογράφος, (δικογραφία, Isocr. ἀντίδοσις § 2,) the rhetorician who wrote speeches for the use of parties in the law-courts. The amount of discredit which this employment brought upon those who practised it may be estimated from the following passages. Antiphon commenced this practice (Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. xxxiii. § 1. Westermann, *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit*, 40. 10), and thereby brought upon himself the assaults of the Comic poets; καθάπτεται δ' ἡ κωμωδία τοῦ Ἀντιφώντος ὡς... λόγους κατὰ τοῦ δικαίου συγκειμένους ἀποδιδόμενου πολλῶν χρημάτων. Plat. Phaedr. 257 C, διὰ πάσης τῆς λοιδορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφον. Stallbaum ad loc. In Legg. XI 937 D ad fin., it is solemnly censured and denounced: a prohibitory law is enacted, and the penalty is death to the citizen, and perpetual banishment to the alien, who shall presume thus to pervert the minds of the administrators of justice. See also Stallbaum, Praef. ad Euthydem. p. 46. Dem. de F. L. § 274, λογογράφους τοίνυν καὶ σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλῶν; where Shilleto cites other examples from the Orators. Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως, is obliged to defend himself from the imputations of his enemies and detractors, who charged him with making money by this employment, § 2, βλασφημοῦντας περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς καὶ λέγοντας ὡς ἔστι περὶ δικογραφίαν—which is much the same, he continues, as if they were to call Phidias a dollmaker, or Zeuxis and Parrhasius signpainters. And again § 31, ἐκ δὲ τῆς περὶ δικαστήρια πραγματείας εἰς ὄργην καὶ μῖσος ὑμᾶς καταστήσειν. Lastly, the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 33, has this topic, for meeting a *calumnious charge*, εἰν δὲ διαβάλλωσιν ἡμᾶς ὡς γεγραμμένους λόγους λέγομεν ἢ λέγειν μελετώμεν ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ μισθῷ τιμὴ συνγοροῦμεν κ.τ.λ. I will only add that this sense of the word is not to be confounded with the other and earlier one of prose writers and especially of the early 'chroniclers', antecedent to and contemporaries of Herodotus; in which it is employed by Thucyd. I 21 and Rhet. II 11. 7, III 7. 7, 12. 2.

κὰν ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν] Prov. "contra avaros ac sordidas artes exercentes dicebatur." Victorius.

Other proverbs of the same tendency are quoted by Erasmus, *Adagia*, p. 199. *Avaritia et rapacitas. ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φορολογεῖν* 'to take tribute of the dead'. αἰτεῖν τοὺς ἀνδριάντας ἄλφια, 'to beg of the very statues', κυαμότρωξ, Aristoph. Equit. 41, 'a skinflint'. And Appendix to *Adagia*, s. v. *avaritia*, p. 1891.

6 ἀνελευθερίας. καὶ τὸ μὴ βοηθεῖν δυνάμενον εἰς χρήματα, ἢ ἦττον βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ βοηθεῖσθαι παρὰ 7 τῶν ἦττον εὐπόρων. καὶ δανείζεσθαι ὅτε δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ αἰτεῖν ὅτε ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν ὅτε αἰτεῖν, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἵνα δόξῃ αἰτεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀποτετυχηκότα μηδὲν 8 ἦττον· πάντα γὰρ ἀνελευθερίας ταῦτα σημεῖα. τὸ

αἰσχροκερδείας...ἀνελευθερίας] Eth. N. IV 3, 1122 a 2, 8, 12; ἀνελευθερία, Ib. c. 3, is the extreme, in defect, of the mean or virtue in the expenditure of the money, the excess being ἀσωτία, reckless prodigality: it is therefore undue parsimony, meanness, stinginess in expense. αἰσχροκερδεία is one of Theophrastus' Characters, λ'.

§ 6. 'And either to lend no assistance at all when you have the power or too little'. (ἦττον sc. τοῦ δέοντος). 'Or to receive assistance from those who can less afford it'.

§ 7. 'And borrowing when it will look like begging, to ask a favour under the guise of a loan (begging is a sign of impudence); or begging when it will bear the appearance of asking for a return' (of a favour: the shamelessness of this consists in the pretence that you have a *claim* upon the person from whom you are in reality begging: a favour, even supposing that your claim is well founded, ought never to be conferred from any expectation of a return: comp. I 9. 16, and 19, also II 4. 2, on the unselfishness of friendship), 'and asking for a return (repayment or compensation) when it will have the appearance of begging'. (If you have really done the other a favour, and so have a claim to compensation, still you must not put it in such a way as to *seem* to beg for it; begging is a sign of impudence.) The 'borrowing' propensities of the ἀναίσχυρος appear in Theophr. Char. θ', ὃν ἀποστερεῖ, πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπελθὼν δανείζεσθαι: and also near the end. Victorius interprets the three cases differently. He understands the δόξει of the other party in the transaction; the first case is 'to anticipate the other by asking for a loan, when *you* fancy he is going to beg of *you*'; the second is that of the poorer party who begs when the other is going to demand repayment, and so stops his mouth; the third is that of the richer of the two, who has often assisted the other on former occasions, and being tired of lending him money, when the other comes to renew his solicitations stops *his* mouth by asking for repayment. This I allow to be just as good, perhaps better, in point of sense, certainly more amusing, than my own interpretation: but as far as I am able to judge, the latter is more naturally suggested by the Greek, and more in accordance with precedent, as collected from the language of the previous topics of these chapters on the πάθη. The first of these three, according to Victorius's interpretation, is well illustrated by Timon of Athens, III 2. 49, *What a wicked beast was I to disfigure myself against such a good time...I was sending to use Lord Timon myself, &c.*

'And to praise (your friend, from whom you want to get money) in order to induce him to suppose that you are begging, and after a failure, repulse, rebuff, to go on all the same'—this is the shamelessness of *importunity*—'for all these are signs of illiberality or meanness'.

δ' ἐπαινεῖν παρόντα [κολακείας]<sup>1</sup>, καὶ τὸ τάγαθὰ μὲν  
 ὑπερεπαινεῖν τὰ δὲ φαῦλα συναλείφειν, καὶ τὸ ὑπερ-  
 αλγεῖν ἀλγοῦντι παρόντα, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὅσα  
 9 τοιαῦτα· κολακείας γὰρ σημεῖα. καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπο-  
 μένειν πόνους οὓς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι ἢ οἱ τρυφῶντες ἢ P. 1384.  
 οἱ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντες ἢ ὅλως οἱ ἀδυνατώτεροι·  
 10 πάντα γὰρ μαλακίας σημεῖα. καὶ τὸ ὑφ' ἑτέρου εὖ  
 πᾶσχειν, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις, καὶ ἂ εὖ ἐποίησεν ὄνει-  
 δίξιν· μικροψυχίας γὰρ πάντα καὶ ταπεινότητος ση-

<sup>1</sup> κολακείας sine uncinis, Bekk. ed. Berol. 1831, et ed. Oxon. 1837; item Spengel ed. 1867.

§ 8. 'To praise a man to his face is flattery' (*subaudi σημεῖον*)—Terent. Adelph. II 4. 6, *Ah vereor coram in os te laudare amplius, ne id assentandi magis quam quod gratum habeam facere existimes* (Victorius)—'as is also overpraising a man's good qualities, and disguising (by smearing over and so obscuring, as a writing, or blotting out) all his bad points (all his peccadilloes and weaknesses); and excessive sympathy with his distress (exhibited) in his presence, and everything else of the same kind; for they are all signs of flattery'. οἱ ταπεινοὶ κολακες, Eth. N. IV 8, 1125 a 2, Ib. VIII 9, 1159 a 14, ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι. A distinction is taken between ἄρεσκος and κόλαξ in Eth. Nic. IV 12, sub fin., which is here disregarded. The ἄρεσκος, the 'over-complaisant', is what we usually understand by κόλαξ or flatterer; but κόλαξ is here confined to *interested* flattery; εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, and is in fact equivalent to the ordinary παράσιτος. Theophrastus, Char. β', ε', maintains the distinction. One of the characteristics of κολακεία is καὶ ἐπαινέσαι δὲ ἀκούοντος: this appears also in the ἄρεσκος, Ch. ε'.

§ 9. 'And the refusal to undergo labours which older men (than ourselves are willing to endure); or men brought up in the lap of luxury, in luxurious habits (which engender tenderness, and delicacy, and effeminacy, and in general tastes and habits averse to labour); or those who are in higher authority' (if they condescend to undertake them, we are *a fortiori* bound to do so: or rather perhaps, in consideration of the μαλακία which seems intended to include all the preceding, for the same reason as the last mentioned, that they have not been *inured* to labour); 'or in general, those who are weaker, less capable of undertaking them, than ourselves; for all these are signs of softness, delicacy, or effeminacy'. The οἱ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον may be illustrated by the case of a commanding officer on a march dismounting from his horse, and walking on foot by the side of his men. Such an example would certainly *shame* any of the men who complained of fatigue. [Xen. Anab. III 4. 46—49.]

§ 10. 'And receiving favours from another, either once or frequently, and *then* reproaching him with the service he has done: all signs of a mean spirit and a low, grovelling, mind and temper'. On μικροψυχία 'littleness of mind', see Eth. N. IV 9.

11 μεῖα· καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τάλλότηρια αὐτοῦ φάσκειν· ἀλαζονείας γάρ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστης τῶν τοῦ ἥθους κακιῶν τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ  
12 ὅμοια· αἰσχροὶ γὰρ καὶ αἰσχυντικά. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ τῶν καλῶν ὧν πάντες μετέχουσιν ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι πάντες ἢ οἱ πλείστοι, μὴ μετέχειν. ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω ὁμοεθνεῖς, πολίτας, ἡλικας, συγγενεῖς, ὅλως τοὺς ἐξ ἴσου· αἰσχυρὸν γὰρ ἤδη τὸ μὴ μετέχειν, οἷον παιδεύσεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μᾶλλον, ἂν δι' ἐαυτὸν φαίνεται· οὕτω γάρ

§ 11. 'And saying *any* thing about yourself, making any kind of boast or profession about yourself',—no expression, however exaggerated, of self-laudation that you abstain from; no profession of any art or science that you do not lay claim to—'and taking the credit of, appropriating, other people's merits and advantages', symptomatic of quackery, undue and unfounded pretension or assumption. *The worthiness of praise distains his worth, If that the prais'd himself bring the praise forth.* Troilus and Cressida, I 3. 241.

ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι] to announce or proclaim—to the world in the way of profession in general, or especially the profession of any art, science, or practice; and almost technically (by Plato) applied to the magnificent profession—without corresponding performance—of the Sophists. Rhet. II 24. 11, of Protagoras' profession, what he undertook to do, viz. τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.—On ἀλαζονεία see note on I 2. 7.

'And in like manner the products or results of each of all the various vices of the character, and the outward signs of these (inward vices) and every thing that resembles them; for they are disgraceful (base and therefore to be shunned, in themselves), and provocative of shame (in us)'.

§ 12. 'And besides all these, the want (absence) of any of these estimable things of which all our peers, or most of them, have a share. By 'peers' I mean clansmen (members of the same race or tribe), fellow-citizens, equals in age, relatives, or, in general terms, those who are on an equality (on a level) with us; for *now* (that we have reached this stage, not perhaps before), it is shameful not to participate in advantages, such as education, or anything else in the same way, to so high a degree as they do. And all these disadvantages are still more disgraceful if they appear to be due to ourselves, and our own fault; for by this it *does* appear that they result rather from (internal) vice' (of character, the bad προαίρεσις which stamps them with the *vicious* character), 'if we ourselves be to blame for the introduction (pre-existence), the actual (present) existence, or future growth of them'.

- ἤδη ἀπὸ κακίας μᾶλλον, ἂν αὐτὸς ἦ αἴτιος τῶν ὑπαρ-  
 13 ξάντων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων ἢ μελλόντων, πάσχοντες δὲ ἢ  
 πεπονθότες ἢ πεισόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσχύνονται  
 ὅσα εἰς ἀτιμίαν φέρει καὶ ὀνείδῃ· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ  
 εἰς ὑπηρετήσεις ἢ σώματος ἢ ἔργων αἰσchrῶν, ὧν ἐστὶ  
 τὸ ὑβρίζεσθαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἐκόντα  
 καὶ ἄκοντα, τὰ δ' εἰς βίαν ἄκοντα.<sup>1</sup> ἀπὸ ἀνανδρίας  
 γὰρ ἢ δειλίας ἢ ὑπομονή καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι.  
 14 ἃ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνονται, ταῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοι- p. 69.  
 (14) αὐτα· ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσχύνῃ,

<sup>1</sup> ἄκοντα· (τὰ δ' εἰς βίαν ἄκοντα·)

§ 13. 'And the endurance, present, past, or future (in the anticipation) of any such things as tend to dishonour and reproach, men are ashamed of; and these are all acts of service or subservience of person or shameful deeds, under which head comes wanton outrage' (meaning here that particular kind of ὑβρις which lies in an outrage on or violation of the person; ὑπηρετεῖν is equivalent to χαρίζεσθαι, *sui copiam facere*, the surrender of the person to the service or gratification of another).

τὰ εἰς ἀκολασίαν] sc. φέροντα, συντείνοντα; *quae spectant ad incontinentiam*. 'Turpe est ea pati quae ab intemperantia alterius proficiuntur'. Schrader. 'And of these, all that have a tendency or reference to (all that subserve) licentiousness (the reckless and indiscriminate indulgence of the appetites) are disgraceful, whether voluntary or involuntary; the involuntary being such as are done under compulsion (*forza maggiore*); (even these are disgraceful) because the submission to, tame endurance of, them, and the non-resistance (not defending oneself against the violence), proceed from unmanliness or cowardice'. In ordinary cases, compulsion, any superior external force which cannot be controlled, absolves a man from responsibility for his actions—Eth. Nic. III 1, on the voluntary and involuntary—but in these cases if the force be not *absolutely* overwhelming he is bound to offer all the resistance in his power: to refrain from this shews cowardice or an unmanly spirit, and therefore such acts are still disgraceful, though not for the same reason as the voluntary. τὰ δ' εἰς βίαν ἄκοντα is added as an *explanatory note* to ἄκοντα: it interrupts the reasoning, and should therefore be separated from the context by some mark of a parenthesis.

§ 14. This concludes the first branch of the analysis of shame and its opposite, ποῖα αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυνοῦσιν, § 1, shameful things. We now proceed to consider the second, πρὸς τίνας, the persons, namely, before whom, in whose presence, this feeling is especially excited (*lit.* to whom the feeling is, as it were, *addressed*). These two divisions exhibit the two *πάθη* in their objective aspect, *things* and *persons*. The third, commencing at § 24, gives the subjective view of them, shewing how the persons who feel shame and the reverse are themselves affected by them, and what in them are the signs of its manifestation.

καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων,  
οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης φροντίζει ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ τοὺς δοξάζον-  
τας, ἀνάγκη τούτους αἰσχύνεσθαι ὧν λόγον ἔχει.  
15 λόγον δ' ἔχει τῶν θαυμαζόντων, καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει,  
καὶ ὑφ' ὧν βούλεται θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλο-  
16 τιμεῖται, καὶ ὧν μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης. θαυμά-  
ζεσθαι μὲν οὖν βούλονται ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ θαυμά-  
ζουσι τούτους ὅσοι τι ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῶν τιμίων,  
ἢ παρ' ὧν τυγχάνουσι δεόμενοι σφόδρα τινὸς ὧν  
17 ἐκείνοι κύριοι, οἷον οἱ ἐρῶντες· φιλοτιμοῦνται δὲ πρὸς  
τοὺς ὁμοίους, φροντίζουνσι δ' ὡς ἀληθεύοντων τῶν  
φρονίμων, τοιοῦτοι δ' οἳ τε πρεσβύτεροι καὶ οἱ πεπαι-  
18 δευμένοι. καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερώ

'Such and such like are the things that men are ashamed of. And as shame is a fancy or mental impression about discredit or loss of reputation (def. § 2), and this on its own account, with no reference to any ulterior results or consequences (of the loss of it), and no one cares for the opinion except on account of those who entertain it, it follows of necessity that the persons to whom shame is addressed are those whom we hold in account (take account of, regard and esteem)'.

§ 15. 'We take account of those that admire and look up to *us*, and those whom *we* admire and look up to (comp. I 6. 29), and by whom we wish to be admired, and those whom we are ambitious of rivalling (II 2. 24, note, 4. 24), and those whose opinion we *don't* despise'.

§§ 16, 17. 'Now the persons whom we wish to be admired by, and whom we ourselves look up to, are those who are in possession of any good of that class which is highly valued (which confers distinction), or those from whom we have an excessive desire to obtain something that they are masters of, as lovers; those that we vie with, or strive to rival, are our equals; and those that we look up to as *authorities* on any question (regard as likely to speak, or rather see, the truth in any disputed question on which their opinion is asked) are the men of practical wisdom; and such are men advanced in life and the well educated'.

§ 18. In the first clause of this section, as Schrader has noticed, there is a momentary transition from the *persons* who feel shame to the *things* which produce it; in the second, a return is made to the masculine. Supply αἰσχύνονται. 'And of things that take place, of acts done, under our very eyes, and openly (in broad daylight, or very prominent and conspicuous *in position*) men are more ashamed: whence also the proverb, *the seat of shame is in the eyes*. And the shame is deeper in the presence of those who will be always with us (constantly in our society, as members of our family, intimate friends; and the closer the intimacy the deeper the shame), and those who pay attention to, take particular

μᾶλλον· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς αἰεὶ παρεσόμενους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφοτέρα. καὶ τοὺς μὴ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐνό- P. 1384 b.  
19 χους· δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι τάναντία δοκεῖ τούτοις. καὶ

notice of us (study our character and actions); because both these are cases of special observation'.

ἀμφοτέρα] the abstract neuter; 'both the preceding *things*, or cases'; these two facts, or observations on the manifestation of shame, that it is more felt in the presence (1) of intimate associates and (2) curious observers, are confirmed by the proverb that *the seat of shame is in the eyes*;—when we are very much ashamed of anything we turn away our eyes, and dare not look our friend in the face. So Sappho to Alcaeus, *supra* i 9. 20—whatever the true reading may be—directly expresses this in the phrase αἰδῶς ἔχει ὄμματα.

The principal organ by which the emotion is expressed or manifested is naturally regarded as the *seat* of that emotion: and this is by no means confined to *shame*, but is extended not only to other emotions, but even to *justice* by Eurip. Med. 219, δίκη γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστ' ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς βροτῶν: the eyes are in this case represented as the organs of injustice, not *discerning* right and wrong. So Eur. Hippol. 246, καὶ ἐπ' αἰσχύνῃ ὄμμα τέτραπται. Id. Ctesph. Fr. xviii (Dind.), αἰδῶς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι γίγνεται τέκνον (apud Stobaeum). Arist. Vesp. 446, ἀλλὰ τούτοις γ' οὐκ ἔτι οὐδ' ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν αἰδῶς—τῶν παλαιῶν ἐμβάδων. Athen. XIII 564 B (Gaisford), καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἔφη τοὺς ἐραστὰς εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐρωμένων ἀποβλέπειν ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, ἐν οἷς τὴν αἰδῶ κατοκεῖν. Theogn. 85, οἷσιν ἐπὶ γλώσση τε καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἔπεισιν αἰδῶς. Theocr. XXVII 69, ὄμμασιν αἰδομένη. (Paley ad Suppl. 195, Latin ed.) Apollon. Rhod. III 92 (Victorius). Suidas s. v. αἰδῶς. καὶ ἑτέρα παροιμία "αἰδῶς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς," παρ' ὅσον οἱ κεκακωμένοι τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς οὐκ αἰδοῦνται, ἢ ὅτι τοὺς παρόντας ὁρῶντες αἰδοῦνται μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ τοὺς ἀπόντας. Eustath. ad Il. N 923. 18 (Gaisford), Ἀριστοτέλους γὰρ φιλοσοφώτατα παραδομένον οἰκητήριον αἰδοῦς εἶναι τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς. Id. ad Odys. ξ' 1754. 39, Ἀριστοτέλους φαμένον τὴν αἰδῶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι, .....οἷα τῶν αἰδημόνων καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ὕψους χαρακτηριζομένων, οἱ ἐφ' οἷς αἰδεῖσθαι χρὴ χαλῶσι τὰ βλέφαρα καὶ βλέπειν ἀτενὲς ὀκνοοῦσιν. In Probl. XXXI 3, 957 b 11, this is directly stated as a matter of fact without any reference to the proverb or to vulgar opinion, ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς γὰρ αἰδῶς, as an explanation of something else.

So of love, the eye is the medium or channel by which it is conveyed; Eur. Hippol. 527, ἔρως, ἔρως, ὁ κατ' ὀμμάτων στάσεις πόθον. Aesch. Agam. 419, ὀμμάτων δ' ἐν ἀχηνίας ἔρρει πᾶς' Ἀφροδίτα, on which see Donaldson, *New Crat.* § 478. Ib. 742 (Dind.) μαλθακὸν ὀμμάτων βέλος δηξίθυμον ἔρωτος ἄνθος. Plat. Phaedr. 251 B, τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροήν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων—the Emanation theory—which is afterwards *explained*, ib. 251 C, Cratyl. 420 B, ἔρως δέ, ὅτι ἐσρεῖ ἔξωθεν...ἐπίεσакτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων...ἐκαλεῖτο. Arist. Eth. Nic. IX 12, init. ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρώσι τὸ ὄρῳ ἀγαπητοτάτον ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ



τοὺς μὴ συγγνωμονικοὺς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀμαρτάνειν· ἃ γὰρ τις αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα λέγεται τοῖς πέλας οὐ νεμεσᾶν, ὥστε ἃ μὴ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι 20 νεμεσᾶ. καὶ τοὺς ἐξαγγελτικούς πολλοῖς· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει μὴ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐξαγγέλλειν. ἐξαγ-

ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γενομένου κ.τ.λ. Heliodorus III 8, quoted by King, *Gnostic Gems*, p. 113—4, on βασκανία 'the envious' or 'evil eye'. In the same passage love is described as a kind of ophthalmia, or infection by the eye. Similarly φθόνος, 'the evil eye', Aesch. Agam. 947 (Dind.), μὴ τις πρόσωθεν ὀμμάτων βάλοι φθόνος—where Paley quotes Eur. Inus Fragm. 11, ἐν χερσίν, ἢ σπλάγχνοις, ἢ παρ' ὀμματα ἔσθ' ἡμιν (ὁ φθόνος).—φύβος, Aesch. Pers. 168 (Dind.), ἀμφὶ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς φόβος. ἄχος, Soph. Aj. 706, ἔλυσεν αἰνὸν ἄχος ἀπ' ὀμμάτων Ἀρης. S. Petr. Ep. II ii. 14, ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες μεστοὺς μοιχαλίδος, S. Joh. Ep. I ii. 16, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. χαρά, 'tears of joy', Soph. Electr. 894, 1304, 1231, γεγηθὸς ἔρπει δάκρυον ὀμμάτων ἄπο. Aesch. Agam. 261, χαρὰ μ' ὑφέρπει δάκρυον ἐκκαλουμένη. Ib. 527. Prov. vi. 17, *haughty eyes are an abomination to the Lord*. Isaiah v. 15, *the eyes (i. e. pride) of the lofty shall be humbled*. Ezekiel v. 11, *neither shall mine eyes (i. e. either mercy or justice) spare*. Habak. i. 13, *thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil*. All these various examples shew, what may also be inferred from our own ordinary language, in which we speak indifferently of the *eye* of mercy and of pity on the one hand, and of the *eye* of anger, of envy, of scorn, of hatred, of jealousy on the other, that *the eye may be taken to represent in language any emotion whatsoever, good or bad, of which it is in nature the most prominent organ of expression*.

§ 19. 'Again, in the presence of those who are not liable to the same imputations (as *we* lie under for some shameful act); for it is plain that (in this matter) their feelings and opinions must be contrary to our own. And of those who are not inclined to be indulgent, to make allowance for, apparent faults; for things which a man does himself he is generally supposed not to find fault with in others, and therefore (the converse must be true) what he does not do himself he is plainly likely to condemn in others'. Such as—according to Hudibras—*Compound for sins they are inclined to, by damning those they have no mind to* [i. i. 215].

νεμεσις is *righteous indignation*, moral disapprobation or reprobation; the opposite of ἔλεος and συγγνώμη, which take the indulgent and merciful view of human frailty. Infr. cc. 8, 9. Comp. 9. 1.

§ 20. 'And of those who are inclined to *gossiping* (to telling tales, betraying secrets, publishing, divulging them to their acquaintance in general): because there is no difference (in regard of the effect upon the other) between not thinking (a thing wrong) and not publishing it to the world'. That is, as far as the effect upon the person who has done something wrong is concerned, and the amount of shame which it causes him, it makes no difference whether the other really thinks it wrong, or merely *says* so, to the world. In no other sense are 'not thinking' and 'not telling' the same. 'Tell-tales are, such as have received an injury,—for

γελτικοὶ δὲ οἱ τε ἡδικοιμένοι διὰ τὸ παρατηρεῖν καὶ οἱ κακολόγοι· εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντας, ἔτι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας. καὶ οἷς ἡ διατριβὴ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πέλας ἀμαρτίαις, οἷον χλευασταῖς καὶ κωμωδοποιοῖς· κακολόγοι γάρ πως οὗτοι καὶ ἐξαγγελτικοί. καὶ ἐν οἷς μηδὲν ἀποτετυχήκασιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θαυμαζόμενοι διάκεινται. διὸ καὶ τοὺς πρῶτον

these are always on the watch, lying in wait (παρά lurking in the neighbourhood) (for an opportunity of retaliation)—and those who are censorious and inclined to evil-speaking in general: for the latter, (supply κακολογοῦσι, or κακῶς λέγουσι,) if they speak evil of the inoffensive or innocent, *a fortiori* are likely to do so of the offenders or guilty.

παρατηρεῖν] *inf.* III 2. 15. Xen. Mem. III 14. 4, with an evil design, 'to lie in wait for', Polyb. XVII 3. 2, ap. Liddell and Scott. Add Arist. Top. Θ 11, 161 a 23, ὅταν ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος τὰναντία τῷ ἐρωτῶντι παρατηρῇ προσεπηρέαζων, of one, who in a dialectical discussion 'wantonly' (πρός, in addition to his proper functions, as a work of supererogation) 'and spitefully or vexatiously (ἐπηρέαζων) lies in wait to catch his opponent' in some logical trap or other.

'And those whose occupation or amusement (διατριβή, *passe-temps*) lies in finding fault with their neighbours, such as the habitually sarcastic (*busy mockers*, Ps. xxxv. 16), and comic poets or satirists in general: for these are in a sense (in some sort may be considered as) professional evil-speakers, and libellers of their neighbours'. To the readers of Aristophanes, and indeed of Comedy—especially ancient Comedy—in general, this satirical and libellous character, which has become identified with their art (κωμωδεῖν, Aristoph., Plato, &c.), needs no illustration. Hor. A. P. 281—4.

χλευασταῖς] See II 2. 12, and note. II 3. 9.

'And those with whom we have never before met with a failure (incurred reproach or damage, sustained a repulse, lost credit—explained by ἡδοξήκοτες *infra*); for we are to them as it were objects of admiration and respect' (διάκεινται, *lit.* we are to them in such a disposition, or position, attitude, posture)—they have never yet had occasion to find fault with us, we have hitherto not lost caste in their estimation—'and this is why we feel ashamed in the presence of (are reluctant to refuse) those who ask a favour for the first time, because (on the supposition that) we have never yet lost credit in their eyes (and this respect which they have for us we should be loth to impair)'.

ὥσπερ θαυμαζόμενοι] Objects of shame (οὓς αἰσχύνονται) are those before whom men feel ashamed of any offence against virtue or propriety: comp. ἡ αὐτὴ ἢ ὧν φροντίζει, § 3: also §§ 15, 24.

'And these are either such as have recently conceived the wish to be friends with us—for they have hitherto seen only the best of us—and hence the merit of Euripides' answer to the Syracusans—or, of acquaintances of long standing, such as know nothing against, know no ill of us',

δεθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται ὡς οὐδέν πω ἡδοξηκότες ἐν αὐτοῖς· τοιοῦτοι δ' οἳ τε ἄρτι βουλόμενοι φίλοι εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ βέλτιστα τεθέανται, διὸ εὖ ἔχει ἡ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους) καὶ τῶν  
 21 πάλαι γνωρίμων οἱ μηδὲν συνειδότες. αἰσχύνονται δ' οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ τὰ ῥηθέντα αἰσχυνητὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ <sup>p. 70.</sup> σημεῖα, οἷον οὐ μόνον ἀφροδισιάζοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῦ. καὶ οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντες τὰ αἰσχρά,

(are privy to, conscious of, no vice or misconduct in us,) whose good opinion of us is unimpaired.

The answer of Euripides to the Syracusans is given—invented say some—by the Scholiast, in these words: *Εὐριπίδης πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους πρέσβυς ἀποσταλὴς καὶ περὶ εἰρήνης καὶ φιλίας δεόμενος, ὡς ἐκείνοι ἀνέενον, εἶπεν* ἔδει, ἄνδρες Συρακόσιοι, εἰ καὶ διὰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ γε διὰ τὸ ἄρτι ὑμῶν δέεσθαι, αἰσχύνεσθαι ἡμᾶς ὡς θαυμάζοντας. We know nothing from any other source of Euripides having ever been employed on any other occasion in any public capacity; but as Aeschylus fought at Marathon, and Sophocles was one of the ten generals who conducted the expedition against Samos under Pericles, there seems to be no *a priori* objection to the employment of another tragic poet in a similar public service. That Euripides could speak in public we learn from a reference of Aristotle to another answer of his, *Rhet.* III 15. 8. Nevertheless the objection has been held fatal to the soundness of the reading, and Ruhnken, *Hist. Crit.* (ap. Buhle), has proposed to substitute Ὑπερίδου for Εὐριπίδου in our text, the one name being constantly confounded by transcribers with the other. Sauppe *Orat. Att.* Vol. III. p. 216, *Fragm. Orat.* XV argues the question, and decides (rightly, I think) in favour of the vulgate. There is in fact no reason whatsoever, except our ignorance, for denying that Euripides could have been sent ambassador to Syracuse. Sauppe thinks that the occasion probably was the negotiations carried on between Athens and Sicily from 427—415, previous to the Sicilian expedition. His note ends with an inquiry whether another Euripides, Xenophon's father, *Thuc.* II 70, 79, may possibly be meant here. The extreme appositeness of the answer to Aristotle's topic, which seems to have suggested the suspicion of manufacture for the special occasion, tells in reality at least as much in favour of its genuineness; it is because it is so appropriate, that Aristotle remembers and quotes it.

§ 21. 'And not only the *things* already mentioned cause shame, but also the signs and outward tokens and indications of it' (α σημεῖον is, in logic, the *ordinary* accompaniment of something the existence of which it *indicates*; the *invariable* accompaniment, a *certain* proof of the existence of it, is a τεκμήριον), 'as in the case of sexual intercourse, not merely the act itself, but the signs of it. And similarly, people are ashamed not merely of shameful acts, but also of shameful words, foul language'. *Quod factu foedum est, idem est et dictu turpe.* Soph. Oed. R. 1409, ἀλλ'

- 22 ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγοντες. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐ τοὺς εἰρημένους  
μόνον αἰσχύνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς δηλώσοντας αὐ-  
23 τοῖς, οἷον θεράποντας καὶ φίλους τούτων. ὅλως δ'  
οὐκ αἰσχύνονται οὐθ' ὧν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς  
δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν (οὐδεῖς γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία  
αἰσχύνεται) οὔτε ταῦτ' αὖ τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τοὺς  
ἀγνώτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν  
δοκοῦντα τοὺς δὲ ἄπωθεν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον.
- 24 αὐτοὶ δὲ ὥδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἄν, πρῶτον  
μὲν εἰ ὑπάρχοιεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες οὕτω τινὲς οἷους  
ἔφαμεν εἶναι οὐς αἰσχύνονται. ἦσαν δ' οὗτοι ἢ θαν-

οὐ γὰρ αὐδᾶν ἔσθ' ἃ μηδὲ δρᾶν καλόν. Isocr. ad Demon. § 15, ἃ ποιεῖν  
αἰσχρόν, ταῦτα νόμιζε μηδὲ λέγειν εἶναι καλόν.

§ 22. 'And in like manner we are ashamed (of any disgraceful  
action) before those who will reveal or betray it to them' (viz. the before-  
mentioned τοῖς θαυμάζουσιν and the rest: αὐτοῖς is due to Victorius for  
*varia lectio* αὐτοῦς); 'as servants, and their friends'.

§ 23. 'And in general, people are not ashamed in the presence of  
those for whose opinion, in respect of perceiving the truth and forming a  
*sound judgment* on it, they have a very great contempt—for no one feels  
shame in the presence of children or brutes—nor of the same things' (ταῦτ' αὖ  
cogn. accus. after αἰσχύνονται understood) 'in the presence of persons well  
known to them and of strangers; but in the presence of intimates they  
are ashamed of things which are considered (δοκοῦντα) really and *essen-*  
*tially*, in that of the remote (from them in connexion), of what is only  
*conventionally*, disgraceful'. On this distinction of πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and  
πρὸς δόξαν=πρὸς τὸν νόμον, see note on II 4. 23: and on ἄπωθεν (the ter-  
mination) note on I 11. 16.

§ 24. This section is the commencement of the third division of the  
analysis of shame and its opposite; the *subjective* view of them, shewing  
how they appear in the persons themselves who are affected by them.

'The likely subjects of shame themselves are, first of all men of such  
a disposition, or in such a state of mind, as if they had certain others  
standing to them in the same relation as those of whom we said they  
stand in awe'. Such are persons whom they respect and admire, whom  
they regard as *authorities*, whose judgment and opinions they look up to.  
A somewhat complicated assemblage of words to express this simple  
meaning, that the disposition to shame is the same state of mind as that  
which has been before described as felt in the presence of certain classes  
of persons of whom we stand in awe; which are immediately specified.  
'These were (i.e. *are*, as we described them, ὧν τις τῆς δόξης φροντίζει,  
τῶν θαυμάζοντων, καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει κ.τ.λ. ante §§ 14, 15) either those that we  
admire, or that admire us, or by whom we wish to be admired, or those  
from whom we require any aid or service which we shall not obtain if we

μαζόμενοι ἢ θαυμάζοντες ἢ ὑφ' ὧν βούλονται θαυμά-  
ζεσθαι, ἢ ὧν δέονται τινα χρεῖαν ὧν μὴ τεύξονται  
ἄδοξοι ὄντες, καὶ οὗτοι ἢ ὀρώντες, ὥσπερ Κυδίας περὶ  
τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδημηγόρησεν (ἡξίου γὰρ ὑπο-  
λαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἑλ-  
ληνας, ὡς ὀρώντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους ἀ ἀν-  
ψηφίσωνται), ἢ ἀν πλησίον ὧσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἢ μέλ-  
λουσιν αἰσθήσεσθαι. διὸ καὶ ὀράσθαι ἀτυχοῦντες ὑπὸ  
τῶν ζηλούντων ποτὲ οὐ βούλονται· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ  
25 οἱ ζηλωταί. καὶ ὅταν ἔχωσιν ἀ καταισχυνοῦσιν P. 1385.

lose our credit with them; and these either as actually looking on, actual spectators (of what we say or do), of which Cydias' harangue on the allotment of Samos furnishes an example—for he required them to imagine the entire Greek people to be standing round the Athenians in a circle, as actual spectators, and not mere (future or expectant) listeners, of the decree they are about to make—or if such be near at hand, or likely to be listeners' (to what we have to say: this especially for the *deliberative speaker*).

The Σάμου κληρουχία here referred to is not the allotment of the Samian lands amongst Athenian citizens after the revolt of the island and its subsequent reduction by Pericles in 440 B.C. Thucydides, who gives an account of the treatment of the Samians after their defeat, I 117, makes no mention of any such allotment. It is referred by Ruhnken, *Hist. Crit.*, and by Grote, *Hist. of Gr.* x 407 and note, 408, to Timotheus' conquest of Samos in 366, and the subsequent Athenian settlement there in 352; of the former of which Cornelius Nepos speaks, Vit. Timoth. c. 1, ap. Clinton *F. H.* sub anno 440. It was against this allotment of Samos that Cydias (of whom nothing seems to be known beyond this notice, his name does not even occur in Baiter and Sauppe's list of Orators,) made his appeal to the Athenian assembly, and invited them to decide the question of spoliation, as though all Greece were standing round them looking on. Isocrates, Paneg. § 107, is obliged to defend his countrymen from the reproach (ὀνειδίζειν) of this and similar practices, not specially named, by the plea that the appropriation of the territory was not due to rapacity, but solely to the desire of securing the safety of the desolated properties by planting a colony to defend them.

'And therefore also men in misfortune don't like (are ashamed) to be seen by their *quondam* rivals or emulators, because these are admirers'; and therefore, by the rule previously laid down, they are ashamed to appear before them in this undignified and melancholy condition.

§ 25. And men are disposed to feel shame, 'whenever they have attached to them any disgraceful deeds or belongings, derived either from themselves or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are in near relation'. ἀγχιστεία, 'nearness of kin', gives the right of succession

ἔργα καὶ πράγματα ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ προγόνων ἢ ἄλλων  
 τινῶν πρὸς οὓς ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς ἀγχιστέα τις. καὶ  
 ὅλως ὑπὲρ ὧν αἰσχύνονται αὐτοί· εἰσὶ δ' οὗτοι οἱ  
 εἰρημένοι καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀναφερόμενοι, ὧν διδάσκα-  
 26 λοὶ ἢ σύμβουλοι γεγόνασιν, ἢ ἐὰν ᾤσιν ἕτεροι ὅμοιοι,  
 27 τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. καὶ  
 μέλλοντες ὁράσθαι καὶ ἐν φανερωῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι  
 τοῖς συνειδόσιν αἰσχυνηλοὶ μάλλον εἰσίν. ὅθεν καὶ  
 Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητὴς μέλλων ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι ὑπὸ  
 Διονυσίου εἶπεν, ἰδὼν τοὺς συναποθνήσκειν μέλλοντας

under the Attic law. Victorius quotes Eur. Hippol. 424, δουλοὶ γὰρ  
 ἄνδρα, κὰν θρασυπλαγχνός τις ἦ, ὅταν συνειδῇ μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς κακά.

ἀ καταισχυνοῦσιν ἔργα] The subject of the neut. plur. with verb sin-  
 gular, and the exceptions, is well treated in Jelf's *Gr. Gr.* §§ 384, 385.  
 Porson, Addenda ad Eur. Hec. 1149, had restricted the exceptions to per-  
 sons or animate objects: Hermann, ad Soph. Electr. 430, corrects this too  
 limited statement. Lobeck, Phrynichus, p. 425. On Aristotle's use of this  
 licence, see Zell ad Eth. Nic. vol. II. p. 4, Waitz ad Organ. vol. I. p. 535.

'And, as a general rule, those on whose behalf (account) we our-  
 selves feel ashamed (when they are guilty of any shameful act). These  
 are such as have been just named (sc. πρόγονοι ἢ ἄλλοι τινές κ.τ.λ.) as well  
 as all such as fall back upon us (ἀναφερόμενοι, *re-lati*, who *refer* to us, as  
 patrons or authorities), those, that is, to whom we have stood in the  
 relation of instructors or admirers; or indeed if there be any others, like  
 ourselves, to whom we look up as competitors for distinction: for there  
 are many things which out of consideration for such we either do or  
 avoid doing from a feeling of shame'.

§ 27. 'And when we are likely to be seen, and thrown together' (ἀνα-  
 στρέφεσθαι, *versari, conversari*; of *converse, conversation*, in its earlier  
 application) 'in public with those who are privy to (our disgrace), we are  
 more inclined to feel ashamed'. Comp. Thucyd. I 37. 4, κὰν τούτῳ τὸ  
 εὐπρεπὲς ἀποπνέον οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ξυναδικήσωσιν ἑτέροις προβέβληνται, ἀλλ' ὅπως  
 κατὰ μόνας ἀδικῶσι, καὶ ὅπως ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν κρατῶσι βιάζωνται, οὐ δ' ἂν λάθωσι  
 πλέον ἔχωσιν, ἣν δέ πού τι προσλάβωσιν ἀναισχυνητῶσι. "May be spared  
 their blushes, as there are none to witness them." According to the pro-  
 verb, *Pudor in oculis habitat*. Arnold ad loc.

'To which also Antiphon the poet referred (ὅθεν, *from which* princi-  
 ple he derived his remark) when, on the point of being flogged to death  
 by Dionysius, he said, as he saw those who were to die with him (his  
 fellow-sufferers) covering their faces as they passed through the gates (at  
 the city gates, where a crowd was gathered to look at them), "Why hide  
 your faces? Is it not for fear that any one of these should see you  
 to-morrow?"

ἐγκαλυπτομένους ὡς ἦεσαν διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, “τί ἐγκαλύπτεσθε” ἔφη. “ἢ μὴ αὐριόν τις ὑμᾶς ἴδῃ τούτων;”

περὶ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνῃς ταῦτα· περὶ δὲ ἀναισχυν- P. 71.  
I τίας δηλον ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐπόρησομεν. τίσις CHAP. VII.

On Antiphon the tragic poet, see II 2. 19; and on ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι, c. 5. 14.

ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι, ‘to hide the face’ especially for *shame*. Plat. Phaedr. 243 B, γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τότε ὑπ’ αἰσχύνῃς ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. In Phaedo 117 C, Phaedo covers his face to hide his tears, ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυφάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἑμαντόν. Stallbaum refers to Dorville ad Charit. p. 274. Aesch. c. Tim. § 26, (Timarchus) γυμνὸς ἐπαγκρατίαζεν ... οὕτω κακῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς διακείμενος τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ μέθης καὶ βδελυρίας, ὥστε τοὺς γε εὖ φρονοῦντας ἐγκαλύψασθαι, αἰσχυνθέντας ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως κ.τ.λ. In the 3rd of the letters attributed to Demosthenes, 1485. 9, τῆς Ἀριστογείτονος κρίσεως ἀναμνησθέντες ἐγκαλύψασθε (hide your faces for shame).

Also for *fear*, Arist. Plut. 707, μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ μὲν εὐθὺς ἐνεκαλυψάμην δέϊσας, Ib. 714.

Plutarch, X Orat. Vit., Ἀντιφῶν, relates this story of Antiphon the orator. He was sent on an embassy to Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse; and, at a drinking party, the question arising, which was the ‘best bronze’ in the world, τίς ἀριστός ἐστι χαλκός; Antiphon said that was the best of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made. Dionysius interpreting this as implying a similar design upon himself ordered him to be executed. Others say that the order was given in a fit of passion brought on by Antiphon’s criticism of his tragedies.

ἢ μὴ τις ἴδῃ] The alternative ἢ prefixed to the interrogative sentence, expresses the opinion of the writer or speaker, ‘It is so—isn’t it?’ ‘You do think so, don’t you?’ and is most familiar in the Platonic dialogues; also very frequent in our author. The *alternative*, which conveys this, refers to a suppressed clause or clauses, “Is it so and so, or so and so,—or rather, as I myself think and suppose that you do also, is it not thus?” In order to express this, in translating we supply the negative. Socrates’ ἢ οὐ; ‘You think so, don’t you?’, which occurs so constantly (in Plato) at the end of his arguments, may seem to contradict this. But it really amounts to the same thing. Socrates, meaning to imply that he expects the other’s assent, says (literally) ‘or not?’; which is, being interpreted, ‘You surely don’t think otherwise?’ Dionysius’ ἡμὴ consequently mean when expressed at full length ‘Is it anything else, or is it not rather as I suppose, lest’...

‘So much for shame: of shamelessness, the topics may plainly be derived from the opposites of these’.

#### CHAP. VII.

ἡ χάρις, the πάθος, or instinctive emotion, of which this Chapter treats, represents the tendency or inclination to benevolence, to do a grace, favour, or service, spontaneous and disinterested (§§ 2, 5) to another, or to our fellow-man. It also includes the feeling of gratitude, the instinctive inclination to *return* favours received.

δὲ χάριν ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν ἢ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες,  
 2 ὀρισαμένοις τὴν χάριν δηλὸν ἔσται. ἔστω δὲ χάρις,  
 καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ὑπουργεῖν δεομένῳ μὴ  
 ἀντί τινος, μηδ' ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι ἀλλ' ἵν'

§ 1. 'The objects of benevolence, the circumstances and occasions (on which it is exercised), and the dispositions, characters, and moods of mind (of those who exercise it), will be evident when we have defined benevolence'.

§ 2. 'Let us then assume benevolence to be that, in accordance with (under the influence of) which he who has the feeling is said to do a service to one who is in want of it, not in return for anything (as a compensation or payment)—it must be spontaneous as an instinct—'nor for his own benefit, but for the advantage of the *other* party (to the transaction, *ἐκείνῳ*): the favour is great if it be (conferred on) one who is in extreme need of it, or if (the benefit it confers) be of great value or difficult (of attainment), on occasions of the like kind (*μεγάλοις καὶ χαλεποῖς*), or if it be unique' (a solitary instance of such a service, the only time it ever was conferred: supply *ἢ ἂν μόνος ὁ ὑπουργῶν ὑπουργήσῃ* or simply *χαρίσῃται*), 'or the first of its kind or the most important of its kind (*lit.* more than any one else has ever done)'.

A passage of Cicero, *de Invent.* XXXVIII. 112, will serve as a commentary on this. *Beneficia ex sua vi, ex tempore, ex animo eius qui facit, ex casu, considerantur.* (The character of acts of benevolence is gathered or determined from these four considerations.) *Ex sua vi quaerentur hoc modo: magna an parva, facilia an difficilia, singularia sint an vulgaria, vera an falsa, quam exornatione honestentur: ex tempore autem, si tum quum indigeremus, quum ceteri non possent, aut nollent, opitulari, si tum quum spes deseruisset: ex animo, si non sui commodi causa, si eo consilio fecit omnia ut hoc conficere posset: ex casu, si non fortuna sed industria factum videbitur aut si industria fortuna obstitisse.* From this close resemblance I should infer, not that Cicero had Aristotle's work before him when he wrote the *de Inventione*, but rather that it had been handed down, perhaps from him in the first instance, as a common-place in the ordinary books of Rhetoric.

It was a disputed question, says Ar. again, *Eth. Nic.* VIII 15, 1163 a 9, seq., whether the magnitude of a favour or benefit is to be measured by the amount of service to the recipient, or by the beneficence<sup>1</sup> of the doer of it: the former being always inclined in the estimate of its value to underrate, the latter to overrate it. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρεῖαις.

<sup>1</sup> τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ. The amount of pains, labour, risk, or sacrifice incurred by the conferrer of the benefit here seems to be regarded as the *measure* of his 'beneficence'.



ἐκείνῳ τι· μεγάλη δ' ἂν ἢ σφόδρα δεομένῳ, ἢ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἢ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα. δεήσεις δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ὀρέξεις, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομένου· τοιαῦται δὲ οἱ ἐπιθυμῖαι, οἷον ὁ ἔρως. καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κακώσεσι καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ

μὴ ἀντί τιος] This might seem at first sight to exclude *gratitude* from the notion of *χάρις*; but this I believe cannot be intended; though gratitude and ingratitude are not distinctly noticed in the chapter. The case is this. *χάρις* in this chapter is employed exclusively in its *subjective* sense (see the Lexx.), to denote one of the instinctive feelings: when therefore it is applied to express *gratitude*, it is the feeling only, and not the actual return of the favour, which is taken into account. This is expressed by the words *μὴ ἀντί τιος*, which signify that it is 'independent of the actual requital of the benefit conferred': and, indeed, gratitude may be equally felt when the receiver of the favour has no means of repaying it in kind. This independent or subjective feeling of gratitude is therefore opposed in the words *μὴ ἀντί τιος* to the notion of a *μισθός*, the 'payment' or wages which a workman receives in fulfilment of an implied contract; where there is no feeling of gratitude or obligation remaining on either side after the work is done and paid for. Whereas gratitude is a permanent feeling, and the sense of obligation still remains after the requital or repayment of the service. The opposite to this is *ὅτι ἀπέδωκεν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔδωκεν*, § 5. It may be argued in certain cases that what appears to proceed from gratitude or spontaneous benevolence, is in reality nothing but the repayment of an obligation, with which *χάρις* is not concerned.

§ 3. 'All our natural impulses are *wants*, and of these those especially which are accompanied by pain at the non-attainment (*μὴ γιγνομένου*) of their object: such are the appetites and desires, as love'. On *ὄρεξις* see p. 9, note on II 2. 1. The connexion of this remark is with the *δεομένῳ* of the preceding definition. The feeling (and the consequent act) of benevolence always implies the satisfaction of some want in the recipient of the favour; if he did not *want* it, it would be no favour. And besides this, the magnitude of the want is a measure of the magnitude of the favour and of the benevolence that prompts it. Aristotle therefore proceeds to notice some of the principal wants, in the satisfaction of which *χάρις* is manifested in the highest degree. *All* our natural impulses imply wants—the *ὀρέξεις*, the 'conative' or striving faculties, all aim at some object which they desire to attain. To the 'impulsive' element of our nature, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, belong the appetites and desires such as love (the animal passion). (Besides these the *ὄρεξις* includes *θυμός*, and *βούλησις* 'the will'.) These appetites and desires, being always accompanied with pain when thwarted or failing to attain their object, are for this reason 'wants in the highest degree', μάλιστα δεήσεις.

καὶ αἱ (ἐπιθυμῖαι) ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κακώσεσι καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις (μάλιστα δεήσεις εἰσὶν)] 'Also those (desires) that occur in (belong to) bodily

κινδυνεύων ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ ὁ λυπούμενος. διὸ οἱ ἐν πενίᾳ  
 παριστάμενοι καὶ φυγαῖς, κἂν μικρὰ ὑπηρετήσωσιν,  
 διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δεήσεως καὶ τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμέ-  
 4 νοι, οἷον ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν δούς. ἀνάγκη οὖν  
 μάλιστα μὲν εἰς ταῦτά ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουργίαν, εἰ δὲ μή,  
 εἰς ἴσα ἢ μείζω. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ φανερόν καὶ ὅτε καὶ ἐφ'  
 οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ  
 τούτων παρασκευαστέον, τοὺς μὲν δεικύντας ἢ ὄντας

sufferings or injuries (are wants of a high degree): for in fact (this a *note* on the preceding) every one that is in danger or in pain feels desire'. For ἐπιθυμῇ ὁ λυπούμενος compare *supra* c. 4 § 3, γιγνομένων ὧν βούλονται χαίρουσι πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως σημείον αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.

κάκωσις, in its ordinary use, and especially in its legal application, denotes a particular kind of injury or suffering, viz. ill-treatment. It also however bears the more general sense, at least three times in Thucydides, II 43, where κάκωσις is a repetition of κακοπραγούντες, and implies ill-fortune, disaster, suffering: VII 4, and 82, τοῖς τε τραύμασι καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ κακώσει, where the sense is unmistakable, and coincides exactly with the use of it here.

'And therefore it is, that those who stand by (assist or succour, παριστάμενοι) a man in poverty or exile, however slight the service they render, by reason of the magnitude of the want and the occasion, confer a great favour' (or, 'are very agreeable, acceptable'. The word seems to include both senses); 'like the man who lent the mat ἐν Λυκείῳ'. *A friend in need is a friend indeed.*

I have not attempted to translate the word Λυκείῳ. We do not even know whether it is the name of a man or a place: it might also be the title of a play or a speech, from which the instance was borrowed. Victorius says, 'historia ignota mihi est;' Schrader, 'quis, cui, quando dederit, incertum (rather *ignotum*) est.' The meaning is plain enough: it is a case like that of Sir Philip Sidney's cup of cold water, in which circumstances of time and place enormously enhance the value and importance of something which in ordinary circumstances is trifling and worthless [cf. Vol. I. pp. 84, 144].

§ 4. 'Accordingly, the service that is received' (by the recipients, which seems to be the subject of ἔχω) 'must be especially directed to these same things' (viz. the satisfaction of the more urgent wants and desires. I have followed Bekker in retaining ταῦτα. MS A<sup>c</sup> has ταῦτα, and Q, Y<sup>b</sup>, Z<sup>b</sup> τοιαῦτα, which is adopted by Victorius), 'or if not, to things equal or greater. And therefore, now that the times, circumstances, and dispositions of mind, which give rise to benevolent feeling, have been pointed out, it is plain that it is from these sources that we must provide our materials (for producing it in our audience), by shewing that the one party (the recipient in the transaction) either is

ἢ γεγεννημένους ἐν τοιαύτῃ δεήσει καὶ λύπῃ, τοὺς δὲ  
ὕπηρετηκότας ἐν τοιαύτῃ χρεία τοιοῦτόν τι ἢ ὕπρε-  
5 τούντας. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἐνδέχε-  
ται τὴν χάριν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀχαρίστους· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι P. 1385 b.  
αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ὕπηρετοῦσιν ἢ ὕπηρετήσαν (τοῦτο δ' οὐκ

or has been<sup>1</sup> in want or pain such (as has been described), and the other either has done or is doing a service in a case of need, the service and the need being each of the kind mentioned'.

§ 5. 'It is plain too from what sources (or topics) may be derived the materials for depriving (those who have conferred a favour) of (the credit of) this kindly and benevolent feeling, and making them (and their act appear, representing them as) devoid of all such feeling and intention'. This is Victorius' interpretation, and I think more consistent with what follows than that of Schrader, who understands it of the audience, and not of the benefactor; and explains it, "facere ut affectu illo, qui ad gratiam habendam referendamve fertur, vacui fiant auditores." ἀχαρίστος and ἀχαρίτος, 'without grace', stand in the first instance for 'unpleasing, disagreeable',—so in Homer, Theognis, Herodotus—and express the opposite of κεχαρισμένος, *sic* § 3: and this, with the substitution of the special sense of χάρις as a πάθος for the general sense of grace, beauty, favour, is the meaning given to the words by Aristotle here: 'without grace' is here to be understood 'without this kindly feeling'. The ordinary use of the word for 'ungrateful' is founded upon a third sense of χάρις, viz. gratitude,

'For (we may argue) either that the (boasted) service is, or was, done from motives of self-interest, and this, as we said, (ἦν, by definition, § 2,) is not benevolent feeling, or that the service was an accident of coincidence, or done under constraint, or that it was a payment and not a free gift, whether the party was aware (of his obligation to the other, so Victorius) or not<sup>2</sup>: for in both cases (whether conscious or unconscious) it was a mere barter or exchange, and therefore again in this respect no benevolence'.

<sup>1</sup> γεγεννημένους. There seems to be no intelligible distinction here made between εἶναι and γίνεσθαι; at least, none that is worth expressing in the translation. What again is the difference intended between the two verbs in this passage, γενόμενα ἢ ἐσόμενα, II. 8. 13? It may be supposed that Aristotle has only used the latter verb in default of a perfect of the former. And it is certain that the Greek writers do occasionally employ forms of γίνεσθαι where our idiom requires the substitution of the simple 'to be'. If the word here be translated literally, the notion of 'becoming' must be rendered by 'having come to be in, or fallen into, such want'.

<sup>2</sup> If I understand Aristotle aright, I cannot see how the alternative εἴτε μὴ εἰδότες can be fairly and properly included in this topic; though it might of course be employed by an unscrupulous speaker to delude an unintelligent audience. It seems to me that the forgetfulness or ignorance that anything is due to the person who receives the favour does alter the character of the transaction; that the gift in such a case may be a free gift, and the feeling that prompts it χάρις, disinterested benevolence, and that the τί ἀντί τινος does not here fairly apply.

ἦν χάρις), ἢ ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης συνέπεσεν ἢ συνηναγκάσθησαν, ἢ ὅτι ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔδωκαν, εἴτ' εἰδότες εἴτε μὴ· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ τὶ ἀντί τινος, ὥστ' οὐδ' οὕτως ἂν εἴη χάρις. καὶ περὶ ἀπάσας τὰς κατηγορίας σκεπτέον· ἢ γὰρ χάρις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ ἢ τοσονδὶ ἢ τοιονδὶ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ποῦ. σημείων δέ, εἰ ἔλαττον μὴ

συνέπεσεν] σύν, as in σύμπτωμα and συμφόρα, marks the 'coincidence.' συνηναγκάσθησαν] The σύν in this compound—compare Lat. *cogere*, *compellere*—conveys the notion of bringing close together, squeezing, crowding, and hence of *compression*, *constraint*; and thus enforces the ἀνάγκη of the verb with which it is combined. Compare συμπίεζεν and συμπιλεῖν (Plat. Tim.).

In illustration of the topic ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔδωκαν, Victorius very appositely cites the case of Demosthenes and Halonnesus referred to by Aeschines κατὰ Κτησιφώντος § 83. 'Ἀλόννησον ἐδίδου (Philip offered to *give*, make us a present of Halonnesus), ὁ δ' (Demosthenes) ἀπηγόρευε μὴ λαμβάνειν, εἰ δίδωσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀποδίδωσιν (if the offer is to be regarded as a free gift instead of a repayment), περὶ συλλαβῶν διαφερόμενος: and (in Athenaeus VI 223 D—224 B) by the orator Cothocides; and the Comic Poets, Antiphanes (ἐν Νεοττίδῃ), Alexis (ἐν Στρατιώτῃ and ἐν Ἀδελφοῖς), Anaxilas (ἐν Εὐανδρίᾳ), and Timocles (ἐν Ἡρωσίν), who ridicule the objection as a mere verbal quibble. The phrase seems to have passed almost into a proverb. Victorius truly observes, "maioris tamen ponderis res erat quam videbatur, ut ex hoc quoque loco intelligitur." Demosthenes seems to have advised his Athenians to refuse the offer as a *gift*, and only to accept it as a *repayment* of an outstanding obligation. The argument derived from Aristotle's topic when applied to the case would be different. This offer is prompted by no χάρις or kindly feeling, as Philip represents it; for it is no free gift but the mere payment of a debt. Consequently he is ἀχάριστος, and we owe him no χάρις, or gratitude, in return.

οὐδ' οὕτως] 'neither in this way'. 'Neither in this way' (i.e. in the two last cases of intentional or even unintentional repayment, included as one under the head of *repayment*), is it true χάρις, *any more than* in the two preceding, where the act is (1) not disinterested, or (2) accidental or compulsory.

§ 6. 'And (in estimating the value of the feeling or act of benevolence) we must examine it under all the Categories; for χάρις may be referred to that of substance (the fact) or quantity, or quality, or time, or place'. Schrader has illustrated the first three of these, but examples are hardly necessary where they so readily suggest themselves. Brandis, in the tract so often cited [*Philologus* IV i], p. 26, observes on this passage, that though there can be no doubt that when Aristotle wrote this he had the list of categories lying before him, whether or no the *book* was then written cannot be decided.

'And it is a sign (of the ἀχαριστία, the absence of benevolent feeling, that there was no intention of obliging us, and that we therefore owe

ὑπὲρ ἔτησαν, καὶ εἰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἢ ταῦτ' ἢ ἴσα ἢ  
μείζω· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἡμῶν ἔνεκα. ἢ εἰ  
φαῦλα εἰδώς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ δεῖσθαι φαύλων.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀχαριστεῖν εἰρη-  
1 ται· ποῖα δ' ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τίνας ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ CHAP. VIII.  
2 ἔχοντες, λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὲ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαι- P. 72.  
νομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχά-

them no thanks), if people have previously refused a smaller service<sup>1</sup>, because it is clear that they must have had some interested motive in conferring the greater, which destroys the favour: 'or if they have done the same or equal or greater to our enemies; for it is plain that here again the service was not disinterested', was not done for our sake. 'Or if the service was worthless, and the doer of it knew it to be so';—(like the 'Calabrian host' and his pears, *porcis comedenda*, which he tries to force upon his unwilling guest; Hor. Epist. I 7. 14 seq. *Prodigus et stultus donat quae spernit et odit*)—for no one will admit that he wants things worthless'.

'Having thus dispatched the subject of favours bestowed from feelings of benevolence and the reverse, let us now pass on to things pitiable, the objects of pity, and the states of mind or dispositions in which it resides'.

#### CHAP. VIII.

§ 2. Pity, according to the popular definition, which is all that Rhetoric requires, is a feeling of pain that arises on the occasion of any evil, or suffering, manifest, evident (*apparent*, to the eye or ear), deadly or (short of that) painful, when unmerited; and also of such a kind as we may expect to happen either to ourselves or to those near and dear to us, and that when it seems to be near at hand: for it is plain that any one who is capable of feeling (*lit.* is to feel) the emotion of pity must be such as to suppose himself liable to suffer evil of some kind or other, himself or his friends; and evil of that kind which has been stated in the definition, or like it, or nearly like it.

On *φαινομένῳ* = *φανερῷ*, evident, unmistakable, see note on p. 10 (II 2. 1). Victorius understands it to mean "quod nobis malum videatur: possemus enim in hoc falli, atque eam miseriam esse iudicare quae minime sit." But this surely would be expressed by *δοκεῖν*, not *φαίνεσθαι*: and to say nothing of the numerous examples by which the other interpretation is supported, (some of which are given in the note above referred to,) this seems to be more appropriate to what follows, and to the nature of the *πάθος* itself: for the feeling of pity is strong in proportion to the vividness with which the suffering is brought home to us<sup>2</sup>. The actual sight of it, when we *see* the effect of the injury (and perhaps also a graphic description of it from an eye-witness), gives it a reality and a force which

<sup>1</sup> Toup, quoted by Gaisford, very unnecessarily conjectures *εἰ ἔλαττον μὲν*, 'si minus dederint quam par esset.'

<sup>2</sup> A remark of Lessing, at the end of the first section of his *Laokoon*, will serve as a commentary on Aristotle's *φαινομένῳ*. "*Alles stoische ist untheatralisch*;

νειν, ὃ κὰν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν

intensify our sympathy. That this is Aristotle's meaning appears most clearly from a subsequent passage, § 8, where these painful things are enumerated, and are found to be all of them bodily affections: and still more perhaps from § 14, where the effect of *πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν* is described. Aristotle has omitted, designedly or not, all mention of mental suffering: perhaps he thought that not being actually *visible* it was incapable of exciting pity. See further on this in note on II 8.8.

Again, this view of the meaning of the word is in exact agreement with a preceding observation upon pain, II 4.31, that 'all painful things are objects of sense, (that is, all feelings which can properly be called painful are excited by sensible objects,)<sup>1</sup> and the greatest evils, as wickedness and folly, are the least sensible; for the presence of vice causes no pain'. Victorius, who however does not refer to this passage, has pointed out that the kind of evil which excites pity is distinguished and limited by the epithets *φθαρτικῶ καὶ λυπηρῶ*; which upon the principle laid down in c. 4.31 excludes the greatest evils, moral and intellectual, as objects of pity.

With τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν *confp.* II 9.1, ἀντίκειται τῷ ἐλεεῖν...ὃ καλοῦσι νευμεσῶν' τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις κ.τ.λ. When a bad man suffers we look upon it as a deserved punishment, and feel no pity, unless we deem the punishment to be excessive. 'Alas', says Carlyle, of the end of the Girondins, 'whatever quarrel we had with them, has not cruel fate abolished it? Pity only survives.' *French Revolution*, Pt. III. Bk. IV. c. 8, ult.

The last clause of the definition, ὃ κὰν αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ., expresses the compassion, sympathy with the sufferer, the fellow-feeling, implied in pity. *Haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco*. It is only in this form, as 'compassion', that the emotion enters into Mr Bain's list; *Emotions and Will*, p. 112, [chap. VII § 22, ed. 1875]. Compassion, according to him, is one of the benevolent affections, a group subordinate to the family of Tender Emotions. This appears to be a juster view of the nature and connexion of the feeling than the account given by Aristotle. The fact is, as I have elsewhere stated<sup>2</sup>, that the conception of general benevolence and love and duty to our fellow-creatures, is of modern and Christian origin, and finds no place in Aristotle's Ethical System: the χάρις of the preceding chapter includes but *und unser mitleiden ist allezeit dem leiden gleichmässig welches der interessirende gegenstand äussert. Sieht man ihn sein elend mit grosser seele ertragen, so wird diese grosse seele zwar unsere bewunderung erwecken, aber die bewunderung ist ein kalter affekt, dessen unthätiges staunen jede andere wärmere leidenschaft, so wie jede andere deutliche vorstellung, ausschliesst.*"

<sup>1</sup> This however seems to require some qualification: it is true of course of all bodily pain; but are not certain mental states, as doubt, suspense, uncertainty, disappointment, also painful? In the case of *ἔλεος*, Ar. probably means that at least some sensible image, a mental representative, or *φαντασία*, proceeding from some object of sense, is required to excite the painful feeling. But surely we can pity the mental as well as the bodily sufferings of a friend, provided he makes them sufficiently distinct and intelligible to us.

<sup>2</sup> *Review of Aristotle's System of Ethics*, 1867, p. 52.

αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνεται· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν τοιοῦτον οἶον οἶσθαι παθεῖν ἂν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἶον εἶρηται ἐν τῷ ὄρω 3 ἢ ὅμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιον. διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔτι παθεῖν οἴονται· πεπόνθασι γάρ) οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὑβρίζουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἅπαντα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν τάγαθά,

a small part of it, being in fact confined to doing a service to a friend in need. Again the limitation of pity to those sufferings to which we ourselves or our friends are exposed, ascribes a selfishness to the emotion which seems not necessarily to belong to it. In fact if this were true, the God of the Christian, and the gods of the heathen would be alike incapable of it. Hobbes, in accordance with his theory of universal selfishness, goes beyond Aristotle in attributing the feeling solely to self-love. *Leviathan*, Pt. I. c. 6, 'Grief for the calamity of another is Pity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also Compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a Fellow-feeling. And therefore' (he continues, another point of contact with Aristotle,) 'for calamity arising from great wickedness the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity those have pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.' [Hobbes, as is well known, analysed Aristotle's treatise in his *Brief of the Art of Rhetorick*, first printed *with* date in 1681. The *Leviathan* was published in 1651. S.]

The Stoic definition, quoted by Victorius from Diog. Laert., Zeno, VII 1, is in partial agreement with that of Aristotle, but omits the last clause; ἔλεός ἐστι λύπη ὡς ἐπὶ ἀναξίως κακοπαθοῦντι. Whence Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* IV 8, 18, *miseriordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria laborantis*. But the Stoics, though they thus defined pity, nevertheless condemned the exercise of it: Diog. Laert., u. s., § 123, ἐλεήμονας μὴ εἶναι συγγνώμην τ' ἔχειν μηδενί· μὴ γὰρ παρίεναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλούσας κολάσεις, ἐπεὶ τό γ' εἴκειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτῇ θ' ἢ ἐπιείκεια οὐδενεία ἐστι ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιουμένη χρηστότητα· μηδ' οἶσθαι σκληροτέρας αὐτὰς εἶναι. "Pity, anger, love—all the most powerful social impulses of our nature—are ignored by the Stoics, or at least recognised only to be crushed." Lightfoot, *Dissert.* II on Ep. to Philip. p. 320.

§ 3. 'And therefore, neither are those who are utterly lost and ruined inclined to pity—for they suppose themselves to be no more liable to suffering, seeing that their sufferings are all over (their cup of suffering has been drained to the dregs)—nor those who deem themselves transcendantly happy; on the contrary, they wax wanton in insolence. For, supposing themselves to be in possession of every kind of good, it is plain that they must assume also their exemption from all liability to evil; which in fact is included in the class total of goods'.

πεπόνθασι] See note on εἰρήσθω, I 11. 29, and the examples of the

δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παθεῖν μηδὲν κακόν·  
 4 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἱ  
 νομίζειν παθεῖν ἂν οἳ τε πεπονθότες ἤδη καὶ διαπεφευ-  
 γότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ δι'  
 ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον,

indicative perfect there collected. Cf. *Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium et ingens gloria Teucrorum.*

§ 4. 'Persons inclined to think themselves (especially) liable to suffering are such as the following; those who have already suffered some disaster from which they have made their escape (i. e. were not παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες, completely ruined by it), and men advanced in years, by reason of the prudence (or wisdom) and experience<sup>1</sup> (which belong to advanced age), and the weak (in *body*; who are powerless to protect themselves against aggression and injury), and those who are of a *rather* more timid disposition than ordinary (this is weakness of *mind*), and men of study and cultivation, for these are men who can accurately calculate' (the chances of human life; by the experience and knowledge which their studies have taught them. So Victorius).

καὶ διαπεφευγότες] This is a remarkable exemplification of that rule of Rhetoric, that every question has two sides, of which either may be maintained indifferently according to circumstances, and that all its materials and reasonings are confined to the sphere of the probable. Here we have a flat contradiction of the statement in the chapter on φόβος and θάρσος, II 5. 18, where we are told that repeated escape from danger is a ground of confidence. The fact is that it may give rise to *either*, according to the temper and turn of mind of this or that individual: the sanguine will derive confidence from repeated escapes; the anxious and timorous, and the student or philosopher, the Solon, who has learnt by bitter experience that no one can be accounted happy until the end has come,—the second class, the πεπαιδευμένοι, [will be affected in exactly the opposite manner], for the reason given by Aristotle himself, εὐλόγιστοι γάρ. There can be no doubt that he had two different kinds of characters in his mind when he made the opposite statements.

οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον] It is quite possible to find a distinct meaning for both these comparatives and not regard them as mere tautology. The comparative in Greek, Latin, English, when it stands alone, with the object of comparison suppressed, has two distinguishable significations; μᾶλλον, for example, is either (1) μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος, 'too much', (*ne quid nimis*), more than it ought to be; or (2), what we express by 'rather', (itself a comparative of *rathe* 'early'—comp. Ital. *piutosto*,

<sup>1</sup> By these they have been taught the instability of all human fortunes; τὰν θρόνῳ, their constant liability to accident and calamity and 'all the ills that flesh is heir to.' βέβαια δ' οὐδεὶς θνητὸς εὐτυχεῖ γεγώς. Eur. Fragm. ap. Stob. p. 562 (Fr. incert. 44 Dind. [fr. 1059, ed. 5]). θνητὸς γὰρ ὢν καὶ θνητὰ πείσασθαι δόκει· θεοῦ βίον ζῆν ἀξιοῖς ἄνθρωπος ὢν; Ibid. p. 568 (No. 45 Dind. [fr. 1060, ed. 5]).



5 καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι· εὐλόγιστοι γάρ. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρ-  
 χουσι γονεῖς ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες· αὐτοῦ τε γάρ  
 6 ταῦτα, καὶ οἷα παθεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα. καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν  
 ἀνδρίας πάθει ὄντες, οἷον ἐν ὀργῇ ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα  
 γάρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα), μήτ' ἐν ὑβριστικῇ διαθέσει  
 (καὶ γάρ οὗτοι ἀλόγιστοι τοῦ πείσεσθαι τι), ἀλλ' οἱ  
 μεταξὺ τούτων. μήτ' αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οὐ γὰρ  
 ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ

*piutosto grasso* 'rather fat'), i.e. more than ordinary, μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰωθότος, a little in excess, rather more than usual. Hence οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον may be rendered 'rather too timid', more in a slight degree than men usually are, and also 'unduly timid', more so than they ought to be. Examples of this 'double comparative'—it being assumed apparently that it is *in all cases* a mere tautological reduplication—are given by Victorius ad I 7. 18, and by Waitz (from Aristotle) on Top. Γ I, 116 b 4, Vol. II p. 465. I have shewn on I 7. 18, that μᾶλλον κάλλιον there is not a case in point, both of the words having each its own meaning. Of the reduplicated comparative and superlative, some examples are given in Matth. Gr. Gr. §§ 458, 461, and of the latter, by Monk, Hippol. 487.

εὐλόγιστος, opposed to ἀλόγιστος § 5, means one that εὖ λογίζεται, is good or ready at calculating, or reasoning in general: and marks the reflecting, thoughtful man, as opposed to the careless and unreflecting, who does not look forward or take forethought at all.

§ 5. 'And those who have parents or children or wives (are inclined to pity), because these are one's own (part and parcel of oneself) and at the same time liable to the accidents before mentioned'.

§ 6. 'And those who are neither in a state of feeling implying courage, as anger or confidence,—for these (ταῦτα, τὰ πάθη) take no thought for' ('are devoid of calculation or reflexion', as before) 'the future—nor in a temper of insolence and wantonness—for these also never reflect upon the possibility of future disaster, but those who are in a state of mind intermediate to these. Nor again those who are in excessive terror, for people who are startled (frightened out of their wits) have no pity for others because they are absorbed by their own emotion (or suffering)'. οἰκείῳ 'that which is *their own*', or proper to them at the moment, and so does not allow them to think of the suffering of others, opposed to τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ. Comp. *infra* § 11, τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἔτερον τοῦ ἐλεεῖν, καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου κ.τ.λ., and King Lear, v 3. 230. Albany. *Produce their bodies, be they alive or dead. This judgment of the heavens, that makes us tremble, touches us not with pity.* Compare also, I 14. 5, ὁ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβούνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. III 27, quoted by Victorius on that passage.

πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει.] From the primary, *physical*, sense of πρὸς with the dative 'at, by, upon', (βάλλειν ποτὶ γαῖην, Hom. Il. A 245), and so 'resting upon', is immediately derived, by an obvious metaphor, that

7 πάθει. *κὰν οἴωνταιί τινας εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς· ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενος πάντας οἰήσεται ἀξίους εἶναι κακοῦ.* καὶ ὅλως P. 1386.

δὴ ὅταν ἔχη οὕτως ὥστ' ἀναμνησθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμ-  
of 'mentally resting upon, fixed upon, devoted to, busily engaged in (as a pursuit)', or as here, 'absorbed in'; generally with εἶναι but also with other verbs signifying a state of rest. The usage is very inadequately illustrated, in fact, hardly noticed, in most of the graminars and lexicons that I have consulted, with the exception of that of Rost and Palm: I will therefore add a few examples that I have noted, though some of these are to be found in the lexicon above named. Wytttenbach, on Plut. de ser. num. vind. 549 D (Op. VII p. 328), and on Plat. Phaedo 84 C (p. 223), has supplied instances chiefly from Plutarch and still later writers, to which Heindorf refers in his note on a passage of the Phaedo. Plat. Rep. VI 500 B, πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι (with the mind, i. e. the attention fixed upon), Ib. VIII 567 A, πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν (βίῳ i. e. τροφῇ) ἀναγκάζονται εἶναι, Ib. IX 585 A, πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι. Critias, 109 E, Parmen. 126 C, πρὸς ἱππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. Phaedo 84 C, Phaedr. 249 C, πρὸς ἐκείνοις ἀεὶ ἔστι μνήμη, D, πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γινόμενος. Demosth. de Cor. § 176, ἦν...πρὸς τῷ σκοπεῖν...γένεσθε (seriously occupy yourselves in the consideration...give your serious attention to it). Id. de Fals. Leg. § 139, ὅλος πρὸς τῷ λήμματι ἦν. Aesch. c. Timarch, § 74, πρὸς τῇ ἀνάγκῃ ταύτῃ γίγνεσθαι. Ib. adv. Ctes. § 192, πρὸς ἐτέρῳ τινὶ τὴν γνώμην ἔχειν. Arist. Pol. VIII (V) 8, *ter.* 1308 b 36, πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίῳις σχολάζειν (to have leisure to attend to their private affairs), 1309 a 5, πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίῳις εἶναι, Ib. line 8, διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις. Ib. c. 11, 1313 b 20, πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες ἀσχολοὶ ὦσιν ἐπιβουλεύειν. Ib. VII (VI) 4, 1318 b 13, πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβειν. Similarly in Latin: Cic. de Or. I 8. 34, *studium in quo estis.* Hor. Sat. I 9. 2, *totus in illis.* Epist. I 1. 11, *omnis in hoc sum.*

§ 7. 'We pity also any of those that we deem men of worth: for if there be any one who thinks that there are none, such will believe that every one deserves to suffer'.

ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενος (εἶναι ἐπιεικῆ) κ.τ.λ.] Such as Timon 'of Athens', ὁ μισάνθρωπος, Vict. and Schrad.; of Timon, see Arist. Av. 1549, Lysistr. 808 seq., Phryn. Com. Μονότροπος, Fr. 1., Lucian, Tim. Hemsterh. ad Luc. I p. 99. Plut. vit. Anton. c. 69 ult., 70. Meineke, *Hist. Com. Gr.* I p. 327. Cic. Tusc. Disp. IV 11. 25, (odium) *in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone, qui μισάνθρωπος ἀπὸ καλλεῖται.* Id. de Amic. XXIII. 87. Schrader cites also Mamercus, in Martial. Ep. v 28, which concludes thus; *Hominem malignum forsitan esse tu credas: ego esse miserum credo cui placet nemo.*

'And indeed in general, (a man is inclined to pity) whensoever he is in such a mood as to call to mind things similar that have happened either to himself or to one of those he loves, or to anticipate the possibility' (γενέσθαι without ἄν) 'of their happening either to himself or his friends'. On the ellipse in τῶν αὐτοῦ see the note on the parallel case, II 2. 1, ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

ἀναμνησθῆναι] Victorius quotes Virgil's Dido, *haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco;* and Theseus, Soph. Oed. Col. 562.

βεβηκότα ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι  
ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

- 8 ὥς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἐλεοῦσιν, εἴρηται, ἃ δ' ἐλε-  
οῦσιν, ἐκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ δῆλον· ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυ-  
πηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά, καὶ

ἐλπίσαι] *ἐλπίς* and *ἐλπίζειν*, like *δνειδος*, *συμφορά*, *τοσοῦτος* (which is sometimes used for 'so little') and others, are *voces mediae*, i. e. have in themselves a *middle* or indifferent sense, to be determined either way by the context. *ἐλπίς* is 'expectation' or 'anticipation', and becomes either hope or fear, according as the expectation is of good or evil. Pind. Nem. I 32 (48), *κοινὰ γὰρ ἔρχοντ' ἐλπίδες πολυπόνων ἀνθρώπων* (Dissen ad loc.). Plat. Legg. I 644 C, *δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δὲ φόβος μὲν ἢ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἢ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου* (Stallbaum ad loc.). It occurs in the sense of simple expectation, and of anticipation of evil, two or three times in Sophocles. In the former, Trach. 721, *τὴν ἐλπίδα—τῆς τύχης κρίνειν πάρος*, Aj. 600, *κακὰν ἐλπίδ' ἔχων*. In the latter, Oed. R. 771 (quoted by Victorius), *κοῦ μὴ στερηθῆς γ', ἐς τοσοῦτον ἐλπίδων ἐμοῦ βεβώτος*. Ib. 1432, *ἐλπίδος μ' ἀπέσπασας* (the expectation of evil). So *spes* and *sperare*. Virg. Aen. IV 419, *hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem* (apud Victorium), Cic. de Or. III 13. 51, *quoniam haec satis spero vobis... molesta et putida videri*. Juv. Sat. IV 57, *iam quartanam sperantibus aegris*: with which Ruperti, in his note on the passage, compares the German, *Ich will nicht hoffen dass dieses geschehe*. Sallust, Cat. 20, *mala res, spes multo asperior*.

ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι] See note on I 4. 9, Vol. I. p. 65.

§ 8. 'We have now stated the moods of mind in which men are inclined to pity; what the objects of pity are, is plain to be seen from the definition: that is, of things which cause pain and suffering all are pitiable that are also destructive, and (in fact) everything that is destructive and ruinous; and all evils of which chance is the cause, provided they be of sufficient magnitude'.

On *λυπηρά* καὶ *ὀδυνηρά*, Victorius and Schrader are agreed, that *λυπηρός* represents *mental*, and *ὀδυνηρός* *bodily*, pain or suffering. But it is certain that in ordinary usage either of them can be applied to both. That *λίπη* and *λυπηρός* include bodily pain appears from the regular opposition of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* expressing pleasure and pain *in general*: equally so in Aristotle's psychology, where *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* are the necessary accompaniments of sensation *in all animals*; and in Plato's moral philosophy (Gorgias, Phaedo, Philebus, &c.), where they most unmistakably include all kinds of pleasures and pains. *ὀδύνη* and *ὀδυνηρός*, though most frequently perhaps applied to pain of body (as especially in Homer, also in Plato and in Soph. Phil. 827, *ὀδύνη* *bodily*, opposed to *ἄλγος* *mental*, pain), can also be used to express *mental* suffering, as may be seen by consulting Rost and Palm's Lexicon. 'Ὀδύνη, proprie corporis.....transfertur ad animi dolorem (Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* s. v.). The derivation of *ὀδύνη* from a root *ed* 'eat', *ἔδω*, *ἐσθίω* *edo*, and of *λύπη* from a root *lup* 'to break', (Curtius, *Grundz. der Gr. Etym.* I. pp. 218, 240,) throws no light upon

ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν μέ-  
 9 γεθος ἔχοντων. ἔστι δ' ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρτικά  
 θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γή-  
 10 ρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια, ὧν δ' ἡ τύχη αἰτία  
 κακῶν, ἀφιλία, ὀλιγοφιλία (διὸ καὶ τὸ διεσπᾶσθαι  
 ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων καὶ συνήθων ἐλεεινόν), αἰσχος, ἀσθέ- p. 73.

the distinction between them: both, according to the natural growth of language, have a physical origin, and are transferred by metaphor to the expression of mental affections. But, read by the light of the explanatory § 8, the difficulty is at once cleared up. Only ὀδυνηρὰ is repeated, which shews that the difference between this and λυπηρὰ is—here at all events—one of expression merely and not of conception. This is confirmed by the details of things painful which are enumerated in § 8, all of them evils affecting the body alone. And this is in fact an explanation of the meaning of φαινόμενον κακῶν in the definition, that being most evident or palpable which is presented immediately to the sense. Comp. note on φαινόμενον § 1.

Of ἀναιρετικά Victorius says that it is not in itself precisely distinguishable in sense from φθαρτικά, but (as I have expressed in the translation) the latter term applies only to some particular cases of λυπηρὰ and ὀδυνηρὰ, whilst ἀναιρετικά is extended to *all things* destructive.

§ 9. 'Painful and destructive are, death' (in its various forms, plur. *sundry kinds of death*) 'and personal injuries' (such as wounds or blows inflicted in an *assault*—*δίκη αἰκίας* is an action of 'assault and battery' under the Athenian law) 'and all bodily suffering or damage' (of any kind, see *ante* II 7. 3, and note), 'and old age, and disease, and want of food'.

§ 10. 'The evils which are due to chance (accident or fortune) are the entire lack, or scarcity, of friends—and therefore also to be severed' (parted, divorced, torn away, *divelli, distrahi, ab aliquo*, Cicero,) 'from friends and familiars is pitiable—personal ugliness or deformity, weakness of body, mutilation' (or any maimed crippled condition of body, which prevents a man from taking an active part in the service of the state, and discharging his duties as a citizen).

The three last of the evils mentioned, αἰσχος, ἀσθένεια, ἀναπηρία, occur again, as Victorius notes (without the reference, which is also omitted by Gaisford who quotes him), Eth. N. III 7, 1114 a 22, seq., in a passage (which will serve as a partial commentary on the text of the Rhetoric) in which the distinction is drawn between defects and injuries bodily and mental as *misfortunes*, due to nature or accident, and the same when we have brought them on ourselves by carelessness or vice. Thus αἰσχροτης or αἰσχος may be due to nature, κατὰ φύσιν, or to the neglect of athletic exercises, ἀγυμνασίαν, or carelessness in general, ἀμέλειαν: in the former case it is the object not of censure but of pity; in the latter it is to be blamed. The same may be said of ἀσθένεια, and πῆρωσις, the equivalent of ἀναπηρία in the Rhetoric; the instance of the mutilation or crippled condition there given is *blindness*; 'no one would reproach a man blinded either by nature or disease or a blow, but would rather pity him; but if

νεια, ἀναπηρία. καὶ τὸ ὅθεν προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι  
πράξαι, κακόν τι συμβῆναι. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τοι-  
11 οὔτον. καὶ τὸ πεπονθότος γενέσθαι τι ἀγαθόν, οἶον

the blindness proceeded from drunkenness or any other form of licentiousness every one would condemn it'. We have here the necessary qualification supplied which limits and distinguishes the cases in which ugliness, weakness and mutilation are really pitiable.

'And when an ill result follows from what might naturally have been expected to lead to good', i. e. when in any enterprise or course of action, we have done everything that seemed likely to ensure success, and yet fail (or 'come to grief') in spite of all our endeavours, this again is a misfortune, or piece of *ill-luck*: 'and the frequent repetition of accidents of this kind'.

With ἀγαθόν τι πράξαι comp. χρηστόν τι πράττων, Arist. Plut. 341. Victorius refers in illustration of this disappointed expectation to Ariadne's complaint in Catullus, Epith. Pel. et Thet. 139, *certe ego te in medio versantem turbine leti eripui*, et seq.

§ 11. 'And the occurrence or accession of some piece of good fortune after a calamity (or disaster which prevents one from enjoying it; as when a man succeeds to an estate in his last illness), as the present from the 'Great King' did not reach Diopieithes till after his death'. This is illustrated by Schrader from Vell. Patern. II 70, *Deciderat Cassii caput cum evocatus advenit nuncians Brutum esse victorem*.

πεπονθότος γενέσθαι] for πεπονθότι, the genitive absolute being substituted for the proper case after the verb. This irregularity occurs more frequently in Aristotle than elsewhere. Comp. Rhet. II 23.7 (this is a doubtful instance), Ib. § 24, ὑποβεβλημένης τινός...ἐδόκει. Ib. § 30, ἀμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν. Polit. II 11, 1273 b 7, βέλτιον δέ...ἀλλ' ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελείσθαι τῆς σχολῆς. Ib. c. 2, 1261 b 5, ἀρχόντων ἑτεροί ἐτέρας ἀρχουσιν ἀρχάς. De Anima I 5, 410 b 29, φησὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων (for the ordinary ἀναπνεύουσιν). Ib. II 8, 420 b 26, ἀναγκαῖον εἶσω ἀναπνεομένου εἰσιέναι τὸν αἶρα. Phys. VI 9.7, 240 a 9, συμβαίνει δὲ τὸ Β εἶναι καὶ τὸ Γ... παρ' ἄλλα κινουμένων (for κινούμενα). De Gen. Anim. II 2.8, 735 b 34, ἐξεληθόντος δὲ ὅταν ἀποπνεύσῃ τὸ θερμόν κ.τ.λ. In Rhet. I 3.5, ὡς χεῖρον, an absolute case, nomin. or accus., is probably an example of the same irregularity. The same usage occurs not unfrequently in Plato, but generally with the addition of ὡς. See Phaedo 77 E, 94 E, διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας οὔσης. Rep. I 327 E, ὡς μὴ ἀκουσομένων οὕτω διανοεῖσθε. V 470 E, VII 523 C, ὡς λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ. Cratyl. 439 C. Theaet. 175 B, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογιζεσθαι. This is further illustrated by Matth., Gr. Gr. § 569.

Somewhat similar is the very common transition from dative to accusative, and especially when the adjective or participle is joined with an infinitive mood as the subject; in which case it may be considered as a kind of attraction: so Sympos. 176 D, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐθέλησαιμι ἂν πιεῖν, οὔτε ἄλλω συμβουλευσαιμι, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραυπαλῶντα ἔτι ἐκ τῆς προτεραιάς; where the participle is attracted back to πιεῖν. Ib. 188 D, where δυναμένους is similarly attracted to ὁμιλεῖν from

Διοπείθει τὰ παρὰ βασιλέως τεθνεῶτι κατεπέμφθη.  
καὶ τὸ ἥ μὴδὲν γεγενῆσθαι ἀγαθόν, ἢ γενομένων μὴ  
εἶναι ἀπόλαυσιν.

ἐφ' οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐλεοῦσι, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα

the preceding ἡμῖν, with which it ought strictly to agree. Instances of a change (without such attraction expressed, but apparently derived from it by analogy,) from dative (or genitive) to accusative may be found in Elmsley's note on Eur. Heracl. 693. Two of these are, Aesch. Choeph. 408, μοὶ κλύουσιν, and Soph. El. 479, ὑπεστί μοι θράσος...κλύουσιν. Add Plat. Rep. III 414 A, τιμὰς δότεον ζῶντι...λαγχάνοντα, V 453 D, ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον...ἐλπίζοντας. The opposite change occurs in Rhet. I 5 13, where μέizonι is substituted for μέizonα after ὑπερέχειν.

Διοπείθει] This reference to the death of Diopieithes, commander of the Athenian troops who defended the Thracian Chersonese against the incursions of Philip, B.C. 342—341, see Grote, *Hist. of Gr.* [Chap. 90] Vol. XI p. 622 seq., furnishes one additional item of evidence, hitherto I believe unnoticed, as to the date of publication of the Rhetoric. Demosthenes defended Diopieithes and his conduct against the Philippizing party at Athens in the speeches *περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ* and the third Philippic, both spoken in the last half of 341. Grote, u. s., p. 624. The earliest date assignable to the death of Diopieithes is consequently 340 B.C. This may be added to the passages, which go to fix the date of this work, cited in the *Introd.* p. 37 seq. Little more is known of Diopieithes: the references to him in Demosthenes are collected by Baiter and Sauppe, *Oratores Attici* III. *Ind. Nom.* p. 40. Most of them occur in the two speeches above mentioned: he is referred to again in the letter attributed to Philip (*Orat.* 12), and de Cor. § 70, as the author of a certain ψήφισμα together with Eubulus and Aristophon. In the Schol. on Demosth. (Baiter and Sauppe, u. s., III p. 72 b 17) *περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ*, we have the following notice, οὗτος ὁ Διοπείθης (there are three others named in the Orators) πατήρ ἦν Μενάνδρου τοῦ κωμικοῦ ὁ δὲ Μένανδρος φίλος ἦν Δημοσθένους, δι' ὃν ὑπὲρ Διοπείθους βουλευέται. [See however A. Schaefer's *Demosthenes* II 422, where the father of Menander is identified with Diopieithes of *Cephisia* and not with Diopieithes of *Sunium*, the general referred to in the text.] Compare also Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici* II 144.

παρὰ βασιλέως] The 'Great King', the king of Persia, as unique amongst sovereigns, and standing alone, far above all the rest who bore the title, appears consequently as βασιλεύς, without the definite article. Being thus distinguished from all other kings, his title, like proper names, and some of the great objects of nature where there is only one of the kind, requires no additional distinction, and consequently the article is omitted.—The reigning king of Persia was at this time Ochus, who took the name of Artaxerxes (*Artax.* III.). Diodorus apud Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, p. 315: on Ochus, ib. p. 316.

'And (it is pitiable) either never to have attained to any good at all (i. e. desired good or success) or after having attained to lose the enjoyment of it'.

12 ἐστίν· ἐλεοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τε γνωρίμους, εἰ μὴ σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὥσιν οἰκειότητι· περὶ δὲ τούτους ὥσπερ περὶ αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας ἔχουσιν. διὸ καὶ Ἀμασις ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ υἱεὶ ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ἐδάκρυσεν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ προσαιτοῦντι· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν· τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ

§ 12. 'These and the like are the things (the ills or sufferings) that we pity: the objects of pity (persons) are our friends and acquaintance—provided they are not very closely connected with us; for in regard of the latter we are in the same state of mind' (have the same feelings, i. e. in this case the feeling of anxiety and alarm) 'as we are about ourselves when threatened with (the like disaster)', μέλλοντας (ταῦτα πείσεσθαι). 'And for this reason it was that Amasis, as is reported, wept, not at the sight of his son led away to death, but of his friend begging: for this is a spectacle of pity, that of terror: for the terrible is distinct from the pitiable, nay, it is exclusive of pity, and often serviceable for the excitement of the opposite feeling'.

The king of Egypt, here by an oversight called Amasis, was in reality Psammenitus, his successor on the throne. The horrible story of Cambyses' ferocious cruelty here alluded to is told by Herodotus III 14, with his accustomed naiveté, as if there was nothing in it at all extraordinary or unusual. It will be sufficient to quote in the way of illustration Psammenitus' answer to Cambyses' inquiry, why he acted as Aristotle describes, which will likewise serve as a commentary on οἰκειότητι in our text. ὁ παῖς Κύρου, τὰ μὲν οἰκῆτα ἦν μέζω κακὰ ἢ ὥστε ἀνακλαίειν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐταίρου πένθος ἄξιον ἦν δακρύων· ὃς ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ εὐδαιμόνων ἐκπεσὼν εἰ πτωχῇν ἀπύκται ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ. τὰ οἰκῆτα are, his son's death, and his daughter's humiliation. As to the substitution of Amasis for Psammenitus, Victorius and Buhle think it may be explained either by a slip of memory on Aristotle's part, or by a variation in the story in the account given by other authorities. I have no doubt myself that the true explanation is the former. We have already seen that our author is very liable to misquotation, as I believe to be the case with all or most of those who, having a wide range of reading and an unusually retentive memory, are accustomed to rely too confidently upon the latter faculty. The vague ὡς φασίν confirms this view. If Aristotle had remembered as he set down his example that he had it from Herodotus, it seems to me quite certain that he would have mentioned his name.

ἐκκρουστικόν] prop. 'expulsive', inclined to strike or drive out (having that nature or tendency), the metaphor being taken, according to Victorius, from two nails, one of which being driven in after the other forces it out, or expels it. He quotes Eth. Nic. III 15, sub fin., (αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι) ἂν μεγάλα καὶ σφοδραὶ ᾖσιν, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. Plut. p. 1088 A, non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum c. 3, (πόνος) ὑπ' ἄλλων πόνων, ὥσπερ ἤλων σφοδρότερον, ἐκκρούμενος ἀπαλλάττεται, and

- 13 ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον. ἔτι ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ δεινοῦ ὄντος. καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἥθη, κατὰ ἔξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῷ ἂν ὑπάρξαι· ὅλως γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι, ὅσα

Cic. Tusc. Disp. IV 35. 75, *etiam novo quidem amore veterem amorem, tanquam clavo clavum, eiciendum putant*. ἦλον ἡλφ ἐκκρούειν is a proverb, occurring three times in Lucian, de merc. cond. c. 9, Vol. I. p. 716, ed. Hemst., pro lapsu inter salut. c. 7, I 733, Philopseudes, c. 24, III 39, ἡλφ, φασίν, ἐκκρούεις τὸν ἦλον.—ἐναντίῳ] sc. πάθει.

χρήσιμον] seems to refer to the rhetorical *use* of the topic, rather than to the promotion of the feeling itself, to which the word is less appropriate. On the mutual exclusiveness of terror and pity compare I 14. 5 (note), and § 5 of this chapter. The pity and terror therefore, which it is the object of tragedy to excite and purify, Poet. VI 2, can never be simultaneous.

I will just observe here in passing that these two emotions are appealed to in that branch of Rhetoric which was collectively called *affectus* and divided into *indignatio* and *miseratio*, technically δεινωσις and ἔλεος; δεινωσις is otherwise called σχετλιασμός (Rhet. II 21. 10). Though they might be scattered over the whole speech, the proper place for them is the conclusion, the ἐπίλογος or *peroratio*, because the impression is then most vivid and intense, and is 'left behind', like the bee's sting, in the minds of the audience, τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροαμένοις (Eupolis, of Pericles).

The importance of these to the rhetorician may be estimated by the fact that Thrasymachus, one of the most celebrated of the early writers on Rhetoric, gave his work the title of ἔλεοι (Cicero, *miserationes*) referred to by Aristotle, Rhet. III 1. 7, and ridiculed by Plato, Phaedr. 267 c. The ἔλεοι certainly 'had a wider scope than their name would indicate' (Thompson's note ad loc.), for Aristotle expressly mentions in the passage quoted that they included remarks upon language and style. See further on this subject, Introd. p. 367, and 368 note 3.

§ 13. 'Further' (returning to the last term of the definition, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται) 'men are pitied when danger or suffering is impending and close at hand'. (δεινόν is any object of δέος or dread; derived from δέος as ἐλεεινός from ἔλεος, κλεινός from κλέος.) 'We pity also those who are like us, in age, or character, or habits of mind (moods, states of mind, moral and intellectual, virtuous and vicious), in reputation (of various kinds, expressed by the plural), or in blood (race and family): for in all these cases there seems to be a greater likelihood of the same misfortune occurring to oneself as well as the others (καὶ αὐτῷ): for here again' (ἐνταῦθα, καὶ as well as in the case of fear, referring to II 5. 12, "the same things that we dread for ourselves, we pity in others") 'in a general way we must suppose' (λαβεῖν 'to take up, receive', an opinion; to assume or believe; or perhaps 'to gather' as the result of observation, and so form an opinion of conclusion) 'that all things



ἐφ' αὐτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ' ἄλλων γιγνόμενα  
 14 ἔλεουσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐγγὺς φαινόμενα τὰ πάθη ἐλεεινά  
 ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γενόμενα ἢ ἐσόμενα οὐτ'  
 ἐλπίζοντες οὔτε μεμνημένοι ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν ἢ  
 οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι  
 καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθήσει καὶ ὅλως τῇ ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινο-  
 τέρους εἶναι· ἐγγὺς γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸ κακὸν  
 πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιοῦντες, ἢ ὡς μέλλον ἢ ὡς γεγονός.

that we dread in our own case, the same we pity when they happen to others'.

§ 14. 'And seeing that all calamities and sufferings are (especially) objects of pity when they appear close at hand, and yet things that either have happened ten thousand years ago, or will happen ten thousand years hence, neither in expectation or recollection do we ever pity equally, if at all, (ὁμοίως, as we do things close at hand, whether past or to come,) it necessarily follows from this (that pity is heightened when the object is brought near us) that those (orators) who aid the effect of their descriptions (*lit.* join with the other arts of Rhetoric in producing *ἔλεος*) by attitude (gestures, action in general), by the voice, and dress, and the art of acting in general, are more pitiable (i.e. more successful in exciting pity): because, by setting the mischief before our very eyes (by their graphic representation of it) they make it appear close to us whether as future or past'.

πρὸ ὁμμάτων] which is almost technical in Rhetoric, is again used to denote a vivid, graphic, striking representation, III 2. 13, Ib. 10. 6, and in III 11. 1, seq. is explained and illustrated. Comp. Poet. c. XVII 1, δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι (aid the effect by the language) ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὁμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα ὄρων, ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνομένοις τοῖς πραττομένοις, εὐρίσκει τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστ' ἂν λανθάνοιτο τὰ ὑπεναντία. Ib. § 3 we have the same phrase that occurs here, τοῖς σχήμασι συναπεργαζόμενον. Compare also Poet. XIV 1, τὸ φοβερόν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὀφείας γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ., de Anima III 3, 427 b 18, πρὸ ὁμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες<sup>1</sup>. Cicero expresses this

<sup>1</sup> Referring to mental pictures, in aid of the memory as a kind of *memoria technica*, such as that of a large house-front with various windows, or the plan of a building, or any other divisions, occurring in a regular order, in which the topics of a speech or argument may be lodged as it were; the plan of this is retained in the mind, and will suggest the topics in their proper order. These 'mnemonic' artifices—τὰ μνημονικά, "mnemonics"—are described in Auct. ad Heren. III. xvi. 29, seq. Such aids to the memory are of two kinds, *loci* and *imagines*; the former are 'the places', or compartments, the sequence of which suggests the order or arrangement of the *imagines*, which are the "forms, marks, images, of the particular things which we wish to remember, such as horse, lion, eagle, &c." The same subject is treated by Cicero, de Orat. II 86. 351—360, from whom the author of the other treatise has manifestly borrowed. The invention of this

- 15 καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεει- P. 1386 b.  
 16 νότερα διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰς πράξεις,  
 οἷον ἐσθῆτάς τε τῶν πεπονθότων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα,  
 καὶ λόγους καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ πάθει ὄντων,  
 οἷον ἤδη τελευτώντων. καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπουδαίους  
 εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς ὄντας ἐλεεινόν' ἅπαντα

by the equivalent phrase, *subicere oculis*, Orat. XL 139. Auct. ad Heren. IV 47.60, *ante oculos ponere (de similitudine); hoc simile...sub aspectum omnium rem subiecit*. Quint. VIII 6. 19, *translatio...signandis rebus ac sub oculis subiiciendis reperta est*. Ern. *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s.v. ὄμμα.

§ 15. 'And things that have happened recently, or are about to happen speedily, excite more pity for the same reason'; i.e. because the recent occurrence or immediate anticipation makes almost the same impression upon us as if the suffering or disaster were actually present, and enacted as it were before our eyes.

§ 16. 'And all signs (of any tragic event), and acts (of the sufferer, represented in narrative or description), (the exhibition) for example (of) the dress of the sufferer and everything else of the same kind, or his (last) words, or anything else connected with those who are in the very act of suffering, for instance such as are actually dying' (*in articulo mortis*). It is hardly necessary to mention the use that is made by Mark Antony of this 'sign' in exciting the people after the murder of Caesar by the exhibition of his 'mantle',—"you all do know this mantle"—pierced by the dagger of his assassins, in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, III 2. 174, since it must be fresh in every one's recollection. The incident and accompanying circumstances and the effect of Antonius' speech are related by Plut., *Vit. Anton.* c. 14, from whom Shakespeare may have derived it; and referred to by Quint., VI 1. 31. Suetonius, *Jul. Caes.* c. 84, gives a very different account of what passed on this occasion. See also Appian, *Bell. Civ.* II 146 (Schrader). Another example occurs in Aesch. *Choeph.* 980, where Orestes after the death of Clytemnestra holds up to the spectators the bathing robe in which his father was murdered, ἴδεσθε...τὸ μηχανήμα, δεσμὸν ἀθλίῳ πατρὶ κ.τ.λ. 982, ἐκτείναν' αὐτόν, which is also referred by Hermann to the display of the robe.

'And most pitiable of all is the case when men have borne themselves bravely (worthily), at such critical moments, because all these things intensify our commiseration (in three ways), by the appearance they have of being close upon us, and by the suggestion (or impression, *ᾧς*) of *unmerited* suffering and by the vivid representation of it (as though it took place before our eyes)'. The gender and construction of ἀναξίου

*ars memoriae* is there attributed to Simonides, §§ 351—353. The theory of the art and practice is, that as of all mental impressions those derived from the senses, of which the sight is the keenest and most powerful, are the most distinct, vivid and intense; *quare facillime animo teneri posse ea quae perciperentur auribus aut cogitatione, si etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur*.

γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς φαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔλεον, καὶ ὡς ἀναξίου ὄντος καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου τοῦ πάθους.

1 ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι <sup>P. 74.</sup> CHAP. IX.

are both uncertain ; it may be either masc. or neut. ; and may be made to agree either with πάθους if neut., or, as I rather think, used as masc. and construed thus ; καὶ ὡς τοῦ πάθους ὄντος ἀναξίου ('being that of one who did not deserve it' ; whose sufferings were unmerited because he was σπονδαῖος) καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου : and so I have rendered it. Or again, if ἀναξίου be considered as neut., it may be interpreted with τοῦ πάθους ὄντος, 'unworthy' of the sufferer, in the sense of undeserved by him—though this is rather a non-natural explanation of the word. Or thirdly, a comma may be placed after ὄντος, and ἀναξίου will then be masculine with τοῦ παθόντος understood.

#### CHAP. IX.

The subject of the following chapter, νέμεσις, is briefly noticed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II 7 sub fin., together with αἰδώς, as a πάθος, an instinctive emotion, which approaches nearly to a virtue, and may therefore be included in a list of virtues. The detailed description of it, which ought to have followed that of αἰδώς in IV 15, is lost, together probably with some concluding observations leading up to the separate discussion of justice in Bk. V., and justifying its connexion with the other virtues and conformity to the law of the 'mean', which is barely mentioned in the fifth book as it stands at present. νέμεσις is defined in Eth. N. II 7, as here, ὁ νεμεσητικὸς λυπείται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, and is placed in the scheme as a mean, or virtuous state of feeling, between φθόνος the excess, and ἐπιχαρεκακία the defect, of indignation. Of this we shall have to speak further in the explanation of §§ 2—5, which reads like a criticism and retraction of the misstatement of the Ethics, and very much strengthens the evidence of the later composition, as well as publication, of the Rhetoric. See Introd. p. 48. A definition of νέμεσις and φθόνος is found likewise in Top. B 2, 109 b 36, φθόνος ἐστὶ λύπη ἐπὶ φαινομένη εὐπραγία τῶν ἐπεικῶν τινός, and again, p. 110 a 1, φθονερὸς ὁ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν εὐπραγίαις, νεμεσητικὸς δ' ὁ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν κακῶν εὐπραγίαις. Fuller and better than all these is that of Eudemus, Eth. Eud. III 7. 2, ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις διὸ καὶ θεοὶ οἴονται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν. Comp. § 2 of this chapter, διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νεμεσᾶν.

Of the earlier notion of νέμεσις, alluded to in the foregoing passage, viz. that of divine vengeance or retribution, or the power that exercises it, a good description is found in a fragment of Euripides, Fr. Inc. 181 (Dind.), ὅταν δ' ἴδῃς πρὸς ὕψος ἡρμένον τινά, λαμπρῷ τε πλούτῳ καὶ γένει γαυρούμενον, ὀφρῶν τε μείζω τῆς τύχης ἐπηρκότα' τούτου ταχεῖαν νέμεσιν εὐθὺ προσδόκα' ἐπαίρεται γὰρ μείζον ἵνα μείζον πῆσθαι [tolluntur in altum, ut laetus graviore ruant]. Claudian, in Rufinum, I 22.]

This doctrine of the ἀρχαῖοι is well illustrated by two stories in Herodotus, that of the interview between Solon and Croesus, I 29—33, and

νεμεσᾶν τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακο-

what followed it c. 34, μετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον, ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον· ὡς εἰκάσαι, ὅτι ἐνόμιζε ἑωυτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὀλβιώτατον: and the story of Polycrates, III 39—43. On these two stories see the remarks in Grote's *Hist. of Gr.* IV 263, and 325 [Chap. XI and XXXIII].

Compare also Hom. Od. XIV 283, Διὸς δ' ὠπίζετο μῆνιν ξεινίου, ὅσπερ μάλιστα νεμεσσᾶται κακὰ ἔργα. Herodotus says in another place, VII 10, οὐ γὰρ ἑὰ φρονεῖν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ Θεὸς ἢ ἑωυτόν. Aeschylus (Fr. Inc. 281, Dind.) has presented νέμεσις in its human aspect as the natural indignation which is felt at undeserved good fortune, κακοὶ γὰρ εὖ πράσσοντες οὐκ ἀνασχετοί. Fr. Inc. 243, line 3, ἡμῶν γε μέντοι Νέμεσις ἐσθ' ὑπερτέρᾳ, καὶ τοῦ θανόντος ἡ δίκη πράσσει κότον.

According to Aristotle's definition of νέμεσις 'a feeling of pain at undeserved good fortune', it represents the 'righteous indignation', arising from a sense of the claims of justice and desert, which is aroused in us by the contemplation of success without merit, and a consequent pleasure in the punishment of one who is thus undeservedly prosperous. It is no selfish feeling, § 3; if it had any reference to oneself and one's own interests it would be *fear* of evil consequences arising to us from the other's prosperity, and not *indignation*. It implies also its opposite, the feeling of pleasure at deserved success or prosperity. In this narrow sense it is treated in the present chapter. It is in fact one form in which 'moral disapprobation', founded upon the distinction of right and wrong, shews itself in our nature. Aristotle, in classing it with the πάθη, makes it *instinctive*; not therefore a virtue, nor necessarily requiring moral cultivation. Of moral approbation and disapprobation see the account given by Butler, at the commencement of his *Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue*. He also seems to regard these two as natural instincts, when he says of them, "we naturally and unavoidably approve of some actions under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert." See also Serm. VIII. 'On deliberate anger or resentment.' Prof. Bain, *Emotions and Will*, p. 321, [Chap. XV § 22, ed. 1875], in treating of 'moral disapprobation', expresses himself thus; "the feeling that rises up towards that person (a guilty agent) is a strong feeling of displeasure or dislike, proportioned to the strength of our regard to the violated duty. There arises a moral resentment, or a disposition to inflict punishment upon the offender," &c. But such an instinctive sense of right and wrong has a much wider scope and sphere of action than Aristotle's νέμεσις, which is confined to one particular class of cases upon which this moral instinct or faculty operates.

§ 1. 'The nearest opposite to pity is what is called righteous indignation; for to the feeling of pain at undeserved misfortunes is opposed in some sort (or sense), and proceeding from the same temperament, the feeling of pain at undeserved good fortune'.

μάλιστα μὲν] seems to have for its correlative δόξειε δέ, § 3, and the sense is this:—Pity is *most* opposite to righteous indignation<sup>1</sup>, though

<sup>1</sup> I find, on looking through a very long note of Victorius, after writing the above, that he has so far anticipated me in this observation.

πραγμαίαις ἀντικείμενόν ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπρα-  
 2 γίαις. καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἡθους χρηστοῦ· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττουσι κακῶς συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν· ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν  
 3 τὸ νεμεσᾶν. δόξειε δ' αὖ καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταυτὸν envy seems to be as much so, but is not. I have therefore substituted a period after τὸ νεμεσᾶν for the comma of [Bekker's *Oxford* edition of 1837. The punctuation given in the text is also found in Bekker's *Berlin* editions and in Spengel's].

§ 2. 'And both of these feelings are indicative of good character (i. e. of a good disposition of mind shewing itself outwardly in the character): for it is our duty to sympathise with unmerited misfortune and pity it, and to feel indignant at unmerited prosperity: because all that happens to a man' (τὸ γιγνόμενον, Victorius, '*quod fit*', 'all that is done'; meaning I suppose 'whenever the rule of justice is violated', in any case, generally. But I think 'happens', which includes the injustices of nature and fortune, as well as those of man, is more to the purpose here) 'not in conformity with his deserts is unjust, and this is why we ascribe (or assign, render as a due; see note on I 1.7) righteous indignation to the gods as well as to men (καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς)'.

παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν] i. e. in violation of the principles of distributive justice. ἀξία is the 'value' of anything, by which its worth or merits or deserts are measured. It is the principle and basis of distributive justice, and should determine the assignment of power and property in the state. It does in fact regulate the distribution of them; only the standard of a citizen's value, his ἀξία, varies with the constitution under which he lives; for in a democracy the principle of distribution is founded upon liberty, in an oligarchy upon wealth or birth, in an aristocracy upon virtue. See the passage of *Eth. N. v* 6, 1131 a 24 seq. from which I have been quoting. Quarrels and factions and complaints always arise out of the undue apportionment of civil rights and power in the state, ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἡ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμονται. But the true standard by which the share of the individual citizen should be measured is virtue or merit and the power of doing the state service, *Pol. III* 9 ult. Justice in this sense is a *proportion*. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν. Compare *Ib. VIII* 12 on the three forms of constitution, 1160 b 13, the change from aristocracy to oligarchy is due κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμονται τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν; and in family life κατ' ἀξίαν ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἂν δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα. If he encroaches on his wife's rights his government becomes an oligarchy, παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἀμείνων. On the same subject of political justice see *Pol. III* 9, from the beginning.

§ 3. 'But it may be thought that envy as well (as νέμεσις, καὶ) is

τῷ νεμεσᾶν, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον· λύπη μὲν γὰρ παραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ καὶ εἰς εὐπραγίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ μὲν νέμεσις τὸ δὲ φθόνος, ἀλλὰ φόβος, εἰάν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχη καὶ ἡ παραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦ-  
 4 λον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας. φανερόν δ' ὅτι ἀκολου-  
 θήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπού-  
 μενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ  
 opposed in the same way to pity, on the ground that it is very closely  
 connected, or indeed identical, with righteous indignation, though it is in  
 fact different; for though it be true that envy is also (καὶ as before) a  
 pain causing perturbation of mind and directed against good fortune, yet  
 the good fortune is not that of the undeserving, but that of an equal  
 and one like himself'. Compare with this Poet. XIII 1453 a 4, of pity and  
 fear, ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον ἐστὶ δυστυχοῦντα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ἔλεος  
 μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον. With ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ  
 ὁμοίου comp. c. 10 § 1, φθόνος, λύπη περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους.

'The absence of all selfish, interested motive, distinct from (independent of) the feelings themselves, (and their *direct* objects, supply τῶν παθῶν,) these emotions, on the contrary (ἀλλά), being entirely on our neighbour's account, must be common to them all (common to all *men* who have the feeling); for they are *now* no longer the one righteous indignation and the other envy, but (both of them) fear—on the supposition namely that the pain and perturbation are due to the expectation that some evil consequence to ourselves will follow from the other's good fortune.'

τὸ μὴ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] The grammar of this sentence is to be explained by regarding all the words ὅτι αὐτῷ—τὸν πλησίον as one collective abstract notion, which would be commonly expressed by a verb in the infinitive mood, and therefore neut., τό; this notion being negated by μὴ 'the non-existence, want, absence of it'. The usage is by no means uncommon, but occurs generally in much shorter phrases, from which this differs only in the number of words included. Matth., *Gr. Gr.* § 272 c, and Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 457. 1, 2, 3, will supply sufficient examples. Aristotle's formula descriptive of the λόγος or εἶδος 'the formal cause', τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, 'the—what it was (designed) to be', is a good illustration.

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι] On ἔτι in a negative=ἤδη in an affirmative sentence, see note on ἤδη, I 1. 7.

§ 4. 'Plainly too these will be accompanied by the opposite feelings also (in addition, καί); for one who feels pain at unmerited ill fortune, will feel either pleasure or no pain at the misfortunes of those who *do* deserve them (ἐναντίως=ἀξίως); for example, no man of worth would feel pain at the punishment of parricides or murderers, when it befalls them, for at the sufferings of such we should rejoice, as in like manner

ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν· οἶον  
 τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμω-  
 ρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθεῖν χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ  
 τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι  
 κατ' ἀξίαν· ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν  
 ἐπιεικῇ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν, ἅπερ τῷ  
 5 ὁμοίῳ, καὶ αὐτῷ. καὶ ἔστι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἥθους ἅπαντα  
 ταῦτα, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός

at the prosperity of such as deserve it: for both (the sufferings of the one and the prosperity of the other) are agreeable to justice and give joy to the good man' (ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαυοῦμεν...καὶ...μεταφέρομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Eth. Nic. v. 14, 1137 b 1), 'because (being a good man himself) he must needs hope that what has fallen to the lot of his like, may fall also to his own'.

τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μαιφόνους λυπηθεῖν] Vater explains the accus. after the passive verb by supposing a change of construction, Ar. having intended to write, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐλεήσει (sic) χρηστός. This is quite unnecessary. The accus. after passive and neuter verbs, indicative of the local seat of any affection, an extension of the cognate accus., is common enough fully to justify the construction of the text. At the same time there is a difference between such an expression as this, and the ordinary case of the local accus., such as ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλὴν. The accus. κεφαλὴν directly and properly expresses the seat of the affection as in the subject who himself feels the pain: and this is the ordinary case. But in our text the seat of the pain<sup>1</sup> is transferred from subject to object, the feeling migrating, as it were, and taking up its temporary residence in the parricides and murderers who are the *objects* of it. But whatever the true explanation may be, there are at all events several precisely parallel instances—some of which may be found in Matth. Gr. § 414, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 549 c—quite sufficient to defend this particular use of the accus. Comp. for instance Soph. Aj. 136, σὲ μὲν εὖ πράσσοντ' ἐπιχαίρω. Eur. Hippol. 1355, τοὺς γὰρ εὐσεβεῖς θεοὶ θνήσκοντας οὐ χαίρουσιν, where the dying are just as much the objects of the joy (or the absence of it) as the murderers are of the pain in the passage before us. Similarly αἰσχύνεσθαι, (frequent in the Rhet. and elsewhere,) as in Eur. Ion 1074, where αἰσχύνομαι τὸν πολύμνον θεόν, is to feel awe *in the presence of* the god; who is the object of this feeling of shame, just as the murderers are of the painful feeling. Victorius thinks that the prepos. διὰ is *understood*, 'as it often is in the Attic writers, such as Thucydides, Lysias, Aristophanes'! He contents himself however with the general assertion, and quotes no example.

§ 5. 'And all these (ταῦτα is explained by ὁ γὰρ, 'nämlich', κ.τ.λ.) belong to the same kind of character (or disposition), and their opposites

<sup>1</sup> It is in fact not the pain, but the absence of it, that is here in question: but as this would make nonsense of the illustration, nonentities having no local habitation, I must be allowed to substitute the positive for the negative conception.

ἐστὶν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ' ᾧ γὰρ τις P. 1387.  
 λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον  
 ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν.  
 διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτα ἐστί, διαφέρει

to the opposite temper; that is to say, it is the same sort of man that takes a malicious pleasure in mischief and that is given to envy; for whenever the acquisition or possession of anything (by another) is painful to a man (envy), he must needs feel pleasure at the privation or destruction of the same (*ἐπιχαιρεκακία*).

*στέρσις*, Categ. 10, is one of the four kinds of opposites, relative opposites, contraries (as black and white), state and privation (*ἔξις*, *στέρσις*), affirmation and negation. *στέρσις* is defined ib. 12 a 26 seq. It is the absence or want of a state which is *natural* and usual to that in which the state resides, as sight to the eye: *τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν*. A man's blindness is a *στέρσις*, because with him sight is natural: the term is not applicable to animals born without eyes, *ἐκ γενετῆς οὐκ ὄψιν ἔχοντα*: these cannot properly be said to be deprived of sight, which they never had. *στέρσις* therefore in the present passage implies a loss of some good which had been previously gained or possessed, and is distinguished from *φθορά*, as privation or loss from ruin or destruction. Victorius understands *φθορά* of destruction, decay, as opposed to *γενέσει* which is implied in *γιγνομένῳ*; a man may be deprived of or lose a *possession*, that which grows may decay and come to nothing, 'Interitus manifesto generationi alicuius rei contrarius est.' I cannot think this interpretation as appropriate as the other: *γίγνεσθαι*, to come to the possession of something, to gain or acquire it, is properly opposed to *ὑπάρχειν*, to have it already in possession, long-standing and settled.

'And therefore all these feelings (*νέμεσις*, *φθόνος*, *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*) are obstructive of pity, but different (in other respects) for the reasons already stated; so that they are all alike serviceable for making things appear not pitiable'.

The introduction of these episodical remarks, §§ 3—5, upon the connexion and distinctions of the three *πάθη* above mentioned, otherwise not easy to explain, may possibly be accounted for, as I have already suggested, by referring them to the statements of Eth. Nic. II 7, 1108 b 4, which Ar. now sees must be retracted. There they are reduced to the law of the mean by making *νέμεσις* the mean state of the pleasure and pain felt at our neighbour's good or ill fortune; of which *φθόνος* is the excess, the pain being felt at all good fortune deserved or undeserved, and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* the defect 'because the feeling falls so short of pain that it is actually pleasure'. The words of § 5, *καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἥθους... ὃ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός*, κ.τ.λ. are, whether they are intended for it or not, a correction of the blunder made in the Ethics. It is plain enough, as we are here told in the Rhetoric, that the two *πάθη* in question are but two different phases of the same *ἥθος* or mental disposition: the same man who feels pain at his neighbour's good fortune



δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας· ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεῖν  
ποιεῖν ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα.

- 6 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν, τίσι  
τε νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες αὐτοί, εἴτα  
7 μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τῶν p. 75.  
εἰρημένων· εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ  
φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι  
8 οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς νεμεσᾶν· οὐ γὰρ

will feel pleasure at his misfortunes, and the two cannot be opposed as extremes. Again, the description of *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* as a defect of *νέμεσις* and opposite of *φθόνος* cannot be sustained: the *objects* of the two feelings are different: *envy* is directed against the *good* fortune of another, the *malicious pleasure* of the other is excited by his *ill* fortune. See also Grant's note on the above passage of the Ethics.

After this digression we return to the analysis of *νέμεσις*.

§ 6. 'Let us begin then with an account of righteous indignation, who, that is, are the objects of it, the occasions that give rise to it, and the states of mind of the subjects of it, and then pass on to the rest (of the *πάθη*, to what remains to be said of them).'

§ 7. 'The first of these is plain from what has been already said, for if righteous indignation is (as it has been defined) a feeling of pain which is roused against any one who appears to enjoy unmerited prosperity, it is clear first of all that this indignation cannot possibly be applied (directed) to every kind of good'; (virtue for example and the virtues are exceptions.)

§ 8. 'For no one is likely to feel indignant with one who becomes just, or brave, or acquires any virtue in general', (that is, one who by exercise and cultivation attains to any special virtue, or to a virtuous character in general)—'nor indeed is compassion' (the plur. *ἔλεοι* indicates the various acts, states, moments of the feeling) 'bestowed upon (applied to) the opposites of these' (vices, namely, which ought to be the case, if the others were true)—'but to wealth and power and such like, all such things, namely, to speak in general terms (without mentioning possible exceptions, *ἀπλῶς* opposed to *καθ' ἕκαστον*), as the good (alone) deserve'.

So far the meaning is clear; the good as a general rule are entitled to the enjoyment of wealth and power and the like, and when they *do* acquire them we feel no indignation because we know they deserve them; it is upon the undeserving that our indignation is bestowed. But as the text stands, and as far as I can see there is no other way of understanding it, there is another class of persons, viz. those who are endowed with natural or personal advantages, such as birth or beauty, which, being independent of themselves and mere gifts of nature, cannot be objects of moral indignation, though they may be of envy, who are coupled with the morally good as deserving

εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, νεμεσήσει  
 τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτῳ  
 εἰσίν), ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοι-  
 ούτοις, ὅσων ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄξιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ  
 καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ, οἷον εὐγένειαν καὶ  
 9 κάλλος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐγγύς  
 τι φαίνεται τοῦ φύσει, ἀνάγκη τοῖς ταῦτ' ἔχουσιν  
 ἀγαθόν, εἰν νεωστὶ ἔχοντες τυγχάνωσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο  
 εὐπραγῶσι, μᾶλλον νεμεσᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ λυποῦσιν  
 οἱ νεωστὶ πλουτοῦντες τῶν πάλαι καὶ διὰ γένος·  
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντες καὶ δυνάμενοι καὶ πολύφιλοι  
 καὶ εὐτεκνοὶ καὶ ὀτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. κἂν διὰ ταῦτ'

of wealth and power. This however cannot possibly be Aristotle's meaning: birth and beauty certainly have no claim *per se* to any other advantages. When a bad man makes his way to wealth or power, we infer that they have been acquired by fraud or injustice, and thence that he is undeserving of them, which excites our indignation; but no such inference can be drawn from the possession of birth or beauty, there is no such thing as illicit, or undeserved possession of them. Aristotle seems to have meant, what Victorius attributes to him, that, besides moral excellence, *natural* gifts and excellences are also exempt from righteous indignation, for the reason above given—that they *are* gifts of nature, and the possessors are in no way responsible for them: and this is fully confirmed by the connexion of what immediately follows. Bekker, Spengel, Buhle and the rest are alike silent upon the difficulty, and Victorius, though he puts what is probably the right interpretation upon the passage, has not one word to shew how such interpretation can be extracted from the received text.

§ 9. 'And seeing that antiquity (possession of long standing) appears to be a near approach to a natural gift or endowment' (i. e. to carry with it a claim or right, nearly approaching to that conferred by nature), 'of two parties, that have possession of the same good, the one that has come by it recently, and thereby attained his prosperity, provokes the higher degree of indignation: for the *nouveaux riches* give more offence than those whose wealth is transmitted from olden time and by right of family (or inheritance): and the like may be said of magistracies (offices of state), of power (in general), of abundance of friends, of happiness in children (a fair and virtuous family), and anything else of the same sort. Or again, any other good that accrues to them, due to the same causes; for in fact in this case again the newly enriched who have obtained office by their wealth (been promoted in consequence of their wealth) give more pain (or offence) than those whose wealth is hereditary. And the like in all similar cases'. Comp. II 16. 4. ἀρχαῖος πλούτος,

ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν γίγνηται αὐτοῖς, ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ  
 ἐνταῦθα μᾶλλον λυποῦσιν οἱ νεόπλουτοι ἄρχοντες διὰ  
 τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ οἱ ἀρχαιοπλουτοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ  
 10 τῶν ἄλλων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι οἱ μὲν δοκοῦσι τὰ αὐτῶν  
 ἔχειν οἱ δ' οὐ· τὸ γὰρ αἰεὶ οὕτω φαινόμενον ἔχειν  
 11 ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε οἱ ἕτεροι οὐ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχειν. καὶ  
 ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἄξιον,

*ἀρχαιοπλουτος*, *νεόπλουτος*, all occur in other authors. The first in Aesch. Agam. 1043, Blomf. Gloss. 1010, Soph. El. 1393, and Lysias [Or. 19 § 49] ap. Blf. Gl. *ἀρχαιοπλουτος* as a synonym of the third is found in Eur. Suppl. 742, and *νεόπλουτος* twice in Rhet. II 16. 4; as a term of contempt, Demosth. *περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν* § 23, p. 218<sup>1</sup>; Arist. Vesp. 1309, *νεοπλούτῳ* τρυγί.

§ 10. 'The reason of this is, that the one seems to have what is his own (that which *naturally* and properly belongs to him), the other not; for that which constantly presents the same appearance (shews itself in the same light) is thought to be a truth (or substantial reality), and therefore it is supposed that the others (*οἱ ἕτεροι δοκοῦσιν*) have what does *not* really belong to them. Here we have a good example of the distinction between *φαίνεσθαι* and *δοκεῖν*. The former expresses a *sensible* presentation, a *φαντασία*, an appeal to the *eye* or other senses: *δοκεῖν* is an act of the understanding, an operation and result of the judgment, a *δόξα* an opinion or judgment, appealing to the reasoning faculty or *intellect*, consequently τὸ *φαίνεσθαι* represents a lower degree of certainty and authority than *δοκεῖν*. Eth. Eud. VII 2, 1235 b 27, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα. The distinction appears again in *περὶ ἐνυπνίων* c. 3, 461 b 5, φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τὸ ἐπικρίνον κατέχηται ἢ μὴ κινήται τὴν οἰκίαν κίνησιν. Ib. 462 a 1, οὐ μόνον φανέται, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξει εἶναι δύο τὸ ἐν, ἂν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ, φανέται μὲν οὐ δόξει δὲ, κ.τ.λ. See also Waitz ad Anal. Post. 76 b 17, II p. 327.

§ 11. 'And whereas every kind of good is not to be indiscriminately assigned to *any one* at random, but a certain proportion and fitness (appropriateness) is (to be observed in the distribution or assignment of the one to the other)—as for instance arms of peculiar beauty (high finish) are not appropriate to the just man but to the brave, and distinguished marriages' (i.e. the hand of a lady distinguished for beauty, virtue, accomplishments, high birth and so forth, τὴν ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἀξίον, III 11. 12) 'should not be contracted with men recently enriched, but with members of noble houses—then as I say (οὖν) if a man being worthy fails to obtain what suits him' (is appropriate to his particular sort of excellence) 'it is a case for indignation'.

τοῦ τυχόντος ἀξίον] The good that is 'worthy of' a man, here seems to

<sup>1</sup> The use of the word *νεόπλουτος* is assigned to the author of the argument as one of the reasons for ascribing the speech rather to Hyperides than Demosthenes.

ἀλλὰ τις ἔστιν ἀναλογία καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον, οἷον ὅπλων κάλλος οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ ἀρμόττει ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ, καὶ γάμοι διαφέροντες οὐ τοῖς νεωστὶ πλουτοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς εὐγενέσιν<sup>1</sup>. ἐὰν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὢν μὴ τοῦ ἀρμόττοντος τυγχάνῃ, νεμεσητόν. καὶ τὸν ἥττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν

<sup>1</sup> εὐγενέσιν,—

mean that which suits, befits, is appropriate to him: *non omne donum cuius homini congruit*, Victorius. Similarly *ἄξιον* with a dat. of the person is used to signify 'worth his while', 'meet', 'fit', as Arist. Ach. 8, *ἄξιον γὰρ Ἑλλάδι*, ib. 205, *τῇ πόλει γὰρ ἄξιον ξυλλαβεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα*, and Equit. 616, *ἄξιόν γε πᾶσιν ἐποιοῦν*.

ἐὰν οὖν κ.τ.λ. after *καὶ ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον* is an Aristotelian irregularity of construction. The apodosis of *ἐπεὶ* is *νεμεσητόν* at the end of the second paragraph. The unnecessary *οὖν* has crept in like the apodotic *δέ*, in the *resumption* of a previous statement, (on which see I 1. 11, note on *δῆλον* *δέ*, Vol. I. p. 20)—after the parenthetical illustrations; the protasis is forgotten, or overlooked in the writer's haste, and a new sentence introduced by *οὖν* terminates with the apodosis. I have collected a number of examples of similar irregularities from our author's writings. I will here only quote those that illustrate this particular form of oversight. *ἐπεὶ* *δέ*... *τὰ μὲν οὖν*, Top. Θ 8, 160 a 35. *ἐπεὶ ἀναγκαῖον* ... and after five lines, *τῆς μὲν οὖν θύραθεν*, de Somn. et Vig. c. 3, sub init. *ἐπεὶ* *δέ*... *ἀνάγκη οὖν*... Rhet. II 11. 1. *εἰ γάρ*, ... *ἀνάγκη δὲ*, Phys. VI 4 init., 234 b 10, 15. *ἐπεὶ* *δέ*... *ὅπου μὲν οὖν*, Pol. VII (VI), 5, 1320 a 17, 22. The remainder are cases of *εἰ* *δή*—*ὥστε*, *ἐπεὶ*—*ὥστε*, *εἰ οὖν*—*ὥστε*, *ἐπεὶ* *δέ*—*διό* (!), *ἐπεὶ*—*δῆλον* *δέ*, which may be reserved for a future occasion. Meanwhile see Zell on Eth. Nic. VII 14, II p. 324. Spengel in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 34. Bonitz, *Arist. Stud.* Pt. II. p. 129 seq. One example cited by Bonitz, p. 131, from de Anima III 3, has a parenthesis of nearly 20 lines between its *ἐπεὶ* *δέ* and *ὅτι μὲν οὖν*. On *οὖν* in resumption, after a parenthesis, 'well then, as I was saying', see Klotz on Devar. *de Partic.* p. 718. Hartung, *Partikellehre*, II 22 seq.

'It is matter of indignation also (*subaudi νεμεσητόν* from the foregoing clause) for the inferior to compete with the superior, nay and especially where the inferiority and superiority lie (or manifest themselves) in the same department, province, study or pursuit'. With *τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ* must be understood *ἥττους καὶ κρείττους* from the preceding. The case here described is that of an indifferent artist, painter or sculptor, setting himself up as the rival of Apelles or Phidias; of Marsyas and Apollo; of the frog and the ox in the fable.

*μάλιστα μὲν οὖν*] The *μὲν* in this phrase is the ordinary correlative of *δέ* in the next sentence, *εἰ δὲ μή*<sup>1</sup>. The other particle, *οὖν*, though its

<sup>1</sup> I will venture here to express my conviction that Dr Donaldson is right in the account he gives of these two particles, *New Crat.* §§ 154, 155; that *μὲν* viz.

precise meaning in this context may not be quite certain, and it is somewhat unusual in this collocation, is nevertheless fully justified by similar examples to be quoted immediately. The origin of the particle is, as it seems to me, as yet unexplained. It has been traced to various roots, as may be seen by consulting Donaldson, *New Cratylus* § 189, Klotz on Devar. *de Partic.* p. 717 seq., Hartung, *Partikell.* II 8, Doderlein, and Rost, in Rost and Palm's *Lex.*, but in none of these derivations have I been able to find any intelligible connexion with the actual senses of the word. Yet until we know the root of the word and its affinities, we shall hardly be able to trace historically the various senses which diverge from its primary meaning. It is a connective particle, which draws an inference or conclusion from something preceding, 'then, accordingly', (1) logically in an argument, and (2) in the continuation of a narrative, the *consequence* primarily implied having passed into the mere notion of what is *subsequent*, 'that which follows', in both its senses. Hence in all Greek authors *μὲν οὖν* is habitually employed in this second sense, like the French 'or', and our 'now' or 'then', to impart a slight degree of liveliness and animation to a continuous narrative or discussion. From the first or inferential signification, it acquires this intermediate sense of, 'so then', 'well then', 'accordingly', which lies halfway between the logical and the temporal application; just like our 'then', which has both these senses, only derived in the reverse order, the particle of time in the English 'then', passing from the temporal to the logical use. For this *μὲν οὖν* at the commencement of a new paragraph the orators—Demosthenes in particular, with whom *μὲν οὖν* is comparatively rare, Aeschines in a less degree—often substitute *τοίνυν* or *μὲν τοίνυν*, which is used precisely in the same way. "*μὲν οὖν*, in continuando sermone cum quadam *conclusionis* significatione usurpatur." Hermann ad Viger. note 342.

The other prevailing signification of *μὲν οὖν* when used in combination, which, though by no means confined to them, is found chiefly in dialogues as those of Plato and Aristophanes—in the former most frequently in the familiar *πάνυ μὲν οὖν*—has a negative corrective sense conveying an emphatic assertion, sometimes to be rendered by a negative; being employed to correct, in the way of strengthening or heightening, a previous statement or assertion; and while it assents to a proposition indicates an advance beyond it. Dem. de Cor. § 316, *διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας, οὓσας ὑπερμεγέθεις, οὐ μὲν οὖν εἶποι τις ἂν ἡλικίας.* Ib. § 130, *ὁψέ γάρ ποτε—ὁψέ λίγω; χθές μὲν οὖν καὶ πρόην κ τ.λ.* Aesch. Eum. 38, *δείσασα γὰρ γραῦς οὐδέν, ἀντίπαις μὲν οὖν.* Eur. Hippol. 1012, *ματαίως ἄρ' ἦν, οὐδαμού μὲν οὖν φρενῶν.* In all these cases it may be translated 'nay more', or 'nay rather'. Similarly in answers it expresses a strong assent, *πάνυ μὲν οὖν, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν, κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν*, 'just so', 'quite so', 'exactly so'. In all these cases it may be rendered '*immo*', 'nay rather'. Herm. ad Vig. n. 343. In the same

is the neut. of an older form *μεῖς, μῆς, μέν*, of which *μῆς* alone remains in the language, the numeral 'one'; and *δέ* connected with *δύο* 'two'; though as far as I know he stands alone in the opinion; the origin usually assigned to it being that it is a weaker form of *δή*. Donaldson's view of the primary meaning and derivation of these particles is so completely in accordance with all their actual usages, and is so simple and natural, that it seems to me to carry with it its own evidence, and to need no further proof of its truth.

τῷ αὐτῷ· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηται,

P. 1387 b.

Αἶαντος δ' ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·

Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμέσασχ', ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο.

εἰ δὲ μή, κὰν ὀπωσοῦν ὁ ἥττων τῷ κρείττονι, οἶον εἰ  
ὁ μουσικὸς τῷ δικαίῳ· βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ δικαιοσύνη τῆς  
μουσικῆς.

οἷς μὲν οὖν νεμεσῶσι καὶ δι' ἅ, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον·

sense it appears in the Aristophanic *ἐμοῦ μὲν οὖν, ἐμοῦ μὲν οὖν*, 'no, mine; no mine', in answer to Cleon's nauseous offer to the Demus, *Equit.* 911; and elsewhere. *πάνν μὲν οὖν* is to be explained thus; I not only assent to what you say, but I go farther, I am absolutely convinced of it; 'nay more (or nay rather), absolutely so'. The *οὖν* in all these instances, and others like them, conveying thus a strong emphasis, at the same time may be considered to retain its consequential sense, 'conclusionis significationem', indicative of what *follows*, something else, 'accordingly', which is contained in the assent to the preceding statement, and thus the two usages of it are connected. The *μὲν* in the combination of the two particles is explained by Dr Donaldson, *New Cratylus* § 154—rightly I think—by a tacit reference to some suppressed sentence with the correlative *δέ, μὲν* being always opposed to *δέ* expressed or understood. *πάνν μὲν οὖν* would imply *ἄλλως δὲ οὐ*. (Donaldson supplies *τί δ' ἔπειτα*; 'but what then?') Following this explanation we may render *μάλιστα μὲν οὖν* in our text 'nay more, most of all, in the highest degree'.

I will now conclude this long note on a phrase which I have never seen fully explained, with a few examples parallel to that of our text. *Soph. Ant.* 925, *ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὖν τάδ' ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς καλὰ.....εἰ δ' οἷδ' ἀμαρτάνουσι κ.τ.λ.* *Plato, Phaedo* 90 E, *ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κ.τ.λ.*, on which Stallbaum, not. crit., observes, *οὖν utpote de vitio suspectum seclusimus*. With what reason, we have seen. *Eth. Nic.* VI 7, init. *ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν*, where *οὖν*, as here, seems to be superfluous, and is certainly unusual. *Ib.* VII 9, 1151 a 14, *ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, ὁ δ' οὐ*. *Polit.* I 2, 1252 b 29, *γινόμενη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*. *Ib.* IV (VII) 10, sub init., *τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἴγυπτον Σεσωστρίους, ὡς φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην*. *De Soph. El.* 6, 169 a 19, *οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν...οἱ δ' ἄλλοι κ.τ.λ.* *Hist. Anim.* V 16, 548 a 25, *αἱ μὲν οὖν...αἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* *De part. Anim.* IV II. 10, 691 a 28, *ἄνθρωπος μὲν οὖν...οἱ δ' ἵχθυες καὶ ὄρνιθες...* *Magn. Mor.* II 3, 1199 b 1, *ὡς δ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἀδικος...οἶδεν· ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῷ... Ib.* c. 6, 1203 a 16, *τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἀκρατοῦς...τοῦ δὲ ἀκολάστου κακῶς*.

'Whence also this saying'. Here follow two hexameter lines as an illustration of the foregoing topic; Cebriones, who knew that the divine vengeance falls upon those who attack their superiors, 'avoided the encounter of Ajax son of Telamon'. *Il.* XI 542. This is followed by a line which is rejected by the recent editors from the text of Homer, but appears again in the *Life of Homer*, attributed to Plutarch. See Paley's note ad loc. '(Chiefly in the *same* art, profession, or pursuit),

12 ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐστίν. αὐτοὶ δὲ νεμεση- p. 76.

τικοὶ εἰσιν, ἐὰν ἄξιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ταῦτα κεκτημένοι· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων

13 ἡξιῶσθαι τοὺς μὴ ὁμοίους οὐ δίκαιον. δεύτερον δ', ἂν ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι τυγχάνωσιν· κρίνουσί τε

or if not in the same, any case whatsoever of competition of inferior with superior (understand ἀμφοιβητῇ); of a musician, for instance, with a just man ("ut si musicus cum iusto viro *de dignitate* contendat." Victorius); because justice is better than music'. The claims of the two are unequal, of which the inferior ought to be sensible. 'So now from all this it is clear what are the objects and occasions of righteous indignation; such they are (as we have described them) and such-like'.

οἷς καὶ δι' ᾧ... δῆλον] There is an inaccuracy here in the language, δῆλον should be δῆλος or δῆλα in agreement with one or other of the antecedents to the relatives; or else οἷς should be τίσιν, and δι' ᾧ, διὰ τίνα or ποῖα. Aristotle, when he wrote δῆλον, seems to have had in his mind his usual formula for designating these two departments of inquiry, in the πάθη, viz. τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις. The same oversight occurs again c. 2 § 27, where οἷς &c. is followed by εἴρηται, which is impersonal, and cannot supply an antecedent to οἷς. The mistake is again repeated, c. 10 § 5, and, reading οἷς, in c. 10 § 11.

§ 12. We now pass to the third division of the analysis of νέμεσις; the subjects of it, the characters, tempers, states of mind which are especially liable to it. 'Those who are inclined to this kind of indignation in themselves are, first, such as happen to be deserving of the greatest blessings and at the same time in possession of them; because it is unjust that those who are unlike us should have been deemed worthy of (should have been enabled to attain to) the like advantages'. This is against the principle of distributive justice above described, which assigns honours and rewards, &c. κατ' ἀξίαν. See on § 2, above. The actual possession, as well as the right or claim to these good things, is necessary to the excitement of the indignation provoked by this comparison. The mere claim without the satisfaction of it would be rather provocative of envy or anger than of righteous (disinterested) indignation: when a man is satisfied himself, he is then ready to take a dispassionate view of the successes and advantages of his neighbour. When under the influence of personal feeling he is not in a state of mind fit to measure the comparative claims of himself and the other.

§ 13. 'And secondly, such as chance (have the luck) to be good and worthy men, because they both decide aright, and hate all injustice'. They have both the faculty and the feeling necessary for the occasion; the intellectual faculty of discernment, and the hatred of all that is wrong, which are both essential to the excitement of righteous indignation. On σπουδαῖος and its opposite φαῦλος, see note on I 5. 8.

§ 14. 'Or again, such as are of an ambitious temper, and eagerly striving after certain actions' (πράξεις, modes of activity, such as public employments in the service of the state; these are also objects of

- 14 γὰρ εὖ, καὶ τὰ ἄδικα μισοῦσιν. καὶ ἐὰν φιλότιμοι,  
καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τινῶν πράξεων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ  
ταῦτα φιλότιμοι ὥσιν ὧν ἕτεροι ἀνάξιοι ὄντες τυγ-  
15 χάνουσιν. καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοὶ αἰτοῦς ὧν  
ἐτέρους μὴ ἀξιοῦσι, νεμεσητικοὶ τούτοις καὶ τούτων.  
διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι  
οὐ νεμεσητικοί· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν οὗ ἑαυτοὺς οἴονται  
ἀξίους εἶναι.
- 16 φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ ποίοις ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ  
κακοπραγοῦσιν ἢ μὴ τυγχάνουσι χαίρειν ἢ ἀλύπως  
ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι

*ambition*, as giving scope for the exercise of special excellences, for the attainment of distinction, of honours, and the like); 'and especially when their ambition is directed to such objects as the others happen to be unworthy of'. The greater a man's ambition, and the stronger his desire of the honours and distinctions which he feels to be due to himself, the deeper his resentment at the unfairness of their attainment by those whom he knows, by comparison with himself, to be undeserving of them.

§ 15. 'And in general, *all* such (besides the really meritorious) as *think themselves* deserving of things (honours, rewards, emoluments), of which they deem others undeserving, are inclined to feel indignant with them and for (on account of) them (*for* the honours, &c. which they have unworthily obtained). And this also is the reason why the servile, and mean-spirited, and unambitious, are not inclined to feel indignation; because, that is, there is nothing which they think they *do* deserve'.

§ 16. 'From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose misfortunes, and calamities, and failures, we are bound to rejoice, or (at any rate) to feel no pain: for from the statements already made, the opposites' (i.e. opposite cases and circumstances) 'are manifest: and therefore if the speech put those that have to decide (*κρίνειν* applicable to all three branches of Rhetoric) in such and such a frame of mind (namely, such as have been described), and shew that those who claim, appeal to, our compassion—as well as the things (the occasions and circumstances) for which they claim it—are unworthy to meet with it (in the particular case), or of such a character and reputation in general as to repel it altogether, it is impossible (for the judges or other audience) to feel it'. The persons here meant are, according to Victorius, *rei et adversarii*, the prisoner under trial, in a criminal, the opponent in a civil case: but besides these the other *κριταί*, the audiences of public as well as panegyrical orations, must be included, who are equally liable with the judges in a court of law to be unduly influenced by an appeal to the feelings on the part of an unscrupulous advocate or declaimer.



δῆλα, ὥστ' ἐὰν τοὺς τε κριτὰς τοιούτους παρασκευάσῃ  
ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἀξιούντας ἐλεεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς  
ἐλεεῖσθαι, δείξῃ ἀναξίους μὲν ὄντας τυγχάνειν ἀξίους  
δὲ μὴ τυγχάνειν, ἀδύνατον ἐλεεῖν.

I δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι φθονοῦσι καὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς CHAP. X.  
ἔχοντες, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγία

CHAP. X.

Envy, the next of the *πάθη* that comes under consideration, is here defined 'a painful feeling occasioned by any apparent' (i. e. *παράφατος*, *conspicuous*) 'good fortune, the possession, namely, (or acquisition) of any of the good things before mentioned'—most likely the 'good things' enumerated in I cc. 5, 6—'which falls to the lot of' (*περί, lit.* in respect of, in the case of,) those who are like us', (in various ways, detailed in the next section) 'not for any personal consequences to oneself (understand *γένηται* or *συμβαίνει*), but solely on their account', because *they are* prosperous or successful, and it pains us to see it; usually (not always) because some comparison, some feeling of rivalry or competition, is involved in it, when we contrast our own condition with theirs—"rival-hating envy", Shakesp. *Richard II.* Act I. sc. 3. 131)—and therefore it is *περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους*; commonly has reference to, i. e. is directed against, 'those like us', with whom, that is, we come into competition in anything. δι' ἐκείνους is further explained in c. 11. 1, ὁ δὲ (φθονερὸς) παρασκευάζει τὸν πλήσιον μὴ ἔχειν (τὰ ἀγαθὰ) διὰ τὸν φθόνον. Such seems to be the meaning of the definition. [For a consecutive translation of § 1, see p. 123.]

Victorius, here as before, and again on c. 11. 1, renders *φαινομένη* 'or that which *appears* to be so' in the more ordinary sense of the word. But here at all events it cannot have this meaning, for there is no alternative in Aristotle's text; and without it he is made to say, that it is *only* 'seeming' prosperity that gives rise to the feeling. See note on II 2. 1. Again he and Schrader both understand *μὴ ἴνα τι αὐτῷ[σί]*, 'not from any dread of loss or danger, or prospect of advantage to oneself, from the other's good fortune', the second of which only is contained in *ἴνα τι αὐτῷ*; the first would require *μὴ* instead of *ἴνα*; and also is contradictory to what was said in c. 9 § 3, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον,—οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ μὲν νέμεσις τὸ δὲ φθόνος, ἀλλὰ φόβος, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦλον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας.

The definition *limits* the objects of the pain, and is thus a *second* correction, in addition to the criticism of c. 9 §§ 3—5 (on which see note), of the erroneous language applied to *φθόνος* Eth. Nic. II 7, sub fin., ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς...ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπείται.

Envy seems to have been regarded by the ancients as the worst and most distressing of all the painful emotions. *Invidia Siculi non invenere tyranni maius tormentum*, says Horace, Epist. I 2. 58. Σωκράτης τὸν φθόνον ἔφη ψυχῆς εἶναι πρίονα; and Menander, ὁ δὲ τὸ κάκιστον τῶν κακῶν πάντων φθόνος, Men. Fr. Inc. XII 6, ap. Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* IV 235 (quoted by Orelli ad loc. Hor.). "Of all other affections (envy) is the most importune and continual.....It is also the vilest affection and the most

φαινομένη τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους,  
μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκείνους· φθονήσουσι μὲν

depraved; for which cause it is the proper attribute of the devil," &c. Bacon, *Essays*, Of Envy, sub fin.

Φθόνον δὲ σκοπῶν (ὁ Σωκράτης) ὃ τι εἴη, λύπην μὲν τινα ἐξεύρισκεν αὐτὸν ὄντα, οὔτε μέντοι τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἀτυχίας οὔτε τὴν ἐπ' ἐχθρῶν εὐτυχίας γιγνομένην· ἀλλὰ μόνους ἔφη φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνιωμένους. Xen. Mem. III 9. 8 (quoted by Gaisford). Socrates defends this view of envy in the next sentence against the charge of paradox, by asserting that the *fact* is true, however paradoxical it may appear: still none but simpletons, ἡλιθίους, are liable to the feeling, no wise man, φρόνιμος, is capable of it. This is in accordance with the doctrine that virtue is nothing but knowledge. However it is plain that it is a mistake to confine the feeling to the good fortune of *friends* or those we love; and Aristotle has doubtless improved upon it by substituting his τοὺς ὁμοίους. The so-called Platonic *δρος* runs thus, following Socrates, λύπη ἐπὶ φίλων ἀγαθοῖς ἢ οὖσιν ἢ γεγενημένοις. "Οροι, 416 D.

The Stoic definition, λύπην ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, Diog. Laert., Zeno, VII 111, which does not define the *objects* of the feeling, seems to have been the prevailing form of it. It is repeated by Cicero as Zeno's with additions, Tusc. Disp. IV 8. 17, *Invidentiam esse dicunt (Stoici) aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti. Nam si quis doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non recte dicatur invidere; ut si Hectori Agamemno: qui autem cui alterius commoda nihil noceant tamen eum doleat his frui, is invidet profecto.* This leaves the objects of the πάθος unlimited, which seems to be the true account of it. So Horace, Ep. I 2. 57, *Invidus alterius macrescit rebus opimis.*

I will conclude this note with two or three more modern definitions. "Grief for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called Emulation: but joined with endeavour to supplant or hinder a competitor, Envy." Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Of the Passions, Pt. I, ch. 6. Envy and Emulation, ζήλος, *aemulatio*, usually go together in a classification of the πάθη, being evidently closely connected. See the passages in Diog. Laert. and Cic. above quoted; and so also Aristotle. This definition very nearly approaches to that of Ar., only omitting the μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ.

"Envy", says Locke, *Essay*, &c., Bk. II. Ch. 20, *Of modes of pleasure and pain*, "is an uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of a good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us." Here again the notion of 'competition' enters into the definition.

Lastly, Bain, *Emotions and Will*, Ch. VII, classes this under the general head of emotions of self, and connects it, like his predecessors, with Emulation, § 9 [p. 105, ed. 2, 1865]. Comparison and the desire of Superiority, lie at the bottom of both Emotions. "The feeling of *Envy* is much more general in its application. Referring to everything that is desirable in the condition of some more fortunate personage, there is

γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσὶ τινες ὅμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται.  
2 ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ'  
ἡλικίαν, καθ' ἔξιν, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα.

combined a strong wish for the like good to self, with an element of malevolence towards the favoured party." This differs from Aristotle in the introduction of the selfish and the malevolent elements, and removes the unnecessary restriction to cases of competition, by which he has limited its objects and scope. It is I believe a much truer and more philosophical account of the Emotion.

Bacon's *Essay*, Of Envy, has some points in common with Aristotle. Bacon knows the sting of envy in the want of something which another possesses. "A man that hath no virtue in himself, ever envieth virtue in others. For men's minds will either feed upon their own good or upon others' evil; and who *wanteth* the one will prey upon the other; and whoso is out of hope to attain to another's virtue will seek to come at even hand by depressing another's fortune." This introduces Aristotle's principle of rivalry and competition as the foundation of envy. Again, with §§ 2 and 5, may be compared, "Lastly, near kinsfolk and fellows in office and those that have been bred together, are more apt to envy their equals when they are raised. For it doth upbraid unto them their own fortunes; and pointeth at them, and cometh oftener into their remembrance, and incurreth likewise more into the note of others: and envy ever redoubleth from speech and fame." This arises from their constant association, which gives frequent occasion to envy. "Again, envy is ever joined with the comparing of a man's self; and where there is no comparison, no envy; and therefore kings are not envied but by kings;" compared with the end of § 5.

§ 1. 'The occasions, objects, and mental dispositions, that give rise to envy may be clearly gathered from the definition of it; that it is, viz. a feeling of pain occasioned by manifest or conspicuous good fortune, the accession, that is, of any one of the good things previously mentioned, (chiefly) in the case of any one of those like us, for no personal advantage or gain to ourselves that is likely to accrue from it, but simply on their account: for such as have, or think they have, any like them, i. e. persons similar to themselves, in such things as are likely to bring them into rivalry and competition, will be most subject to the feeling of envy'.

§ 2. 'By *like* or *similar* I mean, those who are of the same race (or are alike in stock), of the same family (relatives), alike in age, in states', mental and bodily (virtues of all kinds, accomplishments, acquirements, and excellences of mind and body, when developed, confirmed and permanent are *ἔξεις*: *qui artibus scientiis et huiusmodi rebus pares sunt*, Victorius: this may be included in the other, more general, meaning), 'in reputation, in property or possessions' (of any kind, *patrimonio ac re familiari*, Victorius). This is well illustrated by a passage of Cic. Brutus, c. XLII § 156, quoted by Victorius on § 5. *Simul illud gaudeo, quod et aequalitas vestra, et pares honorum gradus, et artium studiorumque finitima vicinitas, tantum abest ab obtreptione invidiae, quae solet*

καὶ οἷς μικροῦ ἐλλείπει τὸ μὴ πάντα ὑπάρχειν. διὸ οἱ μεγάλα πράττοντες καὶ οἱ εὐτυχοῦντες φθονεροὶ 3 εἰσιν· πάντας γὰρ οἶονται τὰ αὐτῶν φέρειν. καὶ οἱ

*lacerare plerosque, uti ea non modo exulcerare vestram gratiam sed etiam conciliare videatur.*

In reality envy is not *confined*, as Aristotle seems to say, to these classes of people as objects; nor even to those with whom we are likely to come into competition; it seems rather that there is no limit, within the circle of humanity, to the objects on which it may be exercised. A man may envy a baby its innocence, its health, its rosy cheeks, or the poorest and meanest his health and strength: the feeling of pain which belongs to envy no doubt proceeds from an involuntary comparison of oneself with another, who *has* some valuable possession which we happen to *want*; and the unsatisfied desire, contrasted with the gratification of it in some one else, friend or foe, good or bad, high or low, in a malevolent disposition—not in the *wise* man, as Socrates has it—breeds the feeling of pain. Aristotle's definition may be thus summed up: envy is a feeling of pain, excited, usually if not always, by the successful competition of a real or supposed rival. 'Those also' are disposed to it 'who (have nearly attained to) want but little of complete satisfaction (of possessing every thing desirable)'. A long and uninterrupted course of success and prosperity, and the attainment of *nearly all* that is desirable, seems to give them a *right* to what still remains deficient; and the envy which they would in any case feel of the possession of it by another, gains strength by the contrast with their own deficiency. Here again it is the competition and the comparison of our own condition with that of another, the want and the inferiority, that add a sting to envy.

μικροῦ] like ὀλίγου, adv. 'nearly', 'within a trifling distance of', is a genitive with δέον understood.

τὸ (μὴ) if ἐλλείπει is impersonal, as it usually is, is redundant as far as the sense is concerned; if not, τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν is its subject. In illustration of the former case, see Hermann ad Aj. 114, ἐπειδὴ τέρψις ἐστὶ σοι τὸ δρᾶν, who (unnecessarily, I think<sup>1</sup>) distinguishes two senses of the phrase, and exemplifies it by several instances all taken from Sophocles the great storehouse of Greek idiom. Add these two from prose authors, Dem. de F. L. § 180, p. 392, οὐκ ἀνησὶς ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς...τὸ μὴ πράττειν, Plat. Tim. 20 C, πρόφασις τὸ μὴ δρᾶν (vid. Stallbaum ad loc.), and the present passage. Examples from Thucydides are to be found in Shilleto's note, ad Dem. de F. L. § 92. See also Matth. Gr. Gr. §§ 541, 542.

'And this is the reason why those who undertake great enterprises—engage in great actions—and the successful are envious: because they think that all such are carrying off what properly belong to themselves', i.e. the profits, honours, and distinctions to which they are entitled. The difference between this feeling and that of *νέμεσις* is confined to this, that the latter distinguishes between the deserving and undeserving, the former does not. Comp. II 9. 3.

<sup>1</sup> Indeed he allows it himself, *qui usus, specie magis quam re, a priore illo diversus est.*

τιμώμενοι ἐπὶ τινι διαφερόντως, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἢ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι φθονερώτεροι τῶν ἀφιλοτίμων. καὶ οἱ δοξόσοφοι· φιλότιμοι γὰρ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ· καὶ ὅλως οἱ φιλόδοξοι περί τι φθονεροὶ περὶ τοῦτο. καὶ οἱ μικρόψυχοι πάντα γὰρ μεγάλα  
 4 δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς εἶναι. ἐφ' οἷς δὲ φθογοῦσιν, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἴρηται· ἐφ' ὅσοις γὰρ φιλοδοξοῦσι καὶ φιλο- P. 1388.  
 P. 77.

§ 3. 'And those who have a pre-eminent reputation for anything, and especially for wisdom or happiness'. The latter, says Victorius, on account of its extreme rarity. These three classes, desiring to engross all the success, credit, good fortune, themselves, grudge the acquisition or possession of them by their competitors, or any others. 'And the ambitious are more prone to envy than the unambitious': because they set a higher value upon honours and distinctions. 'And the pretenders to wisdom and learning' (like the Sophists, ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔσης, de Soph. El. 1, 165 a 21), 'owing to their ambition of this kind of reputation, because they are ambitious of the credit of wisdom'. Plat. Phaedr. 275 B, δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν ('the conceit of wisdom instead of the reality.' Thompson). 'And as a general rule, all those who are covetous of distinction in anything (art, study, pursuit, accomplishment, acquirement), are in this envious (of the distinction of others). Also the little-minded (mean-souled), because to them everything appears great (by comparison)'; and therefore an object of desire, which when unsatisfied breeds envy. μικροψυχία, opposed to μεγαλοψυχία, is defined in Eth. Nic. II 7, 1007 b 22, περὶ τίμην καὶ ἀτιμίαν ἑλλειψις: again IV 7, 1123 b 10, the μικρόψυχος is described as ὁ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος ἑαυτὸν ἀξίων, one who rates his claims to honour and distinction too low': and further, Ib. c. 9, sub init. ὁ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὧν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν ἄξιος ἐστὶ. Having this mean opinion of himself and his own merits and deserts, and no power of appreciating what is really great, he is of course likely to over-estimate in others the gifts and advantages which he supposes himself to want, and so becomes indiscriminate in his envy. In I 9. 11, 12, μικροψυχία occurs in a somewhat different sense, that of meanness in general, and especially in the use of money. Some Latin equivalents of μικροψυχία and μεγαλοψυχία are cited by Heindorf on Hor. Sat. 1 2. 10, *Sordidus atque animi quod parvi politi haberi*. Schrader quotes from a little treatise, περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, attributed (most improbably) to Aristotle, which gives a very different account of μικροψυχία from that which we find in his genuine works. It occurs c. 7, 1251 b 16, but is not worth transcribing.

§ 4. 'The kinds of good things which give occasion to envy have been already mentioned' (that is, they may be inferred from the preceding enumeration of the classes of persons who are most liable to envy).

τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ] according to Donaldson's rule, *New. Crat.* § 154 (see note

τιμούνται ἔργοις ἢ κτήμασι καὶ ὀρέγονται δόξης, καὶ ὅσα εὐτυχήματά ἐστι, σχεδὸν περὶ πάντα φθόνος ἐστί, καὶ μάλιστα ὧν αὐτοὶ ἢ ὀρέγονται ἢ οἶονται δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν, ἢ ὧν τῇ κτήσει μικρῷ ὑπερέχουσιν 5 ἢ μικρῷ ἐλλείπουσιν. φανερόν δὲ καὶ οἷς φθονοῦσιν ἅμα γὰρ εἶρηται· τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ

on μὲν οὖν, II 9. 11), tacitly refers to a correlative clause τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κ.τ.λ., on the *other* occasions of envy, which has been forgotten and omitted.

‘For everything of which men covet the reputation, or of which they are ambitious—be they deeds done or possessions acquired—striving after fame (the credit of the achievements and acquirements), and every kind of good fortune (successes and acquirements due to fortune, and not, like the others, to a man’s own exertions),—with all these, as one may say, envy is concerned; and most of all, the objects of our own aspirations, or whatever we think we have a right to ourselves, or things of which the acquisition confers a slight superiority or a slight inferiority’. A very great superiority or inferiority places a man beyond the reach of envy. It is when the competition is close, and the difference between the competitors small, that the apparent value of the good competed for is greatly enhanced, and the envy excited by the success of the opponent proportionately strong.

σχεδόν] (1) ‘near at hand’, (2) ‘pretty nearly’, is familiarly used, especially by Plato and Aristotle, to modify too general an assertion: signifying, that your words in the general expression that you have, inadvertently as it were, let fall, are not to be construed strictly and literally, but room must be left for possible exceptions; that the statement is pretty nearly exact, but not quite. Hence it becomes equivalent to ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ‘as one may say’, ‘so to speak’, which similarly qualifies what may be an over-statement of the case, demanding a fair latitude of construction. Plato sometimes writes σχεδόν τι, Aristotle (I believe) rarely or never. [‘σχεδόν δέ τι, Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, Θ 3, 253 ὁ 6, sed τι om. codd. EFHK.’ *Index Aristotelicus*.]

§ 5. φανερόν οἷς] See note on II 9. 11, at the end.

‘It is plain too who are the objects of envy, from the mention that has been already made of them incidentally’ (ἅμα simultaneously; with something else, another subject, to which it did not properly belong: in § 2, namely, as an appendix to the definitions); ‘those, namely, who are near to us in time, and place, and age, and reputation, are the ordinary objects of envy’.

τοῖς ἐγγὺς...ἡλικίᾳ...φθονοῦσιν] Victorius illustrates ἡλικίᾳ by the instance of Fabius Maximus’ defence of himself against the suspicion of having opposed himself to Publius Scipio out of envy: *docuit enim si nullae aliae res ab ea culpa ipsum vindicarent, aetatem saltem liberare debere; quod nulla aemulatio seni cum P. Scipione esse posset, qui ne filio quidem ipsius aequalis foret* [paraphrased from Livy XXVIII. 40, where the defence is given in *oratio recta*].

τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν. ὅθεν εἴρηται

τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται.

καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται· φιλοτιμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μυριοστὸν ἔτος ὄντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσομένους ἢ τεθνεῶτας οὐδεῖς, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἐφ' Ἑρακλείαις στήλαις. οὐδ' ὧν πολὺ οἶονται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις λείπεσθαι, οὐδ' ὧν πολὺ ὑπερέχειν, ὡσαύτως καὶ πρὸς τοὺτους 6 καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν

‘Whence the saying’, (of doubtful authorship: attributed by the Scholiast to Aeschylus, apud Spengel) “Kinship is well acquainted with envy too.” And those whom we are ambitious of rivalling’ (on πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, see note on II 2. 22); ‘which occurs towards those just mentioned (τοῖς ἐγγύς κ.τ.λ. opposed to the following, who are all πόρρω, ἄπωθεν, ‘far off’ in place or time); but towards those who were alive ten thousand years ago’ (*lit.* to whom it is now the 10,000th year since they were, from the time of their existence), ‘or those who are yet to be (yet unborn), or already dead’, (differs from the first in the length of time—the *dead* may be *recently* dead), ‘*never*: nor towards those who are at the world’s end’.

τοὺς ἐφ' Ἑρακλείαις στήλαις] The ‘columns of Hercules’, the limits of the *known* world, stand in the place of our ‘antipodes’ to express extreme remoteness—all beyond them being a mystery. Arist., Meteor. II 1. 10, assigns it as the extreme boundary of the Mediterranean sea, ἡ ἐντὸς Ἑρακλείων στηλῶν (θάλασσα); the Mediterranean itself being ἡ ἔσω, ἡ ἐντός, θάλασσα, *mare internum, intestinum*. See the article in Smith’s *Dict. of Geogr.* Vol. II. p. 57, *Internum Mare*: and Vol. I. p. 1054, *Herculis Columnae*. With Aristotle’s metaphor in the Rhet. comp. Pind. Ol. III 79, Θήρων ἄπτεται Ἑρακλέος σταλῶν. τὸ πόρρω δ' ἔστι σοφοῖς ἄβατον ἄβατον κἀσόφοις, and again, Nem. III 35, οὐκέτι πρόσω ἀβάταν ἅλα κίωνων ὑπὲρ Ἑρακλέος περᾶν εὐμαρές. Isthm. IV 20. In Nem. IV 112, Γάδειρα takes its place.

‘Nor (do we attempt to rival) those to whom, either by our own judgment, or that of everybody else, we are brought to the opinion that we are far inferior’, (this is the *general* case of superiority and inferiority, *dignitate atque opibus*, Victorius,) ‘or superior; and the same is true with regard to similar things as to these persons’, i. e. the same that has been said of these persons, may be applied equally to the corresponding things for which men compete (this is the *special* case of competition in some particular art, pursuit, or excellence; the case for example of an ordinary mathematician and Sir Isaac Newton, or in any other art or profession the distinguished and the undistinguished practitioner).

§ 6. ‘And seeing that this ambition of rivalry is (especially) directed

ἐφιεμένους φιλοτιμούνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις  
φθονεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ.

7 καὶ τοῖς ταχὺ οἱ ἢ μόλις τυχόντες ἢ μὴ τυχόντες  
8 φθονοῦσιν. καὶ ὧν ἢ κεκτημένων ἢ κατορθούντων  
ὄνειδος αὐτοῖς· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐγγὺς καὶ ὅμοιοι·  
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι παρ' αὐτοὺς οὐ τυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἀγα-  
9 θοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο λυποῦν ποιεῖ τὸν φθόνον. καὶ τοῖς  
ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἢ κεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς προσήκεν

against (pointed at) our competitors in some struggle or encounter (i.e. any *ἀγών*, in which there are *ἀγωνισταί* or 'combatants': law-suits, battles, games, and such like), or in love (*rivalry* proper), or generally against those who are aiming at the same things, these must necessarily be the chief objects of envy: whence the saying "two of a trade". See *supra* II 4. 21, I 11. 25. Hesiod. Op. et D. 25, καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων.

§ 7. 'Such as have attained a rapid success are objects of envy to those who have either succeeded with difficulty, or not at all'.

§ 8. 'And those whose possession (of any coveted object), or success, is a reproach to ourselves: and these too are *near* us and *like* us' (in the senses defined in §§ 5 and 2. The meaning is, the attainment of something which is the object of competition, or success, on the part of a rival is a reproach to us, when the other is not greatly our superior, but nearly on the same level, and in our own sphere, *ἐγγὺς καὶ ὅμοιος*; we argue that if *he* could attain to it, it ought to have been within *our* reach); 'for it is plainly our own fault that we fail to obtain the good thing, and so the pain of this produces the envy'.

παρ' αὐτούς] 'along of' ourselves, see Arnold on Thuc. I 141. 9 and Dem. Phil. I § 11, p. 43 (quoted by Arnold) where it occurs twice, παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βώμην, παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν, in both, 'by' the agency, or cause, of... so that the prepos. with the accus. is used in two diametrically opposite senses. Arnold's parallel English vulgarism seems to explain very well this meaning of the word; the notion of travelling alongside of, readily suggests the notion of constant accompaniment, and *that* of consequence, as in the two logical usages of *ἔπασθαι* and *ἀκολουθεῖν*, to 'accompany' as well as to 'follow'. Otherwise, the sense of constant companionship may give rise to the notion of friendly aid in producing some effect or consequence, and so it passes into the signification of *διά*, or nearly so.

§ 9. 'And we are apt to envy those who either have now in their possession, or have once possessed', (so I distinguish *ἔχουσι* and *κεκτημένοις*, which however ordinarily express the same thing. Victorius translates *habent possidentque*; which not only conveys no distinction at all, but mistranslates the *alternative* ἢ, which clearly shews that



10 ἢ κέκτηντο ποτέ· διὸ πρεσβύτεροι νεωτέροις. καὶ  
οἱ πολλὰ δαπανήσαντες εἰς ταὐτὸ τοῖς ὀλίγα φθο-  
11 νοῦσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ οἷς<sup>1</sup> χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ  
ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες· ὥς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχοντες λυ-  
<sup>1</sup> ἐφ' οἷς *infra*.

Aristotle *did* mean two different things,) 'anything to which we ourselves had a natural claim or had once possessed (*subaudi* ὅσα αὐτοὶ κέκτηνται); and this is why seniors are prone to envy their juniors'. Victorius recurs here to the case of Q. Fabius Maximus and Scipio, already cited on § 5. Maximus in his old age was naturally suspected of envy in the opposition he offered to Scipio's command in Africa: people thought he was jealous (this is nearer to jealousy than envy) of the reputation that the young general was rapidly acquiring, which interfered with his own earlier claims to similar distinction. The case of a similar jealousy of a younger rival, in any science, art, or profession, is too notorious to need special illustration.

§ 10. 'And those that have laid out large sums (for the attainment of any object) envy those who have obtained the same success at a small expense'. Here again the envy arises from having been beaten in the competition. τοῖς ὀλίγα (δαπανήσασιν).

§ 11. In this last section there are two or three points requiring consideration which it will be as well to dispatch before proceeding to the translation. The first is, whether we are to read ἐφ' οἷς or οἷς without the prepos.; and then, what do ἐφ' οἷς or οἷς and ἐπὶ τίσι, severally represent. Spengel, following MS A<sup>o</sup> retains ἐφ' οἷς; Bekker in his third ed., for once departs from that MS and reads οἷς, although, as it seems, none of the MSS give any various reading. It seems therefore on this ground preferable to retain ἐφ' οἷς if we can; and we have next to consider how it is to be interpreted, and how distinguished from ἐπὶ τίσι. ἐφ' οἷς and οἷς are equally irregular after δῆλον (see note on II 9. 11, at the end), and the grammar therefore throws no light upon the reading. As far as the grammar and interpretation are concerned there seems to be no objection to retaining ἐπὶ.

We have then to decide whether οἷς or τίσι stands for persons or things; either of which is possible. However if the choice is to be made between them, τίσι seems the more natural representative of persons, and οἷς of things; and so in general, throughout these analyses of the feelings, Aristotle is accustomed to designate the *persons* who are the objects of them by the pronoun *τίσις*.

Thirdly, there is no objection to ἐπὶ τίσι χαίρουσιν in the sense of 'at' or 'by whom they are pleased' (lit. *upon* whom their pleasure is bestowed or directed), 'in whom they find pleasure', though the bare τίσι is more usual (possibly this may be Bekker's reason for his alteration [of ἐφ' οἷς]); and if there were any doubt about it, it would be sufficiently supported by ἐπὶ ποίοις (what sort of *persons*) χαίρειν, c. 9. 16. Consequently, as I can see no sufficient reason for altering the text contrary to all manuscript authority, I have retained ἐφ' οἷς, understanding it of *things*, the occasions of joy or delight; and ἐπὶ τίσι of the *persons* who excite the feeling in us.

ποῦνται, οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἡσθήσονται.

The next clause, ὥς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, κ.τ.λ. presents some difficulty, and Muretus and the *Vetus Translatio*, followed by Schrader and Wolf, reject the negative οὐκ (or μή as it stood in the MSS employed in the older editions). This however would make the two opposite feelings of pleasure and pain the *same* state or disposition of mind, which I think could not possibly have been Aristotle's meaning. Victorius takes what I believe to be the right view on the point. The meaning will then be, that the negative, the contradictory, of pain, i. e. pleasure (the two never co-existing), is excited by the opposite circumstances to those which are productive of the pain of envy; if pain under particular circumstances is excited by the sight of the good fortune of another, substitute the opposite, ill fortune for good fortune in each case, and you will have the appropriate topics for giving rise to the feeling of pleasure in your audience. This, says Victorius, is ἐπιχαιρεκακία, wanton malice, malevolent pleasure in the misfortunes of others. The above interpretation is at all events free from the objection to which Schrader's is liable, namely that it makes Aristotle say that the same mental state or disposition is painful and pleasurable. The choice between the two depends mainly upon the interpretation of οἱ τοιοῦτοι and πῶς ἔχοντες. I understand by the former the φθονεροί, the common character of all the classes distinguished in the analysis; Schrader of the members of the several classes, the ambitious, the prosperous and successful; and in his view these classes must fall under the several 'states of mind' designated by πῶς, ὥς, οὕτως, ἔχοντες, such as ambition; though how it can be applied to others, such as 'the prosperous and successful', his second instance, he does not inform us. If by the 'state of mind' the πάθος or emotion is meant<sup>1</sup> (which seems to be Spengel's view), it is quite impossible that two such states, one pleasurable and the other painful, can be the same. Schrader, however, appears to take the πῶς ἔχειν in a different sense, for the character or habit of mind, the mental constitution, which tends to produce such and such feelings; and in this point of view, though ambition (his first instance) may fairly enough be called a disposition of mind, yet I cannot see how the second, the prosperous and successful men, or prosperity and success, can well be included in the designation.

In conclusion I will transcribe part of his note, that the reader may have the opportunity of deciding for himself; merely adding that manuscript and editorial authority is against his omission of the negative, and that though his interpretation is very plausible at first sight, I doubt whether it can be right, for the reasons stated. "Veritas autem huius lectionis e re ipsa quoque fiet manifesta, si per προτάσεις a § 2 ad 9 transeas, et huc illas applies. Ambitiosi e. g. dolent honore alterius, iidem, sive eodem modo affecti, gaudent alterius opprobrio. Qui res magnas gerunt, et fortuna utuntur prosperrima, dolent

<sup>1</sup> This is certainly so. Take, for instance, the first words of the following chapter, πῶς δ' ἔχοντες ζηλοῦσι, the state of mind in which ζῆλος is shewn, or resides: which identifies ζῆλος with the *state* in question.

ται· ὥστε ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν παρασκευασθῶσιν οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δ' ἐλεείσθαι ἢ τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιούμενοι ὧσιν οἱοὶ οἱ εἰρημένοι, δῆλον ὡς οὐ τεύξονται ἐλέου παρὰ τῶν κυρίων.

I πῶς δ' ἔχοντες ζηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ ποῖα καὶ ἐπὶ CHAP. XI.  
P. 78. τίσιν, ἐνθὲνδ' ἐστὶ δῆλον· εἰ γάρ ἐστι ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένη παρουσία ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐν-

si alium ad eundem fortunae gradum cernant evectum: iisdem vero illi gaudent cum alios longe infra se relinqui conspiciunt."

And now to proceed with the translation :—

'It is plain too what are the occasions, the objects, and the states of mind of such (the envious); that is to say, that the same state of mind which is absent in the painful feeling, will be present in the joy that is excited by the opposite occasions' (or thus, 'whatever may be the state of mind the absence of which manifests itself in, or is accompanied by, pain, the same by its presence on the opposite occasions will give rise to pleasure'). 'Consequently, if we ourselves (i. e. any audience) are brought into that state of mind (envy or jealousy), and those who lay claim to (think themselves deserving of) compassion from us, or any good that they want to obtain from us' (as κριταί, judges of any kind, in a disputed claim; but it is equally true of men in general), 'be such as the above described (i. e. objects of envy), 'it is plain that they will never meet with compassion' (which will apply to τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ as well as to ἐλεείσθαι) 'from the masters of the situation' (those who have the power to bestow either of them, those with whom the matter rests).

παρασκευάζειν, 'to prepare the minds of' the judges or audience, said of the speaker who puts them into such and such a state of mind or feeling, is rendered by κατασκευάζειν, *supra* II 1. 2 (see note ad loc.) and § 7, where it is applied in two somewhat different senses.

#### CHAP. XI.

With envy, as we have seen, is closely connected ζῆλος or emulation; both of them originating in the desire of superiority, which manifests itself in rivalry and competition with those who so far, and in that sense, resemble us (περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους), that we are necessarily brought into comparison with them. Both of them are painful emotions—the pain arises from the unsatisfied want which they equally imply—and the difference between them is this, that envy is malevolent; what the envious man *wants* is to deprive his neighbour of some advantage or superiority, and do him harm by reducing him to his own level; the pain of emulation springs from the sense of our own deficiencies and the desire of rising to a higher level of virtue or honour: consequently the one is a virtuous, the other a vicious, feeling; emulation leads to self-improvement, and the practice of virtue; the object of envy is nothing but the degradation or injury of another: or, as Aristotle expresses it, emulation aims at the acquisition of good things, envy at

δεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλω ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ ἐπικεῖν ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπικειῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν

the deprivation of them in another, the infliction of harm and loss on one's neighbour.

Such is Aristotle's account of emulation ; according to him the feeling is one, and that virtuous. The Stoics however, as interpreted by Cicero, Tusc. Disp. IV 8. 17, distinguished two kinds of *aemulatio*:—*ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit. Nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur : et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit alius potitur ipse careat.* And again, c. 26. 56, *aemulantis, angī alieno bono quod ipse non habeat.* The two definitions differ also in this, that in Ar.'s all emulation is painful and all virtuous ; in that of the Stoics, one form of it is virtuous but not painful, the other painful but not virtuous ; and in fact it is difficult to distinguish the latter form of it from envy.

The Stoic definition of Zeno and (apparently) Chrysippus, Diog. Laert., Zeno, VII 111, gives only the painful and vicious form of ζῆλος, λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ παρέρναι ὧν αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ. Cicero attributes his double definition also to Zeno.

Hobbes' and Bain's definitions of the affection I have already quoted in the introductory note to Ch. x. Locke, in the chapter there referred to, does not include emulation in his list of 'Passions', or 'Modes of pleasure and pain'.

Stewart, *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, Pt. II. Sect. III. 5, has some remarks upon emulation, which he classes with the desires, and not (as Aristotle and others) with the affections. "It is the desire of superiority which is the active principle ; and the malevolent affection is only a concomitant circumstance." Here he is in accordance with Aristotle. "When emulation is accompanied with malevolent affection, it assumes the name of envy."

"Emulation," says Butler, *Sermon I.*, On Human Nature, note 4, "is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or superiority over others, with whom we compare ourselves. There does not appear to be *any other grief* in the natural passion, but only *that want* which is implied in desire. However, this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great *grief*. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority by the *particular means* of others being brought down to our own level or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at, is exactly the same ; namely that equality or superiority ; and consequently, that to do mischief is not the object of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end." At all events, the malevolent *feeling* is a constituent element of the emotion of envy, without which it would not be what it is : though the actual *doing mischief* may not be essential to it.

1. 'The dispositions of emulation (the states of mind which exhibit it, in which it resides), its occasions and objects, will be clear from what follows'. τὰ ποῖα here stands for 'the sort of things' which excite emu-

φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν παρασκευάζει  
διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλη-  
σίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον· ἀνάγκη δὲ ζηλωτικούς  
μὲν εἶναι τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας αὐτοὺς ἀγαθῶν ὧν μὴ ἔχου- P. 1388 b.  
2 σιν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀξιοῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀδύνατα. διὸ οἱ  
νέοι καὶ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει

lation, usually expressed in these analyses by ἐπὶ ποίοις : ἐπὶ τίσι for the 'persons' or 'objects', *υφον* whom it lights, i.e. against whom it is directed, which again is more usually conveyed by the simple τίσι. See however c. 10 § 11, ἐπὶ τίσι, and the note there ; and ἐπὶ ποίοις χαίρειν c. 9 § 16. 'If, namely, emulation is a feeling of pain on the occasion of the manifest (unmistakable) presence of good things, highly valued and possible for ourselves to acquire, (περί in respect of, in the case of, i.e.) belonging to, or acquired by, those who have a natural resemblance to ourselves (in temper, faculties, powers, gifts and accomplishments natural or acquired, or anything which brings them *into contrast* with us); not because another has them (which is envy) but because we ourselves have them not (and so, feeling the *want*, are anxious to obtain them, in order to raise ourselves to the level of our assumed rival)—and accordingly, (the latter,) emulation is virtuous and a property of virtuous men, envy on the other hand vicious and of the vicious: for whilst the one is led by his emulation to procure (contrive, manage) for himself the attainment of these goods, the other is led by his envy to manage merely that his neighbour shall *not* have them':—(This is mere malevolence, the desire of harm or loss to another, without any corresponding advantage to oneself. The sentence from διὸ to φθόνον, is a *note* on the distinction of ζῆλος and φθόνος : the argument is now resumed, and the apodosis commences with the irregular δὴ, introduced unnecessarily, *more Aristotelio*, after the parenthesis as correlative to the εἰ of the πρότασις, see note on 11 9. 11, 1 1. 11)—'then, I say (if emulation be such as it has been described), those must be inclined to emulation who think themselves deserving of good things which they do not possess'; (sc. δυνατῶν αὐτοῖς ὄντων, provided they are possible for them to attain. This connecting link, omitted by Aristotle, is supplied by Muretus and Victorius, and doubtless explains the connexion of the reasoning,) 'for no one lays claim to things manifestly impossible'.

§ 2. 'And this is why the young and the high-minded are of this character'. With οἱ νέοι comp. c. 12. 6 and 11. The latter of these two passages gives the reason why the young are inclined to emulation, it is διὰ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὐτοὺς μεγάλων ; which also makes them μεγαλόψυχοι. Emulation in the μεγαλόψυχοι must be confined to rivalry in *great things*, if it is to be consistent with the character assigned to them in Eth. Nic. IV 8, 1124 b 24, καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ λέναι, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλήτην ἄλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. In fact self-sufficiency is characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος, ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων ἀξίος ὢν, who therefore is devoid of all *vanitas* ambition, διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν.

τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἃ τῶν ἐντίμων ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀνδρῶν  
ἐστι γὰρ ταῦτα πλοῦτος καὶ πολυφιλία καὶ ἀρχαί  
καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· ὥς γὰρ προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῖς

‘Also, those who are in possession (*themselves*, opposed to οὗς οἱ ἄλλοι ἀξιοῦσιν, in the following sentence) of such good things as are worthy of men that are held in honour: such are, namely (γάρ)<sup>1</sup>, wealth, abundance of friends (an extensive and powerful connexion), state offices, and all the like. For, on the supposition that they have a natural claim to goodness, because the good *have* a natural right to these things [ὅτι προσῆκε τοῖς ἀγαθῶς ἔχουσι], good things of this kind they emulously strive after’. That is to say, they start with the assumption that their natural character is virtuous, and then, because wealth and power and such like have a natural connexion with, i.e. are the proper rewards of, virtue, they are eager to obtain them, and vie with their competitors in the pursuit of them<sup>2</sup>. The meaning of this sentence is further elucidated by comparison with what is said in § 7. We are there informed that some kinds of good things, such as those that are due to fortune, or mere good luck, without merit, may be the objects not of emulation but of contempt. ἀγαθὰ ἃ τῶν ἐντίμων ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀνδρῶν are consequently confined to those good things the acquisition of which implies merit.

προσῆκε imperf. is properly ‘*had* a natural claim’. The past tense, precisely as in the familiar use of the imperf., ‘so and so *is* as I said’, referring back to a past statement, here signifies, ‘*has* a claim, as they were in the habit of believing’. I have not thought it worth while to express this in the transl., as the phraseology is Greek and not English. Muretus, approved by Vater, writes προσῆκει, overlooking the force of the imperfect.

In ἀγαθῶς ἔχουσι, ἀγαθῶς for εὖ is as abnormal as ‘goodly’ would be, used as an *adverb* for ‘well’. It occurs once again, Top. E 7, 136 b 28, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ δικαίως ἴδιον τὸ ἀγαθῶς. Amongst the Classical Greek writers, Aristotle appears to enjoy the monopoly of it [but the present passage and the parallel just quoted from the Topics are the only instances given in the *Index Aristotelicus*]: it is found also in the Septuagint (Stephens’ *Thesaurus* s. v.), and apparently nowhere else.

‘And also (opposed to the preceding), those whom everybody else

<sup>1</sup> Here and elsewhere I have followed Schleiermacher, who in his Translation of Plato, invariably renders γάρ ‘*nämlich*.’ The same word in English, though not so usual as in the other language, is perhaps the nearest equivalent to the Greek γάρ. It is used thus in a specification of particulars, *videlicet*, that is to say, in confirmation of, assigning a *sort of reason* for, a previous statement.

<sup>2</sup> Brandis, in the tract on the Rhet. in Schneidewin’s *Philologus*, iv i. p. 46, following apparently the opinion of Muretus and Vater, calls the passage a *verderbte Stelle*, for which I can see no foundation whatsoever. The sense and connexion are perfectly intelligible, the imperf. προσῆκε has been explained, and ἀγαθῶς defended by the use of it in the Topics. Bekker, Ed. III., retains the v. l. The version of the *Anonymus* (apud Brandis) ζηλοῦσι γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ ἴεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔχειν τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἃ προσῆκει ἔχειν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, seems to me to be sufficiently close to the *received text* to be intended for a paraphrase of *it*, and not (as Brandis thinks) to suggest a different reading.

εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ προσήκε τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἔχουσι<sup>1</sup>, ζηλοῦσι τὰ  
 (2) τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν. καὶ οὐς οἱ ἄλλοι ἀξιοῦσιν.  
 3 καὶ ὧν πρόγονοι ἢ συγγενεῖς ἢ οἰκεῖοι ἢ τὸ ἔθνος ἢ ἡ  
 πόλις ἔντιμοι, ζηλωτικοὶ περὶ ταῦτα· οἰκεῖα γὰρ  
 4 οἶονται αὐτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄξιοι τούτων. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ  
 ζηλωτὰ τὰ ἔντιμα ἀγαθὰ, ἀνάγκη τὰς τε ἀρετὰς  
 εἶναι τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὠφέλιμα καὶ εὐερ-  
 γητικά· τιμῶσι γὰρ τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας καὶ τοὺς  
 ἀγαθοὺς. καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλησίον  
 5 ἐστίν, οἷον πλοῦτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ὑγιείας. φα-  
 νερόν δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες· οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ

<sup>1</sup> Coniectit Vahlen. ὅτι προσήκε τοῖς ἀγαθῶς ἔχουσι, MSS.

thinks worthy of them'. They are stimulated to exertion by the praises, and exhortations, and encouragement of their friends.

§ 3. 'Any distinction acquired or enjoyed by one's ancestors, or kinsmen, or intimate friends, or race, or nation' (the *city* in Greece is represented by the *nation* in modern language), 'has a tendency to excite emulation in those same things (in which the distinction has previously manifested itself); the reason being, that in these cases people think that (these distinctions) are their own (properly belonging, appropriate, to them), and that they deserve them'. Supply, καὶ (οἶονται αὐτοὶ εἶναι) ἄξιοι τούτων. On πρόγονοι, Victorius aptly quotes Cicero, de Off. I 35, *quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere*; et seq.

§ 4. 'And if all good things that are held in honour are objects of emulation (i. e. of emulous exertion, what we vie with others in trying to acquire), all the virtuous must needs be of this same kind (ἐντίμους), and everything that is profitable and productive of benefit to the rest of the world, because all benefactors and good men in general are held in honour. And especially those good things of which the enjoyment' (particularly *sensual* enjoyment: see the account of the three kinds of lives, the ἀπολαυστικός, πρακτικός, and θεωρητικός, Eth. Nic. I 3: compare III 13, 1118 a 31, τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις, VII 6, 1148 a 5, σωματικαὶ ἀπολαύσεις) 'can be shared by one's neighbours, wealth for instance, and personal beauty, more than health'. The enjoyment of beauty may no doubt be 'shared by one's neighbours', because the sight of it is always agreeable; but how it, or health, can be called 'an object of emulation', I own I am at a loss to see. No help is given by the Commentators. Did Aristotle, absorbed in his distinction, forget for a moment that the instances selected were inappropriate to the topic he was employed in illustrating?

§ 5. 'It is plain too who the *persons* are, that are the objects of emulation: they are, namely, those who possess these and similar

τοιαῦτα κεκτημένοι ζηλωτοί. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὰ εἰρημένα, οἷον ἀνδρία σοφία ἀρχή· οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες πολλοὺς δύνανται εὖ ποιεῖν, στρατηγοί, ῥήτορες, πάν-  
 6 τες οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμενοι. καὶ οἷς πολλοὶ ὁμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι, ἢ πολλοὶ γνώριμοι, ἢ φίλοι πολλοί. ἢ οὓς πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἢ οὓς αὐτοὶ θαυμάζουσιν.  
 7 καὶ ὧν ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια λέγονται ἢ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν ἢ λογογράφων. καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐναν-

advantages. These are those already mentioned, such as courage, wisdom, power: the last class, men in power, are objects of emulation in virtue of their frequent opportunities of doing service, conferring benefits; examples are generals, orators, and all that have the like power or influence'. The power that orators have of doing service is exemplified in Crassus' eulogium on Rhetoric, Cic. de Orat. I 8. 32, (referred to by Victorius): *Quid tam porro regium, tam liberale, tam munificum, quam opem ferre supplicibus, excitare afflictos, dare salutem, liberare periculis, retinere homines in civitate?*

§ 6. 'And again, those whom many desire to resemble, or to be acquainted with, or their friends'. These, according to Victorius, are three classes of possessors of an ἀγαθὸν ἐντιμον which makes them objects of emulation. 'Or those who are admired by many, or by ourselves'.

§ 7. 'And those whose praises and panegyrics are pronounced either by poets or speech-writers' (i.e. especially, writers of panegyric speeches). On the distinction of ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον see Introd., Appendix B, to Bk. I. c. 9, p. 212 seq.

λογογράφοι. This word is used in two distinct senses. In its earlier signification it is applied to the *Chroniclars*, the earliest historians and prose writers, predecessors and contemporaries of Herodotus; of whom an account may be found in Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. XVIII, and Mure, *Hist. of Gr. Lit.* Bk. IV. ch. 2, 3, Vol. IV, and Dahlmann, *Life of Herodotus*, Ch. VI. sect. 2, and foll. In this sense it occurs in Thuc. I 21, upon which Poppo has this note: "Aut solutae orationis scriptores universi, aut historici vel etiam μυθογράφοι" (this early history was often of a mythical and legendary character), "denique orationum panegyricarum auctores hoc ambiguo vocabulo significantur." (The later, and most usual, meaning of the word is here omitted.) As this was for some time the only prose literature in existence, the λογογράφοι might well be contrasted with the poets, so as to signify 'prose writers' in general. And this, according to Ernesti, *Lex. Technologiae Graecae* s.v., is the sense that it bears here, *Dichter und prosaische Schriftsteller*. Isocrates also, Phil. § 109, has the same contrast, οὔτε τῶν ποιητῶν οὔτε τῶν λογοποιῶν.

The later and commoner signification, which appears so frequently in the Orators (see examples in Shilleto's note on Dem. de F. L. § 274), dates from the time of Antiphon, who commenced the practice, which



became common, and was pursued for instance by Isocrates and Demosthenes, of *writing speeches*, for which he received remuneration, for the use of parties in the law-courts. Public feeling at Athens was very much against this supposed prostitution of a man's talents and special knowledge (which may be compared with Plato's horror, expressed in the Phaedrus, of making a trade of teaching), and *λογογράφος* became a term of reproach. Perhaps the earliest example of this application is the passage of the Phaedrus, 257 C, where Lysias is said to have been taunted with it by a political opponent, διὰ πάσης τῆς λοιδορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφον. Aeschines applied it very freely to his rival Demosthenes. On this import of the word Gaisford (ad hunc locum) quotes Schol. Plat. p. 63, λογογράφους ἐκάλουν οἱ παλαιοὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ μισθῷ λόγους γράφοντας, καὶ πιπράσκοντας αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαστήρια· ῥήτορας δὲ τοὺς δι' ἐαυτῶν λέγοντας.

But besides this special sense, *λογογραφία* and *λογογράφος* are said of speech-writing and speech-writers in general (so Pl. Phaedr. 257 E, 258 B), and especially of panegyric speeches, like those of Isocrates, and of speeches written to be read in the closet, and not orally delivered in the law-court or public assembly: and as this is the most appropriate to the present passage of Aristotle, who is speaking of *eulogies* in poetry and prose; and is likewise the sense in which it is used in two other passages of the Rhetoric, III 7.7, 12.2, I have little doubt that it is to be so understood here. Hermogenes περὶ ἰδεῶν, β, chap. 10, περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου, *Rhetores Graeci*, Vol. II. p. 405, 6, and again chap. 12, περὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς πανηγυρικοῦ, ib. p. 417, in treating of the πανηγυρικὸς λόγος, the name by which he designates Aristotle's ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος, seems to divide all literature into three branches, poetry, spoken and written speeches; distinguishing ῥήτορας and λογογράφοι, and both of them from ποιηταί; ἄριστος οὖν κατὰ πάντων λόγων εἶδη καὶ ποιητῶν ἀπάντων καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ λογογράφων Ὀμηρος (p. 406, 9, and elsewhere). And (in the second passage above referred to) he includes *ιστορία* under the general head of *λογογραφία*, οὐδὲ μὲν ἡ λογογραφία ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἱστορία, p. 417, and still more expressly *ιστορίας τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης λογογραφίας*, p. 418. Rhetoric, when treated as the art of *composition*, *λέξις*, may no doubt be considered to embrace all *prose literature*, which will so fall into two divisions (1) public and forensic speeches, orally delivered, and (2) all written compositions. ["The relation between ancient oratory and ancient prose, philosophical, historical or literary, is necessarily of the closest kind." Jebb's *Attic Orators* I. p. lxxi.] In Rhet. III 12.2, the written style, *λέξις γραφικὴ*, is opposed to the ἀγωνιστικὴ, which has to be employed in actual encounter, spoken and acted, not (necessarily) written; and the συμβουλευτικὴ and δικανικὴ to the ἐπιδεικτικὴ. The art of composition therefore, and prose composition in general, may properly be referred to this third branch of Rhetoric, the declamatory or panegyric, as Hermogenes expressly, and Aristotle tacitly, do refer it: and so *λογογράφος* may mean either a *speech-writer* (as opposed to ῥήτωρ), or a writer of *prose* (as opposed to poetry).

'The opposites of all these (the foregoing classes of persons) are objects of contempt: for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the notion of the one to the notion of the other' (the substantive in -ας denotes the *process*, or operation of the feeling; the infin. with τό the *abstract conception* of it). 'And those who are so constituted as to emulate others,

τίον γὰρ ζήλω καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὥστε ζηλωσαί τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι, καταφρονητικούς εἶναι p. 79. τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν. διὸ πολλάκις καταφρονοῦσι τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχη αὐτοῖς ἡ τύχη.

δι' ὧν μὲν οὖν τὰ πάθη ἐγγίγνεται καὶ διαλύεται,  
I ἐξ ὧν αἱ πίστεις γίγνονται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴρηται. τὰ CHAP. XII.

or *themselves* to be the objects of emulation, must necessarily be inclined to feel contempt for all such persons—and on such occasions (an unnecessary parenthetical *note*, which interrupts the construction)—as lie under the defects and disadvantages opposite to the good things which are the objects of emulation. Hence contempt is often felt for the fortunate, when their luck comes to them without those good things which are really valuable (i. e. which depend in some degree upon merit for their acquisition)'.  
 'Here ends the account of the means (*lit.* channels, *media*) by which the several emotions are engendered and dissolved, (furnishing topics or premisses) from which the arguments (modes of persuasion) that belong to them may be derived'.

διαλύεται] is here applied to the dissolution, breaking up, and so bringing to an end, of the *πάθη* themselves. In a former passage on a similar subject, c. 4 § 32, it seems rather to have its logical sense of breaking up, or refuting an argument.  
 εἴρηται] it has been stated, and is now over [Vol. I. p. 225, note].

#### CHAP. XII.

We now enter upon the consideration of the second kind of *ῥῆθ*, which may be employed as a subsidiary proof or instrument of persuasion, to assist the cogency of the logical arguments. This occupies the six following chapters from 12 to 17; in which the salient features or characteristics of the three ages, youth, old age, and manhood or the prime of life; and of the three social conditions of noble birth or family, wealth, and power, are set forth in detail. The import of these chapters, and their connexion with the main subject of the entire work, which explains and justifies their position here, has been already treated in the Introduction, pp. 110—112, to which the reader is referred. The study of these 'characters' will enable the speaker to accommodate his language and arguments to their several tastes and dispositions.

The four stages of human life, as described by Horace, *Epist. ad Pis.* 156 seq., have much more in common with Shakespeare's 'seven ages', (*As you like it*, Act II. sc. 7 [lines 143—166],) than with Aristotle's analysis. Horace writes with a view to the use of the *poet*, and describes them as they should appear in the drama or the Epic poem: his cha-

racters are the *dramatic characters*: Aristotle writing for the rhetorician applies his analysis to the purposes of *argument*; reserving the dramatic expression of character for the third book, where it naturally falls under the treatment of style and expression. Horace's object appears in the lines, *Ne forte seniles mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles, semper in adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis* [176].

Bacon's *Essay*, Of Youth and Age [XLII], is too well known to need more than a mere reference. Two such observers as Aristotle and Bacon must of course agree in the general outline of the two contrasted characters; but Bacon's is a brief sketch, presenting the leading features of both more particularly as they exhibit themselves in the conduct and management of business, and in public life: Aristotle fills in the details of the picture in a much more complete and comprehensive analysis.

Plutarch, in the treatise *de virtute morali*, c. XI, discussing the moral constitution of the human subject, illustrates his material theory of the origin of the *πάθη* by reference to the characters of the young and old, which he thus describes; διὸ νέοι μὲν καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ἱταμοὶ (headlong, hasty, precipitate,) περὶ τε τὰς ὀρέξεις διάπυροι καὶ οἰστροῦδεις αἵματος πλήθεις καὶ θερμότητι τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἥπαρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ κατασβέννυται, καὶ γίνεται μικρὰ καὶ ἀσθενής· ἰσχύει δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῷ σώματι συναπομαραινόμενον. Compare with this Rhet. II 12. 8, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνώμενοι, οὕτω διάθερμοι εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως: and 13. 7, οἱ πρεσβύτεροι ἐναντίως διακίεονται τοῖς νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γὰρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί. ὥστε προωδοποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος κατὰ ψυχῆς τίς ἐστι. The curious correspondence of the metaphors in the two authors' description of the hot impetuosity of the one and the cold phlegmatic temper of the other, is accounted for by similarity of theory as to the origin of the *πάθη*. With both the explanation is physiological, and in the spirit of modern inquiries in the same department. Aristotle's views may be gathered from the *de Anima* I 1, 403 a 3, seq. He there describes them as inseparable from the body and its matter and functions; with the possible exception of τὸ νοεῖν 'thought and intelligence', which is there included with the *πάθη* as a property of 'life'; and they are ranked with sensation in general: φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων—the independent existence of the intellect, or part of it, being left an open question—οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρύνειν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. See further, *ib.* line 16: and *ib.* line 31, a 'physical' definition of anger (which he seems to accept as correct as far as it goes) is given, ζέσις τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμῶς: this is the definition of the ὕλη of the *πάθος*. *Eth.* N. IV 15, 1128 b 14, σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεται πως εἶναι ἀμφοτέρω (αἰδῶ καὶ νέμεσιν) ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι. Near the end of the 12th chapter Plutarch further assigns as the *πάθη* τῶν νέων, αἰσχύνη (comp. *Eth.* N. IV 15, 1128 b 16 seq.), ἐπιθυμία (Aristotle, ἐπιθυμητικοί, c. 12. 3), μετάνοια (*Ar.* εὐμετάβουλοι, c. 12. 4), ἡδονή, λύπη (meaning of course that they are excessively susceptible of these two feelings), φιλοτιμία. (*Ar.* *ib.* § 6.)

Against Spengel's view of these *ἡθη*—viz. that they are the analysis of the *ἦθος* proper, ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, taken by Aristotle out of the order of treatment, which he had originally laid down for the three great divi-

δὲ ἦθη ποῖοί τινες κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἔξεις καὶ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τὰς τύχας, διέλθωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα.

sions of rhetorical proof, *πίστεις*, *ἦθος*, *πάθος*; and placed after, instead of before, the *πάθη*—I will here add to what I have already said in the Introd. p. 112 (and p. 110 on the real difference between the two kinds of *ἦθος* described in II 1 and here), that, whereas in II 1 reference is made for details to the analysis of the virtues in I 9, the *political* characters of I 8, and the characters of the three ages and conditions of life, are not noticed at all; and for the best of reasons; because they in fact belong to a different class of *ἦθος*; the object of the first, *ἦθος* proper, being to impress the audience favourably as to your own character and good intentions; that of the second to adapt your tone, sentiments and language, to the tastes and feelings of certain special classes whom you may have to address; you study their ‘characters’ for the purpose of introducing into your speech what you know will be acceptable to each of them. And precisely the same thing may be said of the *political* characters.

§ 1. ‘The varieties of men’s characters in respect of their instinctive feelings and developed states and of their several ages and fortunes (conditions of life), let us next proceed to describe’. § 2. ‘By feelings or emotions I mean anger, desire, and such like of which we have spoken before (II 2—11), and by settled states, virtues and vices: these too have been discussed before, as well as the objects of individual choice, and of individual action (what sort of things they are inclined to do, or capable of doing, *πρακτικοί*)’. The second reference is to I 9, and probably also to I 5 and 6, on good absolute and comparative, as the object of human aspiration.

On *πάθη*, *δυνάμεις*, *ἔξεις*, see Eth. Nic. II 4; and on the import of *ἦθος* and its relation to *ἔθος*, Introd. p. 228, Appendix C, to Bk. I. c. 10.

Vater raises a difficulty about the connexion of the above passage with the concluding sentence of the last chapter, which he says he cannot understand. “How could Aristotle after stating that he had concluded the description of the *πάθη* immediately add, as though nothing had been said about them; *nunc autem qui mores aut animorum motus —explicemus*”? My answer is that he does *not* say so: the two sentences have reference to two totally different things: at the end of c. 11, he tells us that he has now finished the analysis of the *πάθη*, and shews by the analysis how they can be applied to the purposes of the rhetorician, how to excite and allay them. What he says at the opening of c. 12, is that he is now going to treat of the application of these *πάθη* and the *ἔξεις* which grow out of them to the characters of certain ages and conditions of life. The Latin words quoted are a mere mistranslation: the *κατά* is overlooked, and the sentence rendered as if it were *τὰ δὲ ἦθη καὶ τὰ πάθη ... διέλθωμεν*. Vater accordingly on this ground, and also on that of the passage of Quintilian (immediately to be noticed), supposes that something is lost here.

The passage of Quintilian, v 10. 17, presents a *real* difficulty. In referring to Aristotle *in secundo de Arte Rhetorica libro*—which can only

2 λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ὀργὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον, ἔξεις δὲ ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας· εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων πρότερον, καὶ ποῖα προαιροῦνται ἕκαστοι, καὶ ποίων πρακτικοί. ἡλικίαι δ' εἰσὶ νεότης καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ γῆρας. τύχην δὲ λέγω P. 1389. εὐγένειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τάναντία τούτοις καὶ ὅλως εὐτυχίαν καὶ δυστυχίαν.

3 οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἥθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι ταῖς περὶ τὰ  
4 ἀφροδίσια, καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης. εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ

mean this place—he adds to what we actually find in Aristotle several other ‘characters’ of which no trace is now to be found in his text, “*ut divitias quid sequatur, aut ambitum, aut superstitionem; quid boni probent, quid mali petant, quid milites, quid rustici; quo quaeque modo res vitari vel appeti soleat.*” Both Victorius (Comm. ad II 17. 6, p. 358, ed. 1548), and Spalding (ad loc. Quint.), attribute the discrepancy to a lapse of memory on Quintilian’s part, who was here quoting without book. The former, in a sarcastic note, thinks that it is much more probable to suppose that Quintilian, without referring to the text of his author, added *de suo* what he thought *ought* to be there, than that anything has been lost in a book which presents no trace of any hiatus. To which Spalding adds, “non uno quidem loco vidimus videbimusque Quintilianum memoriae vitio e libris afferentem, quae in iis non plane eadem legerentur. Cf. IV 2. 132.” In this explanation I think we must acquiesce. Spengel also, in his tract *über die Rhet. des Ar.* (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851) p. 43, attributes this want of coincidence to a ‘mistake’ of Quintilian.

§ 2. ἡλικίαι, κ.τ.λ.] ‘The *ages* are youth, prime of life (manhood), and old age. By “fortune” I mean, birth, and wealth, and power of various kinds (*plural*), and their opposites, and in general good and bad fortune’.

§ 3. ‘Now the youthful in character are prone to desire, and inclined to do (to carry out, put in practice or execution) anything they may have set their hearts upon. And of the bodily appetites lust is that which they are most disposed to follow (to give way to, or obey), and in this (sc. τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, this particular appetite) they are incontinent’. If ταῖς is right (some MSS have τῆς), ταύτης is a piece of careless grammar, denoting lust as a single appetite, of which the plural preceding represents the varieties, or moments. Comp. Eth. Nic. I 1, 1095 a 5, seq. εἰ δὲ (ὁ νέος) τοῖς πάθειν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν—it will be in vain and unprofitable for him to study moral philosophy, which is a *practical* science, whereas he has as yet no sufficient control over his own actions—οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἑλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ἔχειν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα.

ἀψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὁξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι

§ 4. 'Changeable too and fickle are they in respect of their desires and appetites, and these are violent but soon subside: for their wishes and volitions (βούλησις includes both) are sharp (keen, eager) and not strong or enduring (*non firma, non perdurantia*, Victorius), like the hunger and thirst of the sick' (the plural of the abstract nouns, here, as usual, the various or successive moments, accesses of the two appetites). Comp. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 16, οὐ πάση δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ· οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι. Horace, A. P. 160, (puer) *mutatur in horas* (εὐμετάβολος); 165, *et amata relinquere pernix* (ἀψίκορος); 163, *cereus in vitium flecti*.

ἀψίκορος. As this word is not explained nor sufficiently illustrated in the Lexicons, it will be well to supply the deficiency by a few examples. This appears to be its earliest appearance in the extant Greek literature. It does not become at all common till Plutarch's time. Hesychius and Suidas supply the derivation. ἀψίκορον· ἀπλησμον. ἡ ἄμα τῷ ᾄψασθαι κορεννύμενον ταχέως. ἀψίκορος· καυματινός (καματηρός, Salmasius), ταχέως ὀλιγωρῶν, καὶ κόρον λαμβάνων. ἀψικίρως· εὐμεταβλήτως (Hesychius s. v.). ἀψίκορος· εὐμετάβλητος· ἡ ὁ ταχέως καὶ ἄμα τῷ ᾄψασθαι κορεννύμενος. "διὰ τε τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν Νομάδων ἀψικορίαν" (fickleness) κ.τ.λ. (Polyb. XIV 1, 4; the quotation in Suidas is inexact), καὶ αὖθις (M. Anton. I 16, Bekker ad loc.) "συντηρητικὸν δεῖ εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους καὶ μηδαμοῦ ἀψίκορον" (Suidas, s. v.). Thus the primary meaning of the word is, *one that is satiated by a mere touch*, ἄψει κεκορεσμένος, κορεσθεῖς, easily satisfied with anything, soon tired of it; fickle, changeable, fastidious; *fastidiosus, ad mutationem proclivis* (Asi's *Lex. Plat.* s. v.); "quem cito omnis rei fastidium capit, ac simul atque attigit satius illa expletusque est" (Victorius ad hunc locum). It is found in the Pseudo-Plat. Axiochus, 369 A, as an epithet of the δῆμος. Once in Lucian, Calumniae non temere credendum, c. 21, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ φιλόκαινον, ὃ φύσει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ ἀψίκορον. Once in Polybius, the passage quoted by Suidas. More frequently in Plutarch, περὶ παιδων ἀγωγῆς, c. 9, p. 7 B, τὸν μονόκωλον λόγον...πρὸς τὴν ἀσκησιν ἀψίκορον (tiresome, speedily producing weariness or disgust) καὶ πάντῃ ἀνεπίμονον. Id. πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκοῦειν c. 4, p. 20 B, it is coupled in the same sense with ἐφήμερον and ἀβέβαιον, with which it is almost synonymous. Id. περὶ πολυφιλίας, c. 2, p. 93 D, διὰ τὸ φιλόκαινον καὶ ἀψίκορον (*praesentium fastidio*, Lat. Transl. ap. Wyttenbach). περὶ ἀδολεσχίας, c. 5, p. 504 D, μόνος Ὁμηρος τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀψικορίας περιγέγονεν. Ἐρωτικός, c. 5, 752 B, Ἔρως χωρὶς Ἀφροδίτης...καὶ πλήσιμον καὶ ἀψίκορον. Ib. c. 16, 759 F, Ὅτι οὐδὲ ζῆν ἔστιν ἡδέως κατ' Ἐπίκουρον, c. 3, p. 1088 B, τὸ σῶμα...ἐν ταύταις (ταῖς ἡδοναῖς) ἀσθενές τι καὶ ἀψίκορον (*satiatati, fastidio obnoxium*).

σφόδρα ἐπιθυμοῦσιν] Victorius refers in illustration to Caesar's saying of Brutus, *quidquid vult valde vult* [Cicero, ad Att. XIV 1. 2]; which Plutarch renders, πᾶν δ' ὁ βούλεται σφόδρα βούλεται [Brutus, c. 6].

5 καὶ πείναι. καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἷοι ἀκο-  
λουθεῖν τῇ ὀρμῇ. καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ. διὰ  
γὰρ φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ'  
6 ἀγανακτοῦσιν ἂν οἶωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ φιλότιμοι  
μὲν εἰσι, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι· ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ  
ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχὴ τις. καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα  
μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι· φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα  
διὰ τὸ μήπω ἐνδείας πεπειραῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ Πιτ-  
7 τακοῦ ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραον. καὶ οὐ κακο-  
ήθεις ἀλλ' εὐήθεις διὰ τὸ μήπω τεθεωρηκέναι πολλὰς

§ 5. 'And passionate and quick-tempered (hasty), and apt to give way to their impulses. And under the dominion of (slaves to) their passion' (θυμός, here the angry passions: on the more technical sense of θυμός, as one of the three divisions of the ὀρέξεις in a psychological classification, see in note on II 2. 1); 'for by reason of their love of honour they cannot brook (put up with) a slight, but always resent any thing which they suppose to be a wrong'. Hor. A. P. 159, *puer...iram colligit ac ponit temere et mutatur in horas*.

§ 6. 'And fond as they are of honour, they are still fonder of victory: for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority'. The φιλοτιμία of youth seems to be represented in Horace's *cupidus*, A. P. 165, 'desirous', that is, of honour and glory; not, of course of money, covetous or avaricious. Comp. II 2. 6; and I 11. 14, 15, on the pleasures of victory in competitions of all kinds, founded on the natural desire of superiority which is an instinct of humanity. Victorius quotes Cic. de Fin. v 22. 61, (de pueris) *Quanta studia decertantium sunt: quanta ipsa certamina: ut illi efferuntur laetitia cum vicerint, ut pudet victos:...quos illi labores non perferunt ut aequalium principes sint*. 'And both of these they are fonder of than of money: in fact for money they have no fondness at all (*lit.* in the very least degree), owing to their never yet having had experience of want; to which Pittacus' pithy saying (or ἀπόφθεγμα II 21. 8) of Amphiaraus is in point'. Until we know what the saying was—*dictum hoc Pittaci intercidit*, says Buhle—we cannot decide whether εἰς is to be interpreted 'against' Amphiaraus or merely applied or addressed 'to' him; [perhaps simply 'on'; with ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραον, compare in this sense Pindar, Ol. VI. 13, αἶνος, ὃν Ἀδραστος εἰς Ἀμφιάρον φθέγγετο.]

§ 7. 'And not ill-natured but good-natured, because they have as yet had but few opportunities of observing the (prevalent) wickedness (of society)'. πονηρίας, plural, the acts or cases of villainy which meet us so frequently in the experience of life.

The meaning of εὐήθεις here may be determined by its opposite κακοήθεις, which is thus defined in c. 13. 3; κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. It therefore denotes the simple, innocent, artless, candid turn of mind which 'thinketh no evil', and puts a favourable interpretation upon any doubtful act or expression. This is of course the primary

πονηρίας. καὶ εὐπίστοι διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἐξηπα-  
 8 τῆσθαι. καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὕτω  
 διάθερμοί εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως· ἅμα δὲ καὶ  
 and proper sense of the word, and so it is employed by Thucyd. III 83,  
 καὶ τὸ εὐθές, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλείστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη, 'simp-  
 plicity, the chiefest ingredient of a noble temper, was laughed to scorn  
 and disappeared'; namely, in that degeneration of character, and conse-  
 quent perversion of language, which are ascribed by the author to the  
 factious quarrels then prevailing in Greece.

In Herod. III 140, there is a doubtful instance, δι' εὐθίην, which  
 Schweighäuser explains by *animi bonitas*, though the more unfavourable  
 signification is equally probable. And in Demosth. c. Timocr. 717. 2, τῆς  
 ὑμετέρας εὐθείας certainly bears the same sense as Aristotle gives to the  
 word here. But in its ordinary application—even in Herodotus and the  
 tragedians; in Plato, with whom it is very frequent, almost invariably—  
 'simplicity' has degenerated into silliness or absurdity, by that process  
 of deterioration, common in language, which Trench, *Study of Words*,  
 Lect. II. 'On the morality in words', has abundantly illustrated. He  
 refers to εὐθής without naming it, p. 46. *Bonhomie* and *Einfalt* have  
 precisely the same double sense. [Cf. Vol. I. p. 175.]

I must however add that it is equally possible that Ar. may have  
 meant here that youth are 'simple-minded', i. e. prone to a simple and  
 literal interpretation of everything *as they see it*, without penetrating  
 beneath the surface, 'inclined to think well of everything'—and so  
 Victorius, *ingenii simplicis et fatui, bene de omnibus existimantes*—  
 especially as Ar. himself has twice used the word in the disparaging  
 sense, III 1. 9; 12. 2. Comp. Plat. Rep. III 409 A (quoted by Victorius),  
 διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐθεις νέοι ὄντες οἱ ἐπικεικίς φαίνονται, καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοι ὑπὸ τῶν  
 ἀδίκων, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παραδείγματα ὁμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς.  
 [Martial, XII. 51, *Tam saepe nostrum decipi Fabullinum Miraris, Aule?*  
*Semper homo bonus tiro est.*]

καὶ εὐπίστοι, κ.τ.λ.] 'And credulous (easy of persuasion), owing to their  
 having been hitherto seldom exposed to deceit'.

§ 8. 'And sanguine; for youths, like men when in a state of drunk-  
 enness, are pervaded by a heat due to their nature (i. e. their physical  
 structure); and also at the same time because they have not as yet had  
 much experience of failure'. The first is the physical, the second the  
 intellectual or logical, explanation of the phenomenon.

οἰνώμενοι] This is one of the verbs beginning with οἰ which "seldom  
 or never receive the augment", as οἰστρᾶν p. p. οἰστρομένος, "compounds  
 of οἶαξ and οἰνώς, οἶχωκα Aesch. Pers. 13, Soph. Aj. 896." Matth. *Gr. Gr.*  
 § 168 obs. "This seems," he adds, "to have originated from the old  
 orthography, in which ω was as yet unknown." οἰμαγμένον, Eur. Bacch.  
 1284. Similarly, εὐ for ην, in εὐρεῖν, εὐρηκέναι, καθεῦθε, εὐλόγησα. See  
 Ellendt's *Lex. Soph.* s. v. οἰνώ, Elmsley ad Bacch. 686, who (following  
 Porson) writes ὠνωμένος, though the manuscript authority is against him.  
 See his note ad loc., and on εὐρεῖν see Lobeck ad Phrynichum, p. 140.  
 οἰνώμενος occurs no less than five times in Eth. N. VII, from c. 5 to 15.

With διάθερμος, as a *compound*, 'hot or heated all through', pervaded,



διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναι. καὶ ζῶσι τὰ  
πλείστα ἐλπίδι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλοντός p. 80.  
ἐστίν ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παροισχομένου, τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ  
μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς βραχύ· τῇ γὰρ  
πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μεμνησθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἶόν τε, ἐλπίζειν

saturated, with heat, compare διάλευκος Ar. Probl. xxiii 6. 2, διάλεπτος Arist. Nub. 160, Hermann (διὰ λεπτοῦ, Dindorf and Meineke), διαμελαίνειν Plut., διαμυδαλέος Aesch. Pers. 538, Porson, διάξηρος, διαπρύσιος, διάπυρος Plutarch, *de virtute morali*, xi (p. 403) [quoted *supra* on p. 139], Xenoph., Eurip., &c.

With the *statement* comp. Plutarch (already referred to), and the rest of the preliminary note on c. xii. The heat in youth is supposed to be caused by the boiling of the blood, this being the physical origin of the πάθη, (as anger, de Anima i 1, 403 a 31, already cited,) which are specially characteristic of the young, see note *supra* § 3. The young are again compared to drunken men, Eth. Nic. vii 15, 1154 b 10, ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνώμενοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης. The physical explanation of both these comparisons is given in Probl. xxx 1. 27, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὸ περὶ τὸν τόπον ᾧ φρουνοῦμεν καὶ ἐλπίζομεν ποιεῖ εὐθύμους· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθύμως, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς εὐέλπιδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας (cited by Zell): which not only serves as a commentary on the present passage, but also proves that Zell's, and not Fritzsche's (ad Eth. Eudem. Z 15, 1154 b 9—11), interpretation of the second is the true one. "Inde igitur iuventutis et ebrietatis affinitas, quia utraque corpori calorem impertit." (Fritzsche in alia omnia abijt: q. v. si tanti est.) That διάθερμι here and θερμοί c. 13. 7, are to be interpreted literally as well as metaphorically will further appear by a comparison of the passage referred to in the note on ii 13. 7 [p. 154].

'And their lives are passed chiefly in hope ("eam sibi propositam habent in vita ac sequuntur ut omnium suarum actionum ducem." Victorius); for hope is of the future, but memory of the past, whilst to youth the future is long but the past short; for in their earliest years' (so Victorius; comp. τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ, c. 13. 8) 'it is impossible for them to remember anything (i.e. they have nothing or hardly anything to remember), whilst everything is to be hoped for'. I have adopted (as also Spengel) Bekker's conjecture οἶόν τε for οἶονταί, which has little or no meaning. τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ may also very well be interpreted literally 'on the first day of their existence', the *extreme case* being taken for the purpose of illustration. With this interpretation οἶονταί may be retained; for it now will have the meaning, that on the very first day of their existence, even then, they *suppose*—they can't be sure—that they remember nothing, &c.

The phrase ζῶσιν ἐλπίδι, which recurs in § 12, τῷ ἡθεὶ ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ, and c. 13. 12, expresses the same thing, viz. 'living in the exercise or practice of', as ζῆν κατὰ πάθος and τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικοί,

δὲ πάντα. καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοί εἰσι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον·  
 9 ἐλπίζουσι γὰρ ῥαδίως. καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι· θυμῷδεις  
 γὰρ καὶ εὐέλπιδες, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ  
 θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται,  
 10 τὸ τε ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθὸν τι θαρραλέον ἐστίν. καὶ  
 αἰσχυνηλοί· οὐ γάρ πω καλὰ ἔτερα ὑπολαμβάνου-  
 11 σιν, ἀλλὰ πεπαίδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου μόνον. καὶ  
 μεγαλόψυχοι· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπεί-

Eth. Nic. I 1, 1095 a 5 and 9, comp. *infra* 13. 14, and ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκολουθη-  
 τικοί, *supra* § 3. It is otherwise rendered by *ζηῖν πρὸς τι*, c. 13. 9; 14. 2,  
 3, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες κ.τ.λ. Victorius quotes Probl. XXX (11), ὁ μὲν  
 οὖν ἄνθρωπος τῷ νῷ τὰ πλείστα ζῇ, τὰ δὲ θηρία ὀρέξει καὶ θυμῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ.

‘And easy to deceive for the reason already mentioned, that is, the  
 readiness with which their hopes are excited’.

§ 9. ‘And rather inclined to courage (ἀνδρειότεροι τοῦ εἰωθότος, or τῶν  
 ἄλλων); for they are passionate and sanguine, of which the one produces  
 the absence of (or freedom from) fear, the other *positive* confidence: be-  
 cause on the one hand fear and anger are incompatible (II 3. 10, ἀδύνατον  
 ἅμα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι, 5. 21, θαρραλέον γὰρ ἢ ὀργή), and on the other  
 hope is a sort of good thing that inspires confidence’.

§ 10. ‘And bashful, sensitive to shame; because they have not yet  
 acquired the notion of (ὑπολαμβάνειν) any other standard of honour and  
 right, but have been trained (schooled) by the conventional law alone’.  
 ὁ νόμος is here the law established by society, the conventional usages in  
 respect of honour and conduct, the traditions and customary observances  
 of good breeding, any violation of these calls a blush to the cheek of  
 youth. Old age, the opposite, has lost this quick sense of shame; διὰ  
 γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι τοῦ  
 δοκεῖν, c. 13. 10. πρεσβύτερον δ’ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός, Eth.  
 N. IV 15, 1128 b 20. Νόμος in this sense is opposed to φύσις, as in the  
 famous antithesis, the abuse of which is one of the principal sources of  
 paradox and sophistry (πλείστος τόπος τοῦ ποιεῖν παράδοξα λέγειν), τὸ κατὰ  
 φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν νόμον. ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κατὰ  
 νόμον τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦν. Topic. IX (de Soph. EL) 12, 173 a 7 seq.  
 In this more comprehensive application of the term, however, the posi-  
 tive laws, of human origin, enacted in the various states and cities, are  
 included amongst the ‘social conventions’. On the similar antithesis of  
 πρὸς δόξαν and πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, see note on II 4. 23, comp. c. 6. 23. In the  
 former case truth or reality is opposed to popular opinion and its results;  
 in the latter reality and right are represented as the ‘natural’ law or  
 order of things. In this passage the ἀλήθεια has a moral character; τὸ  
 καλόν, the ‘true’ is here the ‘right’ or ‘noble’, the ultimate end of the  
 moral action. On this sense of καλόν, see my *Review of Aristotle's System  
 of Ethics*, 1867, p. 14.

§ 11. ‘And high-minded (having lofty thoughts and aspirations) for

νωνται, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ  
 ἀξιοῦν αὐτὸν μεγάλων μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο δ' εὐέλ-  
 12 πιδος. καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν  
 συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἔθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λο-

two reasons: first, because they have not yet been humiliated by (the experience of) life—their thoughts and aspirations have not yet been checked and lowered by the experience which life gives of the impossibility of realising them—‘but are as yet without experience of the force of circumstances’ (τὰ ἀναγκάζοντα, things that constrain and compel us against our will, control our actions, and thereby check and prevent the carrying out of lofty designs, of high and generous purposes: ‘enforced actions’, says the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 § 10, τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, τὰ μὴ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὄντα πράττειν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης θείας ἢ ἀνθρωπίνης οὕτως ὄντα); ‘and secondly, because highmindedness is characterised by the consciousness of high desert (thinking oneself deserving of great rewards and successes), and this belongs to the *sanguine* temper’: and therefore may be inferred from § 8. The definition of μεγαλόψυχος, Eth. N. IV 7, sub init., is ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων ἄξιος ὢν. The two last words, essential to the definition (as may be seen from what immediately follows), are omitted in the Rhetoric as not required for the occasion. The consciousness of exalted merit, which *does* form a part of the definition, is sufficient here for the purpose aimed at, namely to connect highmindedness with the sanguine temperament, Hor. A. P. 165, *sublimis*, full of high thoughts and aspirations.

§ 12. ‘And in action they prefer honour to profit’—*utilium tardus provisor*, Hor. A. P. 164—‘for their conduct in life is rather due to the impulses of their character, than guided by reasoning and calculation; the latter being directed to profit, whereas honour and the right are the aim of virtue’. The intellect and its calculations are here distinctly excluded from any participation in virtue, which is assigned solely to the moral character; the impulses, *ὀρέξεις* and *πάθη*, duly cultivated and regulated, pass into virtues. This is in direct contradiction to the doctrines of the Ethics, which give to the two virtues of the intellect, *σοφία* and *φρόνησις*, ‘wisdom, speculative and practical’, even the pre-eminence over the moral virtues; identifying true happiness with the exercise of the former. But our author is here departing from his Eudaemonistic ethical system, which makes happiness (in a transcendental sense no doubt) the end of all human action; and substituting for it the more popular and higher view of the *τέλος*, which represents it as the abstract *good* and *noble*, or the *right*, τὸ καλόν; a standard and an end of action independent of all sordid and selfish motives or calculation, with which it is here brought into contrast. This view of the *τέλος* appears incidentally, as an excrescence upon the systems (to which it is opposed), in the Nic. Ethics, as III 7, sub init. Ib. c. 10, 1115 b 24, and especially IX 8, p. 1169 a 4, et seq. With what is said in our text, comp. Eth. N. IX 8, 1168 a 34, ὁ δ’ ἐπεικῆς (πράττει) διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσφ’ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν.

γισμῶ, ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἢ δὲ  
 13 ἀρετῇ τοῦ καλοῦ. καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλοίκειοι καὶ  
 φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν P. 1389 b.  
 τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν,  
 14 ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους. καὶ ἅπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον  
 καὶ σφοδρότερον ἀμαρτάνουσι παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον·

On λογισμός, the discursive, reasoning or calculating faculty or process, opposed to the νοῦς, and identical with διάνοια in its lower and limited sense, see Eth. Nic. VI 2, 1139 a 6 seq.; where the entire intellect is divided into two faculties, (1) the νοῦς, or pure reason, *ᾧ θεωροῦμεν*, the organ of speculation, and of *a priori* truth, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, and (2) the διάνοια (in its special sense) the *understanding*, the organ of reasoning, and of deliberation or calculation in practical matters, τὸ λογιστικόν.

The exact opposite of all this [§§ 8—12] appears in the character of old age, c. 13 §§ 5, 9, 10, 11, 14. Old men are δυσελπίδες, ἀναισχυντοί, μικρόψυχοι, ζῶσι πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον and κατὰ λογισμόν.

§ 13. 'And they are more fond of their friends and companions than the other ages (prime of life, and old age), owing to the pleasure they take in social intercourse ('their liking for company'), and to their not yet having learnt to measure everything by the standard of profit or self-interest, and therefore not their friends (either)'. Of the three kinds of friendship, Eth. N. VIII 2, 3, 4, founded severally upon (1) good (i.e. real, moral, good, the only basis of perfect friendship or love), (2) pleasure; and (3) profit or utility, that of young men belongs to the second. Of these it is said, c. 3, 1156 a 13, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι (by reason of their moral character) ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς.

§ 14. 'And all their errors are in the way of excess and undue vehemence, contrary to Chilon's maxim (μηδὲν ἄγαν, *ne quid nimis*); for everything that they do is in excess; for their love is in excess, and their hatred in excess, and everything else in the same way. And they think they know everything, and therefore are given to positive assertion, which (this confidence in their own knowledge and judgment) in fact accounts for their tendency to excess in everything'. μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώπων (Theognis, 401, Bergk). "Cum enim omnia sibi nota esse putent, nec se labi posse credant, nihil timide tractant," Victorius, who also quotes, in illustration of a 'positive assertion', Hist. Anim. VI (21. 3), ἐνιοὶ δὲ διισχυρίζονται δέκα μῆνας κύειν ἡμερολογδόν (to the very day—counting the days throughout the month till you come to the very end). The word occurs again in the same sense Ib. c. 37. 5, and indeed is common enough in other authors.

Of Chilon, to whom is ascribed the famous proverb which inculcates moderation in all things—the earliest hint of the doctrine of 'the mean'—an account may be found in Diog. Laert. I 3. 68, seq., and in Mure's *Hist. of Gk. Lit.*, Bk. III, c. 6 § 16, Vol. III, p. 392. He was a native of Lacedaemon, and his *floruit* is placed in 596 B.C. "Dubitatur quis sapientium

πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσί τε γὰρ ἄγαν  
καὶ μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὁμοίως. καὶ  
εἰδέναι πάντα οἴονται καὶ διυσχυρίζονται· τοῦτο γὰρ  
15 αἰτιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν. καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα  
ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν καὶ οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ  
διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστούς καὶ βελτίους ὑπολαμβάνειν·  
τῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀκακία τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ὥστ'  
16 ἀνάξια πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς. καὶ φιλο-

auctor esset sententiae, μηδὲν ἄγαν. Palladas in Anthol. II 48. 1, μηδὲν ἄγαν τῶν ἐπτά σοφῶν ὁ σοφώτατος εἶπεν. Alii tribuunt Chiloni, alii Sodamo, teste Scholiasta nostro, qui epigramma laudat quod in Tegea exstabat, ταῦτ' ἔλεγεν Σώδαμος Ἐπηράτου, ὃς μ' ἀνέθηκεν, μηδὲν ἄγαν, καιρῷ πάντα πρόσσεστι καλά." Monk, ad Eur. Hippol. 265. See also Valckenaer on the same passage. Diog. Laert., I 41, quotes the following epigram: ἦν Λακεδαιμόνιος Χεῖλων σοφός, ὃς τὰδ' ἔλεξε· μηδὲν ἄγαν· καιρῷ πάντα πρόσσεστι καλά. Chilon and Sodamus are alike omitted in Smith's *Dictionary of Biography*.

§ 15. 'The offences they commit incline to insolence or wanton outrage, not to mean or petty crimes and mischief'. Their crimes, when they commit them, are rather those of open violence, outrage of personal dignity, wanton aggression and the like, than of that mean and low form of wrong-doing manifesting itself in all underhand dealings, as fraud, cheating, calumny, and other similar offences, which work their mischief secretly and insidiously, as it were underground, or in the dark: the former being directed more especially against the person, ὕβρεως ἀτιμία, II 2. 6: the latter against a man's property, fortune, character. Compare II 2. 6, which gives the reason for this distinction, διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὕβρισταί· ὑπερέχουσιν γὰρ οἴονται (they think to shew their superiority) ὕβριζοντες. Of ὕbris, αἰκία is given as an instance II 16. 4, where this kind of offence is again attributed to the πλούσιοι: as it is also in Polit. VI (IV) II, 1295 b 9. Excess in personal beauty, or strength, or birth, or wealth, and their opposites, weakness and poverty and meanness of condition, give rise severally to two different orders of offences: γίνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὕβρισταί καὶ μεγαλοπύνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπύνηροι λιαν' τῶν δ' ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίνεται δι' ὕβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν. Compare Plat. Legg. V 728 E, ὥς δ' αὐτῶς ἢ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων κτήσις κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ῥυθμὸν ἔχει· τὰ μὲν ὑπέρογκα γὰρ ἐκάστων τούτων ἔχθρας καὶ στάσεις ἀπεργάζεται ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα δουλείας ὥς τὸ πολὺ.

'And disposed to compassion, because they suppose every one to be good (*absolutely*) or better (*comparatively*, than they really are; so Victorius); for they measure their neighbours by their own harmlessness (or freedom from malice and the love of mischief), and therefore assume that their sufferings are unmerited': which is the occasion of ἔλεος, II 8. 1.

§ 16. 'They are also fond of laughing (mirth, fun), and therefore disposed to pleasantry or facetiousness; for pleasantry is wantonness

γέλωτες, διὸ καὶ εὐτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πε-  
παιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν.

I τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἦθος, οἱ δὲ CHAP. XIII.  
πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναν-

schooled by good breeding'. From the description of εὐτραπελία given in Eth. Nic. II 7, 1108 a 23, and IV 14, ab init., it results that it is 'easy, well-bred (τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου, τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει) pleasantry in conversation, of which it is the 'agreeable mean', lying between βωμολοχία, 'buffoonery' the excess, and ἀγροικία, 'rusticity, boorishness', the inability to see or give or take a joke. It is a social virtue (one of three), and one of the accomplishments of a gentleman. It forms part of the relaxation of life, ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, which includes διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, all the lighter occupations of which amusement or relaxation is the object and accompaniment, opposed to the serious business of life, and corresponds exactly to the French *passe-temps*; (on διαγωγή, which may include even literary pursuits, or studies, anything in fact that is not *business*, compare σχολή, and is so in some sense opposed to παιδιά, which is therefore inserted here to qualify it, see Bonitz ad Metaph. A I, 981 b 18). 1128 a 10, οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποι (from their versatility). The two terms are exactly represented by Cicero's *facetis* and *facetiae*. Wit, *sales*, takes two forms, *dicacitas* and *facetiae*; the first, raillery, pungent and personal, σκῶμμα, σκώπτειν; the second, easy and agreeable, giving grace and liveliness to conversation or writing. *Utetur utroque; sed altero in narrando aliquid venuste, altero in iaciendo mittendoque ridiculo*, et seq., Orat. xxvi 87. Compare de Orat. II 54. 219, where the distinction is somewhat different, or at all events expressed by different terms. de Off. I 30. 104, *genus iocandi elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum*, et passim. Cowper's *John Gilpin* furnishes a good specimen of εὐτραπελία: *Now Gilpin had a pleasant wit, and loved a timely joke.*

'Such then is the character of the young'.

#### CHAP. XIII.

The character of age we have already seen, and shall further find, to be in almost all points the exact opposite of that of youth. Victorius thinks that the desire of bringing out this contrast was Aristotle's reason for departing from the natural order in his treatment of the three ages. The authors quoted at the commencement of the last chapter will again serve for illustrations of the topics of the present. Aristotle, as well as Horace, confines himself almost exclusively to the delineation of the unfavourable side of the character of old age, suppressing its redeeming features. Horace represents his opinion at the opening of his sketch (A. P. line 169), *Multa senem circumveniunt incommoda* which he proceeds to describe.

§ 1. 'Elderly men, and those who have passed their prime, have most of their characters (formed) of the elements opposite to these; for from their long experience of life, its frequent errors and failures

τίων τούτοις τὰ πλείστα ἔχουσιν ἥθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸ  
πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ πλείω ἐξηπατῆσθαι καὶ  
ἡμαρτηκέναι, καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα εἶναι τῶν πραγ-  
μάτων, οὔτε διαβεβαιοῦνται οὐδέν, ἥττον τε ἄγαν  
2 ἅπαντα ἢ δεῖ. καὶ οἴονται, ἴσασι δ' οὐδέν, καὶ ἀμ- p. 81.  
φισβητοῦντες προστιθέασιν αἰὲ τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα,  
3 καὶ πάντα λέγουσιν οὕτω, παγίως δ' οὐδέν. καὶ κα-  
κοήθεις εἰσίν· ἔστι γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον  
ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. ἔτι δὲ καχύποπτοί εἰσι διὰ  
4 τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἄπιστοι δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν. καὶ οὔτε

(from having lived many years and often been deceived or imposed upon by others, and fallen into error by their own fault), and from their observation of the inherent vice of all human things (everything turns out ill, nothing can be depended upon, and so they lose all confidence, and), they refrain from all positive assertion and are in excess in the undue remissness shewn in whatever they do'. Muretus, *et sunt in omnibus rebus remissiores*. As the young carry everything they do to excess, ἄγαν, so on the contrary the old are in excess too (ἄγαν...ἢ δεῖ) but this is manifested in *want* of spirit and energy and activity in all that they *do* undertake; supply πράττουσιν. It is doubtful whether ἄγαν should be taken before or after ἥττον. If ἥττον ἄγαν, as the order is in the text, it will be 'everything they do is "less in excess" (referring to the proverb, and the application of it to the young in the preceding chapter) than it ought to be'. If the order is ἄγαν ἥττον, the meaning is, 'everything they do is excessively too little (inferior in vigour and energy) to what it ought to be'.

§ 2. 'And they only say they *think*, never "I *know*". And when in doubt (or, when they are arguing or disputing a point), they always add "perhaps" and "possibly", constantly expressing themselves in this way (doubtfully), never with certainty' (or decidedly. πάγιος, fixed, firm, solid, and hence certain. παγίως λέγειν, *certo affirmare*, Plat. Rep. IV 434 D, παγίως νοῆσαι, Ib. V 479 C, Theaet. 157 A).

§ 3. 'And they are ill-natured, for ill-nature is the tendency to put an unfavourable construction upon everything' (to attribute, for example, every indifferent act to a bad motive, *in deterius, in peius, interpretari*. Comp. c. 12. 7, of youth). 'And prone to suspicion by reason of their incredulity, and incredulous from their experience'. καχύποπτος is otherwise written καχυπόπος in Plat. Phaedr. 240 E (Zurich Editors, and Thompson ad loc.), though in Rep. III 409 C, it appears as Aristotle writes it, and according to the Zurich Editors without *varia lectio*. ὑποτοπεῖν and -εἶσθαι occur in Herod., Thucyd., Aristoph. and Lysias.

§ 4. 'And for the same reason neither their love nor their hatred is ever deep, but according to the precept of Bias, their love is such as may hereafter become hatred, and their hatred love'. This famous and of-

φιλοῦσι σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ 5 μισοῦσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες. καὶ μικρόψυχοι διὰ τὸ

quoted saying of Bias of Priene, the last of the seven sages (585—540 B.C.)—on whom see Diog. Laert. I 5, 82 seq. and Mure, *Gk. Lit.* III 393,—is again referred to, without the author's name, II 21. 13. I will give two or three of the most important references. Soph. Aj. 678 (Lobeck's Ed.), a well-known passage of six lines, concluding with the *reason* or explanation of the precept, τοῖς πολλοῖσι γὰρ βροτῶν ἁπιστός ἐσθ' ἑταίρειας λιμὴν. Comp. Lobeck ad loc., and to the same effect Oed. Col. 614, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἤδη, τοῖς δ' ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ, τὰ τερπνὰ πικρὰ γίγνεται καθύς φίλα. Diogenes, u. s., § 87 (in the same chapter several more of his apophthegms are quoted), ἔλεγέ τε τὸν βιόν' οὕτω μετρεῖν ὡς καὶ πολὺν καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιωσομένους, καὶ φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας· τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους εἶναι κακοὺς, and again § 88, ἀπεφθέγγετο· οἱ πλείστοι κακοί, which gives *his* reason for the rule. A similar sentiment is found in Eurip. Hippol. 253, χρὴν γὰρ μετρίως εἰς ἀλλήλους φιλίας θνητοὺς ἀνακίρνασθαι κ.τ.λ. Cic. de Amic. xvi. 59, *Negabat* (Scipio) *ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri, quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus: nec vero se adduci posse ut hoc, quemadmodum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus est unus e septem, sed impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi, aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis, esse sententiam.* Publius Syrus apud Gell. Noct. Att. xvii 14 (ap. Schneidewin ad loc. Aj.), *Ita amicum habeas, posse ut fieri hunc inimicum putes.* Bacon de Augm. Scient. VIII c. 2, *Works*, Ellis and Sped. ed., Vol. I. p. 788, "Septimum praeceptum est antiquum illud Biantis; modo non ad perfidiam, sed ad cautionem et moderationem, adhibeatur: et ames tanquam inimicus futurus, et oderis tanquam amaturus. Nam utilitates quasque mirum in modum prodit et corrumpit si quis nimium se immerserit amicitii infelicibus, molestis et turbidis odiis, aut puerilibus et futilibus aemulationibus." Comp. *Adv. of Learning*, II xxiii. 42. La Bruyère, *Caract.* c. 4 (in Ellis' note). "*Vivre avec nos ennemis comme s'ils devoient un jour être nos amis, et vivre avec nos amis comme s'ils pouvoient devenir nos ennemis, n'est ni selon la nature de la haine, ni selon les règles de l'amitié: ce n'est point une maxime morale mais politique. On ne doit pas se faire des ennemis de ceux qui mieux connus pourroient avoir rang entre nos amis. On doit faire choix d'amis si surs et d'une si exacte probité que venant à cesser de l'être ils ne veuillent pas abuser de notre confiance, ni se faire craindre comme nos ennemis,*" (on which Mr Spedding has another commentary, too long to quote). Finally, Demosthenes, c. Aristocr. § 122, p. 660 (quoted by Gaisford), expresses his approbation of the maxim as a rule of action. He refers to it as a current precept, without naming the author, and sums up in conclusion, ἀλλ' ἀχρὶ τούτου καὶ φιλεῖν, οἶμαι, χρὴ καὶ μισεῖν, μηδετέρου τὸν καιρὸν ὑπερβάλλοντας, that is, neither friendship nor enmity should be carried too far, and so interpreted, as to exclude the possibility of a subsequent change of feeling.

§ 5. 'And they are little-minded, because their spirit has been humbled by life (the experience which they have had of life and its



τεταπεινώσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου  
 οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.  
 6 καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἐν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ οὐσία,  
 ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ  
 7 κτήσασθαι καὶ ῥάδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν. καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ  
 πάντα προφοβητικοί· ἐναντίως γὰρ διάκεινται τοῖς

delusions and disappointments has taught them how little they can do, and thereby lowered their aims and aspirations, and deprived them of all spirit of enterprise and high endeavour; for they (now) desire nothing great or extraordinary (standing out from and above all others of the same class, περιττοῦ, singular, striking, extra-ordinary, above the common herd, and the ordinary level; note on I 6.8), but only what tends to (the uses, or the ease and comfort of) their life'. This again is in direct opposition to the character of youth, c. 12. 11.

§ 6. 'And (for similar reasons) illiberal' (in money matters; mean, parsimonious: this is because they *have* known want; whereas their opposites, the young, who have never known it, are inclined to liberality, ἥκιστα φιλοχρήματοι, c. 12 § 6); 'for property is one of the necessities of life; and at the same time they know by (their) experience how hard it is to get, and how easy to lose'. ὡς, of course, may also be 'that'; and the *literal* translation is 'that gain or acquisition is hard, and loss easy'. Hor. A. P. 170, *Quaerit et inventis miser abstinet et timet uti*. Comp. Eth. Nic. IV 3, 1121 b 13, *δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν*. Pericles (in the funeral oration, Thuc. II 44, ult.) disputes this, though he allows that it is a prevailing opinion; *ἄσπερ δ' αὖ παρηβήκατε...καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀχρείῳ τῆς ἡλικίας τὸ κερδαίνειν, ὅσοι τινὲς φασι, μᾶλλον τέρπει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι*. Byron, on the other hand accepts the Aristotelian view. *So for a good old-gentlemanly vice I think I'll e'en take up with avarise* (Don Juan).

§ 7. 'And cowardly, and in everything (always) inclined to dread, in anticipation of coming danger (or, always inclined to anticipate danger and evil), their disposition being the reverse of that of the young: for they are cooled down (chilled by age), the others hot'. Hor. A. P. 171, *res omnes timide gelideque ministrat*, the *gelide* being manifestly taken from Aristotle. On ἀνελεύθεροι, Gaisford cites Bacon on this topic. The passage which he refers to in the Engl. Vers. occurs in *de Augm. Scient.* Lib. VII c. 3, Vol. I p. 734, Ellis and Spedding's ed., "*Videmus enim Plautum miraculi loco habere, quod senex quis sit beneficus; Benignitas huius ut adolescentuli est*" (Mil. Glor. III 1. 40). Bacon has misquoted: the line runs, *Nam benignitas quidem huius oppido adulescentulisti* (Ritschl). Bentley on Hor. A. P. 172 has made use of this characteristic, προφοβητικοί, in support of his emendation *avidus* for *avidus*. Orelli observes on this that it contradicts *spe longus* which occurs just before. But the two are not absolutely contradictory; a man may look far forward in his hope of a long life, and yet be fearful and anxious about what that future may bring. This physical theory of heating and cooling as

νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γάρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί, ὥστε  
 προωδοποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος  
 8 κατάψυξις τις ἐστίν. καὶ φιλόζωοι, καὶ μάλιστα  
 ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπόντος εἶναι τὴν  
 ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὐ δὲ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιθυ-  
 9 μείν. καὶ φίλαντοι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· μικροψυχία γάρ

applied to human character and passions is illustrated by Probl. xxx 1. 22, ὅστε φοβερὸν τι ὅταν εἰσαγγελθῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ψυχροτέρας οὐσης τῆς κράσεως τύχη, δειλὸν ποιεῖ· προωδοποίηκε γὰρ τῷ φόβῳ, καὶ ὁ φόβος καταψύχει. δηλοῦσι δὲ οἱ περίφοβοι· τρέμουσι γάρ. See the same, §§ 29, 30. Διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν παῖδες εὐθυμότεροι, οἱ δὲ γέροντες δυσθυμότεροι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ θερμοί, οἱ δὲ ψυχροί· τὸ γὰρ γῆρας κατάψυξις τις. § 32, ἡθοποιὸν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστίν. Victorius refers to de Part. Anim. II 4, 650 ὁ 27, ὁ γὰρ φόβος καταψύχει· προωδοπιῖται οὖν τῷ πάθει τὰ τοιαύτην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ κρᾶσιν (of the blood). On this physical or physiological account of the πάθη, and their connexion with the condition of the blood and muscles, and their different degrees of heat and cold, see further in the remainder of the same chapter. θερμότητος γὰρ ποιητικὸν ὁ θυμός (passion produces heat as well as heat passion), τὰ δὲ στερεὰ θερμανθέντα μᾶλλον θερμαίνει τῶν ὑγρῶν· αἱ δ' ἵνες (the muscles) στερεὸν καὶ γεῶδες, ὥστε γίνονται οἷον πυρίαι (vapour-baths) ἐν τῷ αἵματι καὶ ζέσιν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς θυμοῖς. Ib. 650 ὁ 35, πολλῶν δ' ἐστὶν αἰτία ἡ τοῦ αἵματος φύσις καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν, κ.τ.λ. 651 a 12.

‘And therefore old age prepares the way for cowardice (on προωδοποιεῖν, see note on I 1. 2); in fact fear is a kind of cooling down’. Comp. Horace’s *gelide*, A. P. 171, already quoted. “Virg. Aen. I 69, *extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra*. Servius, *frigore*, i. e. *timore*, *et est reciproca translatio, nam et timor pro frigore, et frigus pro timore ponitur*.” Schrader.

§ 8. ‘And fond of life, and more than ever in their last days’ (not, ‘their very latest day’. Victorius ad c. 12. 8, τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. So also Bentley, in note on A. P. 172, translates, ‘sub *supremo vitae die*’), ‘because all desire is of the absent, and therefore what they (most) want (are deficient in), that they most desire’. Orelli, on Hor. A. P. 170—178, compares φιλόζωοι with *avidus futuri*, which he retains; (also Bentley, on verse 172). He also quotes Soph. Fragg. 64 (Dind.), τοῦ ζῆν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὥς ὁ γηράσκων ἐρᾷ.

§ 9. ‘And they exceed the due measure in self-love, this again (as well as illiberality and cowardice) being a kind of little-mindedness’ (which is characteristic of them, *supra* § 5). The connexion of μικροψυχία and φίλαντία [a word used in late Greek only] seems to be this: Little-mindedness (Eth. N. IV 9, init.) is the undervaluing of oneself, and one’s own advantages. This ‘narrows and cramps the mind, which is consequently incapable of lofty aims and aspirations. A form of this is selfishness, or self-love, which is thus described, Eth. N IX 8,

τις καὶ αὐτή. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ  
 πρὸς τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαντοί εἶναι·  
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλόν  
 10 ἀπλῶς. καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοί· διὰ P. 1390.  
 γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμ-  
 11 φέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ  
 τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνομένων φαυλά

sub init. ὡς ἐν αἰσχροῦ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσιν, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαυ-  
 λος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀν·μοχθηρότερος ἢ, τοσοῦτον  
 μᾶλλον· ἐγκαλοῦσι δὲ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐθέν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ("away from himself",  
 without reference to himself, and his own interests) πράττει. But when  
 all a man's aims and desires are centred in himself, they must of  
 course be very mean and confined as compared with the lofty aspira-  
 tions of the μεγαλόψυχος, or even of the average man, and the wide  
 sphere in which they range; and therefore self-love when excessive is one  
 form in which narrow-mindedness shews itself.

'Their rule in life is profit, not honour, more than it ought to be,  
 which arises from their selfishness: for profit, self-interest, is a man's *own*  
 good, whereas honour (or the right) is good absolutely'. Orelli quotes this,  
 and ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κέρδος, in illustration of Horace's *quaerit et inuenit  
 miser abstinet et timet uti*, A. P. 170. On the distinction of αὐτῷ the  
 individual, and ἀπλῶς the general notion or the absolute, see note on τὸ  
 αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπλῶς, I 7. 35.

On τὸ καλόν in its two aspects, see I 7. 24, and I 9. 3, and notes. We  
 are here presented with the two opposing views of good, the ideal and prac-  
 tical. The ideal form represents good as the fair and right, the aim and  
 end of our hopes and aspirations, and the rule of life, in the shape (it may  
 be) of honour or glory (*la Gloire*), or some immaterial, high and noble  
 object, apart from all considerations of self, and one's own interest. The  
 practical view of good regards it as something useful and serviceable for  
 the uses and purposes of life, and for one's own interest and advance-  
 ment; it is τὸ χρήσιμον and τὸ ξυμφέρον, the useful and profitable.  
 Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* argues in favour of this view of  
 'good'.

§ 10. 'And they are rather inclined to insensibility than to sensibility  
 to shame (comp. 12. 10); for in consequence of their caring little for  
 honour as compared with profit, they pay slight regard to (treat with  
 contempt) other people's opinions of them (how they seem to others)'.  
 They only care for solid and substantial advantages, and disregard all  
 mere empty 'seeming' and 'opinion'. πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαιné-  
 σειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός (Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 20). If he *were* keenly sen-  
 sitive to shame, he would get no credit for it; οὐθέν γὰρ οἴόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν  
 πράττειν οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη.

§ 11. 'Also they are given to despondency, in consequence of their  
 (unfavourable) experience (of life and its fortunes);—for most things that

- ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γοῦν τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ  
 12 ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν· καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ  
 ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γὰρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ δὲ  
 παρεληλυθὸς πολὺ, ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλον-  
 τος ἡ δὲ μνήμη τῶν παροιχομένων. ὁ περ αἴτιον καὶ  
 τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς· διατελοῦσι γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα  
 13 λέγοντες· ἀναμνησκόμενοι γὰρ ἡδονταί. καὶ οἱ  
 θυμοὶ ὀξέεις μὲν εἰσιν ἀσθενεῖς δέ, καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ  
 μὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσίν, ὥστε οὔτ' ἐπι-  
 θυμητικοὶ οὔτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ

happen are bad (full of defects)—at all events the results are mostly disappointing (things mostly turn out for the worse);—and besides this, owing to their cowardice.' Aesch. c. Timarch. § 24, οὐκ ἡγνόει ὁ νομοθέτης ὅτι οἱ πρεσβύτεροι τῷ μὲν εὖ φρονεῖν ἀκμάζουσιν, ἡ δὲ τόλμα ἤδη αὐτοῖς ἄρχεται ἐπιλείπειν διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων.

§ 12. 'And they live by (their) memory rather than by hope' (comp. c. 12. 8, and the note there, on ζῶσιν ἐλπίδι), 'for what remains to them of their life is short, but that which is past long; and hope is of the future, but memory of the past. Which is also the reason of their garrulity (habit of chattering or prattling<sup>1</sup>); for they are continually talking about what has happened, their delight being in recollection'. The aged Cephalus says of himself, Plat. Rep. I 328 D, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἄμοιγε ὅσον αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδوناὶ ἀπομαραινόνται, τοσοῦτον αὖξονται αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναὶ (Gaisford). "*With seats beneath the shade For talking age and whispering lovers made,*" Goldsmith, *Deserted Village*.

§ 13. 'And their fits of passion (θυμός, as before, the passionate, angry impulses; one of the three δρέξεις, with ἐπιθυμία and βούλησις) are sharp, but feeble, (neither strong nor lasting,) and of their appetites, some have failed altogether, others become enfeebled, so that they are not prone either to the feeling of desire or to act under its impulses, but only according to the dictates of self-interest. Accordingly men at this time of life are thought to have the disposition to temperance, or self-control, besides (sc. the preceding); not only because their appetites are relaxed (slackened, ἀνίσσθαι contrasted with ἐπιτείνεισθαι, met. from stringing the lyre, note on I 4. 12), 'but also because they are slaves to their own interest'. σωφροσύνη being the *acquired* and *fixed habit*, or *virtue*, of self-control, σῶφρων the possessor of the virtue, and σωφρονικοί those who are inclined or have a tendency to it; those men, whose desires and passions are so feeble as to *require no control*, gain credit in the eyes of the world for the *disposition to* (termination -ικός) the virtue itself.

<sup>1</sup> ἀδολεσχία. Eth. N. III 13, 1117 δ 35, τοὺς περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας...καλοῦμεν.

- κατὰ τὸ κέρδος. διὸ καὶ σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ p. 82.  
 τηλικούτοι· αἱ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασι, καὶ δουλεύ-  
 14 ουσιν τῷ κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ  
 κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος  
 τὸ δ' ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν. καὶ τὰδίκηματα ἀδικοῦ-  
 15 σιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν. ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ  
 γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ ταῦτο τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν  
 γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν· πάντα  
 γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς εἶναι αὐτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν  
 ἐλεητικόν. ὅθεν ὀδυρτικοὶ εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι  
 οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ  
 φιλογέλῳτι.  
 16 τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἥθη  
 τοιαῦτα· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ

σωφρονικοὶ recurs in Eth. N. VI 13, 1144 b 5, and is found in Xenophon and Plato, and the adverb in Aristophanes.

§ 14. 'And their course of life is directed rather by calculation than character: for calculation is directed to one's own interest, whereas character is indicative of virtue'. The opposite of this, c. 12. 12.

ἦθος] is 'the impulse of character', as before. Virtuous 'dispositions' or 'characters' are natural to us, Eth. N. VI 13, u. s. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι καὶ τὰλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς. These however are not virtues—Eth. N. II 1, sub init., οὐδεμία τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται—but dispositions or tendencies to virtue, δυνάμεις, which may be developed into ἕξεις, of which σωφρονικός (having a tendency to σωφροσύνη) is an individual instance.

'And the offences which they commit incline rather to petty knavery and mischief than to insolence and wanton outrage'. See c. 12. 15, and the passages there referred to.

§ 15. 'Old men also (as well as young, c. 12. 15) are inclined to compassion, but not for the same reason as the young; in the one it is from humanity, in the other from weakness; for all calamities that happen to others seem to be near at hand, impending over, themselves (near at hand to themselves to suffer, ὥστε αὐτοὺς παθεῖν αὐτά), and this is what was said (ἦν, viz. c. 8 § 1) to incline men to pity. And hence it is that they are querulous (*difficilis*, *querulus*, Hor. A. P. 173) and not given to pleasantry nor fond of mirth; for a querulous disposition (habit of complaining, bemoaning oneself) is opposite to love of mirth'.

§ 16. 'Such are the characters of the youthful and elderly; accordingly, since language conformable to their own character, as well as persons similar to themselves, are acceptable to every one, it is plain

σφετέρῳ ἦθει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται  
 I καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι. οἱ δὲ ἀκμάζοντες φανερόν ὅτι CHAP. XIV.  
 μεταξὺ τούτων τὸ ἦθος ἔσονται, ἐκατέρων ἀφαιρῶν-

enough how we are to use our words in order that we and our speeches may assume such and such a character'. The study of the tempers, and manners and habits and modes of thought of these two ages and the rest, will enable us without difficulty to assume the tone and language which are in conformity with the taste of any particular kind of audience which we have to persuade: everybody likes to be addressed in his own style, to hear the sentiments and language which are habitual to himself.

τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἦθει λεγομένους λόγους] *Orationes quae dicuntur ad proprios mores*, Vetus Translatio;—*Quae ingenio moribusque ipsorum convenientes habentur*, Victorius;—*Quae suis ipsorum moribus convenientes habentur orationes*, Riccobon. No notice has been taken of the difficulty of explaining the force of the dative ἦθει after λεγομένους. In the above translations the first evidently understands it in the sense of *spoken to*, *addressed to*, the direct dative. But although λέγειν τινί, *to say unto, tell, or bid* anyone is allowable Greek, I doubt if that use of it is applicable here. Surely to *address to* must be rendered by πρὸς τὸ σφετέρῳ ἦθος, and not by the dative. The other two translations are mere evasions of the difficulty, giving the sense, but not explaining the construction. The only other possible sense of the dative which suggests itself to me, is the *instrumental* 'by': but 'by the aid of their character' is I think not a probable, though a possible, mode of expressing the *conformity* which is here required. The meaning is plain; speeches which express, or are in conformity with, the characters and manners of certain classes, whom we may have to address. As a last resource I venture to propose ὁμολογουμένους as a substitute for λεγομένους; there is no variation of MSS; but it certainly seems possible that the three first letters in the long word in question may have been accidentally decapitated in the course of transcription, and then the remainder λογουμένων would naturally have been converted into λεγομένους.

#### CHAP. XIV.

§ 1. 'The character of men in the prime of life will plainly lie between the other two, by subtraction of the excess of each, (so that) they are neither excessively confident—for that kind of disposition is rashness—nor overmuch given to fear, but in a right state of mind as to both, neither implicitly trusting nor altogether distrusting everyone indiscriminately, but rather with a due distinction according to the real facts of the case'.

ἀφαιρεῖν, properly opposed to προστιθεῖν, as in a numerical calculation to *add* and *subtract*. Hence *withdraw, remove*, et sim. For example, Plat. Cratyl. 431 C, προστιθεῖς ἢ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα. Ib. 432 A. Phaedo 95 E, bis, et alibi. Xen. de Rep. Ath. III 8 and 9, κατὰ μικρόν τι προσθέντα ἢ ἀφελόντα, 'by slight and gradual addition or subtraction' (said of the changes of political constitutions).

2 τες τὴν ὑπερβολήν, καὶ οὔτε σφόδρα θαρροῦντες (θρα-  
 σύτης γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον) οὔτε λίαν φοβούμενοι, καλῶς  
 δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες, οὔτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὔτε  
 πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς κρίνοντες  
 μᾶλλον, καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὔτε P. 1390 b.  
 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω, καὶ οὔτε πρὸς  
 φειδῶ οὔτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀρμόττον·  
 3 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ  
 σῶφρονες μετ' ἀνδρίας καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ σωφροσύνης.  
 ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέρονσι διήρηται ταῦτα·  
 εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ  
 πρεσβύτεροι σῶφρονες καὶ δειλοί. ὥς δὲ καθόλου  
 εἰπεῖν, ὅσα μὲν διήρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν  
 ὠφελίμων, ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλ-

θαρροῦντες and θρασύτης here preserve their proper distinction, *θάσος*, true courage, *θράσος*, reckless audacity or impudence, though these senses are often interchanged. The verb *θαρσεῖν* or *θαρρέειν*, as Plato, Aristotle, and the later Greeks write it, has never the unfavourable sense.

§ 2. 'And the conduct of their life will be directed neither to honour alone, nor to self-interest, but to both'. Compare 12.12; 13.9. 'And neither to parsimony nor to profligate extravagance, but to what is fit and proper', i.e. the mean, *ἐλευθεριότης*; Eth. N. II 7, 1107 b 10, IV 1, 1120 a 1, seq.

§ 3. 'And similarly in respect of passion and appetite. And they will be temperate (sober-minded, under self-control) with courage, and courageous with self-control: for in the young and old these two are separated (or distinguished), the young being brave and licentious (devoid of self-control), and the elders sober and temperate but cowardly'. 'Self-control' is the form in which the virtue appears especially in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Republic*, where it is described as a regulating principle which guides the whole man, ordering and harmonising his entire moral constitution.

'And, speaking in general terms, all the advantages (good qualities, elements of good character) that youth and old age have divided between them (= *ἔχει διηρημένα*), both of these the others enjoy; and whereinsoever (the two first) are excessive or defective, in these (they observe, *συνδιδίαι οἱ ἀκμάζοντες ἔχουσιν*) a due moderation (or mean) and a fitness or propriety of conduct'.

ὅσα διήρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας] I think *διαίρεισθαι* must be here middle, said of those who divide amongst themselves, have *shares* in any joint work or possession. Thuc. VII 19, *διελομένοι τὸ ἔργον*. An objection might be taken to this, that *διήρηται* is singular and not plural, and

λουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσι, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἀρ-  
4 μόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα  
ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πεντεκατριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ περὶ  
τὰ ἐνὸς δεῖν πενήκοντα.

that no one can share a thing with himself. But although the verb is singular in form, being connected grammatically with νεότης alone, *which stands next to it*, yet it is evident that γήρας is meant to be included in the distribution as well as the other. It is accordingly equivalent to διηρημένα ἔχουσιν. I think it cannot be passive; the analogy of πιστεύεσθαι τι 'to be trusted with something', ἐπιτετράφθαι τι, and the like, cannot be applied to this case.

τὸ μέτριον] is Plato's *summum bonum*, the highest in the scale of goods, in the Philebus; also the Horatian *aurea mediocritas*: it may also stand for the Aristotelian μέσον, which at all events is the sense in which it is employed here.

τὸ ἀρμόττον] that which *fits*, the fitting; derived by metaphor from the carpenter's, joiner's and builder's trades; is nearly equivalent to τὸ πρέπον, and like it refers us to the *fitness of things*, as a standard of good, to a harmonious organisation or order of the universe, a system physical or moral which has all its parts dove-tailed, as it were, together, arranged in due order and subordination, carefully and exactly fitted together; Cicero's *apta compositio* (*membrorum*, of the human figure [de officiis I 28.98]).

§ 4. 'The body is in its prime from 30 to 35 (years of age), the soul (i. e. the intellectual and moral faculties) about nine and forty' (50 minus one: δεῖν is δέον, *wanting* so much).

Two of the numbers here mentioned are multiples of seven. The stages of life are determined by a septenary theory, the earliest record of which is an elegiac fragment of doubtful genuineness (Porson), attributed to Solon (ap. Clemen. Alexandr. *Strom.*, Bergk, *Lyr. Gr.* p. 332 [346, ed. 2], Sol. Fragm. 25), in which the seventy years allotted to human life, and its successive stages of growth, development and decay, are divided into ten periods of seven years each. The dates here given by Aristotle for the prime of body and mind, agree tolerably well with the verses of the fragment: τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶς τις ἐν ἑβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος ἰσχύν ἦν ὅ' ἄνδρες σήματ' ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς. The fifth septenary is the marriageable age. In the seventh the intellect and powers of speech have reached their prime. ἑπτὰ δὲ (49) νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν ἐν ἑβδομάσιν μέγ' ἄριστος κ.τ.λ.

The same theory, whether derived from Solon or not, which seems to have been generally current, reappears in Polit. IV (VII) 16, 1335 b 32, κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμὴν· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἡνερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πενήκοντα ἐτῶν (i. e.  $7 \times 7 = 49$ ); and again Polit. ib. c. 17, 1336 b 37, δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ μεχρὶ ἡβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν ἀφ' ἡβης μεχρὶ τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσιν διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ



περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίῳν  
 I ἡθῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· περὶ δὲ τῶν CHAP. XV.  
 ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων ἀγαθῶν, δι' ὅσα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ P. 83.

καλῶς (leg. κακῶς, Spengel), δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν. Nevertheless the theory is departed from in assigning the proper age of marriage in the two sexes; ib. c. 16, 1335 a 28, the woman is to marry at 18, the man at 37 'or thereabouts'; neither of them divisible by seven; ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσι τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται κ.τ.λ. And in line 35, the term of human life is again fixed at 70 years. So the Psalmist [xc. 10], "The days of our years are threescore years and ten."

And to the same theory (the number seven, marking a crisis, or stage of growth, in the life of an animal,) reference is frequently made, in the Hist. Anim., as VII I. 2, 16, 18, c. 12. 2, and elsewhere: from all which it may be concluded that Aristotle was a believer in it. Plato, Rep. v 460 E, fixes the prime of life in a woman at the age of 20, in a man at 30: in Legg. IV 721 A, and in three other places, the age of marriage is fixed from 30 to 35, though in one of them (VI 772 E) 25 is also named. Compare on this subject Hes. Opp. et D. 695 seq. Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. I 6, (Stallbaum's note on Plato I. c.).

But the theory of the virtues of the number seven was carried to a far greater extent, as may be seen in I 6 of Macrobius' Commentary on Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*, of which the sum is given in a quotation from the *Somnium Scipionis*:—*Cicero de septenario dicit, Qui numerus rerum omnium fere nodus est.* Everything in nature is determined by the number seven. Near the end of the chapter, we are told, in conformity with Aristotle's statement, *Notandum vero quod, cum numerus se multiplicat* (at the age of 49,  $7 \times 7$ ), *facit aetatem quae proprie perfecta et habetur et dicitur: adeo ut illius aetatis homo, utpote qui perfectionem et attigerit iam, et necdum praeeterierit, et consilio aptus sit, nec ab exercitio virium alienus habeatur.* This is the prime of mind and body together. *Quinta* (hebdomas) *omne virium* (strength and powers of body alone), *quanta esse unicuique, possunt, complet augmentum.* All this came no doubt originally from the Pythagoreans; as may be inferred from Arist. Met. N 6, 1093 a 13, where this number seven, is said to be assigned by them as the cause of everything that happened to have this number of members; *seven vowels, seven chords or harmonies, seven Pleiads*; animals shed their teeth in *seven years*—yes, says Ar., *some do*, but some don't—and *seven champions* against Thebes. And from this and similar considerations they inferred some mysterious virtue in the number; and identified it with *νοῦς* and *καῖρός*. (Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* c. 2, Pythag. § 102, note a.)

'So for youth and age and prime of life, the kind of characters, that is to say, that belong to each, let thus much suffice' (to have been said).

#### CHAP. XV.

A γνώμη of Phocylides may serve as a motto of this chapter. καὶ τόδε Φωκυλίδεω· τί πλέον γένος εὐγενὲς εἶναι οἷς οὐτ' ἐν μύθοις ἔπεται χάρις,

ἦθη ποί' ἅττα συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, λέγωμεν  
 2 ἐφεξῆς. εὐγενείας μὲν οὖν ἡθὸς ἐστὶ τὸ φιλοτιμό-  
 τερον εἶναι τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτήν· ἅπαντες γάρ, ὅταν  
 ὑπάρχη τι, πρὸς τοῦτο σωρεύειν εἰώθασιν, ἢ δ' εὐγέ-  
 νεια ἐντιμότης τις προγόνων ἐστίν. καὶ καταφρο-  
 νητικὸν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐστὶ τοῖς προγόνοις τοῖς  
 αὐτῶν, διότι πόρρω ταῦτ' ἀλλοῦ ἢ ἐγγὺς γιγνόμενα

οὗτ' ἐν βουλῇ; Brunck, *Poet. Gnom.* p. 91. Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* p. 339 [p. 358, ed. 2].

§ 1. 'Of the goods arising from fortune, as many of them, that is, as have an influence upon men's characters, let us proceed to speak next in order'.

§ 2. 'One characteristic of *noble birth* is that the ambition of the possessor of it is thereby increased. For everyone that has anything to start with, or to build upon', (as a nucleus, focus, or centre of attraction: *ὑπάρχειν*, to underlie, to be there already, prop. as a basis or foundation for a superstructure,) 'is accustomed to make this the nucleus of his acquisitions or accumulations, and high or noble birth implies or denotes ancestral distinction'. *σωρεύειν πρὸς τι*, *lit.* to bring to *this*, in order to heap round it, any subsequent accumulations. The meaning is, that any new acquisitions of honour or property that a man makes, will generally take the form of an addition to some stock which he already has, whenever he *has* one ready for the purpose, *ὅταν τι ὑπάρχη*.

'This condition of life is inclined to look down upon even those who resemble, are on a level with, (in condition, wealth, rank, distinction, and so forth,) their own ancestors, because their distinctions, in proportion to the degree of their remoteness, are more distinguished (than those of contemporaries) and are easier to brag of' (more readily admit of boastful exaggeration). *Distance lends enchantment to the view*. Honours and distinctions shine with a brighter lustre in the remote ages of antiquity, and confer more dignity upon those who by right of inheritance can claim a share in them, than those of the same kind, and equal in all other respects, when acquired by contemporaries—familiarity breeds in some degree contempt for them—just as *ἀρχαιοπλουτεῖν* is a higher claim to consideration than *νεοπλουτεῖν*, II 9. 9, q. v. Antiquity of possession carries with it a prescriptive right.

*καταφρονητικόν*] agrees with τὸ εὐγενές, the abstract for the concrete, und. from the preceding *εὐγένεια*. An abstract term is often *particularized*, or expressed by the component members in detail, as in construction of antecedent and relative, such as Polit. I 2, 1252 δ 13, *κοινωνία...οὗς Χαράνδας καλεῖ*... This construction is an instance of that wide-spread and multiform grammatical 'figure', the *σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαίνόμενον*, which, in a great variety of different ways, departs from the usual *construction* of words and adapts it 'to the thing signified'; as, in the case above given, the abstract virtually includes all the component members of the *society* who are *expressed* in the *plural* relative.

3 ἐντιμότερα καὶ εὐαλαζύνοντα. ἔστι δὲ εὐγενὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετὴν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως· ὃ περ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ

εὐαλαζύνοντα] On ἀλαζονεία and ἀλαζών, see note on I 2.7. Of the two significations of the word, that of 'bragging' is here uppermost.

§ 3. 'The term εὐγενὲς (*well-born*, come of a good stock, of noble *race*, or *descent*) is applied to mark distinction (excellence) of race; γενναῖος (of noble *character*) to the maintenance of the normal type of character' (keeping up to, not degenerating from, the true family standard). The difference between εὐγενής and γενναῖος lies in this; that in the former the *race* or *descent*, γένος, is *directly* expressed as the prominent and leading idea; it indicates that the εὐγενής comes of a good breed, but says nothing of the individual character: in the latter it is the *character*, conformable to the excellence of the breed or race, that is put prominently forward. The account here given of εὐγένεια is illustrated by the definition of it in I 5.5; it denotes in fact the excellences and distinctions of one's ancestors, *as distinguished from* one's own. See the passages there collected. In Hist. Anim. I 1, 488 b 18, these two words are defined and distinguished almost in the same terms; εὐγενὲς μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ γένους, γενναῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως. Ar. is here characterising the dispositions of animals. Some are ἐλευθέρια καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ εὐγενῆ οἶον λέων, τὰ δὲ γενναῖα καὶ ἄγρια καὶ ἐπίβουλα, οἶον λύκος· from which it appears that γενναῖότης is strictly and properly *only* the maintenance of a certain type of character, which need not necessarily be a good one: though in ordinary usage it is invariably applied to denote good qualities. On εὐγένεια, see Herm. Pol. Ant. § 57.

ἐξίστασθαι] 'to quit a previous state'; of a change in general, especially a change *for the worse*, degeneration. Plat. Rep. II 480 A, τῆς ἐαυτοῦ ιδέας ἐκβαίνειν...εἴπερ τι ἐξίστατο τῆς αὐτοῦ ιδέας· of God, changing his own proper form, and descending to a lower. Eth. Nic. VII 7, 1150 a 1, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Pol. VIII (V) 6, sub fin., αἱ δημοκραταὶ καὶ ὀλιγαρχαὶ ἐξίστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς ἐναντίας πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 9, 1309 b 32, ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν...ἐξεστῆ-κνίας τῆς βελτίστης τάξεως.

On φύσις as the τέλος, the *true* nature, the normal or perfect state of anything, see Pol. I 2, 1252 b 32, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἶον γὰρ ἑκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελειοθείσης, ταύτην φαρὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκαστὸν, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας. Grant, on Eth. Nic. II 1. 3, distinguishes five different senses of φύσις in Aristotle, of which this is the last.

'Which (the maintenance of the ancestral character) for the most part is not the lot of the well-born, but most of them (the members or descendants of an illustrious family) are good-for-nothing'<sup>1</sup> (εὐτελής *vilis*, cheap. *Fortes non semper creantur fortibus*); 'for there is a kind of crop in the families of men (φορά here implies an alternation of φορά and ἀφορία, of good and bad crops) just as there is in the produce of the soil (*lit.* the things

<sup>1</sup> παῖροι γάρ τοι παῖδες ὁμοῖοι πατρὶ πέλονται· οἱ πλέονες κακίους, παῖροι δὲ τε πατρὸς ἀρείους. Hom. Od. β' 276.

οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενέσιν, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ  
 εὐτελεῖς· φορὰ γάρ τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν  
 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γιγνομένοις, καὶ ἐνίοτε  
 ἂν ἡ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διὰ τινος χρόνου  
 that grow in the country places); for a certain time (διὰ with gen., along  
 the course or channel of, during,) remarkable men (distinguished *above*  
 their fellows, standing *out* from among them, *περί*), grow up in them, and  
 then (after an interval of unproductiveness) they begin again to produce  
 them'. There are two ways of understanding ἀναδίδωσιν; either it is  
 active, 'to send up, produce', as the earth *yields* her fruits, and this is  
 the natural interpretation, and supported by the use of the word in  
 other writers: or, as Rost and Palm in their Lex., *zurückgehen*, 'to go  
 back', *relapse* into a state of barrenness, on the analogy of ἀναχωρεῖν  
 et sim. ['deficit'. *Index Aristotelicus*]. In this case διδόναι is neut. (by  
 the suppression of the reflexive pronoun) as indeed both itself and its  
 compounds frequently are—and may be either 'to give (itself) back, to  
 give way', or perhaps rather, like ἀνιέναι, ἀνίσθαι, to *relax* or *slacken* in  
 production (ἀνῆ, Soph. Phil. 764). Victorius gives both renderings; I have  
 adopted his second version ["posteaque rursus, intervallo aliquo temporis  
 edit ac gignit industrios item atque insignes viros"], which seems to me  
 the more natural interpretation of ἀναδίδωσιν.

φορὰ] *proventus*, the produce which the earth bears, φέρει, is either  
 'a crop' simply, or 'a good crop', opposed to ἀφορία—fertility, abundance,  
 to barrenness, either absolute or comparative. Plat. Rep. VIII 546 A,  
 οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζῳοῖς φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς  
 τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνεται. Ar. Hist. Anim. V 21. 1, ἐλαιῶν φορὰ, 'a crop  
 of olives'. Ib. 22. 3, ἐλαιῶν φ., de Gen. Anim. III 1. 15, τῶν δένδρων τὰ  
 πολλά...ἐξαναίνεται μετὰ τὴν φορὰν (after the crop). And *metaphorically*  
 in Dem. de Cor. § 61, φορὰν προδοτῶν καὶ δωροδόκων. Aesch. c. Ctes.  
 § 234, φ. ῥητόρων πονηρῶν ἅμα καὶ τολμηρῶν. Dissen ad loc. Dem. cit. Plut.  
 Platon. Quaest. I 1, 999 E, φ. σοφιστῶν. Diodor. XVI. 54, φ. προδοτῶν.  
 "Sic Latine *novorum proventum scelerum* dixit Lucan. Phars. II 61, et  
 similiter *messem* usurpat Plaut. Trinum. I 1. 11." Dissen, l. c.

With the whole passage compare Pind. Nem. XI 48, ἀρχαῖαι δ' ἀρεταὶ  
 ἀμφέροντ' ἀλλασσόμεναι γενεαῖς ἀνδρῶν σθένος, ἐν σχέρφ δ' οὐτ' ὦν μέλαινα  
 καρπὸν ἔδωκαν ἄρourke· δένδρεά τ' οὐτ' ἐθέλει πάσαις ἐτέων περ ὁδοῖς [*al.*  
*περίδοις*] ἄνθος εὐώδες φέρειν, πλούτφ ἴσον, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀμείβοντι. καὶ θνατὸν  
 οὕτω σθένος ἄγει Μοῖρα. Ib. VI 14 (Gaisford).

'When clever families degenerate, their characters acquire a tendency  
 to madness, as for instance the descendants of Alcibiades and Dionysius  
 the elder (tyrant of Syracuse), whereas those of a steady (staid, stable)  
 character degenerate into sluggishness or *dulness*' (of which the stubborn  
 ass is the type; ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὄνος...ἐβλήσατο παῖδας νωθῆς, φ δὲ πολλὰ περὶ  
 ῥόπαλ' ἀμφὶς ἐάγη [Il. XI 559]), as in the case of those of Conon and Pericles  
 and Socrates'. We learn from Plato, Men. 93 B—94 E, that the son of  
 Themistocles, Cleophantus; of Aristides, Lysimachus; the sons of Pericles,  
 Paralus and Xanthippus; of Thucydides (the statesman and general, the  
 opponent of Pericles and his policy), Melesias and Stephanus; all de-

ἄνδρες περιττοί, κ᾿πειτα πάλιν ἀναδίδωσιν. ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφυᾶ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἦθη, οἷον οἱ ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου, τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα, οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος καὶ Περικλέους καὶ Σωκράτους.

I τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἃ ἔπεται ἦθη, ἐπιπολῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν CHAP. XVI.  
ἅπασιν· ὑβρίζονται γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πᾶσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἅπαντα τάγαθὰ οὕτω διάκεινται· ὁ γὰρ πλοῦτος οἷον P. 1391.

generated from their fathers; and in spite of the advantages of their education turned out nevertheless either quite ordinary men, or altogether bad.

The alliance of quickness of wit or cleverness and madness is marked again in Poet. XVII 4, 1455 a 32, εὐφροῦς ἢ ποιητικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ μανικοῦ (the poet's 'fine frenzy'). Probl. xxx 1. 18, ὅσοις μὲν πολλὴ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐνυπάρχει (ἢ κράσις τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς) νωθοὶ καὶ μωροί, ὅσοις δὲ λίαν πολλὴ καὶ θερμὴ μανικοὶ καὶ εὐφρεῖς κ.τ.λ. *Great wits are sure to madness near allied, and thin partitions do their bounds divide.* Dryden [*Absalom and Achitophel*, I 163].

στάσιμα] *settled*, steady characters, is illustrated by Thuc. II 36, ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ηλικίᾳ ('mature and vigorous age'), Soph. Aj. 306, ἔμφρων μόλις πως ξὺν χρόνῳ καθίσταται ('settles down again into his senses'). Aesch. Pers. 300, λέξον καταστάς ('first compose thyself, and then speak'). Blomfield, Gloss. ad loc., refers to Ar. Ran. 1044, πνεῦμα καθεστηκός, and Eurip. Orest. 1310, πάλιν κατάστηθ' ἡσύχῃ μὲν ὄμματι. Theophr. ap. Plut. Symp. I 5, p. 623 B, μάλιστα δὲ ὁ ἐνθουσιασμός ἐξίστησι καὶ παρατρέπει τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν φωνήν τοῦ καθεστηκότος. Victorius points out a similar opposition of the two characters here contrasted, in Probl. III (16. 1). What is here called ἀβελτερία and νωθότης is there designated by τετυφωμένους, a term of similar import. διὰ τί ὁ οἶνος καὶ τετυφωμένους ποιεῖ καὶ μανικούς; ἐναντία γὰρ ἡ διάθεσις. (τετυφώσθαι is explained by Harpocration and Suidas of one who has lost his wits in the shock of a violent storm; whether by the storm itself which has confounded him, or by the accompanying thunderbolt: Hesych. s. v. μεμηνέναι; and τετύφωται, ἀπόλωλεν. ἐμπέπηρσται. ἐμβεβρόντηται. ἐπήρηθη. Hence, of one *stumped*, ἐμβρόντητος, παράλληλῃ, out of his wits; or of fatuity, dulness in general).

#### CHAP. XVI.

§ 1. The characters that accompany wealth (the characteristics of wealth) lie on the surface within the view of all (*lit.* for all to see; ἐπιπολῆς ἅπασιν ὥστ' αὐτοῖς ἰδεῖν αὐτά comp. I 15. 22, and note there); for they are insolent, inclined to violence and outrage, and arrogant (in their conduct and bearing), being affected in some degree (their nature altered, the alteration for the worse regarded as a kind of suffering or affection) by the acquisition of wealth. These dispositions originate in the supposition that (in having wealth) they have every kind of good, all goods in

τιμή τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων, διὸ φαίνεται ὧνια  
2 ἅπαντα εἶναι αὐτοῦ. καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλάκωνες,  
τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τρυφήν καὶ τὴν ἐνδειξιν τῆς  
εὐδαιμονίας, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι διὰ τὸ πάντας

one; for wealth is as it were a sort of standard of the value of everything else, and consequently it seems as if everything else were purchasable by it'.

§ 2. 'They are also voluptuous (dainty and effeminate, *molles et delicati*, Victorius), and prone to vulgar ostentation, the former by reason of their self-indulgence (the luxury in which they live) and the (constant) display of their wealth and prosperity (εὐδαιμων, as well as ὀλβιος, = πλούσιος); ostentatious and ill-bred, because they (like others) are all accustomed to spend their time and thoughts upon what they themselves love and admire (and therefore, as they think about nothing but their wealth, so they are never weary of vaunting and displaying, which makes them rude and ostentatious), and also because they suppose that everybody else admires and emulates what they do themselves'. Foolishly supposing that every one else feels the same interest in the display of wealth that they do themselves, they flaunt in their neighbours' eyes till they excite repugnance and contempt instead of admiration.

τρυφεροί] denotes luxury τρυφή, and its effects, luxurious, effeminate, voluptuous habits: Eth. N. VII 8, 1150 b 1, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν' καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τίς ἐστιν. Eth. Eudem. II 3, 8, ὁ μὲν μηδεμίαν ὑπομένων λύπην, μηδ' εἰ βέλτιον, τρυφερός.

σαλάκωνες] denotes vulgar ostentation, and is very near akin to, if not absolutely identical with, βανασία and ἀπειροκαλία; the former is the excess of μεγαλοπρέπεια, proper magnificence in expenditure: the βάνανσος goes beyond this, spending extravagantly where it is *not* required: Eth. Nic. IV 6, 1123 a 21, seq., ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος—of which some instances are given—καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἴομενος θαυμάζεσθαι. Ib. c. 4, 1122 a 31, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολή (ἐλευθεριότητος) βανασία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία (bad taste) καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, ... ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι. Comp. Eth. Eudem. II 3, 9, ἄσματος (spendthrift) μὲν ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν δαπάνην ὑπερβάλλων, ἀνελεύθερος δ' ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἐλλείπων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ σαλάκων' ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρόπον (ὁ σαλάκων), ὁ δ' ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρόποντος. Hesych. s. v. σαλακωνία' ἡ ἐν πενίᾳ ἀλαζονεία. σαλακωνίσαι' (after a different and wrong explanation, he adds) ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος σαλάκωνά φησιν εἶναι, τὸν δαπανῶντα ὅπου μὴ δεῖ; which agrees with Aristotle. Suidas, s.v. σαλάκων' προσποιοῦμενος πλούσιος εἶναι, πένης ὦν (as Hesych.), καὶ σαλακωνία ἀλαζονεία ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον, καὶ σαλκωνίσαι ἀλαζονεύεσθαι. Ib. διασαλακωνίσαι, διαθρύψασθαι "εἰτα πλουσίως ὡδὶ προβῆς τρυφερόν τι διασαλακώνισον" ('swagger', Arist. Vesp. 1169).

σόλοικοι] 'rude, ill-mannered, ill-bred'; liable to make mistakes, or commit solecisms; first, in language—σολοικίζειν, τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν, Top. I (de

εἰωθέναι διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἐρώμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῷ οἶεσθαι ζηλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους ἂ καὶ αὐτοί. ἅμα δὲ καὶ εἰκότως τοῦτο πάσχουσιν πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ δεόμενοι τῶν ἐχόντων. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων

Soph. EL) 3, ult. [p. 165 δ 21]—and secondly, transferred thence to manners, conduct, breeding. Victorius cites, Xen. Cyr. VIII 3. 21, Δαΐφάρης δέ τις ἦν σολοικότερος ἀνθρώπος τῷ τρόπῳ, ὃς ῥέτο εἰ μὴ ταχὺ ὑπακοῦσι ἐλευθερώτερος ἂν φαίεσθαι. Plut. Pol. Praec. p. 817 A, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν ἀπειροκάλων καὶ σολοίκων. Ib. Vit. Dion. p. 965 A, οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ διαίτῃ σόλοικον ἐπιδεικνύμενος. The word is derived from Σόλοι, a town of Cilicia (there was another place of the same name in Cyprus), πόλις ἀξιόλογος (Strabo). 'Qui cum barbare loquerentur, inde vocabulum hoc ad omnes vitiosos sermone utentes, et tandem ad illos quoque qui in actionibus suis ineptiunt, est translatum' (Schrader). Strabo XIV c. 5, Cilicia. Diog. Laert., Solon I 51, ἐκείθεν τε ἀπαλλαγείς (ὁ Κροίσος) ἐγένετο ἐν Κιλικίᾳ, καὶ πόλιν συνήκισεν ἣν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ (Solon) Σόλους ἐκάλεσαν' (others represent Soli as founded by the Argives and Lindians from Rhodes. Smith's *Dict. Geogr.* Vol. III 1012 δ); ὀλίγους τέ τινες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκατέκτισεν, οἱ τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν φωνὴν ἀπογενωθέντες ἐλέχθησαν. καὶ εἰσιν οἱ μὲν ἔνθεν Σολεῖς, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Κύπρου Σόλιοι. Schrader therefore is incorrect in saying, 'Solis oppidum cuius incolae Soloeci'; σόλοικος is derived from Σόλοι, but is not the name of one of its inhabitants.

'And at the same time, these affections are natural to them, for many are they who require (the aid, the services) of the wealthy'. They have an excuse for being thus affected by their wealth; the numerous claimants upon their bounty elate them with a sense of superiority, and at the same time by their servility give them frequent opportunities of exercising at their expense their ostentation and ill manners. On οἱ ἔχοντες, the possessors of property, *sub. χρήματα*, see Monk on Eur. Alc. 57.—'Whence also—this also gave occasion to the saying of Simonides about the philosophers and men of wealth to Hiero's wife, when she asked him whether it was better to get rich or wise (to acquire riches or wisdom): Rich, he replied: for, said he, I see the philosophers waiting (passing their time) at the doors of the rich'. This same story is alluded to by Plato, Rep. VI 489 C, without naming the author of the saying, who indignantly denies its truth. The Scholiast, in supplying the omission, combines the two different versions of Aristotle and Diog. Laert., and describes it as a dialogue between Socrates and Eubulus. Diog. Laert. (II 8. 4, Aristip. § 69) tells the story thus: ἐρωτηθεὶς (Aristippus) ὑπὸ Διονυσίου διὰ τί οἱ μὲν φιλόσοφοι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐκέτι, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἴσασιν ὧν δεόνται, οἱ δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The merit of another *mot* attributed to Aristippus, as it is also connected with our present subject, may excuse its insertion here. Διονυσίου ποτ' ἐρωμένον (τὸν Ἀριστιππον) ἐπὶ τί ἤκοι, ἔφη... ὅποτε μὲν σοφίας ἐδεόμην, ἤκον παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτην· νῦν δὲ χρημάτων δεόμενος παρὰ σέ ἤκω. Diog. Laert. u. s. § 78.

πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἰέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρείττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· πλούσιον εἶπειν τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων p. 84  
 3 θύραις διατρίβοντας. καὶ τὸ οἶεσθαι ἀξιόους εἶναι ἄρχειν· ἔχειν γὰρ οἶονται ὧν ἕνεκεν ἄρχειν ἄξιον. καὶ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, ἀνοήτου εὐδαίμονος ἥθους ὁ  
 4 πλοῦτος ἐστίν. διαφέρει δὲ τοῖς νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις καὶ τοῖς πάλαι τὰ ἥθη τῷ ἅπαντα μᾶλλον καὶ φανλότερα τὰ κακὰ ἔχειν τοὺς νεοπλούτους· ὥσπερ γὰρ

On ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις, see Ast ad Pl. Phaedr. 245 A, p. 376. Add to the examples there given, Plat. Symp. 183 A, 203 D, de amantibus. θυραυλεῖν, Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 144, Stallbaum ad Symp. 203 D, Arist. Eccl. 963.

§ 3. καὶ τὸ οἶεσθαι (ἔπεται τῷ πλούτῳ). ‘Cum καὶ οἱ οἰόμενοι pergere oporteret, τὸ οἶεσθαι posuit.’ Vater. ‘Wealth too is accompanied (in the minds of its possessors) by the opinion of a just claim to power (office, authority); and this is due to the supposition that they have what makes power worth having (ἀξίον). This I think is the only way of translating the text, with ἀξίον: and so the *Vetus Translatio*; *habere enim putant quorum gratia principari dignum*. The version of Victorius is *quod tenere se putant ea, quae qui possident regno digni sunt*. But this seems to require ἀξιοί, though the sense and connexion are certainly better; ἀξιοί had suggested itself to me as a probable emendation. Bekker and Spengel retain ἀξίον. ‘And in sum, the character that belongs to wealth is that of a thriving blockhead (a prosperous fool, good luck without sense).’ Victorius very properly observes that εὐδαιμονία is not to be understood in its strict ethical sense of real happiness, which must exclude folly, but it is used here loosely as a synonym of εὐτυχία. He also quotes a parallel phrase in Cic. de Amic. (54), *nihil insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest*.

§ 4. ‘However there is a difference in the characters of the recent and the hereditary possessors of wealth, in that the newly-enriched have all the bad qualities of their condition (τά) in a higher degree and worse (than the others); for recently acquired wealth is a sort of want of training in wealth (in the conduct, the use and enjoyment of it)’. On the habit of the *parvenu*, Victorius quotes Plut. Symp. VII, p. 708 C, καὶ περὶ οἶνων διαφορὰς καὶ μύρων ἐρωτᾶν καὶ διαπνυθάνεσθαι φορτικὸν κομιδῇ καὶ νεόπλουτον; and Gaisford, Aesch. Agam. 1009, εἰ δ’ οὖν ἀνάγκη τῆσδ’ ἐπιρροέοι τύχης, ἀρχαιοπλούτων δεσποτῶν πολλή χάρις· οἱ δ’ οὐποτ’ ἐλπίσαντες ἤμυσαν καλῶς ὧμοί τε δούλοις πάντα καὶ παρὰ σταθμῇν. Blomfield’s Glossary. Donaldson’s *New Crat.* § 323. *Supra* II 9.9.

‘And the crimes that the wealthy commit are not of a mean character—petty offences of fraud and mischief—but are either crimes of insolence and violence or of licentiousness, such as assault (outrage on the person) in the one case, and adultery in the other’.



ἀπαιδευσία πλούτου ἐστὶ τὸ νεόπλουτον εἶναι. καὶ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ κακουργικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικά τὰ δὲ ἀκρατευτικά, οἷον εἰς αἰκίαν καὶ μοιχείαν.

- 1 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως σχεδὸν τὰ πλείεστα CHAP.  
XVII.  
φανερὰ ἐστὶν ἦθῃ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει ἡ δύνα-  
2 μιν τῷ πλούτῳ τὰ δὲ βελτίῳ· φιλοτιμότεροι γὰρ  
καὶ ἀνδρωδέστεροί εἰσι τὰ ἦθῃ οἱ δυνάμενοι τῶν  
πλουσίων διὰ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἔργων ὅσα ἐξουσία αὐτοῖς  
3 πράττειν διὰ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σπουδαστικώτεροι  
διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι, ἀναγκαζόμενοι σκοπεῖν τὰ  
4 περὶ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σεμνότεροι ἢ βαρύτεροι· ποιεῖ

*εἰς αἰκίαν κ.τ.λ.*] signifies the direction or tendency, or the issue or result, of the particular ἀδικημα. This distinction of crimes has already occurred twice in the delineation of the characters of Youth and Age, II 12. 15 (see note), and 13. 14. αἰκία, the legal crime of assault and battery, is here adduced as an illustration of ὑβρις, though under the Attic law it is expressly distinguished from it; ὑβρις denoting a higher class of crimes, subject to a γραφή or public prosecution, αἰκία only to a δίκη, private suit or action. [Isocr. Or. 20 §§ 2, 5; Dem. Or. 54 (Conon) §§ 1, 17. Comp. Jebb's *Attic Orators* II 215—6.]

#### CHAP. XVII.

§ 1. 'And in like manner also of power, most of the characters are pretty clear, the characteristics of power being in some points (or particulars) the same as those of wealth'.

§ 2. 'In others better (but still of the same *kind*); for the powerful are more ambitious and more manly (or masculine) in their characters than the wealthy, which is due to their aspiring to such deeds (achievements) as their power gives them the liberty of effecting'. *ἔστιν δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη* (shewing how nearly the two characters coincide), Eth. Nic. IV 10, 1125 b 11, ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν, Ib. c. 11, 1126 b 2. The *power* supplies the occasion of doing great deeds, and the habit of doing them forms the ambitious and masculine character: *wealth* does not confer such opportunities.

§ 3. 'And more active and energetic, by reason of the constant attention they are obliged to pay in looking to the means of maintaining their power'; which without such close attention might probably slip from their hands.

§ 4. 'And they are rather proud and dignified than offensive, because their distinguished rank (or position) by making them more conspicuous (than all the rest) obliges them to moderation (in their demeanour). This pride and dignity is a softened (subdued) and graceful arrogance (or assumption)'.

γὰρ ἐμφανεστέρους τὸ ἀξίωμα, διὸ μετριάζουσιν·  
ἔστι δὲ ἡ σεμνότης μαλακὴ καὶ εὐσχήμων βαρύτης.  
καὶν ἀδικῶσιν, οὐ μικραδικηταί· εἰσιν ἀλλὰ μεγάλα-  
δικοι.

- 5 ἡ δ' εὐτυχία κατὰ τε<sup>1</sup> μόρια τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχει  
τὰ ἥθη· εἰς γὰρ ταῦτα συντείνουσιν αἱ μέγιστα  
δοκοῦσαι εἶναι εὐτυχίαι· καὶ ἔτι εἰς εὐτεκνίαν καὶ τὰ  
κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθὰ παρασκευάζει ἡ εὐτυχία πλεον-  
6 εκτεῖν. ὑπερφανώτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀλογιστότεροι P. 1391 δ.  
διὰ τὴν εὐτυχίαν εἰσιν, ἐν δ' ἀκολουθεῖ βέλτιστον

<sup>1</sup> 'leg. τὰ' [margin of Mr Cope's copy of Bekker's Oxford ed. 1837].

βαρύς, heavy, burdensome, and hence offensive, the German *lästig*.  
βαρύτης, 'offensiveness' in general; Dem., de Cor. § 35, speaks of the  
ἀναλησσία and βαρύτης of the Thebans, where it evidently means *im-  
portunitas*. Similarly in Isocr. Panath. § 31, it belongs to the character of  
the πεπαιδευμένοι, to assume themselves a becoming and fair behaviour to  
their associates, καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ  
ῥαδίως φέροντας; where it seems to denote offensiveness in the form of ill  
manners. Here it is applied to a particular kind of offensiveness or bad  
manners, which shews itself in that excess or exaggeration of σεμνότης or  
pride called arrogance and assumption. 'Whenever they *do* commit a  
crime, the criminality shews itself, not in a trifling and mean offence, but  
on a grand scale, in high crimes and misdemeanours'.

§ 5. 'Now the characters of good fortune are indeed found (or ex-  
hibited, principally) in the parts (the three divisions) of those already  
mentioned—for all those which are considered the most important kinds of  
good fortune *do* in fact converge to these—but also besides these, good  
fortune (prosperity) provides an advantage (over a man's neighbours) in  
respect of happiness of family, and all personal gifts and accomplish-  
ments'.

πλεονεκτεῖν] must here, I think, be used, not in its ordinary and  
popular *acquired* signification, of seeking an *undue* share, covetousness,  
greed, rapacity, but in the simple and literal meaning, which it sometimes  
bears, of having an advantage (of any kind) over others. The ordinary  
sense—though Victorius appears to understand it so—seems to me quite  
inappropriate to the passage. These other kinds of good fortune are  
supplied in the list given I 5.4, where εὐτεκνία and τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθὰ,  
are both introduced, and the particulars of the latter enumerated.

§ 6. 'Now though good fortune makes men more arrogant, over-  
weening and inconsiderate, thoughtless, yet good fortune is attended by  
one excellent characteristic, viz. that (the fortunate) are pious or lovers of  
the gods' (God-fearing, we say), 'and have a certain religious character,  
their trust in them being due to the good things they have derived from  
fortune'; they are in reality due to fortune, but are ascribed by them to the

ἦθος τῇ εὐτυχίᾳ, ὅτι φιλόθεοί εἰσι καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ θεῖον πως, πιστεύοντες διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν καὶ τύχην ἡθῶν εἴρηται· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φανερά ἐστιν, οἷον πένητος καὶ ἀτυχοῦς ἦθος  
1 καὶ ἀδυνάτου. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τῶν πιθανῶν λόγων χρῆσις CHAP. XVIII.

divine grace and favour. Lactantius, Div. Inst. II 1.8 (quoted by Gaisford), gives a truer account of this matter: *Tum* (in prosperis rebus) *maxime Deus ex memoria hominum elabitur, cum beneficiis eius fruentes honorem dare divinae indulgentiae deberent. At vero si qua necessitas gravis presserit, tunc Deum recordantur.* And Lucret. III 53, *multoque in rebus acerbis acrius advertunt animos ad religionem.*

'So of the characters which follow the various ages and conditions of life enough has been said; for the opposites of those that have been described, as the character of the poor man, the unsuccessful (unfortunate), and the powerless, may be easily ascertained from their opposites', i.e. by substituting the opposites of *their* opposites, the characteristics, viz. of poverty, misfortune, powerlessness, for those of wealth, prosperity, and power.

#### CHAP. XVIII.

The following chapter marks a division of the general subject of the work, and a stage or landing-place, from which we look back to what has been already done, and forwards to what still remains to do. The evident intention of the writer is to give a summary statement of the entire plan, and the main division of his system of Rhetoric, contained in the first two books, which comprise all the intellectual part, τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, II 26. 5, all that depends on argument; as opposed to the non-essential and ornamental part, style, action, and arrangement, treated in Bk. III. And it may fairly be supposed that it was also his intention to arrange these divisions in the same order as that which he proposed to follow in the actual treatment of the subject.

But in the text, at any rate of the first half of the chapter, to ποιητέον, this order is not observed; and there is altogether so much irregularity and confusion in the structure of the sentences, and such a mixture of heterogeneous subjects, that it seems tolerably certain that we have not this portion of the chapter in the form in which Aristotle wrote it. First, the long parenthesis about the applicability of the terms κρίσις or decision, and κρίτης, judge or critic, to all the three branches of Rhetoric, has no natural connexion with the context—though at the same time it is quite true that the use of the parenthesis, a note inserted in the text, is a marked feature of Aristotle's ordinary style: still this would be an exaggeration, or abuse of the peculiarity. Spengel has pointed out (*Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 35), that the whole of this parenthesis, ἔστι δέ—βουλεύονται [p. 175, line 2, to p. 176, last line], is nothing but an expansion of a preceding passage,

1 1. 2, the same notion being here carried out into detail. But although it is so much out of place that it is hardly conceivable that even Aristotle (whose style is not remarkable for its close connexion—is in fact often rather rambling and incoherent) should have introduced it here, as part of an enormous protasis of which the apodosis or conclusion relates to something entirely different; yet as it bears all the characteristic marks of the author's style, including the irregularity and the heaping of parenthesis upon parenthesis, though it was most probably not written for this place, there is no reason to doubt that it proceeds from the pen of Aristotle.

The parenthesis ends at *βουλεύονται*, and we ought now to resume the interrupted *πρότασις*. This appears, according to the ordinary punctuation, (with the full stop at *πρότερον*), to be carried on as far as *πρότερον*, the conclusion or apodosis being introduced by *ὥστε*, as usual. The grammar *ἐπεὶ...ὥστε* is no objection to this, since we have already seen (note on 11 9. 11) that Aristotle is often guilty of this, and even greater grammatical irregularities. But the sense shews that the passage when thus read cannot be sound. There is no real conclusion; for it by no means follows that, because 'the employment of all persuasive speeches is directed to a *decision* of some kind', and because (second member of protasis) 'the political characters' have been described (in 1 8), 'therefore it has been determined how and by what means or materials speeches may be invested with an ethical character'. In fact it is a complete *non-sequitur*.

Bekker [ed. 3] and Spengel, in order to establish a connexion between protasis and apodosis, put a comma at *πρότερον*; suppose that the preceding sentence from the beginning of the chapter is left incomplete, without apodosis, at *βουλεύονται*; and that *ὥστε* marks the conclusion *only* from the clause immediately preceding; the meaning then being, that the description of the 'political characters' in 1 8 is a sufficient determination of the modes of imparting an ethical character to the speech. But this cannot be right: for not only is the fact alleged quite insufficient in itself to support the conclusion supposed to be deduced from it, but also the two kinds of characters designated are in fact different; and it could not be argued from the mere description of the characters of 1 8, that the *ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι* had been sufficiently discussed and determined; which is in fact done—so far as it is done at all—in 11 1, and not in 1 8.

Other proposed alterations and suggested difficulties in the rest of the chapter may be left for discussion to their place in the Commentary: the meaning and connexion of this part are in general perfectly intelligible, though omission, interpolation, and obscurity or error are alleged against this and that phrase; and the order of the actual contents of the work coincides essentially and in the main with that which is here followed.

I have now to state the views of two recent critics and commentators upon the whole passage, in its connexion with the order of the several divisions of the entire work.

Spengel's views upon this subject are to be found in his tract *über die Rhetorik des Arist.*, in the *Transactions of the Bav. Acad.* 1851,

pp. 32—37 ; a work which I have already had frequent occasion to refer to. He had previously spoken of the order contemplated and adopted by Aristotle, in the arrangement of the three main divisions of his subject ; the analysis of the direct proofs, *πίστεις*, by logical argument, and the two modes of indirect confirmation of the others, the *ἡθῆ*, and the *πάθῃ*. The passages which he himself quotes in illustration of the first order in which Aristotle proposes to take them, pp. 25—27, shew that the order is *πίστεις*, *ἡθῆ*, *πάθῃ* : nevertheless Spengel inverts the two last, p. 30 et seq., omitting the actual treatment of the *ἡθῶς*, as a *subsidiary argument* or mode of persuasion in II 1, the true *ἡθῶς ἐν τῷ λέγοντι* ; and, as it seems to me, confounding that with a totally different set of characters, which are delineated as an appendix to the *πάθῃ*, and consequently *after* them in II 12—17. This I have already pointed out, and explained the real application of the six characters of II 12—17 to the purposes of Rhetoric, in the Introduction p. 110, foll. and at the commencement of c. 12 in the Commentary. Spengel notices the inconclusive *ὥστε* in the apodosis, c. 18. 1 (p. 34), apparently assuming that the passage is corrupt, but throws no further light upon the interpretation or means of correcting the section. Next we have, p. 36 foll., an attempt to prove that τὰ λοιπά, in § 5, is to be understood of the treatment of the *πάθος* and *ἡθῶς* contained severally in c. 2—11 and 12—17 of Bk. II, and that consequently from the words *ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσθέντες ἀποδῶμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν* we are to conclude that the order of treatment of the contents of the first two books was as follows ; the *εἰδη*, or *πίστεις ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου* (as if the *ἡθῶς* and *πάθος* were not equally conveyed *by the speech itself*), occupying the first book ; next, the four *κοινὸι τόποι*, and the second part of the logical *πίστεις*, II 18—26 ; and thirdly, the *πάθος* and *ἡθῶς* in the first seventeen chapters of Bk. II, which originally formed the conclusion of that book, though now the order of the two parts is inverted.

Vahlen, in a paper in the *Transactions of the Vienna Acad. of Sciences*, Oct. 1861, pp. 59—148, has gone at some length into the questions that arise out of this eighteenth chapter, where it is compared with other passages in which Aristotle has indicated the order in which he meant to treat the several divisions of his subject. Op. cit. 121—132. His principal object in writing, he says, p. 122, is to defend against Brandis' criticisms Spengel's view that the original arrangement of Aristotle in treating the subjects of the second book has been subsequently inverted in the order in which they now stand ; Aristotle having intended to complete the survey of the logical department of Rhetoric before he entered upon the *ἡθῆ* and *πάθῃ*. He is of opinion (p. 126) that the analysis of the *κοινὸι τόποι* came next (in accordance with the original plan) to the *εἰδη* of the first book ; and consequently that there is a gap at the opening of the second between the conclusion of the *εἰδη* and the commencement of the *ἡθῆ* and *πάθῃ* ; and that as a further consequence, the words in § 2, *εἰ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἡθικὸς—διώρισται*, are an interpolation of some editor of Aristotle's work, who introduced them, *after the κοινὸι τόποι had been transferred to their present place*, as a necessary recognition of what had actually been done. His principal object is in fact to establish what he conceives to be the true order of the several parts of

the work; and in doing so he deals, as it seems to me, in the most arbitrary manner with Aristotle's text. He assumes a Redactor, or Editor, who has taken various liberties with the text of his author, and has interpolated various passages, chiefly relating to the *ῆθη*, to supply what he conceived to be deficient after the order had been changed. How or why the order was changed, neither he nor Spengel gives us any indication; and the supposition of these repeated interpolations has little or no foundation except his own hypothesis of the inseparable connexion of the *εἶδη* and *κοινοὶ τόποι*: for my own part I cannot find in the passages which he quotes in support of this opinion, or elsewhere in Aristotle's Rhetoric, any statement of a necessary connexion between the two, such as to make it imperative that the *κοινοὶ τόποι* should be treated immediately after the *εἶδη*. The order of treatment which we find in the received text appears to be sufficiently natural and regular to defend it—in default of the strongest evidence to the contrary—against the suspicion of dislocation and interpolation, though no doubt the order suggested by Vahlen may be, considered in itself, more strictly logical and consecutive. On the connexion of the clauses of the passage now under consideration (c. 18 § 1), and how and why the long inappropriate parenthesis was introduced *here*—which are, after all, the things that most require explanation—he leaves us as much in the dark as his predecessor Spengel. His interpretation of *τὰ λοιπά* (which Spengel seems to have misunderstood), and anything else that requires notice, may be left for the notes on the passages to which they belong.

I have suggested in the Introduction, p. 250, the possibility of the accidental omission of some words or sentences between *εἴρηται πρότερον* and *ὥστε διωρισμένον*, in order to supply some connexion between protasis and apodosis, and give some significance to the conclusion; but without any great confidence in the success of the attempt to solve the difficulty: to which I am bound to add that it leaves unexplained the introduction of the parenthesis, *ἔστι δέ—βουλευόνται*, which, however and whencesoever it may have been introduced, is here most certainly out of place. And I will now proceed to give a summary of the contents of the chapter, as I understand them.

All speeches which have persuasion for their object are addressed to, or look to, a *decision* of some kind. In the two more important branches of Rhetoric, the deliberative and forensic, *ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγῶσιν*, the *decision* and the *judge* may be understood literally: in the third or epideictic branch, the audience is in some sense also a judge, in his capacity of *critic*, being called upon to *decide* or pass sentence on the merits of the composition. Still it is only in the first two that the term 'judge' can be applied to the hearer in its absolute, or strict and proper sense (*ἀπλῶς κριτής*). Then, as a second member of the protasis, comes a clause which has the appearance of being a continuation or supplement of something which has been lost—a reference, namely, to the treatment of the *ῆθος* in II 1, which might justify the conclusion that follows, that 'it has now been determined in what way and by what means speeches may be made to assume an ethical character'. Still the sentence and its statements remain incomplete: for if, as it appears, Aristotle's intention was to give an enumeration in detail of the main divisions of his Rhetoric

πρὸς κρίσιν ἐστὶ (περὶ ὧν γὰρ ἴσμεν καὶ κεκρίκαμεν,  
οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ λόγου), ἐστὶ δέ, ἃν τε πρὸς ἓνα τις τῶ p. 85.

in the order in which he had placed them, the omission of the important department of the *πάθη* would be quite unaccountable, unless indeed—which I am myself inclined to believe—he meant to include the *πάθη* under the general head of *ἠθικοὶ λόγοι*; which, as the treatment of the *πάθη* belongs to Ethics, and the effects of the use of them by the speaker are purely ethical, he was fairly entitled to do. At the same time, if this be admitted, the *first part* of the protasis with the parenthesis appended has no sufficient connexion with the conclusive *ῥοτε*: nor is it clear why the ‘political characters’, which do not come under the *ἦθος* proper, should be especially singled out as one at least of its representatives: though, if I am right in supposing something to be lost which stood before this clause, it might very likely have contained something which led to the mention of these characters, as one of the varieties of *ἦθος* which impart an ethical colour to the speech.

However, let us suppose at least, as we fairly may, that Aristotle’s intention, however frustrated by corruption of his manuscript, was to tell us what he had already done from the commencement of the second book, and what he next proposed to do in the remainder of it. He has hitherto been employed (in this book) upon the Ethical branches of the art, by which the character of the speaker himself may be displayed in a favourable light, and the emotions of the audience directed into a channel favourable to the designs of the orator, § 1.

We now take a fresh start, and from a new protasis, which states that the *εἶδη*, from which the statesman and public speaker, the pleader, and the declaimer, may derive their premisses and proofs, have been analysed under these three branches of Rhetoric, and also the materials, which may serve for imparting an ethical colour (in two senses, as before) to the speech, have been already despatched and determined, we arrive at the conclusion that it is now time to enter upon the subject of the *κοινοί* or universal topics—three in number as they are here classified, the possible and impossible, the past and the future, and amplification or exaggeration and depreciation—which comes next in order; and is accordingly treated in the following chapter. When this has been settled, we must endeavour to find something to say about *enthymemes* in general, arguments which may be applied to all the branches of Rhetoric alike, and *examples*, the two great departments of rhetorical reasoning or proof, ‘that by the addition of what still remained to be done’ (that is, by the completion of the logical division of the subject, by the discussion of enthymemes and examples, c. 20, the enthymeme including the *γνώμη*, c. 21, the varieties of enthymeme, demonstrative and refutative, c. 22, and specimens of these, c. 23, fallacious enthymemes, c. 24, and the solution of them, c. 25, with an appendix, c. 26), ‘we may fulfil the engagement, the task, which we proposed to ourselves at the outset of this work’.

§ 1. ἔστι δέ, ἃν τε πρὸς ἓνα κ.τ.λ.] Comp. I 3. 2. 3, of which most of the statements of this parenthesis are a repetition, though in other words. This may help to account for the introduction of it here, where the

λόγῳ χρώμενος προτρέπη ἢ ἀποτρέπη, οἷον οἱ νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡττον κριτῆς ὁ εἶς· ὃν γὰρ δεῖ πείσαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κριτῆς), εἴαν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἴαν τε πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν λέγῃ τις, ὁμοίως· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τάναντία, πρὸς ἃ ὥσπερ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς· ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν. ὅλως δὲ μόνος ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς κριτῆς ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὃ τὰ ζητούμενα κρίνων· τὰ τε γὰρ ἀμφισβητούμενα ζητεῖται πῶς ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ὧν βουλευόνται. περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολι-

author is reviewing the progress of his work; the same train of reasoning recurs to his mind, and he starts again with the same topic.

κριτῆς ὁ εἶς] Comp. III 12. 5.

εἴαν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντα κ.τ.λ.] ‘Whether you are arguing against a real antagonist (in a court of law, or the public assembly), or merely against some thesis or theory (where there is no antagonist of flesh and blood to oppose you); for the speech must be used as an instrument, and the opposite (theory or arguments) refuted, against which—as though it were an imaginary antagonist—you are directing your words’. In either case, if you want to persuade or convince any one, as an antagonist real or imaginary, you are looking for a decision or judgment in some sense or other: in the case of the defence of the thesis, the opposing argument or theory, which has to be overcome, seems to stand in the place of the antagonist in a contest of real life, who must be convinced if you are to succeed. When you want to convince anyone, you make him your judge.

ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν κ.τ.λ.] ‘the composition of the speech is directed (submitted) to the spectator (for his judgment or decision) as though he were a judge’. The spectator, the person who comes to listen to a declamation, like a spectator at a show, for amusement or criticism, stands to the *panegyric*, or declamatory show-speech, as a critic, in the same position as the judge to the parties whose case he has to decide. I 3. 2, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτὴν...ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως (κρίνων) ὁ θεωρός.

‘But as a general rule it is only the person who decides the points in question in political (public, including judicial) contests that is absolutely (strictly and properly) to be called a judge; for the inquiry is directed in the one to the points in dispute (between the two parties in the case) to see how the truth really stands, in the other to the subject of deliberation’.



τείας ἡθῶν ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον,<sup>1</sup>  
 ὥστε διωρισμένον ἂν εἴη πῶς τε καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς  
 2 λόγους ἡθικοὺς ποιητέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον μὲν  
 γένος τῶν λόγων ἕτερον ἦν τὸ τέλος, περὶ ἀπάντων  
 δ' αὐτῶν εἰλημμένοι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσὶν ἐξ ὧν  
 τὰς πίστεις φέρουσι καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπι-  
 δεικνύμενοι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, ἔτι δ' ἐξ ὧν ἡθικοὺς  
 τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων διώ-  
 3 ρισται, λοιπὸν ἡμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν· πᾶσι  
 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὰ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου  
 προσχρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἔσται  
 4 τοὺς δὲ ὡς γέγονε πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι. ἔτι δὲ περὶ  
 μεγέθους κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων· χρῶνται  
 γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειοῦν καὶ αὖξιν καὶ συμβουλεύον-

<sup>1</sup> πρότερον. ὥστε Bekker (ed. 1831).

ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς] The division of the work, from I 4. 7 to I 8 inclusive, in which is contained the analysis of the various εἶδη, or special topics, which belong to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric. The punctuation πρότερον, ὥστε, in Bekker's [later] editions and in Spengel's, making ὥστε—ποιητέον the apodosis to the preceding clause only, has been already mentioned in the introductory note to this chapter [p. 172, middle], and the arguments against it stated.

εἴρηται πρότερον] I c. 8, see especially § 7: the notes on § 6, and Introd. p. 182, and p. 110.

§ 2. ἕτερον ἦν τὸ τέλος] ἦν, 'is as was said', sc. I 3. 1, seq.

δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις] δόξαι are the popular prevailing opinions which form the only materials of Rhetoric, προτάσεις the premisses of his enthymemes, which the professor of the art constructs out of them. Vahlen, *Trans. Vienna Acad.* u. s., p. 128, remarks that this combination of δόξα and πρότασις occurs nowhere else except here and in II 1. 1, and is an additional mark of the connexion between that passage and this chapter.

συμβουλεύοντες] in I 4. 7, to I 8; ἐπιδεικνύμενοι in I 9; and ἀμφισβητοῦντες, I 10—15.

ἔτι δὲ.....διώριστα] Vahlen (u. s., p. 126), in conformity with his somewhat arbitrary hypothesis, has, as already mentioned, condemned this clause as an interpolation, partly on account of the absence of the πάθη where they required special mention. I have already observed that in default of any other evidence of the spuriousness of the passage we may very well suppose that Ar. intended to include them in the ἡθικοὶ λόγοι [see p. 175 *init.*].

§§ 3, 4. The four κοινὸι τόποι, common to all three branches of Rhetoric. These are illustrated in c. 19.

προσχρῆσθαι] to employ them in addition to the εἶδη.

AR. II.

12

τες<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἢ  
 5 ἀπολογοῦμενοι. τούτων δὲ διορισθέντων περὶ τε ἐνθυ- P. 1392.  
 μημάτων κοινῇ πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι ἔχομεν, καὶ  
 περὶ παραδειγμάτων, ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσθέντες ἀπο-  
 δώμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν· ἔστι δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ  
 μὲν αὖξιν οἰκειότατον τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται,  
 τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς (περὶ τούτων γὰρ ἡ κρί-  
 σις), τὸ δὲ δυνατόν καὶ ἐσόμενον τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς.

I πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦ λέγω- CHAP. XIX.  
 P. 86.

<sup>1</sup> + ἢ ἀποτρέποντες Bekker (ed. 1831) A<sup>c</sup>. καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες Q, Y<sup>b</sup>, Z<sup>b</sup>.

ἢ ἀποτρέποντες is rejected by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], and is certainly suspicious. The latter had already remarked, *Trans. Bav. Acad.* [1851], p. 33, note 2, that Ar. never uses συμβουλεύειν for προτρέπειν, as he has done in this case if the text be genuine. Therefore, either συμβουλεύοντες must be changed into προτρέποντες (printed by an oversight ἀποτρέποντες) or better, ἢ ἀποτρέποντες erased: the course which he has adopted in his recent edition. Of course Arist. employs συμβουλεύειν as a general term including both persuasion and dissuasion; as in II 22. 5 and 8 (referred to by Spengel).

§ 5. Next to the κοινὸι τόποι will follow the illustration of the κοινὸι πίστεις, c. 20. 1, the universal instruments of all persuasion, Example (c. 20), Enthymeme (and its varieties) cc. 21—24, with an appendix on Refutation, c. 25 (and a shorter one of a miscellaneous character, c. 26).

τα λοιπά] interpreted by Spengel, u. s., of the ἡθῆ and πάθη, which he supposes to have been treated last in this book; and by Vahlen (rightly, as I think) of the logical part of the treatise, the enthymemes and examples, 'which still remain' (after the analysis of the κοινὸι τόποι) to be handled, u. s., p. 129). Brandis, ap. Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV 1, p. 7, note 7, unnecessarily limits τὰ λοιπὰ to the contents of cc. 23—26. Schrader, "doctrinam de elocutione et dispositione hoc verbo innuit, quam tertio libro tradit." Vahlen, u. s., pp. 128 and 132, contemptuously rejects this interpretation.

ἀποδῶμεν τὴν πρόθεσιν] On ἀποδιδόναι, see note on I 1. 7. Here, to fulfil a purpose or intention, *lit.* to render it back, or pay it as a due, to the original undertaking.

ὥσπερ εἴρηται] I 9. 40. Comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 6 (7). 2. τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς, I 9. 40; I 3. 4 and 8. τὸ δὲ δυνατόν... τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς, I 3. 2, and 8.

τὸ γεγονὸς..... περὶ τούτων] 'Fact', as an abstract conception, and therefore neut. sing., is represented in its particulars or details—the particular, individual, instances, from which the notion is generalised—in the plural τούτων.

#### CHAP. XIX.

In the following chapter the κοινὸι τόποι are treated under the three heads, (1) of the possible and impossible, (2) fact, past and future, and (3)

μεν. ἂν δὴ τὸ ἑναντίον ἢ δυνατόν ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἑναντίον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι δυνατόν, οἷον εἰ δυνατόν ἄνθρωπον ὑγιασθῆναι, καὶ νοσῆσαι· ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ 2 δύνάμιστῶν ἑναντίων, ἢ ἑναντία. καὶ εἰ τὸ ὅμοιον

amplification and depreciation; for the topic of *degree*, of greater and less, or the comparative estimate of goods, which might be distinguished from the third, seems here, and c. 18. 3, 4, to be included in it. In the latter of the two passages, this third *τόπος* is called simply *περὶ μεγέθους*, and here the two parts are included under the one phrase *περὶ μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν*, which is equivalent to *αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν*, and denotes one general topic. I wish so far to correct what I have said in the *Introd.* p. 129. They may also be divided into four, or six heads.

Of the importance of the first in deliberative oratory Cicero says, de Orat. II 82. 336, *Sed quid fieri possit aut non possit quidque etiam sit necesse aut non sit, in utraque re maxime quaerendum. Inciditur enim omnis iam deliberatio, si intelligitur non posse fieri aut si necessitas affertur; et qui id docuit non videntibus aliis, is plurimum vidit.*

Quintilian has some observations on the possible, and necessary, as *partes suadendi*, Inst. Or. III 8. 22—26.

On *δύναμις*, *δυνατόν* and the opposite, and their various senses, there is a chapter in *Metaph.* Δ 12.

§ 1. 'The possibility of anything, in respect of being or coming to be, implies the possibility of the contrary: as, for example, if it be possible for a man to be cured, it is possible for him also to fall ill: for there is the same power, faculty, potentiality, i. e. possibility of affecting a subject, in the two contraries, in so far as they are contrary one to another'.

ἢ ἑναντία] i. e. solely in respect of their being contraries, and excluding all other considerations. As in the instance given, a man is equally liable to be affected by health and sickness in so far as they are contraries, without regard to any properties or qualities in himself, which may render him more or less liable to one or the other. This is Schrader's explanation.

τὰναντία] 'contraries' is one of the four varieties of *ἀντικείμενα*, 'opposites'. These are (1) *ἀντίφασις*, 'contradiction' (or contradictories), *κατάφασις* and *ἀπόφασις*, affirmation and negation, affirmative and negative, to be and not to be, yes and no. (2) τὰ ἑναντία, 'contraries' which are defined as the extreme opposites under the same genus—good and bad, black and white, long and short, quick and slow, &c.—which cannot reside in the same subject together. (3) Relative opposites, τὰ πρὸς τι, as double and half, master and servant, father and son, &c. And (4) opposites of state and privation, *ἔξις* and *στέρησις*, the possession of something and the privation, absence, want, of it; as sight and blindness. (This last term, however, privation, is properly applied only to cases in which the opposite, possession or state, is *natural* to the possessor; in which consequently that which *wants* it, is *deprived*—defrauded, as it were—of something to which it has a natural claim: blindness can only be called a *στέρησις* when the individual affected by it belongs to a class

of animals which have the faculty of vision: τυφλὸν λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν. Categ. c. 10, 12 a 26 seq.) On 'opposites', see Categ. cc. 10, 11. Top. B 2, 109 b 17—23. Ib. c. 8, 113 b 15 seq. Ib. E 6. Metaph. Δ 10, 1018 a 20 seq. (where two more kinds are added, unnecessarily, see Bonitz ad loc.) and I 4, 1055 a 38, where the usual four are alone mentioned. Cicero, Topic. XI 47—49, enumerates and illustrates the same four. Of *ἐναντία* he says, *Haec, quae ex eodem genere contraria sunt appellantur adversa*. *Contrarium* with him is Aristotle's ἀντικείμενον, the *genus*, or general notion of *opposite*.

The *argument* from contraries, as employed here, is this: the possibility of anything *being* or becoming the one, implies that of being or becoming the other; only not both at once: a virtuous man may always become (has the capacity, δύναμις, of becoming) vicious, and the converse; but ἐνεργεία, when the one state is actually present, and realised in the subject, it excludes the other. This reciprocal possibility in contraries arises from the fact that the two contraries belong to the same *genus* or class. Black and white both fall under the *genus* colour, of which they are the extremes; they pass from one into the other by insensible gradations of infinite variety, from which we may infer that any surface that admits of colour at all, will admit either of them indifferently apart, but not together; two different colours cannot be shewn on the same surface and at the same time.

§ 2. Again, likeness or resemblance, τὸ ὁμοιον, between two things suggests or implies a common possibility; if one thing can be done, the probability is that anything else *like it* can be done equally.

This is a variety of the argument from *analogy*. We have a tendency, which appears to be natural and instinctive, to infer from any manifest or apparent resemblance between two objects, that is, from certain properties or attributes which they are seen or known to possess in common, the common possession of other properties and attributes, which are not otherwise known to belong to them, whereby we are induced to refer them to the same class. So here, the likeness of two things in certain respects, is thought to imply something different, which is also common to both; a common capacity or possibility. The argument being here applied solely to the use of Rhetoric, the things in question are rather actions and their consequences than facts and objects: if it has been found possible to effect something, to gain some political advantage for instance, in several previous cases, we argue that in the similar, parallel case which is under consideration, the like possibility may be expected.

This however, though the popular view of the argument from analogy, and the ordinary mode of applying it, is not, strictly speaking, the right application of the term. Analogy, τὸ ἀνάλογον, is arithmetical or geometrical proportion, and represents a similarity, not between objects themselves, but between the relations of them. See Sir W. Hamilton, *Lect. on Logic*, Vol. II. p. 165—174, Lect. XXXII, and on this point, p. 170. Whately (*Rhet.* p. 74, c. 1), "Analogy, being a resemblance of ratios, that should strictly be called an argument from analogy, in which the two cases (viz. the one *from* which, and the one *to* which we argue) are not themselves alike, but stand in a similar *relation* to something else; or, in other words, that the common genus that they both fall under, consists

3 δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον. καὶ εἰ τὸ χαλεπώτερον  
4 δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ῥᾶον. καὶ εἰ τὸ σπουδαῖον καὶ καλὸν  
γεγένησθαι δυνατόν, καὶ ὅλως δυνατόν γεγένησθαι χαλε-  
5 πώτερον γὰρ καλὴν οἰκίαν ἢ οἰκίαν εἶναι. καὶ οὗ

in a relation." This he illustrates by two examples of analogical reasoning. One of them is, the inferences that may be drawn as to mental qualities and the changes they undergo, from similar changes (i.e. relations) in the physical constitution—though of course there can be no direct resemblance between them. Hamilton's illustration of analogy proper is derived directly from a numerical proportion: that of analogy in its popular usage is, "This disease corresponds in many symptoms with those we have observed in typhus fevers; it will therefore correspond in all, that is, it is a typhus fever," p. 171.

Butler's *Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion to the constitution and course of Nature* may be regarded as an analogy of relations between them and God the author of both, in the proper sense of the word, though in his Introduction he twice appears to identify analogy with mere likeness or similarity.

Lastly, the logical description of Analogy is to be found in Thomson's *Laws of Thought*, § 121, 'Syllogism of Analogy', p. 250, seq. The author's definition is, p. 252, "the same attributes may be assigned to distinct but similar things, provided they can be shewn to accompany the points of resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference." Or 'when the resemblance is undoubted, and does not depend on one or two external features'), "when one thing resembles another in known particulars, it will resemble it also in the unknown."

On the different kinds of ὁμοίτης and ὁμοία, consult Metaph. Δ 11, 1018 a 15, with Bonitz' note, and Ib. I 3, 1054 b 3, seq., also Top. A 17, on its use as a dialectical topic.

§ 3. 'Thirdly, if the harder of two things (as any undertaking, effort, enterprise, such as the carrying out of any political measure) is possible, then also the easier'. This is by the rule, *omne maius continet in se minus*; or the *argumentum a fortiori*.

§ 4. 'And (again *a fortiori*) the possibility of making or doing any thing *well*, necessarily carries with it the possibility of the making or doing of it in general' (ὅλως, the general or abstract conception of making or doing; in any way, well or ill): 'for to be a *good* house is a harder thing than to be a mere house', of any kind. The same may be said of a *fine* picture, statue, literary composition, or any work of art; anything in short in which ἀρετή, merit, or excellence, τὸ σπουδαῖον, can be shewn. ῥᾶον γὰρ ὅτι οὖν ποιῆσαι ἢ καλῶς ποιῆσαι, Top. Z I, 139 b 8 (cited by Schrader). Compare with this Metaph. Δ 12, 1019 a 23 (on the various acceptations of δυνατόν), ἔτι ἢ τοῦ καλῶς τοῦτ' ἐπιτελεῖν (δύναμις) ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν· ἐνίστε γὰρ τοὺς μόνον ἂν πορευθέντας ἢ εἰπόντας, μὴ καλῶς ἢ μὴ ὥς προεῖλοντο, οὗ φαμεν δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ βαδίζειν; which may possibly have suggested the introduction of the topic here.

§ 5. 'The possibility of the *beginning* of anything implies also that of the *end*: for nothing impossible comes into being or begins to do so,

ἡ ἀρχὴ δύνатаι γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ τέλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γίγνεται οὐδ' ἀρχεται γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον τὸ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι οὐτ' ἂν ἄρξαιτο γίγνεσθαι οὔτε γίγνεται. καὶ οὐ τὸ τέλος, καὶ ἡ  
6 ἀρχὴ δυνατή· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνεται. καὶ

as for example the commensurability of the diameter (with the side of the square) never either begins to, nor actually does, come into being. *To begin implies to end*, says Tennyson, *Two Voices* [line 339]. In interpreting a rhetorical topic which is to guide men's practice, it is plain that we must keep clear of metaphysics. The beginning and end here have nothing to do with the finite and infinite. Nor is it meant that things that can be begun necessarily admit of being finished: the Tower of Babel, as well as other recorded instances of *opera interrupta*, shew that this is not true. And though it may be true of the design or intention, of any attempt, that it always looks forward to an end, immediate or remote, still to the public speaker it is facility and expediency, rather than the mere possibility, of the measure he is recommending, that is likely to be of service in carrying his point. All that is really meant is, that if you want to know whether the end of any course of action, plan, scheme, or indeed of anything—is possible, you must look to the beginning: beginning implies end: if it can be begun, it can also be brought to an end: nothing that is known to be impossible, like squaring the circle, can ever have a beginning, or be brought into being. Schrader exemplifies it by, *Mithridates coepit vinci, ergo et debellari poterit*. Proverbs and passages on the importance of ἀρχή are cited in the note on I 7. 11.

The incommensurability of the diameter with the side of the square, or, which is the same thing, the impossibility of squaring the circle, is Aristotle's stock illustration of the impossible: see examples in Bonitz ad *Metaph. A* 2, 983 a 16. Euclid, *Bk. x. Probl. ult.* Trendelenburg, on *de Anima* III 6. 1, p. 500, explains this: the diameter of a square is represented by the root of 2, which is irrational, and therefore incommensurable with the side. He also observes that Aristotle cannot refer to the squaring of the circle; a question which was still in doubt in the time of Archimedes could not be assumed by Aristotle as an example of impossibility. The illustration, which passed into a proverb, ἐκ διαμέτρου ἀντικείσθαι, is confined to the side and diameter of the parallelogram. See also Waitz on *Anal. Pr.* 41 a 26.

‘And when the end is possible, so also is the beginning, because everything takes its origin, is generated, from a beginning’. The end implies the beginning: everything that comes into being or is produced—everything therefore with which the orator has to deal in his sphere of practical life—has a beginning. Since the beginning is implied in the end, it is clear that if the end be attainable or possible, so likewise must the beginning be.

§ 6. ‘And if it is possible for the latter, the posterior, the subsequent, of two things, either in substance and essence, or generation, to be brought into being, then also the prior, the antecedent; for instance, if a man

εἰ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῇ γενέσει δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον, οἷον εἰ ἄνδρα γενέσθαι δυ-

can be generated, then a child ; for *that* (the child) is prior in generation (every man must have been first a boy ; this is *ἐν γενέσει*, in the order of growth, in the succession of the natural series of generation or propagation) : and if a child, then a man ; because this (the child, *ἐκείνη* being made to agree with *ἀρχή* instead of *παῖς*,) is a beginning or origin'. This latter example is by the rule that every end necessarily implies a beginning ; a child stands in the relation to mature man of beginning to end : and therefore every grown man must have passed through the period of childhood ; which is also reducible to the other rule, that the possibility of subsequent implies that of antecedent, of which the preceding example is an illustration.

τὸ ὕστερον, τὸ πρότερον] The two principal passages on the various senses in which *πρότερον* and *ὑστερον*, before and after, earlier and later, antecedent and subsequent, prior and posterior, can be applied, are Categ. c. 12, in which five varieties are distinguished, and Met. Δ 11, in which there are four. On the former passage Waitz says in his Comm. p. 316, "non premendam esse divisionem quam nostro loco tradidit : apparet enim non id agi in his ut ipsa rerum natura exploretur et perverstigetur, sed ut quae usus ferat sermonis quotidiani distinguantur alterum ab altero et explicentur."

In the Metaphysics, the divisions are four. In the first, prior and posterior refer us to a *series* and an *order*, established either by nature or by the human will, under which the *τῇ γενέσει* of the Rhetoric will naturally fall. Of this there are five varieties, (1) *κατὰ τόπον*, local (comp. Phys. IV 11, 219 a 14, seq.) ; (2) *κατὰ χρόνον*, chronological, the order of time (Phys. IV 14, 223 a 4, seq.) ; (3) *κατὰ κίνησιν* ; (4) *κατὰ δύναμιν*, capacity or power ; capacity a natural order, power either of nature or human choice ; (5) *κατὰ τάξιν*.

In the second the order of knowledge is referred to : only in two different applications the meaning of the two terms is inverted : in the order of *growth* the particular is prior to the universal, sense and observation to generalisation or induction : in the order of dignity, the universal is prior to the particular, as the whole to the individual parts. The one is *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, the other, *πρότερον ἀπλῶς*.

The third, *πρότερα λέγεται τὰ τῶν προτέρων πάθη*, the priority of the attributes of the prior (in some series), as straightness is prior to smoothness, because the line is prior to the plane or surface—the notion is that the plane is *generated from*, and so, in growth and origin, posterior to the line ; and therefore the attribute of the latter is prior to that of the former—is not, as Bonitz remarks, coordinate with the three others, "pendet enim a reliquis, quae suapte natura sunt priora, tamquam accidens a subiecto suo qui inhaeret."

The fourth, the *οὐσία* of the Rhetoric, priority and posteriority in essence or substance, *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν* ; priority in this sense belongs to things *ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἀνευ ἄλλων* : that is, things which are independent of others, whereas the others (the posterior) are dependent on them : the latter imply the former, the former do not necessarily imply the latter. Such is the relation of one and two ; two always imply one,

- νατόν, καὶ παῖδα (πρότερον γὰρ ἐκείνο γίγνεται), καὶ  
 7 εἰ παῖδα, καὶ ἄνδρα (ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκείνη). καὶ ὦν ἔρως ἡ  
 ἐπιθυμία φύσει ἐστίν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐρᾷ  
 8 οὐδ' ἐπιθυμῇ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. καὶ ὦν ἐπιστήμαί εἰσι

one does not necessarily imply two. Similarly the *first category*, οὐσία substance, is prior to all the others, which express only properties and attributes of the first. This priority is οὐσία, which is evidently inserted merely because it was suggested by the opposite γένεσις, and being utterly useless in Rhetoric, from which all nice distinctions and subtleties of all kinds are alien, is accordingly passed over in the illustration. This division of οὐσία also includes priority of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, where again the order of growth and of dignity inverts the relation of the two: δύναμις, the capacity, being of course prior in growth or time, the ἐνέργεια, actus, the realization, or active and perfect condition, being superior in the order of dignity and importance, or in conception, λόγῳ.

Another division is that of οὐσία substance, λόγῳ conception, and χρόνῳ. Metaph. Θ 8, 1049 b 11, seq.

See further on this subject, Bonitz ad Met. Δ 11, Comm. p. 249—252; Waitz ad Organ. p. 14 a 26 (Categ. c. 12). Trendelenburg, *Categorienlehre* p. 38, seq., 72, seq.

§ 7. 'And things (in general) are possible which are the objects of love or desire'—these πάθη, being instinctive and natural, show that the objects of them are attainable, because "nature does nothing in vain", a constantly recurring principle in our author: οὐθέν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ, Pol. I 2, 1253 a 9, εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, Ib. c. 8, 1256 b 20, *et passim*: if the desires could not be satisfied, nature would not have implanted them in us—'for no one either loves or desires anything impossible for the most part': the qualification ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, is added to allow for the exceptional cases of insane or infatuated passion as that of Pasiphae (referred to by Victorius) or of Pygmalion; or a child's desire to have a star to play with.

§ 8. 'And all sciences and arts imply the possibility of the existence or generation of their objects'. The sciences, as natural history, moral and political philosophy, chemistry, geology, &c., have *facts* or phenomena, actually existing, which are to be observed and generalized, for their objects; the *practical* arts produce, or bring into being, *their* objects, as painting, sculpture, and the fine arts in general, also the useful and mechanical arts. This I think is the distinction here intended. Moral and political philosophy come under the head of sciences which have facts, moral and social, for the objects of their study; though they belong to the *practical* department of knowledge, and have *action* for their end and object. ἐπιστήμη and its object τὸ ἐπιστητόν, are relative terms, the one necessarily implying the other, Categ. c. 10, 11 b 27, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι ἀντίκειται; and often elsewhere. This may help to establish the necessary connexion which is assumed between knowledge, science, art, and their objects. But I do not suppose that Ar. here means to assert the existence of a natural law which connects them; but only that, as a matter of fact, men never *do* choose as an



καὶ τέχνη, δυνατόν ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι.  
 9 καὶ ὅσων ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἢ  
 ἡμεῖς ἀναγκάσαιμεν ἢ πείσαιμεν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν  
 10 ὧν κρείττους ἢ κύριοι ἢ φίλοι. καὶ ὧν τὰ μέρη  
 δυνατά, καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ ὧν τὸ ὅλον δυνατόν, καὶ τὰ  
 μέρη ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· εἰ γὰρ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλὴς  
 καὶ χιτῶν δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ ὑποδήματα δυνατόν

object of study in science, or try their hand at producing by art, anything which they know in the one case to have no real existence, and in the other to be incapable of being produced.

§ 9. 'And again, anything (that we wish to do, or to effect, in the ordinary course of life, as in our business or profession) of which the origin of generation lies in things which we would (if we wished it, opt. with ἂν,) influence or control either by force or persuasion (meaning by ἐν τούτοις *men* in particular, as appears from what follows; but not excluding *things*, as *circumstances*, *conditions* and such like, the command of which might enable us to effect our purpose); such are (persons whom we can influence or control) those whose superiors we are in *strength* and *power*, or those who are under our *authority*, or our friends'. The two first classes illustrate the ἀναγκάζειν the force of superior strength, and of authority natural (as that of a parent or master) or legal (the authority of the magistrate); the third, friends, who are amenable to persuasion, exemplify the πείθειν.

§ 10. 'If the parts are possible, so also is the whole: and if the whole of anything, so are the parts, as a general rule: for if slit in front, toe-piece, and upper-leather, are capable of being made, then also shoes can be made; and if shoes, then front-slit, toe-piece, and upper-leather'. A whole implies its parts, and the parts a whole. Whole and part are relative terms: neither of them can stand alone, nor has any meaning except in reference to its correlative: hence of course the possibility of the one necessarily implies the possibility of the other. ὅλον λέγεται οὐ μὴθὲν ἄπεισι μέρος ἐξ ὧν λέγεται ὅλον φύσει, Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 b 26. Ib. c. 2, 1013 b 22, the whole is said to be τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, the λόγος or formal cause of a thing, that which makes the combination of parts what it was to be, viz. a whole, and therefore of course *in-separable* from it.

The qualification, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, of the *universal* possibility of the divisibility of a whole into its parts, seems to be introduced to meet the objection which might arise from the existence or conception of ἀδιαίρετα, such as a geometrical point, or an atom, or the human soul, or Parmenides' 'one', οὐδὸν, μουνυγενές, ... ἐν ξυνεχές [Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* § 145].

Of the parts of a shoe here mentioned we have absolutely no information either in ancient or modern authorities. The explanation of the word πρόσχισμα, given by Photius, who refers to Aristophanes for an example of it, εἶδος ὑποδήματος; and by Hesychius, the same words with the

- γενέσθαι, καὶ εἰ ὑπόδηματα, καὶ πρόσχισμα καὶ κε-  
 11 φαλὶς καὶ χιτῶν. καὶ εἰ τὸ γένος ὅλον τῶν δυνατῶν P. 1392 b.  
 γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ γένος,  
 οἶον εἰ πλοῖον γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ τριήρη, καὶ εἰ  
 12 τριήρη, καὶ πλοῖον. καὶ εἰ θάτερον τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα

addition of *ἐσχισμένον ἐκ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν*, and Pollux—will not apply *here* at all events, nor to Ar. Probl. XXX 8, *ὑπόδημα ἐκ προσχίσματος*, where it is plainly, as here, a part of the shoe, and not the whole—though it is probable enough that Aristophanes in the passage referred to by Photius may have meant it by *ὑπόδηματος εἶδος*: and *κεφαλὶς* and *χιτῶν* are passed over in total silence: they appear in none of the dictionaries of antiquity that I am acquainted with, nor are the ordinary Lexicons more instructive. We are left therefore to conjecture as to the precise meaning of them, but I think the consideration of the words themselves will *help* us at least to understand what they represent.

*πρόσχισμα* is 'a slit in front' of the shoe, with which Aristotle's use of the word in the Problem above quoted exactly agrees. This I think is fully confirmed by a drawing of a *ὑπόδημα* in Becker's *Charicles*, p. 448 (Transl. ed. 2), which is a facsimile of a modern half-boot laced up in front. The *πρόσχισμα* is the slit down the front, which when the shoe is worn has to be laced up. This seems pretty certain; but of *κεφαλὶς* I can only conjecture from the name, that it is a head-piece, or *cap*, covering the *toes*, and distinguishing this kind of shoe from those in which the toes were left uncovered, which seems to have been the usual fashion. *χιτῶν*—guided by a very common use of the word, which extends it from a covering of the body to any covering whatsoever (in Rost and Palm's *Lexicon*, s. v. No. 2, Vol. II. p. 2466)—I have supposed to mean the upper leather, the object of which, just like that of the tunic or *coat*, is to protect or cover the upper part of the foot, and keep out the cold. Stephens' *Lexicon* referring to this passage translates *κεφαλὶς tegumentum capitis*! Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII 2. 5, (where *σχίζων* and *χιτῶνας* are used in connexion with shoes,) and Schneider's note, throw no additional light upon the exact meaning of these three words.

§ 11. 'The possibility of a *genus* or class implies that of any subordinate *species*, and conversely; if a vessel can be built, then triremes; and if triremes, then a vessel'.

§ 12. 'And if the one of two things that stand in a natural relation to one another (i. e. two relative terms; see above, §§ 8 and 10) be possible, then also the other; as double implies the possibility of half, and half of double'. *Categ.* c. 10, 11 b 26, *διπλάσιον καὶ ἡμισυ* is one of the stock examples of one kind of τὰ πρὸς τι, the category of relation. Of these *relative opposites* Cicero says, *Top.* XI 49, *nam alia quoque sunt contrariorum genera, velut ea quae cum aliquo conferuntur: ut duplum, simplum; multa, pauca; longum, brevis; maius, minus.* In de Invent. I 30. 47, the argument from these *opposites* is thus illustrated; *In iis rebus quae sub eandem rationem cadunt hoc modo probabile consideratur: Nam si Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locare, ne Hermacreonti quidem turpe*

πεφυκότην, καὶ θάτερον, οἶον εἰ διπλάσιον, καὶ ἡμισυ,  
13 καὶ εἰ ἡμισυ, καὶ διπλάσιον. καὶ εἰ ἄνευ τέχνης καὶ  
παρασκευῆς δυνατόν γενέσθαι, μᾶλλον διὰ τέχνης καὶ  
ἐπιμελείας δυνατόν ὅθεν καὶ Ἀγάθωνι εἴρηται

καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε χρὴ τέχνη πράσσειν, τὰ δέ  
ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη προσγίγνεται. p. 87.

14 καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις

*est conducere.* To which Quintilian (referring to this place of Cicero, and quoting the example) adds—*de suo* apparently, for it is not in the original—*Quod discere honestum, et docere* [comp. Cicero, Orator, § 145]. Victorius. Ar. Rhet. II 23. 3, ποιεῖν and πᾶσχειν τι κελεύσαι and πεποικέναι. εἰ γὰρ μὴδ' ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τὸ πωλεῖν, οὐδ' ἡμῖν τὸ ἀνείσθαι.

§ 13. 'And if a thing can be done without art or preparation (or perhaps rather, *apparatus*) it is *a fortiori* possible to do by aid of art' (διὰ with gen. 'through a channel', *medium*, and hence, 'by means of'), and pains (study, attention)'. This is not the exact converse of the topic of § 3, which implied the possibility of a thing being done *at all* from that of its being *well* done; here the use of art, study and attention, and any other artificial means by which we assist nature, is alleged as facilitating the construction of anything, or of carrying out any purpose or design that we may have in view: the possibility of doing anything without art implies *a fortiori* the possibility of doing it with additional help and contrivance.

In the two verses of Agathon (from an uncertain play) which follow, the old reading was καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε τῇ τύχῃ πράσσειν, τὰ δέ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τέχνη προσγίγνεται, but Porson's transposition of τύχῃ and τέχνη (ad Med. 1090), which is undoubtedly right, has been adopted by Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, as it was by Elmsley, ad Med. 1062. This alteration brings them into the required correspondence with Aristotle's text. "If", says Aristotle, "anything can be effected without art",—which is interpreted as it were by Agathon's "accident, and necessity or overpowering force". But τῇ τέχῃ may be very well retained; and the translation will be: "And moreover it falls to our lot to do (effect) some things by art, others by force and mere accident". προσγίγνεσθαι occurs three times in this sense, *efficio*, *accido*, in Sophocles, Oed. Col. 1200, Electr. 761, Trach. 1163 (Ellendt's *lex*).

§ 14. 'And anything that is possible for inferiors in capacity (and personal qualities in general), and power or position, and intelligence, is *a fortiori* possible to the opposites (those who are superior) in all these'. Schrader quotes in illustration: *Ergo haec* (ferre laborem, contemnere vulnus,) *veteranus miles facere poterit, doctus vir sapiensque non poterit? ille vero melius ac non paullo quidem* (Cic. Tusc. II 17). Galgacus, ap. Tacit. Agric. 31, *Brigantes femina duce exurere coloniam, expugnare castra, ac nisi felicitas in socordiam vertisset, exuere iugum potuere: nos integri et indomiti primo statim congressu non ostendemus quos sibi Caledonia viros seposuerit?*

- δυνατόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύνοιο ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς  
 15 δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὐρεῖν. περὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτου δηλὸν ὅτι  
 ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὑπάρχει.  
 16 εἰ δὲ γέγονεν ἢ μὴ γέγονεν, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.

‘As indeed Isocrates said, that it was monstrous to suppose that what an Euthynus could learn he himself should be unable to discover’. Of Euthynus Buhle says, “de Euth. nihil constat, praeterquam quod ex hoc loco colligi potest, fuisse eum stupidi et sterilis ingenii hominem.” After all it is only *Isocrates’* estimate of him that we have to judge by: in comparison with himself most of Isocrates’ contemporaries were to him contemptible. The name of Euthynus does not occur in Isocrates’ extant orations. A doubtful speech, *πρὸς Εὐθύνοιο* (Ready wit), is printed with his works. This Euthynus was ἀνεψιὸς Νικίου, § 9. Of course he cannot be the person here meant. Euthynus, a wrestler, is mentioned by Demosthenes, c. Mid. § 71, who might *possibly* be the man for whom Isocrates expressed his contempt.

[The latter part of the speech *πρὸς Εὐθύνοιο*, Isocr. Or. 21, has not been preserved, and Aristotle may possibly be here referring to something in the part that is now missing. Perhaps the only difficulty about this supposition is the loose sense in which Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη must then be interpreted, as the speech in question (whether *written*, as I believe, by Isocrates, or not) was not *delivered* by him. In another speech, Isocr. *πρὸς Καλλίμαχον*, Or. 18 § 15, we have the words: θαυμάζω δ’ εἰ αὐτὸν μὲν ἱκανὸν γινώσκει νομίζει, ὅτι... ἐμὲ δ’ οὐκ ἂν οἶται τοῦτ’ ἐξευρεῖν, εἴπερ ἐβουλόμην ψευδῇ λέγειν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ., and Aristotle may, after all, be quoting *memoriter*, as is his wont, from the latter passage; in this case we should have to suppose that Εὐθύνοιο is a slip of memory for Καλλίμαχος. See Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II 203; and comp. Jebb’s *Attic Orators*, II 259. S.]

§ 15. ‘On the impossible, it is plain that the orator may be supplied with topics from the opposites of those which have been already mentioned (on the possible)’.

ὑπάρχει] ‘are already there’, ready at hand, for use; as a *stock*, on which he may draw for his materials.

§ 16. The second of the *κοινὸι τόποι* is the topic of fact, ‘whether such and such a thing has been done or not’: this is most useful in the forensic branch, in courts of law. It is the *στάσις στοχαστική*, *status coniecturalis* the first of the legal *issues*, and the first question that arises in a case. To this is appended, §§ 23—25, fact future; or rather, future probability, whether so and so is likely to happen or not. This of course belongs almost to the deliberative orator, who has to advise upon a future course of policy. The following topics suggest arguments to prove the *probability* of some act having been committed which the pleader wishes to establish against his antagonist.

‘First of all we may infer that if anything that is naturally less likely to have occurred has happened (been done), then (*a fortiori*) anything (of the same kind) that is more usual may probably have happened also’.

- πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἦττον γίγνεσθαι πεφυκὸς  
 17 γέγονεν, γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον. καὶ εἰ τὸ  
 ὕστερον εἰσθὸς γίγνεσθαι γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον  
 γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐπιλέλησται, καὶ ἔμαθέ ποτε τοῦτο.  
 18 καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο, πέπραχεν· πάντες γάρ,  
 ὅταν δυνάμενοι βουλευθῶσι, πράττουσιν· ἐμποδὼν γὰρ  
 19 οὐδέν. ἔτι εἰ ἐβούλετο καὶ μηδὲν τῶν ἕξω ἐκώλυνεν,

The *probability* the degree of which is estimated by the frequency of recurrence, being in the latter case greater. Introd. p. 160.

§ 17. 'And if (in a relation of prior and posterior, antecedent and consequent) the usual consequent (of the antecedent) has happened, then (we may argue that) the antecedent also has happened; as, for instance, the having forgotten something implies a previous learning, some time or other, of the same'. Learning is the necessary antecedent of forgetting; without the first the second is impossible. As this is a *necessary connexion*, the argument from it is a *τεκμήριον*, a *certain* indication: it is not however convertible, as a necessary sequence; for it does not follow that, because a man can't forget without having first learnt, he also can't learn without afterwards forgetting: the converse is only probable, not necessary.

§ 18. When power is combined with the will to do a thing, we may argue that the thing has been done: this is human nature: every one, having the power to do what he wishes, does it; because there is no impediment, nothing to hinder him from the gratification of his desire. Polit. VIII (v) 10, 1312 b 3, ἂ δὲ βούλονται δυνάμενοι πράττουσι πάντες.

§ 19. 'Further, it may be argued that an act has been done, if the supposed perpetrator had the wish or desire to do it, and no external circumstances stood in his way; or if he had the power of doing it (some injury to another), and at the same time was angry; or if he had at the same time a desire and the power of satisfying it', (the *desire* here is especially *lust*, and the act done, adultery); 'for men for the most part are wont to gratify their impulses when they have the power of doing so; the bad from want of self-control, and the good because their desires are good or well-directed (because they desire what is good, and nothing else).

ἐβούλετο, ἐπεθύμει] "*Voluit* praevia deliberatione, *concupivit* ex affectu." Schrader. If Schrader meant by *voluit* that βούλησις is *willing* and not *wishing*, and that it implies deliberation and purpose, as he certainly seems to say, this is a mistake. I will endeavour to determine the proper signification of βούλησις and its distinction from ἐπιθυμία.

First, however, it must be admitted that neither of the two terms, βούλεσθαι and ἐπιθυμείν, is confined exclusively to its own proper and primary sense: these like other terms of psychology are used with a latitude and indefiniteness which belong to a very early stage of inquiry into the constitution of our inner man. For instance, ἐπιθυμία, which properly denotes the three bodily appetites, is often extended to the

καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὠργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπε-  
θύμει· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ὧν ὀρέγονται, ἂν δύνων-  
ται, καὶ ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἱ δ'  
20 ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ εἰ ἔμελλε

whole class of *desires*, mental as well as bodily; and thus becomes identified or confounded with *βούλησις*.

From a comparison of three passages of our author in which we find notices of *βούλησις*, we draw the inference that it means *wish* and not *will*. *Will* implies *purpose*; and we are distinctly told in Eth. Nic. III 4, 1111 b 20 seq. that *βούλησις* is distinguished from *προαίρεσις*, deliberate moral purpose, by the absence of this. Further the exercise of *προαίρεσις* is confined to things which are in our power to do or avoid; the wish sometimes is directed to what is impossible or unattainable, to immortality for instance or happiness. It is also directed to the *end*, whereas *προαίρεσις* looks rather to the means of attaining the end. τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 a 19. Further it is always directed to what is good, real or supposed, Rhet. I 10. 8. Psychologically considered, it belongs to the family of the *ὀρέξεις*, the instinctive impulses which prompt to action, acting unconsciously and without deliberation. These are three, de Anima II. 3, 414 b 2, ὀρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία (appetite) καὶ θυμός (passion, especially anger), καὶ βούλησις (wish, the mental desire of good). (*βούλησις*, Rhet. u. s., is distinguished from *ἐπιθυμία*, by this intellectual character of discrimination between good and bad; *ἐπιθυμία* being a mere animal appetite, ἄλογος ὀρεξις). Comp. de Anima I. 5, 411 a 28, ἐτι δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ ὅλως αἱ ὀρέξεις, where the two are again distinguished. And in Rhet. u. s. the three ὀρέξεις are divided into λογιστικὴν καὶ ἄλογον, the former character belonging to *βούλησις*, the latter (irrational) to *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*. *ἐπιθυμία* therefore is bodily appetite, and *ἐπεθύμει* here, as a cause of crime, though not excluding hunger and thirst, refers more particularly to *lust*. In the second case, *ἐπιθυμοῦσιν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν*, 'desire' is extended to intellectual impulses, which can distinguish good from bad; and is thus confounded with *βούλησις*, which denotes wishing, but not willing. It is to be observed that the discrimination which is exercised by *βούλησις* in the choice of good, is purely impulsive or instinctive, otherwise it would not be one of the *ὀρέξεις*: it employs no calculation or deliberation like the *προαίρεσις* preparatory to decision, and does not always stimulate to action; as when it is directed to impossibilities.

εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὠργίζετο] Because anger, as long as it lasts, is always accompanied by the desire of vengeance, which, if a man have the power, he will be sure to wreak on the object of his anger, II 2. 2. After each of these three clauses supply πέπραχεν, from § 18, as the apodosis.

§ 20. καὶ εἰ ἔμελλε γίνεσθαι, καὶ ποιεῖν] What seems to be meant is this; anything which was on the point of being done, we may assume to have actually happened; or whatever a man was on the point of doing, that he actually did. Expressed at full length this would run, καὶ εἰ τι ἔμελλε γίνεσθαι, (ἐγένετο)· καὶ (εἴ τις ἔμελλε) ποιεῖν, ἐποίησεν, or πέπραχεν

[γίγνεσθαι, καὶ] ποιεῖν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ  
 21 ποιῆσαι. καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὅσα πεφύκει πρὸ ἐκείνου ἢ  
 ἔνεκα ἐκείνου, οἷον εἰ ἥστραψε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ  
 εἰ ἐπείρασεν, καὶ ἔπραξεν. καὶ εἰ ὅσα ὕστερον πε-  
 φύκει γίγνεσθαι ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα γίγνεται γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ

(again from § 18). In any other Greek author one would hardly perhaps venture upon thus supplying an ellipse; but I see no other way of extracting at once sense and Greek from the text. There appears to be no variation in the MSS. Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, read καὶ εἰ ἐμέλλε [γίγνεσθαι, καὶ] ποιεῖν. In § 19, the latter also puts ἐβούλετο καὶ, and (after ἐκώλυεν) καὶ εἰ δυνατόν (so A° for ἐδύνατο), in brackets, as interpolations. The last three words are also omitted by MS Z°. It seems to me that, in the two latter cases at least, the text is perfectly intelligible and defensible. The only reason alleged for omitting the five words in brackets in § 19 is that, if we retain them, εἰ ἐβούλετο...ἐκώλυεν is a mere repetition of the preceding εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο. That this is not the case, Victorius has pointed out in his explanation. The former of the two topics, § 18, combines power and wish: both together are certain to produce the act. The latter statement is different; the wish alone is sufficient to produce the act—provided there are no external impediments in the way: in that case the mere wish, the internal impulse, is *not* sufficient.

‘For it is natural or likely—this is all we want for our argument—that one who is waiting to do something, or on the point of doing it, would also actually carry out his intention, and do it: the probability is that it has been done’.

§ 21. In this connexion of antecedent and consequent, if it is usual, but not necessary, it is a sign, σημεῖον, and uncertain; when necessary, it is a τεκμήριον. Anal. Pr. II 27, sub init. σημεῖον (here including both kinds) δὲ βούλεται (would be, if it could: aspires to be) εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαῖα ἢ ἔνδοξος· οὐ γὰρ ὄντος ἔστιν ἢ οὐ γενομένου πρότερον, ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι.

‘And again, if what had been previously (πεφύκει, ‘had always been’, the regular accompaniment) the natural antecedent of so and so, (of the assumed event, or imputed act,) or means to a certain end, has happened, (then the ordinary consequent has happened, or the end aimed at been attained); for instance, we infer from the occurrence of thunder that there has been lightning; and from the attempt, the execution of a crime’. By ἐπείρασε, says Victorius, is meant—principally, not exclusively—*stuprum*, ‘seduction’, the attempt on a woman’s chastity: on this use of the verb *πειράω* see Ruhnken ad Tim. s. v. p. 210. Timaeus explains it, *πειράζειν διὰ λόγων παῖδα ἢ γυναῖκα*. Plat. Phaedr. 227 C, Arist. Plut. 150, and Lat. *tentare*.

‘And (the converse) if what had been the ordinary natural consequent of something else, or the end of certain means (the aim and object of certain actions) has happened, then we infer that the ante-

πρότερον καὶ τὸ τούτου ἔνεκα γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐβρόν-  
τησε, καὶ ἥστραψεν, καὶ εἰ ἔπραξε, καὶ ἐπείρασεν.  
ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δ' ὡς  
22 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι  
φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

23 καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον· τό P. 1393.

cedent in the one case has occurred, the means to the end in the other have been employed, as we infer lightning from thunder, and the attempt from the execution of an act or crime. And of all these cases, in some the connexion is of necessity, in the rest only for the most part'. The *natural* antecedent and consequent, as the uniform order of nature, is the *necessary* connexion: of the uncertain issues of *human agency*, τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, actions which depend upon ourselves and our own will, nothing more than probability can be predicated: ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχylōs καὶ τύφῃ τἀληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι: the conclusions of moral and social sciences can but amount to probability (Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 19, *et passim*). Consequently, the connexion of motives and actions, and of actions with one another, follows only a general rule, and this rule can never be applied with absolute certainty.

§ 22. Materials for arguments on the topic of 'not happening', the disproof of a statement of fact, may plainly be derived from the opposites of the preceding, which shew how it may be established. The verb is omitted: supply, as in § 15, ὑπάρχει. This omission of the verb probably accounts for the omission of ὅτι in MSS Q, Y<sup>b</sup>, Z<sup>b</sup>.

§ 23. Arguments for the establishment of the probability of future events and consequences clearly may be derived from the same source: for where the power and the wish to do anything are united, the thing will be done; as likewise when desire, anger, and calculation, are accompanied by the power of gratifying the two first, and carrying out the third. Spengel has again, without manuscript authority, bracketed καὶ λογισμῷ as an interpolation; doubtless because it is not mentioned in §§ 18, 19, of which this is a summary. The objection has been already anticipated and answered by Victorius. Calculation or reasoning is implied, he thinks, in the desires of good men, which are always directed to what is good. I cannot think however that this is what Ar. means here by λογισμός. And if we insist upon the strict interpretation of ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, as excluding any operation of the intellect, still it is hard to deny the author the opportunity of supplying in § 23 what he has omitted to notice in § 19. The statement is perfectly true: 'calculation *plus* the power' of carrying it out *will* produce future consequences: neither does it *contradict* anything that has been said before, but merely supplements it. After all even Aristotle is a man, and liable to human infirmities; and certainly his ordinary style of writing is not of that character which would lead us to expect rigorous exactness: on the contrary it is hasty and careless in a degree far beyond the measure of ordinary writing. Upon the whole, I see no reason whatsoever for



τε γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ βουλήσει ὃν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν  
ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα.  
διὰ ταῦτα καὶ εἰ ἐν ὀρμῇ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ μελλήσει,  
ἔσται· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται μᾶλλον τὰ μέλ-  
24 λοντα ἢ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα. καὶ εἰ προγέγονεν ὅσα  
πρότερον πεφύκει γίγνεσθαι, οἷον εἰ συννεφεῖ, εἰκὸς  
25 ὕσαι. καὶ εἰ τὸ ἔνεκα τούτου γέγονεν, καὶ τοῦτο p. 88.  
εἰκὸς γενέσθαι οἷον εἰ θεμέλιος, καὶ οἰκία.

excluding καὶ λογισμῷ from the text: the MSS warrant it, and Bekker retains it.

διὰ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.] The meaning of this obscure sentence seems to be this:—It follows from what has just been stated, διὰ ταῦτα—the statement, that is, that the co-existence of impulse (desire and passion) with power, is a sure source or spring of action—that the intention which these impulses suggest,—whether it be immediately, in the very impulse (or, starting-point, first start) to action, or (future) when a man is anxiously waiting for his opportunity (ἐν μελλήσει),—is most likely to be carried out; and then an *additional* reason is assigned for the probability of the future event when it is *on the point* of taking place, either immediately, or not long hence, that things that are impending (acts or events) are for the most part much more likely to happen than those that are not impending. With ἐν ὀρμῇ comp. Soph. Phil. 566, οὕτω καθ' ὀρμὴν δρῶσιν.

I subjoin Victorius' explanation. "Vi etiam horum locorum, si operam dabat ut gereret, ac iam iamque eam rem aggrediebatur (hoc enim valere hic arbitror ἐν ὀρμῇ), aut denique si post facere aliquando statuerat (quod significari arbitror hoc verbo μελλήσει) dici potest id futurum: duos autem, si ita legatur, manifesto locos complectitur: quorum prior rei tentandae peragendaque propinquior erat: alter tantum facere in animo habebat."

§ 24. 'And if the things that had previously been in the habit of preceding, in a natural order of succession, have already happened, (then we may expect the usual consequent); if the clouds gather, we may expect rain'.

συννεφεῖν, transitive, Arist. Av. 1502. Here impersonal, according to the analogy of verbs which express states of weather or atmospheric phenomena, ὕει, νίφει, ἐβρόντησε, ἤστραψεν, *supra* § 21, ἔσεισε, Thuc. v. 52.

The impersonal use of these verbs is explained by the original expression, and subsequent omission of a subject, ὁ Θεός or Ζεὺς (the God of the sky). In their ignorance of the natural causes of these and similar phenomena, they attributed them to divine interposition [Shilleto on Thuc. I 51. 2, *ξυνεσκόταξε*].

§ 25. 'And if anything which would serve as means to a particular end (act or event) has happened, then we may infer that the end or object which these imply is likely to be brought about; as a foundation implies a future house'.

- 26 περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μείζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὅλως μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐστὶ φανερόν· εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς περὶ τε μεγέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττονος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερόν ὅτι δι' ἐκείνων ληπτέον τὰς  
27 αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταυτὰ τι ζητεῖν περὶ

§ 26. The last of the three κοινὸί τόποι is that of amplification and depreciation, of exalting and magnifying or disparaging and vilifying anything, according as we desire to set it in a favourable or unfavourable light. Its usual name is αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν, II 18. 4; 26. 1; III 19. 3. Comp. Introd. p. 276, on II 26, and the note. Though this is a κοινὸς τόπος, and therefore can be used in the three branches of Rhetoric, it is most especially applicable to the ἐπιδεικτικὸν γενός, and finds there its most natural and appropriate sphere; I 9. 40.

'The subject of (περὶ) the arguments or inferences that may be drawn as to the value of things, absolute or comparative; of greatness and littleness of things in themselves, or relatively to one another; or in general of things great and small; is clear from what has been already said'. They have been treated of under the head of the deliberative branch of Rhetoric, in I 6, on things good in themselves, and I 7, on the degrees, or comparative value of them.

ἀπλῶς] *simpliciter* (Victorius), seems to be more applicable to μέγεθος than to the relative μείζον and ἑλάττον. As it is applied here to the latter, it must mean that the degree, or relative value, is the *only* thing which is taken into the account of them in that chapter.

'And therefore, since in each of the three kinds of speeches (I 3. 5) the end or object proposed is some form of good, that is to say, either the expedient, or the fair and right, or the just, it is plain that these must be the channels by which they are all (all three kinds of speakers) supplied with the materials of their amplifications'.

οἷον] 'that is to say', *nempe, scilicet*, not 'for instance'; defining or explaining, not exemplifying; occurs perpetually in Aristotle's writings. Waitz has some examples on Categ. c. 4, I b 18; comp. note on 4 b 23; and Bonitz on Metaph. A 4, 985 b 6. [For some instances, see *infra*, note on III 1. 4.]

§ 27. 'But to carry our inquiries beyond this into the subject of magnitude and excess or superiority absolutely and in themselves is mere idle talk (trifling with words): for for use, or practical purposes (the needs or business of life), particular things are far more important (authoritative, carry greater weight with them, are more convincing) than universals'. What is said here of particulars being more useful than universals for practice, or for the practitioner in any art, and therefore

μεγέθους ἀπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἐστίν· κυριώτερα γάρ ἐστι πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν τῶν καθόλου τα καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων.

περὶ μὲν οὖν δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ πότερον γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν καὶ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστειν CHAP. XX. ἅπασιν εἰπεῖν, ἐπεὶ περ εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων. εἰσὶ

for the rhetorician, is illustrated by Metaph. A 1, 981 a 12, πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἔχοντων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρῶν...ἀλλὰ Καλλιαν ἢ Σωκράτην. In Rhet. I 2. 11, where at first sight this might seem to be contradicted, the author is speaking of Rhetoric as an *art*, which deals with universals, if it be a true art and not a mere empirical practice: here as a practice, and as employed by a practitioner.

κενολογεῖν] is found in the same sense applied to the *mere variety* or *idle talk, without meaning*, of the Platonic ideas, in Metaph. A 9, 991 b 20, and the repetition of the same passage, M 5, 1079 b 26.

#### CHAP. XX.

Having now finished the treatment of the special modes of rhetorical proof, the *εἶδη, ἦθος, πάθος* and *κοινὸι τόποι*, we have next to speak of the universal.

Hitherto the objects of our investigation and analysis have been of a *special* character, included under particular sciences, chiefly moral and political, and also, under the three branches of Rhetoric, the topics severally appropriate to each: the *ἦθος* and *πάθος*, the secondary arguments, by which a favourable impression of the speaker's character is conveyed to the audience, and they themselves brought into the state of feeling which his purpose requires, are likewise confined to Rhetoric: as are also the *κοινὸι τόποι*—*common* to all the three branches, though even these are not equally applicable to all, and may therefore in a sense be included under the term *ἴδια* (so Schrader).—We now proceed to what remains to be done before we bring the logical and intellectual division of Rhetoric to its conclusion—to give an account of the two universal methods common to all reasoning of every kind, compared with which all the rest may be called *ἴδια*, viz. deduction, demonstration, syllogism, and induction; or, as they appear in Rhetoric, in the imperfect forms of enthymeme (inference) and example; which are in fact the only two methods by which we can arrive at truth and knowledge. ὅτι δ' οὐ μόνον οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων γίνονται σχημάτων (the figures of syllogism), ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡτισοῦν πίστις καὶ καθ'

δ' αἱ κοινὰί πίστεις δύο τῷ γενεῖ, παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήματος ἐστίν.  
 2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγῇ ἀρχή.

παραδείγματων δ' εἶδη δύο· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ παραδείγματος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα, ἐν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν. τούτου δ' ἐν μὲν παρα-  
 3 βολή ἐν δὲ λόγοι, οἷον οἱ Αἰσώπειοι καὶ Λιβυκοί. ἐστι

ὁποιαοῦν μέθοδον, νῦν ἂν εἴη λεκτέον. ἅπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς. Aristotle supposed that inductive reasoning could be reduced to a syllogistic form [Grote's *Aristotle* I 268]. Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 b 9. εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει. Anal. Post. I 18, 81 a 40. This explanation will reconcile the apparent contradiction of including the κοινοὶ τόποι under ἴδια; it is only as contrasted with the still more universal induction and demonstration that they can be so called.

'These *common* (universal) modes of persuasion, or rhetorical proof, are generically two (two in kind as we say; two *species* in one *genus*), example and enthymeme; for γνώμη is a part of enthymeme'. This last remark is meant to correct the ordinary treatment of the γνώμη as a distinct species of argument, apart from the enthymeme, of which in reality it is a mere variety. This is actually done in the Rhet. ad Al. c. 7 (8). 2 and c. 11 (12). The γνώμη and its logical character are described in the next chapter, § 2.

§ 2. 'First of all then let us speak of example; for example is like induction, and induction is a beginning or origin'. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ. Anal. Post. II 19, 100 b 3, and the whole chapter. Induction is a *beginning*, because from and by it, originally from objects of sense, we collect all our primary (πρῶτα) and universal first principles, the highest ἀρχαί, from which all our syllogisms must ultimately be deduced. It seems that this is assigned as a reason for *beginning* with παράδειγμα, which is a variety of induction, rather than with ἐνθύμημα, the rhetorical offshoot of ἀπόδειξις, demonstration or deduction. On παράδειγμα, or example in general, see Introd. p. 105, seq.

'Of examples there are two kinds: one of them is to relate past facts, the other to invent them for oneself. Of the latter again, one kind is comparison or illustration; the other λόγοι, fables, like Aesop's and the Libyan'; (and the fables of Phaedrus, La Fontaine, and Gay). The illustration, 'those of Aesop and the Libyan', is confined to only one of the two kinds of λόγοι, fables proper, in which animals, plants, or even inanimate objects are endowed with speech and reason: the other includes fictions, tales, stories: analogous cases, fictitious, and made for the occasion, or more usually derived from the writings of poets, especially epic and tragic, philosophers, historians, or any authors of credit. See further on these terms and divisions, Introd. pp. 254—6, and the

δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν τοιόνδε τι, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέ-  
γοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔαν  
Αἴγυπτον χειρώσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ Δαρεῖος οὐ πρότερον P. 1393 b.  
διέβη πρὶν Αἴγυπτον ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, καὶ πάλιν  
Ξέρξης οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχείρησε πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν  
δὲ διέβη· ὥστε καὶ οὗτος ἔαν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται· διὸ  
4 οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτόν· παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον

references there given: and on λόγοι, 'fables', p. 255, note. On the Fable, see some excellent remarks in Müller, *H. G. L.* c. XI 14, 15; and G. C. Lewis, in *Phil. Mus.* I 280, "On the fables of Babrius." He begins with this definition:—"A fable may be defined to be an analogical narrative, intended to convey some moral lesson, in which irrational animals or objects are introduced as speaking."

§ 3. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν] For παράδειγμα of the older editions, I accept with Bekker, ed. 3, Spengel's alteration πράγματα λέγειν. It is suggested by MS A\* παραδείγματα λέγειν, and supported by § 8, τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων; see in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* Munich 1851, p. 49.

'The historical example (τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα) is of this kind: as if, for instance (a deliberative speaker) were to say, We must arm against the King' (the Great King, the King of Persia, as usual without the article), 'and not allow him to subdue Egypt: for in fact Darius did not cross (the Aegean to attack us) until he had secured (got possession of) Egypt, but as soon as he had done that, he *did* cross; and Xerxes again did not make *his* attempt upon us until he had seized it, but crossed as soon as he was master of it: and therefore (the *inference* from the two *examples* or historical parallels) this King also is likely to cross if he is allowed to seize it, so that we must not permit it'. The case here given in illustration is probably an imaginary one, εἴ τις λέγοι; and this seems to be Victorius's opinion. But it is barely possible that the recovery of Egypt by Ochus, ὁ μετονομασθεὶς Ἀρταξέρξης (Diod.), about 350 B.C., *Clint. Fast. Hell.* II, p. 316 and note w, may have attracted the attention of the Athenian assembly, and this argument have been used by one of the speakers on the question. Max Schmidt, in his tract *On the date of the Rhetoric*, makes use of this passage as helping to fix it, pp. 19—21. Artaxerxes' expedition to Egypt was undertaken in 351 B.C., and continued through the next year. Both the rival sovereigns, Nectanebus, the reigning king, and Artaxerxes, sent ambassadors to the Greek states for aid, and the subject excited general interest at Athens, as well as in the rest of Greece. It was at this time that Aristotle, who was then employed on his *Rhetoric*, introduced this illustration, which was suggested by what was actually going on at the time.

§ 4. παραβολή is *juxtaposition*, setting one thing *by the side* of another for the purpose of *comparison* and illustration; taking analogous or *parallel* cases; it is the argument from analogy, ἂν τις δύνηται ὁμοιον ὀρᾶν,  
§ 7. A good instance of παραβολή in this sense occurs, *Pol.* II 5, 1264 b 4, where Plato is said to derive a παραβολή, or analogy, ἐκ τῶν θηρίων

εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν· ὅμοιον γὰρ p. 89  
ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοὺς ἀθλητὰς κληροίη μὴ οἱ ἂν δύνων-  
ται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλω-  
τήρων ὃν τινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώσειεν, ὡς δέον τὸν

(i.e. dogs), to prove that the pursuits and occupations of men and women should be the same.

‘Of παραβολή<sup>1</sup> the Socratic practice or method is an example; as for instance if one were to say, that the magistrates ought not to be chosen by lot: for this is analogous to the case of choosing for the athletes (who were to enter the lists) not those who are fitted for the combat, but those upon whom the lot falls; or to choosing the steersman out of a crew of sailors on the principle that it was the man who won the toss, and not the man of knowledge and skill (the man who knows his business), that ought to be chosen’.

This very same analogy is ascribed to Socrates by the accuser at his trial, as one of those which he was in the habit of using, Xen. Memor. I 2.9. And the same mode of inference, from the analogy of the mechanical and other arts, was transmitted by Socrates to Plato, and through him to his pupil Aristotle, in whose writings it constantly appears in illustration of many of his moral and social and political theories. It is to this practice of Socrates that Critias refers, when he and Charicles, during the tyranny of the Thirty, summoned him before them, and forbade him to continue his dialectical practice and intercourse with the young Athenians. Socrates inquires what sort of questions he is ordered to abstain from. Ib. I 2.37, ὁ δὲ Κριτίας, ἀλλὰ τῶνδ' τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι, ἔφη, δεήσει, ὃ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων· καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ἤδη κατατετρίφθαι διαθρυλλουμένους ὑπὸ σοῦ. Similarly Callicles, Plat. Gorg. 491 A, νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε αἰεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἱατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, κ.τ.λ. Alcibiades, Sympos. 221 E, ὄνους γὰρ κανθηλίου λέγει καὶ χαλκίας τινὰς

<sup>1</sup> Παραβολή is thus described by Eustath. ad Il. A p. 176 (ap. Gaisford, λέγεται δὲ παραβολή διότι τοῖς λεγομένοις παραβάλλει, τουτέστι συγκρίνει καὶ παρατίθησι, πρᾶγμα τι γνώριμον εἰωθὸς αἰεὶ γίνεσθαι· ὅπερ ὀφείλει πάντως γνωριμώτερον εἶναι τοῦ δι' ὃ παρελπίεται. κακία γὰρ παραβολῆς τὸ ἀγνωστον καὶ ἀσύννητον... διότι οὐδὲ διδασκαλικὴ ἢ τοιαύτη ἐστὶ παραβολή. On the definition, and various definitions of the ‘parable,’ see Trench on the Parables, Ch. I Introd. The author in defining parable, and distinguishing it from fable, seems to confine himself too exclusively to the New Testament parables, when he says that the latter “is constructed to set forth a truth spiritual and heavenly,” whereas the fable “never lifts itself above the earth”; it “inculcates maxims of prudential morality, industry, caution, foresight,” all its morality being of a *worldly* character, p. 2. And again, p. 9, “the parable differs from the fable, moving as it does in a spiritual world, and never transgressing the actual order of things natural.” Aristotle, to whom Dr Trench does not refer, distinguishes parable *in general* from fable by this; that the former depicts *human* relations (in which the N. T. parable coincides with it); it *invents* analogous cases, which are not *historical*, but always such as *might* be so; always probable, and corresponding with what actually occurs in real life. The fable is *pure fiction*, and its essential characteristic is, that it invests beasts, birds, plants, and even things inanimate with the attributes of humanity.

5 λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον. λόγος δέ, οἷος ὁ Στησιχόρου περὶ Φαλάριδος καὶ Αἰσώπου ὑπὲρ τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ. Στησίχορος μὲν γάρ, ἐλομένων στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῶν Ἱμεραίων Φάλαριν καὶ μελόντων φυλακὴν διδόναι τοῦ σώματος, τὰλλα διαλεχθεῖς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λόγον ὡς ἵππος κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος, ἐλθόντος δ' ἐλάφου καὶ διαφθείροντος τὴν νομὴν βουλόμενος τιμωρῆσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον ἡρώτα τὸν καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ αἱ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταῦτα φαίνεται λέγειν. And Hippias' sneer, Xen. Mem. IV 4, 5 and 6, (Socrates had just compared *more suo* the teaching of justice to that of various trades,) εἴτι γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα λέγεις, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτὲ σου ἤκουσα, and Socrates' rejoinder repeated in Gorg. 490 E, 491 B. Compare Xen. Mem. III 1. 2 and 4, III 7. 6. Plat. Rep. I 332 C, 333 C, II 370 D, 374 C, VIII 551 C (the pilot), Gorg. 447 D, and indeed throughout most of his dialogues. His favourite trades for the purposes of this kind of illustration seem to have been that of the physician and cobbler (ὁ σκυτοτόμος).

ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις] See note ad I 1. 5, Vol. I, p. 9.

§ 5. The fable may be exemplified by that of Stesichorus about Phalaris, and that of Aesop, in his defence of the demagogue.

For when the Himereans had elected Phalaris general with absolute power, and were about to give him a body-guard, Stesichorus, after having finished the rest of his argument (or discussion), told them a fable, 'how a horse was the sole possessor of a meadow, when a stag came, and desiring to take vengeance upon the stag for spoiling his pasture he asked the man (or a man *ανά*, MS. A', Spengel) if he could help him to chastise the stag: the other assented, on the condition of his accepting a bit and allowing himself to mount him with his javelins: so when he had agreed and the other had mounted, instead of his revenge he himself became a slave henceforth to the man: so likewise you, said he, see to it that ye do not in your desire of vengeance upon your enemies share the fate of the horse: for the bit ye have already—when ye elected a general with absolute power, but if ye grant him a body-guard and let him get on your backs, *then* henceforward ye *will* be Phalaris' slaves.' The same fable is briefly told by Horace, Ep. I. 10. 34, *Cervus equum pugna melior communibus herbis pellebat*, &c.

This fable of Stesichorus, which Aristotle here assigns to the age and case of Phalaris, is by Conon 'a writer in Julius Caesar's time,' Bentley, *Phalaris*, Vol. I. p. 106 (ed. Dyce [p. 101 ed. Wagner]) transferred to that of Gelon; and this latter version is regarded by Bentley as the more probable; 'the circumstances of Gelon's history seem to countenance Conon.' 'If we suppose then with the Arundel marble that Stesichorus lived Ol. LXXIII 3,' (this is highly improbable; it places Stesichorus' *floruit* a full century too low, in the year B.C. 486; which should indeed be 485, the year in which Gelon became master of Syracuse, Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici, sub anno*), 'it exactly

ἄνθρωπον εἰ δύναται ἂν μετ' αὐτοῦ κολάσαι τὸν ἔλα-  
 φον, ὃ δ' ἔφησεν, εἰάν λάβῃ χαλινὸν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβῇ  
 ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἔχων ἀκόντια· συνομολογήσαντος δὲ καὶ ἀνα-  
 βάντος, ἀντὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι αὐτὸς ἐδούλευσεν ἤδη  
 τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. “οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς” ἔφη “ὁράτε μὴ  
 βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρήσασθαι ταῦτ' ὁ πά-  
 θητε τῷ ἵππῳ· τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε ἤδη,  
 ἐλόμενοι στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα· εἰάν δὲ φυλακὴν  
 δώτε καὶ ἀναβῆναι εἰσῆτε, δουλεύσητε ἤδη Φαλά-  
 ριδι.” Αἰσωπος δὲ ἐν Σάμῳ συνηγορῶν δημαγωγῶ

agrees with the age of Gelon, and Conon's account of the story may seem more credible than Aristotle's. And then all the argument that would settle Phalaris' age from the time of Stesichorus, will vanish into nothing' (which is probably Bentley's principal reason for maintaining the paradox). Mure, Müller and Clinton, *F. H.*, *sub anno* 632, place the date of Stesichorus' birth in B.C. 645, 643 or 632, and 632, severally; 'so that,' says Müller, *H. G. L.* ch. XIV 4, (as he lived over 80) 'he might be a contemporary of the Agrigentine tyrant Phalaris, against whose ambitious projects he is said by Aristotle to have warned his fellow-citizens (he was a native of Himera) in an ingenious fable.' Mure likewise, Vol. III. p. 226, follows Aristotle. Clinton, *F. H.*, places Phalaris' accession to the throne of Agrigentum in B.C. 570. On Phalaris, see Mr Bunbury's article in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*. Mr B. says, it would appear from Aristotle, *Rhet.* II 20, if there be no mistake in the story there told, that he was at one time master of Himera as well as Agrigentum.

On εἰ δύναται ἂν, see Appendix at the end of this book, *On ἂν with the optative after certain particles.*

§ 6. Αἰσωπος] On Aesop, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. XI 16.

'And Aesop in Samos as advocate for a demagogue on his trial for a capital offence, said that a fox in crossing a river was driven into a cleft or chasm (in the bank); being unable to get out, she suffered for a long time, and many dog-ticks fastened upon her. And a hedgehog, in his wanderings, when he saw her, took compassion upon her, and asked her, if he should (was to, *optative*) remove the dog-ticks from her. But she would not allow it. And upon his asking her why, she replied, because these are already satiated with me and suck (draw) little blood; but if you remove these, others will come, hungry, and drain me of all the blood that is left. But you too, men of Samos, he continued, *this* one will do you no more harm, for he has got rich; but if you put him to death, others will come who are poor, and they will waste all your public property by their thefts.'

This fable is referred to also by Plutarch, *An seni gerenda respublica* p. 790 C, ἡ μὲν γὰρ Αἰώπειος ἀλώπηξ τὸν ἐχλῖνον οὐκ εἶα τοὺς κρότῳνας



κρινομένῳ περὶ θανάτου ἔφη ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνουσαν ποταμὸν ἀπωσθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα, οὐ δυναμένην δ' ἐκβῆναι πολὺν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν, καὶ κυνοραϊστὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς· ἐχῖνον δὲ πλανώμενον, ὡς εἶδεν αὐτήν, κατοικτεῖραντα ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνοραϊστὰς· τὴν δὲ οὐκ ἔαν· ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν φάναι ἤδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὀλίγον ἔλκουσιν αἷμα· ἐὰν δὲ τούτους ἀφέλῃς, ἕτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες ἐκπιοῦνταί μου τὸ λοιπὸν αἷμα. “ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς” ἔφη, “ὦ ἄνδρες Σάμιοι, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι βλάβει (πλούσιος γάρ ἐστιν)· ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνῃτε, ἕτεροι ἥξουσι πένητες, οἳ ὑμῖν ἀνα- P. 1394.  
7 λώσουσι τὰ κοινὰ κλέπτοντες.” εἰσὶ δ' οἱ λόγοι δη-

αὐτῆς ἀφελεῖν βουλόμενον, ἂν γὰρ τούτους, ἔφη, μεστοὺς ἀπαλλάξῃς ἕτεροι προσίσι πεινῶντες. Victorious.

εἰς φάραγγα] φάραγξ has two senses, ‘a cliff’, as Alc. Fragm. 44 (Bergk), εὐδουνιν ὀρέων κορυφαί τε καὶ φάραγγες; and ‘a chasm’ or ‘cleft’, which it bears here. A fox in attempting to cross a rapid river has been carried down by the torrent, and lodged in a rent or chasm of the precipitous bank, and is there caught as it were in a trap, prevented from getting out by the rapidity of the stream in front. This sense of φάραγξ is illustrated by Thuc. II 76, *bis*, where it is used of the pits or clefts in the rocks into which the Athenians threw the bodies of the Spartan ambassadors who had been betrayed into their hands and then murdered, the Lacedaemonians having previously treated Athenian prisoners in the same manner, ἀπέκτειναν πάντας καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐνέβαλον. Eur. Troad. 448, φάραγγες ὕδατι χειμάρρῳ ῥέουσai, whether they are narrow clefts or ravines traversed by winter torrents. Arist. Equit. 248, of Cleon, φάραγγα (met. *vorago*, a chasm or abyss, which swallows up all the income of the state) καὶ χάρυβδιν ἀρπαγῆς. Xen. de Ven. v 16, Hares when pursued sometimes cross rivers, καὶ καταδύονται εἰς φάραγγας “are swallowed up in their chasms or abysses.”

Another of these political ‘fables’, of Antisthenes (Socraticus), is referred to by Ar., Pol. III 13, 1284 a 15. Speaking of the folly of attempting to control by legislation the born rulers, who, one or more, excel all the rest of the citizens together in virtue, and are like Gods amongst men, he adds, “they would very likely reply if the attempt were made, ἅπερ Ἀντισθένης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων (hares) καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν.”

κυνοραϊσταί, ‘dog-ticks’. These canine-tormentors are as old as Homer. Argus, Ulysses’ dog, in his old age was covered with them: ἐνθα κύων κεῖτ’ Ἀργος ἐνίπλειος κυνοραϊστέων. Od. ρ’ (XVII) 300.

§ 7. ‘Fables are adapted to public speaking, and the virtue they



μηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα  
μὲν εὐρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπὸν, λόγους δὲ  
ῥᾶον ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἃν τις p. 90.  
δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὁρᾶν, ὃ περ ῥᾷδιόν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλο-

have lies in this, that whereas (μὲν) similar facts that have really happened are hard to *find*, fables are easier (to *invent*—εὐρεῖν being unconsciously used in two different senses); for they must be invented, like the parallel, analogous, cases; (which, as we have seen, are invented for the occasion, but must be conformable to the circumstances of real life,) that is to say, if one *has* the faculty of seeing the analogy, which may be facilitated by the study of philosophy'. Philosophy is used here in a vague and popular sense, for intellectual study, and mental exercise in general. So research and philosophising are identified, Pol. V (VIII) 11, sub fin. 1331 a 16, ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. Comp. III 11. 5, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολλῷ διέχουσιν θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου, and the note there. The tracing of resemblances in nature is the foundation of analogous reasoning, and consequently of the inductive method. ζητεῖν δὲ δεῖ ἐπιβλέποντα ἐπὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀδιάφορα, πρῶτον τί ἅπαντα ταῦτ' ἔχουσιν, κ.τ.λ. Anal. Post. II 13, 96 b 7. In Top. A 13, 105 a 25, ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις is said to be one of four ὄργανα δι' ὧν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν. Comp. c. 17, 108 a 7, seq. on analogies. See Trendelenburg, El. Log. Ar. § 59, p. 137. On the various senses of φιλοσοφία and πραγματεία (which are often identified) see Waitz, ad Org. 96 b 15, II. p. 415.

On Isocrates' comprehensive use of this word see note in *Cambr. Journal of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* Vol. II, No. 5, p. 150, and especially the passage of *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* §§ 180—192, 'where he includes in it all branches of mental education, in which Rhetoric of course occupies the foremost place.' Other references are there given'. [Comp. Isocr. Paneg. § 10 τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους φιλοσοφίαν (with note) and especially Jebb's *Attic Orators*, II, p. 37.]

λόγοι δημηγορικοί] δημηγορικὸν γένος, or δημηγορία, is one of the alternative names of the first branch of Rhetoric, the συμβουλευτικόν. I 1. 10, περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά, τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας, ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς, ἡ δημηγορία. III 12. 5, ἡ δημηγορικὴ λέξις. *Historical* examples (as indeed we are told in the next section) of similar cases that have already occurred, must of course be more useful to one who is addressing a public assembly on matters of state policy, than to the pleader in a court of justice, or a declaimer in an epideictic speech. But these, says our text, are not always easy to be found; either there are none at all, or they are rare; or at all events easily forgotten: whereas *fables*, and other analogous cases, which may be invented for the occasion, may be easily supplied if the faculty of tracing resemblances already exists; if not, it may be cultivated by exercise in philosophical study.

ἀγαθόν] some virtue, something good (about them), comp. I 2. 10, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ρητορικῆς.

<sup>1</sup> φιλοσοφία is inadequately rendered 'literature' in *Introd.* p. 256.

8 σοφίας· ῥάω μὲν οὖν πορίσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν λόγων, χρησιμώτερα δὲ πρὸς τὸ βουλευσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων· ὅμοια γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν.

9 δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παραδείγμασι μὴ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐνθυμήματα ὡς ἀποδείξεσιν (ἢ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων), ἔχοντα δὲ ὡς μαρτυρίοις, ἐπιλόγῃ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν· προτιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἐπαγωγῇ, τοῖς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ οἰκείον ἐπαγωγῇ πλὴν ἐν

§ 8. 'Now the arguments or inferences by way of fables (τὰ διὰ, with genitive, which are conveyed 'through the channel of', are conveyed 'by'), are easier to supply (provide) oneself with, but those by way of facts (historical parallels) are more serviceable for deliberation; because the future for the most part resembles the past'. We can *therefore* argue with probability from the results of circumstances past, to the results of similar circumstances, which are now under deliberation, in the future. Men are much the same in all ages; human nature is tolerably constant in its operations and effects; the same motives prevail, and lead to similar actions; what has been in the past, will be in the future.

§ 9. 'Examples must be used, in the absence of enthymemes, as direct logical proofs—for this is the road to persuasion (or conviction)—if we have them, as (confirmatory) evidence, and they are to be employed as a supplement to our enthymemes: for when put first they resemble an induction (the several examples are the particulars, or facts, from which the general rule is collected), but induction is not appropriate to Rhetoric, except in rare cases; but when they are appended to the others they are like evidence, and evidence is always acceptable (the witness always carries weight, is always listened to; people are *inclined* to believe him)'.  
 The enthymeme is the σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, I I. 3, ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικῇ ἐνθύμημα...κυριώτατον τῶν πίστειν, Ib. § 11. On the application of the term ἀπόδειξις to *rhetorical* proof, see note on I I. 11.

ἐπίλογος is here simply equivalent to τὸ ἐπιλεγόμενον, something added, appended, as a supplement, and not to be understood as the technical ἐπίλογος, the concluding member of the speech, the peroration.

ἐπιλόγῃ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν] This cannot mean 'using the enthymemes as a supplement', which is directly contrary to what the author intends to say. The construction is, χρώμενον (αὐτοῖς ὡς) ἐπιλόγῃ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν, that is ὡς λόγῳ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν as a λόγος—'argument' or 'sentence'—after, following, supplementary to, the enthymemes. And this is confirmed by ἐπιλεγόμενα μαρτυρίοις in the next clause. This construction, the substantive taking the case of its verb, is fully justified by the examples given in the note on II 4. 31, *supra* p. 56, note 1.

ὀλίγοις, ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίοις, ὁ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός. διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἐν ἱκανόν· μάρτυς γὰρ πιστὸς καὶ εἰς χρήσιμος.

πόσα μὲν οὖν εἶδη παραδειγμάτων, καὶ πῶς αὐ-  
 1 ταῖς καὶ πότε χρηστέον, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ γνῶμολογίας, CHAP. XXI.  
 ῥηθέντος τί ἐστὶ γνῶμη, μάλιστ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν  
 περὶ ποίων τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν ἀρμόττει χρῆσθαι  
 2 τῇ γνῶμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἐστὶ δὲ γνῶμη ἀπό-

‘And therefore also, if you put your examples first you must necessarily employ a considerable number; if you introduce them afterwards even one is enough; for even a single witness that can be relied on of service’. This is a second objection to putting the examples first. If you do so, they will resemble an induction: but an induction derived from only one or two particulars is of little or no force. Therefore the particular cases must be numerous; and so, not only the induction itself is inappropriate in Rhetoric, but you will also be obliged to make it long.

‘So the subject of the number of kinds of examples, and how and when they are to be employed, has been dispatched (disposed of)’.

#### CHAP. XXI.

Of γνῶμαι ‘maxims’, general sentiments of a *moral* character, which serve as enthymemes, and are therefore included here as introductory to the treatment of them, an account has been given, with reference to other writers on the same subject, in *Introd.* p. 257 seq., to which the reader is referred. Compare on this subject Harris, *Philolog. Inq.* Vol. IV. p. 182 seq. The author mainly follows Aristotle.

For examples of γνῶμαι see Brunck's *Poetae Gnomici*, passim; and Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.*, Theognis, Phocylides, Solon, &c.

§ 1. γνῶμολογία, ‘the subject, or art of maxim-making’, occurs again, *Pl. Phaedr.* 267 c, as part of the contents of Polus’ rhetorical repertory<sup>1</sup>. As to (the art of) maxim-making, we shall best arrive at a clear understanding of the objects, times, and persons, to which and at which the employment of it is most appropriate in our speeches, when it has been first stated what a maxim is.

§ 2. ‘A maxim is a declaration—not however of particulars or individuals, as, for instance, what sort of a person Iphicrates is, but universally (a general statement, an universal moral rule or principle)’. ἀπό-

<sup>1</sup> This may help to throw light on the disputed explanation of this word in the passage of Plato, see Dr Thompson's note ad loc. It is there translated “the style sententious.” γνῶμολογία is here, at any rate, the science or study, the theory (λόγος), and (in Rhetoric) the use or practical application, of γνῶμαι, maxims or general moral sentiments; after the analogy of ἀστρολογία, μετεωρολογία, δικολογία (*Rhet.* I 1. 10), φυσιολογία (*Plut.*) and a great number of modern sciences; the use of the maxim predominates in the application of γνῶμολογεῖν throughout the chapter.

φανσις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ποίός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ, καὶ αἰρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὁ περὶ τούτων συλλογισμός ἐστι σχεδόν, τὰ τε συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γινώμαί εἰσιν, οἷον

χρὴ δ' οὐ ποθ', ὅς τις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ,  
παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.

φανσις (ἀποφαίνειν) a 'declaration' or 'utterance'. Here again we have in two MSS the *varia lectio* ἀπόφασις. See on this, note on I 8. 2. Comp. § 9, οἱ ἀγροῖκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥαδίως ἀποφαίνονται, and § 16, διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα...

ἀποφαίνεσθαι seems to have some special connexion with γνώμη in its ordinary signification as well as this technical application. See Heindorf on Gorg. § 48, p. 466 C. In several passages which he quotes the same verb is used for *declaring* a γνώμη, in the sense of *opinion*. ["So Protag. 336 D, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι; ib. 340 B." Dr Thompson on Gorg. I. c.]

'And not of all universals, as, for example, that straight is opposed to crooked, but only of those which are concerned with (human) actions, and are to be chosen or avoided in respect of action.' This concern with human action—πράξεις can only be predicated of human beings—gives the γνώμη its *moral* character. See, for instance, the beginning of the second chapter of Eth. Nic. II. Of actions it is said, 1104 a 31, αὗται γὰρ εἰσι κύρια καὶ τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις; they determine the moral character. And so frequently elsewhere. This moral character of the γνώμη however, though it undoubtedly predominates in the description and illustration of it through the remainder of the chapter, is not absolutely exclusive: the γνώμη may be applied likewise to all practical business of life, and all objects of human interest, as health in § 5; and πράξεις must be supposed virtually to include these. With this definition that of Auct. ad Heren. IV 17. 24 deserves to be compared: it is not so complete as Aristotle's, but may be regarded as supplementary to it: *Sententia* (i. e. γνώμη, which is also the term by which Quintilian expresses it, Inst. Orat. VIII 5) *est oratio sumpta de vita, quae aut quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita breviter ostendit, hoc pacto*; it is there illustrated to the end of the chapter. One useful precept for the guidance of the rhetorician in the employment of the γνώμη may be quoted here, especially as Aristotle has omitted it. *Sententias interponi raro convenit, ut rei actores, non vivendi praeceptores videamur esse.* γινώμαι often take the form of 'precepts'. Harris, u. s., p. 182.

'And therefore since rhetorical enthymemes are as one may say'

τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμη· προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ  
τοῦ διὰ τί, ἐνθύμημά ἐστι τὸ ἅπαν, οἷον

χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἥς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας,  
φθόνον παρ' ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῇ.

καὶ τὸ

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅς τις πάντ' ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ.

καὶ τὸ

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅς τις ἔστ' ἐλεύθερος

γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα·

ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστιν ἢ τύχης.

(σχεδόν 'pretty nearly', that is, not absolutely, but generally, making allowance for some which are *not* concerned with the practical business of life—so Victorius) 'the logical mode of reasoning or inference on these subjects (the business of life and human actions), when this syllogistic process is withdrawn (and the major premiss or conclusion is left alone), the conclusions and major premisses of enthymemes are γνώμαι'. These premisses and conclusions taken by themselves are mere *enunciations* of some general principle: they do not become enthymemes, i.e. inferences or processes of *reasoning*, till the *reason* is added—*sententia cum ratione*, Quint. and Auct. ad Heren., Introd. p. 257—which is stated in the next sentence. *Hanc quidem partem enthymematis quidam initium aut clausulam epichirematis esse dixerunt: et est aliquando, non tamen semper.* Quint. VIII 5. 4 (de Sententiis, VIII 5. 1—8, q. v.).

'For instance, "No man that is of sound mind ought ever to have his children over-educated to excess in learning," (Eur. Med. 294). Now this is a maxim (moral precept, the *conclusion* of the enthymeme): but the addition of the reason, and the why (the *αἰτία* or cause) makes the whole an enthymeme, for example, "for besides the idle habits which they thereby contract to boot" (into the bargain—the *comparative* ἄλλος, other, in this common, but illogical use of the word, brings two heterogeneous things into illicit comparison: see [p. 46 *supra* and note on III 1. 9]) "they reap (gain as their reward) hostile jealousy from the citizens." The ἀργία here is the literary indolence, or inactivity, the withdrawal from active life and the consequent neglect of their duties as citizens, into which they are led by their studious habits. This is what provokes the jealousy and hostility of the citizens. Plato's unpopularity at Athens was due to the same cause. Plato justifies himself against these charges of his enemies in four well-known passages, in the Republic [VI 484—497], Theaetetus [172 C] and Gorgias [527]; and in the seventh Epistle, if that be his [see Introd. to Dr Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, pp. xii—xiv].

These lines are put into the enthymematic form, as an argument, in § 7. It is a specimen of a *practical syllogism*, or enthymeme, logic applied to action or conduct. As a syllogism it would run thus: All

P. 1394 b.

p. 91.

3 εἰ δὴ ἐστὶ γνώμη τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀνάγκη τέτταρα εἶδη  
εἶναι γνώμης· ἢ γὰρ μετ' ἐπιλόγου ἔσται ἢ ἄνευ  
4 ἐπιλόγου. ἀποδείξεως μὲν οὖν δεόμεναί εἰσιν ὅσαι  
παράδοξόν τι λέγουσιν ἢ ἀμφισβητούμενον· ὅσαι δὲ  
5 μὴδὲν παράδοξον, ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου. τούτων δ' ἀνάγκη  
τάς μὲν διὰ τὸ προεγνώσθαι μὴδὲν δεῖσθαι ἐπιλόγου,  
οἶον

ἀνδρὶ δ' ὑγιαίνειν ἀριστόν ἐστιν, ὥς γ' ἡμῖν δοκεῖ

ought to avoid, or no man should be rendered liable to, idle habits and the hatred of his fellow-citizens: children who are over-educated do become idle and unpopular; therefore children ought not to be over-educated.

'And again, "There is no man who is altogether happy"—Eur. *Fragm. Sthenel. I* (Dind., Wagn.). The *reason*, which converts it into an enthymeme, is supplied by Aristoph. *Ran.* 1217, ἢ γὰρ πεφνκῶς ἐσθλὸς οὐκ ἔχει βίον, ἢ δυσγενὴς ὢν, (he is here interrupted by Aeschylus who finishes the verse for him with *ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσεν*: but the Schol. supplies the conclusion,) *πλουσίαν ἀροῖ πλάκα*.

'And another, "there is none of mankind that is free"' is a γνώμη, but with the addition of the next verse (τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἔπει) it becomes an enthymeme, "for he is the slave either of money or fortune." From Eur. *Hec.* 864. Our texts have *θυγῶν* for *ἀνδρῶν*: doubtless it is one of Ar.'s ordinary slips of memory in quotation, and a very unimportant one. But I think as a general rule, it is quite unsafe to rely upon our author's quotations in correction of any reading in more ancient writers.

§ 3. 'If then a γνώμη is what has been described, there must necessarily be four kinds of γνώμη: either with, or without, an appendage or supplement (containing the reason)'. It is first put forward independently as a γνώμη, and then, if it is not generally acceptable, and a reason is required, this is added, and it becomes an enthymeme.

§ 4. 'Those that require proof (*ἀπόδειξις* 'demonstration', as before, used loosely for proof of any kind) are all such as state anything paradoxical (contrary to received opinion; or surprising, unexpected, contrary to expectation, and to anything that you ever heard before) or anything which is questioned (or open to question): those that have nothing unexpected about them (may be stated, *λέγονται*) without a supplement'. These together make up the four kinds.

§ 5. The first two kinds are those which require no supplement. 'Of these, some must require no supplement owing to their being already well known, as, "best of all is wealth for a man, at least in my opinion;" because most people think so'.

The line here quoted is of uncertain origin. There was a famous *σκόλιον*, drinking-song or catch, usually attributed to Simonides, which Athen., xv 694 E, has preserved amongst several that he there quotes; and it is also to be found in Bergk's Collection, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr. Scolia*,

(φαίνεται γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω), τὰς δ' ἅμα λεγο-  
μένας δήλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψασιν, οἶον

οὐδεὶς ἐραστῆς ὅς τις οὐκ αἰεὶ φιλεῖ.

6 τῶν δὲ μετ' ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος εἰσίν,  
ὥσπερ

χρὴ δ' οὐ ποθ' ὅς τις ἀρτίφρων,

13. It runs thus: ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ, δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν  
φύαν γενέσθαι, τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ  
τῶν φίλων. This is repeated by Anaxandrides in some iambs of his  
Thesaurus, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* III 169), and quoted  
by Athen. immediately after the σκόλιον as a parallel or illustration.  
Anaxandrides does not know the author; ὁ τὸ σκόλιον εὐρῶν ἐκείνος,  
ὅστις ἦν. Plato has likewise quoted it in *Gorg.* 451 E, and elsewhere (see  
Stallbaum's note). The Scholiast on this passage says, τὸ σκόλιον τοῦτο  
οἱ μὲν Σιμωνίδου φασίν, οἱ δὲ Ἐπιχάρμου. On which Meineke, u. s., note,  
says 'Nonne igitur pro ἡμῖν legendum εἰμίν, et ipse ille versus, ἀνδρὶ δ'  
ὑγιαίνειν κ.τ.λ., Epicharmo tribuendus?' The trochaic metre is doubtless  
in favour of this supposition, but that shews on the other hand that it  
could not have formed part of the scolion above quoted, which is in  
quite a different measure: and also, supposing it to be taken from that,  
it would be a most improbable and unmeaning repetition of the first  
line. If therefore Meineke is right in attributing it to Epicharmus, it  
must have belonged to another and independent scolion. Another  
scholium in Cramer, *Anecd. Paris.* on Ar. *Rhet.* has τὸ "ἀνδρὶ δ' ὑγιαίνειν  
ἄριστον" Σιμωνίδου ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῶν σκολιῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπῶν. οἱ δ' Ἐπιχάρμου.  
Meineke, u. s. Simonides at all events has something like it, οὐδὲ καλῶς  
σοφίας χάρις, εἰ μὴ τις ἔχει σεμνὰν ὑγίαν. This places health at the  
head of the list of goods: another distich, quoted in Ar. *Eth. Nic.* I 9,  
*Eth. Eudem. init.*, as 'the Delian inscription' ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ  
Λητφῶν (*Eth. Eud.*), *Theogn.* 255, and (in iambs) *Soph. Fragm. Creus.*  
(*Stob. CIII* 15, *Dind. Fr.* 326), places health second in the order, or rather,  
perhaps, leaves the question open. Ariphron of Sicyon (*Athen.* XV 702  
A) wrote a hymn to Health, beginning ὑγίεια πρεσβίστα μακάρων; he  
also regards it as the greatest of all blessings, σέθεν δὲ χωρὶς οὐτις  
εὐδαίμων ἔφην, line 8. See in Bergk, *Fr. Lyr. Gr.* p. 841 [p. 984, ed. 2].  
*Comp. Philem. Fr. Inc.* 62, αἰτῶ δ' ὑγίαν πρῶτον, εἰτ' εὐπραξίαν κ.τ.λ.

'Whereas others (the second kind, of division 1) (though previously  
unknown) are clear the very moment they are uttered, provided you  
pay attention to them,' (or perhaps, 'the moment you cast your eye  
upon them'). *Comp. Top.* I 6, 120 a 32, 34; b 15 and 30, E 4, 132 a 27.  
ἐπιβλέψις *Anal. Pr.* I 29, 45 a 26, ἐπιβλέψεων *Ib.* V 17, προσεπιβλέπειν  
*Ib.* V 21 (from Waitz). Upon the whole I think the comparison of these  
passages is in favour of the former of the two interpretations: and so  
Victorius.

οἶον κ.τ.λ.] 'as "no lover is inconstant in his affection."' Eur. *Troad.*  
1051, quoted again, *Eth. Eud.* VII 2, 1235 b 21.

§ 6. 'Of those which have the supplement (these are the two kinds



αἱ δ' ἐνθυμηματικάι μὲν, οὐκ ἐνθυμήματος δὲ μέρος· αἱ  
περ καὶ μάλιστ' εὐδοκимоῦσιν. εἰσὶ δ' αὖται ἐν ὅσαις  
ἐμφαίνεται τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἷτιον, οἷον ἐν τῷ

ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὢν

τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάναι μὴ δεῖν αἰεὶ φυλάττειν τὴν ὀργὴν

of the second division), some are part of an enthymeme, as "no man of sound mind ought," (the commencement of the verses of Euripides in § 2), and the rest have an enthymematic character, but are not part of an enthymeme: which (the latter) are in fact the most popular'. αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος may be thought to be a careless expression, contradictory to the description of enthymeme in 1 2.13: since it is characteristic of the enthymeme that it omits at least one of the premisses (see on the enthymeme Introd. p. 104), and therefore a γνώμη with the reason appended represents a conclusion with one premiss, which is an enthymeme. The explanation seems to be that an enthymeme is an *assumed* syllogism: the inference which it draws rests upon the possibility of constructing a syllogism out of it: if that cannot be done, the inference is not valid. So that in one sense the enthymeme is a true and complete syllogism, in another, in so far as it *expresses* only *one* premiss, it may be called a *part* of it, and incomplete. And this serves to explain the statement of 1 2.13, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν (i. e. a mode of syllogistic reasoning), καὶ ἐξ ὁλῶν τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός.

'And all those have this (latter) character in which the reason of the (general) statement is made to appear, as in this, "mortal as thou art, guard, keep (cherish), not immortal anger:" for, to say "that a man ought not to keep his anger for ever" is a γνώμη; but the addition, "as a mortal" (*because* he is a mortal), states the (reason) *why*. And like it again is this, "Mortal thoughts" (or a mortal spirit—that is, one which confines its aims and aspirations within the limits of its mortal condition), "not immortal, become a mortal man."

The first of these two quotations is used by Bentley in his *Dissertation on Phalaris*, p. 247 [p. 229 ed. Wagner], and foll. He does not attempt to fix the authorship of it, but contents himself with saying "this, though the author of it be not named, was probably...borrowed from the stage," p. 247, but afterwards, p. 249 [231], "and even that one (the verse in question) is very likely to be taken from the same place" (viz. Euripides). Subsequently, p. 262 [243], he speaks of it as from "a poet cited by Aristotle," and "Aristotle's poet." He quotes from Euripides' *Philoctetes*, *Fragm. IX* (Dind.), *XII* (Wagner), a parallel passage as having been borrowed by the author of *Phalaris*, ὥσπερ δὲ θνητὸν καὶ τὸ σῶμ' ἡμῶν ἔφν, οὕτω προσήκει μὴδὲ τὴν ὀργὴν ἔχειν ἀθάνατον, ὅστις σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται. The same verse, with ἔχθραν for ὀργήν, occurs also in Menander, *Γνώμαι μονόστιχοι*, line 4, ap. Meineke *Fragm. Comm. Gr.* 340. Wagner, *Incert. Trag. Fragm.* p. 185, "Auctor versus, quisquis fuit, imitatus est Eurip. *Fragm.* 790 (sc. *Philoct.*);" and to this also he ascribes the γνώμη attributed to Menander, ἔχθραν being "sive calami errore, sive imitatione."

γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσκείμενον “ θνητὸν ὄντα ” τὸ διὰ τί λέγει. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ τὸ

θνητὰ<sup>1</sup> χρή τὸν θνητόν<sup>1</sup>, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνητόν<sup>1</sup>  
φρονεῖν.

- 7 φανερόν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἶδη γνώμης, καὶ περὶ ποῖον ἕκαστον ἀρμόττει· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων μὴ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου, ἀλλ’ ἢ προθέντα τὸν ἐπίλογον γνώμη χρῆ-

<sup>1</sup> θνατὰ...θνατόν. ‘*Si Epicharmi est versus, male vulgares formas θνητὰ atque θνητὸν exhibet A...doricam formam ceteri omnes praeferunt.*’ Spengel.

The second verse, θνατὰ χρή κ.τ.λ., is ascribed by Bentley to Epicharmus; a supposition with which the dialect and metre agree. Müllach, *Fragm. Philos. Gr.* p. 144, Fr. Epicharm. line 260. This maxim is alluded to, but condemned, in the exulting description of perfect happiness, Eth. Nic. x 7, 1177 b 32, οὐ χρή δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπων ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν κ.τ.λ. Buhle quotes Horace, Od. II 11. 11, *quid aeternis minorem consiliis animum fatigas?*

For the use of the article in τὸν θνητόν, indicating a member of a certain class, see notes on I 7. 13, II 4. 31.

§ 7. ‘It is plain then from what has been said, how many kinds of γνώμη there are, and on what sort of subject (or occasion) each of them is appropriate; for (when it pronounces) on things questionable or paradoxical (or unexpected, surprising, as before) the supplement must not be omitted (*subaudi* ἀρμόττει λέγειν); but either the supplement should come first, and then the conclusion (of the inference) be used as a γνώμη—as, for instance, if it were to be said (returning to the first example, § 2), “now for my own part, since we are bound neither to incur jealousy nor to be idle, I deny that they (children) ought to be educated”; or else, say this first, and then add the supplement (the reason)’.

τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων κ.τ.λ.] “Ni enim ratio addatur, fidem non inveniet huiusmodi sententia. *Melius esse iniuriam accipere quam inferre* (this is the apparent paradox maintained by Socrates in Plato’s *Gorgias* and *Republic*): *supplicum misereri non oportere*, et his similia qui audit reicit; at si rationes annectantur, haud dubie assentietur; nempe qui facit iniuriam semper improbus est, at qui patitur probus esse potest. Et misericordia intempestiva iustitiae solet esse adversa.” Schrader.

‘(When they are) about things, not unexpected, but obscure’ (not immediately intelligible. Understand δεῖ, ἀρμόττει, λέγειν αὐτάς), ‘you must add the (reason) why, as tersely as possible’. A popular audience is always impatient of long explanations, and long trains of reasoning; or enthymemes, II 22. 3; comp. I 2. 12, III 17. 6. In assigning therefore the reason for the ambiguous or seemingly paradoxical γνώμη, we must express ourselves in the fewest possible words, as briefly and compactly as possible.

σθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι, οἷον εἴ τις εἴποι “ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε φθονεῖσθαι δεῖ οὔτ’ ἀργὸν εἶναι, οὐ φημι χρῆναι παιδεύεσθαι,” ἢ τοῦτο προειπόντα ἐπειπεῖν τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δέ, 8 προστιθέντα τὸ διότι στρογγυλῶτατα. ἀρμόττει δ’ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ αἰνιγματώδη, οἷον εἴ τις λέγει ὁ περ Στη-

στρογγυλός, ‘rounded’, ‘compact’ (as a ball), is properly applied to the *periodic* style—the period, *περί-όδος*, is in fact a kind of circle, “a sentence returning into itself,” Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* [II 155]. Comp. Dionysius, de Lysia Jud. c. 6. ἡ συστρέφουσα (condenses, packs close) τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις, “expresses them in a rounded, compact, terse form.” Arist. Σκηρὰς καταλαμβάνουσαι, *Fragm.* IV (Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* II 1142), of Euripides’ neat, terse, well-rounded style, *χρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ*. So *rotunde*; Cic. de Fin. IV 3. 7, *Ista ipsa, quae tu breviter*,—*a te quidem apte et rotunde: quippe habes enim a rhetoribus*. Brut. LXVIII 272, *rotunda constructio verborum*. Orat. XIII 40, *Thucydides praefractor nec satis, ut ita dicam, rotundus*. Nizolius ad verbum, *concinne, explicite*, στρογγύλως. Ernesti, *Clavis Cic.* s. v.

§ 8. ‘In such cases (or on such subjects) *Laconic* utterances and enigmatical sayings are appropriate, as when one employs what Stesichorus said at Locri, that they had better not be so presumptuous, lest their cicalas should be brought to chirp on the ground.’ *Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα*; pithy, sententious, *utterances*, which have become proverbial in our word ‘laconic’. Plutarch has made a collection of ‘*Laconic Apophthegms*’, from which it appears that they are usually of a character rather wise than witty—though there are also some extremely smart repartees in answer to impertinent questions or observations—pithy, pungent, pregnant, expressed with pointed brevity, which indeed is characteristic of them, and is also the ‘soul of wit’.

I will quote only one (a short one) as a specimen. Antalcidas: *πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀμαθεῖς καλοῦντα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους Ἀθηναῖον, μόνου γούν, εἶπεν, ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν μεμαθήκαμεν παρ’ ὑμῶν κακόν*. Quite true (says Ant.); we are deplorably ignorant—“At any rate we are the *only* people that have learnt no mischief from *you*.” The word is applied to two sayings of Theramenes, before his death, Xen. Hellen. II 3 ult. For a description of these *Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα* as pointed and pithy as the *ρήματα* described, see Pl. Protog. 342 E [*ἐνέβαλε ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής*].

*αἰνιγματώδη*] hard, obscure, ambiguous sayings, which like *riddles* require solution before they can be understood; like that pronounced by Stesichorus to check the presumptuous insolence of the Locrians: the solution of which is, that cicalas always sit in trees when they chirp. So that, *οὐ γίνονται τέττιγες ὅπου μὴ δένδρα ἔστιν*, Arist. Hist. An. v 30, 556 a 21 (the entire chapter is on *τέττιγες*). When the trees are gone, when they have been felled *and the land ravaged*, then it is that the cicalas will

σίχορος ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὕβριστὰς εἶναι,  
 9 ὅπως μὴ οἱ τέττιγες χαμόθεν ἄδωσιν. ἀρμόττει δὲ <sup>P. 1395.</sup>  
 γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικία μὲν πρεσβυτέροις, περὶ δὲ τούτων <sup>P. 92.</sup>

have to sing their song on the ground. *This* is what the insolence of the Locrians will bring them to. See Mure, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* (Stesichorus), III 248. He says, note 2, "Similar is our own popular proverb of 'making the squirrels walk', denoting a great fall of wood." This is repeated nearly *verbatim*, III 11.6. Demetrius, *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* (*περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων*) § 99 (Vol. III. p. 284, Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.*), attributes the saying to Dionysius, without telling us to whom it was said: and calls it an ἀλληγορία. And again, § 243, *περὶ δεινότητος* (III p. 315), οὕτω καὶ τὸ χαμόθεν οἱ τέττιγες ὑμῖν ᾄδονται δεινότερον ἀλληγορικῶς ῥηθέν, ἢ εἶπερ ἀπλῶς ἐρρήθη, τὰ δένδρα ὕμῶν ἐκκοπήσεται. The felling of the trees, especially the fruit trees, always accompanied the ravaging of a country in a hostile incursion. Hence *δενδροτομεῖν* Thuc. I 108, of Megara, comp. II 75. 1, IV 79. 2. Dem. de Cor. § 90 (in a Byzantian decree), καὶ τὰν χώραν δαίνοντας καὶ δενδροκοπίοντας. [Dem. Or. 53 (Nicostr.) § 15, φυτευτήρια...κατέκλασεν, οὕτω δεινὸς ὥς οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πολέμιοι διαθείεν].

§ 9. 'The use of maxims, or sententious language, is appropriate in respect of age (time of life) to elders, and as to subjects, should be directed to those in which the speaker has experience; since for one who is not so far advanced in life to employ maxims is as unbecoming as story-telling (i. e. fables, legends, mythical stories), whilst to talk about things that one knows nothing of is a mark of folly and ignorance (or want of cultivation)'. On *μυθολογεῖν* Victorius says, "Fabellarum sane auditione delectantur pueri; non tamen ipsi fabulas fingere aut narrare congruit." And this, because young people have as yet had little or no experience of life, and if they pronounce maxims and precepts at all, must do it of things of which they are ignorant: and this shews folly, as well as ignorance. So Quintilian, who supplies the reason for this precept: VIII 5. 8, *ne passim* (sententiae) *et a quocunque dicantur. Magis enim decent eos in quibus est auctoritas, ut rei pondus etiam persona confirmet. Quis enim ferat puerum aut adolescentulum aut etiam ignobilem, si iudicat in dicendo et quodammodo praecipiat?* "It has been said too they come most naturally from aged persons, because age may be supposed to have taught them experience. It must however be an experience suitable to their characters: an old general should not talk upon law, nor an old lawyer on war." Harris, *Philol. Inq.* Works IV 186. The Justice in the 'Seven Ages' (*As you like it* [II 6. 156]), who is advanced in years, is *full of wise saws and modern instances*. 'A sufficient indication (of the truth of what has just been said, viz. that it is only the simpleton, or the ignorant and uneducated, that pronounces maxims upon subjects of which he knows nothing), is the fact that rustics (clowns, boors) are especially given to maxim-coining, and ever ready to shew them off (exhibit them)'. This propensity to sententiousness, and the affectation of superior wisdom which it implies, characteristic of the 'rustic', has not escaped the observation of Shakespeare: whose numerous 'clowns' are *all* (I believe) addicted to this practice. Dogberry in *Much ado about nothing*—see in

ὦν ἔμπειρός τις ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικούτον ὄντα  
γνωμολογεῖν ἀπρεπὲς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ  
δ' ὦν ἄπειρος, ἡλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. σημεῖον δ'  
ικανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῖκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ  
10 καὶ ῥαδίως ἀποφαίνονται. καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου  
εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἀρμόττει ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει,

particular, Act III Sc. 5—the 'fool' in *Lear* I 4—'Touchstone' in *As you like it*, III 3 and 'Costard' in *Love's labour's lost*, throughout; are all cases in point.

ἀγροῖκος, country-bred, rustic, boor, clown, implying awkwardness and the absence of all cultivation and refinement of language, manner, mind, is opposed to ἀστεῖος which represents the opposite, city life, and city breeding, the city being the seat of refinement, cultivation personal and intellectual, civilisation and fashion; as *rusticus* to *urbanus*, and *Country* with its associations, to *Town* and its belongings, in our dramatists and light literature of the two last centuries, the echo of which has not quite died away.

§ 10. 'Generalising, where there is no generality (stating a proposition or maxim universally which is only partially true), is most appropriate in complaint and exaggeration, and in these either at the commencement (of either of the two processes), or after the case has been made out (proved, ἀποδεικνύει here again in a vague and general sense).'

σχετλιασμός, "*conquestio*, h. e. ea pars orationis qua conquerimur et commoti sumus ex iniuria vel adversa fortuna'. Ernesti, *Lex. Technologiae Graecae*, s.v. *Conquestio est oratio auditorum misericordiam captans*, Cic. Inv. I 55. 106, who gives a long account of it divided into 16 topics. This was the subject of Thrasymachus' treatise, the ἔλαιο (*miserationes* Cic. [Brutus § 82]), referred to by Arist., Rhet. III 1. 7; the contents are satirically described by Plat., Phaedr. 267 C. It was "a treatise, accompanied with examples, on the best modes of exciting compassion" (Thompson ad loc.). What follows, ὀργίσαι τε αὖ κ.τ.λ. describes the art of δεινώσις, which no doubt accompanied the σχετλιασμός in Thrasymachus' work. On Thrasy-machus' ἔλαιο see *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* Vol. III 274, No. 9. σχετλιασμός therefore is the act of complaining, or the art of exciting the compassion of the audience for the supposed sufferings of the speaker himself or his client by age, penury, distress, or wrong or injury from others: and its appropriate place is the ἐπίλογος, the peroration of the speech. See Rhet. III 19. 3.

δεινώσις is a second variety of the same κοινὸς τόπος, viz. αὔξησης and μείωσις, to which both of these are subordinate. There is in fact a natural connexion between the two: pity for the person wronged is usually accompanied by indignation against the wrong-doer. This is *indignatio*, of which Cicero treats de Inv. I 53. 100—54. 105. *Indignatio est oratio per quam conficitur ut in aliquem hominem magnum odium aut in rem gravis offensio concitetur*. The art of exciting indignation or odium

II καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ ἀποδείξαντα. χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὧσι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς ὁμολογούν-

against any person or thing, by exaggeration or intensification; vivid description heightening the enormity or atrocity of that against which you wish to rouse the indignation of the audience. "δείνωσης invidiae atque odii exaggeratio," Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v. Quint. VI 2. 24, *Haec est illa quae δείνωσης vocatur, rebus indignis asperis invidiosis addens vim oratio; qua virtute praeter alios plurimum Demosthenes valuit.* Ib. VIII 3. 88, δείνωσης in exaggeranda indignitate. IX 2. 104, *intendere crimen, quod est δείνωσης.* Comp. Rhet. III 19. 3, on the ἐπίλογος.

Macrobius Saturn. IV 6 (ap. Ernesti u. s.), *Oportet enim, ut oratio pathetica aut ad indignationem aut ad misericordiam dirigatur, quae a Graecis οἶκτος καὶ δείνωσης appellatur: horum alterum accusatori necessarium est, alterum reo; et necesse est initium abruptum habeat, quoniam satis indignanti leniter incipere non convenit.*

The illicit generalisation above mentioned is one of the arts employed to heighten the two πάθη which are most serviceable to the orator, ἔλεος and ὀργή or νέμεσις by σχετλιασμός and δείνωσης. The first is well illustrated by Victorius from Catullus, Epith. Pel. et Thet. 143, the deserted Ariadne exclaims, *Iam iam nulla viro iuranti femina credat, Nulla viri speret sermones esse fideles* &c. (similarly Ovid, Fasti III 475, *Nunc quoque 'nulla viro' clamabo 'femina credat'*) and Eur. Hec. 254, ἀχάριστον ὑμῶν σπέρμ' ὅσοι δημηγόρους ζηλοῦτε τιμάς. This is a generalisation from the single case of Ulysses. Add Cymbeline, Act II 5. 1; Posthumus. *Is there no way men to be, but women must be half-workers? We are bastards all* &c. and (already quoted in Intro.) Virg. Aen. IV 569, *varium et mutabile semper femina;* and Hamlet, Act I Sc. 2, [146], *Frailty, thy name is woman.* So οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον § 15.

§ II. 'Maxims which are in everyone's mouth (notorious), and universally known, should be also employed if they are serviceable (when they are to the point): for the fact that they are universal (universally known and employed) being equivalent to an universal acknowledgment (of their truth), they are generally supposed to be right (true and sound)'.

τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις] Such are the sayings of the seven sages, and of the old gnomie poets in general, Theognis, Hesiod, Phocylides and the rest, which everybody remembers and repeats. θρυλεῖν is to repeat again and again, as ὑμνεῖν, *decantare*. Zonaras, *συνεχῶς λέγειν*. Suidas and Photius, λαλεῖν, *κυκλᾶν*. (Hesych. θρυλλεῖ, *ταράσσει*, ὁχλεῖ. θρύλλοι, *ψιθυρισμοί, ὁμιλίαι*.) Arist. Eq. 348, *τὴν νύκτα θρυλῶν καὶ λαλῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς*, of the sausage-monger, who after having made, as he thinks, a good speech, walks about the streets all night *repeating it over and over again*, and chattering. Eurip. El. 909, *καὶ μὴν δι' ὄρθρων γ' οὐποτ' ἐξελίμπανον θρυλοῦσ'*, ἃ γ' εἰπεῖν ἤθελον. "She had long practised and considered her speech in the early dawn of the mornings." Paley. For τεθρυλημέναις cf. also III 7. 9; 14. 4, 'notorious'. Plat. Phaedo 65 B, 76 D. πολυθρύλητον, Ib. 100 B, Rep. VIII 566 B. Isocr. Panath. § 237, *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* § 55, (λόγους) τοὺς

των ἀπάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἷον παρακα-  
λοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους

εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης,  
καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττους ὄντας

ξυνὸς Ἐννάλιος,

καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν

πάλα παρ' ὑμῖν διατεθρυλημένους. Ast, Lex. Plat. *decantare*. May not θρύλλειν (so it is sometimes written) be an onomatopoeia from the sound of the harp, like *θρεττανελό*, Arist. Plut. 290; the notion of constant repetition, recurrences being derived from 'harping' perpetually on the same string, *chorda qui semper oberrat eadem?* [Horace, A. P. 356].

παρακαλοῦντι] *lit.* 'to a man exhorting'; when Ar. wrote this dative he was most likely thinking of ἐὰν ᾧσι χρήσιμοι, rather than of anything else; though it is extremely uncertain. 'As for instance in an exhortation to make the adventure—run the risk of battle—without previous sacrifice'.

θυσαμένους] Schrader interprets *litare*, said of a sacrifice which *propitiates* the deity to whom it is offered. He may possibly mean that it is the use of the *middle voice* that gives it this sense 'for themselves, for their own benefit'.

εἰς οἰωνὸς κ.τ.λ.] Hom. Il. XII 243 (Hector to Polydamas, who has threatened him with an evil omen). οἰωνὸς in the γνώμη has reference to the preceding θυσαμένους. Talk not to me of your omens (from sacrifice) says the officer, cheering on his men, who are disheartened by the absence of favourable omens; "One omen is best of all, to rally for our country's defence." Pope, "And asks no omen but his country's cause." Lord Derby, "The best of omens is our country's cause." Applied by Cicero to his own public conduct and intentions, Ep. ad Attic. II 3. 3, ult. Schrader quotes Cic. Cato Maior, 3. 4, *Q. Fabius Maximus, augur cum esset, dicere ausus est optimis auspiciis ea geri quae pro reipublicae salute gererentur: quae contra rempublicam fierent contra auspicia fieri*.

'And again an exhortation to run the risk (*subaudi παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν*<sup>1</sup>) with inferior forces'; ξυνὸς Ἐννάλιος, Il. XVIII 309. This again is from a speech of Hector, expressing his readiness to encounter Achilles. Οὐ μιν ἔγωγε φεύξομαι...ἀλλὰ μάλ' αὐτὴν στήσομαι, ἥ κε φέρῃσι μέγα κράτος, ἥ κε φερόιμην. ξυνὸς Ἐννάλιος, καὶ τε κτανέοντα κατέκτα. This passed into a proverb for 'the equal chances of battle'. Archilochus, (Bergk, *Fr. Lyr. Gr.* No. 56, p. 479 [p. 550, ed. 2]), ἐτήτυμον γὰρ ξυνὸς ἀνθρώποις Ἄρης. Aesch. S. c. T. 409, ἔργον δ' ἐν κύβοις Ἄρης κρινεῖ. Liv. XXVIII 19, *In pugna et in acie, ubi Mars communis et victum saepe erigeret et affligeret victorem*. Ib. V 12, XXI 1 (quoted by Trollope on the verse of Homer).

'And an exhortation (und. as before) to destroy enemies' children

<sup>1</sup> Gaisford, echoing F. A. Wolf, says of this, "Recte statuit W. haec non sana esse. Mihi videtur verbum aliquod excidisse." In a writer like Aristotle there is nothing at all extraordinary in such an ellipse as I have supposed: in any other it might no doubt lead one to suspect an omission.

ἀδικοῦντα

νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

- 12 ἔτι ἔναι τῶν παροιμιῶν καὶ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον παροι-  
 13 μία “Ἀττικὸς πάροικος.” δεῖ δὲ τὰς γνῶμας λέγειν  
 καὶ παρὰ τὰ δεδημοσιευμένα (λέγω δὲ δεδημοσιευμένα  
 οἷον τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν), ὅταν ἡ τὸ  
 ἦθος φαίνεσθαι μέλλῃ βέλτιον, ἢ παθητικῶς εἰρημένη  
 ᾗ. ἔστι δὲ παθητικὴ μέν, οἷον εἴ τις ὀργιζόμενος

even when innocent, “Childish is he, who first slays the father and then leaves the children behind.” This is a verse of Stasinus’s *Κύπρια*, one of the Cyclic poems. It is ascribed to him by Clemens Alex. *Strom.* vi p. 747. Düntzer, *Fragm. Epic. Gr.* p. 16. See note on I 15.14.

§ 12. ‘Some proverbs also are γνῶμαι; for example, “an Attic neighbour” is a proverb (and also may be used as a γνῶμη). νήπιος ὃς κ.τ.λ. is quoted as a *proverb* in I 15.14; here it is a γνῶμη. It may be added to the list of Trench’s ‘immoral proverbs’, *On Proverbs*, p. 82 seq.

On the παροιμία, its definition and character, see Erasmus, *Adag.* *Introduct.*: and Trench, “on the lessons in Proverbs.”

What sort of neighbour an *Attic neighbour* was, may be best gathered from the description of the Athenian character drawn by the Corinthians, and contrasted with that of their Lacedaemonian rivals, in their speech at the Congress at Sparta. Thuc. I 70. The restless, excitable, intriguing spirit, the love of novelty and foreign adventure, the sanguine temper, quick wit, and daring audacity, therein described, must necessarily have made them the most troublesome and dangerous of neighbours; ever ready to interfere in their neighbours’ affairs, and form schemes of aggrandisement at their neighbours’ expense. Another proverb of the same kind is mentioned by Schrader as having been applied to the Franks, *Francum amicum habeas, vicinum non habeas*: it is found in Eginherd’s *Life of Charlemagne*. Gibbon also refers to it, without naming his authority. In the 10th century at Constantinople, “a proverb, that the Franks were good friends and bad neighbours, was in every one’s mouth.” *Decline and Fall*, ch. XLIX. Vol. IV. p. 509 (Murray, 1846).

§ 13. ‘Maxims may also be cited in opposition to, or in contradiction of, those that have become public property—by these I mean such as ‘know thyself’, ‘avoid excess’ (the maxims or adages of Solon and Chilon)—whenever one’s character is likely to be put in a more favourable light (thereby), or the γνῶμη has been pronounced in an excited state of feeling (by the opponent who is to be answered); of this ‘pathetic’ γνῶμη an instance is, if for example a man in a fit of passion were to say that it is false that a man is bound to know himself, “this gentleman at any rate, if he knew himself, would never have claimed to be elected general.”’

Aristotle has said that there are two classes of cases in which a



φαίη ψεύδος εἶναι ὡς δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτόν· οὗτος γοῦν εἰ ἐγίγνωσκεν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε στρατηγεῖν ἤξιωσεν. τὸ δὲ ἦθος βέλτιον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ὥσπερ φασί, φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν ὡς φιλή-  
 14 σοντας. δεῖ δὲ τῇ λέξει τὴν προαίρεσιν συνδηλοῦν,

generally accepted or 'universal' maxim—such as Solon's γνώθι σεαυ-  
 τόν—may be contradicted *with effect*. One of these is, when the γνώμη  
 itself, including the contradiction of it—as appears from the example—  
 is uttered in a state of excited feeling, real or assumed, such as indigna-  
 tion. The example of this is a man *in a fit of passion*, ὀργιζόμενος,  
 loudly asserting that Solon's universally accepted maxim, or the precept  
 conveyed by it, is untrue, or at any rate liable to exception; for if so  
 and so (some imaginary person) had had a true knowledge of himself  
 (and his own incapacity) he never would have aspired to be a general:  
 but he *has* done so, and succeeded in the attempt: and this *success*  
 shews the falsity of the rule, as a prudential maxim, at any rate in this  
 case; and also being *undeserved* provokes the indignation of the speaker.  
 And it is to be observed that this success without merit is *necessary* to  
 inspire the feeling, the existence of which is distinctly stated. The case  
 is that of Cleon, Thuc. IV 27 seq. Victorius however understands it in  
 a different sense. According to him the case is that of an Iphicrates,  
 who raised himself from a low condition to the height of power and dis-  
 tinction; Rhet. I 7. 32, Ἰφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρξε ταῦτα;  
 I 9. 31, ἐξ οἷων εἰς οἷα, (τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους); if Iphicrates had 'known himself',  
 i. e. remembered his origin, he never could have entered upon such a  
 career. But it seems to me that this is not a proper interpretation of  
 'self-knowledge', and that the maxim could not be applied in this sense:  
 the mere recollection of his former low estate surely is not entitled to  
 the name of knowledge of self. Iphicrates, instead of disobeying the  
 precept, conformed to it in the strictest sense; he did *know himself* so  
 well, he was so fully aware of his capacity for fulfilling the duties of the  
 office, that he did not hesitate to apply for and exercise the command of  
 an army. Victorius' words are; "παθητικῶς dicet, qui ira percitus ita  
 loquetur" (but what is the *occasion* of the anger, when it is thus inter-  
 preted? The mere contradiction of an universal maxim does not give  
 rise to a fit of passion), "falsum est omnino, quod aiunt, debere homines  
 seipso nosse: hic enim profecto si se ipsum cognosset nunquam praetor  
 ducere exercitum voluisset." It may perhaps be meant that the speaker  
*assumes* indignation in order to give force to his contradiction: or really  
 gets into a passion at the thought of the folly of mankind for believing it.

'Our character is bettered, men's opinion of our character is im-  
 proved, by saying for instance (*subaudi* οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι, *aut tale aliquid*)  
 that we ought not, as is said, to love as with the prospect of our love  
 being turned into hatred, but rather the reverse, to hate as if that was  
 likely to become love'. This is Bias' precept or suggestion, ὑποθήκη, see  
 note on II 13. 4.

§ 14. 'The language (statement, expression) should be accompanied

εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, οἶδον ἢ οὕτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι “δεῖ δὲ φιλεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ φασίν, ἀλλ’ ὡς αἰὲ φιλήσονται· ἐπιβούλου γὰρ θάτερον,” ἢ ὥδε “οὐκ ἀρέσκει δέ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν γ’ ἀληθινὸν φίλον ὡς φιλήσονται αἰὲ φιλεῖν.” καὶ “οὐδὲ τὸ p. 93. μὴδὲν ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ τοὺς γε κακοὺς ἄγαν μισεῖν.”

15 ἔχουσι δ’ εἰς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην μίαν P. 1395 b.  
μὲν δὴ διὰ τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκρατῶν· χαίρουσι

by the manifestation of the deliberate moral purpose (by which the moral character of every thought and action is estimated), or if not, the reason (at any rate) should be added; as thus “a man’s love should be, not as people say, but as though it were to be lasting (as deep and fervent and assured, as though it were to endure for ever); for the other (the reverse) has the character of treachery (belongs to, is characteristic of, a designing, plotting, treacherous man; implying deceit together with evil designs of future mischief).” This is the construction that *may* be put upon it: it also admits of a more favourable interpretation: see the note on II 13. 4, already referred to. ‘Or thus, “but the statement, the maxim, does not satisfy me: for the true, sincere, genuine friend should love as if his love were to last for ever.” And again, neither does the (maxim) “nothing to excess (satisfy me); for the wicked surely should be hated to excess.”’

§ 15. ‘These γνῶμαι are of the greatest service (help) to our speeches—one of which’ (the other follows in the next section) ‘is due to, arises out of, the want of cultivation and intelligence in the audience; for they are delighted if ever any one chance to light upon, and express in general terms, any opinion that they hold themselves, but partially.’

φορτικότης, as far as Classical Greek is concerned, appears to be a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον: it is found also in Eustathius (Steph. *Thes.* sub v.). φορτικός, from φόρτος a burden or load, burden-like, burden-ish, and hence met. burdensome, oppressive, annoying: especially applied to *vulgarity*, in person, manners, or intellect. The last of these senses, intellectual vulgarity, the want of cultivation and refinement, and especially of philosophical cultivation—a coarse and vulgar habit of mind, which looks merely at the surface of things, with little or no faculty of observation or power of distinction, and contents itself with a mere vulgar knowledge shared with the mass of mankind—is, if not *peculiar* to Aristotle, at any rate much more commonly found in his writings than in others. In this sense the φορτικός does not differ much from the ἀπαίδευτος, and is opposed to the χαρίεις, which, in Aristotle, often expresses the *highest degree* of *grace* and refinement, arising from the study of philosophy. It is in this signification that the word is used here, meaning a want of intelligence and of philosophical or (generally) intellectual training, which disqualifies men for making distinctions and estimating the value of an argument; consequently they measure the validity of a

γὰρ εἰάν τις καθόλου λέγων ἐπιτύχη τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκείνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν. ὃ δὲ λέγω, δηλὸν ἔσται ὧδε, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεῖ αὐτὰς θηρεύειν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀπόφανσις καθόλου ἐστίν, χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου ὃ κατὰ μέρος προ-υπολαμβάνοντες τυγχάνουσιν· οἷον εἴ τις γείτοσι τύχοι κεχρημένος ἢ τέκνοις φαύλοις, ἀποδέξαιτ' ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡλιθιώτερον τεκνοποιίας. ὥστε δεῖ στοχά-

reason not by its logical force or cogency, but by its coincidence with their own previously conceived opinions; which they love to hear exaggerated by the orator, who humours them by these illicit generalisations. The Scholiast explains it ἀγροικίαν. Victorius has, I think, entirely mistaken the meaning of the word. The φορτικότης here ascribed to vulgar audiences is much the same as the μοχθηρία τῶν ἀκροατῶν, III 1.5, the vices or defects, which oblige the orator to have recourse to τὰλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδείξαι in order to convince them, because they are unable to appreciate logic alone. Comp. I 2. 13, on this subject, ὃ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἀπλοῦς. See also on III 1. 5.

'My meaning will be explained, and at the same time also how they (the γνώμαι) are to be caught' (hunted, pursued, like game, Anal. Pr. I 30, 46 a 11, θηρεύειν ἀρχάς), 'by what follows (ὧδε)'. 'The γνώμη, as has been stated (§ 2), is an utterance or declaration expressed universally; and an audience is always delighted with the expression, as of an universal truth, of any opinion which they previously, but partially, entertain: for example, if a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would be glad to hear (approve) any one who said "nothing is more troublesome (harder to bear) than neighbourhood" (abstract for concrete, γείτονες neighbours), or "nothing is more foolish than the procreation of children."—Possibly also, though this is doubtful, a man with a frail wife might like to hear Hamlet exclaim "Frailty, thy name is woman."

γειτονίας] Plat. Legg. VIII 843 C, χαλεπὴν καὶ σφόδρα πικρὰν γειτονίαν ἀπεργάζονται. γειτονῶν, apud eundem. For χαλεπώτερον γειτονίας, comp. Thuc. III 113, ἔδεισαν μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροιχοι ᾧσι. With the γνώμη comp. Demosth. πρὸς Καλλικλέα [Or. 55], init. οὐκ ἦν ἄρ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χαλεπώτερον οὐδὲν ἢ γείτονος πονηροῦ καὶ πλεονέκτου τυχεῖν (Victorius), evidently referring to this proverb, [cf. Hesiod, Op. et D. 345, πῆμα κακὸς γείτων].

στοχάζεσθαι κ.τ.λ.] 'And therefore (the speaker) must guess what their previous (already formed) opinions are and what sort of things they are about (how they think about what), and then express this opinion in a general proposition on these matters'. Schrader quotes Cic. de Orat. II 44. 186, (M. Antonius) *sicut medico... sic cum aggredior ancipitem causam et gravem, ad animos iudicum pertractandos omni mente in ea cogitatione curaque versor, ut odoror quam sagacissime possim quid sentiant quid existiment quid expectent quid velint, quo deduci oratione facillime posse videantur.*

ζέσθαι πῶς τυγχάνουσι ποῖα προῦπολαμβάνοντες,  
 16 εἶθ' οὕτω περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν. ταύτην τε δὴ  
 ἔχει μίαν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν, καὶ ἑτέραν κρείττω·  
 ἠθικοὺς γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. ἦθος δ' ἔχουσιν οἱ  
 λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δῆλη ἡ προαίρεσις. αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι  
 πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν  
 γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστ'  
 ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοῖς φαίνεσθαι  
 ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.

περὶ μὲν οὖν γνώμης, καὶ τί ἐστὶ καὶ πόσα εἶδη  
 αὐτῆς καὶ πῶς χρηστέον αὐτῇ καὶ τίνα ὠφέλειαν  
 1 ἔχει, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· περὶ δ' ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου CHAP. XXII.

πῶς ποῖα] Two interrogatives without copula: common in Greek—but in verse rather than prose—as Soph. Phil. 1090, τοῦ ποτε τεύξομαι...πόθεν ἐλπίδος.

§ 16. 'This then is one use (or usefulness, advantage) of the employment of γνῶμαι, there is also another, and a better; that is, that it gives an ethical character to our speeches. All speeches have this moral character in which the moral purpose is manifested'. Comp. III 17.9. The ἦθος referred to in III 16.9 is of a different kind, it is *dramatic* character, the third of the three distinguished in Introd. p. 112.

'All γνῶμαι have this effect, because any one who uses a γνώμη makes a declaration in general terms about the objects of moral purpose (or preference), and therefore if the γνῶμαι themselves are good (have a good moral tendency) they give to the speaker also the appearance of good character'. On ἀποφαίνεσθαι, see above on II 21.2.

'So, for the treatment of γνώμη, its nature, number of kinds, mode of employment, and advantages, let so much suffice'.

## CHAP. XXII.

On the treatment of enthymemes in general. A summary of the contents of this chapter is given in the Introduction, p. 260 seq., and the enthymeme in its logical aspect described in the same, p. 101—8. The principal part of it is occupied with the selection of topics of enthymemes, preparatory to, and exemplified by, c. 23, the τόποι τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων. [On the enthymeme, see Grote's *Aristotle* I 291—3.]

On the selection of topics, comp. Top. A 14. "Derivatum est hoc caput ex εὐπορίᾳ προτάσεων, *ratione conquirendi medios terminos*"—the middle term which connects the two extremes and so gives rise to the conclusion, is *therefore the* thing to be looked for in constructing a syllogism—"quae docetur, Anal. Pr. I 27—32: ut seq. cap. (23) e libris Topicorum, c. 24 et 25 ex Elenchis Soph. est traductum." Schrader. Of course the mode of treatment is *adapted* to the purposes of Rhetoric. I will repeat

- τε εἰπωμεν, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα  
 τοὺς τόπους· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκατέρου τούτων ἐστίν.  
 2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς τις ἐστίν, εἴρη-  
 ται πρότερον, καὶ πῶς συλλογισμὸς, καὶ τί διαφέρει  
 3 τῶν διαλεκτικῶν· οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν οὔτε πάντα δεῖ

here, that the enthymeme differs from the strict dialectical syllogism only in *form*. The materials of the two are the same, *probable* matter, and of unlimited extent: the dialectician may dispute, and the rhetorician draw his inferences, about *anything whatsoever*. The difference between the two is simply this, that the dialectician rigorously maintains the form of the syllogism, with its three propositions, major and minor premiss and conclusion: the rhetorician *never* expresses all three—if he did, his enthymeme would become a regular syllogism—though his argument or inference derives all the validity of its reasoning from the syllogism, of which it is a *kind*. [See esp. *note* on p. 103 of *Introd.*]

§ 1. 'Let us now speak of enthymemes in general, that is, of the mode of looking for them, and next their (principal) *τόποι*' (general heads of enthymemes, arguments or inferences; a classification of *cases* to which orators may refer for appropriate arguments in any *particular* case which they have to argue: in c. 23); 'for each of these is (of) a different kind'. On which Schrader, "ratio seligendi enthymemata differt a locis ipsis. Quomodo aliud est argenti fodina, aliud argentum investigandi et explorandi modus."

§ 2. 'Now that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism has been already stated (I 2. 8, and 13), and also how (in what respects) it is a syllogism, and wherein it differs from those of dialectics (I 2. 11); for—these are two of the differences—'we must neither go very far back, nor introduce all the steps (of the regular syllogism), in drawing our inferences; the one is obscure by reason of its length, the other is mere chattering (idle talk, or vain repetition, leading to nothing, III 3. 3), because it states what everybody sees already (what is already evident)'.

οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν κ.τ.λ.] This is a manifest reference to I 2. 13, where *both* of these two things which the rhetorician has to avoid are expressly mentioned.

First, he must not deduce his inference, the conclusion which he wishes to establish, by a long train of connected syllogisms from a remote distance, συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον... ἀνάγκη μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολουθητὸν διὰ τὸ μῆκος, ὃ γὰρ κριτῆς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἀπλοῦς. Comp. I 2. 12, ἔστι τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς (τῆς ῥητορικῆς)...ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἱ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὔδ' ἐλογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. (Comp. Topic. A 11, 105 a 8, where this is extended to dialectical argumentation. A similar precept is given in III 17. 6. πόρρωθεν of 'far-fetched' metaphors, III 2. 12. Comp. III 3. 4.) This will only puzzle his 'simple' audience, whose powers of perception and memory will be alike unable to keep pace with him. The reasoning of the rhetorician must be as clear and as brief as possible.

Secondly, he must draw his conclusion without expressing all that

λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία διὰ τὸ φανερὰ λέγειν. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ πιθανωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ φασὶν

belongs to the regular syllogism; this is also for the sake of brevity; the formal syllogism is unsuitable to the orator who has a great deal to say, and is hastening to his conclusion, fearing to weary his audience, because it *expresses* a great deal that is self-evident, and may well be left for the hearers themselves to supply. Besides this, the enthymeme which he employs obliges him to omit either one of the two premisses or the conclusion; which of them it is to be, depends upon the degree in which the reasoning will be intelligible without it: anything that is absolutely *φανερὸν* should (in reasoning) be omitted to save time. These are the two points in which the use of the enthymeme differs from that of the dialectical syllogism.

With respect to the first, the dialectician, whose object is merely to gain the victory in the dispute, and who has an antagonist more or less a match for him, can take his own time, and need not accommodate his reasoning to the intelligence of his opponent: to the rhetorician, the time allowed is generally limited, he has usually an uneducated and perhaps unintelligent audience to address, which he must keep in good humour, and therefore neither puzzle nor weary. The second point conveys the essential difference between the enthymeme and dialectical syllogism, that in the former οὐ πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν. πάντα may also include, what Schrader adds, "multas propositiones probabiles, communes, intempestivas," which "plane omitti debere praecipit."

On ἀδολεσχία, see note on III 3. 3. Eth. N. III 13, 1118 a 1. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15.

τοῦτο γάρ] γάρ here can hardly bear its usual signification, that of 'a reason assigned': the fact—that the uneducated are more convincing to a mob than your philosopher—is not the reason of the preceding statement, but rather the reverse; the previous statement explains (supplies the reason or explanation of) the fact. It must therefore be a case of that use of γάρ which Schleiermacher in his translation of Plato represents by *nämlich, videlicet*; a use of the word which frequently occurs in the Platonic dialogues. And so I have translated it: though it is to be observed that if *nämlich* always represents the Greek γάρ (in these special cases), the English 'namely' will not always represent the German *nämlich*. [Comp. note 1 on p. 134, and Shilleto on Thuc. I. 25. 4.]

'This, *namely*, is also the reason why the ignorant (or illiterate) have a greater power of persuading when they are addressing a mob than the highly educated or cultivated (in dialectics and philosophy), as the poets say that the uncultivated are the more accomplished speakers in a crowd'.

οἱ ποιηταί] is generalised from one, viz. Euripides, who alone is referred to. The plural sometimes expresses the single individual *plus* those like him. So we speak of 'our Newtons and our Bacons',

οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους παρ' ὀχλῶ μουσικωτέρως

as if there were several of them, 'poets, Homers and Virgils'; or else conveys contempt, 'don't talk to me of your Hegels and Schellings' (from some one who was no admirer of German philosophy) and so on. Soph. Phil. 1306, *ψευδοκήρυκας*, of Ulysses alone (Schneidewin). Sim. Plat. Rep. III 387 C, *Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στύγας*. Aesch. Agam. 1414, *Χρυσήϊδων μείλιγμα τῶν ὑπ' Ἰλίου*. (Longin. *περὶ ὕψους* § 23, ἐξήλθον "Ἐκτορές τε καὶ Σαρπηδόνες, Eur. Rhés. 866, οὐκ οἶδα τοὺς σοὺς οὓς λέγεις 'Οδυσσεάς. Hor. Ep. II 2. 117, *Calonibus atque Cethegís*, Lucan, Phars. I 313, *nomina vana, Catones*, quoted in Blomfield's Gloss. ad loc.) Arist. Ran. 1041, *Πατρόκλων Τεύκρων Θυμολεόντων* (characters of Aeschylus). See Valckn. ad Theocr. Adon. line 141, sub fin. *Δευκαλίωνας*.

The verses here referred to, not directly quoted, are from Eur. Hippol. 989, οἱ γὰρ ἐν σοφοῖς φαῦλοι, παρ' ὀχλῶ μουσικώτεροι λέγειν. The same verses are referred to by Plutarch, de Educ. Lib. c. 9, p. 6 B.

*μουσικός*, has here an unusual sense, which seems to be borrowed from the notion of *cultivation*, literary and intellectual, which the term expresses: hence 'skilled in', 'highly trained or cultivated' in the practice of a *particular* art. So Rost and Palm Lex. *wohlunterrichtet, geschickt*. "Accomplished in" seems to unite the two meanings; general cultivation, with special skill in the particular art. Ast's *Lex. Plat.*, on *μουσικῶς*: "Et in universum *decenter*. Plat. Rep. III 403 A, ἔρως πέφυκε ...μουσικῶς ἐρᾶν, Legg. VII 816 C."

'For the one (the *πεπαιδευμένοι*) talk about generals and universals, the others about (*lit.* 'from', the materials *from* which the speech is derived) what they really know, and things that are near to us (near, that is, to our observation, things sensible; and to our interests, those which nearly concern us)'. The *κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου* are the general or abstract, and universal notions, with which alone the philosopher and man of science care to deal. These are of course remote from popular knowledge and interests. The *artist* also is conversant with 'generals' and not with 'particulars or individuals': the rules of art are all general rules. Experience or empiricism deals with the particular: ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἑκαστὸν ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου. Metaph. A I, 981 a 15. Rhet. I 2. 11, II 19. 27. But although these *abstract* universal truths and rules are in themselves better known, καθ' αὐτά, ἀπλῶς, τῇ φύσει γνωριμώτερα, that is, convey a higher and more comprehensive kind of knowledge, yet *to us*, ἡμῖν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς, things of sense and the *concrete*, the visible and palpable, are nearer or closer (ἐγγύς), *clearer* and more interesting, and in this sense, better known; the knowledge of these *comes to us first*, as the simpler *πρότερον*, appeals to our senses, and is consequently more in accordance with *our* lower nature<sup>1</sup>. The distinction of absolute or objective, and relative or subjective, knowledge is very familiar to Aristotle. See Phys. Auscult. at the

<sup>1</sup> *φύσις* is used in more than one sense: thus it may be applied to the normal or abstract notion of *nature*, its true and highest form, perfect nature; or an imperfect nature, as it shews itself in us and our imperfect faculties and condition.

λέγειν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς. ὥστ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν δοκούντων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὠρισμένων λεκτέον, οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὐς ἀποδέχονται. καὶ τοῦτο

p. 94.  
p. 1396.

beginning [p. 184 a 16], πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἢ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς. Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b 1, seq. Bonitz ad loc. Waitz ad Organ. 71 a 1, II 299, 71 b 24, p. 307. Trendelenburg ad de Anima p. 337 seq., Elem. Log. Ar. § 19, p. 82.

'We therefore must not derive our arguments or inferences from all possible opinions' ("ex omnibus quae probantur, et vera esse videntur." Victorius); 'but select them out of those which are defined or determined or settled for us (marked off, and separated from the rest, as especially suitable to our purpose) (in some way or other) as, for instance, either by the judges (i.e. their known opinions: this in a law case) or those whose authority they accept'.

That is, there are many truths, such as scientific generalities, which may indeed be included amongst *opinions* (because they are *believed* as well as *known*) but yet are alien to the purposes of Rhetoric, and also many opinions, properly so called, which are unfit for its use, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν, I 2. 11; and besides this, "every fool has some opinions", I 2. 11; we must therefore make a selection if we wish to persuade—we had been already told that though the sphere of Rhetoric, like that of Dialectics, is theoretically unlimited, I 2. 1, yet that in practice it is usually confined to the business of life and human action, and therefore that its materials are in fact drawn from Politics, including Ethics, from political and social philosophy, ib. § 7.

Here however there is a still further restriction—we must select out of the vast range of probable opinions those which happen to suit our immediate purpose: for instance, if we are arguing a case in a law-court we must draw our inferences from such opinions as they (the judges) themselves are known to hold, or at any rate such as those whom they regard as authorities are known to approve. κρίνειν and κριτής, as we have seen, II 1. 2; 18. 1, may be extended to the *decision* of audiences in all three branches of Rhetoric, the assembly, the judges, and the θεαταί or θεωροί of an epideixis, and Victorius takes this view. As however κρίνουσιν is qualified by οἷον, which shews that there are other analogous cases, the two audiences of indirect κρίνοντες may perhaps be left to be understood.

τῶν δοκούντων] 'probable opinions', comp. II 1. 6; 25. 2, and φαίνεται in I 2. 11, and in the succeeding clause.

καὶ τοῦτο δέ] 'And this too should be clear—the speaker should be quite certain—that it *does* so appear to—that this *is* really the opinion of—all or most (of any audience)'.—If δέ be retained (so Bekker), compare note on I 6. 22. MS A<sup>c</sup> δῆ. *Quaere dei?* Victorius seems to understand it so, as he uses the word *debet*; perhaps supposing that the notion of 'ought' is carried on from the preceding λεκτέον: and this is confirmed by the following συνάγειν.



δ', ὅτι οὕτω φαίνεται, δῆλον εἶναι ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς P. 1395.  
πλείστοις. καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων,  
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

4 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεῖ λέγειν  
καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι εἴτε πολιτικῶ συλλογισμῶ εἴθ'

'And his inferences should be drawn not only from necessary propositions, but also from those that are only true for the most part', probabilities. The τεκμήριον, the certain sign, the necessary concomitant, is the only *necessary* argument admitted in Rhetoric: its ordinary materials are εἰκότα and σημεία, things by their very name and nature only probable. On these materials of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 160 seq. One might suppose from the phraseology adopted here, μὴ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, that the necessary propositions and conclusions were the rule and the probable the exception; instead of the reverse. The true statement is found in I 2. 14. Comp. Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 32—36.

§ 4. 'So first of all it must be understood that anything we have to speak or reason about' (on συλλογίζεσθαι et sim. for reasoning in general, see note on I 1. 11), 'whether it be on a political subject or any other whatever, it is necessary to (have in our possession) be acquainted with everything that belongs to this also (καὶ besides the συλλογισμός itself, or the particular point which the argument has in view), either all or some (according to circumstances); for if you have nothing (no information, no facts) in your possession (as material) you will have nothing to draw your inferences from'. The same thing is stated, and nearly in the same words, Anal. Pr. I 30, 46 a 3, ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἢ αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιοῦν καὶ μάθημα' (all learning and all philosophy and science begin with *observation*), δεῖ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει περὶ ἐκάτερον ἀθρεῖν, καὶ τούτων ὡς πλείστων εὐπορεῖν. And again, a 22, ὥστε ἂν ληφθῇ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἕκαστον, ἡμέτερον ἤδη τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἐτοίμως ἐμφανίζειν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν παραληφθῇ τῶν ἀληθῶς ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἔξομεν περὶ ἄπαντος, οὐ μὲν ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ταύτην εὐρεῖν καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ δὲ μὴ πέφυκεν ἀπόδειξις, τοῦτο ποιεῖν φανερόν. The ὑπάρχοντα here spoken of are all that properly *belong* to a thing, all its properties, qualities, attributes, all its antecedents and consequences—these are especially important in human actions, the rhetorician's subject—everything closely connected with it, whether similar or different, as opposites, relative terms and so on: in short, if you have to speak or reason upon any subject, if you wish to succeed, you must first know *all about it*. This is illustrated at length from the three branches of Rhetoric in the next five sections.

λαβεῖν I take to be here λαβεῖν τῷ νῷ or τῇ διανοίᾳ, to seize or grasp with the mind, apprehend, conceive.

πολιτικῶ] Politics, including Ethics, being almost exclusively the source from which rhetorical enthymemes are to be drawn, though theoretically the field of rhetorical practice is boundless: see note on p. 224. Otherwise, πολιτικός συλλογισμός may mean 'a rhetorical syllogism' or

ὁποιοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ἔχειν ὑπάρχοντα,  
 ἢ πάντα ἢ ἓνα· μηδὲν γὰρ ἔχων ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοις  
 5 συνάγειν. λέγω δ' οἷον πῶς ἂν δυνάμεθα συμβου-  
 λεύειν Ἀθηναίοις εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ πολεμητέον, μὴ  
 ἔχοντες τίς ἢ δύνამις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυτικὴ ἢ πε-  
 ρικὴ ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ αὕτη πόσις, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ  
 φίλοι καὶ ἐχθροί, ἔτι δὲ τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμή-  
 6 κασι καὶ πῶς, καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἢ ἐπαινεῖν, εἰ  
 μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν

enthymeme: 'political' that is 'on political subjects', to which Rhetoric is almost exclusively confined, is so far convertible with 'rhetorical'. This seems to be Victorius' view; on II 22. 10.

§ 5. 'As an instance of what I mean—how could we possibly *advise* the Athenians' (the συμβουλευτικὸν γένος) 'whether they should make war or not, unless we know what is the nature of their power (or forces), whether it is a naval or military force, or both, and its amount or magnitude, and what their revenues are, and their friends or enemies, and besides all this what wars they have waged, and with what success (or possibly, what are their *modes* of warfare)—and everything else of the same sort'. Compare with this I 4. 7, to the end, on political topics.

§ 6. 'Or deliver a panegyric' (the ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος) 'if we had not the sea-fight at Salamis, and the battle at Marathon, or all that was done on behalf of the Heraclidae, or anything else of the like sort. For all (panegyrists) derive their encomiums from the fair deeds, renown, distinctions (of their hero), real or supposed'.

These are the stock subjects of the Athenian declaimers: οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν, I 9. 30, III 14. 11. Plato's Menexenus has all these topics, the Heraclidae, 239 B; Marathon, c. 10; Salamis, c. 11. Isocrates, Panegyricus, §§ 54—60; 64, 65; Marathon and Salamis, § 85 seq. Comp. Philipp. § 147. de Pace § 37. Panath. § 194, Eurystheus and the Heraclidae; § 195, Marathon. He can't even keep it out of the περὶ ἀντιδόσεως (though that speech is of a purely personal nature); where it appears again, § 306. Lysias, ἐπιτάφιος, §§ 11—16, 20—26, 27—43. And the same three topics recur in the same order, only more briefly treated, in the ἐπιτάφιος attributed to Demosthenes, § 8 seq. Pseudo-Dem. περὶ συντάξεως § 22. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 259. Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 198. These topics are *not* introduced in the Speech for the Crown.

The tragic poets wrote dramas upon the same stories of unflinching interest, as Aeschylus' Persae, and Euripides' Heraclidae; and Aristophanes refers derisively to this habit of self-glorification, Acharn. 696—7, Vesp. 711, Equit. 781—785, and 1334. The Μαραθωνομάχαι, the warriors of Marathon, Ach. 181, Nub. 986, is not applied altogether in jest.

[ἐν Μαραθῶν is an instance of departure from the stereotyped ad-

Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὲρ Ἑρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα  
ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ  
7 δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες. ὁμοίως  
δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί  
ὑπάρχει τοιούτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι  
τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν  
βάρβαρον συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας ἡν-  
δραποδίσαντο Αἰγινήτας καὶ Ποτιδαιάτας, καὶ ὅσα  
ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιούτον ἀμάρτημα  
ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. ὥς δ' αὐτως καὶ οἱ κατηγοροῦντες  
καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοπού-  
8 μενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται. οὐδὲν δὲ δια-

verbial form *Μαραθῶνι*, without the preposition. See Cobet, *Variae Lectiones*, p. 201, and Dr Thompson's ed. of the *Gorgias*, p. 152.]

§ 7. 'And in like manner also topics of censure are derived from the opposites of these, by considering what of the like (i.e. τὸ ἐναντίον, the opposite) nature actually belongs, or seems to belong, to them' (the objects of the censure; things as well as men: see note in *Cambr. Journal of Cl. and Sacred Phil.*, Vol. II., No. 5, p. 158), 'as for instance, that they (the Athenians) reduced the Greeks to servitude and made slaves of the Aeginetans and Potidaeans, men that had shared in the fight and distinguished themselves against the barbarian (in the Persian invasion), and everything else of the like kind; and any other similar offence that can be alleged against (*iii.* belongs to) them'. On the treatment of the Aeginetans, see Thuc. II 27; and of the Potidaeans, Ib. c. 70. Against the charges brought against the Athenians of abusing their maritime supremacy, and oppressing their subject states, and other iniquities, Isocrates, Paneg. § 100 seq., defends them as well as he can: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἤδη τινὲς ἡμῶν κατηγοροῦσιν, ὥς ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης παρελάβομεν πολλῶν κακῶν αἰτίοι τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέστημεν, καὶ τὸν τε Μηλιῶν ἀνδραποδισμόν καὶ τὸν Σκιωναίων ἕλεθρον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἡμῖν προφέρουσιν' κ. τ. λ.

'And in like manner also, plaintiff and defendant (in a court of justice) derive their (arguments in) accusation and defence from the circumstances of the case, which they have to consider (take into account)'. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are here the acts and facts alleged, the characters of the two parties, and such like.

Schmidt, *On the date of Aristotle's Rhet.* p. 17, remarks on the three last sections, that the examples therein given would have been used by none but a resident at Athens, and go far to shew that the Rhetoric was written in that city.

§ 8. 'But in doing this (in acquiring the requisite information on the facts of the case, and the character and history of the person) it

φέρει περὶ Ἀθηναίων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεοῦ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο δρᾶν· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλευόντα τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ καὶ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ ψέγοντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον, ἵν' ἐκ τούτων λέγωμεν ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες εἴ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ὑπάρχει, κατηγοροῦντες δ' ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι εἴ τι δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, συμβουλευόντες δ' εἴ τι συμφέρον ἢ βλαβερόν. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ περὶ πράγματος ὅτου οὖν, οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης, εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐκ  
 9  
 10 τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. ὥστ'

makes no difference whether our subject be Athenians or Lacedaemonians, man or god; for whether we advise Achilles' (for *any* individual), 'or praise or censure, or accuse or defend him, we must alike make ourselves acquainted with all that belongs, or is thought to belong to him, in order that from this we may have to state whatever belongs to him and to his interests, whether fair or foul (noble or base, right or wrong), in praise and censure; just or unjust, in accusation and defence; and in advising' (advice or counsel includes ἀποτρέπειν as well as προτρέπειν) 'expedient or injurious'.

§ 9. 'And in like manner any subject whatsoever is to be dealt with; as for example, the question of justice, whether it be good or bad, (must be discussed from topics) derived from the belongings of justice and good'. Victorius reminds us of Thrasymachus' thesis in the first book of Plato's Republic—and he might have added that of Callicles in the Gorgias—that injustice is in reality, and by nature, superior to justice, which is the good *of others*, but injurious to the just man himself.

§ 10. 'And therefore since everyone manifestly demonstrates (i.e. argues, infers) in this way (i.e. from and by the knowledge of everything that belongs to his subject) whether his reasoning takes the exact or rigorous form of the syllogism (as in scientific demonstration, and probably also in dialectical argument), or employs the laxer mode (of the rhetorical enthymeme)'—(γὰρ in the parenthesis that follows, assigns the reason for the 'selection', the περὶ ἕκαστον εἶχειν ἐξελεγμένα; and as it comes *before* that for which it assigns the reason, must be translated 'since')—'since they don't take (their propositions, premisses, materials) from *everything*' (οὐκ ἐξ πάντων τῶν δοκούντων κ.τ.λ. *supra* § 3—see note ad loc.—οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν, I 2.11: although it is true that Rhetoric *admits* of this, it *may* argue anything), 'but from what belongs to each particular subject (that comes under their notice), and by means of the *speech* (at any rate, to say nothing about the demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms) it is plainly impossible to prove anything otherwise<sup>1</sup>: it

<sup>1</sup> This I take to be the meaning of διὰ τοῦ λόγου. The other interpretation, 'it is plain by reason', or 'reason shews that', is supported by Muretus and Vater.

ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντες οὕτω φαίνονται ἀποδεικνύντες, ἔάν τε ἀκριβέστερον ἔάν τε μαλακώτερον συλλογίζωνται

is clearly necessary, as in the Topics (or Dialectics, in general), first to have ready on each particular subject a selection already prepared of the probabilities and of those circumstances of the case which are most suitable, appropriate (opportune, timely, seasonable, germane to the matter in hand); (these are to be kept in stock, and ready prepared for use on occasion: from which are distinguished τὰ ἐξ ὑπογνίου); and also about circumstances (evidence, or what not) that arise on the sudden, to pursue your inquiries in the same way (make yourself acquainted with them as far as possible in such an emergency); turning your attention not to things indefinite (such as universals, intellectual and moral) but to what actually belongs to the subject of your speech, and including (drawing a line round, enclosing with a line) as many, and as close (nearly connected) to the subject, as possible: for the more of these circumstances there are in your possession, so much the easier is it to prove your point; and the closer the connexion, so much the more appropriate are they, and less general'.

Of the selection of προτάσεις for syllogisms, Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 δ 6, it is said, διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων (antecedents, consequents, and concomitants) ὅσα τε ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅσα ὡς ἴδια (ῥητορία: properties which, though not of the essence of the subject, are yet inseparably attached to it, and peculiar to, characteristic of it), καὶ ὅσα ὡς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ τούτων ποῖα δοξαστικῶς καὶ ποῖα κατ' ἀλήθειαν· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλείονων τοιούτων εὐπορῇ τις θάπτον ἐντεύξεσσι συμπεράσματος, ὅσα δ' ἂν ἀληθεστέρον μᾶλλον ἀποδείξει. *Mutatis mutandis*, and omitting the ποῖα κατ' ἀλήθειαν 'the truths of science', this agrees with what we find in the Rhetoric.

ἀκριβέστερον] the more exact mode of reasoning by formal syllogism, demonstrative or dialectical: the latter probably included, because, as far as the form is concerned, the dialectical syllogism follows precisely the same rules as the other, and the construction of the two is identical.

μαλακώτερον] softer, more yielding, less stiff and rigid and unbending, is naturally transferred to a *more relaxed* or *less rigorous* mode of reasoning, in force and substance, i.e. to the rhetorical enthymeme. Though the word is very often used metaphorically, I can find no other instance of this particular application of the metaphor. [For the metaphor, compare Metaph. E I, 1025 δ 13, ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ ἀναγκαϊότερον ἢ μαλακώτερον, ib. K 7, 1064 α 6, δεικνύναι τὰ λοιπὰ μαλακώτερον ἢ ἀκριβέστερον, de generatione et corruptione, B 6, 333 δ 25, ἔδει οὖν ἢ ὀρίσασθαι ἢ ὑποθέσθαι ἢ ἀποδείξαι, ἢ

Victorius renders it, "as by general use, so also, *ita etiam ratione quadam confirmatur*," meaning by *ratio* the process of reasoning. As to the first, it seems to me that διὰ τοῦ λόγου would be a very affected and unnatural way of expressing either 'by reason', or 'by reasoning': it would rather be τῷ λόγῳ if that were the meaning. Also διὰ with the genit., which denotes the channel, medium, course, or means, of anything, is much more appropriately joined with δεικνύναι, with which my version connects it, than with δηλῶν, which, to say the least, would be very unusual Greek.

(οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων λαμβάνουσιν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ P. 13 96b.  
 ἕκαστον ὑπαρχόντων), καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δῆλον ὅτι  
 ἀδύνατον ἄλλως δεικνύναι, φανερόν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον,  
 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, πρῶτον περὶ ἕκαστον ἔχειν  
 ἐξελεγμένα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπικαιρο-  
 II τάτων, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξ ὑπογυίου γιγνομένων ζητεῖν  
 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς ἀόριστα ἀλλ'

ἀκριβῶς ἢ μαλακῶς, ἢ ἁμῶς γέ πως, ib. N 3, 1090 b 8, μὴ λίαν ἢ μαλακῶς (ὁ λόγος),  
 de Caelo, Δ 6, 313 b 4, ἐνστάς λυεῖ μαλακῶς. *Index Aristotelicus* (Bonitz).]

ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς] Brandis, in the tract so often referred to [*Philol.*  
 IV i] p. 18, notices on this "that it marks the connexion between Rhetoric  
 and the Topics, i. e. dialectics", being a reference to II 23. It seems not  
 to refer to any particular passage of the Topics, but merely to state in  
 general terms that the mode of treating the Topics is the same in Rhe-  
 toric as in 'the Topics', i. e. the entire work, or the practice of dialectics  
 in general. Similarly Schmidt, in the tract *On the date of the Rhet.*  
 p. 2, "verisimile est etiam in tribus aliis locis (videlicet, II 22. 10, II 23. 9,  
 II 26. 4) eum non suos de arte topica libros (we need not go so far as this)  
 sed hanc artem ipsam intellexisse." Is it possible that this may be one of  
 the, I might almost say, *ordinary* lapses of the Aristotelian memory in  
 quotation, and that he has referred to the Topics instead of the Prior  
 Analytics? In the latter, I 30, quoted above on § 4, there is a passage  
 which contains a statement very closely resembling what has been said  
 here about the selection of topics, 46 a 10, ὅπως μὴ βλέπωμεν εἰς ἅπαντα  
 τὰ λεγόμενα... ἀλλ' εἰς ἐλάττω καὶ ὀρισμένα, καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ ἐκλέγειν τῶν  
 ὄντων, οἷον περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἐπιστήμης. Whether this be so or not, the pas-  
 sage at all events deserves to be compared with this section of the  
 Rhetoric. Top. A 14 is upon the selection of προτάσεις, chiefly in the  
 shape of δόξαι for dialectical purposes; but cannot, I think, be *directly*  
 referred to here.

ἐξελεγμένα, ἐκλογῆς, § 12.] "The collection of premisses, whether  
 scientific theses, or dialectical organa, or rhetorical specific data, is ex-  
 pressed by the word ἐκλέγειν or ἐκλαμβάνειν," Poste, *Poster. Anal.* p.  
 121, note 1, comp. p. 25, and note 1. The terms occur constantly in the  
*Anal. Prior.* [Comp. *supra* I 2, 1358 a 23, βέλτιον οὖν ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰς προ-  
 τάσεις.] The use of them is not confined to Aristotle, and seems to be  
 technical. *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 10 (11), § 2, ἐκληπτέον.

ἐπικαιροτάτων] So Top. Γ 6, 109 a 36, μάλιστα ἐπικairoi καὶ κοινοὶ τῶν  
 τόπων. Ib. H 4 init.

§ 11. ἐξ ὑπογυίου] See note on I 1. 7, p. 11. The phrase is applied here  
 to circumstances that arise out of the occasion, which you must seize on as  
 well as you can; extemporaneous, sudden, unpremeditated, and there-  
 fore unprepared; temporary accidents of the subject in hand, *quae*  
*repente eveniunt* (Victorius). These we must collect *as well as we can*, on  
 the spur of the moment; but the same rules are to be observed as in  
 the other cases. Poste, u. s., p. 24, "*singular* circumstances."

εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιγράφοντας ὅτι πλείστα καὶ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος· ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλείω ἔχεται τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοσοῦτῳ ῥᾶον δεικνύναι, ὅσῳ δ' ἐγγύτερον, τοσοῦτῳ οἰκειότερα  
 12 καὶ ἦττον κοινά. λέγω δὲ κοινὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἡμιθέων καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ Ἴλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὥστ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος

περιγράφοντας] περιγράφειν and περιγραφή are usually applied to the outline of a drawing, so περιγεγράφθω τὰγαθόν of a rough sketch or outline of good (opposed to ἀναγράφαι, to fill up, *lit.* draw over, this outline) Eth. N. I 7, init. and περιγραφή Ib. 1098 a 23: but this is not applicable here. *Praefinientem seponentemque* says Victorius. The meaning required seems to be that of 'enclosing', for the purpose of keeping things separate from others, so that you may be able to lay your hand upon them at once when you want them, and not have to *sort* them at the time: for this purpose you draw a line of demarcation round them, which keeps them from getting mixed up with other things that resemble them, or at all events that you don't want just then. [Metaph. K 7, 1064 a 2, ἐκάστη γὰρ τούτων περιγραφαμένη τι γένος αὐτῇ περὶ τοῦτο πραγματεύεται.]

ἦττον κοινά] 'less general', and therefore more *special*, ἴδια. κοινὰ is illustrated in the next section; from which it appears that it means here the wider and higher generalisations which are attributes of very large classes, and have therefore nothing *special*, distinctive, and characteristic, about them. Neither of them is used in a technical sense, as *genus* and *species*. ἴδια are *peculiarities* and peculiarities of *individuals*.

In contrast with what is here said of the selection of rhetorical topics compare Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 1 seq., on the selection of topics for demonstrative syllogisms: in these the major premisses and conclusions must be universal and necessary, and the rules laid down are in conformity with that. Near the end of the chapter, ληπτέον δὲ κ.τ.λ. 43 b 32, seq. a supplementary note is added, on probable (τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) questions and their syllogisms, referring to dialectical and rhetorical proofs.

§ 12. 'By "common" or "general" I mean, saying (for instance) in praise of Achilles, that he is a man, or one of the demigods, or that he joined the expedition against Troy; for these things belong (these distinctions are shared by, are common) to many others besides, so that one who does this (such an one) praises Achilles no more than Diomedes. By "special" or "peculiar", what belongs' (properly as a *separable accident*, but not technical here) 'to no one else but Achilles, as for instance to have slain the famous (τόν) Hector, the best and bravest of the Trojans, and the renowned Cynus, who, being invulnerable, prevented the landing of the whole (Greek) army; and that he was the youngest of those that made the expedition, and joined it without taking the oath' (unsworn, i. e. voluntarily, whereas the rest were *compelled* to serve by their engagement to Tyndareus), 'and anything else of the same kind'.

Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεί ἢ Διομήδην· ἴδια δὲ ἂ μὴδενὶ ἄλλῳ  
 συμβέβηκεν ἢ τῷ Ἀχιλλεΐ, οἷον τὸ ἀποκτείνει τὸν  
 Ἑκτορα τὸν ἀριστον τῶν Τρώων καὶ τὸν Κύκνον, ὃς  
 ἐκάλυπεν ἅπαντας ἀποβαίνειν ἄτρωτος ὦν, καὶ ὅτι  
 νεώτατος καὶ οὐκ ἔνορκος ὦν ἐστράτευσεν, καὶ ὅσα  
 ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

- 13 εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς καὶ πρῶτος οὗτος  
 ὁ τοπικός, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγωμεν.  
 στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό.  
 πρῶτον δ' εἵπωμεν περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον.

Κύκνον] Cycnus does not appear in Homer. The earliest mention of him seems to be that of Pindar, Ol. II 82 (146), who uses him for the same purpose as Aristotle, viz. for the glorification of Achilles. (Ar.'s notice may possibly be a reminiscence of Pindar.) Ἀχιλλέα...ὃς Ἑκτορῷ ἔσφαλε, Τρῳάας ἀμαχὸν ἀστραβῇ κίονα, Κύκνον τε θανάτῳ πόρον, Ἀοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα (Memnon.) The story of Achilles' encounter with Cycnus at the landing of the troops, the long conflict with his 'invulnerable' antagonist, and how Achilles finally destroyed him, are all related at length by Ovid, Met. XII 64—145. He was the son of Neptune, Ovid u. s. 72, *proles Neptunia*; is again classed with Hector, line 75; and in lines 135—144 is described as finally crushed and strangled with the thong or fastening of his own helmet.

ἄτρωτος] not *unwounded*, but *invulnerable* (invulnerable by ordinary weapons; not absolutely, since he was killed). Pind. Nem. X 11, ἀτρώτῳ κραδίᾳ, Isthm. III 30 ἀτρωτοὶ παῖδες θεῶν. Plat. Symp. 219 E.

οὐκ ἔνορκος] The oath sworn by Helen's suitors to her father Tyndareus at Sparta, that they would defend him whom she chose for her husband against any aggression. This was Menelaus. Victorius quotes, Pausan. Lac. c. 24, Ὅμηρος δὲ ἔγραψε μὲν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀρχόμενος ὡς Ἀχιλλεὺς χαρίζομενος τοῖς Ἀτρεΐωσι παῖσι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνεχόμενος τοῖς ὅρκοις τοῖς Τυνδάρεω, παραγένοιτο εἰς Τροίαν. The passage referred to seems to be Il. A 158. Ulysses says the same of his son Neoptolemus, Soph. Phil. 72, σὺ μὲν πέπλευκας οὐτ' ἔνορκας οὐδενὶ κ.τ.λ.; and Philoctetes of himself, Ib. 1026. The story of the oath is told in Eurip. Iph. Aul. 49—65; and frequently alluded to elsewhere in the Tragic writers. Comp. Soph. Aj. 1111, Teucer of Ajax, ὦ γάρ τι τῆς σῆς οὔνεκ' ἐστρατεύσατο,.....ἄλλ' οὔνεχ' ὀρκῶν οἷσιν ἦν ἐνόμος.

§ 13. 'One method of the selection then, and the first (most important), is this, namely the topical (dialectical, following the dialectical method, that *by topics*); and now let us pass on to the elements of enthymemes; by *elements* and *topics* of enthymemes I mean the same thing'. This is repeated, c. 26. 1. On *στοιχεῖον*=τόπος, and why so called, see Introd. pp. 127, 128. Add to the examples there given, Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37). 9, *στοιχεῖα κοινὰ κατὰ πάντων*, which seems to mean *τόποι*.



14 ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἶδη δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἐστιν ὅτι ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστιν, τὰ δ' ἐλεγκτικά, καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἐλεγχος καὶ συλλογισμός. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν περὶ

'But (before we proceed to do so) let us first state the necessary preliminaries'.

§ 14. 'Of enthymemes namely there are two kinds: for some undertake to shew that something is, or is not, so and so—*direct* proof; the establishment of a proposition, affirmative or negative—others are refutative; and these differ just like refutation and syllogism in dialectics'. On this and the next section see Introd. pp. 262, 3, and the notes.

§ 15. 'The demonstrative enthymeme (which proves *directly*) is, to draw an inference' (to 'gather,' *colligere*); corresponding to the conclusion, *συμπέρασμα*, of the regular syllogism) 'from universally admitted premisses (those general probabilities which everyone is ready to admit); the refutative is to draw inferences or conclusions not *agreeing* (with the opinions or inferences of the adversary)'. The *ἐλεγχος* is *ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμός*, the negative of, or conclusion contradictory to, the conclusion of the opponent: *refutation* always assumes an opponent, real or imaginary, whose arguments, or opinions, or theories are to be refuted by proving the negative.

This interpretation is in conformity with the received signification of *ἀνομολογούμενος* 'disagreeing with, contradictory'. This negative sense is rare: Plat. Gorg. 495 A, Ar. Anal. Pr. I 34, 48 a 21 [τοῦτο δὲ ἀνομολογούμενον τοῖς προειρημένοις], Rhet. II 23, 23, *dis*, are the only instances cited; comp. Butt. Auctar. ad Heind. Gorg. § 108, p. 490. So Victorius, "quae adversentur iis quae ab adversario ostensa prius et conclusa fuerint;" and Augustinus Niphus (quoted by Schrader) "quod ex datis concessive adversario repugnantia atque improbabilia colligit. Repugnantia autem et improbabilia dico quae sunt contra adversariorum opinionem."

§ 16. 'Now of the general heads or classes of the specific topics that are useful or necessary we may be said to be pretty nearly in possession; for the premisses on each particular subject have been selected, so that the special topics from which enthymemes on the subjects of good or bad, fair or foul (right or wrong), just or unjust, must be derived' (these are the *εἶδη*, analysed under the heads of the three branches of Rhetoric in the first book, from c. 4, 7, to 14), 'and in like manner the topics of the characters, and feelings, and states of mind, have been previously taken and are before us' (*ὑπάρχουσιν* are *ready for us*, for our use).

The construction of the preceding clause *ὥστε—οἱ τόποι* I stand to be this, though Vahlen [*Transactions of the VI<sup>e</sup> of Sciences*, Oct. 1861, p. 131] declares *ὥστε* and *τόπων* to be. *Τόπων* is attracted, as usual, to the construction of the *οἱ τόποι* ἐξ ὧν δεῖ φέρειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα: and *οἱ τόποι* is

ἐκάστων τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν χρησίμων καὶ ἀναγκαίων

end of the clause—unnecessarily perhaps, but not ungrammatically—in the second part of it introduced by καί. As to the ὥστε, readers of Aristotle must have remarked that his ὥστε's are not always to be very strictly interpreted; sometimes they almost lose the force of a logical *consequence*, and indicate little more than a *sequence*. I presume that Vahlen's meaning (which is not explained) is, that ὥστε κ.τ.λ. is a mere repetition, and no consequence at all. But the two things spoken of are not precisely identical, and there is a certain connexion of cause and effect between them: it is first said in general terms that the premisses upon each subject of Rhetoric have been already selected: and from this it may *in a sense* be said to *follow* that we are supplied *in detail*, with topics for our enthymemes, with εἰδη or special topics under the three branches of Rhetoric, and also for the ἡθῆ, πάθη and ἔξεις in Bk. II.

Vahlen, u. s. pp. 130, 1, for the reasons before mentioned (some account of his views on this subject has been given in the introductory observations on c. 18), condemns the whole of section 16, as the interpolation of an editor, who has inserted (we are not told *why*) a sentence 'without motive, and disturbing' the connexion, in which of course, following the *altered* arrangement (which is assumed) he has placed the ἡθῆ and πάθη immediately after the εἰδη (as they now stand).

Besides this he objects to παθημάτων and ἔξων, with which we have next to deal. πάθημα in this sense for πάθος, is certainly very rare, perhaps unique. But, *per contra*, there are at least four passages where πάθημα is found in other senses, to express which πάθος is always elsewhere employed. Metaph. A 2, 982 b 16, τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων, and c. 4, 985 b 12, τῶν παθημάτων (τῆς ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας): Anal. Post. I 10, 76 b 13, τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ παθημάτων, and Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 b 9 ὅσα φυσικά ἐσσι παθήματα: which certainly seem to be sufficient to justify παθημάτων here<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> [Bonitz (*Aristotelische Studien* V 50, and *Index Aristotelicus*) holds that in Aristotle there is no clear distinction of meaning between πάθημα and πάθος, "sed eadem fere vi et sensus varietate utrumque nomen, saepius alterum, alterum rarius usurpari." In the Aristotelian writings, πάθημα is never found in the sing. except in the spurious *Physiognomica* 806 a 2; the gen. pl. παθημάτων occurs 38 times, παθῶν only 8, (Note Eth. Eudem. B, 2, 1220 b 6, λεκτέον δὲ κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς πό' αἷτα ἦθῆ. ἔσται δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ' ἃς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγονται τῷ πάσχειν πῶς ἢ ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι. μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις (?) τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυναμένων καὶ τῶν ἔξων. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ ἐπιθυμίαν.) Bernays, while admitting that the words are often used loosely, draws the following distinction: πάθος ist der Zustand eines πασχειν und bezeichnet den unerwartet ausbrechenden und vorübergehenden Affect; πάθημα dagegen ist der Zustand eines παθητικὸς und bezeichnet den Affect also inhärent der afficirten Person und als jederzeit zum Ausbruche reif. Kürzer gesagt, πάθος ist der Affect und πάθημα ist die Affection (Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, Abhhandl. der hist. phil. Gesellschaft in Breslau, I. pp. 149, 194—6). The distinction is insisted on in a treatise by H. Baumgart, *Pathos und Pathema im Aristotelischen Sprachgebrauch*, Königsberg, 1873, pp. 58.]

ἔχονται οἱ τόποι· ἐξελεγμένοι γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις  
 περὶ ἑκάστων εἰσιν, ὥστ' ἐξ ὧν δεῖ φέρειν τὰ ἐν- P. 96.  
 θυμήματα τόπων περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, ἢ καλοῦ ἢ  
 αἰσχροῦ ἢ δικαίου ἢ ἀδίκου, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ  
 παθημάτων καὶ ἔξεων ὡσαύτως εἰλημμένοι ἡμῖν ὑπάρ-  
 17 χουσι. πρότερον οἱ τόποι. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον καθ- P. 1397.

As to *ἔξεων*, this, through a deviation from the author's usual phraseology, who generally confines himself to *ἡθῆ* and *πάθη*, appears again in this connexion; II 12 init., τὰ δ' ἡθῆ ποῖοι τινας κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἔξεις κ.τ.λ. The author there himself tells us his meaning, interpreting *ἔξεις* by *ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας*; and I can see no reason for condemning the word, as Vahlen does, except the very insufficient one, that it is unusual<sup>1</sup>. The *ἔξεις* in this sense, do actually enter into, and in fact constitute the *ἡθος*, and I do not see why they should not be specially mentioned, if Aristotle chose to depart from his ordinary practice, and do so.

So far then we have been occupied with the *εἰδη*, special subjects derived from special sciences, and specially employed each in one of the three departments of Rhetoric—this is generally, not absolutely true; for though the three ends of Rhetoric, the good or useful, the just, and the noble or right, are more appropriate and more serviceable, each in *one* of the three branches, yet any of them can be, and sometimes is, introduced in them all—and we must now turn to the topics, the families, classes, of arguments into which enthymemes in *general* may be made to fall. This is for convenience of practice, that we may know where to look for them when we want them, and apply that which happens to be appropriate to the particular case. This classification is made in the 23rd chapter, which therefore is the *rhetorical* representative of the far more extensive and minute classification of *dialectical* topics, and is the object also of Cicero's *Topica*. And as the treatise on fallacies, the book *περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων*, is appended to the books of the *Topics*, so we have a similar chapter on rhetorical fallacies (c. 24) added to the analysis of the genuine arguments.

I will here remark (against Vahlen) that the word *καθόλου* § 17, which contrasts these universal *τόποι* with the special topics that have preceded, renders the actual mention of them in the foregoing section almost, if not quite, necessary.

§ 17. 'Let us now proceed further in another way to take (or find)

<sup>1</sup> I have noticed in many recent German commentators on Aristotle, Brandis being an honourable exception, a disposition to pin down their author to a fixed and particular mode of expression in certain cases from which he is never to be allowed to deviate. Aristotle is the very last writer to whom any such rule should be applied. He is always hasty, often careless; and, as we have seen in so many instances in this work, is very apt to use words in senses either vague and indeterminate, or (properly) inapplicable, or unusual; and his style is loose and careless to a fault, both in construction and expression. He is a writer who more than all others requires a most liberal allowance for irregularities.

όλου περί ἀπάντων λάβωμεν, καὶ λέγωμεν παρασημαινόμενοι τοὺς ἐλεγκτικούς καὶ τοὺς ἀποδεικτικούς καὶ τοὺς τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων, οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπεὶ περ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν. δηλωθέντων δὲ τούτων, περί τῶν λύσεων καὶ ἐνστάσεων διορίσωμεν, πόθεν δεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα φέρειν.

I. ἔστι δ' εἷς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναν-

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universal topics about every thing (taken promiscuously, that is, from any of the εἶδη, and applied indifferently to any of the three branches of Rhetoric), and add a supplementary note upon the refutative and demonstrative (*subaudi* τόπους ἐνθυμημάτων) topics of enthymemes (the contents of c. 23), and those of apparent' (shams, impostors, not genuine), 'not real, enthymemes; not real, because this is likewise the case with syllogisms (of which enthymemes though mutilated are a copy, and therefore share with the others the fallacious kind)'.

The literal translation of οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπεὶ περ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν is, "enthymemes not real, because there are also unreal (not-real syllogisms"; οὐδὲ, neither, being broken up into two parts, of which the δὲ contrasts συλλογισμῶν with ἐνθυμημάτων, and the οὐ negatives the genuineness (und. from the preceding) of the syllogism, not the syllogism itself.

παρσημαινόμενοι] is a very oddly chosen word to express the treatment of chapters 23 and 24, which are just as much connected with the subject of the work, and treated with as much care and detail, as the rest. It means according to Victorius (and Rost and Palm's *Lex.*) *adscribere*, *adnotare*, applied to something of subordinate interest and importance, or not immediately and closely connected with the subject in hand, as a *note* on the margin of a manuscript; 'noting beside' the main subject, a *supplementary note*. This is certainly the meaning of it in Top. A 14, 105 b 16, where it is applied to the 'noting down' of the opinions of individual philosophers, 'beside', as supplementary to, those which are generally accepted: and also, as Victorius thinks, of παράσημα in de Soph. El. 20, 177 b 6—this is not quite so certain: [ἐν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις παράσημα ποιοῦνται (signa ponunt ad vocabula distinguenda), *Index Aristotelicus*]. Alexander Aphrodisiensis in his commentary on the former passage adds παραγράφειν, apparently as a synonym, or interpretation of the other.

And after this has been made clear, let us pass on to the determination of solutions and objections, whence they must be brought, from what sources derived, for the refutation of enthymemes'. Of λύσις and its two modes, ἔλεγχος and ἐνστασις, the contents of c. 25, see Intro. 268 seq.

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In an excellent *Review of the study of ancient Rhetoric* [by Spengel], read at the celebration of the eighty-third anniversary of the foundation

of the Munich Academy of Sciences, 1842, a clear account is given of the relation of these *τόποι ἐνθυμημάτων* that follow to the *εἶδη* of the first book, of which I will give a translation with very slight alterations.

To the first of these he gives the name of 'formal', to the second of 'material' proofs. "Formal proofs, such as they appear in Dialectics and Rhetoric, are of an universal nature, and therefore applicable alike to all branches of science; they form the collective Topics, which Aristotle has elaborated for Dialectics with wonderful completeness in the most comprehensive of all the works of his Organon; whilst in Rhetoric, not without reference to the other, he has selected and put forward only what is most essential. Material proofs are with him such as are derived from the principles of the special sciences, the knowledge of which the orator must bring with him, ready for any occasion on which it may be properly applied. Aristotle is by no means of opinion that a mere superficial description, without thorough knowledge of the object to be described, and alien to the true spirit of it, can be called 'rhetorical' with propriety; on the contrary, the orator must be thoroughly imbued with the knowledge of his subject, whatever department of knowledge it may happen to belong to, and from this special science bring with him his concrete proofs, for the purpose of convincing. Accordingly, for forensic pleading the accurate study of law is indispensable, for the deliberative speaking or counselling that of Politics, the science of government, and similarly for each kind the special knowledge which belongs to it. But this special knowledge cannot be obtained from Rhetoric itself, otherwise it would carry in itself all knowledge, which is not the case: the office of Rhetoric is, to work up the proofs which the special science offers, to combine them with the 'formal', and so to bring the subject within the reach of universal comprehension."

On the contents of this chapter, and its connexion with the Topics, Brandis, ap. Schneidewin's *Philologus* [IV i.] p. 18, has the following remarks. "We now turn (c. 23) to the universal points of view (topics) most worthy of attention for the formation or refutation of enthymemes, which are briefly discussed. Before passing to this, Aristotle has already pointed out the connexion which exists between this division of the Rhetoric and the Topics (c. 22 § 10). It is perfectly conceivable however that here also (as before, referring to Rhet. I 7,) what in the Topics has met with a detailed discussion in regard of the various modes of applying them, is here only briefly referred to, and with an exclusive view to the application to be made of them in speaking." He then illustrates this at some length from the two works; but it will be more convenient to leave these details till we come to them in the course of the notes on the topics themselves. [On the Topics, see in general Grote's *Aristotle*, ch. ix.]

Cicero, *Topica*, first gives a summary classification of the various forms of these arguments under their most general heads, III 11. These are, *coniuncta, ex genere, ex forma, ex similitudine, ex differentia, ex contrario, ex adiunctis, ex antecedentibus, ex consequentibus, ex repugnantibus, ex causis, ex effectis, ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum*, (the last, *comp. maiorum et minorum*, are the topics of Rhet. I 7,) which are afterwards described in greater detail and illustrated, cc. IX 38,—XVIII 71, *Haec ego argumenta, quae transferri in multas causas*

τίων· δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον

*possunt, locos communes nominamus, de Inv. II 15. 48. Quintilian treats them, Inst. Orat. V 10, 20—94, and sums them up thus, § 94; Ergo ut breviter contraham summam, ducuntur argumenta a personis, causis, locis, tempore (cuius tres partes diximus, praecedens, coniunctum, insequens), facultatibus (quibus instrumentum subiecinus), modo (id est ut quidque sit factum), finitione, genere, specie, differentibus, propriis, remotione, divisione, initio, incrementis, summa, similibus, dissimilibus, pugnantibus, consequentibus, efficientibus, effectis, eventis, iugatis, comparatione, quae in plures diducitur species. Iugata are Cicero's coniugata, Aristotle's σύστοιχα and ὁμοίαι πώσεις.*

These arguments can *all*(?) be turned both ways, and applied to prove either the affirmative δεικτικά, κατασκευαστικά, constructive, confirmatory; or the negative, ελεγκτικά, (23. 30); ἀνασκευάζειν, ἀναίρειν; destructive of the proposition maintained by the theorist (in philosophy), the opponent (in dialectics). Rhetoric τὰναντία συλλογίζεται [I 1. 12]. Of the first, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, this is expressly stated.

§ 1. One class of demonstrative (or affirmative) enthymemes is derived from *opposites*: we have to consider, namely, whether the opposite (to the one) belongs to (i. e. can be said, or predicated of) the opposite (to the other). Two pairs of opposites are supposed, as in the example, temperance and licentiousness, good, i. e. profitable, and injurious: the question is whether the two opposed terms or things stand in the same relation to one another, i. e. that one can be predicated of the other, as the two first, to which they *are* opposed: if they can, the original proposition may be maintained, or inferred by the enthymeme; if not, it can be confuted or destroyed. The inference in either case is drawn ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, from the correctness or incorrectness, the truth or falsehood, of the assertion of compatibility or coexistence in the opposites, or that one *can* be predicated of the other. Thus in the example, if the opposites to the original proposition—temperance is profitable—stand in the same relation to one another as the two members of the first, so that the one can be truly predicated of the other—if the opposite, injurious, is truly predicable of licentiousness—then, so far, we infer the truth of the first: if not, the proposition may be confuted. The inference, like all other rhetorical inferences, is *probable*, not necessary: it can always be contradicted.

Aristotle, as we have already seen (note on c. 19. 1), distinguishes four kinds of ἀντικείμενα, or opposites; contradictory, contrary (extremes under the same genus, as here σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία are the two extremes, virtue and vice, under the genus ἦθος, moral character), relative; and ἕξις and στέρησις, state and privation. In the Topics all the four kinds in their relation to this form of argument are successively handled; in the Rhetoric, the treatment is confined to the single kind of contraries, as the most useful and plausible, and the rest passed over. See Brandis, u. s., p. 18. The passage in the Topics corresponding to this is B 8, 113 b 27, seq. [Grote's *Ar.* I, chap. IX pp. 422, 3]; but compare also B 2, 109 b 17; on the import and limitations of ἐναντίον Ib. c. 7; Γ 6, init. on the great advantages and wide extent of these two first topics, viz. this, and the next,

ὑπάρχει, ἀναιρῶντα μὲν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν. ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ· εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἴτιος τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπανορθώσασθαι.

εἰ περ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῖς κακῶς δεδρακόσιν  
ἀκουσίως δίκαιον εἰς ὀργὴν πεσεῖν,  
οὐδ' ἂν ἀναγκασθεῖς τις εὖ δράσῃ τινά,  
προσῆκόν ἐστι τῷδ' ὀφείλεσθαι χάριν.

ἀλλ' εἰ περ ἔστιν ἐν βροτοῖς ψευδηγορεῖν  
πιθανά, νομίζειν χρή σε καὶ τούναντίον,  
ἄπιστ' ἀληθῆ πολλὰ συμβαίνειν βροτοῖς.

τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν πτώσεων. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνδοξον τὸ ἀξιώσαι, εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ λύπην πᾶσαν εἶναι κακόν κ.τ.λ. followed by a series of illustrations: also B 9, 114 b 6. The treatment of opposites in the Topics and Rhetoric corresponds in this, that in both works it has reference solely to the art of reasoning, to the inferences affirmative or negative that may be drawn by constructive, or refutative, syllogisms and enthymemes.

Cicero (who borrows a good deal from Aristotle), Topic. xi. 47, *Deinceps locus est, qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt* (Arist.), *ut sapientia et stultitia....Haec quae ex eodem genere contraria sunt appellantur adversa.* His instance is, *si stultitiam fugimus, sapientiam sequamur* (this in the Aristotelian form would be, If folly is to be shunned, wisdom is to be sought or pursued). He then goes through the three remaining kinds of *contraria*, following Aristotle.

*Ex contrariis, Frugalitas bonum, luxuria enim malum* (enthym.). *Si malorum causa bellum est, erit emendatio pax: si veniam meretur qui imprudens nocuit, non meretur praemium qui imprudens profuit.* Quint. v 10. 73. In the last example, the opposites are, excuse, indulgence (for a fault), and reward (for a service), injury and benefit: the merit or *desert* is common to both: only in the one case it takes the form of demerit, which *deserves* punishment: as is also the absence of purpose, of good or ill intention.

ἀναιρεῖν, 'to take up', passes on to the sense of removing, taking away; thence to *taking off*, destroying; and so finally, when it comes to logic, is applied to the argument which upsets, subverts, destroys, or refutes the adversary's argument or position.

'Or (a second example) as it is in the Messeniac speech (of Alcidas, on which see note on I 13. 2), "for if it is the war which is the cause of the present evils, it is by the peace (which I now propose) that they must be rectified." συμβουλευεῖ ὁ Ἀλκιδάμας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις μὴ καταδουλώσαι τοὺς ἐν Μεσσήνῃ, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ

## 2 ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων· ὁμοίως γὰρ δεῖ ὑπάρ-

πόλεμος, φησί, προυξήνησε τάδε τὰ κακά, εἰρήνη πάλιν ταῦτα ἐπαυροβύσεται (Scholiast). 'Verba ipsa Alcідamantis scholiastes videtur conservasse.' Sauppe ad Alcід. Fragm. Mēssen. 2. *Oratores Attici*, III 154. Quintilian has borrowed this, see above [middle of p. 239].

"The four lines which follow as a third example are of uncertain authorship: Gaisford attributes them either to Agathon or Theodectes: the enthymeme *ex contrario* that it contains would suit either of them, since they both cultivated Rhetoric as well as the dramatic art (Wagner *Trag. Gr. Fragm.* III 185). To avoid the conjunction of εἰ and οὐ, Elmsley, ad Med. 87, proposes ἐπεὶ. Reisig, *Coniect.* I p. 113 (ap. Pflugk), justly replies that εἴπερ is equivalent to ἐπεὶ, and therefore admits the same construction. On εἰ with ἄν and the optative, see Appendix (on II 20 § 5) at the end of this book; and on εἰ followed by οὐ, see Appendix C, Vol. I p. 301. For οὐδ' ἄν, Wagner proposes either ἤν or ἄν.

Cicero, de Inv. I xxx 46, has adopted this: *In contrariis hoc modo; nam si iis qui imprudentes laeserunt ignosci convenit, iis qui necessario profuerunt haberi gratiam non oportet*, and Quintilian, v 10. 73, (above).

The second quotation (example 4), is from Euripides' Thyestes, Fragm. VII (Wagner). This we learn from the Scholiast, quoted in Wagner's note. Matthiae refers to the similar paradox in Agathon's couplet, Rhet. II 24. 10.

§ 2. Top. II. ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων] On πτώσεις and σύστοιχα, see note on I 7. 27. πῶσις "*grammatische abbiegung*," Brandis [*Philol.* IV i]. 'Another (inference may be drawn) from similar inflexions; for the inflected words (or, the inflexions of the word) must be capable of similar predication, (for instance from δίκη by inflexion, or variation of termination, are formed the πῶσις, δίκαιος, δικάως—as well as the grammatical cases, inflexion and declension, and if δίκαιον can be predicated of anything, then δικάως must be predicable of the same). We may therefore argue, says the example, 'that justice is not all good', taking the negative side, μὴ ὑπάρχειν, good is not universally predicable of justice; otherwise good would be predicable of the πῶσις, δικάως, which is not true in all cases; 'for all good is αἰρετόν, an object of choice; but a just punishment, or to be justly punished, everybody would allow not to be desirable'. This is an application of the topic to its negative, destructive, or refutative use; the inference is that the rule laid down is not true. Compare with this example, I 9. 15, where the same distinction is made: although τὰ δίκαια and δικάως ἔργα are similarly predicable, yet this is not the case with the πάθη: ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ (this is therefore an exceptional case to which the ordinary rule of ὁμοίαι πτώσεις does not apply) ταύτη τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸ δικάως καλόν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημοῦσθαι αἰσχροῦν τὸ δικάως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως.

Brandis u. s. notes on this topic another difference which shews itself between the Topics and the Rhetoric, that whereas in the former the σύστοιχα are usually (not always) added to the πτώσεις in the treatment of it, they are here omitted, and the grammatical form of co-ordinates alone taken into account.



χειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἶον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ δικαίως, νῦν δ' οὐχ αἰρετὸν τὸ  
3 δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ  
γὰρ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ καλῶς ἢ δικαίως ποιῆσαι,  
θατέρῳ τὸ πεπονθέναι, καὶ εἰ κελεῦσαι, καὶ τὸ πε-

The use of the topic as a dialectical argument is abundantly illustrated in the Topics, in very many places, as may be seen by consulting Waitz's Index ad Organon, s. v. The principal passage on the subject is Top. B 9,—where the πτώσεις, the *grammatical* co-ordinates, are properly subordinated to the more extensive σύσταιχα, things which are *logically* co-ordinate, 114 b 34. The latter are exemplified by δικαιοσύνη, δίκαιος, δίκαιον, δικαίως. Compare A 15, 106 b 29, on the application of them to ambiguous terms, πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα, also Γ 3, 118 a 34, Δ 3, 124 a 10, and the rest, which indicate their various applications<sup>1</sup>.

Cicero, Top. IV 12, comp. IX 38, illustrates *coniugata*, which is his name for Ar.'s πτώσεις, by *sapiens, sapienter, sapientia*; and the argument from it by, *Si compascuus ager est, ius est compascere. Haec verborum coniugatio*, he says, συζυγία dicitur: on which Spengel (*Specim. Comm. in Ar. Lib. II* 23, Heidelb. 1844) remarks, "Non Aristotelem qui semper συστοιχίαν dicit, sed posteriores, in primis Stoicos, intelligit." In de Or. II 40. 167, they are called *coniuncta*.

Quintilian, who treats the topic with some contempt as hardly deserving of notice, has, Inst. Orat. v 10. 85, *His illud adiciere ridiculum putarem, nisi eo Cicero uteretur, quod coniugatum vocant: ut, Eos, qui rem iustam faciant iuste facere, quod certe non eget probatione; Quod compascuum est compascere licere* (from Cicero).

§ 3. Top. III. ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα] The argument, from mutual relation of terms or notions. This is treated, Top. B 8, 114 a 13, under the head of oppositions or opposites, ἀντιθέσεις, or ἀντικείμενα, of which it is one of the four varieties. For example, inferences may be drawn from double to half, and *vice versa*; from triple to multiple and the converse; from knowing or knowledge ἐπιστήμη, to the thing known τὸ ἐπιστητόν; from sight as a sensation, to the thing seen as an object of sense. The logical objections, ἐνστάσεις, that may be brought against it are also given [Grote's *Aristotle* I. pp. 423, 424].

"Latina schola vocat *relata*. Talia sunt ista: *facere pati; emere vendere; dare accipere; locare conducere: et nomina ista; pater filius; dominus servus; discipulus magister.*" Schrader. He also cites as an example, Cic. Orat. XLI 142, *Sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est, sed etiam universam rempublicam, cur aut discere turpe quod scire*

<sup>1</sup> If I am not mistaken ὅμοιαι πτώσεις is a misnomer. If πτώσεις are the various inflexions—declensions in an extended sense—of a root-word, the term must be confined to the changes of the terminations: in these appears, not *similarity*, but *difference*: the similarity lies, not in the terminations, but in the idea or root common to all the varieties: 'similar' therefore, though it may very well be predicated of the σύσταιχα, is not properly applied to πτώσεις.

ποιηκέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ τελώνης Διομέδων περὶ τῶν  
τελών “εἰ γὰρ μὴδ’ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τὸ πωλεῖν, οὐδ’  
ἡμῖν τὸ ὠνεῖσθαι.” καὶ εἰ τῷ πεπονθότι τὸ καλῶς ἢ  
δικαίως ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ ποιήσαντι, καὶ εἰ τῷ ποι-  
ήσαντι, καὶ τῷ πεπονθότι. ἔστι δ’ ἐν τούτῳ παρα- P. 97.  
λογίσασθαι· εἰ γὰρ δικαίως ἔπαθεν τι, δικαίως πέπον-  
θεν, ἀλλ’ ἴσως οὐχ ὑπὸ σοῦ. διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς  
εἰ ἄξιός ἐστι παθὼν παθεῖν καὶ ὁ ποιήσας ποιῆσαι, εἴτα P. 1397<sup>b</sup>.

*honestum est, aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum docere* :  
a good illustration of the argument from relatives.

This topic has occurred before, II 19. 12, as one of the topics of ‘the possible’: where the parallel passages of Cic. Topic. XI 49, and de Inv. I 30. 47, will be found in the note. On the same, Quintilian, Inst. Or. V 10. 78, *Illa quoque quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestantibus ducuntur (quae proprii generis videri quidam volunt, et vocant ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus) fortiter consequentibus iunxerim* (I should be bold to add to *consequents*): *si portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est et Hermocreoniti conducere; et quod discere honestum, et docere* (from de Inventione, u. s.). The argument is, ‘If it may be said of one (of the two terms of the relation) that he has *done* rightly or justly, then the same terms may be applied to what the other has *suffered* (ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, agent and patient, are relative opposites<sup>1</sup>); and similarly (κελεύειν is relative to πείθεσθαι) command implies obedience, and the converse (this may be *inferred* as the ordinary, probable, not a necessary consequence): as Diomedon the tax-collector argued about the taxes (i. e. the *farming* of them) “If it is no disgrace to you to *sell*, neither is it to us to *buy*.”

οἷον ὡς] This pleonasm occurs again in § 6, οἷον ὡς Ἰφικράτης.

Of Diomedon, nothing is known but what we learn from the passage.

‘And if the terms fairly or justly can be applied to the sufferer, then also to the doer (or perpetrator) of the act; and conversely, if to the doer then also to the sufferer’. If there be any difference between this and the preceding, εἰ γὰρ θατέρῳ—πεπονθέναι, it is that the first is the general expression of the relation between agent and patient, the second is a particular exemplification of it, in the justification of what would otherwise be a crime.

‘But this admits of a fallacy: for though it may be true (in general, or in itself) that deserved suffering involves the justice of the punish-

<sup>1</sup> The relation of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, agent and patient, action and passion, is well illustrated in the argument between Polus and Socrates, Plat. Gorg. c. 32, 476 B, seq. It is there shewn by analogy—the usual Socratic and Platonic method—that the relation between the two prevails throughout its various applications, and *therefore* that crime and punishment follow the same law, and that justice or desert in the punishment of the criminal or patient implies the like justice in the infliction of it by the agent, and *vice versa*.

χρησθαι ὁποτέρως ἀρμόττει· ἐνίοτε γὰρ διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ Θεοδέκτου

μητέρα δὲ τὴν σὴν οὐ τις ἐστύγει βροτῶν;

ment, yet perhaps (it does not always follow that) *you* should be the agent of it, that the punishment should be inflicted by *you* (any particular individual)'. This fallacy is actually illustrated from Theodectes' Orestes, *infra* c. 24 § 3. The argument is used by Orestes in his trial for the murder of his mother Clytemnestra. In the trial scene of the Eumenides this point is taken into consideration, and the act of Orestes justified by Apollo and Athena on the general ground of the superiority of male to female; the father, the author of his existence, has a higher claim upon the son's affection and duty than the mother, and Orestes was right in avenging his father's death even upon her. Aesch. Eumen. 625 seq., 657 seq., 738—40. Comp. Eur. Orest. 528, where Tyndareus, Clytemnestra's father, says, *θυγατὴρ δ' ἐμὴ θανούσ' ἔπραξεν ἔνδικα· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ πρὸς τοῦδ' εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὴν θανεῖν*: and Orestes, *ib.* 546, defends himself on the same grounds as in Aeschylus, *ἐγὼ δ' ἀνόςσιός εἰμι μητέρα κτανών, ὅσιος δέ γ' ἕτερον ὄνομα, τιμωρῶν πατρί.* 552, *πατὴρ μὲν ἐφύτευσεν με κ.τ.λ.* 562, *ἐπὶ δ' ἔθυσσα μητέρα, ἀνόςσια μὲν δρῶν ἀλλὰ τιμωρῶν πατρί.* Electr. 1244, (quoted by Victorius on *φησὶ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος—κτανεῖν*), the Dioscuri to Orestes, *δίκαια μὲν νῦν ἡδ' ἔχει· σὺ δ' οὐχὶ δρῆς.* The case of Orestes and Clytemnestra became one of the stock examples in the rhetorical books. Auct. ad Heren. I 10. 17, I 15. 25, 16. 26. Cic. de Inv. I 13. 18, 22. 31. Quint. Inst. Or. III 11. 4, and II seq., VII 4. 8.

'And therefore a separate investigation is required, not only whether the sufferer deserved to suffer, but also whether the doer had a right to do it (as, to inflict the punishment), and then make the appropriate use of either: because sometimes there is a difference in cases of this kind (i. e. both kinds of right are not always found together: the punishment may be just, but *you* may not be the proper person to inflict it), and there is nothing to prevent (the case being) as it is put in Theodectes' Alcmaeon (where this 'division', *διαλαβόντα*, is actually made): "And did no mortal abhor thy mother?" This is a question put to Alcmaeon, probably by Alpheisiboea (Victorius), whose reply includes the words actually quoted, *ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρη σκοπεῖν*, with, of course, a good deal more about the murder which is omitted. 'To which (Alcmaeon) says in reply "nay but we must first distinguish, and then consider the case."' (The *division* or *distinction* here spoken of is well illustrated by the parallel passage, the case of Orestes, II 24. 3.) 'And when Alpheisiboea asks "How?", he replies, "To her they adjudged death, (i. e. decided that she was justly slain,) but (decided also) that I should not have been the murderer."' From this reply it may be gathered that the judges in Theodectes' play had made the requisite distinction: the death of Eriphyle they agreed was deserved, but it was not for her son to inflict the penalty. "Alcmaeon Eriphylen matrem suam interfecerat, quod haec Amphiarai mariti salutem prodiderat" (Alcmaeon's act, like that of

φησὶ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος

ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρη σκοπεῖν·

ἐρομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀλφεισιβοίας πῶς, ὑπολαβὼν φησι·

τὴν μὲν θανεῖν ἔκριναν, ἐμὲ δὲ μὴ κτανεῖν.

καὶ οἶον ἢ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη καὶ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων Νικάνορα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ δικαίως ἐκρίθησαν ἀποκτεῖναι,

Orestes, was justified by the implied murder of his father—the treachery which caused his death). “Alphesiboea fuit Alcmaeonis uxor.” Schrader. This fragment is quoted by Wagner, Theodect. Fragm. Alcm. I, but without a word of commentary, III 118.

On Theodectes of Phaselis, the rhetorician and dramatic poet, the friend of Aristotle, who frequently refers to his compositions in both kinds, and on the rhetorical character of his writings, which is well illustrated here and in II 24. 3, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* ch. XXVI § 7, who refers to these passages. Also, *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX Vol. III p. 260 seq.<sup>1</sup> To the passages there quoted on this author, add Theopomp. *Hist. Phil. Lib.* I, Fr. 26, ap. *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* (Didot) p. 282; and a ref. to his Philoctetes, *Eth. Nic.* VII 8, 1150 b 9.

Two other examples follow, but, as Spengel (*Tract on the Rhet. in Trans. Bav. Acad.*, Munich 1851, p. 46) justly says, they have no connexion with the preceding example from Theodectes, and the division which it exemplifies, but are illustrations of the general topic. Retaining the text (with Bekker) as it stands, we must accordingly understand the words *ἔστι δ' ἐν τούτῳ—μὴ κτανεῖν* as parenthetical, and suppose that the author, after the insertion of this as a *note*, proceeds with his exemplification of the general topic. Spengel, u. s., p. 47, suggests that they may have been a later addition by the author himself, a note written on the margin, which has got out of its place. My supposition, of a note, *not* written on the margin, but embodied in the text as a parenthesis—which is quite in Ar.'s manner—will answer the purpose equally well, and save the text in addition.

‘And, another example, the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor; for as they were adjudged to have slain him justly (the act), it was held that his death (the passion or suffering) was just’. This is cited by Dion. Halicarn., *Ep. I ad Amm.* c. 12, as a proof that Aristotle was acquainted with and quoted the speeches of Demosthenes, referring it to the case (against Aeschines) for the Crown. In doing so he omits *περί*. Of course *ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη* cannot have this meaning: and it is most probable that it is not the Orator that is here referred to, but Thucydides’ general, or some other person of the name.

<sup>1</sup> The unwarrantable identification, there supposed, p. 261, of the Theodectea with the *Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον*, has been sufficiently corrected in *Introduct.* to *Rhet.* pp. 55–67, on the Theodectea; where more information will be found about the author and his works.

δικαίως ἔδοξεν ἀποθανεῖν. καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευσε κρῖναι εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἄδικον ὄν τὸ ἀποκτείνειν τὸν δικαίως ἀπο-

Neither is anything known of Nicanor and his murderers. On the use of Demosthenes' name in the Rhetoric, see *Intro.* p. 46, note 2.

'And again, the case of him that died at Thebes; concerning whom he (the spokesman of the defendants) bade them (the judges) decide whether he (the murdered man) deserved death, since there was no injustice in putting to death one that deserved it'. "In hanc quoque historiam nunquam incidi." Victorius. Buhle rightly refers it to the case of Euphron, introduced as an episode, and described at length by Xenophon, *Hellen.* vii 3. There had been one of the usual quarrels between the aristocratical (οἱ βέλτιστοι) and the popular party at Sicyon, of which Euphron took advantage, with the design of making himself master of the city. But knowing that as long as the Thebans occupied the acropolis he had no chance of success, he collected a large sum of money and went to Thebes with the intention of bribing the Thebans to assist him. Some Sicyonian exiles learning this, followed him to Thebes and murdered him in the acropolis. Here the murderers were brought to trial before the magistrates and council, who were already there assembled. The accusation of, the magistrates, and the speech for the defence, are both recorded. All the accused with one exception asserted their innocence: one alone admitted the fact, and in justification of it pleaded for himself and the rest the guilt of the man that had been slain, just as Aristotle here describes it. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Θηβαῖοι ταῦτα ἀκούσαντες ἔγνωσαν δίκαια τὸν Εὐφρόνα πεπονθέναι. But the Sicyonians (οἱ πολῖται), interpreting the word 'good' in the sense of good to them (τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἐαυτῶν), said he was a *good* man, and buried him in the market-place, and adore him as the (second) founder of their city (ὡς ἀρχηγέτην), like Brasidas at Amphipolis (*Thuc.* v. 11).

The whole of this section, with the exception of the last example, καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, is quoted by Dionysius l. c. in support of his view that Demosthenes' speeches had been delivered before the composition of the Rhetoric, and were accessible to its author. The difference between the text which he seems to have used and that now received is very great, and apparently unaccountable. Besides minor discrepancies, the entire quotation from Theodectes, ἐνίστε γὰρ—κτανεῖν is omitted; and the clauses preceding and following stand thus, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογίσσασθαι. οὐ γὰρ εἰ δικαίως ἔπαθεν ἄν, καὶ δικαίως ὑπὸ τούτου πέπονθεν, ὡς ὁ φόνου ἄξια ποιήσας πατὴρ, εἰ ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἀπάγεται, δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς.....ὅποτερως ἂν ἀρμότῃ. ἐνίστε γὰρ διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον. ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκμαίωνι τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, καὶ οἶον ἢ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη κ.τ.λ. All the alterations seem to be for the worse, and in one of them, ἔπαθεν ἄν for ἔπαθεν τι, the grammatical blunder betrays corruption. The additional example of the father and son introduced by Dionysius is, as Spengel observes, not here in point. The very example for the sake of which the extract was made is mutilated, and the explanation, ἐπεὶ γὰρ—ἀποθανεῖν, omitted: from which Spengel very justly argues that it could

4 θανόντα. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, οἶον “ εἰ μὴδ’ οἱ θεοὶ πάντα ἴσασι, σχολῇ γε οἱ ἄνθρωποι.”

not have been in the MS that he used : if he had read it there, he could not have so absurdly misapplied the example to the case for the Crown. Spengel has reviewed the two passages in connexion in the tract above cited, pp. 44—47. Our text, which is, when properly explained, perfectly consistent and intelligible, is retained by Bekker and seems to require no alteration : at all events none of Dionysius’ variations could be advantageously introduced.

§ 4. Top. iv. The argument from greater to less—from that which is more to be expected to that which is less (Brandis)—and the converse; Top. B 10, 114 b 37 seq. To which is subjoined, § 5, εἰ μὴτε μᾶλλον μὴτε ἥττον, where two things are compared which are equally likely or probable, and accordingly the one may be inferred from the other: of this there are three cases, ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἢ δοκεῖν ὑπάρχειν τριχῶς. Top. Ib. 115 a 15. Of the first there are four varieties: according as (1) the more or less is predicated of the *same* object—if pleasure is good, then the greater the pleasure the greater the good; and if wrong-doing is bad, the greater the wrong the worse; the *fact* is to be ascertained by induction—or (2) when one of two things is predicated (in the way of comparison), if that of which it is more likely to be predicated is without it (any property or quality), the same may be inferred of the less likely; or conversely, if the less likely has it, *a fortiori* the more likely: or (3) (the reverse of the preceding) when two things are predicated of one, if the more likely is not there, we may infer that the less likely will not, or if the less likely be found there, that the more likely will also: (4) when two things are predicated of two others, if that which is more likely is wanting to the one, the less likely will surely be wanting to the other; or, conversely, if that which is less likely to be present to the one is there, the other will be sure to have that which is more likely [Grote’s *Ar.* I. p. 425]. These nice distinctions, though appropriate to Dialectics, are unnecessary in Rhetoric, and are therefore here omitted; but the examples will suggest the proper use of the topic. The inference in all these cases is plain and will be acknowledged by the audience, and that is all that is required.

The inference from greater to less, or from more to less likely or probable, is commonly called the *argumentum a fortiori*; the rule *omne maius continet in se minus* may also be referred to the same principle, though the two are not absolutely coextensive.

Cic. Topic. III 11, *Alia* (ducuntur argumenta) *ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum*. This is well exemplified in IV 23. XVIII 68, *Reliquus est comparationis locus cuius...nunc explicanda tractatio est. Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur: in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio*. These four modes of application are clearly explained and illustrated in the following sections, 69—71.

De Orat. II 40. 172, *Maiora autem et minora et paria comparabimus sic: ex maiore; si bona existimatio divitiis praestat et pecunia tanto opere expetitur, quanto gloria magis est expetenda: ex minore; Hic*

τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστίν, εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπάρχοι μὴ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ᾧ ἦττον. τὸ δ' ὅτι τοὺς πλησίον τύπτει ὅς γε καὶ τὸν πατέρα, ἐκ τοῦ, εἰ τὸ ἦττον ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει, καθ' ὁπότερον ἂν δέη δείξαι, εἴθ' ὅτι ὑπάρχει εἴθ' ὅτι οὐ. ἔτι εἰ μήτε

*parvae consuetudinis causa huius mortem fert tam familiariter; Quid si ipse amasset? quid hic mihi faciet patri? (Terent. Andr. I 1. 83): ex pari sic; est eiusdem et eripere et contra rempublicam largiri pecunias.*

De Inv. I 28. 41, II 17. 55, de Orat. Part. II 7, ult. Quint. v 10. 86—93, Apposita *vel* comparativa dicuntur quae maiora ex minoribus, minora ex maioribus, paria ex paribus probant. These are applied, subdivided, and illustrated through the remaining sections.

‘Another from the more or less, as for instance, “if not even the gods are omniscient, surely men can hardly be supposed to be so:” for that is as much as to say, if that to which something is more likely to belong wants it, plainly that which is less likely must want it too. Again (the argument) that a man who was capable of striking his father would also strike his neighbours, follows (is derived from) the (general rule or principle), that the less involves or implies the (possible existence, or capacity, δύναμις, of the) greater; in whichever way we are required to argue (the inference is required to be drawn), whether the affirmative or the negative’. This last example, as an exemplification of the inference from less to greater, has been looked upon as an error, and various corrections have been proposed, as by Vater, and Spengel in *Specim. Comm. ad Ar. Rhet.* II c. 23, p. 12, 1844. The latter has subsequently altered his opinion, and in 1851 (*Trans. of Bav. Acad.* p. 58) he admits that the explanation suggested by Victorius, and adopted by Muretus, Majoragius, and others, is sufficient to support the text; which, as usual, is retained by Bekker. No doubt, according to the ordinary interpretation of μᾶλλον and ἦττον in one of these comparisons, where the greater and less are referred to the *magnitude* and *importance* of the crime, the argument is ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον, *ex maiore ad minus*: the man who would strike his father (the greater) would *a fortiori* strike an ordinary acquaintance. But Ar. has here departed from this usual application of the topic, and makes the comparison in respect of the *frequency* of the crime: as it is less usual to strike one’s father than one’s neighbour, a man that could be guilty of the former, is much *more likely* to commit the latter and lesser offence: and the inference is from the less to the greater *in this sense*. “Aristoteles, cum boni viri officium sit nemini vim afferre, cumque iniuria ab omni abesse debeat, si tamen ibi manet ubi minus esse debebat, illic etiam existet ubi frequentius esse consuevit: et haec causa est cur εἰ τὸ ἦττον ὑπάρχει appellarit, *a minoreque* eam significari voluerit.” Victorius.

On the double reading of MS A\*, see Spengel, *Trans. of Bav. Acad.* 1851 p. 57 [and to the same effect in Spengel’s ed., 1867; “in A post δέη δείξαι haec sententia alia ratione verbis τύπτει ὅτι...δεῖ δείξαι explicatur...duplicem sententiae formam iuxta positam melius perspicimus :

μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον· ὅθεν εἴρηται

καὶ σὸς μὲν οἰκτρὸς παῖδας ἀπολέσας πατήρ·

Οἶνεὺς δ' ἄρ' οὐχὶ κλεινὸν ἀπολέσας γόνον;

καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴδὲ Θησεὺς ἠδίκησεν, οὐδ' Ἀλέξανδρος,

καὶ εἰ μὴδ' οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδ' Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ

τὸ δ' ὅτι τοὺς πλησίον τύπτει ὅς γε καὶ τὸν πατέρα

τύπτει ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἦττον ὑπάρχει, καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει. καθ' ὁπότερον ἂν δέη δεῖξαι

τύπτει ὅτι εἰ τὸ ἦττον ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει· τοὺς γὰρ πατέρας ἦττον τύπτουσιν ἢ τοὺς πλησίον. ἢ δὴ οὕτως ἢ εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει, μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ᾧ ἦττον εἰ ὑπάρχει ὁπότερον δεῖ δεῖξαι·

εἴθ' ὅτι ὑπάρχει εἴθ' ὅτι οὐ·"]

On these Aristotelian διτογραφίαι, see Torstrick, Praef. ad de Anima, p. xxi, seq.

§ 5. The second branch of these inferences from comparison, is that of parallel cases. This is the argument from analogy, the foundation of induction, the observation of resemblances in things diverse, leading to the establishment of a general rule: the Socratic and Platonic Method: comp. c. 20. 4, note. *Ex pari*, Cic. de Inv. I 30. 47, *ut locus in mari sine portu navibus esse non potest tutus, sic animus sine fide stabilis amicis non potest esse*. On the argument from analogy in general, see note on c. 19. 2.

‘Again if the comparison is not of greater and less, (but of things equal or parallel): whence the saying, “Thy father too is to be pitied for the loss of his children. And is not Oeneus then, for the loss of his illustrious offspring?” ἄρα marks the inference. “Par infortunium parem misericordiam meretur.” Schrader. The verses are supposed (by Victorius, Welcker, *Trag. Gr.* p. 1012, and Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.* III 185) to be taken from Antiphon’s Meleager, which is quoted again § 20, and at II 2. 19. (Antiphon, a Tragic Poet contemporary with the Elder Dionysius, Rhet. II 6. 19, Clinton *F. H.* Vol. II. Praef. XXXIII, flourished at the end of the fifth cent. B. C. Compare note on II 2. 19.)

The first of the two verses—if the story is that of Meleager—refers to the death of the two sons of Thestius, Toxeus and Plexippus, by the hand of their nephew Meleager: Oeneus was the father of Meleager, whom he too had now lost. The words are those of some one who is consoling Althea, Oeneus’ wife, and perhaps belong (says Victorius) to Oeneus himself. The meaning then would be, (Oeneus to his wife,) You speak of the losses of your father whose sons are slain—are not mine as great as his, in the loss of my famous son Meleager? and do we not *therefore* equally deserve pity? The story is told in Diod. Sic. IV 34 (Schrader), and Ov. Met. VIII. See 86, 87, *An felix Oeneus nato victore fructus, Thestius orbis erit? melius lugebitis ambo*.

The conduct of Alexander or Paris in the abduction of Helen is next justified by the *parallel case* of Theseus, who did the same; Isocr.



Πάτροκλον Ἐκτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλέξανδρος. καὶ εἰ μὴδ' οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνῖται φαῦλοι, οὐδ' οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καὶ εἰ μὴδ' οἱ στρατηγοὶ φαῦλοι ὅτι ἡττῶνται πολ- λάκις, οὐδ' οἱ σοφισταί. καὶ ὅτι “εἰ δεῖ τὸν ἰδιώτην τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων.” ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν, οἶον

Helen. §§ 18—20; and every one—and more especially an *Athenian* audience—must allow that he was a good man and could do no wrong (οὐκ ἠδίκησεν); and of the Tyndaridae, Castor and Pollux, who carried off the two daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and Eleaera (or Hilaira, Propert. I 2. 15), Ov. Fast. v 699, Theocr. Id. xxii 137, and these were demigods; and if Hector is not blamed for the death of Patroclus, neither should Paris be censured for that of Achilles. This is from some ἐγκώμιον or ἀπολογία Ἀλεξάνδρου, of an unknown rhetorician, similar to Isocrates' Helen. It is referred to again, § 8, and 24 §§ 7, 9.

‘And if no other artists (professors of any art or science) are mean or contemptible, neither are philosophers: and if generals are not to be held cheap because they are often defeated, neither are the sophists (when their sophistical dialectics are at fault)’. From some speech in defence of philosophy, and of the Sophists.

The following is an argument, urged by an Athenian orator upon the general assembly, from the analogy of the relation of a private citizen to the state of which he is a member, to that of the same state as an individual member of the great community of the entire Greek race to the whole of which it is a part: if it be the duty of an individual Athenian to pay attention to, to *study*, the glory of his own country, then it is the duty of you, the collective Athenians whose representatives I am now addressing, to study in like manner the glory of the entire Greek community. Or it might be used by the *epideictic* orator in a Panegyric (πανηγυρικός λόγος, delivered in a πανήγυρις), pleading, like Isocrates, for the united action of the Greeks against the Barbarian.

§ 6. Top. v. The consideration of time. This kind of argument, though important in Rhetoric, is inappropriate in Dialectics, and therefore receives only a passing notice in the Topics, B 4, III δ 24, εἰ ἐπὶ τὸν χρόνον ἐπιβλέπειν, εἴ που διαφωνεῖ, where the word ἐπιβλέπειν shews that it is a mere passing glance, a cursory observation, that it requires: and in Cicero's Topics it is altogether omitted [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 418]. The application of it in Top. B II, 115 δ II, referred to by Brandis, is different, and indeed unsuited to rhetorical purposes.

On this topic of time, and its importance in Rhetoric, Quintilian, Inst. Orat. v 10. 42 seq., after a preliminary division of time into (1) general (now, formerly, hereafter,) and (2) special or particular time, proceeds, *Quorum utrorumque ratio et in consiliis* (genus deliberativum) *quidem, et in illo demonstrativo* (τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ γίνεαι) *genere versatur; sed in iudiciis frequentissima est. Nam et turis quaestiones facit, et qualitatem distinguit, et ad coniecturam plurimum confert* (contributes very greatly to the establishment of the fact—the *status coniecturalis* or *issue* of fact—

ὡς Ἰφικράτης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον, ὅτι “εἰ πρὶν p. 98.  
ποιῆσαι ἡξίουں τῆς εἰκόνας τυχεῖν ἐὰν ποιήσω, ἔδοτε  
ἂν ποιήσαντι δ’ ἄρ’ οὐ δάσετε; μὴ τοίνυν μέλλοντες

and especially to the refutation of the assertion of an alleged fact : this is illustrated by the cases following); *ut quum interim probationes inexpugnabiles afferat, quales sunt, si dicatur (ut supra posui) signator, qui ante diem tabularum decessit: aut commissis aliquid, vel quum infans esset, vel quum omnino natus non esset.* Further, §§ 45—48, arguments may be readily drawn *ex iis quae ante rem facta sunt, aut ex coniunctis rei, aut insequentibus*, or from time past, present (*instans*), and future : and these three are then illustrated. Inferences may be drawn from what is past or present, to the future, from cause to effect ; and conversely from present to past, from effect to cause. It seems that the two principal modes of applying the topic of time to Rhetoric are (1) that described by Quintilian, in establishing, or, more frequently, refuting the assertion of a fact, which is the chief use that is made of it in the *forensic* branch—this is again referred to, II 24. 11, on which see Introd. p. 274—the consideration of probabilities of time in matters of fact : and (2) the *καίρος*, the right time, the appropriate occasion, which may be employed by the *deliberative* orator or politician in estimating the expediency, immediate or prospective, of an act or course of policy ; and by the *panegyrist* to enhance the value and importance of any action of his hero, or of anything else which may be the object of his encomium. On this use of *καίρος* comp. I 7. 32, I 9. 38, and the notes. For illustrations, see Top. I 2, 117 a 26—b 2.

‘Another from the consideration of time, as Iphicrates said in the case (*subaudi δίκη*) against Harmodius, “Had I before the deed was done laid claim to the statue, provided I did it, you would have granted it me : will you then (the inference) refuse to grant it me now that I *have* done it? Do not, then, first make the promise in anticipation, and then, when you have received the benefit, defraud me of it.” The case, or speech, as it is here called ‘against Harmodius’, is also known by the name of *ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰκόνας* : this was the statue which was granted him in commemoration of the famous defeat of the Lacedaemonian *μόρα* in B. C. 392. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 243, Ask the judges why they made the presents, and set up the statues, to Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Timotheus. The answer is, Ἰφικράτει ὅτι μόραν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπέκτεινεν. [Dem. *Lept.* 482 § 84, *τιμῶντές ποτε Ἰφικράτην οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν ἐτιμήσατε...ιδ.* § 86, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἀρμόττει δοκεῖν παρὰ μὲν τὰς εὐεργεσίας οὕτω προχειρῶς ἔχειν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς εὐεργέτας τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνων φίλους, ἐπειδὴν δὲ χρόνος διέλθῃ βραχύς, καὶ ὅσα αὐτοῖς δέδωκατε ταῦτ’ ἀφαιρείσθαι]. The speech here referred to was attributed by some—as Pseudo-Plutarch vit. Lys. *συνέγραψε δὲ λόγον καὶ Ἰφικράτει τὸν μὲν πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον*—to Lysias<sup>1</sup>, which is denied by Dionysius, de Lysia

<sup>1</sup> See on this and two other speeches of Iphicrates attributed to Lysias, Sauppe, ad Fragm. Lys. XVIII and LXV. *Oratores Attici* III 178 and 190; [also Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, p. 335].

μὲν ὑπισχνεῖσθε, παθόντες δ' ἀφαιρεῖσθε." καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θηβαίους διεῖναι Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, P. 139<sup>8</sup> ὅτι "εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκεῖς ἡξίου, ὑπέσχοντο ἄν' ἄτοπον οὖν εἰ διότι προεῖτο καὶ ἐπίστευσε μὴ 7 διήσουσιν." ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ' αὐτοὺς πρὸς

Iud. c. 12, on two grounds, first the inferiority of the style, which was unworthy of Lysias; and secondly, because Lysias died seven years before the deed for which the statue was granted. Aristotle plainly ascribes it to Iphicrates himself. The speech *περὶ τῆς εἰκόνας*, is quoted again, § 8. See also Clinton *Fasti Hellenici* II 113, *sub anno* 371. It was not till after Iphicrates had resigned his military command, and retired into private life, ἀποδοὺς τὰ στρατεύματα ιδιώτης γίνεται, that he claimed his statue, μετὰ Ἀλκισθένην ἄρχοντα, i.e. in the archonship of Pharsiclides, B.C. 371. The grant was opposed by Harmodius, a political antagonist.

And again to induce the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territories into Attica, it is argued that, "had he made the claim (or preferred the request) before he helped them against the Phocians (when they wanted his aid), they would have promised to do so; and therefore it would be monstrous for them *now* to refuse it, because he threw away his chance (*then*)";—behaved liberally or with reckless generosity (so Vict.) on that occasion, and neglected to avail himself of his opportunity, (see the lexicons, s. v. *προεῖσθαι*)—"and trusted to their honour and good faith". The former event occurred in B.C. 346, when Philip allied himself with the Thebans and overran Phocis, and so put an end to the Phocian war. An embassy was sent to the Thebans after the capture of Elatea B.C. 339, to request that Philip's troops might be allowed to march through their territory to attack Attica; but was met by a counter-embassy from Athens, proposed and accompanied by Demosthenes, who prevailed upon the Thebans to refuse the request, and conclude an alliance with Athens. κατὰ Λυσισμαχίδην ἄρχοντα, Dionys. Ep. I ad Amm. c. 11. On this embassy and the proposals there made, see Demosthenes himself, de Cor. §§ 311, 313, from which it would seem that the words here quoted are not Philip's, but an argument used by his ambassadors. Comp. also § 146, οὐτ' εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐλθεῖν δυνατός... μῆτε Θηβαίων διεῖντων: and Aesch. c. Ctes. § 151, καὶ γράψαι ἐφ' ἡγήσιμα (ὁ Δημοσθένης)...πέμπειν ὑμᾶς πρέσβεις αἰτήσοντας Θηβαίους διόδον ἐπὶ Φίλιππον, (referred to by Spengel, *Specim. Comm. ad Ar. Rhet.* Heidelb. 1844, p. 15). In the following year, 338 B.C. ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Χαιρώνδου, was fought the battle of Chaeronea. M. Schmidt (*On the date of the Rhet.* Halle, 1837, p. 16) uses this passage in fixing the date of Ar.'s work. [See Introd. p. 38.]

Dionys., ad Amm. c. 11, cites the whole of this topic. The only important variations are two manifest blunders; the omission of εἰς before Φωκεῖς, and διέσπευσεν μὴ δάσουσιν for ἐπίστευσε μὴ διήσουσιν.

§ 7. Top. vi. This topic, "the retort which turns the point of what has been said against ourselves upon him who said it," viz. the adverse

τὸν εἰπόντα· διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος, οἶον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ·

party in the law-court or assembly, belongs, as Brandis also remarks, u. s., p. 19, exclusively to Rhetoric. "Cum argumentum ducitur ex iis quae ex moribus vitaeque ipsorum dicta sunt, admodumque ipsis congruunt, adversus illum ipsum qui dixit : eminet autem, inquit, hic inter alios, ac vim maximam semper habere existimatus est." Victorius. That *κατά* in the definition means 'against' and not 'of' (in respect of) appears from the example. Iphicrates asks Aristophon, who had accused him of taking bribes to betray the fleet, "Would you have done it yourself? No; I am not like *you*. Well then, as you admit that *you*, Aristophon, are incapable of it, must not I, Iphicrates, (your superior in virtue and everything else,) be still more incapable of it?" As Ar. adds, the argument is worth nothing unless the person who uses it is conscious of his own moral superiority, and knows that the audience whom he addresses shares his conviction: employed against an 'Aristides the Just', it would be simply ridiculous.

*διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.*] This is interpreted by Spengel, *Specim. Comm.* u. s., p. 16 [and ed. 1867], "*Mores sunt qui in hac re in discrimen vocantur; mores enim et vita eminet et litigantes discernit.*" I doubt if *τρόπος*, standing thus alone, can mean *mores*: nor, I think, is the mention of character and manners appropriate in this place: further on it would be suitable. Gaisford's explanation and connexion seem to be upon the whole most satisfactory. "*Verba οἶον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ—εἵπειν* puto esse διὰ μέσου. His certe seclusis belle procedunt omnia. Sententiae nexus hic est; *Excellit autem hic modus* (vel *locus*—reading *τόπος*), Sed ad fidem accusatori detrahendam." And in that case, Quintilian's words, v 12. 19, *Aristoteles quidem potentissimum putat ex eo qui dicit, si sit vir optimus &c.*, may be a translation of *διαφέρει ὁ τρόπος*. *διαφέρειν*, if thus understood, denotes 'pre-eminence, distinction above others'.

*οἶον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ*] This is no doubt Sophocles' tragedy of that name: of which four fragments (and one doubtful one) still survive. See Wagner, *Fragm. Tr. Gr.* I 388, 9. "Quum Ar. ubi poetarum nomina omisit tantummodo clarissimos quosque respexerit, facile inducimur ut eum Sophoclis Teucrum dixisse credamus." And Spengel, *Spec. Comm.* u. s., p. 16 [and ed.] "Sophoclis puto; si alius esset, nomen addidisset." The same play is quoted again, III 15. 9, whence it appears that Ulysses was one of the characters. In an altercation with Teucer, the latter must be supposed to have used a similar argument, or retort, founded upon his own acknowledged superiority in moral character<sup>1</sup>. See Wagner l. c.

<sup>1</sup> Ulysses may be supposed to have accused Teucer of the murder of his brother—comp. Aj. 1012 seq. and 1021, where such a suspicion is hinted at: If *you*, Ulysses, are shocked at such a crime, do you suppose that *I*, Teucer, could have been guilty of it? The same argument was employed by Euripides in his Telephus. *Fragm.* XII, Dindorf, ap. Arist. Acham. 554. Wagner, II p. 364. Fr. Tel. 24. ταὐτ' οὐδ' ὅτι ἂν ἔδρατε (ita Meineke), τὸν δὲ Τηλέφον οὐκ οἴμεσθα; comp. Valck. Diatr. ad Fr. Eurip. p. 211, "Telephi verba cum Ulysse loquentis." Ulysses had been making some charge against Telephus, who makes this reply: *You* would have done so and so: am *I* not as likely, or still more so, to have done the same? Plut. ἀποφθ. βασιλέων, Alex. II, p. 180 B, Δαρείου δίδοντας αὐτῷ μυρία τέλαιντα καὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν

ὃ ἐχρήσατο Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα, ἐπερό-  
μενος εἰ προδοίῃ ἂν τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν· οὐ φά-  
σκοντος δὲ “εἶτα” εἶπεν “σὺ μὲν ὦν Ἀριστοφῶν οὐκ  
ἂν προδοίης, ἐγὼ δ’ ὦν Ἰφικράτης;” δεῖ δ’ ὑπάρχειν

who gives a long account of the subject of the play, and compares it with Pacuvius’ play of the same name, supposed to be borrowed from Sophocles.

Aristophon was already celebrated as an orator in 403 B.C. (Clinton, *F. H.*, *sub anno.*) His fame may be inferred from the frequent and respectful mention of him by Demosthenes especially (see for instance, de Cor. § 219, de Fals. Leg. § 339), Aeschines and Dinarchus. See Baiter et Sauppe, *Orat. Att. Ind. Nom.* s. v., p. 21, Vol. III. He was an Azenian, Ἀζηνεύς, and thereby distinguished from his namesake of Collytus, de Cor. § 93. The speech to which Iphicrates here replies was delivered in “the prosecution of Iphicrates by him and Chares for his failure in the last campaign of the Social war, Diod. XVI 15. 21,” (Clint. *F. H. sub anno.*) in the year 355 B.C., at an already advanced age. See also Sauppe, *Fragm. Lys.* 65, *Or. Att.* III 190: and note on *Rhet.* III 10. 6. He died before 330, the date of the de Corona, *Dem. de Cor.* § 162. On the speech ὑπὲρ Ἰφικράτους προδοσίας ἀπολογία, attributed to Lysias (rejected by Dionysius, de *Lys. Iud.* c. 12, comp. note on § 6 *supra*; on that against Harmodius), from which Iphicrates’ saying against Harmodius is supposed to have been extracted, see Sauppe, *Fragm. Lys.* LXV, (*Orat. Att.* III 190): and comp. *ibid.* p. 191, *Aristid. Or.* 49, who quotes the same words somewhat differently, and, like Aristotle, attributes them directly to Iphicrates, and *not* to Lysias. [A. Schaefer, *Dem. und seine Zeit*, I 155.]

Quintilian, v 12. 10, borrows this example, referring it however to a different class of arguments, *probationes quas patheticas vocant ductas ex affectibus*, (he means the ἦθος,) § 9. After quoting the *nobilis Scauri defensio*, (on which see *Introd.* p. 151, note 1,) he adds, *cui simile quiddam fecisse Iphicrates dicitur, qui cum Aristophontem, quo accusante similis criminis reus erat, interrogasset, an is accepta pecunia rempublicam proditurus esset? isque id negasset; Quod igitur, inquit, tu non fecisses, ego feci?* Comp. Spalding’s note *ad locum*.

εἰ προδοίῃ ἂν] εἰ=πότερον; see Appendix, *On ἂν with the optative after certain particles* [printed at the end of the notes to Book II].

δεῖ δ’ ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.] ‘But (the person who employs the argument) must have this advantage on his side, that the other (the opponent) would be thought more likely to have done the wrong: otherwise, it would seem absurd, for a man to apply this to an Aristides (the model of justice and integrity) when he brings a charge;—(not so), but only for the discrediting (throwing a doubt upon, making the audience distrust, the credibility) of the accuser: (if ἀλλά be connected with what immediately precedes, to complete the sense, something must be supplied, such as οὐχ

νεύμασθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπίσης, καὶ Παρμενίωνος εἰπόντος, ἔλαβον ἂν εἰ Ἀλέξανδρος ἦμην, καὶ γὰρ νῆ Δία, εἶπεν, εἰ Παρμενίων ἦμην.

μᾶλλον ἂν δοκοῦντα ἀδικῆσαι ἐκείνον· εἰ δὲ μή, γελοῖον ἂν φανείη, εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα τοῦτό τις εἴπειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγοροῦ· ὅλως γὰρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος· τοῦτ' οὖν ἐξελέγχειν αἰεί. καθόλου

οὕτω, ἀλλὰ χρηστέον<sup>1</sup>), and this, because as a general rule the accuser pretends to be (*would be* if he could) a better man than the defendant : this (assumption) then always requires confutation'. Should not αἰεί be δεῖ?<sup>2</sup>

βούλεται] βούλεσθαι like ἐθέλειν frequently implies a tendency, design, intention, or aspiration, real or imaginary—the latter in things inanimate—wants to be, would be, would like to be, if it could; and hence here it denotes the assumption or pretension of superior goodness, 'he *would be* better'. Zell, ad Eth. Nic. III 1. 15 (III 2, 1110 b 30, Bk.), Stallbaum ad Phaedr. 74 D. Ast ad Phaedr. 230 D, p. 250. Thompson ad eundem locum. Viger, pp. 263, 264, n. 77.

Eth. N. III 2, 1110 b 30, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις κ.τ.λ. 'won't be called', 'don't choose to be called', as if it had the choice. Hist. Anim. I 16.11 [495 a 32], θέλει γὰρ εἶναι διμερής (wants to be, would be if it could; of a general tendency, intention or plan, not completely carried out) ὁ πλεῦμων ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. [the *Index Aristotelicus* does not quote this passage, either under θέλειν or under διμερής, though it is given under πλεῦμων]. Ib. VII 3. 4 [583 b 26], αἱ καθάρσεις βούλονται...οὐ μὴν ἐξακριβοῦσί γε κ.τ.λ. (the same); de Part. Anim. IV 10, 29, θέλει, Ib. III 7. 2, ὁ ἐγκέφαλος βούλεται διμερής εἶναι. de Gen. An. II 4, 9, 10 (*his eodem sensu*). Ib. V 7. 17, [787 b 19], τὰ δ' ὅσα ζητεῖ τὴν τοῦ νέρου φύσιν is used in the same sense. This I believe to be a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, [no instance is given in the *Index Aristotelicus*, s. v. ζητεῖν, where even the passage just quoted is not cited]. de part. An. IV 2. 10, βούλεται, 'is designed to be'; so Eth. N. V 7, 1132 a 21, ὁ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι ὅλον δικαίον ἐμψυχον, animated justice, the embodiment of abstract justice—this is what he is intended to be, though he often falls short of it. Ib. c. 8, 1133 b 14, βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. de Anima A 3, 407 a 4, βούλεται, Plato means or intends. Topic. Z 5, 142 b 27, τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν. Ib. c. 13, 151 a 17. Pol. II 6, 1265 b 27, ἡ σύνταξις δὲ β. εἶναι (πολιτεία) 'is designed, or intended, to be'. Ib. 1266 a 7, ἐγκλίειν β. πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. Ib. I 5, 1254 b 27, c. 6, 1255 b 3, c. 12, 1259 b 6, et saepe alibi. ["Saepe per βούλεται εἶναι significatur quo quid per naturam suam tendit, sive id assequitur quo tendit, sive non plene et perfecte assequitur." *Index Aristotelicus*, where more than forty references are given.]

So Latin *velle*; Cic. Orat. XXXIII 117, *quem volumus esse eloquentem*, Hor. A. P. 89, *versibus exponi tragicis res comica non vult*.

καθόλου δ' ἄποπός ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.] Und. ὁ τρόπος (or ὁ τόπος) from above : not

<sup>1</sup> This is the usual way of connecting the parts of the sentence; but I think Gaisford's explanation, quoted above, is certainly to be preferred.

<sup>2</sup> ["In cod. abest καὶ post Τεύκρω' (p. 252), 'ego addidi' ego καὶ scripsi : deinde τοῦτό τις, ego τοῦτ' οὗτις; extreme aliiue δεῖ." Ussing, in *Opuscula Philologica ad Ma*...

δ' ἄτοπός ἐστιν, ὅταν τις ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλοις ἢ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσειεν ἄν, ἢ προτρέπη ποιεῖν ἢ αὐτὸς μὴ 8 ποιεῖ μὴδὲ ποιήσειεν ἄν. ἄλλος ἐξ ὀρισμοῦ, οἶον ὅτι τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ

as Victorius, who supposes it to mean an absurd *man*. 'And in general the use of it is absurd whenever a man censures (*taxes*) others for something which he does himself, or would do (if he had the opportunity), or exhorts them to do what he does not do now himself, and never would do (under any circumstances)'. The first of these two cases is that of Satan rebuking sin; the second that of one who preaches what he does not practise.

§ 8. Top. VII. Definition. The definition of terms is the basis of all sound argument, and the ambiguity of terms one of the most abundant sources of fallacy and misunderstanding. A clear definition is therefore necessary for intelligible reasoning. To establish definitions, and so come to a clear understanding of the thing in controversy, was, as Aristotle tells us, the end and object of the Socratic method. The use of the definition in dialectics is treated in the Topics, A 15, 107 a 36 — b 5 [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 404], B 2, 109 b 13 seq. and 30 seq. Cic. Topic. v 26—VII 32. De Inv. II 17. 53—56. Orat. Part. XII 41. De Orat. II 39. 164. Quint. v 10. 36, and 54 seq.

The first example of the argument from definition, is the inference drawn by Socrates at his trial from the definition of τὸ δαιμόνιον, Plat. Apol. Socr. c. 15. Meletus accuses him of teaching his young associates not to believe in the gods recognized by the state, and introducing other new divinities, ἑτέρα δαιμόνια καινά, in their place. Socrates argues that upon Meletus' own admission he believes in δαιμόνια divine things (27 C); but divine things or works imply a workman; and therefore a belief in δαιμόνια necessarily implies a belief in the authors of those works, viz. δαίμονες. But δαίμονες are universally held to be either θεοί or θεῶν παῖδες (27 D), and therefore in either case a belief in δαιμόνια still implies a belief in the gods. The conclusion is τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι δαιμόνια καὶ θεία ἡγεῖσθαι (E).

In Xenophon's apology this argument is entirely omitted; and Socrates is represented as interpreting the καινὰ δαιμόνια (which he is accused of introducing) of τὸ δαιμόνιον, the divine sign which checked him when he was about to do wrong; and this is referred to the class of divine communications—oracles, omens, divination and so forth.

As to the status of the δαίμονες opinions varied: but the usual conception of them was, as appears in Hesiod, Op. et D. 121, and many passages of Plato, Timaeus, Laws (VIII 848 D, θεῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων θεοῖς δαιμόνων), IV 713 B, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ γένους θειοτέρου τε καὶ ἀμείνονος, δαίμονας, and elsewhere, that they were an order of beings, like angels, intermediate between men and gods, and having the office of tutelary deities or guardian angels to the human race. So Hesiod, u. s., Theogn. 1348 (of Ganymede), Plat. Phaedo 108 B, 107 D, 113 D. Aristotle seems to imply the same distinction when he says, de Div. per Somn. I 2, init., that dreams are not θεῶν πεμπτα, because they are natural, δαιμόνια μέντοι· ἢ γὰρ

ἔργον· καίτοι ὅς τις οἶεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἶεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι. καὶ ὡς Ἴφικράτης, ὅτι γενναιότατος ὁ βέλτιστος· καὶ γὰρ Ἀρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχε γενναῖον πρὶν γενναῖόν τι πράττειν. καὶ ὅτι συγγενέστερος αὐτός· “τὰ γοῦν ἔργα συγγενέστερά ἐστι τὰ ἐμὰ τοῖς Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἢ τὰ σά.” καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν τοὺς μὴ κοσμίους οὐχ ἐνὸς σώματος ἀγαπᾶν ἀπόλαυ-  
φύσις δαμονία, ἀλλ’ οὐ θεία. This argument of Socrates is repeated, III 18. 2, more at length, and with some difference of detail.

The *second* example is taken from Iphicrates' speech upon the prosecution of Harmodius, the δίκη πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον, *supra* § 6, “cum Harmodius generis obscuritatem obiiceret, definitione *generosi et propinqui fastum adversarii repressit et decus suum defendit.*” Schrader. Harmodius had evidently been boasting of his descent from the famous Harmodius, and contrasting his own noble birth with the low origin of Iphicrates. The latter replies, by defining true nobility to be merit, and not mere family distinction (comp. II 15, and the motto of Trinity College, *virtus vera nobilitas* [Iuv. VIII. 20 *nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus*]); ‘for Harmodius (himself) and Aristogeiton had no nobility anterior to their noble deed’. Next as to the relationship which Harmodius claimed : he himself is in reality more nearly related to Harmodius than his own descendant : true kinship is shewn in similarity of actions : ‘at all events my *deeds* are more nearly akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than thine’. This is still more pointedly expressed in Plutarch's version, Ἀποφθέγματα βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν Iphicr. ε', p. 187 B, πρὸς δὲ Ἀρμόδιον, τὸν τοῦ παλαίου Ἀρμοδίου ἀπόγονον, εἰς δυσγένειαν αὐτῷ λαιδορούμενον ἔφη· τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ γένος ἄρχεται, τὸ δὲ σὸν ἐν σοὶ παύεται. This seems to be taken, with alterations, from a speech of Lysias, ap. Stob. flor. 86. 15, quoted by Sauppe, *Fragm. Lys. XVIII. Or. Att. III* 180. Another form of Iphicrates' saying, briefer still, is found in Pseudo-Plut. *περὶ εὐγενείας* c. 21 (ap. Sauppe u. s.), Ἴφικράτης οὐκ ἐκδιδόμενος εἰς δυσγένειαν· ἐγὼ ἄρξω, εἶπε, τοῦ γένους.

The *third* is taken from the Alexander of some unknown apologist, quoted before, § 5, and § 12 ; and c. 24. 7 and 9. On this Schrader ; “sententia illius videtur haec esse : Paridem intemperantem habendum non esse, una quippe Helena contentum. Argumentum e definitione temperantis (temperantiae) petitum.” Similarly Victorius, “μὴ κόσμος ἐστὶν ὃς ἡμεῖς ἀγαπᾶμεν· ἀλλὰ ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν ὃς ἡμεῖς ἀγαπᾶμεν.” Similarly Victorius, “μὴ κόσμος ἐστὶν ὃς ἡμεῖς ἀγαπᾶμεν· ἀλλὰ ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν ὃς ἡμεῖς ἀγαπᾶμεν.” Cum sola Helena ipse contentus vixerit, non debet intemperans vocari.

ἐνὸς therefore is ‘one only’, and ἀγαπᾶν ‘to be satisfied with’. ἀπόλαυσις, of *sensual* enjoyment, *Eth. N. I* 3, sub init., ὁ ἀπολαυστικός βίος, the life of a Sardanapalus. *Ib. III* 13, 1118 a 30, ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι’ ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτοῖς καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. VII 6, 1148 a 5, τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις.



σιν. καὶ δι' ὃ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέ-  
λαον· ὕβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι  
ὁμοίως εὖ παθόντα ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. πάντες γὰρ  
οὗτοι ὀρισάμενοι καὶ λαβόντες τὸ τί ἐστι, συλλογι-  
9 ζονται περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς,

The *fourth* is, the reason that Socrates gave for refusing to go to pay a visit to Archelaus; that it would be ignominious to him, to receive favours from a man, and then not to have the power of requiting the benefits (good treatment) in the same way as one would injuries (ill treatment). This was a new definition, or an extension of the ordinary one, of ὕβρις, which is "wanton outrage," *supra* II 2. 5, an *act* of aggression. ὕβρις usually implies hostility on the part of him who inflicts it; in this case the offer of a supposed benefit is construed as inflicting the ignominy.

The abstract ὕβρις, for the concrete ὕβριστικόν, occurs often elsewhere, as in Soph. Oed. Col. 883, ἀρ' οὐχ ὕβρις τάδ'; KP. ὕβρις ἀλλ' ἀνεκτία. Arist. Ran. 21, εἴτ' οὐχ ὕβρις ταῦτ' ἐστὶ; Lysistr. 658, Nub. 1299. Similarly Ter. Andr. 15. 2, *quid est si hoc non contumelia est?* (Reisig ad loc. Soph.) And in other words; ὃ μῖσος (i. e. μισητόν hated *object*) εἰς Ἑλλήνας, Eur. Iph. T. 512; ὃ μῖσος, Med. 1323, and Soph. Philoct. 991. ἄλγος for ἀλγεινόν, Aesch. Pr. Vinc. 261. Eur. Ion, 528 γέλως for γελοῖον, and Dem. de F. L. § 82, ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα γέλως, μᾶλλον δ' ἀναισχυντία δευή. Arist. Acharn. 125, ταῦτα δὴτ' οὐκ ἀγχόνη.

The contempt of Archelaus implied in this refusal is noticed by Diog. Laert., Vit. Socr. II 5. 25, ὑπερεφρόνησε δὲ καὶ Ἀρχελάου τοῦ Μακεδόνα...μήτε παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπελθών; and see Schneider's note on Xenophon, Apol. Socr. § 17, on Socrates' ordinary conduct in respect of the acceptance of fees and gratuities and favours in general. On Archelaus and his usurpation of the throne of Macedonia, and his tyranny and crimes, see Plato Gorg. c. XXVI p. 470 C—471 C.

'For all these first define the term (they are about to use), and then, having found its true essence and nature, they proceed to draw their inference (conclude) from it on the point that they are arguing. The ὅρος or ὀρισμός, 'definition', is itself defined at length, Metaph. Δ 12, 1037 *b* 25, seq.: and more briefly Top. A 8, 103 *b* 15, 101 *b* 39, Z 6, 143 *b* 20. The definition of a thing is its λόγος, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων, that which expresses the *formal cause* of a thing; the *what it was to be*; the essence of it, or that which makes it what it is. Only εἶδη or species can, strictly speaking, be defined: the definition of the εἶδος gives the γένος, the essentials, together with the διαφορά, or specific difference: and these two constitute the definition; which is here accordingly said to express τὸ τί ἐστὶ, 'the, what the thing really is'. On the definition see Waitz, *Organ.* II p. 398, and Trend. *El. Log. Ar.* § 54, et seq. This topic of definition afterwards became the στάσις ὀρική, *nomen* or *fnitio*; one of the legal 'issues', on which see Introduction, Appendix E to Bk III pp. 397—400.

§ 9. Top. VIII. ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς] Between the topics of definition, and division (§ 10) is introduced this topic of ambiguous terms, or words

10 οἶον ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς. ἄλλος ἐκ διαί-  
ρέσεως, οἶον εἰ πάντες τριῶν ἔνεκεν ἀδικοῦσιν· ἢ  
τοῦδε γὰρ ἔνεκα ἢ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε· καὶ διὰ μὲν τὰ δύο p. 99.

that are susceptible of many and various senses, such as *good* (Top. A 15, 106 a 4 [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 402]); which must be carefully examined to see whether or no they are all of them applicable to the argument. It is treated at great length in Top. A 15, and again B 3; and is inserted *here* (between definition and division) because it *is* equally applicable to both (Brandis). The exhaustive treatment bestowed upon it in the Topics supersedes the necessity of dwelling on it here; and we are accordingly referred to that treatise for illustration of it. Brandis, u.s., p. 19, objects to περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς, "that there is nothing in the Topics which throws any light upon the enigmatical ὀρθῶς;" and proposes περὶ τοῦ εἰ ὀρθῶς 'upon the right use of the terms', i. e. whether it can be applied properly in any one of its various senses or not. But surely the reading of the text may be interpreted as it stands in precisely the same meaning: οἶον ἐν τοπικοῖς (λέλεκται, or διώρισται) περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς (χρησθαι αὐτῷ), 'as in the Topics (we have treated) of the right use of the terms'. Muretus has omitted the words in his transl. as a gloss: and Victorius, followed by Schrader and Buhle, understands it as a reference, not directly to the Topics, but to the 'dialectical art', as elsewhere, II 22. 10, for instance—see Schrader's note on II 25. 3. "Disciplina Topica intelligenda est." Buhle. It seems to me to be a *direct* and explicit reference to the passages of the Topics above mentioned, in which the right way of dealing with these ambiguous terms is described.

§ 10. Top. IX. ἐκ διαίρέσεως] the topic of division. This is the division of a *genus* into its *εἶδη* or *species*; as appears from the example, the three motives to crime, from which the inference is drawn. *Finitioni subiecta maxime videntur genus, species, differens, proprium. Ex his omnibus argumenta ducuntur.* Quint. v 10. 55. Top. B 2, 109 b 13—29. F 6, 120 a 34 [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 435]. On *διαίρεσις* in demonstration, use and abuse, see Anal. Pr. I 31. Trendel. *El. Log. Ar.* § 58, p. 134 seq. Cic. Topic. v 28, XXII 83, de Orat. II 39. 165, *Sin pars* (rei quaeritur) partitione, *hoc modo: aut senatui parendum de salute rei publicae fuit aut aliud consilium instituendum aut sua sponte faciendum; aliud consilium, superbum; suum, adrogans; utendum igitur fuit consilio senatus.* Quint. v 10. 63, 65 seq. *Ad probandum valet, et ad refellendum,* § 65. *Periculosum*; requires caution in the use, § 67. The example, which illustrates the topic by the three motives to crime or wrong-doing, pleasure, profit, and honour, is taken from Isocrates' *ἀντιδοσις*, §§ 217—220, as Spengel points out, *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 20, note. All the three are successively applied to test the accusation (of corrupting youth) that his enemies have brought against him, and all of them are found to be unsuitable to explain the alleged fact. He therefore concludes by the method of exhaustion, that having no conceivable motives, he is not guilty. It must however be observed that Ar.'s διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδ' αὐτοὶ φασιν, is not supported by anything in Isocrates' text. The causes and motives of actions have been already *divided* in I 10, with a very

11 ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδ' αὐτοί φασιν. ἄλλος  
ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, οἷον ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας, ὅτι περὶ τῶν

different result. The same terms are there employed, διελώμεθα § 6, and διαίρεσις § 11.

For an example of this topic, see II 23. 22 in the note.

On the inference from 'disjunctive judgments', see Thomson, *Laws of Thought*, § 90, p. 160.

§ 11. Top. X. ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς] The rudimentary kind of induction, of which alone Rhetoric admits: two or three similar cases being adduced to prove a general rule, from which the inference is drawn as to the present case. It is the argument from analogy, or cases in point. This and the following, says Brandis, u. s., naturally find nothing corresponding to them in the Topics. Cic. de Or. II. 40. 168, *ex similitudine; si ferae partus suos diligunt, qua nos in liberos nostros indulgentia esse debemus?* &c. Quint. v 10. 73, *est argumentorum locus ex similibus; si continentia virtus, utique et abstinentia: Si fidem debet tutor, et procurator. Hoc est ex eo genere quod ἐπαγωγὴν Graeci vocant, Cicero inductionem.*

ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας] δίκης; comp. § 6, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον. An extract 'from the well-known *Peparethian* case', about the parentage of a child; the speaker adduces two analogous cases, or cases in point, to prove the rule which he wishes to establish, that it is the mother who is the best judge of the parentage of the child. Gaisford quotes Homer, Od. A 215, μήτηρ μὲν τ' ἐμέ φησι τοῦ ἔμμεναι, αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδ' οὐ γὰρ πω τις ἐὼν γόνον αὐτὸς ἀνέγνω: on which Eustathius; δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει τὰ εἰρημένα ὁρθῶς ἔχειν.

Πεπαρηθίας<sup>1</sup>] "Concionis (ut puto) sive alterius generis scriptionis nomen est Peparethia," Victorius. But in that case it would be masc. (with λόγος understood), not feminine: and the analogy of § 6 is also in favour of the ellipse of δίκης. Otherwise we might understand ἐπαγωγῆς, or γυναικός.

The meaning is, 'Another topic of inference is induction; as, for instance, it may be inferred as a general rule from the *Peparethian* case, that in the case of children (as to the true parentage of children) women always distinguish the truth better (than the other sex)'. And the same rule has been applied, from a similar induction, in two other recorded cases; 'for, in the first, (on the one hand), at Athens, in a dispute in which Mantias the orator was engaged with his son (about his legitimacy), the mother declared the fact (of the birth, and so gained the cause for her child); and in the second, at Thebes, in a dispute between Ismenias and Stilbo (for the paternity of a child), Dodonis (the mother

<sup>1</sup> Peparethus, one of a small group of islands (Sciathus, Icus, Halonnesus, Scyrus; Strab. Thessal. IX 5) off the coast of Magnesia, πρόκεινται τῶν Μαγνητίων, Strabo u. s. (νήσος μία τῶν Κυκλάδων, Steph. Byz. s. v.; una ex Cycladibus, Buhle. οὐκ ἀποθεν Εὐβοίας, Suidas, N. E. of Euboea: famous for its wine, Soph. Phil. 548, εἰβοτῶν Πεπαρηθον, Aristoph. Thesmoph. Sec. Fr. 1 (ap. Athen. I 29, A [Aristoph. fragm. 301. Dind. ed. 5]) Meineke, *Fragm. Com.* II 1076. Comp. Herm. Fragm. Phorm. 2 12 (ap. eund. II 410).

τέκνων αἱ γυναῖκες πανταχοῦ διορίζουσι τὰληθές·  
 τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀθήνησι Μαντία τῷ ῥήτορι ἀμφισβη- P. 1398 δ.  
 τοῦντι πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἢ μῆτηρ ἀπέφηνεν, τοῦτο δὲ  
 Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου καὶ Στίλβωνος ἀμφισβητούντων  
 ἢ Δωδωνὶς ἀπέδειξεν Ἰσμηνίου τὸν υἱόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο  
 Θετταλίσκον Ἰσμηνίου ἐνόμιζον. καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ  
 νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπιμεληθεῖσι τῶν  
 made a declaration that it belonged to Ismenias; and in consequence  
 Thettaliscus was always regarded as Ismenias' son'.

'Mantias the orator', whose name does not appear in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.*, may be the same person who is mentioned as the father of Manti-  
 theus and Boeotus, of the deme of Thoricus, Dem. Boeot. de nom. §§ 7,  
 10; comp. §§ 30 (bis), 37. ['Mantias proposed that Plangon should declare  
 on oath before an arbitrator, whether Boeotus and Pamphilus were her  
 sons by Mantias or not. She had assured him privately that if the oath  
 in the affirmative were tendered to her, she would decline to take it... She,  
 however, unexpectedly swore that they *were* her sons by Mantias.' From  
 Mr Paley's *Introd.* to Dem. Or. 39, *Select Private Orations*, I p. 131.  
 Comp. supplementary notes on pp. 134 and 182].

Ismenias, whose name likewise is wanting in Smith's *Dict.*, was in  
 all probability the one somewhat celebrated in Theban history, as leader,  
 with Autoclides, of the anti-Lacedaemonian party at Thebes, mentioned  
 by Xenophon, *Hellen.* v 2. 25 seq. He was accused by his opponent  
 Leontiades, tried, and put to death by a court appointed for the purpose  
 by the Lacedaemonians, who were then (383 B. C.) in occupation of the  
 Cadmeia, Xen. *Ib.* §§ 35, 36, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* x pp. 80, 85, 86 [chap. LXXVI].  
 His name is also associated by Mr Grote, *H. G.* x 380, 387, 391 [chap.  
 LXXIX], with that of Pelopidas, as one of the ambassadors to the court of  
 Artaxerxes at Susa in 367 B. C.; and again, as taken prisoner with him by  
 Alexander of Pherae in the following year. The authority for these state-  
 ments appears to be Plutarch, *Artax.* XXII for the first; and *Id.* *Pelopid.*  
 XXIX *sub fin.* for the second: Xenophon does not mention him in this  
 connexion. At all events, it was not the *same* Ismenias, that was put to  
 death in 383, and accompanied Pelopidas, as ambassador and captive, in  
 367 and 366<sup>1</sup>. Of Stilbon, and the other persons named, I can find no  
 further particulars.

'And another instance from Theodectes' "law"—if to those who have  
 mismanaged other people's horses we don't entrust horses of our own, or  
 (our ships) to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if the rule  
 hold universally, those who have ill guarded or maintained the safety  
 and well-being of others, are not to be employed in (entrusted with) the  
 preservation of our own', Sauppe, *Fragm. Theod. Νόμος (Or. Att.* III

<sup>1</sup> The name Ismenias appears to have been traditional in Boeotia from the very  
 earliest times. Ἰσμηνίης ὁ Βοιωτίας is mentioned in the biography of Homer  
 ascribed to Herodotus, §§ 2, 3, as one of the original settlers of the new colony  
 of Cuma in Aeolia, and carrying with him Homer's mother Critheis.

ἀλλοτρίων ἵππων οὐ παραδιδόασι τοὺς οἰκείους, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνατρέψασι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ναῦς· οὐκοῦν εἰ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἀπάντων, καὶ τοῖς κακῶς φυλάξασι τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ χρηστέον ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν σωτηρίαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν· Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καὶ περ βλάβσθημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι, καὶ Χίιοι Ὅμηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην,

247), thinks with every appearance of probability that Theodectes' 'law' "(*declamationem*) ad rationes militum mercenariorum lege ab Atheniensibus accurate ordinandas pertinuisse." Both the fragments quoted by Aristotle, here, and again § 17, agree perfectly with this view. The extract here stigmatizes the folly shewn by the Athenians in entrusting their interests to mercenaries—like Charidemus and his fellows—who have already shewn their incapacity and untrustworthiness whilst in the employment of others—foreign princes and states—who have used their services. The other extract, § 17, is to shew that by their gross misconduct and the mischief they have already done, most of them—with the exception perhaps of men like Strabax and Charidemus—have entirely disqualified themselves for employment. From the example in Theodectes' 'law', the *general principle* may be inferred, that it is folly to entrust with the care of our own interests and the management of our affairs such as have already shewn themselves incapable by previous failures in like cases. The argument from the analogy of trades and professions is quite in the manner of Socrates and Plato.

On Theodectes himself and his works, see note on II 23. 3, and the references there.

Ἀλκιδάμας] Of Alcidas and his writings, see note on I 13. 2, and the reff. This fragment is referred by Sauppe, *Fragm. Alcid.* 5, to Alcidas' *Μουσείον*; of which he says, on fragm. 6, that he supposes it to have been: "promptuarium quoddam rhetoricum, quod declamationes de variis rebus contineret" [*"Alkidamas...sein mannigfaltige rhetorische Probestücke umfassendes Buch μουσείον nannte,"* Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas*, p. 495]. Alcidas' *Μεσσηνιακὸς λόγος* is quoted, I 13. 2, and II 23. 1.

Πάριοι γοῦν—ἡ πόλις] translated in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. 9, Vol. III. p. 267.

τοὺς σοφοὺς] are here the great 'wits', men of genius; men distinguished (not here specially as *artists*, but) for literature, learning, or wisdom in general.

Of Archilochus, his life, character, and writings, a good account is to be found in Mure, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* Vol. III. p. 138 seq. (Bk. III. ch. iii), in which the *βλασφημία* noted by Alcidas, as well as his great celebrity, is abundantly illustrated. See also Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. XI §§ 6—10, and 14. *Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo*, Hor. A. P. 79 (with Orelli's note). *Parios iambos*, Ib. Ep. I 19. 23 seq.

οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην] This, the vulgata lectio, is retained by Bekker, and even (for once) by Spengel, though A\* has *πολιτικόν*. In favour of this,

καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καὶ περ γυναιῖκα οὔσαν, καὶ  
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα τῶν γερόντων ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα  
 φιλόλογοι ὄντες, καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ  
 Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ

the reading of the best MS, it may be urged, that *πολίτην* would represent the Chians as *disclaiming* Homer as their fellow-citizen, quite contrary to the pertinacity with which they ordinarily urged their claim to the honour of his birthplace. This was carried so far, that Simonides in one of his fragments, Eleg. Fragn. 85 line 2 (Bergk), says of a quotation from Homer, *Χίος ἔειπεν ἀνὴρ*. Comp. Thucyd. III 104. On this 'Ionic' claim, see further in Mure, *Hist. Gk. Lit.* Vol. II p. 202. On the other hand *οὐ πολίτην* may mean—as Müller supposes, *Hist. Gk. Lit.* ch. v § 1—that they claimed, not Homer's *birth*, but merely his *residence* among them. The other reading *πολιτικόν* affords an equally good sense; that his Chian fellow-countrymen conferred honours upon Homer, though not upon the ordinary ground of public services, or active participation in the business of public life; as the Athenians—had they so pleased—might have dealt with Plato.

*καὶ περ γυναιῖκα οὔσαν*] "Sappho so far surpassed all other women in intellectual and literary distinction that her fellow-countrymen, the Mytileneans, assigned to her the like honours with the men, whom she equalled in renown; admitted by her countrymen of every age to be the only female entitled to rank on the same level with the more illustrious poets of the male sex." Mure, *H. G. L.* Vol. III p. 273, Sappho. He refers to this passage. Chilon, Mure, *Ib.* p. 392. Diog. Laert., vit. Chil. 68, substitutes the ephory for the seat in the *γερονσία* as the honour conferred on Chilon by the Lacedaemonians.

*φιλόλογοι*] 'of a literary turn'.

*Ἰταλιῶται*] (*Σικελιώται*) Greek settlers in Italy (and Sicily). Victorius remarks that these are properly distinguished from *Ἰταλοί*, the original inhabitants, who would not have understood Pythagoras' learning, or institutions, or moral precepts.

*Pythagoras*, according to the received account, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, vit. Pyth., was a native of Samos, to which after various travels he was returning, when, finding it oppressed by the tyranny of Polycrates, he started for Croton in Italy; *κάκει νόμους θεῖς τοῖς Ἰταλιώταις ἐδοξάσθη σὺν τοῖς μαθηταῖς, οἱ πρὸς τοὺς τριακοσίους ὄντες ὠκονόμουν ἄριστα τὰ πολιτικά, ὥστε σχεδὸν ἀριστοκρατίαν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν*, § 3. In what way the honour of his new fellow-citizens was expressed rather by respect and admiration, than by substantial rewards, may be gathered from the famous *αὐτὸς ἔφα* of his pupils, and from a notice in Diogenes, § 14, *οὕτω δ' ἔθαυμάσθη κ.τ.λ.*

*Anaxagoras* was a native of Clazomenae in Ionia, but, *τέλος ἀποχωρήσας εἰς Λάμψαχον αὐτόθι κατέστρεψεν*. Diog. Laert., *Anaxagoras*, § 14, a custom held in his honour, *Ib.* *τελευτήσαντα δὴ αὐτὸν ἔθαψαν ἐντίμως οἱ Λαμψακηνοὶ καὶ ἐπέγραψαν* 'Ενθάδε, πλείστον ἀληθείης ἐπὶ τέρμα περήσας οὐρανίου κόσμου, κείται Ἀναξαγόρας, § 15.

τιμῶσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν... ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις χρησάμενοι εὐδαιμόνησαν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Λυκούργου, καὶ Θήβησιν ἅμα οἱ προστάται φι-  
12 λόσοφοι ἐγένοντο καὶ εὐδαιμόνησεν ἡ πόλις. ἄλλος ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου, μά-

καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι] ita vulg. et vet. transl. Lat. "ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι, A<sup>a</sup> apud Vict. et Gaisf." Spengel. Accordingly Bekker, Ed. 3, Spengel and Vahlen now read *ὅτι* Ἀθ. preceded by the mark of something omitted. And in fact, as Spengel observes, what follows is not a proper continuation of the preceding quotation from Alcidas, but a new example of the general topic of induction. The general rule which is derived from the two following instances has fallen out, or something suggesting it, to which *ὅτι* refers, has been omitted either by a copyist, or possibly in his haste by the author himself. Aristotle is capable of this; continuing perhaps to quote from Alcidas, he may have neglected to supply the proper connexion. The general principle that is to be inferred from the induction may be the Platonic paradox that the true statesmen are philosophers: this appears from the three examples, 'that the Athenians flourished and were happy under the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, the prosperity (or flourishing condition) of the city was coeval with the accession of its leaders to philosophy'. I have rendered the last words thus to express *ἐγένοντο*. But the meaning of the whole is doubtless as Victorius gives it, that the happiness of Thebes, that is, its virtue and glory, began and ended with the philosophy of its leaders. This is inadequately expressed by *ἐγένοντο*, which only conveys the beginning of the coincidence: and, if the explanation of the suppressed rule be right, would have been better represented by *ἅμα οἱ φιλόσοφοι προστάται ἐγένοντο*. The last word is a correction of Victorius from MS A<sup>a</sup> for the *vulgata lectio* ἐλέγοντο. (The leaders here referred to are Epaminondas and Pelopidas.)

§ 12. Top. XI. This is an inference *ἐκ κρίσεως*, 'from an authoritative judgment or decision already pronounced upon the same question, or one like it, or the opposite' (opposites may always be inferred from opposites); 'either universally and at all times' (supply οὐτῶ κεκρίκασι) 'or, in default of that, by the majority, or the wise—either all or most—or good'. This topic, like the last, is naturally wanting in the dialectical Topics, to which it is inappropriate. Brandis, u. s.

Cicero, Top. XX 78, mixes up this topic with the authority of character, the *ἥθος ἐν τῇ λέγοντι*, which ought not to be confounded though they have much in common; the authority being derived from the same source, intellectual and moral pre-eminence, but employed in different ways. The former of the two is made supplementary to the other, *sed et oratores et philosophos et poetas et historicos: ex quorum et dictis et scriptis saepe auctoritas petitur ad faciendam fidem*. Quintilian omits it in his enumeration, v 10.

λιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ αἰεὶ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλ' οἱ γε πλείστοι, ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πλείστοι, ἢ ἀγαθοί. ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οὐς ἀποδέχονται

We have here, and in the following sentence, a classification of 'authorities' from whose foregone decisions we may draw an inference as to the truth of a statement, or the rectitude of a principle, act, or course of policy which we have to support; or the reverse. Such are the universal consent of mankind<sup>1</sup>, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*: short of that, the judgment of the majority: or of the 'wise', especially *professional* men, experts, pre-eminently skilled in any art, science, practice, pursuit, or the majority of *them*: or, lastly, the good, the right-minded, and therefore sound judging; whose minds are unclouded by passion or partiality, unbiassed by prejudice, clear to decide aright: men of *φρόνησις* who have *acquired the habit* of right judgment in practical business and moral distinctions. The good, or virtuous man, the *φρόνιμος* or *ἀγαθός*, or the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, appears again and again in Aristotle's Moral and Political writings as the true *standard of judgment*. Comp. Rhet. I 6. 25, *ἀγαθόν, ὁ τῶν φρονιμῶν τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν*, and see note and references there.

The wise, as *authorities*; particularly judges and legislators, as well as poets, philosophers, statesmen, prophets and seers, and the like; are one class of *μάρτυρες* (as *attesting* the truth of a statement or principle) of the *ἀτεχνοὶ πίστει*, I 15. 13, seq.: where Homer, Periander, Solon, Themistocles (as an interpreter of oracles), and Plato, are selected as examples.

ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες] again *κεκρίκασιν*. 'Or again, (special classes of authorities,) if the judges themselves, or those whose authority they accept (have already pronounced upon the point); or those whose decision we have no *power* of opposing, such as our lords and masters (any one that has power, controul, over us, with whom it is *folly* to contend); or those whose decision it is not *right* to oppose, as gods, father, pastors and masters' (whom we are *bound* in duty to obey).

'An instance of this is what Autocles said in his speech on the prosecution of Mixidemides' (this is lit. 'as Aut. said, what he *did* say against M.')

'that' (before εἰ supply *δεινὸν εἶναι aut tale aliquid*, 'it was monstrous that, to think that'—) 'the dread goddesses' (the Eumenides or Erinnyes) 'should be satisfied to bring their case<sup>2</sup> before the Areopagus, and Mixidemides not!' That is, that the *authority* of the court had been proved by the submission of the Eumenides, Mixidemides was therefore bound to submit in like manner: the jurisdiction and its claims had been already *decided*. Of the circumstances of the case nothing further is known: but it seems

<sup>1</sup> On the force of this argument from universal consent, see Cic. Tusc. Disp. I cc. 12, 13, 14, 15: especially 13, 30 (of the belief in God), and 15, 35, *omnium consensus naturae vox est*, seq. With which compare the maxim, *Vox populi vox Dei*.

<sup>2</sup> *δικὴν δοῦναι* is here, as in Thuc. I 28, *δικας ἤθελον δοῦναι*, 'to submit to trial or adjudication': comp. Aesch. c. Ctes. § 124, and the phrase *δικὴν δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν*, denoting a general legal settlement of differences. The usual meaning is 'to pay the penalty or give satisfaction'.



οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οἷς μὴ οἶόν τε ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἶον τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ οἷς μὴ καλὸν τὰ ἐναντία κρίνειν, οἶον θεοῖς ἢ πατρὶ ἢ διδασκάλοις, ὥσπερ τὸ εἰς Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Αὐτοκλῆς, εἰ ταῖς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαῖς ἱκανῶς εἶχεν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δοῦναι δίκην, Μιξιδημίδῃ δ' οὐ. ἢ ὥσπερ Σαπφῶ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ οὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν. ἢ ὡς Ἀρί-

from the allusion here, that Mixid. had first refused to submit to the Court of Areopagus the trial of some charge against him, on which he was subsequently, and consequently, prosecuted in one of the ordinary courts of Autocles.

The appearance of the *σεμναὶ θεαί* as prosecutors in the court of the Areopagus is of course a reference to their prosecution of Orestes in Aeschylus' Eumenides. Of Mixidemides we know but the name. Autocles was a much more important personage. He was an Athenian, son of Strombichides, Xen. Hellen. VI 3. 2, one of the seven ambassadors sent to the congress at Sparta in 371 B.C., in the spring before the battle of Leuctra, Xen. I. c., who reports his speech § 7. Xenophon (u. s. § 7) calls him *μάλα ἐπιστρεφῆς ῥήτωρ*, 'a very careful orator' (so Sturz, Lex. Xen. and Lexx. but I think rather, 'dexterous', one who could readily *turn himself about* to anything, 'versatile': and so apparently Suidas, who renders it *ἀγχίνους*). Autocles was again employed in 362—361 "in place of Ergophilus (Rhet. II 3. 13) to carry on war for Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus." (Grote.) Xenophon's Hellenics do not reach this date. His operations against Cotys in the Chersonese, and subsequent trial, are mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 104 and c. Polycl. § 12, and his name occurs, pro Phorm. § 53 [A. Schaefer's *Dem. u. s. Zeit* I pp. 64, 134 and III 2. p. 158]. See Grote, *H. G.* x 223 [c. LXXVII], and 511 seq. [c. IXXX]. Another Autocles, *ὁ Τολμαῖον*, is mentioned by Thuc. IV 53, and again c. 119: and another by Lysias, *πρὸς Σίμωνι* § 12: and a fourth by Aeschines, de F. Leg. § 155.

'Or (another example) Sappho's saying, that death must be an evil: for the gods have so decided; else they would have died themselves': using the gods as an *authority* for the truth of her dictum.

'Or again, as Aristippus to Plato, when he pronounced upon some point in—as he, Aristippus, thought—a somewhat too authoritative tone, "Nay but," said he, "our friend"—meaning Socrates—"never used to speak like that."

Aristippus draws an inference from the *authority* of their common master—who never dictated, but left every question open to free discussion, always assuming his own ignorance, and desire to be instructed rather than to instruct—to the proper rule in conducting philosophical discussion. On Aristippus see Grote's Plato, Vol. III. p. 530, seq. ch. XXXVIII.

On this passage, see Grote, Plato, III 471, and note. In qualification of what is there said of Plato's 'arrogance', so far as it can be gathered

στιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἶ- p. 100.  
πόντα, ὡς ᾔετο. “ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γ’ ἐταῖρος ἡμῶν” ἔφη  
“οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον,” λέγων τὸν Σωκράτην. καὶ Ἀγ-

from our text, take Victorius' commentary on ὡς ᾔετο, with which I entirely agree: "quae sequuntur verba modestiam Platonis defendunt, et paene declarant sine causa Aristippum arrogantiae eum insumulasse: addit enim ὡς ᾔετο, ut opinio illius erat." I will not however deny that Plato may even in conversation have been occasionally guilty of dogmatizing: in his latest writings, such as the Timaeus and Laws, and to a less degree in the Republic, such a tendency undoubtedly shews itself: but by far the larger portion of his dialogues, which represent probably nearly three-fourths of his entire life, are pervaded by a directly opposite spirit, and are the very impersonation of intellectual freedom. Following the method and practice of his master, he submits every question as it arises to the freest dialectical discussion, so that it is often impossible to decide which way (at the period of writing any particular dialogue) his own opinion inclines; and always presents in the strongest light any objections and difficulties in the thesis which he is maintaining. I think at all events with Victorius that Aristotle at any rate lends no countenance here to Aristippus' charge of dogmatic assumption. So far as his outward bearing and demeanour were concerned, I can conceive that he may have been haughty and reserved, possibly even morose: but a habit of 'laying down the law', or of undue assumption and pretension in lecturing and discussion—which is what Aristippus appears here to attribute to him—seems to me to be inconsistent with what we know from his dialogues to have been the ordinary habit of his mind, at least until he was already advanced in life<sup>1</sup>.

ἐπαγγελτικώτερον] ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι is to 'announce', 'make public profession of', as of an art, pursuit, business, practice. Xen. Memor. I 2. 7, ἐπ' ἀρετήν, of the Sophists, who 'made a profession of teaching virtue'. So Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα, Rhet. II 24. 11. This 'profession' may or may not carry with it the notion of pretension without performance, imposture, sham, φαινομένη σοφία, show without substance: and it is by the context and the other associations that the particular meaning must be determined. Thus when Protagoras says of himself, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὡς Σ., τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι, he certainly does not mean to imply that he is an impostor: when Aristotle l. c. applies the term to him, this is by no means so certain; judging by his account of the Sophists, de Soph. El. I, 165 a 19 seq. Instances of both usages may be found in Ast, Lex. Plat. There can be no doubt that undue assumption or pretension is meant to be conveyed by Aristippus in applying the word to Plato's tone and manner.

<sup>1</sup> And Agesipolis repeated the inquiry of the God at Delphi, which he had previously made (of the God) at Olympia (Apollo at Delphi, Zeus at Olympia), whether his opinion coincided with his father's;

<sup>1</sup> I have expressed my opinion upon some points of Plato's character, in contrast with that of Aristotle, in Introd. to transl. of Gorgias p. xxvii, and note; to which I venture here to refer.

σίπολις ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεόν, πρότερον κε-  
 χρημένος Ὀλυμπίασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταῦτά δοκεῖ ἅ περ τῷ  
 πατρί, ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὃν τάναντία εἰπεῖν. καὶ περὶ τῆς P. 1399.  
 Ἑλένης ὡς Ἴσοκράτης ἔγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ  
 Θησεὺς ἔκρινεν· καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὃν αἱ θεαὶ  
 προέκριναν, καὶ περὶ Εὐαγόρου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος, ὥσπερ  
 Ἴσοκράτης φησὶν· Κόνων γοῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντας

assuming or inferring' (ὡς sc. from the obvious duty of respecting the authority of a father) 'the disgracefulness of pronouncing the contrary'.

For v. l. Ἡγήσιππος Victorius and Muretus had proposed to substitute Ἀγησίπολις, from Xen. Hellen. IV 7. 2, which has been adopted in the recent editions of Bekker and Spengel; being also confirmed by a variation in the old Latin Transl., which has *Hegesippus polis*. See Spengel in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 53. Gaisford in *Not. Var.* and Victorius. Xenophon in the passage cited tells the whole story. Agesipolis is the first of the three kings of Sparta of that name, who came to the throne in 394 B.C. (Clinton, *F. H.* II p. 205). His expedition into Argolis, to which the consultation of the oracle was preparatory, was in 390 (Clinton, *F. H. sub anno*). This Agesipolis has been not unnaturally confounded with his more distinguished fellow-citizen and contemporary Agesilaus, to whom Plutarch, *Reg. et Imper. Apophthegm.*, Agesilaus 7, p. 191 B, erroneously ascribes this saying as an *apophthegm* (Gaisford). And similarly Diodorus, XIV 97, has substituted the latter name for the former in his account of (apparently) the same event that Xenophon is relating in the passage above cited. See Schneider's note *ad locum*.

'And Isocrates' argument about Helen, to shew that she was virtuous and respectable, (as she must have been) since (εἴπερ, if—as he *did*) she was approved by Theseus (Theseus decided, or gave judgment in her favour)'. Aristotle's ἔκρινεν expresses Isocrates' ἀγαπήσαντας καὶ θαυμάσαντας. See *ante*, I 6. 25. The passage of Isocrates referred to occurs in his Helen §§ 18—22. Compare especially §§ 21, 22. He concludes thus, περὶ δὲ τῶν οὕτω παλαιῶν προσήκει τοῖς κατ' ἐκείνους τὸν χρόνον εὖ φρονήσασιν ὁμονοοῦντας ἡμᾶς φαίνεσθαι, to give way to their *authority*.

'And the case of Alexander (Paris) whom the (three) goddesses (Juno, Minerva, Venus) preferred' (selected, decided, by preference; πρό, before all others; to adjudge the prize of beauty). This instance is given before, with the preceding, in I 6. 25.

'And—as Isocrates says, to prove that (δρι) Evagoras was a man of worth—Conon, at all events after his misfortune, left all the rest and came to Evagoras'. Evagoras, the subject of Isocrates' panegyric, Or. IX, was king of Salamis in Cyprus. In the spring of 404 B.C., after the defeat of Aegospotami (δυστυχήσας), he fled for refuge to Evagoras, Xen. Hellen. II 1. 29; the words δυστυχήσας ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθε are a direct quotation from the Oration, § 52. This incident of Conon's *forced* visit is absurdly embellished, exaggerated, and distorted from its true significance by the voluble panegyrist, § 51 seq.

13 τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπών, ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθεν. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, ποῖα κίνησις

§ 13. Top. XII. ἐκ τῶν μερῶν] the argument from the parts to the whole. This topic, so briefly dispatched here, is much more clearly and fully set forth in the Topics, B 4, 111 a 33 seq. [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 417], to which we are referred; the same example being given in both. The parts and whole, are the species and genus. Anything of which the genus or whole can be predicated must likewise fall under one of its species, because the species taken together make up the genus; if knowledge for instance be predicable of something, then some one of its parts or branches—grammar, music or some other species of knowledge—must needs be predicable of the same; otherwise it is no part of knowledge. And the same applies to the declensions—*παρωνύμως λεγόμενα*, the same root or notion with altered terminations—of the words representing the genus; what is true of *ἐπιστήμη* &c. is equally true of *ἐπιστήμων*, *γραμματικός*, *μουσικός*. If then all the parts of the genus are or can be known (this is assumed in the text), we have to consider when any thesis is proposed, such as, the soul is in motion (*τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖσθαι*, meaning, that the soul *is* motion), what the kinds of motion are, and whether the soul is capable of being moved in any of them; if not, we *infer*, 'from part to whole', that the genus motion is *not* predicable of soul, or that the soul is devoid of motion.

*κίνησις* is usually divided by Aristotle into four kinds, (1) *φορά*, motion of translation, motion proper; (2) *ἀλλοίωσις*, alteration; (3) *αὔξις*, growth; and (4) *φθίσις*, decay. De Anima I 3, 406 a 12. Again Metaph. A 2, 1069 b 9, *κατὰ τό τι ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ ποσόν ἢ πού*, where *γένεσις ἀπλὴ καὶ φθορά* are added to the list, and distinguished from *αὔξις* and *φθίσις*, but still included in four divisions; *γένεσις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τὸδε ὃν τὸ τί; αὔξις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τὸ ποσόν; ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τὸ πάθος, ὃν ποῖον; καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τόπον, ὃν πού*. In Phys. VII 2 sub init. there are distinguished *φορά, ποσόν, ποῖον*. Categ. c. 14, 15 a 13, six, *γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, ἢ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή*. Plato gives two, Parmen. 138 C, (1) motion proper or of translation and (2) change. To which, p. 162 E, is added as a distinct kind the motion of revolution or rotation, (1) *ἀλλοιοῦσθαι*, alteration, change of character, *κατὰ τὸ πάθος, τὸ ποῖον*; (2) *μεταβαίνειν*, change of place; and (3) *στρέφεσθαι*, revolution. And in Legg. X c. 6, 893 B seq., where the distinctions are derived from *a priori* considerations, ten is the total number, 894 C. (Comp. Bonitz ad loc. Metaph., Waitz ad l. Categ.) Cicero treats this topic of argument, under the general head of *definitio*, Top. v 26, seq., afterwards subdivided into *partitio* and *divisio*; and under the latter speaks of the process of dividing the genus into its species, which he calls *formae*; *Formae sunt hae, in quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur: ut si quis ius in legem, morem, aequitatem dividat*, § 31: but does not go further into the argument to be derived from it.

Quintilian, v 10. 55, seq., follows Cicero in placing *genus* and *species* under the head *fnitio*, § 55, comp. § 62; in distinguishing *partitio* and *divisio*, as subordinate modes of *fnitio* § 63; and points out the mode of drawing inferences, affirmative or negative, from the division of the *genus* into its parts or *species*, as to whether anything proposed

ἡ ψυχὴ· ἥδε γὰρ ἡ ἥδε. παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· “εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἡσέβηκεν;

can or can not be included under it, § 65. These are his examples. *Ut sit civis aut natus sit oportet, aut factus: utrumque tollendum est, nec natus nec factus est.* Ib. *Hic servus quem tibi vindicas, aut verna tuus est, aut emptus, aut donatus, aut testamento relictus, aut ex hoste captus, aut alienus: deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus.* He adds, what Aristotle and Cicero have omitted; *periculosum, et cum cura intuendum genus; quia si in proponendo unum quodlibet omiserimus, cum risu quoque tota res solvitur.*

‘Example from Theodectes’ Socrates: “What temple has he profaned? To which of the gods that the city believes in (recognises, accepts) has he failed to pay the honour due?” The phrase ἀσεβῆν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς occurs twice (as Victorius notes) in Aesch. c. Ctes. §§ 106, 107. Theodectes’ “Socrates,” which is (most probably) quoted again without the author’s name § 18, was one of the numerous ἀπολογία Σωκράτους of which those of Plato and Xenophon alone are still in existence. We read also (Isocr. Busiris § 4) of a paradoxical κατηγορία Σωκράτους by Polycrates (one of the early Sophistical Rhetoricians, Spengel *Art. Script.* pp. 75—7. *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX vol. III 281—2), which was answered by an ἀπολογία Σωκράτους from Lysias, Speng. op. cit. p. 141. On this see Sauppe, *Lys. Fragm.* CXIII *Or. Att.* III 204: which is to be distinguished from another and earlier one, also by Lysias, Sauppe, u. s. Fr. CXII p. 203. [Blass, *Att. Bereds.* I, p. 342, II, pp. 337, 416.]

Theodectes is here answering the charge of Meletus, οὗς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, Xen. Mem. I 1. 1, Apol. Socr. § 11, Plat. Ap. Socr. 26 B. To this Xenophon, like Theodectes, replies by a direct contradiction, and affirmation of the contrary, Mem. I 1. 2, θύων τε γὰρ φανερός ἦν, κ.τ.λ. comp. § 20; and sim. Apol. Socr. § 11 seq. How the charge is met by Plato in his Apology cc. XIV, XV, and dialectically argued, has been already intimated, *supra* § 8,—see note, and comp. III 18. 2. The difference of the mode of treatment severally adopted by the two disciples in the defence of their master is remarkable. The inference implied in Theod.’s argument is this:—You accuse Socrates of impiety and disbelief in the gods. Has he ever profaned a temple? Has he neglected to worship them and do them honour, by sacrifice and other outward observances? The indignant question, implying that the speaker defies the other to contradict him and prove his charge, assumes the negative. But such offences as these are the *parts* of impiety which indicate disbelief in the gods—the orator in his excitement takes for granted that the enumeration is complete, that there is nothing else which could prove disbelief in the gods—and if he is not guilty of any of them, neither can he be guilty of the impiety which includes these, and these alone, as its parts; the whole or genus is *not* predicable of him<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> This argument may possibly be suitable to a sophist and declaimer, but the use of it in a court of justice would certainly be exposed to the ‘danger’ against which Quintilian warns those who employ the topic in general.

τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζοι;"  
 14 ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων συμβαίνει ὥσθ' ἔπε-  
 σθαί τι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολου-  
 θούντος προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἢ  
 ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν. οἷον τῇ παιδεύ-

§§ 14, 15. Top. XIII. *Argumentum ex consequentibus*; ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων τινὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, which Vict. found as a title to the topic in one of his MSS. On *ἔπεσθαι* and *ἀκολουθεῖν*, and their various senses, dialectical and in the ordinary language, see note on I 6. 3. The general meaning of them seems to be 'concomitant'; that which constantly waits or attends upon something, either as antecedent, simultaneous, or subsequent.

There are two topics of consequents, XIII and XIV. The first is simple. Most things have some good and some bad consequent usually or inseparably attached to them, as wisdom and the envy of fellow-citizens are the ordinary results of education. In exhortation, defence, and encomium (the three branches of Rhetoric) we urge the favourable consequence—the resulting wisdom in the case proposed—if we have to dissuade, to accuse, to censure, the unfavourable; each as the occasion may require. The second is somewhat more complex. Here we have two opposites (*περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένων*) to deal with—in the example public speaking falls into the two alternatives of true and fair speaking, and false and unfair. These are to be treated 'in the way before mentioned', τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ: that is, in exhorting or recommending we take the favourable consequent, in dissuading the unfavourable. But the difference between the two topics lies in this (*διαφέρει δέ*); that in the former the opposition (that must be the opposition of the good and bad consequent, for there is no other) is *accidental*—that is, as appears in the example, there is no relation or logical connexion between wisdom and envy; they may be compared in respect of their value and importance as motives to action, but are not logical opposites—but in the latter, the good and the bad consequences are two contraries (*ἄναντία*) love and hatred, divine and human. In the example of the second topic, the dissuasive argument which comes first assigns evil consequences (*hatred*) to both alternatives of public speaking: that in recommendation, the contrary, *love*. The topic of consequences, in the general sense, as above explained, has been already applied in estimating the value of goods *absolute*, I 6.3; and in the comparison of good things, I 7.5. In Dialectics it does not appear in this simple shape, though it is virtually contained in the application of it to the four modes of *ἀντίθεσις* or opposition, Top. B 8; and in the *comparison* of two good things, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 5—15. Brandis u. s. [*Philologus* IV 1] observes of the two Rhetorical topics, that they could not find an independent place and treatment in the Topics.

Cicero speaks of the general topic of consequence *dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus antecedentibus et repugnantibus*, omitting the

σει τὸ φθονεῖσθαι ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν, τὸ δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν· οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ παιδεύεσθαι, φθονεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ δεῖ· δεῖ μὲν οὖν παιδεύεσθαι, σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ. ὁ τόπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Καλλίππου τέχνη προσλαβοῦσα καὶ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὰλλα, ὡς εἴρηται.

simple form in which it appears in Rhetoric. His *consequentia* are necessary concomitants, *quae rem necessario consequuntur*. Top. XII 53. The mode of handling it is illustrated, XIII 53.

Quint. v 10. 74, Ex consequentibus sive adiunctis; *Si est bonum iustitia, recte iudicandum: si malum perfidia, non est fallendum. Idem retro.* § 75, *sed haec consequentia dico*, ἀκολουθία; *est enim consequens* (in Cicero's sense) *sapientiae bonitas; illa sequentia, παρεπόμενα, quae postea facta sunt aut futura.* And two other examples of the application of the argument, §§ 76, 77. Quintilian naturally, like Aristotle, gives only the rhetorical, and omits the dialectical use of the topic.

Note by the way the redundant ὥστε in συμβαίνει ὥστ' ἐπεσθαι. See Monk on Eur. Hippol. 1323, Κύπρις γὰρ ἤθελ' ὥστε γίγρεσθαι τάδε. And add to the examples there given, Thuc. I 119, δεηθέντες ὥστε ψηφ., VIII 45, ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε, Ib. 79, δόξαν ὥστε διανομαχεῖν Ib. 86, ἐπαγγελλόμενοι ὥστε βοηθεῖν. Herod. I 74, III 14. Plat. Protag. 338 C, ἀδύνατον ὥστε, Phaed. 93 B, ἔστιν ὥστε, 103 E, (Stallbaum's note,) Phaedr. 269 D (Heindorf ad loc. et ad Protag. l. c.). Dem. de F. L. § 124 (Shilleto's note). Aesch. de F. L. p. 49, § 158, εἰσέτε... ὥστε. Arist. Polit. II 2, 1261 a 34, συμβαίνει ὥστε πάντας ἀρχεῖν (as here), Ib. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, συμβέβηκεν... ὥστε. Ib. VIII (V) 9, 1309 b 32, ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν. Pind. Nem. V 64, Soph. Oed. Col. 1350 (D), δικαίων ὥστε... Eur. Iph. T. 1017 (D), πῶς οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὥστε... Ib. 1380.

The example of Top. is taken from the passage of Eur. Med. 294, already employed in illustration of a γνώμη, II 21. 2. Education of children has for its inseparable attendants wisdom or learning as a good, and the envy of one's fellow-citizens as an evil: we may therefore take our choice between them, and argue either for or against it, persuading or dissuading. (Note a good instance of μὲν οὖν, as a negative (usually) corrective, 'nay rather'; this of course comes from the opponent who is arguing on the other side, that education is advantageous. Also in § 15.)

'The illustration of this topic constitutes the entire art of Callippus—with the addition (no doubt) of the possible, (the κοινὸς τόπος of that name,) and all the rest (of the κοινὸι τόποι, three in number), as has been said', in c. 19, namely.

The two notices of Callippus and his art of Rhetoric in this passage and § 21, are all that is known to us of that rhetorician. He is not to be confounded with the Callippus mentioned in I 12. 29. Spengel, *Art. Script.* 148—9, contents himself with quoting the two passages of this chapter on the subject. He was one of the early writers on the art of Rhetoric; and it is possible that a person of that name referred to by

15 ἄλλος, ὅταν περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένοις ἢ προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν δέῃ, καὶ τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν χρῆσθαι. διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ τυχόντα ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τάναντία. οἷον ἰέρεια οὐκ εἶα τὸν υἱὸν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ ἄνθρωποι σε μισήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ θεοί. δεῖ μὲν οὖν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ θεοί σε φιλήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ ἄνθρωποι. τουτὶ δ' ἐστὶ ταυτό τῷ λεγόμενῳ τὸ ἔλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλας· καὶ ἡ βλαί-

Isocrates—who was born in 436 B.C.—as one of his *first* pupils, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 93, may have been this same Rhetorician Callippus.

§ 15. Tiresias, ap. Phoen. 968, ὅστις δ' ἐμπύρῳ χρεῖται τέχνη μάταιος· ἦν μὲν ἐχθρὰ σημήνας τύχη, πικρὸς καθέστηχ' οἷς ἂν οἰωνοσκοπῇ. ψευδὴ δ' ὑπ' οἴκτου τοῖσι χρωμένοις λέγων ἄδικεῖ τὰ τῶν θεῶν, is compared by Victorius<sup>1</sup> with the example in the second topic.

This second topic of consequences differs from the preceding in these particulars. In the first, which is simple, the consequences of the thing which is in question are twofold—bad and good, and these are unconnected by any reciprocal relation between them. The second is more complicated, and offers contrary alternatives, which are set in opposition ἀντιτίθεται τάναντία, as δίκαια and ἄδικα λέγειν in the example—and then, 'proceed as before', τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ; that is, state the consequence of each, (favourable in exhortation or recommendation, unfavourable in dissuasion,) and bring the two into comparison in order to strike the balance of advantage or disadvantage between them. In public speaking, for instance, the alternatives are, true and fair, and false and unfair, words and arguments: if your object is to dissuade from it, you adduce the ill consequences of both, and contrast them, so as to shew which is the greater.

'But that is all one with the proverb, to buy the marsh with the salt': i. e. to take the fat with the lean; the bad with the good; the unprofitable and unwholesome marsh (*palus inamabilis*, Virg. G. IV 479, Aen. VI 438) with the profitable salt which is inseparably connected with it. An argument pro and con, but only of the first kind, Top. XIII, by comparing the good and the bad consequence, according as you are for or against the purchase. An Italian proverb to the same effect is quoted in Buhle's note, *comprare il mel con le mosche*; and the opposite, the good *without* the bad, appears in the Latin, *sine sacris haereditas*, Plaut. Capt. IV 1. 5 (Schrader.). [We may also contrast the proverb *μηδὲ μέλι, μηδὲ μελίσσας*: ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ βουλομένων παθεῖν τι ἀγαθὸν μετὰ ἀπευκτοῦ (Diogenianus, *cent.* vi, 58). Cf. Sappho, fragm. 113.]

<sup>1</sup> Gaisford, *Not. Var.*, cites this as from Victorius. It is not found in my copy, Florence, 1548.



σωσις τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅταν δυοῖν ἐναντίοι ἐκατέρω  
ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐπηται, ἐναντία ἐκάτερα ἐκατέροις.

There is an evident intention in the association of *ἔλος* and *ἄλας*: the alliterative jingle, as in so many other proverbs (*παθήματα μαθήματα*, safe bind safe find), sharpens the point, and helps its hold on the memory.

Some MSS have *ἔλαιον* for *ἔλος*, which is expressed in the Vet. Tr. Lat., 'olim (oleum) emi et sales,' and by other interpreters; and also adopted by Erasmus, *Adag.*, oleum et salem oportet emere; 'to be in want of oil and salt,' implying insanity, against which this mixture was supposed to be a specific. Victorius, referring to the Schol. on Arist. Nub. 1237, ἀλσὶν διασμηχθεὶς ὄναι' ἂν οὐτοσί, who notes τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἀλσὶ καὶ ἐλαίῳ διέβρεχον, καὶ ὠφελοῦντο, supposes that some copyist having this in his mind altered *ἔλος* into *ἔλαιον*. At all events the proverb in this interpretation has no meaning or applicability here.

In the following paragraph (καὶ ἡ βλαίσωσις...ἐκατέροις) the meaning of *βλαίσωσις*, the application of the metaphor, and its connexion with what follows, which appears to be intended as an exemplification or explanation of the use of *βλαίσωσις*, are, and are likely to remain, alike unintelligible. The Commentators and Lexicographers are equally at fault; Spengel in his recent commentary passes the passage over in absolute silence: Victorius, who reasonably supposes that *βλαίσωσις* (metaphorically) represents some figure of rhetorical argument, candidly admits that nothing whatsoever is known of its meaning and use, and affords no help either in the explanation of the metaphor, or its connexion with what seems to be the interpretation of it. Buhle, and W. Dindorf, ap. Steph. *Thes.* s. v. *prævaricatio*; Vet. Lat. Tr. *claudicatio*; Riccoboni *inversio*. Vater discreetly says nothing; and Schrader that which amounts to nothing. After all these failures I cannot hope for any better success; and I will merely offer a few remarks upon the passage, with a view to assist others as far as I can in their search for a solution.

*βλαισός* and *ῥαιβός*, *valgus* and *varus*, all of them express a deformity or divergence from the right line, or standard shape, in the legs and feet. The first (which is not always explained in the same way<sup>1</sup>) seems to correspond to our 'bow-legged', that is having the leg and foot bent outwards: for it was applied to the hind legs of frogs, *βλαισοπόδης βάτραχος*, poet. ap. Suidam. And Etym. M. (conf. Poll. 2. 193,) interprets it, ὁ τοὺς πόδας εἰς τὰ ἔξω διεστραμμένος (with his feet distorted so as to turn outwards) καὶ τῷ Δ στοιχείῳ ὀικώς; so that it seems that it may represent the act of straddling. The adj. itself and some derivatives not unfrequently occur in Ar.'s works on Nat. Hist.; likewise in Galen, once in Xenophon, de re Eq. 13, and, rarely in other authors; but *βλαίσωσις* appears to be a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*. *ῥαιβός* is the opposite defect to this, 'bandy-legged', where the legs turn inwards. And to these correspond *valgus* and *varus*: the first, *qui suras et crura habet extrorsum intortas*, of which Petronius says, *crura in orbem pandit*; and Martial, *crura... simulant quae cornua lunae*. Huic contrarius est *varus*, qui introrsus

<sup>1</sup> *βλαισός*...bandy-legged, opposed to *ῥαιβός*. *ῥαιβός*, crooked, bent, esp. of bandy legs. Liddell and Scott's Lex. sub vv.

16 ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ταῦτ' ἀφανερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἀφανῶς, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς μὲν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπαι-

pedes et crura obtorta habet. "Vari dicuntur incurva crura habentes." Festus (ap. Facc.). Heindorf ad Hor. Sat. I. 3, 47. G. Dindorf (in Steph. Thes.) explains it by *prævaricatio*, quoting Cic. Orat. Partit. xxxvi 126, (*prævaricator definitur*) *ex nomine ipso, quod significat eum qui in contrariis causis quasi vare* (Edd. varie) *esse positus videatur*<sup>1</sup>. If we revert to the derivation, and apparently the original meaning, of the word, following Cicero, and understand it as 'a deviation from the right' course or path, by a metaphor from bent or distorted legs, *prævaricatio* might be taken as expressing by a similar metaphor the general meaning of βλαίσωσις; but in its ordinary acceptance of 'the betrayal of his client by an advocate, and collusion with his opponent'—in which Buhle and the Translators must be supposed to understand it, since they offer no other explanation—it seems altogether inappropriate. So however Rost and Palm, in their *Lexicon*.

The translation, as the passage stands, is 'and the βλαίσωσις is, or consists in, this, when each (either) of two contraries is followed (accompanied) by a good and an ill consequence, each contrary to each', (as in a proposition of Euclid). This is a generalisation of the example in Top. XIV: the two contraries are the fair and unfair speaking; each of which has its favourable and unfavourable consequence; truth, the love of God and hatred of men; falsehood, the love of men and hatred of God. But how this is connected with βλαίσωσις I confess myself unable to discover. The nearest approach I have been able to make to it—which I only mention to condemn—is to understand βλαίσωσις of the *straddling* of the legs, the Λ of the Etymol. M., which might possibly represent the *divergence* of the two inferences pro and con deducible from the topic of consequences; but not only is this common to all rhetorical argumentation, and certainly not characteristic of this particular topic, but it also loses sight of the deviation from a true standard, which we have supposed this metaphorical application of the term to imply.

§ 16. Top. xv. This Topic is derived from the habit men have, which may be assumed to be almost universal, of concealing their real opinions and wishes in respect of things good and bad, which are always directed to their own interests, under the outward show and profession of noble and generous sentiments and of a high and pure morality. Thus, to take two examples from de Soph. El. c. 12, they openly profess that a noble death is preferable to a life of pleasure; that poverty and rectitude, is better than ill-got gains, than wealth accompanied with disgrace: but secretly they think and wish the contrary. These contrary views and inclinations can always be played off one against the other in argument, and the opponent made to seem to be asserting a paradox: you infer the one or the other as the occasion requires. This is in fact the most effective (κυριώτατος) of all topics for bringing about this result. The mode of dealing with the topic is thus described in de Soph. El. I. c. 173 a 2, "If the thesis is in accordance with their real desires, the

<sup>1</sup> Compare the whole passage §§ 124—126, in illustration of *prævaricatio*.

νοῦσι μάλιστα, ἰδία δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα μᾶλλον βού-  
λονται, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι συνάγειν θάτερον· τῶν  
γὰρ παραδόξων οὗτος ὁ τόπος κυριώτατος ἐστίν.  
17 ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ταῦτα συμβαίνειν· οἶον ὁ

respondent should be confronted with their public professions; if it is in accordance with them [the latter], he should be confronted with their real desires. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either their publicly expressed, or secret opinions." Poste, Transl. p. 43. This is for dialectics: but it may be applied equally well to rhetorical practice, in which there is nearly always a real or (as in the epideictic branch) imaginary opponent. The author proceeds, Ib. 173 a 7, further to illustrate this by the familiar opposition of φύσις and νόμος, nature and convention or custom, which is to be handled in the same way as the preceding, and is πλείστος τόπος τοῦ τὰ παράδοξα λέγειν: referring to Callicles' well-known exposition of the true doctrine of justice conventional and natural, in Plato's Gorgias, c. 38, foll.

This topic does not occur in Cicero's tract, which is confined to dialectics; nor is it found amongst the rhetorical topics of Quintilian's tenth chapter of Book v, which has supplied us with so many illustrations of Aristotle.

'Another; whereas in public and in secret men praise not the same things, but openly most highly extol what is just and right, yet secretly (privately, in their hearts,) prefer their own interest and advantage, from these (i. e. from premisses derived from the one or the other of these two modes of thought and expression, whichever it be that the opponent has given utterance to,) we must endeavour to infer the other: for of all *paradoxical* topics (topics that lead to paradox, which enable us to represent the opponent as guilty of it,) this is the most effective (most powerful, mightiest, most authoritative)'. If the opponent has been indulging in some high-flown moral commonplaces about virtue and honour, by an appeal to the real but *secret* feelings of the audience on such matters, we must shew that such sentiments are paradoxical, or contrary to common opinion; or conversely, if we have occasion to assume the high moral tone, make our appeal to those opinions which they openly profess, and shew that it is a paradox to assume with the opponent that men are incapable of any other motives than such as are suggested by sordid self-interest.

§ 17. Top. xvi. 'Another (inference may be drawn) from the *proportion* of so and so (ταῦτα)'. This is the argument from analogy in its strict and proper sense, the 'analogy of relations'. See Sir W. Hamilton, quoted at II 19. 2, and on the argument from analogy in general. The analogy or proportion here is the literal, numerical or geometrical, proportion, 2 : 4 :: 8 : 16. "Analogy or proportion is the similitude of ratios." Eucl. El. Bk. v def. 8.

This topic also does not appear in the dialectical treatise, where it is inappropriate; nor in Cicero and Quintilian, except so far as the *ordinary* and *popular* analogy (see again the note above referred to)

Ἰφικράτης τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ νεώτερον ὄντα τῆς ἡλικίας, ὅτι μέγας ἦν, λειτουργεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, εἶπεν ὅτι εἰ τοὺς μεγάλους τῶν παίδων ἄνδρας νομίζουσι, τοὺς μικροὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν παῖδας εἶναι ψηφιοῦνται. καὶ Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ὅτι πολίτας μὲν ποιεῖσθε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οἷον Στράβακα καὶ Χαρίδημον, διὰ τὴν

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is recognised under the names of *similitudo* (c) and *similia* (Q). Similitude is between two, proportion requires four terms. Eth. N. v 6, 1131 a 32, ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων (equality or parity of ratios), καὶ ἐν τέταρτον ἐλαχίστοις. And comp. the explanation of the 'proportional' metaphor in Poet. XXI 11, and the examples, §§ 12, 13. Accordingly of the two examples each has four terms, and the inference is drawn from the similitude of the two ratios.

'As Iphicrates, when they (the assembly, ψηφιοῦνται,) wanted to force upon his son the discharge of one of the liturgies' (pecuniary contributions to the service of the state, ordinary and extraordinary, of a very onerous character), 'because he was tall, though he was younger than *the* age (required by law), said that if they suppose tall boys to be men, they will have to vote short men to be boys': the proportion being, Tall boys : men :: short men : boys. Two ratios of equality. The argument is a *reductio ad absurdum*. The first ratio is hypothetical. If tall boys are really to be regarded as men, then by the same ratio, &c.

'And Theodectes, in the "law"' (which he proposes, in his declamation, for the reform of the mercenary service, see above § 11, note) 'you make citizens of your mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, for their respectability and virtue, and won't you (by the same proportion) make exiles of those who have been guilty of such desperate (ἀνήκεστα) atrocities?'

Of these 'mercenaries' who swarmed in Greece from the beginning of the fourth century onwards, the causes of their growth, their character and conduct, and the injury they brought upon Greece, see an account in Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. XI p. 392 seq. [chap. LXXXVII].

Charidemus, of Oreus in Euboea, in the middle of that century, was perhaps the most celebrated of their leaders. He was a brave and successful soldier, but faithless, and profligate and reckless in personal character. Theopomp. ap. Athen. X 436 B. C. Theopomp. Fr. 155, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.*, ed. C. and Th. Müller, p. 384 b (Firmin Didot). διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν, therefore, is not to be taken as an exact description of Charidemus' character, but is the assumption upon which the Athenians acted when they conferred these rewards. His only real merit was the service he had done them. He plays a leading part in Demosthenes' speech, c. Aristocratem; who mentions several times, §§ 23, 65, 89, the citizenship conferred on him by the Athenians in acknowledgment of his services, as well as—somewhat later—a golden crown, § 145, πρῶτον πολίτης, εἶτα πάλιν χρυσοῖς στεφάνοις ὡς εὐεργέτης στεφάνωνται, § 157,

ἐπιείκειαν· φυγάδας δ' οὐ ποιήσετε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μ-  
18 σθοφόροις ἀνήκεστα διαπεπραγμένους; ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ,  
τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐὰν ᾗ ταῦτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν συμβαίνει  
ταῦτά· οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν  
οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέ-  
γουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς  
ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐξ ἐκατέρου λαμ-  
βάνειν ὡς ταῦτ' αἰεί. “μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ

presents, and the name of ‘benefactor’, 185, and 188. Besides the Athenians, he was employed by Cotys and his son Cersobleptes, kings of Thrace, and by Memnon and Mentor in Asia. A complete account of him and his doings is to be found in Weber’s Proleg. ad Dem. c. Aristocr. pp. LX—LXXXIII.

Of the other mercenary leader, Strabax, all that we know is derived from Dem. c. Lept. § 84, that through the intervention or by the recommendation (διὰ) of Iphicrates he received a certain ‘honour’ from the Athenians, to which Theodectes’ extract here adds that this was the citizenship. We learn further from Harpocration and Suidas that Strabax is—an ὄνομα κύριον. “De commendatione Iphicratis, ornatus Strabax videri potest Iphicratis in eodem bello (sc. Corinthiaco) adiutor fuisse.” F. A. Wolff, ad loc. Dem.

§ 18. Top. XVII. Inference from results or consequents to antecedents, parity of the one implies parity or identity of the other<sup>1</sup>: if, for instance, the admission of the *birth* of the gods equally with that of their *death*, leads to the result of denying the eternity of their existence—in the former case there *was* a time when they *were not*, as in the other there is a time when they *will not be*—then the two assertions (the antecedents) may be regarded as equivalent, or the same in their effect, and *for the purposes of the argument* ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν, because they both lead to the same result or consequent; so that one can be put for the other, whichever happens to suit your argument.

On Xenophanes, see note on I 15. 29, and the reff. On this passage, Müllach, Fr. Phil. Gr., Xenoph. Fragm. Inc. 7, “Hoc dicto veteres poetæ perstringuntur, qui quum diis aeternitatem (potius immortalitatem) tribuerent, eos tamen hominum instar ortos esse affirmabant eorumque parentes et originem copiose enarrabant.” And to nearly the same effect, Karsten, Xenoph. Fr. Rell. xxxiv. p. 85. The saying against the assertors of the birth of the gods is not found amongst the extant fragments, but the arguments by which he refuted this opinion is given by Aristotle (?) de Xenoph. Zen. et Gorg. init. p. 974. 1, seq. and by Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. f. 6 A, ap. Karsten p. 107, comp. p. 109.

For καὶ—δέ, see note on I 6. 22.

‘And in fact, as a general rule, we may always assume’ (*subaudi dei, χρη,*

<sup>1</sup> “Von der gleichheit der folgen auf gleichheit des ihnen zu grunde liegenden schliessende.” Brandis [*Philologus* IV i.].

Ἰσοκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν." καὶ ὅτι τὸ διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ

*aut tale aliquid*) the result of either of two things to be the same with that of the other (*ἐκτέρου*), (or with *ἐκάστου*, as A<sup>2</sup>, adopted by Spengel, the result of *anything*, i.e. any things, two or more, that we have to argue about) 'as in the example, "what you are about to decide upon is not Isocrates, but a study and practice, whether or not philosophy deserves to be studied."' Whether you decide upon Isocrates or his pursuit and study, the inference or result *is the same* (*ταυτόν*), and can be deduced equally from both. I have here adopted Spengel's emendation of Isocrates for Socrates, "*quam emendationem*," as Spengel modestly says, "*Victorius si integram vidisset Antidosin nobis non reliquisset*". It is given in his *Specim. Comm. in Ar. Rhet.*, Munich, 1839, p. 37. A comparison of this passage with Isocr. *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως*, § 173, οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἐμοῦ μέλλετε μόνον τὴν ψῆφον διοίσειν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ὃ πολλοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν, certifies the emendation. Even Bekker has accepted it. At the same time the *vulgata lectio* Σωκράτους, as Victorius interprets it, yields a very sufficient sense, thus more briefly expressed by Schrader, "*Socrate damnato simul damnabitur studium sapientiae* : Socrate servato servabuntur sapientiae studia;" Socrates and his study or pursuit stand or fall together; to condemn Socrates, is to condemn philosophy: and might even be thought to be confirmed by *κρίνειν*, which more immediately suggests a *judicial* decision.

'And that (the result, effect, consequence of) *giving earth and water* is the same as, equivalent to, slavery'. The demand of 'earth and water' by the Persian monarchs from a conquered prince or state, in token of submission, and as a symbol of absolute dominion or complete possession of the soil—therefore equivalent to slavery, *δουλεύειν*—is referred to frequently by Herodotus, IV 126, Darius to Idanthyrus, the Scythian king, *δεσπότη τῷ σὺ δῶρα φέρων γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ*. V 17, the same to Amyntas king of Macedonia, Ib. 18, the same to the Athenians, Ib. 73, VII 131, 133, 138, 163. Plut. Themist. c. 6. Plin. N. H. xxii 4 (ap. Bähr), *Summum apud antiquos signum victoriae erat herbam porrigere victos, hoc est terra et altrice ipsa humo et humatione etiam cedere: quem morem etiam nunc durare apud Germanos scio*. It appears from Duncange, Gloss. s. v. *Investitura*, that this custom was still continued in the transmission of land during the middle ages (Bähr).

'And participation in the general peace (would be equivalent to) doing (Philip's) bidding'. The Schol. on this passage writes thus: Φίλιππος κατηγάκε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰν' εἰρηνεύωσιν μετ' αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χώραι, ὃ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἀντιπίπτων λέγει ὅτι τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης μετὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου ἡμᾶς, ὥς καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας, ἐστὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ὃ προστάττει ὁ Φίλιππος. Spengel was the first to point out (*Specim. Comm.* u. s. p. 39) that the *κοινὴ εἰρήνη* here referred to is the same of which mention occurs several times in a speech *περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνηκῶν*—attributed to Demosthenes, but more probably by Hyperides; see the Greek argument, and Grote, *H. Gr.* [chap. xci] XII 21 and note—

προσταττόμενον. ληπτέον δ' ὁπότερον ἂν ἡ χρή-  
19 σιμον. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ταὐτὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ αἰ-  
ρεῖσθαι ὕστερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, οἶον τόδε  
τὸ ἐνθύμημα, "εἰ φεύγοντες μὲν ἐμαχόμεθα ὅπως

§§ 10, 11, 17, 19, 30. The κοινὴ εἰρήνη, and the συνθήκαι πρὸς Ἀλέξ. both denote the convention at Corinth of the deputies of all the Greek states, with the exception of the Lacedaemonians who refused to appear, in 336 B. C., "which recognised Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian prince (Alexander, not Philip) as imperator, president, or executive head and arm." Grote, u. s. p. 18. The speech π. τ. π. Ἀλέξ. σ., according to the same authority, p. 21, was delivered in 335. But neither Aristotle's quotation, nor the Scholiast's comment, can refer to this speech, as Spengel himself observes. If the Scholiast is right in describing the opposition of Demosthenes as directed against *Philip*, it must be referred to a different speech delivered by him against the *former* agreement of a similar kind with Philip, after Chaeronea, which took place two years earlier than that with Alexander, in 338. Grote, u. s., p. 17. Comp. XI 700. [A. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, III 186—193.]

This passage has been already referred to in the Introduction, on the question of the date of publication of the Rhetoric, p. 28; and again, 46 note 2, on the references to Demosthenes in the same work.

'Of the two alternatives (the affirmative or negative side, whether the result is or is not the same, either may be taken, whichever happens to be serviceable'. Or, as Victorius, 'of the two alternatives, which though in themselves different, yet in the result are the same, we may always take that which best suits our argument'.

§ 19. Top. XVIII. 'Another (is derived from the natural habit or tendency of mankind) that the same men don't always choose the same things' (Spengel omits τοὺς αὐτοὺς with A<sup>c</sup>; Bekker, as usual, retains it) 'after as before (something intermediate, act, occurrence, period), but conversely' (i. e. *do* the second time what they have avoided the first, or *vice versa*); 'of which the following enthymeme is an example'.

ἡ *quaere* ἡ? which expresses 'as' (in the way in which), much more naturally than ἡ. This seems to be the required sense; and so I think Victorius understands it, "non eadem iidem homines diversis temporibus sequuntur." The same meaning is very awkwardly expressed, if indeed it *is* expressed, by rendering ἡ 'or'. In that case ὕστερον and πρότερον must be 'at one time or another': Riccobon 'posterius vel prius' 'after or before': 'sooner or later'. I will put the question, and leave it to the judgment of others. Which is the more natural expression, the more usual Greek, and more in accordance with the example? 'The same men don't always choose the same things after as before', i. e. the second time, when they have to repeat some action or the like, as the first time, when the circumstances are perhaps different: or, if ἡ be *or*, 'men don't always choose the same things after *or* before, sooner *or* later'. Surely the alternative is here out of place; in this case it should be καί, not ἡ.

ἐνθύμημα] Victorius interprets this "argumentum *ex contrariis* conclusum:" on which see Introd. pp. 104, 5, Cic. Top. XIII 55. This is the

κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ὅπως μὴ μάχόμεθα." ὅτε μὲν γὰρ τὸ μένειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι

sense in which it is found in the *Rhet. ad Alex.*, Cicero and Quintilian, and was in fact the *common* usage of it. But, as far as I can recollect, it *never* occurs in this special sense, at all events, in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*; and is in fact one of the leading distinctions between it and the *Rhet. ad Alex.* Neither was there any occasion to depart here from *his* ordinary use of the term: for enthymemes, i. e. rhetorical inferences in general, are exactly what he is employed in illustrating throughout this chapter.

The original sentence of Lysias begins with, *δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ κ.τ.λ.* 'For monstrous would it be, men of Athens, if when we were in exile we fought for our return (to be restored to our) home, and now that we *have* returned (been restored) we shall fly to avoid fighting'. We were eager to fight before (this was, as will appear afterwards, with the Lacedaemonians who aided the Thirty), shall we now after our restoration shrink from it? The *example* is an instance of what men are in the habit of doing, viz. changing their minds without reason: the argument, that it is unreasonable, and monstrous at all events to do it now.

*κατελθεῖν*, to return from exile, prop. 'down', *κατά*, viz. to the shore or harbour, at which almost all returned exiles would naturally arrive; either from the interior of the country, *ἀναβαίνειν καταβαίνειν*; or from the open sea into port, *ἀνάγεσθαι* contrasted with *κατάγεσθαι, προσσχέιν*. Aesch. Choeph. 3, and his own commentary, Arist. Ran. 1163—5.

This is followed by Aristotle's explanation, which is certainly more obscure than what it professes to explain. 'That is to say (*γάρ*), at one time (before) they preferred staying (where they were, 'maintaining their ground') at the price of fighting; at another (*after* their restoration) not fighting at the expense of not staying', i. e. the *second* time, they preferred *not staying*, quitting the city, to avoid fighting. It is necessary to interpret *ἀντί* in this way, not 'instead of'—if the reading be sound, to bring the explanation into conformity with the example; and thus no alteration is required.

The words quoted by Ar. are taken from a speech of Lysias, of which Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 33, has preserved a long fragment; printed amongst Lysias' speeches as Orat. 34. Baier et Sauppe *Or. Att.* I 147. [Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit* I p. 441 and Jebb's *Attic Orators* I p. 211.] Dion. gives an account of the occasion of it in the preceding chapter. He doubts if it was ever actually delivered. The title of it is, *περὶ τοῦ μὴ καταλύσαι τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν Ἀθήνησι*; and its object was to prevent the carrying into effect of a proposal of one Phormisius, one of the restored exiles *μετὰ τοῦ δήμου*,—this was after the expulsion of the Thirty in 403 B. C., when the demus had been restored and recovered its authority, and the other party were now in exile—to permit the return of the present exiles, but to accompany this by a constitutional change, which should exclude from political rights all but the possessors of land; a measure which would have disfranchised 5000 citizens. The passage here quoted refers to a somewhat different subject. The *Lace-*



ἡροῦντο, ὅτε δὲ τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ μένειν.  
20 ἄλλος τὸ οὐ ἔνεκ' ἂν εἴη, εἰ μὴ γένοιτο, τούτου ἔνεκα

daemonians, who were at hand with their troops, were trying to impose the measure upon them by force, dictating, and ordering, *κελεύουσιν, προστάτουσιν*, § 6, and apparently preparing to interfere with arms. Lysias is accordingly exhorting the Athenians to resist manfully, and not to give way and quit the city again, after their restoration, for fear of having to fight: and Aristotle—and this is a most striking instance of the difficulty that so frequently arises from Aristotle's haste and carelessness in writing, and also of his constant liability to lapses of memory—quoting from memory, and quoting wrong, and neglecting to mention the occasion of the speech and the name of the author, which he had probably forgotten for the time,—has both altered the words and omitted precisely the two things—*δεινὸν ἂν εἴη*, which shows what the *inference* is intended to be, and *λακεδαιμονίους*—which would have enabled his readers to understand his meaning. The passage of Lysias runs thus: *δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἐφεύγομεν, ἐμαχόμεθα λακεδαιμονίους ἵνα κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ἵνα μὴ μαχώμεθα*. And it is now pretty clear what the intention of the writer of the fragment was, namely to stimulate the Athenian assembly not to submit to the dictation of the Lacedaemonians and to encounter them if it were necessary in battle, by urging the inconsistency and absurdity of which they would be guilty, if, whilst they were ready to fight before their restoration to their city, now that they were in actual possession of it they should quit it and return into exile, merely to avoid fighting.

§ 20. Top. XIX. The wording of this is also very obscure from the extreme brevity. The title of the topic in one of Victorius' MSS is *ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν σκόπον τοῦ λαβόντος, συμβαίνειν*, 'inference, from the issue being contrary to the aim or intention of the receiver,'—i.e. a mistake on the part of the receiver of a gift, who takes it as offered with an intention different from the real motive. This however is only a single instance of the application of the topic, and derived solely from the *illustration*, *οἷον εἰ δοίη κ.τ.λ.* The true interpretation is, as Brandis expresses it, u. s., p. 20, the general one, "An inference from the possible, to the real, motive," as appears from the examples.

Two readings have to be considered: v. l. followed and explained by Victorius *εἰ μὴ γένοιτο*, which Bekker (ed. 3) has retained; and, Vater's conjecture, *ἡ γένοιτο*, following the Schol., *οὕτινος ἔνεκα εἶναι, ἦτοι, διὸ δίδωμι σοι νομίσματα* (this again refers exclusively to the first example). *ἡ γένοιτο, ἦτοι ἔδωκα*: which at all events seems to shew that *he* read *ἡ γένοιτο*: this is also expressed in Muretus' version, 'cuius rei causa aliquid est, aut fieri potest,' and adopted by Spengel in his recent edition. To this in what follows *εἶναι ἡ γεγενῆσθαι* properly corresponds. The translation will then be, 'To say, that the *possible* reason for a fact (*εἶναι*) or motive for an action (*γεγενῆσθαι*), (*lit.* that for which anything *might* be, or be done), *that is* the (true) reason or motive of the fact or action; as in the case of one giving another something, in order to cause him pain by afterwards taking it away (withdrawing it)'. Here is an ostensible motive—a *gift* being usually intended to cause pleasure—which

φάναι εἶναι ἢ γεγενῆσθαι, οἷον εἰ δοίῃ ἂν τις τινὶ ἔν' ἀφελόμενος λυπήσῃ. ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηται,

πολλοῖς ὁ δαίμων οὐ κατ' εὐνοίαν φέρων  
μεγάλα δίδωσιν εὐτυχήματ', ἀλλ' ἵνα  
τὰς συμφορὰς λάβωσιν ἐπιφανεστέρας.

conceals the real motive, which is to cause pain; and this is the inference, you infer from the apparent fact or possible motive to the real one; the object of the topic being to assign a motive which suits your argument. Such then is the general meaning of the topic: the examples are all of the possible concealed *motive* or *intention*—which may be bad or good as your argument requires—that being the form in which it is more likely to be of use in Rhetoric. οὐ ἔνεκ' ἂν εἴη ἢ γένοιτο 'that for which so and so would, could, or might be, or be done', (*would* be naturally or generally, *might* be possibly,) expresses the conditionality or possibility of the fact, motive, or intention, a meaning which is confirmed by ἐνδέχεται γάρ κ.τ.λ., in the explanation of the third example. (I call it the *third*, οἷον εἰ δοίῃ ἂν—λυπήσῃ being an illustration.)

On Victorius' interpretation of εἰ μὴ γένοιτο, 'cuius rei causa aliquid esse potest, *quamvis factum non sit*,' Vater says, "sed hoc *quamvis factum non sit*, ad rem non satis facit, neque in exemplis quae sequuntur eo respicitur an haec causa vera sit necne:" but whether that be so or not, I think that a still better reason may be given for rejecting it, that εἰ μὴ γένοιτο cannot be rendered *quamvis* &c., which would require εἰ καί, or καὶ εἰ (καί) μὴ γένοιτο. Victorius seems to mean, though the Greek (even independently of εἰ for *quamvis*) would hardly I think bear such an interpretation, 'to assert that what *may* be the cause of a thing (i. e. an act) really is so, although it has not been (or, were not) done at all'; in other words, 'though it is *not*': and this, though I cannot think it the right rendering, can scarcely be said to be altogether 'beside the point.'

On εἰ δοίῃ ἂν, see Appendix on εἰ δύναιτ' ἂν, c. 20. 5, 'On ἂν with *Optative after certain particles*' [printed at the end of the notes to this Book].

In conformity with the explanation there given, δοίῃ ἂν, the conditional, is joined with εἰ, just as the future might be, of which in fact the conditional (as the *tense* is in French and Italian) is a mere modification.

The first example, from an unknown Tragic poet (Wagner, *Fragm. Tragic. Gr.* III 186), warns us that 'Heaven bestows on many great successes or prosperity, which it offers not out of good will, with no kind or benevolent intent, but that the disasters that they (afterwards) meet with may be more marked and conspicuous'—a contrast of the apparent with the real intention, from which an inference may be drawn and applied to a parallel case. Victorius compares Caes. de B. G. I 14 (ad Helvet. legatum) *Consuesse deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundiores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere.* [Cf. Claudian's *tolluntur in altum, ut lapsu graviore ruant* (in Rufinum I. 22, 23).]

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος,

οὐχ ἵνα κτάνωσι<sup>1</sup> θῆρ', ὅπως δὲ μάρτυρες

p. 102.

ἀρετῆς γένωνται Μελεάγρῳ πρὸς Ἑλλάδα.

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Αἴαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προείλετο Ὀδυσσέα οὐ τιμῶν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἦττων ᾗ ὁ ἀκολουθῶν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκα ποιῆσαι.

<sup>1</sup> οὐχ ἵνα κτάνωσι

'And another from Antiphon's Meleager'. Referred to above, II 2. 19, where some account is given of the author, and the story of his play. The author of the Meleager is Antiphon the *Tragic* poet. See also note on II 23. 5, where the lines quoted are probably from some play. Wagner, *Fr. Tr. Gr.* III 113. Antiph. Fr. 3. Conf. Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* I 315. He suggests κτάνωσι for κτάνωσι (καίνειν is found several times in Soph., twice in Aesch., and once in Xen. Cyrop.): Gaisford, *Not. Var.* 327, with much less probability οὐχ ὥς κτάνωσι<sup>1</sup>. 'The intention is not to slay the beast, but that Meleager may have witnesses of his valour in the eyes of all Greece'. "Qui locus," says Meineke, l. c., "ex prologo fabulae petitus videtur. Fortissimi quique Graecorum heroes (ita fere apud poetam fuisse videtur) convenerunt, non quo ipsi aprum Calydonium interficiant, sed ut Meleagri virtutem Graecis testificentur."

A third from Theodectes' Ajax (*Aj. Frag.* I, Wagner, u. s., p. 118); cited again § 24, and III 15. 10, where the same passage of the play is referred to. It is there employed in illustration of the interpretation of a fact or a motive, favourable or unfavourable according to the requirements of the argument; exactly as in the topic now under consideration. Ar. there explains in much plainer terms its use and application: κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλείονων ἕνεκα πραγθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι (putting an unfavourable construction upon the act and its motive), τῷ δὲ ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βελτίον (the reverse). The same explanation will apply to both quotations alike. Theodectes' play contained no doubt a rhetorical contest—which would be quite in his manner, like Ovid's—between Ajax and Ulysses for the arms of Achilles, in which the argument from the construction of motives would be applied to the fact, by the competitors, in the two opposite senses. Ulysses would refer to the 'preference' (προείλετο occurs in both the passages), shewing a sense of his superior merit, implied by Diomedes when he chose him out of all the Greeks to be his companion in the hazardous exploring expedition to Troy by night (*Hom. Il. K.* 227 seq. Ovid. *Met.* XIII 238 seq. *Est aliquid de tot Graiorum millibus unum A Diomede legi*, line 241); Ajax would retort that this was not the real motive of Diomedes' choice, but it was that 'the attendant might be inferior to himself' (II 23. 20) or (as it is expressed in III 15. 10,) 'because he alone was too mean to be his rival', to compete with him in his achievements, and to share in the renown to be thereby acquired.

Of ἐνδέχεται, as illustrating εἰ δοίη ἄν, I have already spoken.

<sup>1</sup> Bekker and Spengel both retain οὐχ ἵνα κτάνωσι!

21 ἄλλος κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ τοῖς συμβου-  
 λεύουσι, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα,  
 καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν· ταῦτα  
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ἂν εἰ μὲν ὑπάρχει δεῖ πράττειν, εἰ δὲ μὴ  
 ὑπάρχει, μὴ πράττειν. οἷον εἰ δυνατόν καὶ ῥάδιον καὶ  
 ὠφέλιμον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ φίλοις, ἢ βλαβερὸν ἐχθροῖς καὶ  
 ἐπιζήμιον, ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ P. 1400.  
 προτρέπουσι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρέπουσιν ἐκ τῶν

§ 21. Top. XX. 'Another, common to counsellors (in deliberative rhet.) as well as the two parties in forensic pleadings'. This seems to imply that the preceding topic is confined to the forensic branch; and to this, of the three, it is no doubt, most applicable; the suggestion and construction of motives and intentions being there most of all in request. Still in an encounter of two opponents in the public assembly, as in that of Dem. and Aesch., it is almost equally available; and in the remaining branch even more so, as a topic of panegyric or censure. The present topic, like the five preceding, with the partial exception of Top. xv, which appears also amongst the 'fallacies' of the de Soph. El., is applicable to Rhetoric alone and does not appear in the dialectical treatise.

It embraces arguments, which may be used in the deliberative kind in exhorting to some act or course of policy, or dissuading from it; and in judicial practice in the way of accusation or defence; in which 'we have to inquire, first what are the motives and incentives to action, and what things on the contrary deter men from acting. The things which, if they be on our side or are favourable to us, εἰ μὲν ὑπάρχει, supply motives for action, are such as possibility, facility, advantage, either to self or friends, (of accomplishing or effecting anything); or anything injurious (hurtful, damaging: that is, the power of injuring) and' (bringing loss upon, on this form of adj. see note on I 4.9) 'involving loss to enemies, or (if or when) the (legal) penalty (for doing something) is less than the thing (that is, the thing done, the success of the deed and the profit of it', ('fructus voluptasque quae inde percipitur': 'quod cupiebant quod sequebantur et optabant.' Victorius). The construction of the last words, ἢ ἐλαττων ἢ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος seems to be, if construction it can be called, that ἢ ζημία is continued as an apposition to the preceding nominatives; 'the penalty being less than the profit' is another incentive to action. 'From such cases as these, arguments of exhortation or encouragement are drawn, dissuasive from their contraries (impossibility, difficulty, disadvantage, injury, &c.). From these same are derived arguments for accusation and defence: from dissuatives or deterrents, of defence; from persuasives, of accusation'. That is to say, in defending a client from a charge of wrong-doing, you collect all the difficulties, dangers, disadvantages and so on, to which the accused would be exposed in doing what he is charged with, and infer from them the improbability of his guilt: in accusing, you urge all or any of the opposite incitements to commit a crime, above enumerated. To these last, the inducements to the com-

ἐναντίων. ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται· ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν. ἔστι δ' ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη τέχνη ἢ τε Παμφίλου καὶ 22 ἢ Καλλίππου. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγ-

mission of crime, may be added the topic *cui bono*, 'Cassianum illud' [Cic. Phil. II § 35]. Compare with this the passage upon the various motives and inducements to crime and wrong-doing, in I 10. 5 seq., which is there mixed up with a general classification of all sources and causes of action.

'And of this topic the entire "art" of Pamphilus and Callippus is made up'. Of Callippus it has been already stated, *supra* § 14, that nothing is known but these two notices of Aristotle. It is likely, as I have there pointed out [pp. 271—2], that he was one of the earliest pupils of Isocrates mentioned in his *ἀντιδοσις*, § 93.

Pamphilus, the rhetorician, is mentioned by Cicero, de Orat. III 21. 82, together with Corax, in somewhat contemptuous terms, *Pamphilum nescio quem*, and of his Rhetoric, it is said, (tantam rem) *tamquam pueriles delicias aliquas depingere*. It is plain therefore that Pamphilus, like Callippus, belonged to the early school of Rhetoricians of the age of Gorgias and the Sophists, and treated his art like them in a 'puerile' and unworthy manner. Another, and very brief notice of him occurs in Quintilian, III 6. 34, a chapter on the *status* or *στάσεις*; he rejected *finitio*, the *ὁρικὴ στάσις*. Spalding in his note describes the contents of Pamphilus' 'art' from the passage of the Rhet., and then discusses, without coming to a conclusion, the question whether or no this Pamphilus can be identified with a painter of the same name, mentioned in Quint. XII 10. 6, Pliny in several places, and Aristoph. Plut. 385, and the Schol. Spalding has no doubt that Quint.'s Pamphilus, III 6. 34, is the rhetorician. Spengel, *Art. Script.* p. 149, note 83, thinks that he cannot be the same as Aristotle's, (erat itaque ille P. non ante Herma-gorae tempora,) in consequence of his acquaintance with *στάσεις*, which were of much later invention, and the name of them unknown even to Ar. The same doubt occurred to myself: but I laid the evil spirit by the consideration that though Aristotle was unacquainted with the technical terms and classification of the *στάσεις*, he yet was familiar with the *thing*, which he frequently refers to; and the *technical expression* may belong to Quintilian and not to Pamphilus. Nine times the name of Pamphilus occurs in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 109, ad *Orat. Att.* vol. III,) but the rhetorician is not among them.

§ 22. Top. XXI. The object of this topic is (says Brandis, u. s., p. 20) to weaken the force of arguments from probability. "In incredibilibus provocatur ad effectum, qui si conspicuus sit, resisti non potest quin, quod incredibile videbatur, iam probabile quoque esse fateamur." Schrader.

'Another (class of arguments) is derived from things which are believed to come to pass (*γίγνεσθαι*, actually to take place or happen)

νεσθαι ἀπίστων δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔδοξαν, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἡ ἐγγὺς ἦν. καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον ἢ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ εἰκότα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν· εἰ οὖν ἄπιστον καὶ μὴ εἰκός, ἀληθές ἂν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ διὰ γε τὸ εἰκός καὶ πιθανὸν δοκεῖ οὕτως. οἷον Ἀνδροκλῆς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πιτθεὺς κατη-

but (still) are beyond (ordinary) belief, (you argue, namely) that they would not have been believed at all, had they not actually been or nearly so': i. e. either *been* in existence, or come so near to it, made so near an approach to it, as to enable us by a slight stretch of imagination to realize it so as to be convinced of its existence. Any case of very close analogy, for instance, to the thing in question might produce this conviction. ἡ ἐγγὺς is a saving clause; 'fact or nearly so'. Rhetorical argument does not aim at absolute truth and certainty: it is content with a near approach to it within the sphere of the probable, which is enough for complete persuasion.

'Nay even more', (we may further argue that these at first sight incredible things are even *more* likely to be true than those that *are* at first sight probable. Supply δοκούντά ἐστι for the constr. and (μᾶλλον) ἀληθῆ or ὄντα ἐστὶ τῶν εἰκότων καὶ πιθανῶν for the sense): 'because men believe in (suppose, assume the existence of,) things either actual, real or probable: if then it (the thing in question) be incredible and not probable, it must be true; because its probability and plausibility are *not* the ground of our belief in it'. The argument of the last clause is an exemplification of Topic IX, § 10, *supra*, see note there. It is an inference ἐκ διαιρέσεως, 'from division'; a *disjunctive judgment*. All belief is directed to the true *or* the probable: there is no other alternative. All that is believed—and *this* is believed—must therefore be either true or probable: *this* is not probable; therefore it must be true. ἀληθές *more antiquae philosophiae* identifies truth and being: ἀληθές here = ὄν.

In other words, the antecedent improbability of anything may furnish a still stronger argument for its reality than its probability. Anything absolutely incredible is denied at once, unless there be some unusually strong evidence of its being a *fact*, however paradoxical. That the belief of it is actually entertained is the strongest proof that it is a fact: for since no one would have supposed it to be true without the strongest evidence, the evidence of it, of whatever kind, must be unusually strong. The instance given is an exemplification of the topic in its first and simplest form.

'As Androcles of Pitthus' (or Pithus, whence ὁ Πιθεύς; an Attic deme, of the tribe Cecropis) 'replied in the charge he brought against the law, to the clamour with which he was assailed by them' (the assembly, before which he was arraigning the existing state of the law) 'for saying "the laws require a law to correct them and set them right" which they thought highly improbable—"why so do fish require salt (to keep them from corruption), though it is neither probable nor plausible that bred as they are in brine (the salt sea) they should require salt; and so does

γορῶν τοῦ νόμου, ἐπεὶ ἐθορύβησαν αὐτῷ· εἰπόντι “δέ-  
 ονται οἱ νόμοι νόμου τοῦ διορθώσοντος,” “καὶ γὰρ οἱ  
 ἰχθύες ἀλός, καίτοι οὐκ εἰκὸς οὐδὲ πιθανὸν ἐν ἄλμῃ  
 τρεφομένους δεῖσθαι ἀλός, καὶ τὰ στέμφυλα ἐλαίου·  
 καίτοι ἄπιστον, ἐξ ὧν ἐλαιον γίνεται, ταῦτα δεῖσθαι  
 23 ἐλαίου.” ἄλλος ἐλεγκτικός, τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα  
 σκοπεῖν, εἴ τι ἀνομολογούμενον ἐκ πάντων καὶ χρόνων

oil-cake' (στέμφυλα, the cake or mass of olives remaining after the oil has been pressed out) 'require oil (for the same reason), though it is highly improbable that the very thing that produces oil should require oil itself'. Here we have an improbable statement which is shewn by two close analogies to be after all very near (ἐγγύς) the truth.

Of Androcles, and the time and circumstances of his proposed alteration of the laws, nothing is known but what appears in our text. The names of three Androcleses occur in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 13, *Or. Att.* III) of which the first, mentioned by Andocides *περὶ μυστηρίων* § 27, may possibly be the speaker here referred to. The Androcles of Thuc. VIII 65, (comp. Grote, *H. G.* VIII 43 [c. LXII], Plut. Alcib. c. 19,) the accuser and opponent of Alcibiades, assassinated in 411 B. C. by the agents of Pisander and the oligarchical party, is most likely identical with Andocides; the time of the events referred to in both authors being nearly the same. I think upon the whole that it is not improbable that Thucydides, Andocides and Aristotle may mean the same person<sup>1</sup>.

στέμφυλα] Ar. Nub. 45, Equit. 806, was a common article of food in Attica. It denoted not only the cake of pressed olives, but also of grapes from which the juice had been squeezed. Phrynichus, s. v., has οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τὰ τῶν βοτρυῶν ἐκπίεσματα ἀμαθῶς· οἱ δ' Ἀττικοὶ στέμφυλα ἐλαῶν. Suidas, on the other hand, τὸ ἔκδυμα τῆς σταφυλῆς ἢ τῶν ἐλαῶν, οἷς ἀντὶ ὄψων ἐχρῶντο, and to the same effect, Hesychius. Also Galen, ap. Lobeck; note. Lobeck settles the matter by quoting Geoponic. VI 12. 435, εἰδέναι χρηὶ ὅτι στέμφυλα οὐχ, ὥς τινες νομίζουσι, τῶν ἐλαιῶν μόνον ἐστὶ πυρῆνες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν σταφυλῶν γίγαρτα. (πυρῆνες must surely be a mistake; no amount of pressing could ever convert grape-stones or olive-kernels into an ὄψον, a dainty or relish, and moreover what is here said, that the oil proceeds from the στέμφυλα, shews that the cake is made of the olives themselves, and not of the mere stones.) The word occurs frequently, as might be expected, in the fragments of the Comic writers: see the Index to Meineke's Collection.

§ 23. Top. XXII. 'Another, to be employed in refutation', (i. e. of an adversary; which, real or imaginary, is always implied in refutation. The office of the ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα is τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν, 'to conclude contradictories', II 22. 15, and note: see also *Introd.* ad h. l.

<sup>1</sup> The writer of the Article *Androcles*, in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.*, has no doubt upon this point. He says on this passage, "Ar. has preserved a sentence from one of Androcles' speeches, in which he used an incorrect figure!"

καὶ πράξεων καὶ λόγων, χωρὶς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, οἷον “καὶ φησὶ μὲν φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς, συνώμοσε δὲ τοῖς τριάκοντα,” χωρὶς δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ, “καὶ φησὶ μὲν εἶναι με φιλόδικον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ἀποδεῖξαι δεδικασμένον οὐδεμίαν δίκην,” χωρὶς δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, “καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὐ δεδάνεικε πώποτ’ οὐδέν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς λέλυμαι ὑμῶν.”

24 ἄλλος τοῖς προδιαβεβλημένοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ p. 103.  
πράγμασιν, ἣ δοκοῦσι, τὸ λέγειν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ πα-

p. 263 and note—) is to take into consideration (and argue from) all contradictories, repugnances, disagreements (between your statements or conduct, and the opponent's), whatever contradiction may be derived from all times (conflicting *dates*), actions and words; separately (distinctly; there are three distinct modes of employing it) in the case of the adverse party, as for instance, “and he says he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty”: the thirty tyrants namely, after Aegospotami, B. C. 404: this is from the deliberative branch: ‘and separately in your own case (as applied to your own conduct, *πράξεις*), “and he says that I am litigious, and yet he can't prove that I have ever brought a single case into court.” and again, distinguished from the preceding, the application of it to oneself *and* the opponent (in the way of a contrast of two opposite characters and modes of conduct), “and *he* has never lent any one a single penny, whilst I have even ransomed (got you liberated, *λέλυμαι*), many of you (out of captivity).” This last example reminds us of the contrast drawn by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. pp. 412, 13, seq., of his own character and conduct as compared with that of the rest of the ambassadors to Philip, Aeschines, Philocrates and Phrynon: in which the ransom of captives plays an important part.

This is Cicero's *locus ex repugnantibus*, Top. III 11, IV 21, where it is illustrated by an example, which concludes, *repugnat enim recte accipere et invitum reddere*. And further, XII 53 seq. Quintilian, V 10. 74, *Ex pugnantibus, Qui est sapiens stultus non est*. Ib. 8. 5, *ex repugnantibus*.

§ 24. Top. XXIII. The title of this topic ‘in scripto quodam libro’ apud Victorium, is ἀπὸ τοῦ λεγομένης τῆς αἰτίας λύεσθαι διαβολήν.

‘Another, for’ (the benefit of; the *dative* seems to follow λέγειν;) ‘those that have been previously brought into suspicion or odium, (whether by actual calumny) or suspected’ (thought to be, having the appearance of being, δοκοῦσι, guilty of something wrong, for some *other* reason—so Vater; reading ἢ δοκοῦσι), ‘both men and things, is to state the reason for the (otherwise) unaccountable circumstance: for there must be *some* reason (δι’ ὃ is the αἰτία,) for this appearance (of guilt)’. MS A<sup>c</sup> has μὴ δοκοῦσι, which Victorius adopts and defends. All the recent edd. have ἦ. Victorius understands by μὴ δοκοῦσι a qualification of προδιαβεβλημένοις, to express the unexpected, apparently unreasonable, nature



παδόξουν ἔστι γάρ τι δι' ὃ φαίνεται. οἷον ὑποβε-  
 βλημένης τινὸς τὸν αὐτῆς υἱὸν διὰ τὸ ἀσπάξεσθαι

of the calumny or suspicion, which seems to be quite unsuitable to the character and circumstances of the object of it: "quae tamen nullo modo haerere ipsis videatur, quod alienae ab ea sint." This agrees extremely well with the *παδόξουν* following, and this reading and explanation is deserving at all events of consideration. It supposes *only one* case to be contemplated, that of *unjust* suspicion and consequent calumny. Vater on the contrary thinks that there are *two* cases intended, direct calumny, and suspicion *for any other reason*; and that this requires ἡ *δοκοῦσι*. His transl. is, "Homines significantur, qui propter calumniam vel alia de caussa videantur aliquo modo affecti esse." This is not very clear; but I suppose his meaning to be what I have said. In this case we must understand *ἀδικῆσαι*, or something equivalent, after *δοκοῦσι*. Spengel, in his recent edition, says that Victorius' reading and interpretation is refuted by the sense of the passage—which I cannot agree with—and that *διαβεβλήσθαι* must be understood after ἡ *δοκοῦσιν*. But what is the meaning of 'apparent' calumny? and how is it distinguished from the other?

There is another point which has hitherto escaped observation, viz. the interpretation of *καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ πράγμασι*. Victorius interprets it as in apposition to *τοῖς διαβεβλημένοις*, 'qui valet ad purgandas aliquas et personas et res,' which at first sight seems the most natural and obvious explanation, and I have adopted it in my translation. But then, what are the *things* that can be calumniated or brought under suspicion? One might suppose that it means human actions: but Victorius renders it *res*; and in fact actions are necessarily included in *τοῖς διαβεβλημένοις*; they are *the* things that are subject to misinterpretation; and therefore there is no ground for a distinction between *men* and their *actions*, so far at least as they are subject to calumny. I will venture to suggest, though not with complete confidence, that we might give the words a different construction, and understand them thus, "for the benefit of those who have been unjustly—we must in this case read *μὴ δοκοῦσιν*, unlikely to be guilty—subjected to suspicion, *by* men (by human agency, directly) or by circumstances" (indirectly; which would be equivalent to Vater's second case). At all events it makes very good sense.

We now come to a still greater difficulty, the interpretation of *ὑποβεβλημένης* in the example. A° reads *διαβεβλημένης τινὸς πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν* 'when a certain woman had been brought into suspicion with respect to (i. e. as to her conduct or dealings with) her son', which gives a very sufficient sense, but is rejected by Victorius as well as Bekker and Spengel and modern editors in general.

Victorius' rendering—and no other Commentary that I have seen has a word on the subject—is as follows; I must give it in his own words as it will hardly bear translation. "Ceu cum mater quaedam filium subiisset, corporique ipsius corpus suum supposuisset, ut commode eum osculari posset, in eo habitu corporis spectata visa est stuprum cum adlescente exercere." *ὑποβεβλημένης* is translated literally.

ἐδόκει συνεῖναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, λεχθέντος δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου  
 ἐλύθη ἡ διαβολή· καὶ οἶον ἐν τῷ Αἴαντι τῷ Θεοδόκτου  
 Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγει πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα, διότι ἀνδρείότερος  
 25 ὢν τοῦ Αἴαντος οὐ δοκεῖ. ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, ἂν  
 τε ὑπάρχη, ὅτι ἔστι, καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχη, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν·  
 ἅμα γὰρ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ οὐ αἷτιον, καὶ ἄνευ αἰτίου οὐθέν

I see no other meaning that can be attached to the words as the text at present stands, but it must be observed that *ὑποβεβλημένης τὸν αὐτῆς υἱόν* is very strange Greek for *supposuisse filium corpori suo*, and I do not see how it can be justified. The accus. after *ὑποβάλλειν* represents not the thing *under which* you throw something, but the thing that you *throw under* something else: and the *passive* *ὑποβεβλημένης* meaning 'throwing herself under', is possible perhaps, but by no means usual, Greek. The ordinary construction of *ὑποβάλλειν* with two objects, appears in these examples. The object *thrown* is in the accus.; the object under which it is thrown is either in the dat. or has a prepos. introduced before it. *ὑποβάλλειν πλευροῖς πλευρά*, Eur. Or. 223, *ὑποβ. ἀμφὶ μαστὸν σποδόν*, Suppl. 1160. Xen. Oecon. 18. 5, *ὑπ. τὰ ἀτριπτα ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας*. Plut. Brut. 31, *ὑπ. τοῖς ξίφεσιν τὰς σφάγας*, and similarly in the metaph. applications of it (from Rost and Palm's Lex.). On the genit. *ὑποβεβλημένης* see note on II 8. 10.

The general meaning of the whole is, that a mother had been seen in this position which she had assumed for the purpose of embracing her *own son*—which was not known to the witness—was accordingly subjected to the suspicion of illicit intercourse with him: and we are to suppose further, that her character hitherto had been unimpeachable: when the true reason was explained or stated, the calumny was at once quashed (dissolved or unloosed as a knot). On this sense of *λύειν*, *διαλύειν*, &c. see note in Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note 1.

A second example is taken from the argument between Ajax and Ulysses in the contest for the arms of Achilles, in Theodectes' tragedy 'the Ajax', already referred to § 20 *supra*: where Ulysses tells Ajax 'why (the *reason*, which explains the paradox), though he is really braver than Ajax, he is not thought to be so.' What the reason was we are not told; nor does Ovid. Met. XIII supply the deficiency.

On *διότι* and its three senses, see note on I 1. 11.

§ 25. Top. XXIV. ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου] the inference 'from cause to effect.' 'If the cause be there (its effect which necessarily follows, must be there too, and) the fact (alleged) *is* so: if absent, then (its effect is absent too, and) it is *not* so: for cause and effect always go together, and without a cause (i.e. its proper cause) nothing is'. Brandis, u. s., p. 20, observes, that this like the preceding topics is confined to Rhetoric. Cicero, Top. §§ 58—67, treats of cause in general and its varieties: but has nothing exactly corresponding to this, though he speaks of the great importance of the general topic to orators (65—7). Quintilian, observing that the "*argumentatio, qua colligi solent ex iis quae faciunt ea quae efficiuntur, aut contra, quod genus a causis vocant,*"

ἐστιν. οἶον Λεωδάμας ἀπολογούμενος ἔλεγε, κατηγορήσαντος Θρασυβούλου ὅτι ἦν στηλῆτης γεγωνὸς

is nearly akin to that of antecedent and consequent, v 10. 80, exemplifies it in the four following sections.

‘Leodamas, for instance, said in his defence, when charged by Thrasybulus with having had his name inscribed on the column (as a mark of infamy) in the Acropolis, only he had struck (or cut) it out in the time of ‘the Thirty’, replied that it was impossible; for the Thirty could have trusted him more if the record of his hatred of the *people* had remained engraved on the column’. The fact is denied on the ground of the absence of a *sufficient cause*: an example of the second case, the negative application of the topic, *ἀν μὴ ὑπάρχει*.

OnLeodamas, see on I 7. 13, and the reff. Sauppe, ad Orat. Fragm. xvi, Or. Att. III 216, thinks it impossible that the two Leodamases mentioned by Ar., here and I 7. 13, can be the same [*‘mit Recht’*, A. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* I p. 129 n.]. He argues that the Leodamas whose name was inscribed on the column as a ‘traitor’ (*in proditorum indice inscr.*), according to Thrasybulus, before the domination of the Thirty, that is, not later than 404 B.C. (he says 405), when he must have been about thirty years old<sup>1</sup>, could not have been the Leodamas mentioned by Demosth. c. Lept. § 146, as one of the Syndics under the Leptinean law, in 355 B.C., and consequently, that the latter, the famous orator of Acharnae, must have been a different person, because he would then have been nearly 90. Clinton, *F. H.* II III, sub anno 372—3, merely says, quoting Rhet. II 23. 25, “From this incident it appears that Leodamas was already grown up and capable of the duties of a citizen in B.C. 404, which shews him far advanced in years at the time of the cause of Leptines, in B.C. 355.” And this appears to me to be a sufficient account of the matter. Thrasybulus’ accusation of Leodamas is mentioned likewise by Lysias, c. Evandr. § 13, et seq.

The circumstances referred to in this accusation and defence, and the meaning and intention of the inscription which Leodamas is said to have effaced, are not quite clear. The use of the *στήλη* or pillar here referred to was twofold: the object of it in either case was the same, to perpetuate the memory of some act or character to all future time. But the fact or character commemorated might be either good or evil; and in the former case it was the name of a public benefactor, in the latter of some signal malefactor or public enemy, that was inscribed. It is usual to apply the latter explanation to the case here in question, which is probably what is meant; and then it seems the story must be this:—At some uncertain time previous to the expulsion of the thirty tyrants and their Lacedaemonian supporters by Thrasybulus and his friends, the recovery of the city, and restoration of the demus in 403 B.C., the name of Leodamas had been inscribed as a mark of infamy—as a traitor to his country, as Sauppe u. s. and Herm. *Pol. Ant.* § 144. 11 interpret it—according to custom on a pillar erected in the Acropolis for that purpose. Now if it was ‘hatred to the demus’ that was engraved on it (*ἐγγεγραμμένης*) as

<sup>1</sup> Je n'en vois pas la nécessité.

ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει, ἀλλ' ἐκκόψαι ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα· οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔφη· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν πιστεύειν αὐτῷ τοὺς τριάκοντα ἐγγεγραμμένης τῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς τὸν

the sign and cause of his imputed infamy, it follows that it must have been erected at some period when the popular party was in the ascendant; Leodamas of course being a supporter of the oligarchs. When his friends were in power and he had the opportunity, Thrasybulus charges him, *inter alia* of course, with having 'struck or cut it out' to efface the record. He denies the possibility of their *effect* by arguing the absence of all assignable *cause*, which could have produced it: for this permanent record of his 'hostility to the people' would have been an additional recommendation to the Thirty, who would have trusted him all the more for it. Thrasybulus, says Victorius, was accusing Leodamas of being an enemy and a traitor to his country; and one of the arguments he brought forward was the existence of this inscription, the subsequent disappearance of which he attempted to explain. He likewise cites in illustration of the use of the topic Cic. pro Mil. § 32, cum ostendere vellet insidiatorem fuisse Clodium. *Quoniam igitur facto probari potest insidias Miloni fecisse Clodium? satis est quidem in illa tam audaci tam nefaria bellua docere magnam ei caussam, magnam spem in Milonis morte propositam, magnas utilitates fuisse.* And, as Cic. goes on to remark, this is *Cassianum illud, cui bono fuerit.*

Of στήλη the pillar, and στηλίτης, the person whose name is engraved on it, in its unfavourable sense, where the inscription is a record of infamy—which may be compared with our use of the pillory, the custom of *posting* the name of a defaulter at the Stock Exchange, or a candidate who has disgraced himself in an examination; the object in each case being the same, exposure of the culprit, and a warning to others<sup>1</sup>; the difference between the ancient and modern usages, that the latter are temporary, the other permanent—the following are examples: Andoc. περὶ μυστ. § 78, in a ψήφισμα: Lycurg. c. Leocr. § 117, ποιήσαντες στήλην, ἀναγράφειν τοὺς ἀλιτηρίους καὶ τοὺς προδότας: Demosth. Phil. I § 42, where an historical example is given, and the whole process described. Isocr. περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους, § 9, στηλίτην ἀναγράφειν.

Of the favourable sense, Victorius quotes an instance from Lys. c. Agorat. § 72, προσγραφῆναι εἰς τὴν στήλην ὡς εὐεργέτας ὄντας. Herm. Pol. Ant. u. s. See also Sandys' note on Isocr. Paneg. § 180.

ἐκκοψαί] Ar. seems here to have arbitrarily departed from his original constr. Having begun with κατηγορεῖν and οἷ τῇ, he abruptly changes to the infin. as if λέγειν and not κατηγορεῖν had preceded: so that

<sup>1</sup> At Milan, says Manzoni, Introd. to the 'Storia della colonna infame,' in 1830, the judges condemned to the most horrible tortures some persons who were accused of having helped to spread the plague, and in addition to other severe penalties, decretaron di più, che in quello spazio (where the house of one of the condemned had stood) s' innalzasse una colonna, la quale dovesse chiamarsi infame, con un' iscrizione che tramandasse ai posteri la notizia dell' attentato e della pena. E in ciò non s' ingannarono: quel giudizio fu veramente memorabile.

- 26 δῆμον. ἄλλος, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο βέλτιον ἄλλως ἢ ἐνδέχεται ὧν ἡ συμβουλευεῖ ἢ πράττει ἢ πέπραχε σκοπεῖν· φανερόν γάρ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ πέπραχεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν τὰ φαῦλα καὶ γιγνώσκων προαιρεῖται· P. 1400 b.  
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· πολλάκις γὰρ ὕστερον γίνεται δῆλον πῶς ἦν πράξαι βέλτιον, πρότερον δὲ ἀδελον.  
27 ἄλλος, ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττεσθαι τοῖς πε-

we must supply λέγειν to explain the government of the infinitive. It cannot be the optative.

§ 26. Top. xxv. 'Another, to consider whether it ever was, or is still, possible to improve (do better, more advantageously, under more favourable conditions,) in any other way (by following any other course, by any alteration of time, place, conditions, circumstances), any (bad) advice (which the counsellor is charged with having given, Vict.), or anything which he is doing, or ever has done (anything wrong that he is either meditating or has committed), (you infer) that, if this be *not* so (if he has *not* taken advantage of these possible improvements, which would have contributed to the success of his advice or design), he is not guilty at all; *because* (no one would ever neglect such opportunities if he had it in his power to avail himself of them) no one, intentionally and with full knowledge, ever prefers the worse to the better.' It seems from the omission of συμβουλευεῖ and πράττει, and the prominence given to πέπραχεν the *past act* in the explanation of the reason, that although this topic *may* be applied to deliberative oratory, it is much more usual and useful in defending yourself or a client in a court of law. You say, My client cannot be guilty of the act with which you charge him, for he could have done it much better, would be much more likely to have been successful, in some other way; at some other time, and place, or under other circumstances: therefore, since he has *not* chosen to do the thing in the best way that he could, and at the same time had full knowledge of what *was* the best way of doing it, it is plain that he has not done it now under less favourable circumstances. This is excellently illustrated by Victorius from another passage of Cic. pro Mil. xvi 41. In retorting upon Clodius the charge of lying in wait to assassinate, he first enumerates several favourable opportunities which Milo had previously neglected to avail himself of, and asks whether it was likely that, having acted thus, he should now choose an occasion when time and circumstances were so much less favourable, to carry out such a design: *Quem igitur cum omnium gratia noluit (occidere), hunc voluit cum aliquorum querela? quem iure, quem loco, quem tempore, quem impune non est ausus, hunc iniuria, iniquo loco, alieno tempore, periculo capitis, non dubitavit occidere?*

'But there is a fallacy in this: for it often does not become clear till afterwards (after the commission of the act) how the thing might have been better done, whereas before it was anything but clear'.

§ 27. Top. xxvi. 'Another, when anything is about to be done

II.

\*

πραγμένοις, ἅμα σκοπεῖν οἶον Ξενοφάνης Ἐλεάταις  
ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ θύωσι τῇ Λευκοθέᾳ καὶ θρηνῶσιν, ἢ μή,  
συνεβούλευεν, εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, μὴ θρηνεῖν,

opposed to what has been done already (by the same person), to look at them together': i. e. to bring together things that had been hitherto separate, and so to be able to *compare* them—παράλληλα φανερά μᾶλλον *infra* § 30; παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι, III 2. 9, 9. 8, II. 9, 17. 13, παράλληλα μᾶλλον τὰναντία γνωρίζεται—a process which clearly brings out the contradiction. Brandis u. s. [*Philologus* IV i] p. 20 thus expresses the argument of the topic, "to detect a contradiction in the action in question." It seems in itself, and also from the example selected, to be most appropriate in giving advice.

'As Xenophanes, when the Eleates (his present fellow-citizens) consulted him, asked his advice, whether they are to offer sacrifices *and* dirges to Leucothea, or not; advised them, if they supposed her to be a goddess not to sing dirges (a *funeral* lament implying death and mortality); if a mortal, not to offer sacrifices'. Xenophanes here, by bringing the two practices into immediate comparison—if the example is meant to represent literally the statement of the topic, we must suppose that the Eleates *had already* done one of the two; deified her most likely; and now wanted to know whether they should do the other—makes the contradiction between sacrificing to (which they had done), and lamenting as dead (which they were about to do), the same person.

Of Xenophanes—of Colophon, but then living at Elea, or Velia, where he founded the Eleatic school—we have already had notice in I 15. 29, and II 23. 18.

εἰ θύωσι] εἰ being here equivalent to *πότερον*, admits equally with it of construction with the deliberative conjunctive: compare the same deliberative conjunctive in interrogation, as a modified doubtful future; τί ποιώμεν; 'what *are* we to do?' instead of the direct, 'what shall we do?' Matth. *Gr. Gr.* 526.

This passage is cited by Lobeck, *Aglaophamus, Eleus.* § 21, Vol. I. p. 167.

Plutarch refers more than once to this dictum of Xenophanes, but supposes it to have been addressed to the Egyptians, about the worship of Osiris, and the propriety of θρήνοι in his honour. De Superst. c. 13, p. 171 E, Amator. c. 18, 763 D, de Is. et Osir. c. 70, 379 B. Wytttenbach ad loc. de Superst. Athen. xv 697 A, quoting Aristotle, ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ, εἰ μὴ κατέψευσται ὁ λόγος: apud eundem.

Ino, daughter of Cadmus and Harmonia, and wife of Athamas, in a fit of madness inspired by Hera, threw herself and her son Melicertes—two sons, Eur. Med. 1289; see the whole passage, 1279—1292—into the sea. Both of them became sea deities: she under the name of Leucothea, Melicertes of Palaemon. Virg. Georg. I 436—7. The stories of Athamas and Ino are told under those two names in Smith's *Dict. Biogr.* Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 12. 28. de Nat. D. III 15. 39 in *Græcia multos*

28 εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν. ἄλλος τόπος τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἀμαρτηθέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῇ Καρκίνου Μηδείᾳ οἱ μὲν κατηγοροῦσιν ὅτι τοὺς παῖδας ἀπέκτεινεν, οὐ φαίνεσθαι γοῦν αὐτούς· ἤμαρτε γὰρ ἡ Μηδεία περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παίδων· ἢ δ' ἀπο-  
*habent ex hominibus deos—Leucotheam quae fuit Ino, et eius Palaemonem filium cuncta Graecia.*

§ 28. Top. XXVII. 'Another, from mistakes made; to be employed in accusaton or defence'. The example is an illustration of both; the accusers convert the mistake that Medea made in sending away her children into a charge of having murdered them; Medea retorts the same argument from *another* mistake which she could have committed had she done what they allege, of which however she is incapable. Brandis, "in any mistake that has been made to find a ground of accusation or defence."

'For instance, in Carcinus' Medea, the one party (of the disputants in the play) charge her with the death of her children—at all events (say they) they no where appear: because Medea made a mistake in (in respect of) sending away her children (instead of merely sending them away, they argued that she had made away with them, since they were no where to be found): her defence is, that it was not her children, but Jason, that she would have killed (if she had killed any one); for she would have made a mistake in failing to do this, if she had done the other too': and of such a mistake she never could have been guilty. "Quasi dicat, quomodo tam stulta fuisset" (how could I have made such a mistake?) 'ut innocentes filios necassem; perfidum autem coniugem et auctorem omnium meorum malorum relinquerem'" Victorius.

Carcinus, a tragic poet contemporary with Aristophanes, and his sons, Philocles, Xenotimus, and Xenocles, are often mentioned by Aristophanes, never without ridicule. See Vesp. 1501—12, Nub. 1261, Pac. 782, 864, and in Holden, *Onom. Arist.* Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. XXVI § 2, passes him over with very slight notice, "known to us chiefly from the jokes and mockeries of Aristophanes." Meineke, *Hist. Crit. Com.* Gr. p. 505 seq., *Fragm. Comic.* Vol. I., has a long and learned discussion, principally with the object of distinguishing this Carcinus from others of the same name. There was at all events one other tragic poet of the name, whom Meineke supposes to have been the grandson of the former, p. 506, being said by Suidas to be the son of Xenocles (or Theodectes). This Carcinus flourished according to Suidas 'before the reign of Philip of Macedon', in the first half of the 4th cent. B.C. Some fragments of his Achilles, Semele, and Tereus, are given by Wagner in his collection, *Fragm. Trag. Gr.* III 96, seq. with some others of uncertain plays: but he has omitted all those that are mentioned by Aristotle, the Medea here, the Oedipus in III 16. 11, the Thyestes, Poet. 16. 2. In Poet. 17. 2, there is a reference to a character, Amphiarus, in a play of his not named, with which Ar. finds fault. Athen. I 22 A. See also Clinton, *F. H.* II. Introd. XXIII.

λογεῖται ὅτι οὐκ ἂν τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἰάσονα ἂν  
ἀπέκτεινεν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμαρτεν ἂν μὴ ποιήσασα,  
εἶπερ καὶ θάτερον ἐποίησεν. ἔστι δ' ὁ τόπος οὗτος  
τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεο-  
29 δώρου τέχνη. ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἶον ὡς ὁ  
Σοφοκλῆς

σαφῶς Σιδηρῶ καὶ φοροῦσα τοῦνομα,

'And this topic and the kind of enthymeme is the whole of the earlier *art* of Theodorus'. Comp. *supra* § 14 of Callippus, and § 21, of Callippus and Pamphilus.

ἡ πρότερον Θ. τέχνη] i. e. ἡ πρότερον οὔσα, γεγραμμένη, πεποιημένη: as *οἱ πρότερον*, 'the earliest writers', III 1. 9. Theodorus' work must have passed through two editions, of which the second, from what is said here, seems to have been larger and more complete. This one is the 'first' or 'earlier' edition; the one *before* the second. If this contained nothing but the illustration of the topic of 'mistakes', it must have been extremely insufficient as an 'art of rhetoric'. We must ascribe either to his second and enlarged 'Art' or to speeches and rhetorical excursions all that Aristotle says of him, together with Tisias and Thrasyarchus, de Soph. El. c. 34, 183 b 32, as well as the *καινὰ λέγειν*, Rhet. III 11. 6, and his divisions of the speech, III 13. 5; as also the notices of him in Plato's Phaedrus, Quintilian, Cicero Brut. XII 48, &c., Dionysius, &c. (which may be found in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX. III 284 foll.<sup>1</sup>). Of Theodorus of Byzantium—to be distinguished from another Theodorus, a rhetorician of Gadara, Quint. II 15. 21—see further in Speng. *Art. Script.* p. 98 seq.; Westermann, *Gesch. der Beredsamkeit*, § 30. 16, p. 40, § 68. 7, p. 140. Sauppe, *Fragm. Or. Att.* VIII, *Or. Att.* III 164, simply refers to Spengel's *Artium Scriptores*, and to his own tract in *Zimmerm. diurn. lit. antiq.* 1835, p. 406. [Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, I p. 253.]

§ 29. Top. XXVIII. The argument, ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, *significant names*: "which draws an inference from the signification of a name." Brandis. A dialectical topic akin to, but by no means identical with, this, (the one is confined to surnames, the other extends to all words in general,) occurs in Top. B 6, 112 a 32, to consider the derivation and signification of names with a view to applying them as suits the immediate purpose: which coincides more nearly with Cicero's topic, *quum ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur, quam Graeci ἐτυμολογίαν vocant* Top. VIII. 35 seq., than with the rhetorical form of it as it appears here; though both of the others may be regarded as including this special rhetorical application. But in the rhetorical treatise, the de Inv. II 9. 28, we have the same use of names (i. e. surnames) suggested as by Ari-

<sup>1</sup> In referring to this paper I take the opportunity of withdrawing all that I have said in p. 286, ἡ πρότερον Θεόδωρου τέχνη, and the illustration from Carcius. It is sufficiently corrected in the note on this section.



stotle: *Nam et de nomine nonnumquam aliquid suspicionis nascitur... ut si dicamus idcirco aliquem Caldum vocari, quod temerario et repentino consilio sit.*

Quintilian, v 10. 30, 31, thinks that an argument can seldom be drawn from a surname, except in the case of such significant names as are assigned for a reason, as *Sapiens* (Cato and Laelius), *Magnus* (Pompey), and *Plenus* (?): or where the name is not significant, but suggests a crime—as the name Cornelius, in the case of Lentulus, was suggestive of conspiracy (for a reason there given). The use of the name recommended by Aristotle's topic (which he does not mention) is pronounced, in the case of Euripides—who represents Eteocles as attacking the name of his brother Polynices, πολὺν νεῖκος, *ut argumentum morum*—as insipid and tasteless, *frigidum*. It is however 'a frequent material for jokes; especially in the hands of Cicero, who freely employs it, as in the case of Verres'. The passage of Euripides referred to, is Phoen. 636—7; Eteocles terminates the altercation with his brother with the two lines, *ἔξιθ' ἐκ χώρας· ἀληθῶς δ' ὄνομα Πολυνείκη πατὴρ ἔθετο σοι θεῖα προνοία νεϊκέων ἐπώνυμον*. With this use of significant names all readers of the Greek Tragic poets are familiar. It is not to be regarded in them as a mere play on words, but they read in the significant name the character or destiny of its bearer: and thus employed they have a true tragic interest. It is singular therefore that Elmsley, who had certainly studied the Greek dramatists with care and attention, should, on Bacch. 508, after citing a number of examples, end his note with this almost incredible observation, "Haec non modo ψυχρά sunt" (is the epithet borrowed from Quintilian?), "verum etiam tragicos malos fuisse grammaticos. Quid enim commune habent Ἀπόλλων et ἀπολλύναι praeter soni similitudinem?" And this is all that is suggested by Ajax's pathetic exclamation, *αἶ αἶ τίς ἄν ποτ' φεῖ' κ.τ.λ.* Soph. Aj. 430, and the rest! Elmsley has omitted Aesch. S. c. T. 658, *ἐπωρύμφ' δὲ κάρτα Πολυνείκη λέγω*, from his list; and Eur. Antiope, Fr. 1 (Dind., Wagner), and Fragn. 2, Ibid. Agath. Fragn. Thyest. 1 ap. Wagn. *Fr. Tr. Gr.* III 74. Add from other sources, Dante *Div. Com. Purg.* XIII. 109, *Savia non fui, avvegna che Sapia fossi chiamata*. Shaksp. *Rich. II.*, Act II. Sc. 1 73, Gaunt. *O how that name befits my composition! Old Gaunt indeed; and gaunt in being old*, &c. The king asks, *Can sick men play so nicely with their names?* No, is the reply, *misery makes sport to mock itself*, &c.: which is not a bad answer to Elmsley's objection. This tracing of the character or destiny in the name is particularly common in the Hebrew of the Old Test., as the well-known instance of Genesis xxvii. 36, 'Is not he rightly named Jacob? for he hath supplanted me these two times.' The practice, which seems to be a suggestion of nature itself, is thus shewn to have prevailed in various times, nations and languages.

The line of Soph. is from his Tyro, Fragn. 1 (Fr. Soph. 563), Dind. Sidero, Tyronis noverca: Fragn. IX, Wagn. *Fragn. Trag. Gr.* II 413, "Egredie Brunck. versum huc rettulit, quo haud dubie Sideronis crudelitas in Tyronem exagituratur." On the Tragedy and its contents, Wagner u. s. p. 410. Victorius and Gaisford cite Eustath. ad Il. A p. 158, et ad Il. Γ 379 = 287. 35, καὶ εἰσὶν ἀληθῶς φεράνυμα τὸ σίντιες οἱ παρ' Ὀμήρῳ... ὥς...

καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις εἰώθασι λέγειν, καὶ p. 104.  
ὡς Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκάλει, καὶ  
Ἡρόδικος Θρασύμαχον. “αἰὲ θρασύμαχος εἶ,” καὶ  
Πῶλον “αἰὲ σὺ πῶλος εἶ,” καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομο-  
θέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος.

κατὰ τὴν παροιμιαζομένην Σιδηρῶ θρασείαν ἐκείνην γυναῖκα, φοροῖεν τὸ οἰκίον  
ὄνομα. In the second passage the latter part of this is repeated.

καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις] “Fortasse intelligit iis nominibus vocari  
eos tunc solitos quae vim et potestatem eorum declararent.” Victorius.  
It may perhaps refer to the ‘significant names’ derived from their attri-  
butes or occupations, by which deities are designated, and which as  
special distinctions would naturally occur in the hymns addressed to  
them. These may sometimes be substituted for their proper names,  
and may furnish *arguments of praise*.

The Conon and Thrasybulus here mentioned are doubtless, as may  
be inferred from the absence of any special designation, *the* Conon, the  
victor of Cnidus (394 B. C.), and *the* Thrasybulus, the expeller of the  
Thirty and restorer of the *demos* in 403: though there are several others  
bearing both of these names in Sauppe’s *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* III.  
pp. 63, 4, 81, 2. Thrasybulus is named by Demosth., de Cor. § 219, as  
one of the most distinguished orators among his predecessors, together  
with Callistratus, Aristophon, and Cephalus; the two first of these we  
have had mentioned in the Rhetoric. In de F. L. § 320, he is called τοῦ  
δημοτικοῦ (the popular Thrasybulus, the people’s friend, καὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ Φυλῆς  
καταγαγόντος τὸν δῆμον. Conon and he were contemporaries. Conon  
died soon after 392 B. C., Clinton, *F. H. sub anno* 388. 3, Thrasybulus,  
“perhaps in the beginning of B. C. 389.” Ib. *sub anno* 390. His name,  
according to Conon, fitly represented the *rashness* of his *counsels* and  
character. Grote, *H. G.* IX 509 [chap. LXXV.], in describing the charac-  
ter of Thrasybulus, omits to notice this.

In like manner the name of Thrasymachus, the rhetorician, is signi-  
ficant of the *hardihood* and *pugnacity* which were combined in his char-  
acter. The sketch given of him in the first book of Plato’s Republic is  
in exact correspondence with this. “Always true to your name,” rash  
and combative, said Herodicus to him, doubtless provoked by some  
rudeness of the Sophist in the course of a dialectical disputation. There  
were two Herodicuses, both physicians; see note on I 5.10. Doubtless  
this again is the *better known* of the two, Herodicus of Selymbria in  
Thrace; of whose medical practice Plato gives an account, Rep. III  
406 A seq. In a similar dispute with Polus, another Sophist and Rhe-  
torician, (whose character, in perfect agreement with this, is likewise  
sketched by Plato in his Gorgias, where he is said to be νέος καὶ ὀξύς<sup>1</sup>.)  
Herodicus again reminds him of the significance of his name, “Colt by

<sup>1</sup> [p. 463 E.] A very brief summary of the leading points of Polus’ character as  
he appears in the Gorgias, is given amongst the ‘dramatis personae’ of the Introd.  
to transl. of Gorg. p. lxxvii.

χαλεποὶ γάρ. καὶ ὡς ἡ Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβη εἰς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην

καὶ τοῦνομ' ὀρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἄρχει θεᾶς,  
καὶ ὡς Χαιρήμων

Πενθεὺς ἐσομένης συμφορᾶς ἐπώνυμος.

30 εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκ-  
τικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἐναν-

name and colt by nature<sup>1</sup>." And lastly this inveterate punster applies the same process to 'Dracon the legislator', declaring 'that his laws were not those of a man, but of a *dragon*; so cruel were they'. Aristotle, Pol. II 12 *sub finem*, says of Draco's laws, that they had nothing peculiar, but ἡ χαλεπότης, διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας μέγεθος. Nearly every offence was made punishable with death. Hence Demades said of them that they "were written not in ink, but in blood." Plut. Sol. 17. Tzetzes, Chil. 5, line 342 sqq. ap. Sauppe, Fragm. Demad. 17, *Orat. Att.* III 316; Grote, *H. G.* III 202 [chap. x.], whence our *Draconian* legislation.

The verse that follows is from Eur.'s Troades 990, where Hecuba is answering Helen, who had been arguing the invincible power of Love. "All follies are to mortals Aphrodite" (are attributed by men to this passion, 'take the form of Aphrodite' in their fancy), 'and rightly does the goddess' name begin the word *ἀφροσύνη*.' Ἀφροδίτη and Ἀφροσύνη have the first half of the word in common.

Πενθεύς, κ.τ.λ.] 'Pentheus that bearest the name of thy future fortune'. Comp. Bacch. 367 and 508, and Theocr. Id. XXVI. 26, ἐξ ὄρεος πένθημα καὶ οὐ Πενθῆα φέρουσai.

Probably from Chaeremon's Dionysus, quoted three times in Athenaeus (Elms. ad Eur. Bacch. 508), and also probably, like the Bacchae, on the story of Pentheus. Chaeremon's fondness for flowers and the vegetable creation in general, noticed by Athen. XIII. 608 D, appears throughout the fragments preserved. See *infra* III 12. 2 where he is spoken of as ἀκριβής, ὥσπερ λογογράφος, on which see note in *Introd.* ad loc. p. 325.

On Chaeremon see Müller *Hist. Gr. Lit.* XXVI 6, and the Art. in Smith's *Dict. Biogr.* s.v. He is a poet whose plays are more suited for reading than acting, ἀναγνωστικός, Rhet. III u. s. He is quoted again by Ar. Probl. III 16. In Poet. I 12, his Centaur is spoken of as a μικτὴ ῥαψῳδία, on the import of which see the two writers above referred to; and in Poet. 24. 11, this blending of heterogeneous elements is again alluded to. See also Meineke, *Hist. Crit. Com. Gr.* p. 517 seq. Chaeremon is one of those who have been erroneously included amongst the Comic poets. Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.* III 127—147. Clint. *F. H.* Vol. II. *Introd.* p. xxxii.

<sup>1</sup> This most ingenious rendering was given by Dr Thompson, then Greek Professor, in a lecture delivered Feb. 6, 1854. [*Introd.* to ed. of Gorg. p. v.]

τίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παρ' ἄλληλα δὲ φανερά εἶναι τῷ ἀκροατῇ μᾶλλον. πάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλεγκτικῶν καὶ τῶν δεικτικῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα ἀρχόμενα προορώσι μὴ τῷ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι (ἅμα γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς χαίρουσι προαισθανόμενοι), καὶ ὅσων τοσοῦτον ὑστερίζουσιν ὥσθ' ἅμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν.

§ 30. The chapter concludes with two observations on enthymemes in general. First, 'Enthymemes of refutation are more popular and applauded than those of demonstration, because the former is a *conclusion of opposites*' (the def. of ἔλεγχος; see Introd. p. 262, note 1) 'in a small space (or narrow compass), and things are always made clearer to the listener by being placed side by side (close together, so as to admit of immediate comparison)'. This is repeated in nearly the same words, III 17. 13.

'But of all syllogisms destructive or constructive, such are most applauded as those of which the results are at once (at the very beginning, of the argument) foreseen: not because they are superficial (ἐπιπολῆς, I 15. 22, note ad loc., II 16 1)—for they (the hearers 'are pleased themselves also with themselves at the same time') are pleased (not only with the speaker and his enthymeme, but) with themselves also (ἅμα) for their sagacity in anticipating the conclusion: (and therefore they *don't* think it superficial)—and those which they are only just so far behind—which they can so nearly keep pace with—as to understand them (step by step) as they are delivered'.

ἅμα εἰρημένων] On this genitive, see note on II 8 11. [For the sense, compare III 10. 4.]

#### CHAP. XXIV.

In the preceding chapter a selection has been given of the topics or special classes of enthymemes which are most appropriate and serviceable in the practice of Rhetoric: and these are τὰ ὄντα ἐνθυμήματα, c. 24. 11, ult., sound, genuine, logical inferences. But besides these there are, in Rhetoric as well as Dialectics, arguments apparent but not real, fallacious, illogical, which are often employed to mislead and deceive. Now, although we are to abstain from the use of these ourselves, οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν, I 1. 12, it is necessary for the rhetorician to be thoroughly acquainted with them, in order to detect them in others and to refute any unfair reasoning which may be employed against him, (ibidem): and so vindicate the superiority of truth and right to falsehood and wrong. And accordingly we have in the following chapter a selection of the most prominent rhetorical fallacies, and in c. 25 the solution of them; corresponding respectively to the two parts of the de Soph. El. (cc. 1—15; 16, to the end), which in like manner is appended as a sequel to the Topics in which is expounded and illustrated the genuine and artistic method of the employment of the dialectical syllogism. On Fallacies in

general, see Grote's *Plato, Euthydemus*, Vol. I. c. xix [Grote's *Aristotle* c.x.] and J. S. Mill, *System of Logic*, Vol. II. Bk. v. Whately, *Logic*, ch. v.

In the Topics, (de Soph. El.) c. 4; 165 b 23, fallacious arguments are classified under two heads, *παρὰ τὴν λέξιν*, fallacies of language, *verbal*, and *ἔξω τῆς λέξεως*, non-verbal, beyond the sphere of, not dependent upon mere words; *logical* fallacies. "Alterum vitium positum est in prava verborum interpretatione (*wort-verdrehung*), alterum in falsa argumentatione (*schluss-fehler*)." Waitz ad loc. 165 b 23. *ἔξω τῆς λέξεως*, *die "welche in den ausdruck ihren grund nicht haben."* Brandis, u. s. [*Philologus*, IV i] p. 20. "Fallacies in the words, and fallacies in the matter," Whately, *Logic*, ch. v. On Fallacies, § 1. Verbal fallacies are six in number: (1) *ὁμωνυμία*, equivocal, ambiguous, *terms*, *τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον*; (2) *ἀμφιβολία*, *general* ambiguity in *language*, ambiguous *expressions*, "ambiguous *propositions*," Poste; (these two may be distinguished as here; or, as in Poet. XXV 21, identified, under the one general term *ἀμφιβολία*, 'ambiguity in expression': in the explanation of them, Top. u. s. 166 a 14 seq., we have ἡ ὁ λόγος the proposition, or combination of words, ἡ τοῦ νομα, the single word, the *ὁμώνυμον*); (3) *σύνθεσις* and (4) *διαίρεσις*, explained and illustrated Top. *ibid.* 166 a 22—38, illicit combination and separation of words; (5) *προσφθία*, accent, pronunciation—which is of more use in criticising written composition, especially poetry; in Dialectics, where there is no written text, *ἀνευ γραφῆς*, it is of little or none. *Ibid.* b 1; and (6th and last), *παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως*, 'in figura dictionis', Waitz, fallacies or ambiguities, arising from the confusion of (assuming the apparent for the real,) different categories—"categories, that is, in their *grammatical* acceptation, as predicates, or a classification of the parts of speech; when, owing to similarity of (grammatical) form, a thing is referred to the wrong category" (Waitz, note ad loc.). And as this difference of categorical predication is expressed in the *termination* of words, it may be otherwise represented as "a similarity (or identity) of termination," which leads to fallacy (Poste, Transl. of de Soph. El.). Thus the termination *-ειν* (which marks the infinitive of a verb) in *ὕγιαίνειν* implies 'some quality or disposition of a thing', (as we say, it is a *neuter* verb), i. e. belongs to the category of *ποιότης ἔχειν*: in *τέμνειν* or *οἰκοδομεῖν*, it implies action, *ποιεῖν*; i. e. it is an active verb; belongs to the category of *ποιεῖν*. Similarly from a masculine noun with a feminine termination, or the reverse, and a neuter with either one or the other; *Ibid.* b 10—19, "*falsche grammatische form.*" Brandis, u. s. p. 22.

Of these, accent, division (probably including the opposite), and *ἀμφιβολία*, including *ὁμωνυμία*, are illustrated from the poets in Poet. XXV 18—20. There is a fourth, § 21, *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως*, which may be brought under the more general topic of the dialectical treatise, *παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως*.

Of these dialectical topics four are transferred to Rhetoric: *ὁμωνυμία*, including *ἀμφιβολία*, § 2; and *σύνθεσις* and *διαίρεσις*, together, as one topic, § 3. *σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως*, § 2, stands for a *fallacy of language* quite different to that which bears its name in the Topics. The difference is explained in the note on § 2.

Fallacies *ἔξω τῆς λέξεως*, in the Topics are seven. (1) *παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός*, from the confusion of subject and accident; (2) of absolute

- 1 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμον, τὸν δὲ μὴ εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐνθύμημα, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἐπεὶ-  
2 περ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις. τόποι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων εἰς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν

(ἀπλῶς) and particular or qualified (κατὰ τι, or πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρὸς τι) statements; (3) ἐλέγχου ἀγνοία, *ignoratio elenchi*, "an inadequate notion of confutation," Poste, "inscitiae eorum quae ad redarguendum pertinent," Waitz; (4) τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν, *petitio principii*, begging the question, assuming the thing to be proved; (5) τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι, "in ratione non recte reddita," Waitz, the assumption of not-cause for cause; (6) παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, the assumption that antecedent and consequent are always and reciprocally convertible: that if B follows A, A must follow B. (The order of these two last is inverted in the explanation; 167 δ 1 and 21.) (7) τὸ τὰ δύο ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν, to put two (or more) questions as one, 'when it escapes observation that the question is not one but several, and one answer is returned, as though it were one'. De Soph. El. c. 5, 166 δ 20—27, where there is a summary enumeration of them; and to the end of the chapter, 168 α 16, where they are explained at length and exemplified.

Of these (1) § 6 (these two are the same only in name; see on § 6); (2) §§ 9, 10; (5) § 8; and (6) § 7, occur also in the Rhetoric. ἐκ σημείου, § 5, falls under the head of τὰ ἐπόμενα; de Soph. El. 167 δ 8, ἐν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσὶν. The remaining three (3) (4) (7), are found only in the dialectical treatise. Brandis, u. s. p. 22, expresses his surprise at the omission of these three, and thinks that it argues the later date of the de Soph. El.; though of the priority of the Topics there can be no doubt. Vahlen, *Trans. Acad. Vien.* Oct. 1861, p. 134, pronounces this to be very doubtful; and proceeds to argue in favour of the earlier date of composition for both treatises. Besides these we have the purely rhetorical topic of δεινώσις, aggravation, exaggeration, § 4. The paradox or fallacy, εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, or ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός, and also τὸ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, both come under the head of παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, No. (2), § 10.

§ 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνδέχεται] 'But seeing that besides the (real, genuine) syllogism there may be another, which has only the semblance, not the reality of it; so in the case of the enthymeme, there must necessarily be two corresponding kinds, one real and the other not real, but only apparent, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism', conf. I 1.11. The enthymeme is a syllogism incomplete in form. See Introd. p. 103, note 1.

§ 2. 'Topics of unreal enthymemes are, first, the fallacy that arises from the language' (παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, as Victorius also notes, is *not* 'against', but 'along of', Arnold's Thuc. I 141. 9; like *diá*, 'arising from', 'shewn in', as παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, § 2, παρὰ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, §§ 3, 9); 'and of this one part (sort or kind),—as in dialectics, to omit or evade the syllogistic process (that is, to assume without proof) and then in the terms of a syllogistic conclusion to state the result, "therefore it is *not* so and so

λέξιν, καὶ τούτου ἐν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δια- P. 1401.  
λεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερασματικῶς  
τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη ἄρα  
τὸ καὶ τό. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι<sup>1</sup> τὸ συνεστραμ-

<sup>1</sup> τὸ καὶ τό, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι (Vahlen).

(the conclusion of an *ἔλεγχος* or syllogism of refutation of an opponent's thesis) or, *therefore* necessarily so and so follows" (conclusion of a demonstrative, constructive, syllogism);—*so* in enthymemes (Rhetoric) the enunciation of a concise, condensed, well-rounded or turned, periodic' (συνεστραμμένως, Plat. Protag. 342 E: on ἡ κατεστραμμένη λέξις, Introd. p. 308 seq. on III 9. 3) 'and antithetical sentence passes for an enthymeme'. The *completeness* in the structure of the period, which "like a circle returns into itself", its carefully balanced members, and its antithetical epigrammatic character, have the effect of an argument and supply to the deluded listener the lacking proof. The force of the antithesis and epigram in conversation and discussion is too well known to need further illustration. I have followed Vahlen, who has discussed this sentence at length in his paper, already referred to, *zur kritik Arist. Schrift.* (Trans. Acad. Vien. Oct. 1861, pp. 136—8), in removing the full-stop at τὸ καὶ τό and reading καὶ ἐν for καὶ τό: or perhaps the simple omission of τό would be sufficient. He apologises for the anacoluthon, and the repetition of ἐνθύμημα at the end of the sentence, and proposes two expedients for getting rid of them; unnecessarily as it seems to me: accepting the two alterations, as I have done, the sense is perfect, and the expression of it quite in character with the author's hasty and careless style. I pass over the attempted explanations of Vater and others. Victorius has given the sense correctly, though his interpretation does not adhere closely to *his* text. Bekker and Spengel leave the passage unaltered.

The words of de Soph. El. 15, 174 b 8 (comp. 18, 176 b 32), τὸ μάλιστα σοφιστικὸν συκοφάνημα τῶν ἐρωτῶντων, τὸ μηδὲν συλλογισαμένους μὴ ἐρώτημα ποιεῖν τὸ τελευταῖον, ἀλλὰ συμπεραντικῶς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συλλελογισμένους, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, present an unusually close correspondence in word as well as sense with this parallel passage of the Rhetoric: few I think will agree with Brandis in supposing the dialectical treatise to be the later of the two compositions.

'For such a style'—this condensed and antithetical, *periodic*, style, the style of Demosthenes and Isocrates,—'is the proper seat of enthymeme'. χώρα the region or district, *sedes*, where enthymemes are to be found; their haunt or habitat: precisely like τόπος, *locus*, on which see Introd. pp. 124, 5, and the quotations from Cic. and Quint. So Victorius, "*sedes et tanquam regio enth.*" It cannot possibly be 'form', as Vahlen renders it, (if I do not misunderstand him,) u. s., p. 137, *die dem Enth. eigenthümliche Form*.

With the statement compare III 9. 8, of antithesis, ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις, ...καὶ ὅτι ἔοικε συλλογισμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν. III 18. 4, τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν δεῖ.

'A fallacy of this kind seems to arise from the fashion of' (the style

μένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος. καὶ ἔοικε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. ἔστι δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δ' ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δ' Ἑλλήνας ἡλευθέρωσεν· ἕκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐξ ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίνεσθαι. ἐν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὡς τὸ p. 105. φάναι σπουδαῖον εἶναι μῦν, ἀφ' οὗ γ' ἐστὶν ἡ τιμιω-

of) 'language used', (i. e. the periodical and antithetical construction of the sentences). Such I think *must* be the interpretation of *σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως*, though it differs *in toto* from the signification of the phrase in Top. (de Soph. El.) 4, 166 b 10, the 6th of the verbal fallacies (see above). Vahlen, u. s., points out this difference, which is sufficiently obvious. Nevertheless Victorius identifies them. Both of them may no doubt be referred to the head of fallacies of language—in its most general sense; but the dialectical topic is a mistake or misuse of the termination of single words, involving a confusion of categories; the rhetorical is an *abuse of language* in a totally different application.

'For the purpose of conveying by the language the appearance of syllogistic reasoning it is serviceable to recite (enumerate) the heads (of the results) of many syllogisms (previous trains of reasoning); "some he saved, and on the others he took vengeance, and the Greeks he set at liberty": (this is from Isocr. Evag. §§ 65—9, as Spengel has pointed out, *Tract. on Rhet.* in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 22 note. Aristotle has gathered into these three *heads* of the contents of Isocr.'s five sections. The person of whom this is said is of course Evagoras, the hero of the declamation. The same speech has been already referred to, II 23. 12): 'for each of these points was already proved from something else, but when they are put together, it seems as if some additional (καὶ) conclusion might be drawn from them'.

κεφάλαια] heads of arguments, in a summary or recapitulation. Plat. Tim. 26 c. Dem. Olynth. I § 23 and the foll., de Symmor. § 11, κεφάλαια τῆς δυνάμεως, followed by the enumeration of them. De falsa leg. § 315, ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων.

ἐν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν] The second topic of verbal fallacies: probably including the dialectical ἀμφιβολία, 'ambiguous propositions', fallacies of language which are not *confined to single terms*. 'One (fallacious argument) arising from verbal ambiguity; as to say that a mouse is a thing of worth (a worthy and estimable creature)—from it at least the most valued (esteemed) of all religious rites is derived; for the mysteries are of all religious rites most esteemed'. This is taken beyond all doubt from Polycrates' panegyrical declamation, 'the Encomium of



τάτῃ πασῶν τελετῇ· τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμιω-  
τάτῃ τελετῇ. ἢ εἴ τις κύνα ἐγκωμιάζων τὸν ἐν τῷ  
οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνει ἢ τὸν Πάνα, ὅτι Πίνδαρος  
ἔφησεν

ὦ μάκαρ, ὃν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπὸν  
καλέουσιν Ὀλύμπιοι.

ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύνα ἀτιμώτατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε

mice', referred to in § 6: see the note there. The ambiguity from which the fallacious inference is drawn is of course the assumed derivation from *μῦς* instead of *μύειν*. If mysteries are *derived from* mice, how great must be the honour due to the little animal. See Whately, *Logic*, ch. v. § 8, on ambiguous middle.

τελετῇ] is a religious rite, and specially rites into which initiation enters as a preparation—mysteries; sometimes initiation alone. Athen. B. 12, p. 40 D, τελετὰς καλοῦμεν τὰς ἐτι μείζους καὶ μετὰ τινος μυστικῆς παραδόσεως ἑορτάς. Suidas, s. v., θυσία μυστηριώδης ἢ μεγίστη καὶ τιμιωτέρα. Hesychius, τελεταί· ἑορταί, θυσίαι, μυστήρια. Photius, θυσία μυστηριώδης. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Lib. II § 8, Vol. I p. 304. *Mystic rites*, (Arist. Ran. 1032, Dem. c. Aristog. § 11,) ascribed to Orpheus. Comp. Plat. Rep. II. 635 A, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσίων καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μὲν ἐτι ζώσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἱ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς· μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει. This is said of the Orphic and Musaeus rites and mysteries and initiation into them, but will apply equally to the Eleusinian, and all others which had the same object and character. Comp. Protag. 316 D [and Isocr. Paneg. § 28].

'Or if one in the encomium of a dog takes into the account the dog in heaven (the *dog-star*)'. κύων, as the star Sirius, the herald of the dog-days in summer, Hom. Il. XXII 27—29, ἀστὲρ...ὃν τε κύν' Ὀρίωνος ἐπικλησιν καλέουσιν. Dem. c. Lacrit. § 13, Arist. Hist. An. VIII 15. 9, ἐπὶ κυνί, et alibi, as a mark of the season, like the Pleiads; also ὑπὸ κύνα, μετὰ κύνα, περὶ κύνα, Arist. Theophr. al. *Canis, canicula*, Hor. Od. III 13. 9; Ep. I 10. 16. Virg. Georg. I 218, Ovid, &c.

'Or Pan, because Pindar called him "the mighty mother (Cybele)'s manifold dog"'. Pindar, Parthenia, Fragm. 6. "Pan optime in illo carmine audiebat, quo ante Magnae Matris, ubi eius statua, celebrabatur." Böckh, ad Fragm. Pind., *Op.* II. 594. By 'Cybele's dog' Pindar meant her faithful and constant attendant. This *metaphor* is converted by some panegyrist of the animal into an *argument* in his favour, as if the god Pan were *really* a distinguished member of that fraternity<sup>1</sup>.

ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα κ.τ.λ.] The meaning of this is obscure. Victorius, merely observing that this is another fallacious inference as to the value of a dog, candidly admits that he cannot explain it. Schrader under-

<sup>1</sup> Can the term 'dog' be applied to Pan, in reference to his character of *ovium custos*, (Virg. Georg. I 17,) as a shepherd's dog? I suppose not.

τὸ κύνα δηλον ὅτι τίμιον. καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν φάναι τὸν Ἑρμῆν εἶναι μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν· μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς. καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οὐ χρημάτων ἀλλὰ

stands it thus: "ne canem quidem in domo ali sordidum est. Ergo canem esse honorificum est." He goes on to say that the equivocation lies in the double meaning of κύων, *dog* and *Cynic*<sup>1</sup>. "Cynici enim philosophi Canes appellabantur, qui hac fallacia cognomen istud suum ornare poterant." The argument is, 'To have no dog at all is the highest disgrace' (would this be accepted as *probable*?); 'therefore to be a dog (in another sense, a Cynic,) is plainly a mark of distinction.'

'And to say that Hermes is the most liberal' (communicative of good things to others (so Schrader); or 'sociable', communicative of himself, *superis deorum gratus et imis*), 'of all the gods; for he alone goes by the name of *Common* Hermes'. The latter of the two interpretations of κοινωνικόν seems to be right, from the comparison of Polit. III 13, 1283 a 38, where justice is said to be a κοινωνικὴ ἀρετή, ἥ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας. *Eine der bürgerlichen gesellschaft wesentliche tugend*, i. e. social, (Stahr). The fallacy lies in transferring the *special* signification of κοινὸς in the proverb, and applying it in a *general* sense to the character of the god.

κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς] Hermes is the god of 'luck', to whom all ἔρμαα, wind-falls, lucky finds, pieces of good fortune, are due. When a man finds anything, as a coin which has been dropt in the street, his companion immediately puts in a claim to 'go halves', with the proverbial "Common Hermes", i. e. luck is common, I am entitled to share with you. Theophr. Char. XXX, καὶ εὐρισκομένων χαλκῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων δεινὸς (ὁ αἰσχροκερδὴς) ἀπαιτῆσαι τὸ μέρος, κοινὸν εἶναι φήσας τὸν Ἑρμῆν. Hesychius, κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῇ τε εὐρισκόντων. Plutarch, Phil. esse cum princ. c. 2, ἀλλ' ἀμουσίᾳ καὶ ἀπειροκαλίᾳ τὸν κοινὸν Ἑρμῆν ἐμπόλαιον καὶ ἔμμισθον γενέσθαι (apud Erasmi. *Adag.* Liberalitas, 'Communis Mercurius', p. 1144, ed. 1599), the god of gain, profit, luck, has ceased to be as of old *common* and liberal, and has taken to commerce and mercenary habits. Lucian, Navig. § 12; Adimantus had spoken of some golden visions, to which Lycinus replies, οὐκοῦν τὸ προχειρότατον τοῦτο, κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς, φασί, καὶ ἐς μέσον κατατίθει φέρων τὸν πλοῦτον (let me, as the proverb κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς has it, share your wealth), ἄξιον γὰρ ἀπολαύσαι τὸ μέρος φίλους ὄντας. To be κοινὸς in this latter sense does not entitle a man or god to the epithet κοινωνικός.

'And, to prove that words' (speech, rhetoric; this is probably taken from an encomium on the art) 'are a most excellent, valuable thing; for the reason that the proper reward of good men is, not money, but λόγος (in the double sense of 'words', and 'consideration, estimation'; λόγος ποιεῖσθαι (εἶχειν) τινός, ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ εἶναι, et similia passim); 'for λόγος

<sup>1</sup> On this name as applied to Antisthenes, compare the epigram in Diog. Laert. VI 1. 10, which interprets it thus, τὸν βίον ἦσθα κύων, Ἀντισθένης, ὥδε πεφυκώς ὥστε δακεῖν κραδίην ῥήμασιν οὐ στόμασιν, and to Diogenes, VI 2.

λόγου εἰσὶν ἄξιοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἀπλῶς  
3 λέγεται. ἄλλος τὸ διηρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ  
τὸ συγκεείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταῦτόν δοκεῖ  
εἶναι οὐκ ὄν ταῦτόν πολλακίς, ὁπότερον χρησιμώτε-  
ρον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λό-  
γος. οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐν Πειραιεὶ ἐστίν·

*ἄξιον* is an ambiguous, equivocal expression' (is used in more than one sense).

§ 3. *σύνθεσις* and *διαίρεσις*, 'wrong (fallacious) combination, composition, and disjunction, separation, in reading or speaking', which are here taken together as one form of fallacy, are two in *de Soph. El.* c. 4, 165 b 26, 1b. 166 a 22, and 33. The solution of them is given in c. 20, where "Euthydemus' argument" is also referred to, and thence no doubt transferred hither.

'Another is, to pronounce in combination what is (properly, or is intended to be) separated, or the reverse, the combined as separate: for since it seems to be the same either way (when combined or separated, and it is in this appearance, and the advantage taken of it, that the fallacy lies), whichever of the two happens to be more serviceable, *that* must be done'. *δεῖ* does not here imply a moral obligation; it is not intended to recommend the practice; the only obligation is that which is imposed by the art; *if* you want to avail yourself of this unfair mode of reasoning (which I don't say I approve, I am only stating what the art requires), this is the way to proceed.

'This is Euthydemus' argument. For instance to know that a trireme is in the Piræus, because he knows each (of two things which are here omitted)'. This example, which is unintelligible as it stands here, has some further light (or obscurity) thrown on it by the form in which it occurs in *de Soph. El.* c. 20, 177 b 12, *καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δι' λόγος, ἄρ' οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὐσας ἐν Πειραιεὶ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὄν;* but in both much is left to be supplied, the argument alluded to being supposed to be well known, and in every one's recollection. Schrader thus fills up the argument:—What you know, you know in the Piræus—where the two disputants were standing—this is admitted: but you know also that there are triremes: this also is conceded, because the respondent knows that the Athenians have triremes somewhere; out at sea, or in Sicily, (referring to the expedition of 415 B.C.): whence the conclusion, you know that there are triremes in the Piræus. The illicit combination (*σύνθεσις*) in this interpretation—though Schrader does not explain it further—must lie in the conjunction of the Piræus with the knowledge of triremes, to which it does not belong in the respondent's interpretation of the question: and *ἕκαστον* will be 'each of these two pieces of knowledge, the knowledge of what is known in the Piræus, and of the triremes'. They are both known separately, Euthydemus illicitly combines them.

This seems to be a reasonable explanation of the example *so far as it is given in the Rhetoric*. But it seems quite certain that Aristotle is

ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. καὶ τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστά-  
μενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν.  
καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δις τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἐν φάναι  
ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἐν κακόν

quoting identically the same argument in de Soph. El. The triremes and the Piraeus appear in both, and both are styled Εὐθύδημου λόγος, the well-known argument of Euthydemus. Schrader, though he refers to the passage, takes no account of the words ἐν Σικελία ὧν, which it seems must have formed part of it. Victorius has endeavoured to combine both in his explanation of the fallacy—I am not at all sure that I understand it: I will therefore transcribe it in his own words *verbatim et litteratim*. “Tu scis te esse in Piraeo: quod concedebatur ipsi (the respondent), ac verum erat. Scis triremes Atheniensium esse in Sicilia (miserant enim eo classem ut eam insulam occuparent); id quoque non inficiabatur qui interrogatus erat. Tu scis igitur (aiebat ille) in Piraeo triremes esse, in Sicilia existens. Qua captione ipsum in Sicilia, scire triremes esse in Piraeo cogebatur; cum eo namque, scire in Piraeo, coniungebatur triremes esse: a quo remotum primo pronunciatum fuerat: ab illo vero, in Sicilia, cum quo copulatum editum primo fuerat, disiungebatur: atque ita efficiebatur ipsum, in Sicilia cum esset, scire in Piraeo triremes esse. Quod vero hic adiungit ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν: separatim scilicet utrunque nosse intelligit, se in portu Atheniensium tunc esse: triremesque item in Sicilia. E quorum conglutinatione fallax ratio conflata, quae inde vocata est παρὰ σύνθεσιν.” By this must be meant, that the two statements, existence or knowledge in the Piraeus, and knowledge of triremes in Sicily, which ought to be kept separate, are combined in one statement, and hence the fallacy: true separately, they are not true together. Whether this is a satisfactory version of Euthydemus’ fallacy I fear I must leave it to others to decide. My principal difficulty is as to the mode of transition from the Piraeus to Sicily in the two first propositions, which as far as I can see is not satisfactorily accounted for. What is there to connect the ‘knowing that you are in the Piraeus’, or ‘knowing in the Piraeus’, with knowing or being in Sicily? And yet there must be some connexion, apparent at least if not real, to make the fallacy plausible. This is nevertheless Alexander’s solution of it. Comm. ad Top. 177 b 12, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἡρώτα ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐν Πειραιεὶ τυγχάνων, ὅτε αἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τριῆρεις εἰς Σικελίαν ἦλθον. ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοῦ σοφίσματος ἀγωγή τοιαύτη. “ἀρα γε σὺ νῦν ἐν Πειραιεὶ εἶ; ναί. ἀρ’ οἶδας ἐν Σικελίᾳ τριῆρεις οὐσας; ναί. ἀρα οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὐσας ἐν Πειραιεὶ τριῆρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὧν;” παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὸ σοφίσμα. However this may be, at any rate, if Plato’s dialogue is to be trusted, there is no kind of fallacy however silly, transparent, and contemptible, of which Euthydemus and his partner were incapable; and the weight of authority, notwithstanding the utter want of sense, must decide us to accept this explanation.

Of Euthydemus, and his brother and fellow-sophist Dionysodorus, contemporaries of Socrates, nearly all that we know is derived from Plato’s Euthydemus. They had studied and taught the art military,

ἔστιν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐλεγκτικόν, ὥδε δὲ δεικτικόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν ἀγαθὸν δύο κακά. ὅλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός. πάλιν τὸ Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ὅτι τριάκοντα τυράννους κατέλυσεν· συν-

and the forensic branch of Rhetoric, Euthyd. 273, C. D, before entering at an advanced age upon their present profession, viz. that of ἐριστική, the art of sophistical disputation, and of universal confutation, by which they undertook to reduce any opponent whatsoever to silence. Many examples of their mode of arguing are given in the Platonic dialogue, but Aristotle's instance does not appear among them. See also Grote's Plato, on Euthydemus, Vol. I., ch. xix. The fallacies are exemplified from the dialogue, p. 545 seq. And on Euthydemus and his brother, also Stallbaum's Disp. de Euth. Plat. prefixed to his edition of the dialogues, p. 10 seq. (Ed. 1).

An example of illicit combination is given in the περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, the treatise on the proposition or elementary combination of words, c. 11, p. 20 b 35, ἀλλ' οὐχί, εἰ σκυτεὺς καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ σκυτεὺς ἀγαθός. εἰ γάρ, ὅτι ἐκότερον ἀληθές, εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τὸ συνάμφω, πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ἔσται.

'Another example is that one that knows the letters, knows the whole verse; for the verse is the same thing (as the letters, or elements, of which it is composed)'. The reason given, τὸ ἕπος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν, contains the fallacy. It assumes that the things combined are the same as they are separate; which is not true.

'And (thirdly) to argue, that since twice a certain amount (of food or a drug) is unwholesome, so must also the single portion be: for it is absurd to suppose that if two things separately are good, they can when combined unite into one bad'. If the two parts together are unwholesome, neither of them can be wholesome separately, because the combination of two good things can never make one bad. This is a fallacious *confutation*; of a physician, may be, who is recommending the use of a drug. You say that your drug is wholesome: now you only administer a certain quantity. Suppose you were to double it, you would not say that it was wholesome *then*: but if the two parts together are unwholesome, how can either of them, the component elements being precisely the same in each, be wholesome? two wholesomes could never make an unwholesome. Here the undue combination of the double with the single part produces the fallacy (so Victorius).

'Used thus, it serves for refutation, but in the following way for proof (this is, by inverting the preceding): because one good thing cannot be (made up of) two bad'. If the whole is good, then the two parts, which is not always true. 'But the entire topic is fallacious': in whichever way it is applied (Victorius).

'And again, what Polycrates said in his encomium of Thrasybulus, that he put down thirty tyrants: for he puts them all together'. This again, which without further elucidation would not be altogether intelligible, is explained by two notices in Quintilian, III 6. 26, VII 4. 44.

As an illustration of the argument from number, he gives this, *An Thrasybulo triginta praemia debeantur, qui tot tyrannos sustulerit?*

τίθησι γάρ. ἡ τὸ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστη τῷ Θεοδέκτου ἐκ  
διαίρέσεως γάρ ἐστιν.

δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἢ τις ἂν κτείνῃ πόσιν,  
ἀποθνήσκειν ταύτην, καὶ τῷ πατρὶ γε τιμωρεῖν τὸν  
υἷόν· οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα πέπρακται· συντεθέντα γάρ P. 1401 b.  
ἴσως οὐκέτι δίκαιον. εἶη δ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν·  
4 ἀφαιρεῖται γάρ τὸ ὑπὸ τίνος. ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δει-  
νώσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευάζειν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν  
ὅταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι ἐποίησεν, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα·

Whence it appears that Polycrates had argued that he deserved thirty rewards for his services, one for each tyrant that he had expelled; an illicit combination. Spalding ad loc. III. 6, "Hoc videtur postulasse Polycrates, qui dixit:" quoting this passage. On Polycrates see § 6, *infra*.

'Or that in Theodectes' Orestes, for it is a fallacy of division: "It is just for her that slays her husband" to die, and for the son to avenge his father: and accordingly this is what has actually<sup>1</sup> been done: (but this is a fallacy) for it may be that when the two are combined, (the sum-total) is no longer just'. Orestes, being the son of her that had slain her husband, was no longer the right person to take vengeance on his murderer. On the use of οὐκέτι, the opposite of ἤδη, 'not now as before, in former cases', see note on I 1. 7, ἤδη, οὐπω, οὐκέτι.

On Theodectes of Phaselis, see note on II 23. 3, and the reff. Also compare the topic of that section with this example from his Orestes, which in all probability is there also referred to. This passage of Aristotle is cited by Wagner, *Fragm. Trag. Graec.* III 122, without comment, as the sole remaining specimen of Theodectes' Orestes.

'This may also be explained as the fallacy of omission; for the (person) by whom (the deed was done) is withdrawn'. Had it been stated 'by whom' the vengeance was inflicted, the *injustice* of it would have been apparent. It is stated generally, the particular circumstances which falsify the statement in this case being omitted. παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν is explained in § 9, τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, the omission of time and circumstances, which falls under the more general head of τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς, § 10, an unqualified, instead of qualified statement. It occurs also in § 7.

§ 4. 'Another topic (of fallacious reasoning) is exaggeration, δεινώσις'—especially the excitement of indignation contrasted with ἔλεος, II 21. 10, III 19. 3—in construction or destruction (of a thesis or argument). *Haec est illa quae δεινώσις vocatur: rebus indignis asperis, invidiosis, addens vim oratio.* Quint. VI 2. 24. Ernesti, *Lex. Technologiae Graecae*, s. v. ἀνασκευάζειν and κατασκευάζειν, are technical terms distinguishing the

<sup>1</sup> A<sup>c</sup> and three other MSS have οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πέπρακται. Spengel, ed. 1867, rightly puts the first in brackets and retains the second, which I have followed in the translation.

ποιεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς οὐ πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὔξη, ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν ὀργίζηται. οὐκ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐνθύμημα· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐ δεδειγμένον. ἄλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. οἶον εἴ τις λέγοι “ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστο-

two kinds of syllogisms and enthymemes, the destructive or refutative *ἐλεγκτικοί*, and the constructive or demonstrative *δεικτικοί*, *ἀποδεικτικοί*: as *κατασκευάζειν* is to *establish* something which you undertake to prove, and leads to a *positive* conclusion, so *ἀνασκευάζειν* or *ἀναιρεῖν* (a term of the same import) is to break down or destroy, upset, subvert, an adversary's thesis or conclusion, by refuting it, and so leads to a *negative* conclusion. *κατασκευαστικά* of *enthymeme*, II 26. 3.

‘This means to amplify, heighten, intensify, exaggerate (a species of the general topic *αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν*, amplification and depreciation, the fourth of the *κοινὸι τόποι*. *Introd.* p. 129, comp. II 26. 1), the fact or act alleged (usually a crime), without any proof of its having been committed: for it makes it appear, either that it has not been done’ (read *οὐ* for *οὕτε*, with Bekker and Spengel), ‘when the party accused (or inculpated) employs it; or that the accused is guilty when the accuser grows angry (works himself into a fit of virtuous indignation)’. This might seem to confine the topic to accusation and defence in the forensic branch, and no doubt it is in this that it is most useful and most usual; and also this is its most appropriate sphere as a fallacious *argument*: still as a species of one of the *κοινὸι τόποι* it must needs be applicable to the other two branches, and in fact in all invectives, and in epideictic oratory, it is essential. Its appropriate place in the speech is the *ἐπίλογος* or peroration, III 19. 1, 3.

‘Accordingly it is no (true) enthymeme, for the listener falsely concludes (assumes) the guilt or innocence (alleged) though neither of them has been proved’. This is of course a purely rhetorical topic.

§ 5. ‘Another fallacy is derived from the use of the ‘sign’: for this also leads to no real conclusion (*proves, demonstrates, nothing*). On the *sign* and its logical character and value, see *Introd.* pp. 161—3, and the paraphrases of *Rhet.* I 2. 15—18, *Ibid.* pp. 163—5.

In the *Topics*, fallacies from the sign are noticed as the form which fallacies of *consequence* assume in Rhetoric. *ἐν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσὶν.* De Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 8.

‘As for instance if one were to say, “Lovers are of service to states; for it was the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton that put down (put an end to) the tyranny of Hipparchus”’. This is a mere *apparent sign* or possible indication of a connexion between love and the putting down of tyranny: there is no *necessary consequence*; it is not a *τεκμήριον*, a conclusive sign, or indication: no general rule of connexion can be established between them, from which we might infer—without fallacy—

γείτονος ἔρως κατέλυσε τὸν τύραννον "Ἰππαρχον." ἢ εἰ τις λέγοι ὅτι κλέπτης Διονύσιος· πονηρὸς γάρ· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς πονηρὸς κλέπτης, ἀλλ' ὁ κλέπτης πᾶς πονηρός. 6 ἄλλος διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὁ λέγει Πολυκρά-

that the one would always, or for the most part, follow the other. Herein lies the difference between the dialectical *consequence* and the rhetorical *sign*. The converse of this—from the governor's point of view—is argued by Pausanias in Plato's Symp. 182 C. Οὐ γὰρ, οἶμαι, συμφέρει τοῖς ἀρχουσι...φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς καὶ κοινωσίας (ἐγγίνεσθαι)· ὁ δὲ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν. ἔργω δὲ τοῦτο ἔμαθον καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε τύραννοι· ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ Ἀρμολίου φιλία βέβαιος γενομένη κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν. Victorius.

‘Or again, if one were to say, (it is a sign) that Dionysius (Dionysius, like Socrates and Coriscus, usually, in Aristotle, here represents anybody, men in general) is a thief, because he is a bad man: for this again is incapable of demonstration; because every bad man is not a thief, though every thief is a bad man’. The consequence is not *convertible*. ‘Ὁ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολουθίην, (the fallacy in this topic arises from the assumed convertibility of the consequence), de Soph. El. 5, 167 b 1. In the uncertain *sign*, antecedent and consequent are never reciprocally convertible, the converse does *not* follow reciprocally, and therefore the sign is always liable to be fallacious. On the different kinds of consequences, see Anal. Pr. I c. 27, 43 b 6, seq.

§ 6. ‘Another, the fallacy of *accident*’. This is not the same fallacy as that which has the same name in the Topics, the first of the fallacies *ἔξω τῆς λέξεως*, de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 28; “Fallacies of accident are those that arise from the assumption that the same things are predicable alike of the thing itself (τὸ πρᾶγμα, i.e. the logical subject, τὸ ὑποκείμενον). For whereas the same subject has many accidents, it is by no means necessary that all that is predicable of the former should also be predicable of the latter.” White is an accident, or predicable, of the subject, man: it is by no means true that all that can be predicated of man can also be predicated of white. The confusion of these, the substitution of one for the other, gives rise to the fallacy. The example is the following:—A Sophist argues that because Socrates is not Coriscus, and Coriscus is a man, Socrates is not a man. Man is the subject, and Socrates and Coriscus are both predicates, attributes, or accidents of man. And if we substitute ‘name’ for ‘man’ in the proposition ‘Coriscus is a man’, the argument vanishes. But both the examples here are instances of accident for *cause*, and not for subject, which is no doubt a more suitable application of it for rhetorical purposes.

The first example is taken from Polycrates’ encomium on mice, quoted above without the name, § 2. One of his topics in praise of them was “the aid they lent by gnawing through the bow-strings.” Something similar to this is narrated by Herodotus, II 141 (Schrader), but the circumstances do not quite tally. Sennacherib king of the Arabians and



της εἰς τοὺς μῦς, ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι τιμιώ-  
τατον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμήνισε  
Assyria invaded Egypt with a great host, when Sethos the priest was king. The god appeared to him in a dream with promises of succour against the invaders. "A flood of field-mice poured over the enemy by night, which devoured their quivers and bows, and besides, the handles of their shields, so that on the following day, flying without arms, many of them fell," &c. At all events, wherever the incident was taken from, Polycrates meant to praise the mice for some *service* they had rendered by gnawing the bow-strings: now this service was a mere accident: their intention was, not to do service, but only to satisfy their appetite (Victorius). Polycrates' fallacy therefore consists in assigning as a *vera causa* what was only accidental. I do not see how this can be construed as a confusion of *subject* and accident. And so Victorius in his explanation; "quia quod casu evenit tamquam propter se fuisset sumitur<sup>1</sup>."

Of the declamations of Polycrates, who has been already twice mentioned or referred to, the most celebrated were the ἀπολογία Βουσίριδος, a paradoxical defence of Busiris a mythical king of Egypt, proverbial for inhumanity, *illaudatus Busiris*, Virg. Georg. III 4; and an equally paradoxical κατηγορία Σωκράτους, Isocr. Busir. § 4 (this speech is addressed to Polycrates). He was also famous for his declamations—paradoxical again—on mean and contemptible subjects, as mice, pots (χύτρας), counters, (Menander ap. Spengel, *Artium Scriptores*, p. 75,) which he employed his art in investing with credit and dignity. The *paradoxical*, παράδοξον, is one of the four kinds of ἐγκώμια, Menander περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν II 1. He may possibly have been the author of the similar declamations on 'salt' and 'humble bees', referred to, without the author's name, by Plat. Symp. 177 B, Isocr. Helen. § 12, Menand. περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν (*Rhet. Gr.* III 332. 26, ed. Spengel). Similar *paradoxical* declamations of Alcidas, τὸ τοῦ Θανάτου ἐγκώμιον, ἢ τὸ τῆς Πενίας, ἢ τοῦ Πρωτεύς τοῦ κυνός. Menand. περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν II 1 (*Rhet. Gr.* III p. 346). Quint. III 7. 28, *somni et mortis scriptae laudes, et quorundam a medicis ciborum*. It might have been supposed that these ingenious exercises were intended for burlesques, were it not that Aristotle by quoting *arguments* from them shews that they had a serious purpose. Further on Polycrates, see Spengel, *Artium Scriptores*, pp. 75, 6; Westermann, *Geschichte der Gr. u. R. Beredsamkeit*, § 50, 22; *Cambr. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX, Vol. III. p. 281 seq.

<sup>1</sup> This seems to be the true interpretation; Aristotle has here left it open by not defining the topic. But if this absence of defin. be understood as a tacit reference to the de Soph. El., and we desire to bring the examples here into conformity with the explanation of the topic there, we may understand τὸ πρᾶγμα in that passage, not as the logical subject, but as 'thing' in general, and say that the fallacy of the examples in the Rhetoric lies in the substitution of a mere accident for the *thing* in question, i.e. the real thing, the reality; as in that of the mice, the accidental *service*, for the real *appetite*: and in Achilles' case, the accidental neglect to invite, for the real disrespect that it implied.

<sup>2</sup> [Comp. Lucian's μύλας ἐγκώμιον. Blass, however, explains βομβύλιοι, as *Art. Trinkgefässe* (see Bekker's *Anecd.*, s. v. and comp. χύτρας, *supra*)].

τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ· ὁ δ' ὡς ἀτιμαζόμενος ἐμήνι-  
7 σεν, συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ κληθῆναι. ἄλλος τὸ  
παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι μεγα-

Comp. Ib. N. v, Vol. II. p. 158, note. Sauppe, *Fragm. Orat. Gr.*, Polycrates, *Or. Att.* III 220. [Also Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II pp. 341, 342.]

'Or if one were to say that an invitation to dinner is the highest possible honour; because it was the want of an invitation which excited Achilles' wrath against the Achaeans at Tenedos: his anger was really excited by the disrespect, the non-invitation (the form or mode of its manifestation) was a mere accident of it'. ἐπὶ τοῦ 'on the occasion, in the case of'. This is a fallacious inference (drawn either by Arist. himself, or, more likely, by some declaimer) from an incident in a play of Sophocles, the subject of which was this (Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.*, Soph., Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος, Vol. II. p. 230, from Welcker):—The Greeks on their way to Troy had put in at the island of Tenedos to hold a council as to the best way of attacking the city. Achilles would not attend at the meeting, having taken offence at the neglect, and presumed slight or contempt, of Agamemnon in not inviting him, either not at all, or after the rest, to an entertainment. There are two extant titles of plays by Sophocles, the Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος, and Ἀχαιῶν σύνδειπνον, or σύνδειπνοι, Plutarch, de discr. adul. et amici, 74 A, Vol. I. p. 280, ed. Wytt. ὡς ὁ παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα παροξύνων Ὀδυσσεὺς οὐ φησιν ἐργίεσθαι διὰ τὸ δέειπνον κ.τ.λ., citing three verses from the play (Ulysses had been sent with Ajax and Phoenix to Achilles to make up the quarrel). Comp. Athen. I. p. 17 D, Σοφ. ἐν Ἀχαιῶν συνδείπνῳ, where four lines are quoted; and VIII 365 B, τὸ Σοφ. δράμα...ἐπιγράφειν ἀξιούσι Σύνδειπνον. Cic. ad Quint. Fr. II 16, Σύνδειπνους Σοφ. Dindorf, *Fragm. Soph.* (Poet. Sc.) p. 35, following Toup, Brunck, and Böckh, supposes these two titles to belong to the same play, a satyric drama (Dind.). Wagner after Welcker (*Trag. Graec.* pp. 112 and 233) shews that they were distinct, the Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος founded on the story above mentioned, the other Ἀχαιῶν σύνδειπνον, or simply σύνδειπνον or σύνδειπνοι, derived from the Odyssey, and descriptive of the riot and revelry of the suitors in Penelope's house. See Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.*, Soph., Vol. II. pp. 230 and 380. The case of two distinct dramas is, I think, made out.

§ 7. 'Another from consequence', i. e. from the unduly assumed reciprocal convertibility of antecedent and consequent: just as in the 'sign' (q. v.), between which and this there is no real difference. As we saw in § 5, in the de Soph. El. the sign is spoken of as the rhetorical variety of the general topic of *consequence*: and they ought not to be divided here.

'As in the Alexander', i. e. Paris; a declamation of some unknown author, already referred to, c. 23 §§ 5, 8, 12; (it is argued) 'that he is high-minded, because he scorned the society of many' (*quaere τῶν πολλῶν* 'of the vulgar') 'and dwelt alone in Ida': (the inference being that) 'because such is the disposition of the high-minded, therefore he might be supposed to be high-minded.' This is a fallacy, or logical flaw, as Schrader puts it, "quia universalem affirmantem convertit simpliciter, et

λόφυχος· ὑπεριδὼν γὰρ τὴν πολλῶν ὁμιλίαν ἐν τῇ  
 Ἰδῇ διέτριβε καθ' αὐτόν· ὅτι γὰρ οἱ μεγαλόφυχοι  
 τοιοῦτοι, καὶ οὗτος μεγαλόφυχος δόξειεν ἂν. καὶ  
 ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστὴς καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός· τοι-  
 οῦτοι γάρ. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ  
 καὶ ἄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς φυνγάσιν ἔξ-  
 εστιν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν θέλωσιν· ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν  
 εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς ταῦτα ὑπάρχει,  
 δόξαιεν ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν. διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς· διὸ καὶ

quia in secunda figura concludit affirmative." Or rather, as this is an illicit consequence, because here antecedent and consequent are not reciprocally convertible: it does not follow, even supposing that all high-minded men dwell apart from others, that all lonely-dwellers are high-minded men: and to say that so and so, anybody whatsoever, is high-minded for that reason and that alone, is as much as to say that the rule is universal.

'And again (to argue) that so and so is a dandy and roams at night, and therefore a rake, because such are the habits of rakes'. This, as before, is to say that because (supposing it to be so) all adulterers are smartly dressed and walk at night, therefore all smart dressers and night-walkers are adulterers. This appears also as an example of the sign, the rhetorical form of the topic τὸ ἐπόμενον, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 9, βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστὴς ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁράται πλανώμενος. [See *infra* III 15. 5.]

καλλωπιστὴς] Plato Sympos. 174 A. Socrates (going out to dinner) ταῦτα δὲ ἑκαλλωπισάμην, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω.

'And another (argument), similar to these (for exalting the condition of poverty and exile), is that beggars sing and dance in the temples, and that exiles are allowed to live where they please': because, these things (enjoyments) being the ordinary accidents or concomitants of apparent happiness, those who have them may also be supposed to be happy'. Here again there is an illicit conversion of antecedent and consequent: if singing and dancing, or living where one pleased, were *coextensive* with happiness, the inference would be true and the two convertible. As it is, it does not follow that, because these are *indications* of happiness, or often accompany (follow) it, all men that sing and dance, or can live where they please, are necessarily happy. This is taken from one of those paradoxical encomiums of poverty and exile to which Isocrates refers, Helen. § 8, ἥδη τινές...τολμῶσι γράφειν, ὥς ἔστιν ὁ τῶν πτωχευόντων καὶ φευγόντων βίος ζηλωτότερος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; such as Alcidas' πενίας ἐγκώμιον cited above from Menander on § 6. [For an ἀπολογία Πενίας see Arist. Plutus, 467—597, in the course of which a distinction is drawn between πενία and πτωχεία, 552—4.]

διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς· διὸ κ.τ.λ.] 'But there is a difference in their manner of doing these; and therefore this topic falls under the head of *omission*,

8 εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει. ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον, οἷον τῷ ἅμα ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο γεγονέναι· τὸ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσι, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν as well as (καὶ) that of τὸ ἐπόμενον'. Beggars and exiles do what appear to be the same things as the wealthy and prosperous, they dance and sing in the temples and sacred precincts, and change their place of residence at their pleasure: but there is a difference in the mode and motive of doing these things, *which is omitted*; and the omission when supplied explains the fallacy. The beggars dance and sing in the temples to amuse the visitors and obtain an alms; the wealthy and prosperous out of wantonness or exultation, to shew that they have the liberty of doing what is forbidden to humbler people (so Victorius, and Schrader who borrows his note: these may however be mere *signs of happiness* in the εὐδαίμονες). And again, the exiles are obliged to live abroad, and would gladly be at home again; the wealthy and prosperous travel for change of scene, to satisfy their curiosity, or (like Herodotus and Plato) their desire of knowledge. The ἔλλειψις is here of τὸ πῶς, as in § 3, ult. of ὑπὸ τίνος, and in § 9, of πότε and πῶς, which in each case may be applied to explain the fallacy.

§ 8. This section, ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀναίτιον—συνέβη ὁ πόλεμος, is quoted by Dionys. Ep. ad Amm. c. 12 with no other variation from our text than the omission of οἷον before ὡς.

The fallacy here illustrated is the familiar *post hoc ergo propter hoc*; the assumption of a mere chronological sequence as a true cause: to mistake a mere accidental connexion of the order of time, for one of cause and effect. It is the rhetorical application, and only one variety, of the wider and more general topic of the dialectical treatise (de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 21) *non-causa pro causa*, in dialectical argumentation.

'Another from the substitution of what is no cause for (the true) cause; for instance (this substitution takes place) by reason of the occurrence of something contemporaneously or subsequently (to that which is presumed to account for it): for it is assumed that what merely follows (in time) is the effect of a cause, and especially by politicians; as Demades, for instance, pronounced Demosthenes' policy to be the cause of all their calamities; because it was *after* it that the war (with Philip, and the defeat of Chaeronea) occurred'. Victorius refers to a similar charge of Aeschines, c. Ctes. § 134, καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ὅτου Δημοσθένης πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν προσελήλυθεν, compare § 136, army and navy and cities, ἄρδην εἰσὶν ἀνηρπασμένα ἐκ τῆς τούτου πολιτείας. Dinarch. c. Dem. §§ 12, 13.

This is the only place in which the *name* of Demosthenes appears in Aristotle's Rhetoric. See on this subject Introd. pp. 45, 6, and note 2. In II 23. 18, a few words of his are quoted, but without the author's name. The Demosthenes mentioned in III 4. 3 is probably not the great Orator.

On Demades and his remains, see Sauppe, *Fragm. Orat.* LII, Demades, *Or. Att.* III 312 seq.

Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν·  
9 μετ' ἐκείνην γὰρ συνέβη ὁ πόλεμος. ἄλλος παρὰ τὴν  
ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, οἶον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξ-  
ανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἑλένην· αἵρεσις γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐδόθη  
παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶ-  
τον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τούτου κύριος. ἢ εἴ τις P. 1402.  
φαίη τὸ τύπτειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὕβριν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ

§ 9. 'Another from the omission of *when* and *how*'; a particular case, like those of § 3, and § 7, of the following topic *παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς*; a *dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*; the omission of particulars in the way of exceptions to a general statement, as time, place, manner, circumstances. 'For example, that Paris had a right to take Helen; for the choice was given her by her father (Tyndareus, the *choice* viz. of one of the suitors, whichever she preferred)'. Eur. Iph. Aul. 66, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπιστάθησαν, εὐ δέ πως γέρων ὑπῆλθεν αὐτοὺς Τυνδάρεως πυκνῇ φρενί, δίδωσ' εἰσθαι θυγατρὶ μνηστήρων ἕνα (Victorius). The whole story of 'Helen's choice', and the sequel, is told by Agamemnon, Iph. Aul. 49 seq., in his speech at the opening of the play, which serves for the prologue.

But this is a fallacy; 'for (the choice was granted) not it may be supposed (ἴσως) for ever, but only for the first time: for in fact the father's authority only extends so far'. Helen, acting upon her father's permission, chose Menelaus; ἢ δ' εἶλεθ' ὥς γε μήποτ' ὠφέλει λαβεῖν Μενέλαον, Iph. A. 70; and here, at this *first* choice, her father's authority and her own right to choose ended. The fallacy therefore consists in the 'omission' of the particular time, τοῦ πότε; she *generalized* the time of choice from the particular time to all time; and therefore Paris was *not* 'justified' in taking her.

'Or again, if one were to say, that to strike a free man is an act of ὕβρις (wanton outrage, liable to a γραφή, a public prosecution): for it is not so in every case (πάντως = ἀπλῶς), but only (κατὰ τι) when the striker is the aggressor'. This of course makes all the difference in the nature and legal construction of the offence. If the blow is *returned*, it may be regarded as an act of self-defence; the insulting wantonness, the injury to the sufferer's honour and personal self-respect, is shewn in the wanton aggression. ἂν τις τύπτῃ τινὰ φησιν (ὁ νόμος), ἄρχων χειρῶν ἀδίκων, ὡς, εἴ γε ἡμίνατο, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ. Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 50.

ἄρχειν χειρῶν ἀδίκων is to strike the first blow, to give the offence. The phrase assumes various forms. Rhet. ad. Alex. 36 (37) 39, συνέκοψάς μου τὸν νιόν; ἔγωγε ἀδίκων χειρῶν ἄρχοντα. Isocr. κατὰ Λοχίτου § 1, ἐτυπτε με Λοχίτης ἄρχων χειρῶν ἀδίκων. Xen. Cyrop. I 5. 13, Antiph. τετραλογία Γ. Or. 4, β § 1, and § 6, ἀρξας τῆς πλῆγῆς. χειρῶν is sometimes omitted, Bos, Ellips. p. 301, (527, ed. Schäfer); sometimes ἀδίκων, Plat. Legg. IX. 869D, ἄρχ. χειρῶν πρότερον. Herodotus has ὑπάρχειν ἀδίκων ἔργων, I 5; and various similar phrases, IV 1. VII 8. 2, and 9 a, IX 78; also ἄρχειν ἀδικίης et sim. III 130, &c. ὑπάρχειν alone, Plat. Gorg. 456 E,

10 πάντως, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀρχῇ χειρῶν ἀδίκων. ἔτι ὥσπερ p. 107.  
 ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικαῖς παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς,  
 ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, οἷον ἐν

ἀμυνομένους μὴ ὑπάρχοντας. Stallbaum et Ast, ad Legg. l. c. Also ἀρχεσθαι alone; Arist. Hist. Anim. IX. 12. 3, καὶ τὸν ἀετόν, ἐὰν ἀρῇται, ἀμυνομένοι νικῶσιν (οἱ κύκνοι).

§ 10. ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς]. See note on I 11. 15, where the meaning of this as a technical term is illustrated from the de Soph. El. τὰ ἐριστικά here designates a book or treatise; the fallacious, sophistical reasoning exposed in the ninth book of the Topics; just as τὰ διαλεκτικά stands for the dialectical treatise, including (as below), or not including, the appendage on Fallacies. The subject of the de Soph. El. is described as περὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν καὶ ἐριστικῶν, 165 b 10. ἐριστική there, c. 2, is first distinguished from the three other kinds of 'discussion', διδασκαλική (science), διαλεκτική, and πειραστική, a branch of the latter; and the ἐριστικοί are defined, οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὄντων δὲ συλλογιστικοὶ ἢ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί, which would include the σοφιστικοί. Elsewhere the two are distinguished; both are οἱ πάντως νικᾶν (victory at any price) προαιρούμενοι, 171 b 24; but οἱ τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμὸν σοφιστικοί: the one dispute out of mere pugnacity and contentious habit, the others add to this a desire of gaining a reputation which may be turned to profitable account.

'Further, as in the eristic branch of dialectics, from the substitution of something as universally or absolutely for that which is so not universally, but only partially, or in *particular* cases, an apparent (fallacious) syllogism (i. e. enthymeme, see on I 1. 11) is elicited. As in dialectics for instance, the argument "that the non-existent *is* (has existence), because non-being *is* non-being". (*Is, ἐστί*, has two different senses, absolute and relative, or absolute and particular: the Sophist, in the second case, *intends* it to be understood in its most general signification ἀπλῶς, of actual existence: it is in fact a mere copula connecting the one μὴ ὄν with the other, and merely states the identity of those two *expressions*, which is no doubt a very *partial statement* indeed: it is true, but nothing to the purpose of the argument. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 25, 180 a 33, 4.) 'Or again that the unknown is an object of knowledge, because the unknown may be known—that it is unknown'. (Here of course the particular that is left out of the account is the *ὅτι ἄγνωστον*; whereby the absolute or universal, 'the unknown is knowable', is substituted for the partial or particular statement, that what is knowable is only that it cannot be known.) 'So also in Rhetoric a seeming inference may be drawn from the absolute to merely partial probability'. This topic is illustrated in Plat. Euthyd. 293 c seq. See Grote's *Plato*, I 546, 7, and 549; [also Grote's *Aristotle* I 182, note].

The construction of this last sentence which had been obscured by wrong punctuation in Bekker's 4to and first 8vo ed., has in the second been made intelligible and consecutive by removing the full stops at μὴ ὄν and ὅτι ἄγνωστον, and changing all the colons into commas. The

μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ὄν, ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον, ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἐστὶ φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῶς εἰκὸς. ἀλλὰ τί εἰκός. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει

τάχ' ἂν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι

βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.

γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός.

correlative of ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς is of course οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς: and in the intervening sentence οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, the μὲν has also reference to an intended δέ, to be inserted when Rhetoric comes to be contrasted with Dialectics, which however is never expressed and the μὲν left *pendens*.

The topic is first defined in general terms, as it appears in the dialectical treatise, and illustrated by two examples of its *dialectical* use: and then exhibited in its *special* application to Rhetoric, the paralogism of absolute and particular probability. The first, as in the dialectical examples, is confounded with, or substituted for, the second.

'This (particular probability, τὴν εἰκός,) is not universally (true or applicable), as indeed Agathon says: Perchance just this may be called likely, that many unlikely things befall mortals', Agathon, *Fragm. Inc.* 5. Wagner, *Fragm. Trag. Gr.* III 78. Of Agathon, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* ch. XXVI. § 3. *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX, Vol. III. p. 257. Spengel, *Artium Scriptores*, p. 91, merely quotes four fragments from Aristotle. The extant fragments are collected by Wagner, u. s., on p. 73 seq. His style is criticized in Aristoph. *Thesm.* 55 seq. and imitated or caricatured 101 seq. A specimen of his Rhetoric is given by Plato, *Symp.* 194 E seq.

This 'probable improbable' is illustrated in *Poet.* XVIII 17, 18, from tragedy, by the cunning man cheated, and by the defeat of the brave. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο εἰκός, ὥσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει: εἰκὸς γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. *Comp.* XXV 29. On this fallacy the 'solution' in *Rhet.* ad Alex. 36 (37) § 29, is based. *Dion. Ep.* I ad Amm. c. 8, τὸ κακουργότατον τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων...ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς γίνεται ποτε εἰκός.

'For what is contrary to the probable does come to pass, and therefore what is *contrary* to probability is also probable (καί, besides what is *directly* probable). And if so, the improbable will be probable. Yes, but not absolutely (the answer); but as indeed in the case of Dialectics (in the dialectical form of the fallacy), it is the omission of the circumstances (κατὰ τί, in what respect,) and relation and mode that causes the cheat, so here also (in Rhetoric) (the fallacy arises) from the probability assumed not being absolute probability (or probability in general) but

ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν  
τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ  
τὴν συκοφαντίαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι μὴ  
11 ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ τί εἰκός. ἔστι δ' ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου  
ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη· ἂν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾗ  
τῇ αἰτία, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὦν αἰκίας φεύγῃ· οὐ γὰρ εἰκός·  
καὶ ἔνοχος ὦν, οἷον ἂν ἰσχυρὸς ὦν· οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι

some particular, special probability'. That which is only probable in particular cases, as in particular times, places, relations, and circumstances in general, is fraudulently represented as probable absolutely, *without* any such conditions or qualifications.

συκοφαντία, in this sense of a logical cheat or deception, transferred from its ordinary meaning, of a false, calumnious information or charge, is not to be found in any of the Lexicons.

§ 11. 'Of (the application of) this topic the (whole) "art" of Corax is composed.' 'This topic', as Ar. afterwards implies, is the topic of τὸ εἰκός in general, and not confined to the fallacious use of it. In the former of the two alternatives of the example from Corax's Art the argument is fair enough; the feeble man may fairly plead that it was not likely that he should be guilty of an assault upon one much stronger than himself. Of course this does not *prove* the point, but it would have a considerable effect in *persuading* the judges of the accused's innocence, 'For whether he (the accused) be not liable to the charge, as for instance if (repeat ἂν from the preceding) a weak man were to be tried for an assault, (he defends himself upon the ground that, *lit.* 'it is because,') it is improbable: or if he be liable (under the same circumstances), as for instance if he be a strong man (he argues—the omission explained as before) that it *is* improbable because it was likely to *seem* probable' (and therefore knowing that he would be exposed to the suspicion he was less likely to bring upon himself an almost certain punishment). And in like manner in all other cases: for the accused must be either liable or not liable to the charge: now it is true that both *seem* probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable in the abstract (*ἀπλῶς simpliciter*), but in the way that has been already stated', i.e. under the conditions and circumstances before mentioned.

Of Corax, with Tisias his pupil the founder of Rhetoric, see Cic. Brut. c. 12, Spengel's *Artium Scriptores* p. 22 seq., *Cambr. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. VII, Vol. III. p. 40 seq., Westerm. *Gesch. der Beredt.* § 27, pp. 35—7, Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* xxxii 3 [and Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit* I. pp. 19, 20].

The assault case and its alternatives was evidently one of the stock instances of the rhetorical books. It has been already referred to in I 12. 5, and re-appears in Plat. Phaedr. 223 B, as an extract from Tisias' art. Again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37) § 6.

The topic τὸ εἰκός which formed the staple of the art of Corax, and was treated in that of Tisias, Plato, l. c., continued in fashion with the



εἰκὸς ἐμελλε δόξειν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἡ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ· φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρω εἰκότα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται. καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέрайνον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεῦδός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐκ

early rhetoricians of the Sophistical school, as we may see by the constant notices of it in Plato. Somewhat later it was taken up by Antiphon, a disciple of this school, and appears in his three surviving school exercises, or μελέται, the Tetralogies. See also de caed. Herod. § 63. On the τόπος of the first of these, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. L.* XXXIII § 2. It is to be found also in the Rhet. ad Alex.; and of course in the Orators: and it crept into the Tragedies of Agathon. An amusing instance of the alternative application of the argument is the story of the encounter between Corax and his pupil Tisias in the attempt of the former to recover the fees due for his instruction, which Tisias had withheld. Related at length in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. VII, Vol. III p. 34. It is likewise told of Protagoras and his wealthy pupil Euathlus.

'And this is (the meaning of) "making the worse appear the better argument:" (that is, giving the superior to the inferior, the less *probable*) argument, making it prevail over that which is *really* superior, and more probable: which is identical with the second, the fallacious alternative of Corax's τόπος. Cic., Brut. VIII 30, extends this profession to all the Sophists. *Tum Leontinus Gorgias... Protagoras Abderites... aliique multi temporibus eisdem docere se profitebantur, arrogantibus sane verbis, quemadmodum causa inferior (ita enim loquebantur) dicendo fieri superior posset.* See the dialogue between the δίκαιος and ἄδικος λόγος, Arist. Nub. 889—1104. τὸ λόγῳ—τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα, 882. τίς ὦν; λόγος. ἥττων γ' ὦν. ἀλλὰ σε νικῶ, τὸν ἐμοῦ κρείττω φάσκοντ' εἶναι, 893: and he keeps his word. The fair argument is at last forced to own his defeat, and acknowledge the superiority of his unfair competitor. This was one of the articles of charge of Meletus and his coadjutors against Socrates, Plat. Apol. 19 B. Socrates is there made to refer to Aristophanes as its original author.

'And hence it was that men were justified in taking offence (in the displeasure, indignation, they felt) at Protagoras' *profession*: for it (the mode of arguing that it implies) is false, and not real (true, sound, genuine) but only apparent; and no true art (proceeding by, *lit.* 'included in,' no rule of genuine art), but mere rhetoric and quibbling. And so much for enthymemes, real and apparent'. αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη (ὁ Πρωταγόρας), ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι. Plat. Protag. 319 A.

This distinction of ἀληθής and φαινόμενος, εἶναι and φαίνεσθαι, reality and appearance, the true, genuine, substantial, and the sham, false

ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ  
ἀλλ' ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ.

I καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν CHAP. XXV.  
φαινομένων εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ λύσεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστι

semblance, is traced in its various applications at the opening of the de Soph. El. The latter is the especial characteristic of the Sophists and their professions and practice, 165 a 21, c. 11, 171 b 27—34, and elsewhere. It constantly re-appears in Aristotle's writings.

The imputation here cast on Protagoras' profession is rather that of logical than of moral obliquity and error, though no doubt the latter may also be implied.

I have already referred to the strong expression of Diogenes, Ep. ad Amm. c. 8, on the use of this topic, above, note on § 10.

#### CHAP. XXV.

The account of the genuine and spurious enthymemes or rhetorical inferences in cc. XXIII, XXIV, is followed by a chapter upon λύσις, the various modes of refuting an adversary's argument; the same order being observed as in the corresponding Dialectics (ἀντίστροφος ἢ ῥητορικὴ τῇ διαλεκτικῇ), where we have first (in the eight books of the Topics) the art of logical, systematic, argumentation, laid down and analysed; which is supplemented in an Appendix, Top. IX, or de Soph. El., by an account, (in the first fifteen chapters) of sophistical fallacies and paradoxes, and (from c. 16 to 33) the various modes of 'solving' or refuting them [Grote's *Aristotle*, chap. X]. The principal difference between them is that the dialectical λύσις deals only with the refutation of *fallacious* arguments, the rhetorical with that of rhetorical inferences or enthymemes in general. The same subject is treated again, more briefly, in III 17, under the head of πίσεις, the third 'division of the speech', including the establishment of your own case and the refutation of your opponent's: and in the Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), under that of accusation and defence.

On λύσις, solution, or refutation in general, and its divisions, according to Aristotle, see Poste, *Transl. of Posterior Analytics*, Introd. pp. 28—30. Thomson, *Laws of Thought*, § 127. Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Arist.* § 41. Cic. de Inv. XLII 79, seq. On *refutatio*, Quint. v c. 13. On *ἐνστάσις*, one of its two divisions, Anal. Pr. II c. 26, which is there treated logically and syllogistically, see Poste, u. s., and Appendix C (note) p. 198, *Transl. of de Soph. El.*, Introd. to Rhet. on c. 25, p. 267, seq. In the Topics there is no direct and detailed explanation of λύσις or ἐνστάσις—λύσις is exemplified in de Soph. El.—though that book is twice referred to, II 25. 3, 26. 4, as containing an account of the latter of the two. This apparent contradiction will be considered in the note on the former of the two passages.

§ 1. 'The next thing we have to treat of, after what has already been said (c. XXIII. XXIV), is λύσις, the modes of refuting an opponent's arguments'. On the meaning and derivation of λύσις, see Introd. p. 267, note.

τῶν εἰρημένων εἰπεῖν. ἔστι δὲ λύειν ἢ ἀντισυλλογι-  
 2 σάμενον ἢ ἐνστασιν ἐνεγκόντα. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀντισυλ-  
 λογίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ἐνδέχεται  
 ποιεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δο-  
 3 κούντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν. αἱ δ'

'This solution or refutation may be effected either by a counter-syllogism (which concludes the negative of the opponent's thesis or conclusion, the regular *ἔλεγχος*) or by advancing a (contradictory) *instance*, or objection (to one of the premisses proving or indicating a false statement)'. The *conclusion* must be refuted by a counter-syllogism. Comp. on these two, c. 26. 3, 4.

§ 2. 'Now these counter-syllogisms may plainly be constructed out of the same topics: for syllogisms' (i. e. not all syllogisms, not the scientific and demonstrative, but dialectical syllogisms, and rhetorical enthymemes: note on I 1. 11) 'are derived from probable materials, and mere (variable) *opinions*' (what is generally *thought*, probabilities;—truth, the conclusions of science, is constant: and scientific demonstration, the object of which is *ἀλήθεια*, does *not* admit, like Dialectics and Rhetoric, of opposite conclusions, of arguments on *either* side of a question), 'are often contrary to one another, (and therefore can be converted into *opposite* enthymemes)'.

§ 3. 'Objections (contradictory instances) are brought (against opposing enthymemes) in four ways, as also in the Topics'. Schrader had long ago observed that the words *ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς* are not a reference to the special treatise of that name, but express the art, or the practice of it, in general; and this explanation he had already applied to other passages, as II 23. 9, *ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς* and 24. 10, *ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς*; unnecessarily in those two, as we have seen.

Brandis will not allow that 'the Topics' can ever be applied to Dialectics in general, but thinks that it must be confined to the particular book in which Dialectics are treated as *Topics* (wherein Vahlen agrees with him). He admits that although the fourfold division of *ἐνστάσεις*, as *here given*, is not found in the Topics, as we now have them, (there is a *different* division into four,) yet the proper place for them is indicated in Bk. Θ c. 10; also, that there are plenty of *examples* of these four *ἐνστάσεις* in the Topics; and also that they are found (substantially, not by name and description,) in the Analytics. Nevertheless, he hesitates to suppose that there can be a direct reference to the Topics here and suggests the possibility of an alteration of Bk. Θ subsequent to the composition of the Rhetoric, or of an omission of something in our present text. Tract in Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV. i, p. 23.

To this Vahlen very fairly replies, *zur krit. der Ar. Schrift.* II 25, 1402 a 30, (*Trans. Vien. Acad.* Oct. 1861, p. 140), that Aristotle "has so often exemplified the application of these four kinds of *ἐνστάσεις* in the eighth book of the Topics—see especially c. 2, 157 a 34, and b 1, ff.—and elsewhere throughout the treatise—as in the Topics of *πρὸς τι* (Z 8, 9), *γένος* (Δ), *ἴδιον* (Ε),—that he might very well refer to that work

ἐνστάσεις φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς,  
 τετραχῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐκ p. 108.  
 4 τοῦ ἐναντίου ἢ ἐκ τῶν κεκριμένων. λέγω δὲ ἀφ' ἑαυ-  
 τοῦ μέν, οἶον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἴη τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὡς σπου- P. 1402 b.  
 δαῖος, ἢ ἐνστασις διχῶς· ἡ γὰρ καθόλου εἰπόντα ὅτι  
 πᾶσα ἔνδεια πονηρόν, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐλέγετο

here in the Rhetoric for the application of them to the use of that art."  
 "The words καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς need not be referred to more  
 than the φέρονται ἐνστάσεις (the bringing or *application* of objections),  
 and the expression here is no less correct than in 1403 a 31." (26. 4):  
 and consequently (he says) Brandis' two suggestions are superfluous. The  
 reference to the Topics in Rhet. I 2.9 is a case exactly parallel to this.  
 It is not made to any particular passage, but what is stated may be  
 gathered or inferred from the contents of that work. Compare note ad  
 loc., and see Introd. p. 154, note 1.

On ἐνστάσεις and its four kinds, Introd. pp. 269—271; where the exam-  
 ples that follow, §§ 4—7, are also explained. We learn from the chapter  
 of the Analytics that 'objections', directed against the premisses of a  
 syllogism (or enthymeme), may be either universal or particular: and  
 that the syllogisms into which they are thrown are either in the first  
 or third figure.

ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ] which in the next sentence becomes ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, is, as  
 Schrader puts it, "Cum ex eo quod antecedenti enthymematis nobis oppo-  
 siti, eiusdemque vel subiecto vel praedicato inest, contrarium argumen-  
 tum exsculpitur, eoque id quod obiectum est confutatur." An argument  
 derived 'from itself' must mean 'from the opponent's enthymeme itself',  
 and so retorted on him.

§ 4. 'Supposing for instance your adversary's major premisses were,  
 "all love is good", the objection may be opposed in two ways: either  
 (universally) by saying that all want or defect' (one of Plato's notions of  
 love, Philebus, comp. Rhet. I 11. 11, 12) 'is bad: or particularly, that, if  
 that were the case, the 'Caunian love' would never have passed into a  
 proverb (this is a *particular* instance; *some* love), if there had been no  
 form of love bad at all.'

Καύνιος ἔρως] The reading of all MSS but Ac is κάλλιστος ἢ κάκιστος  
 ἔρως. Who could have divined from this, without the aid of that MS, that  
 Καύνιος was what the author had written? asks Spengel, *Trans. Bav.*  
*Acad.* u. s. 1851, p. 50. What Ac really does read is Κάννικος according  
 to Bekker, Καύνικος according to Spengel.

The saying is proverbial for 'an illicit, or unfortunate (fatally ending)  
 passion'—in either case πονηρός—such as that of Byblis for her brother  
 Caunus; which was πονηρός in both its senses. Suidas, s. v. ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ κατορ-  
 θουμένων ἐπιθυμιῶν· Καύνος γὰρ καὶ Βυβλὶς ἀδελφοὶ ἐδυστύχησαν, Hesychius  
 ἐν Καύνῳ τιμᾶται (under the next word we have Καυνός...καὶ πόλις 'Ρόδου)  
 καὶ ὁ σφοδρός. Erasm. *Adag. Amor.* No. 1. "De foedo amore dicebatur;  
 aut si quis ea desideraret quae neque fas esset concupiscere neque liceret

- 5 Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ πονηροὶ ἔρωτες. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐνστασις φέρεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ,  
6 ἄλλ' οὐδ' ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες αἰεὶ μισοῦσιν,

assequi. Biblis Caunum fratrem impotenter adamavit; a quo cum esset repulsa, sibimet necem conscivit." Ovid, Met. IX 452—664, who says (662) that she wept herself to death, and was changed into a fountain. *Byblis in exemplo est ut ament concessa puellae; Byblis Apollinei correpta cupidine fratris, Non soror ut fratrem, nec qua debebat amavit.*

§ 5. 'The case of a *contrary* instance or objection is exemplified by the following, suppose the opponent's enthymeme is this' (i. e. has for its major premiss, is constructed upon the principle that, derives its conclusion from this), 'that all good men' (ὁ ἀγαθός, the definite article marks the *class*: note on I 7.13, comp. II 4.31), 'or good men invariably, do good to all their friends, the objection may be taken, that the *opposite* is not true; that bad men don't do harm to all theirs'. "The allegation of contraries," Poste, *Transl. of de Soph. El.* Appendix C, p. 197. If it be true that all good men do good to all their friends, the *contrary* of this, that all bad men do harm to all theirs, must be true likewise. But the latter is known not to be universally true; to some of their friends bad men do harm, to others not: it is *not* necessary therefore that good men should always help all their friends; they may be good without that. So Victorius. Comp. Top. B 9, 114 b 6 seq. where two other examples are given: σκοπεῖν δέ...καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον, οἷον ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡδύ' οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ κακὸν λυπηρόν' ἢ εἰ τοῦτο, κἀκείνο. καὶ εἰ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ ἀδικία ἄγνοια. καὶ εἰ τὸ δικαίως ἐπιστημονικῶς καὶ ἐμπείρως, τὸ ἀδικῶς ἀγνοοῦντως καὶ ἀπείρως. And again B 7, 113 a 1 seq. αἱ μὲν οὖν πρῶται δύο κ.τ.λ....line 8, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα τέτταρα ποιεῖ ἐναντίωσιν. τὸ γὰρ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν τῷ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς ἐναντίον' ἀπὸ τε γὰρ ἐναντίου ἡθους ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰρετὸν τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. "But the other four combinations, benefiting a friend, hurting a friend: benefiting an enemy, hurting an enemy: benefiting a friend, benefiting an enemy: hurting a friend, hurting an enemy: are all respectively contraries." Poste, u. s. p. 201.

§ 6. 'An example of an objection from *similars* (is the following), suppose the enthymeme (i. e. the premiss, as before,) to be, that those who have been injured always hate, (it may be met by the objection,) "nay but, neither (no more than in the other case) do those who have been well treated always love". This, as Victorius observes, may plainly be taken as an example of the preceding kind of ἐνστασις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου. It may also exemplify that of 'similars', to which Arist. has here applied it. Ill treatment is no necessary proof of hatred, any more than kindness and benefits are necessarily accompanied by love. The premiss, 'those who are injured always hate', we encounter with the objection, of a *similar, parallel*, case, that 'those who are well treated don't always love'.



8 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον σημεῖον, ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὄντων ἢ δοκούντων συνηγμένα ἐνθυμήματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, τὰ δὲ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου, ἢ ἐνὸς ἢ

Mytilene in 651 B. C., and died in 569 B. C. Mure, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* III 377. Clinton, *F. H. sub anno*. Aristotle also refers to this law of Pittacus, Pol. II 12, 1274 b 19 seq., where the reason for enacting it is given. νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ, τὸ τοῦς μεθύοντας ἀν τυπήσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίειν τῶν νηφόντων διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νηφόντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. Comp. Eth. N. III 7, 1113 b 30 sq. καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια...κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι. III 2, 1110 b 26.

On the appeal to *authorities*, as *μάρτυρες*, comp. I 15. 13, 14, 15; and note on II 23. 12.

§§ 8, 9. The following two sections, 8 and 9, are a summary repetition of what has been already stated more at length, I 2. 14—19, inclusive: on the materials of enthymemes and their varieties.

'Enthymemes being derived from four sources, or kinds of materials, probabilities, example, and signs certain and uncertain; in the first enthymemes being *gathered* (conclusions *collected*) from things which usually happen or seem to do so, that is, from probabilities; in the next (examples) from induction (by an incomplete *inductive process*), by means of similar (analogous, parallel) cases, one or more, when you first obtain your universal (the universal major, premiss or proposition, from which the conclusion is drawn) and then conclude (infer) the particular by an example' (on this process and its logical validity, see the account of *παράδειγμα*, *Introd.* pp. 105—107); 'and (thirdly) by means of' (through the channel, medium, instrumentality, *διὰ* with genit.) 'the necessary and invariable' (reading *καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος*, 'that which ever exists', unchanging, permanent, enduring for ever), 'by *τεκμήριον* that is; and (fourthly) by signs, universal or particular' (see on this, I 2. 16, the two kinds of signs: and the paraphrase of §§ 15—18, *Introd.* pp. 163—5), 'whether (the conclusion be) positive or negative (so *Vict.*); and *the probable*, (of which all these materials of enthymemes consist—with the solitary exception of the *τεκμήριον*, which is very rarely used—not being what is constant and invariable (always occurring in the same way, uniform) but what is only true *for the most part*; it is plain that (the conclusion is that) all such enthymemes as these can be always disproved by bringing an objection: the refutation however is (very often) apparent and not always real; for the objector does not disprove the *probability*, but only the necessity, (of the opponent's statement)'. As *none* of a rhetorician's arguments is more than probable, this can always be done, but in a great many cases it is not fair.

The words *δι' ἐπαγωγῆς* are put in brackets by Spengel as an interpolation. With the limitation which I have expressed in the translation,

πλείονων, ὅταν λαβὼν τὸ καθόλου εἶτα συλλογίσηται  
τὰ κατὰ μέρος, διὰ παραδείγματος, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀναγ-  
καίου καὶ ὄντος<sup>1</sup> διὰ τεκμηρίου, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου  
ἢ τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, εἴαν τε ὃν εἴαν τε μὴ, διὰ σημείων,  
τὸ δὲ εἰκὸς οὐ τὸ αἰεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ,  
φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων αἰεὶ  
9 ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔνστασιν, ἢ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη  
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθὴς αἰεὶ· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς, λύει  
10 ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. διὸ καὶ αἰεὶ  
ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατη-  
γοροῦντα διὰ τοῦτον τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ  
μὲν κατηγορῶν δι' εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ  
ταυτό τὸ λῦσαι ἢ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, αἰεὶ

<sup>1</sup> καὶ αἰεὶ ὄντος

it seems to me that *ἐπαγωγὴς* is quite justifiable, and may be retained : *διὰ* is at all events superfluous, and would be better away ; Victorius and Buhle had already rejected it.

I have followed Vahlen (and Spengel in his recent Ed.) in supposing *αἰεὶ* to have been omitted between *καὶ* and *ὄντος* in the explanation of *τεκμήριον*. Vahlen truly observes, Op. cit. p. 141, "that the *τεκμήριον* rests not upon the necessary *and being*, but upon the necessary and *ever-being*," (the permanent and invariable) : referring to *αἰεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον* in § 10 ; Phys. B 196 b 13, οὕτε τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αἰεὶ, οὕτε τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ : Metaph. E 1026 b 27, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης... τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ' αἰεὶ, ὡς δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ : Ib. 1064 b 32, πᾶν δὴ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης : 1065 a 2 ff.—which seem quite sufficient to warrant the alteration.

εἴαν τε ὃν εἴαν τε μὴ (δν)] *subaudi* ἦ, a rare ellipse of the *subjunctive* mood of εἶναι : Eur. Hippol. 659, ἔς τ' ἂν ἔκδημος χθονὸς Θησεύς. Aesch. Agam. 1318, κοινωσώμεθα ἂν πως ἀσφαλῆ βουλήματα (ἦ). Paley, note ad loc., supplies other examples ; and refers to Büttmann (on Mid. § 14, n. 143, p. 529 b, ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ἡ γραφή), who gives two more, Antiphon de caed. Herod. § 32, ἐφ' οἷς ἂν τὸ πλείστον μέρος τῆς βασιάνου ; Plat. Rep. II 370 E, ὃν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεῖα.

Victorius offers an alternative translation of the above words, 'the real or apparent' sign : but I think his first rendering, which I have followed, is the best.

The contents of §§ 8—11 inclusive are paraphrased at length, with an explanation, in *Introd.* on this chapter, pp. 271—4 ; to which the reader is referred. § 10 (misprinted § 8) is translated on p. 272.

§ 10. ἐπεὶ γὰρ...ὁ δὲ κριτής] On this irregularity, *ἐπεὶ* with the apodosis ὁ δέ, —a case of Aristotelian carelessness, his attention having been diverted from *ἐπεὶ* to ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν—see the parallel examples quoted on I 1. 11.



- δ' ἔχει ἐνστασιν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν εἰκὸς ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· ὁ δὲ κριτῆς οἶεται, εἰ p. 109.  
οὕτως ἐλύθη, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὐτῷ κριτέον, παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη κρίνειν. οὐκ οὖν ἱκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύνειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός. τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται, ἐὰν ἡ
- 11 ἡ ἐνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δέ, εἰ ἀμφοῖν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ πλεονάκεις οὕτω, P. 1493.
- 12 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον. λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα εἰρημένα, καὶ ἡ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· ὅτι γὰρ ἀσυλλόγιστόν ἐστι πᾶν σημεῖον, δηλὸν ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀνα-
- 13 λυτικῶν. πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις

ἂν οὕτως ἐλύθη of course cannot stand, though Spengel retains it in his recent text. It must be either ἂν οὕτως λυθῇ, which seems the simplest and most natural alteration; or, as Bekker, εἰ οὕτως ἐλύθη.

On the dicast's oath, γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη, or more usually τῇ δικαιοσάτῃ, κρίνειν, see Introd. note 1, p. 273.

§ 11. The *enstasis* may be made more probable in two ways, either by the consideration of the time, (as an *alibi* for instance, shewing that at the time alleged the accused was elsewhere, see II 23. 6, the topic of *time*: *this* use of the topic may be added to that which is illustrated there,) or the *circumstances* of the case; or most conclusively (authoritatively, cogently, weightily), by both: for in proportion to the multiplication of events or circumstances similar to your own case as you represent it, is the degree of its probability'. If I am right in the interpretation of τῷ χρόνῳ—see Introd. p. 274—τὰ πλεονάκεις refers to τοῖς πράγμασιν, 'facts and circumstances', alone. If 'the time' meant 'the number of recurring times', it would surely be τοῖς χρόνοις, not τῷ χρόνῳ.

§ 12. 'Signs (except τεκμήρια), and enthymemes stated or expressed by (i. e. derived from, founded on) signs, are always liable to refutation, even though they be true and genuine, *bona fide*, (ὑπάρχοντα, really there, in existence; not imaginary or fictitious,) as was stated at the commencement of this work (I 2. 18, λυτὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, this as well as the first, καὶ ἀληθές ἦ): 'for that no sign can be thrown into the regular syllogistic form is clear to us from the Analytics'. Anal. Pr. II 27. Introd. pp. 162, 3. It wants the universal major premiss, except in the single case of the τεκμήριον.

καὶ τὰ εἰκότα· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμέν τι, οὐχ οὐτω λέ-  
λυται<sup>1</sup>, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ<sup>2</sup> πλείω ἢ πλεον-

<sup>1-2</sup> ἔχωμέν τι οὐχ οὐτω, λέλυται,

<sup>2</sup> οτι. τὰ

§ 13. In this section the clause, ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν...ἄλλως, should (it seems) be read thus: ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμέν τι οὐχ οὐτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκεις ἄλλως and the succeeding, ἐάν τε καί... οὐτω, μαχετίον ἢ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The first alteration of the punctuation, and εἰ καὶ πλείω for ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω, appear first in Spengel's reprint of the Rhetoric, in his *Rhetores Graeci*; the corresponding alteration of punctuation in the second clause occurs in his recent edition. Bekker, who had adopted the altered punctuation in his 2nd ed., has returned to the original one in his 3rd, whether by mere oversight, or intentionally, who can determine? At all events with the punctuation found in all the editions prior to Bekker's 2nd, the sentences appear to be unintelligible. Vahlen, u. s., pp. 142, 3, has adopted the same alterations with the addition of the not improbable but unnecessary one of ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἔν τι. The connexion of the passage thus altered is this: There are two ways of meeting and refuting an opponent's example, the rhetorical substitute for a complete induction: first, if we have an adverse or contradictory instance (οὐχ οὐτω) to bring against his general rule—a case exceptional to the example or examples that he has collected in support of it—this is refuted, at all events so far as to shew that it is not necessary, even though the majority of cases (πλείω καὶ πλεονάκεις, 'more of them and oftener') of the same kind, or examples, are 'otherwise' (ἄλλως, are in another direction, or go to prove the contrary): or, secondly, if the great majority of instances are in conformity with his rule (οὕτως), and (which must be supplied) we have no instance to the contrary to adduce, we must then contend that the present instance (any one of his examples) is not analogous, not a case in point, that there is some difference either of kind and quality, or of mode, or some other, whatever it may be, between the example and that with which he compares it, which prevents its applicability here. The objection to this connexion and interpretation is of course the combination of οὐχ οὐτω with ἐάν; which may perhaps have been Bekker's reason for returning to the original punctuation. But as the sense seems to require the alteration of this, we may perhaps apply to this case Hermann's explanation<sup>1</sup> of the conjunction of οὐ, the direct negative with the hypothetical εἰ, which may occur in cases where the negative is immediately connected, so as to form a single negative notion with the thing denied, and does not belong to the hypothesis: so that οὐχ οὕτως being equivalent to ἄλλο or ἕτερον may stand in its place with the hypothetical particle: though no other example of this combination with ἐάν has been produced. In the choice between the two difficulties, the grammar, I suppose, must give place to the requirements of the sense. Neither Vahlen nor Spengel takes any notice of the grammatical irregularity.

With καὶ τὰ εἰκότα in the first clause πρὸς is to be carried on from πρὸς τὰ παραδειγματώδη.

<sup>1</sup> Review of Elmsley's *Medea*, vv. 87, 348. [Comp. *supra* Vol. I. Appendix C, p. 301.]

άκισ ἄλλως· εἰάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ <sup>1</sup>πλεονάκισ, οὐτω μαχετέον, ἢ ὅτι <sup>2</sup>τὸ παρὸν οὐχ ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ  
14 ὁμοίως ἢ διαφορὰν γέ τινα ἔχει. τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια καὶ  
τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον  
οὐκ ἔσται λῦσαι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀνα-  
λυτικῶν), λείπεται δ' ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον  
δεικνύναι. εἰ δὲ φανερόν καὶ ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι  
τεκμήριον, ἄλυστον ἤδη γίγνεται τοῦτο· πάντα γὰρ  
γίγνεται ἀποδείξει ἤδη φανερά.

1 τὸ δ' αὖξιν καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματος CHAP. XXVI.  
στοιχείον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχείον καὶ τόπον·  
ἔστι γὰρ στοιχείον καὶ τόπος, εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμή-

<sup>1-1</sup> πλεονάκισ οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι

οὐχ ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως] represent similarity of quality, τὸ ποιόν, the third category; and similarity of mode, conveyed by the adverbial termination -ως. "Non esse par, aut non eodem modo geri posse." Victorius.

§ 14. τεκμήρια] 'Certain, necessary, signs, and enthymemes of that sort (founded upon them), will not be found capable of refutation in respect of their not being reducible to the syllogistic form—which is plain to us from the Analytics (An. Pr. II 27), and it only remains to shew that the fact alleged is false (or non-existent). But if it be clear both that the fact stated is true, and that it is a necessary sign, *then* indeed it *does* become absolutely insoluble. For by demonstration (the τεκμήρια converted into a syllogism) everything is made quite clear'; when once a thing is demonstrated, the truth of it becomes clear and indisputable. On the τεκμήριον, I 2. 16, 17, 18, μόνον γὰρ ἂν ἀληθὲς ἢ ἀλυστόν ἐστιν.

#### CHAP. XXVI.

On the object and meaning of this short chapter, Victorius thus writes: "Omnibus iam quae posuerat explicatis, nonnulla quae rudes imperitosque fallere potuissent pertractat: ut bonus enim magister non solum quomodo se res habeat ostendit, sed ne facile aliquis a vero abduci possit, quae adversari videantur refellit." He not only states what is true, but also guards his disciples against possible error.

§ 1. 'Amplification and depreciation is not an *element* of enthymeme: by *element* I mean the same things as *topics*: for elements or topics are so many heads under which many enthymemes fall. But amplification and depreciation are enthymemes or inferences to prove that anything is great or little (to exaggerate and exalt, or disparage, depreciate, lower it), just as there are enthymemes to prove that anything is good or bad, or just or unjust, and anything else of the same kind'. Comp. XXII 13. On στοιχείον, and how it comes to be convertible with τόπος, see Introd. pp. 127, 8. αὖξιν and μειοῦν are in (one or two, under different divisions) of the κοινοὶ τόποι, the *loci*

ματα ἐμπίπτει. τὸ δ' αὖξιν καὶ μειοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνθυμή-  
 ματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι  
 ἀγαθὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν.  
 2 ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πάντα περὶ ἃ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν-  
 θυμήματα· ὥστ' εἰ μὴδὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνθυμήματος  
 3 τόπος, οὐδὲ τὸ αὖξιν καὶ μειοῦν. οὐδὲ τὰ λυτικά  
 ἐνθυμήματα εἰδὸς τι ἐστὶν ἄλλο τῶν κατασκευαστι-  
 κῶν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι λύει μὲν ἢ δείξας ἢ ἔνστασιν

*communissimi*, which can be applied to all the three branches of Rhetoric : and they furnish (*are*, Aristotle says,) enthymemes applicable to all the εἶδη in the three branches, as the good and bad treated in I 6, the greater and lesser good in I 7, fair and foul, right and wrong, in I 9, just and unjust in I 13. Comp. II 18. 4, II 19, on the four κοινοὶ τόποι; § 26, περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος, where he refers to the προειρημένα, the chapters of Bk. I already quoted, for exemplifications of it: and II 22. 16. It therefore (it is here spoken of as *one*) differs from the τόποι ἐνθυμημάτων of II 23. 24, which are *special* topics of particular classes of enthymemes.

§ 2. 'And all these are the subjects (or materials) of our syllogisms and enthymemes; and therefore if none of these (good and bad, just and unjust, &c.) is a topic of enthymeme, neither is amplification and depreciation'. This is the first of the two possible mistakes that require correction.

§ 3. The second is as follows. 'Neither are refutative enthymemes a distinct kind other than the demonstrative (those that prove the affirmative, *construct*, establish); for it is plain that refutation is effected either by direct proof, or by advancing an objection; and the *proof* is the demonstration of the opposite (the negative of the opponent's conclusion)—to prove, for instance, if the object was to shew that a crime had been committed, that it has not; or the reverse. And therefore *this* cannot be the difference, because they both employ the same kind of arguments (steps of proof); for both bring enthymemes to prove one the fact, the other the negation of it (§ 4). And the objection is no enthymeme at all, but, as in the *Topics*, to state an opinion (a probable proposition) from which it will clearly appear either that the syllogism is defective (the *reasoning*, logic, is defective) or that something false has been assumed (in the premisses)'. See II 22. 14, 15. II 25. 1, 2, where ἀπισυλλογίζεσθαι stands for ἀναποδεικνύειν here. It was stated, c. 22. 14, that "there are two kinds of enthymemes," the δεικτικά and ἐλεγκτικά, founded on the distinction of constructive and destructive, affirmative and negative: in this passage that statement is so far corrected as to deny that this is not a sufficient foundation for a distinction of kinds; the mode of reasoning is the same in both, and therefore as enthymemes they are the same.

§ 4. On ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, see note on II 22. 10, and 25. 3.

ἐνεγκών, ἀνταποδεικνύουσι δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, οἷον εἰ p. 110.  
 ἔδειξεν ὅτι γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, εἰ δ' ὅτι  
 οὐ γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι γέγονεν. ὥστε αὕτη μὲν  
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ διαφορά· τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρῶνται  
 ἀμφοτέροι· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν, ἐνθυμήματα  
 4 φέρουσιν· ἢ δ' ἔνστασις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα, ἀλλὰ  
 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς. τὸ εἰπεῖν δόξαν τινὰ ἐξ ἧς  
 ἔσται δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται ἢ ὅτι ψεῦδός τι  
 εἰληφεν.

5 ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ τρία ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ

§ 5. 'Now of the three departments of Rhetoric that require to be treated, of examples, and maxims, and enthymemes, and the intellectual (logical) part in general<sup>1</sup>, whence we are to obtain a supply of them, and how refute them, let us be satisfied with what has been already said: style and order (of the parts of the speech) remain for discussion'.

Dionys., de Comp. Verb. c. 1, divides the art of composition into two branches, διττῆς οὕσης ἀσκήσεως περὶ πάντας τοὺς λόγους, viz. (1) ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος, the facts, or matter—Ar.'s *πίστεις* (in Rhetoric)—and (2) λεκτικός, the style or manner. The latter is again subdivided into σύνθεσις, 'composition', combination, construction of words in *sentences*, and ἐκλογή τῶν ὀνομάτων, selection of single words.

This (with the *possible* exception of τὰ λοιπά in II 18. 5) is the first notice we have in this work that there *is* anything to consider in Rhetoric beyond the proofs or *πίστεις* that are to be employed in persuasion; and the omission of any distinct mention of it up to this point is certainly remarkable. Of course those who regard the third book as not belonging to the system of Rhetoric embodied in the two first—(no one, except Rose, I think, goes so far as to deny the genuineness of the book as a work of Aristotle)—but as a separate treatise, founded on a different conception of the art, improperly attached to the foregoing, assume that the last words, λοιπὸν δὲ...τάξεως, are a subsequent interpolation added to connect the second book with the third. Vahlen, *Trans. Vien. Acad.* Oct. 1861, pp. 131, 2, has again shewn that arbitrary and somewhat dogmatical positiveness which characterises his criticism of Aristotle's text. He pronounces, that of the last section, only the words which he alters into περὶ μὲν οὖν παραδειγμάτων—εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν τοιαῦτα (omitting καὶ ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν)—that is to say, only those which

<sup>1</sup> With τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, comp. Poet. XIX 2, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κεῖσθω. τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μετέδου. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι: which is followed in § 4 by a brief summary of the principal subjects of Rhetoric. Instead of inferring from this correspondence—as seems most natural—the indisputable genuineness of the words in the Rhetoric, Vahlen (see below in text) uses this passage—to which I suppose he refers—as an argument *against* it; that the (assumed) interpolator borrowed his phrase from Rhet. III 1. 7, and 'the Poetics'.

τὸν λόγον, ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγμάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅθεν τε

happen to agree with his theory, that the third book did not form part of the original plan of the work, "are to be regarded as genuine Aristotelian." The promised proof of this theory, is, I believe, not yet forthcoming.

Brandis is much more reasonable, *Tract on Rhet.* [*Philologus* IV i.] p. 7, 8. He thinks that the second and third parts (the contents of Bk. III, λέξις and τάξις) are already presupposed in the conception of the art expressed in the preface to the work. (This is certainly nowhere distinctly stated, and the προσθήκαι and τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος of I 1. 3 seem rather to refer to the exaggerations and appeals to the feelings and such like topics, of which the 'arts' of the earlier professors were mainly composed. Still, *the tricks of style*, introduced by Gorgias and his followers into their arts, may be included with the others, E. M. C.). One of the hypotheses suggested by Brandis on the relation of this third book to the two others seems to me highly probable. It is that the third book—which is in fact complete in itself (E. M. C.)—was written earlier than the rest, and before the author had arrived at his final conception of Rhetoric in its connexion with Logic; and was afterwards appended to the two others, instead of a new treatise written specially with a view to them; and this would account for the repetitions, such as that of III 17, which certainly are difficult to explain, if the third book be supposed to have been written after, and in connexion with, the first and second. With regard to the references, as in cc. 1 and 10, to one of the preceding books, Brandis thinks they might easily have been introduced *after the addition* of the third to the two others. He altogether rejects the notion that any one but Aristotle could have been the author of it. (It has in fact all the characteristics of Aristotle's style, mode of thought and expression, and nothing whatever which is out of character with him: on the other hand let any two sentences in this book and the Rhet. ad Alex. be compared, and it is seen at once that the style, manner, and mode of treatment are all totally different. E. M. C.) Lastly he notes that it is characteristic of Aristotle's writings (this, I think, deserves attention) *not* to give a full account of the contents of the work at the beginning of it; and such omission of style and arrangement was all the more likely in the Rhetoric in so far as it was part of Aristotle's theory of the art that everything but proof direct or indirect was non-essential and completely subordinate. He concludes, "I think therefore that I need not retract the expression I ventured on above (*Sie ist ein werk aus einem gusse*) that the Rhetoric is, more than most of Aristotle's writings, a work made at one cast."

Spengel, in *his* tract on the Rhetoric, Mun. 1851, (*Trans. Bav. Acad.* p. 40), though he thinks the phraseology of the passage requires alteration in one or two points to bring it into conformity with Aristotle's ordinary manner, yet as the MSS all agree in giving the words as they stand in our text, says there is no ground for suspecting their genuineness. On the connexion of the third book with the others he gives no opinion. In the note to his *Tract on Rhetoric* he thinks

εὐπορήσομεν καὶ ὡς αὐτὰ λύσομεν, εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν το- P. 1403 b.  
σαῦτα, λοιπὸν δὲ διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως.

that it may have been added *after* the two first were composed. He pronounces strongly in favour of its genuineness, and against Rose, *Pseudepigraphus*, p. 3 and p. 137 note; adding, for the benefit of that critic, *haec est nostrae aetatis ars critica*.

## APPENDIX (D)

ON

B 20 § 5.

εἰ δύναται ἄν.

*On ἄν with optative after certain particles.*

The attempt to control the free expansion of the Greek language by rigorous rules which forbade the deviation from set forms of speech, and allowed for no irregularities of expression by which nice shades and varieties of thought and feeling might be conveyed; rules derived mostly from a somewhat limited observation, often from the usages of the tragic and comic writers alone, the least departure from which was to be summarily and peremptorily emended; this attempt, which was involved in the practice of scholars like Dawes, Porson, Elmsley and Monk and their followers, has been happily frustrated, and we have learned, chiefly under the guidance of Godfrey Hermann, to deal more liberally and logically with Greek grammar. That Hermann was infallible; that he did not sometimes overreach himself by his own ingenuity; that his nice and subtle distinctions in the interpretation of grammatical variations are always well founded; or that he is always consistent in his explanations, I will not take upon me to assert: but it may at least be said that in this branch of scholarship, the application of logic to Greek grammar, he has done more than any other scholar, past or present.

On this principle, that of leaving the Greeks to express themselves as they please, let us not in the passage before us omit ἄν, though MSS Q, Y<sup>b</sup>, Z<sup>b</sup> do so, but rather endeavour to explain it.

The facts of the case are these. There are numerous instances in the Greek poets and prose writers of ἄν joined with the opt. mood and various particles, in which ordinary usage would seem to require either the subj. with ἄν or the opt. without it. ἄν and the opt. are found (1) with relatives, as Thuc. VIII 68, ἃ ἄν γνώη εἰπεῖν, Plat. Phaed. 89 D, οὗς ἄν ἠγγέσαιτο. Xen. Memor. IV 1. 2, μνημονεύειν ἃ ἄν μάθοιεν, (this is immediately preceded by the ordinary grammar,



μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχοιεν, 'to learn whatever they gave their attention to', which must imply a change of meaning corresponding to the change of expression). Ib. de rep. Lac. II 10, ἐπιτάττειν ὅτι ἄν ἀγαθὸν δοκοίη εἶναι. (2) with ὥς, ὅπως, ὅπη, with which the subj. and not the opt. is usually joined, Thuc. VIII 54, ὅπη ἄν δοκοίη. Aesch. Agam. 355, ὅπως ἄν—βέλος ἡλίθιον σκήψειεν. Arist. Av. 1337, γενοίμαν ἀετός, ὥς ἄν ποταθείην. Plat. Protag. 318 E, ὅπως ἄν, cum optativo bis: and numerous examples in Herm. de Particula ἄν, III 4, p. 151: four in Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 810. 4. (3) after ὅταν (Aesch. Pers. 450, ὅταν ἐκσωζοίατο), ὁπόταν, ἐπειδάν, Dem. adv. Onet. p. 865, § 6, ἐπειδάν δοκιμασθείην, ἕως, ἕωςπερ, Andoc. περὶ μυστηρίων § 81, ἕως ἄν οἱ νόμοι τεθείεν, Soph. Trach. 687, ἕως ἄν ἀρμόσσαιμι, Dem. c. Aphob. p. 814, ἕως ἄν δοκιμασθείην, Pl. Phaedo 101 D, ἕως ἄν σκέψαιο; μέχρι περ, Pl. Tim. 56 D, μέχρι περ ἄν... γῇ γένοιτο; πρὶν, Soph. Trach. 2, πρὶν ἄν θάνοι τις, Antiph. de caede Herodis, § 34, πρὶν ἄν ἐγὼ ἔλθοιμι. (4) After δέδοικα μή, Soph. Trach. 630, δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ πρῶ λέγοις ἄν, and Philoct. 493, ὃν δὴ παλαί' ἄν ἐξ ὅτου δέδοικ' ἐγὼ μὴ μοι βεβήκοι. Thuc. II 93, προσδοκία... μὴ ἄν ποτε.. ἐπιπλεύσειαν. Xen. Anab. VI 1. 1, ἐκείνο ἔννοῶ μὴ λίαν ἄν ταχὺ σωφρονισθείην. (5) After εἰ, εἴπερ, Rhet. II 20. 5, II 23. 7, εἰ προδοίη ἄν, Ib. § 20, εἰ δοίη ἄν. Plat. Theaet. 170 C, σκόπει εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν, Men. 98 B, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἄν εἶδέναι, Phileb. 21 D, εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἄν, Protag. 329 B, εἴπερ ἄλλῃ τῇ... πειθοίμην ἄν, Legg. VII 807 B, εἰ ζητοῖμεν ἄν. Ib. X 905 C. Rep. VIII 553 E, σκοπῶμεν εἰ ὁμοῖος ἄν εἴη. Eur. Hel. 825, εἴ πως ἄν ἀναπέσαιμεν. All, I conceive, or most of these well-established usages would have been condemned as solecisms by Dawes or Elmsley.

In the first class of cases, where *ἄν* with the opt. follows a relative, the simple explanation seems to be this. Take, for instance, the passage of Xen. Mem. IV 1. 2, above quoted. *μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχοιεν* is "to learn whatever they gave their attention to", the opt. indicating *indefinite possibility*, and the *indefiniteness* implying a liability to *recurrence*; an uncertainty as to when the thing will occur; a possible frequency, which we express by the addition of *ever* to the relative; *whatever*, *whenever*. The addition of the *conditional ἄν* suggests some condition attached to the act, and the "whatever they attended to" becomes "whatever they would, could, or might, attend to", under certain circumstances which may be imagined but are not expressed.

In class (2) *ὥς ἄν*, *ὅπως ἄν* with the opt. are usually explained by *quomodo* (Hermann), 'how', 'in what way', which is equivalent to 'that'. Thus in the passage of Aristophanes, quoted, under this head, "Oh that I were changed into an eagle that so I might fly", *ὥς* 'how', 'in what way', may be resolved into *ὅπως οὕτως* (see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 480, obs. 3) 'that in that way', 'that so'; and the opt. with *ἄν* is exactly what it is in an independent sentence, a modified future

or imperative, as the grammars sometimes call it (Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 515, β, γ), or rather a *potential mood* or *conditional tense* like that of the French and Italian verb. This is well illustrated by a passage of the Pseudo-Plat. Eryxias, p. 392 c, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν συμκρῶν τούτων ἂν μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται, οὕτως ὥς ἂν μάλιστα χαλεπώτατοι εἴησαν, where the addition of οὕτως shews how ὥς is to be interpreted. Herm. *de Part.* ἂν, IV 11. 12, and III 4, p. 151 seq. divides these cases into two heads, the first, in which ὥς ἂν, &c. signify *quomodo*; the second, in which the conjunction retains its proper signification 'that', indicating the *end* or *purpose*, and the opt. with ἂν is used only "ubi finis est, ut possit aliquid fieri"—where it indicates *possibility under certain conditions*. In all the examples that he gives, III 11, the other explanation is equally applicable.

(3) Conjunctions of *time*, with ἂν and opt. Hermann in his treatise does not separate these cases from the rest, and deal with them as a separate class, as he does in the case of ὥς ἂν, &c., and the conditional sentence: the object of his first chapter on this subject, III 4, is summed up (p. 151) "apparet ex his reprehensione vacuum esse usum optativi pro coniunctivo, adiuncta particula ἂν:" from which it would appear that his object was rather the establishment of the *fact* than the explanation of it. But the *ut quid possit fieri* may be intended to extend to all cases of opt. with ἂν, though it is confined in expression to that of the *particulae finales*, ὥς, ὅπως, &c., p. 154. In his note on Trach. 2, he attributes the opt. θάνοι to the *obliqua oratio* in which it occurs: which however leaves the ἂν unaccounted for. The *time* or *tense* of the preceding verb has at all events nothing to do with the explanation; the preceding verb is not always a past tense. Perhaps it may be sufficient to say, that it appears from numerous examples, that the optative with or without ἂν *may* be used in the same constructions with conjunctions expressing *time*, as the subjunctive with or without ἂν (ἂν being often omitted, especially in verse, with πρίν, ἕως, &c.) with a slight difference of sense; the subjunctive expressing as usual a future expectation, the optative the bare possibility, or the *indefinite* issue of an event, the ἂν, as usual, adding the notion of certain conditions to which it is subject.

These differences are so nice and subtle, that they are often hardly capable of being expressed in translation: unless it happen, as is not often the case, that there are words in the one language corresponding to those which we wish to render in the other, so far as to suggest exactly similar associations. Perhaps the differences between πρίν θάνῃ or πρίν ἂν θάνῃ, and πρίν θάνοι may be partially represented by 'ere he shall or may be dead', and 'ere he might be dead', implying uncertainty or mere possibility of the event; but when we come to πρίν ἂν θάνοι, where the condition, or circumstances under

which it may occur, is added, it seems impossible to convey the whole by any tolerable English translation, since we have nothing corresponding to *ἄν*, a word of two letters, suggestive of associations which would require in English certainly more than one word to express.

(4) The same explanation may be applied to the rare cases in which *μή* preceded by *δέδωκα* or something equivalent is followed by the optative with *ἄν*.

On these cases Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 814 c, expresses a similar opinion. "The opt. is also used in its secondary meaning to express more decidedly a doubt as to the realization of the object, a possibility only of its being so (this is Hermann's explanation of the signification of the mood): *ἄν* is added when the suspicion is supposed to depend upon a condition: Xen. Anab. vi 1. 29" (quoted above).

The reason why the subjunctive after particles of purpose (*ὥς*, *ὅπως*, &c.), time, and fear (*μή*) is most usual, and the opt. comparatively rare, so as to appear even irregular, is that the former of the two moods, which conveys merely the future expectation, is the expression of the direct and immediate tendency of the impulse or emotion; of that which the subject would naturally and usually feel: whereas the notion of possibility and condition would be, in comparison with the other, very rarely suggested.

(5) The fifth class of cases of opt. with *ἄν*, with *εἰ* or other conditional particles, is treated by Hermann in a special chapter, u. s., c. 11, and abundantly illustrated. He distinguishes two varieties of these, one peculiar to the Epic poets, "particulam (sc. *ἄν*) sic adiectam habens, ut magis ad voculam conditionalem, quam ad optativum pertineat: quare cultior sermo ut non necessariam omittit," p. 171. In the second, "nihil nisi particula conditionalis vel finalis ad optativum rectae orationis cum *ἄν* coniunctum accedit," p. 173. That is to say, if the optative with *ἄν* can be used in an independent proposition, as the conditional tense (see above), it may equally well be so used with a conditional particle attached, which is the mere addition, and nothing more, to the independent proposition, and does not affect the construction: and this is the view I had myself taken. And this is especially true when *εἰ*, as often happens, has lost its conditional force, and become the mere equivalent of 'that.' It also is frequently used interrogatively, as *πότερον* (some of my instances exemplify this); and as *πότερον* can of course be joined with *ἄν* and opt. in their ordinary sense, so likewise can *εἰ*, when it stands for the other. There is an actual example of this in Pseudo-Plat. Eryx. 393 B, *ἤρόμην πότερον ἄν φαίη*, 'whether he would or should say'.

Mr Paley, Appendix C to Aesch. Suppl. Ed. 2 with Latin Commentary, has a note on "*ὥς ἄν* with opt.," which is withdrawn

in the complete edition of Aeschylus, 1861. He there distinguishes two usages of  $\omega\varsigma$ , or  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ ,  $\alpha\upsilon$  with the opt., in one of which, the more usual, (where the particle is to be interpreted *quomodo*,) he says " $\alpha\upsilon$  semper pertinet ad verbum". This means, as I understand it, that when  $\omega\varsigma$  or  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  signifies 'how', 'in what way',  $\alpha\upsilon$  is to be construed with the verb, and the two are to be understood in precisely the same sense and construction as they have in an independent proposition: as I have myself also explained it. But in the other, in which  $\omega\varsigma$ ,  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ , are 'in order that',  $\alpha\upsilon$  adheres closely to, and is to be construed with, the conjunction,  $\omega\varsigma$ — $\alpha\upsilon$ ; so that the two combined may retain the ordinary sense of purpose, as in the case of  $\omega\varsigma$   $\alpha\upsilon$  with the subjunctive. It seems to me better not to make a difference in the explanation of idioms to all appearance identical, provided they *can* be explained in the same way; as I have endeavoured to shew. And also, I see no reason for supposing that the conditional particle can ever be separated from the verb that it conditions, and associated with anything else, either in conception or grammatical construction: the condition must accompany and modify the *action*, which is expressed by the verb.



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COMMENTARY

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# ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

## ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

Γ.

οὐκ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἀ δεῖ λέγειν  
ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὥς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.



# ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

## CORRIGENDA.

(In the notes.)

### VOL. III.

p. 12, line 21, read 'II 4. 9.'

p. 30, line 1, for 'by' read 'at.'

p. 42, line 17, for 'Naturum fassend,' read 'Natur umfassend.'

p. 62, line 19, read 'writings.'

the embarrassed commentator as either of the two preceding; and it is to be feared that the explanation and illustration are not likely to be much shorter than before, in spite of what has been already done in the Introduction.

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# ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

## ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ.

Ι Ἐπειδὴ τρία ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἐν μὲν ἐκ τίνων αἱ πίστεις ἔσονται, δυν-

### CHAP. I.

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Bekker  
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In the Introduction, pp. 276—370, I have already given a complete paraphrase of the contents of this book, exhibiting the main divisions and general principles of arrangement and the connexion of its several parts: and have added, in five appendices, dissertations on some special points which seemed to require a more detailed treatment than they could conveniently receive in mere notes. Referring to this for information on all such general matters, I may confine myself in the commentary to special details of language, allusion, and such like particulars. This book, by the extreme brevity of expression which characterises it, leaving even more than usual to the reader's ingenuity to supply, by the consequent difficulty of translation, and the obscurity of many of the allusions, offers at least as many impediments and stumblingblocks to the embarrassed commentator as either of the two preceding; and it is to be feared that the explanation and illustration are not likely to be much shorter than before, in spite of what has been already done in the Introduction.

With the end of Book II we finish the treatment of what (according to the Latin division) is termed *inventio*, the invention and supply of all the various kinds of arguments, which the orator has to invent, or find for himself; and we now proceed to the analysis of (1) *λέξις*, *elocutio*, verbal style, including *ὑπόκρισις*, delivery, *pronuntiatio* and *actio*, (Aristotle omits the latter, at all events in the treatment of it, confining *ὑπόκρισις* to the mode of speaking, declamation, § 4): and (2) *τάξις*, the order and disposition, together with the ordinary topics, of the several divisions of the speech. The first is examined in the first twelve chapters, the second from the thirteenth to the end. These three general divisions of the art are expressed by Cicero, Orator § 43, *tria videnda sunt oratori, quid dicat* (*πίστεις*), *quo quidque loco* (*τάξις*), *et quomodo* (*λέξις*).

§ 1 commences with a partial repetition of the concluding summary of the preceding chapter. The three modes of proof are enumerated, *πίστεις*, *ἥθος*, *πάθος*: (1) the direct logical proof, by argument; (2) the con-

τερον δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, τρίτον δὲ πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, περὶ μὲν τῶν πίστεων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ πόσων, ὅτι ἐκ τριῶν εἰσί, καὶ ταῦτα ποῖα, καὶ διὰ τί τοσαῦτα μόνα· ἢ γὰρ τῷ αὐτοῖ τι πεπονθέναι οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ τῷ ποιούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας, ἢ τῷ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι πείθονται πάντες. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, πόθεν δεῖ πορίζεσθαι. ἔστι 2 γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶδη τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, τὰ δὲ τόποι. περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συμβάλλεται πολλά πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι 3 ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐζητήθη

veying a favourable impression by the exhibition of character *in and by the speech*; and (3), working on the feelings of the audience, so as to bring them to that state of mind which is favourable to the orator's purpose; to excite an angry or a calm temper, love or hatred, envy, jealousy, righteous indignation, and so on, according to circumstances and the immediate occasion.

'The enthymemes too have been stated, whence they are to be supplied; for of enthymemes there are special (εἰδη) as well as common topics (τόποι)'. See the quotation from Spengel's *Study of Ancient Rhetoric* prefixed to II 23.

§ 2. 'The next subject to be treated of is style' (the manner of expressing oneself; including not only the language, but the manner of *delivery*; both in voice, declamation, the pronunciation, tone, rhythm, &c.; and—here Aristotle stops, and the Latin rhetoricians add—*action*, the appropriate gesticulation, management of the hands and the body in general, and especially the features): 'for it is not sufficient to know *what* to say, it is necessary also to know *how* to say it; and this contributes greatly to the impression conveyed of a certain *character* in the speech'. The tone of voice, the expression of the features, the gestures employed, the kind of language used, quite independently of the arguments, will materially assist the impression of moral (or any particular) character which the orator wishes to assume, on the minds of the audience. The ἦθος of III 16.8 is part of this, the moral character imparted by the choice of language, of terms, tone and expression, significant of moral purpose, *προαίρεσις*.

§ 3. 'Now first of all, inquiry was naturally directed to that which is first in the natural order, the sources from which things themselves derive their plausibility or power of persuasion' (i. e. what are the sources of rhetorical proof of facts themselves; which of course is the basis of the entire art or practice, and therefore 'first in the order of nature'); 'and secondly, the due setting out (disposal) of these by the language;

κατὰ φύσιν, ὃ περ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι· τρίτον δὲ τούτων, ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὐπω δ' ἐπικεχειρήται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπό-

and thirdly (τούτων, of such things as these, the divisions of Rhetoric), what has the greatest force (or influence, *is especially effective* as a means of persuasion), but has not yet been attempted (regularly, systematically, as an art, no serious attempt has yet been made upon it), that which relates to *delivery*'.

§ 3. πρῶτον ἐζητήθη κατὰ φύσιν] A similar phraseology occurs at the beginning of the Poetics, I 1, ult. ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. And de Soph. El. init. ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. Victorius.

διαθέσθαι] denotes the 'disposal' or 'disposition', i. e. the investing of the speech with a certain character, putting it in a certain state, by the use of language: as the ἀκροαταί of a speech are said διατίθεσθαι πως, to be brought into such and such a disposition or state of feeling by it: a common use of the verb. It does not mean here distribution, ordering, arrangement, which is not the special office of the graces and proprieties of language or style. There is another sense in which this verb is used by later writers, as Polybius, Dionysius, Diodorus, with λόγους and the like, *disponere, in publicum proponere, in medium proferre, to dispose or set out* (δια), as wares in a market for sale, *étaler*; which may possibly be the meaning here, though, I think, it would be less appropriate. Victorius renders it *explanare*. διάθεσις, in Longinus quoted below, seems to correspond to διατίθεσθαι here in the sense in which I have explained it.

ἐπικεχειρήται] is a striking instance of that abnormal formation of the passive, which I have explained and illustrated in Appendix B on I 12. 22 [Vol. I. p. 297].

ὑπόκρισις, 'acting', properly includes, besides declamation, the management of the voice, to which Aristotle, as already mentioned, here confines it, § 4, that of the features, arms, hands, and the entire body: and so it is treated by the Latin rhetoricians, Cicero, Quintilian, &c. Longinus, *Ars Rhet.*, (apud Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* I 310.) has a chapter upon it, following another περὶ λέξεως. His description of it is, μίμησις τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐκάστω παρισταμένων ἡθῶν καὶ παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις σώματος τε καὶ τόνου φωνῆς πρόσφορος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν. δύναται δὲ μέγιστον εἰς πίστιν κ.τ.λ. Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene, c. 22, p. 1023 (Reiske), says of the great orator, κοσμοῦντος ἅπαντα καὶ χρηματίζοντος (σχηματίζοντος, Sylburg) τῇ προποῦσῃ ὑποκρίσει ἧς δεινότητος ἀσκητὴς ἐγένετο, ὡς ἅπαντες τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῶν λόγων, κ.τ.λ. See Quint. XI 3. 5, on the effect of *pronuntiatio*, 'delivery, declamation', where he says that even an indifferent speech set off by the vigour and grace of action will have more weight or effect than the very best without it: in § 6 he quotes the opinion of Demosthenes, who assigned successively the first, second, and third place to declamation (*pronuntiatio*), and so on till his questioner stopped. In § 7 he quotes Aeschines' saying to the



κρισιν. καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ῥαψωδίαν ὁψὲ  
παρῆλθεν· ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγωδίας οἱ ποι- p. 111.

Rhodians, who were admiring the *de Corona* as he recited it to them, *Quid si ipsum audissetis? et M. Cicero unam in dicendo actionem dominari putat.* Cic. de Or. III 56. 213, from which the whole passage of Quintilian is taken. Also Brutus, LXVI 234, Lentulus' opinion. XXXVIII 141, 142. XLIII 168 (Spalding ad loc. Quint.). On Demosthenes' dictum. Bacon, *Essays*, Of Boldnesse, init., has this remark: A strange thing that that part of an Oratour which is but superficial, and rather the virtue of a Player, should be placed so high above those other noble parts of Invention, Elocution, and the rest; nay almost alone, as if it were all in all. But the reason is plaine. There is in humane Nature generally more of the foole then of the wise; and therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men's mindes is taken are most potent.

'(And this is not at all surprising) because in fact it was not till late that it made its way into the tragic art and rhapsody; for the poets at first (in the earliest stages of the drama) used to act their tragedies themselves' (and therefore, as there was no profession of acting or professional actors, it was not likely that an art of acting should be constructed; the poets acted, as they wrote, as well as they could by the light of nature, without any rules of art).

ῥαψωδία. On ῥαψωδοί and ῥαψωδεῖν, see Plat. Ion, 530 B, et seq., Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. 4 § 3. Heyne, *Excursus II ad Il.* Ω, § 3; Vol. VIII. p. 792. F. A. Wolf, *Proleg. ad Hom.*, p. 99 seq. Nitzsch, *Quaest. Hom.* IV. p. 13 seq.

ὁψὲ παρῆλθεν] *infra* § 5, ὁψὲ προῆλθεν; Poet. IV 17, τὸ μέγεθος (τῆς τραγωδίας)...ὁψὲ ἀπεσεμνύθη, also V 3.

ὑπεκρίνοντο αὐτοί] Plut. Sol. XXIX (Victorius), ὁ Σόλων ἐθεάσατο τὸν Θέσπιν αὐτὸν ὑποκρινόμενον ὥσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς. Liv. VII 2, *Livius* —idem scilicet, id quod omnes tum erant, *suorum carminum actor*. Victorius thinks that this statement is confirmed by Hor. A. P. 277, *quae canerent agerentque peruncti facibus ora*, which means that 'the poets themselves had their faces smeared'. Donaldson, *Theatre of the Greeks*, Ed. vii. p. 59, n. 10.

'It is plain then that there is something of this kind in Rhetoric also as well as in poetry' (declamation may be studied and practised for the purposes of Rhetoric, as well as for those of acting in tragedy and comedy or of rhapsodical recitation): 'which, in fact, (i. e. the 'poetical' declamation), has been dealt with (treated artistically, see note on I 1. 3), besides others, by Glaucón of Teos in particular'.

This tautological repetition of καί, καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν, is not unfrequent in Aristotle. Compare Pol. I 2, 1252 b 26, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη—οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. Ib. 1253 a 31, ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθέν—οὕτω καὶ χωρισθέν.

Glaucón of Teos, an Ionian city on the coast of Asia Minor, is most probably the same as a Glaucón mentioned by Ion, Plat. Ion 530 D (so Stallbaum's note ad loc.), as following his own profession as a rhapsodist, which seems suitable enough for one who writes on the art of tragic declamation, especially as acting and rhapsodizing are actually coupled

ηται τὸ πρῶτον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν  
 ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν· ὁ περ  
 ἕτεροί τινες ἐπραγματεύθησαν καὶ Γλαύκων ὁ Τήιος.  
 4 ἐστι δὲ αὕτη<sup>1</sup> μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὕτῃ δεῖ χρῆσθαι  
 πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος, οἷον πότε μεγάλη καὶ πότε  
 μικρὰ καὶ πότε μέση, καὶ πῶς τοῖς τόνοις, οἷον ὀξεῖα  
 καὶ βαρεῖα καὶ μέση, καὶ ῥυθμοῖς τίσι πρὸς ἕκαστον.  
 τρία γὰρ ἐστι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ

<sup>1</sup> αὕτη

together by Aristotle in the preceding sentence. I should be disposed also to identify with him of Teos, the Glaucon quoted in Poet. xxv 23 —seemingly as a poetical critic, which is also a kindred pursuit. See in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* the *third* article on Glaucon.

Tyrrwhitt ad loc. Poet. seems in favour of the supposition that the three Glaucons are one. A Glaucon who wrote a work on *γλῶσσαι* (sic), Athen. XI 480 F, was at all events not far removed from the same studies. Schneider, ad Xen. Conv. III 6.

§ 4. *ἔστι δ' αὕτη*] So all MSS and Edd., except Buhle, who reads *αὕτη*. This surely must be right: *αὕτη* seems to have no meaning here. Victorius retaining *αὐτή* translates '*haec*'.

'This (declamation, *ὑπόκρισις*) resides in the voice, in the mode of employing it, that is, for (the expression of) any emotion; that is to say, sometimes loud, sometimes low, sometimes intermediate (between the two, middling, neither the one nor the other); and in the mode of employing the accents (or *tones* of voice), that is to say acute, grave, middle' (circumflex, from the combination of the two others, *Λ* = ~), 'and certain measures (times) in respect of each. For there are three things that are the subjects of such enquiries, magnitude (intensity, volume of sound), tune, time'.

*οἷον*] is here in both cases *videlicet*, 'that is to say', a direct specification of certain definite things; not, as usual, 'for instance', as an example or specimen, which supposes *other* things of the same kind, besides those expressly mentioned. Thus *οἷον* here does not mean that the three kinds of sounds and accents mentioned are mere *examples* of a much larger class, but they *specify* the exact number of kinds which are intended to be distinguished in either case. This is common in Aristotle. Instances are, few out of many, Pol. I 6, sub fin., δούλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἐμψυχον...μέρος. c. 7 sub fin. ἡ δὲ κητικὴ...οἷον ἡ δικαία. c. 8, 1256 a 36, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας κ.τ.λ. c. 13, 1260 a 6, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγον. II 5, 1264 a 26, οἷον φρούρους. Ib. c. 6, 1265 a 35, οἷον, 'I mean to say.' De Sens. c. 5, 443 a 10, τὰ στοιχεῖα, οἷον πῦρ ἀήρ ὕδωρ γῆ. Plat. Gorg. 502 D. [Cf. *supra* II 19. 26.]

On the modulation of the voice in the expression of the various emotions, see Cic. de Or. III. cc. 57, 58, §§ 215—219, where it is illustrated at length.

On the accents, and *μέγεθος*, *ἁρμονία*, *ῥυθμός*, and their application to Rhetoric, see Introduction, Appendix C to Book III, p. 379 seq.

μέγεθος ἀρμονία ῥυθμός. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μεῖζον δύνανται νῦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἀγῶνας διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν 5 πολιτειῶν. οὕτω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὁψὲ προήλθεν· καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνομενον. ἀλλ' ὅλης P. 1404

'Now one might almost say (it is pretty nearly true to say) that these are the men that gain all the prizes in (*lit.* out of, as the *produce* or profit derived from, got out of them,) the contests (dramatic and rhapsodical), and as in these the actors have more power, influence, effect (over the audiences, and those who adjudge the prizes), than the poets nowadays, so likewise (has acting or declamation) in civil and social contests (the contests of the law-courts, and public assembly—comp. III 12. 2) by reason of the defects (the *vicious*, depraved character) of our constitutions' (as that of Athens, where I, Aristotle, am now writing).

The vice or defect, which permits these irregular and extraneous appeals to the feelings, and the influence which 'acting' thereby acquires, are attributed here to the *constitution*—comp. I 1. 4, where 'well-governed states', εὐνομούμεναι πόλεις, states which are under good laws and institutions, are said to forbid them: if that of Athens were sound and healthy and right, ὑγιής, ὀρθή, opposed to μοχθηρά, they would not be allowed *there*. In the next section, 5, the defect is attributed to the *audience*: in the one case the institutions themselves are in fault, in the other the tempers and disposition of the hearers, whose taste and judgment are so depraved that they *require* the stimulus of these distorting (διαστρέφοντα, I 1. 5) emotions.

On the influence of *acting* in producing emotion, and thereby persuasion, see by all means Cicero's description, de Or. III 56 § 213, seq., which furnishes an excellent illustration of what is here said. Note particularly the case of Gracchus, § 214. After a quotation from his speech Cicero adds, *quae sic ab illo esse acta constabat oculis voce gestu, inimici ut lacrimas tenere non possent*. And Orat. c. XVII, *est enim actio quasi corporis quaedam eloquentia, quum constet e voce et motu*, § 55 and the rest.

§ 5. 'But no art has been as yet composed of it; for in fact it was not till late that that of composition made any advance: and it (ἡ ὑποκριτική) is thought low and vulgar' (in the sense of popular and unsubstantial, directed to show, not substance) 'and rightly so considered' (or, 'when considered aright'; so Victorius. But the other is the more *natural* interpretation of ὑπολαμβάνειν; which will not in fact bear the meaning assigned to it by Victorius 'Si vere *iudicare* volumus': 'consider' in the two renderings has *different* senses).

φορτικός, see note on II 21. 15, opposed to χαρτεῖς in the sense of mental refinement and cultivation, *Molestos et illepidos, quos Graeci μοχθηροὺς καὶ φορτικοὺς dicerent*; Aulus Gellius, Noctes Attici 18. 4

οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον, ἐπεὶ τό γε δίκαιον μηδὲν πλείω ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὡς μήτε λυπεῖν μήτε εὐφραίνειν. δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τὰλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδείξαι περιέργα ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὅμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ (Gaisford). See Twining on Poet. note 263, pp. 540—544, where a number of examples illustrative of its various applications are collected. φορικῶς, ἐπαχθῶς, ἐπιπλάστως (Suidas). The last of these two equivalents helps to explain a distinction in Eth. Eudem. I 4. 2, of arts φορτικαί, περὶ χρηματισμὸν (engaged in money-making, mercenary), βάνανσοι (mechanical), which is subsequently explained, λέγω δὲ φορικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον. This I suppose must be meant of arts that have nothing solid and substantial about them, but aim at mere outside show, ostentatious and hollow, πρὸς δόξαν contrasted with πρὸς ἀλήθειαν: and ἐπιπλάστως 'beplastered' seems to correspond to this. And this same signification is plainly conveyed by the word here in the Rhetoric, which is immediately followed by ἀλλ' ὅλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας, i. e. not only ὑποκριτική, but the whole of Rhetoric, is directed πρὸς δόξαν. So that φορικὸν here must stand, as it often does, for the vulgarity which is shewn in unphilosophical habits of mind, want of mental cultivation in persons: and, as applied to a study or art, may signify popular, showy, unsubstantial, and in this point of view too low and vulgar to be entertained by a man of science or philosopher. It has precisely the same meaning in Pol. I 11, 1258 b 35. See Eaton ad loc.

'But since the entire study and business of Rhetoric is directed to mere opinion, is unscientific, (directed to τὸ δοκεῖν, mere outward show, not τὸ εἶναι: I 7. 36—37, see note,) we must bestow the requisite (τὴν) pains and attention upon it, not that it is right (to do so), but as necessary (for success in *persuading*): for, as to strict justice, *that* implies, (requires, *subaudi* ἐστὶ,) looking for no more in the delivery of the speech than (to speak it) in a manner which will give neither offence nor delight: for fairness requires that the case be fought on the facts alone, and therefore everything else outside the direct proof (of them) is superfluous: but still, as has been already said, they have vast influence by reason of the vice or defects (depraved taste and judgment) of the hearer'. Quint. II 17. 27 seq. *Imperiti enim iudicant, et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sunt, ne errent. Nam si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientum conciones; atque omne concilium, nihil invidia valeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes: perquam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus, et prope in sola delectatione ponatur. Sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt.* §§ 28, 29.

οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος] If it be supposed (with Vater) that ὡς is omitted in this clause, comp. c. 3 § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι.

6 ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὅμως ἔχει  
τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ· διαφέρει  
 γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν· οὐ μέντοι  
 τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἅπαντα φαντασία ταύτ' ἐστὶ καὶ  
 πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν· διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδά-  
 7 σκει. ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθῃ ταῦτό ποιήσῃ τῇ

§ 6. 'Now (attention to) style (mode of speaking) is nevertheless in some slight degree necessary (has some slight portion of necessity) in every kind (department) of instruction: for it makes *some* difference in the clearness of an explanation whether we speak in one way or another; not however so much (as is generally supposed), but all this is mere fancy (*φαντασία* 'the mental presentation, a mere copy, without reality, note on I 11. 6), and addressed to (for the sake of, to gratify) the hearer: for no one teaches geometry in this way'. These tricks and graces of style, declamation and acting, have no power of instruction, and therefore are never addressed to any *student*; but only to a popular audience like that of the orator, which requires to be flattered or have its ears tickled (as Plato says in the *Gorgias* [463 C, *κολακείας μόριον τὴν ῥητορικὴν*, and 502 E, *ὥσπερ παισὶ...χαρίζεσθαι*]); to be amused and conciliated, as well as instructed and convinced.

§ 7. 'Now *that* (the art which applies *ὑποκριτικὴ* to Rhetoric), whenever it reaches us (arrives), will produce the same effects as the art of acting (i. e. the application of it to dramatic poetry, § 3): some indeed have already to a trifling extent made the attempt to treat of it, as Thrasymachus in his *ἔλεοι*; in fact, a capacity for acting is a natural gift' (part of that general love of imitation which is the foundation of all the imitative or fine arts, Poet. c. 1) 'and less subject to rules of art' (more, or somewhat, spontaneous, *αὐτοσχεδιαστικὴ*, extemporaneous, Poet. IV 14, of tragedy in its earliest stage), 'but when applied to language (declamation) it (the practice of it) may be reduced to an art. And therefore those who have the faculty (of *ὑποκριτικὴ κατὰ λέξιν*) obtain prizes in *their turn*' (again, *πάλιν*; of which *τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν* is an explanation, Victorius), 'as do also rhetoricians in respect of (by) their acting or declamation: for written speeches (in the *ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος*) owe more of their effect to the style and language than to the thought or intellectual part'; *διάνοιαν* (Rhet. II 26. 5, Poet. XI 2) meaning here the logical part of Rhetoric, the direct and indirect arguments.

Thrasymachus and his *ἔλεοι* are described by Plato, Phaedr. 267 C, *τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόνων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἐλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέαι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὐ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπάρδων κηλεῖν, ὥς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος.*

On Thrasymachus see *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, No. IX Vol. III p. 268 seq., on the *ἔλεοι* 274, Spengel, *Artium Scriptores* [pp. 95—97, and Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, I esp. p. 244, also K. F. Hermann's *Disputatio de Thrasymacho Chalcedonio sophista*,

ὑποκριτικῇ, ἐγκεχειρήκασι δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινές, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις· καὶ ἔστι φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο δυναμένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἄθλα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν· οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μείζον ισχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

8 ἥρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινῆσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέ- p. 112.  
φυκεν, οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν,

Gottingen, 1848, pp. 15, and Mayor's note on Juv. VII 204, *paenituit multos vanae sterilisque cathedrae, sicut Tharsymachi probat exitus*. Quint. III 3. 4, *Nec audiendi quidam...qui tres modo primas esse partes volunt, quoniam memoria atque actio natura non arte contingant...licet Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit* (sc. ἀτεχνότερον εἶναι), where Quintilian must be referring to the present passage, though he is misled by the words οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις, into supposing that the sentence, καὶ ἔστι φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, is a quotation from Thrasymachus.]

οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. III 12. 5, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν κριτῇ κ.τ.λ. at the end of the section.

§ 8. 'Now the origin of this was due, as is natural, to the poets: for not only are all names imitations (copies of *things*, which they are supposed to represent), but there was also the voice ready for use, the most imitative of all our members; and so it was (in virtue of the same imitative faculty, Victorius) that the arts were composed, that of rhapsodizing and of acting and of course (ye, to be sure) others'.

κινεῖν, in the sense of *originating* anything, 'to stir, set in motion', is found in Plut. Solon. 95 B, ἀρχομένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν Θεόσπιν ἤδη τὴν τραγῳδίαν κινεῖν<sup>1</sup> (Victorius). Sext. Empir., adv. Math. VII 6, quotes Aristotle as having said that Empedocles πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινήκειναι: and Quintilian, III 1. 8, doubtless also with reference to Aristotle, repeats this, *primus post eos...movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur*. Sext. Empir. again, p. 546, Bekk. adv. Math. x. πρὸς ἡθικούς § 2, of Socrates' 'origination' of the study of Moral Philosophy, ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὴν δόξας κεκινήκειναι. See Spalding ad loc. Quint., who quotes Athen. XIV 629 C, ὅθεν ἐκινήθησαν αἱ καλούμεναι πνύρίχαι. *Movere* eodem sensu apud Quint. III 6. 10, 103, IV 1. 29.

ὀνόματα μιμήματα] This is the Platonic theory, Cratyl. 423 A seq.

<sup>1</sup> Welcker, *Nachtrag*, p. 239, note 175, accuses Bentley of a 'wonderful blunder' in the interpretation of κινεῖν in this passage, in saying, viz., that it signifies 'the first beginning of tragedy'—which it most undoubtedly does—and understands it himself of 'disturbing, altering', as κινεῖν νόμους (and the proverb μὴ κινεῖ Καμάραν, "let well alone," *quieta non movent*, "let sleeping dogs lie"). He says that Bentley's rendering is *längst widerlegt*. [Bentley, *On Phalaris*, I pp. 284, 386, ed. Dyce, pp. 262, 309, ed. Wagner.]

ὑπῆρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἥ τε ὁ ῥαψωδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι γε. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ

The conclusion is, 423 B, *ὄνομα ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῆς ἐκείνου, ὃ μιμείται καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ, ὃ ἂν μιμῆται.* "Olympiodorus ad Philebum Platonis tradit Democritum nomina vocales imagines rerum appellare consuevisse, ὅτι ἀγάλματα φωνήεντα καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι τῶν θεῶν, ὡς Δημόκριτος." Victorius. Aristotle himself, de Interpretatione, sub init. 16a 3, calls words τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, and afterwards, line 7, ὁμοιώματα, signs or representatives, and copies, of *mental* affections, i. e. impressions, a theory quite different from that of Plato, which is here adopted. On the terms applied by Aristotle to express the nature of words, see Waitz, on Organon 16 a 4. Of the four employed, he says, σύμβολον is a subjective σημεῖον, and ὁμοίωμα an objective μίμημα. On imitation and the natural love of it, the origin and foundation of all the fine arts, see the first three chapters of the Poetics. In c. 4, init. imitation or mimicry is described as natural to man from infancy, and *characteristic* of humanity. [Dionysius Halic. de comp. verb. p. 94 (quoted in Farrar's *Chapters on Language*, chap. XI), μεγάλη τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις, ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικούς ἡμᾶς καὶ θετικούς τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα.]

τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα κ.τ.λ.] This is introduced to account for the poets having been the first who devoted themselves to the study of style or language, in this sense. Words being the copies of things, the poets, whose object is imitation, addicted themselves to the study of them, in order to be able better to represent the things of which they were images. Victorius.

αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν] Some of the writers on rhapsodizing, with which was naturally combined the criticism of Homer, are mentioned in Plat. Ion. 530 C, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotus of Thasos (Xenoph. Conv. III 6), and Glaucon, probably of Teos, mentioned above, § 3.

§ 9. 'And as the reputation which the poets acquired in spite of the simplicity of what they said (the silliness of the thoughts expressed) was thought (by those who imitated them) to be due to their language, it was for this reason that the language (of prose) first took a poetical colour, as that of Gorgias. And still, even at this day, the mass of the uneducated think the discourses of speakers of this kind mighty fine. Such however is not the fact, but the language of prose and poetry is distinct'.

To the same effect Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 3, (v. 457, Reiske). Lysias' predecessors were not of his opinion about style—his was the ἀφελὲς λόγος, the 'smooth and simple' style—ἀλλ' οἱ βουλόμενοι κόσμον τινὰ προσεῖναι τοῖς ὁλοῖς ἐξήλλαττον ἰδιώτην, καὶ κατέφυγον εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν φράσιν μεταβολαῖς τε πολλαῖς χρώμενοι καὶ ὑπερβολαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τροπικαῖς ἰδέαις, ὀνομάτων τε γλωττηματικῶν καὶ ξένων χρήσει, καὶ τῶν οὐκ εἰωθῶτων σχηματισμῶν τῇ διαλλαγῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ καινολογίᾳ καταπληττόμενοι τὸν ἰδιώτην, κ.τ.λ. This was the new style introduced by Gorgias and his followers Polus and Licymnius (Alcidamas, &c.). Hermogenes, περὶ

ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πο-  
ρίσασθαι τήνδε τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικὴ πρώτη  
ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου. καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ  
τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν τοὺς τοιοῦτους οἰοῦνται διαλέγεσθαι  
κάλλιστα. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα λόγου  
καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον·

μυσ. ἐβ' 6

ἰδεῶν, β', περὶ δεινότητος (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 395); on the third  
kind of δεινότης represented by Gorgias and his school, οἱ σοφισταί; ὁ  
φαινόμενος λόγος δεινὸς οὐκ ὦν τοιοῦτος. γίνεται γὰρ τὸ πλείστον περὶ τὴν  
λέξιν, ὅταν τραχείας καὶ σφοδράς τις ἢ καὶ σεμνὰς συμφορήσας λέξεις εἰς  
ἐξαγγέλλῃ ταύταις ἐννοίας ἐπιπολαίους καὶ κοινὰς.

λέγοντες εὐήθη κ.τ.λ.] Cic. Orat. LII 175, of Isocrates, also a follower  
of Gorgias, *Quum enim videret oratores cum severitate audiri poetas  
autem cum voluptate, tum dicitur numeros secutus quibus etiam in ora-  
tione uteremur, quum iucunditatis causa tum ut varietas occurreret  
satieta.* So Theophrastus, Dion. Lys. Iud. c. 14, condemns this af-  
fected poetical language of the Sicilian school of rhetoricians as childish,  
τὸ ἴσον καὶ ὁμοιον παιδιῶδες, and unworthy of a serious purpose, καθάπερ  
ποίημα' διὸ καὶ ἦγον ἀρμόττει τῇ σπουδῇ κ.τ.λ. Plato, Rep. X 601 A—B.

On Gorgias' novel and poetical style and the figures that he in-  
troduced into Rhetoric, see *Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philology*,  
No. VII Vol. III pp. 66—7, 73—5, and on the rhetorical figures, which are  
classified, 69—72. Comp. Cic. Orat. § 175 [*paria paribus adiuncta et  
similiter definita itemque contrariis relata contraria, quae sua sponte,  
etiamsi id non agas, cadunt plerumque numero, Gorgias primus invenit,  
sed eis est usus intemperantius.* See also Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*,  
I esp. pp. 57—64. As a specimen of the poetical style of Gorgias we have  
his metaphorical term for vultures, *ἐμψυχοὶ τάφοι*, parallels to which may  
be found in the poets Lucretius and Spenser, Lucr. V 924, *viva videns vivo  
sepeliri viscera busto*, and *Faery Queen* II 8. 16 (quoted by Munro), *To be  
entombed in the raven or the kight*. That this fancy for poetic prose was  
with Gorgias a 'ruling passion strong in death', is proved by the phrase  
used at the close of his life, 'At last Sleep lays me with his brother  
Death'. Another of his death-bed utterances, *ὥσπερ ἐκ σαπροῦ καὶ ρέοντος  
συνοικίου ἀσμένως ἀπαλλάττομαι* (Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 184),  
may be illustrated by Waller's lines, *The soul's dark cottage, battered  
and decayed, Lets in new light through chinks that time has made*].

λόγου] prose, opposed to ποιήσις. *infra* § 9, c. 2 §§ 3 and 6, ψιλοὶ λόγοι,  
§ 7, ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, § 8, ὁ λόγος τῶν μέτρων. Poet. II 5, VI 26.  
Plato Rep. III 390 A, ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ποιήσει. 'This is shewn by the result:  
for even the tragic writers no longer employ it (sc. τῇ λέξει) in the same  
way (as the earlier tragedians did), but just as they passed from the  
(trochaic) tetrameter to the iambic measure because of all other metres  
this most resembles prose, so also in the use of words (names or nouns)  
they have dropped all that are contrary to the usage of ordinary conver-  
sation, and have dropped also those with which the earliest (dramatic)  
writers (*subaudi ποιῆσαιτες*; especially Æschylus) used to adorn (their



οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγωδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρώνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεταρμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν

compositions), a practice which is even now retained by the writers of hexameters (Epics): it is absurd therefore to copy those who themselves no longer employ that (the original) style'.

ὥσπερ καὶ...οὕτω καὶ] This tautological repetition of καὶ in an antithesis is characteristic of Aristotle's style. [Cf. *supra* § 3.]

ἐκ τῶν τεταρμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν] Poet. IV 17, 18, 19. μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖον ἐστὶ...πλείστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κ.τ.λ. III 3. 3 ult. where this passage is referred to. III 8. 4. Welcker, *Nachtrag*, p. 239.

ὁμοιότατον τῶν ἄλλων] In translating this I have purposely retained the ungrammatical and illogical 'other' with the superlative, because the same blunder is equally common in our own language. Swift, *Tale of a Tub*, 'The most perfect of all others', Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* 'of all other, they are...most infallible'. Bacon, *Essay Of Envy*, 'one of the most able of his predecessors' (of whom he is *not*, and cannot be, *one*), 'of all other affections (envy) the most importune and continual'. The examination of this, and the other irregular use of ἄλλος, (πολίται καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξένοι [Plat. Gorg. p. 473 C]), and the analogies in English, is reserved for an Appendix [this Appendix was apparently never written, though its intended preparation is also hinted in Mr Cope's translation of the Gorgias, p. 11. Compare note I to II 9. 9, τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα].

διάλεκτον] for 'common conversation' (properly dialogue): compare c. 2. 5, ἡ εἰωθὴν διάλεκτος, and Poet. XXII 14. In a somewhat different application διάλεκτος is the third and highest stage of 'sound', (1) noise, ψόφος, which even *inanimate* things, brute matter, wood and stone, are capable of producing: (2) φωνή, φθόγγος, the *indistinct voice* of an animal: and (3) διάλεκτος, the *distinct* utterance of the μέγας ἄνθρωποι, the power of *conversation*, characteristic of humanity. This distinction lies in the power which man has, and other animals (I believe) want, of pronouncing *consonants*, which produce distinct, articulate words. On *speech*, as the characteristic of man, see Pol. I 2, 1253 a 10, seq. where λόγος is substituted for διάλεκτος, [also Isocr. Paneg. § 48, τοῦτο μόνον (sc. τοὺς λόγους) ἐξ πάντων τῶν ζῶων ἴδιον ἔφμεν ἔχοντες, and Cicero, de Off. I 16. 50, (*ferae*) *rationis et orationis expertes*, de Oratore I §§ 32, 33].

οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν] Of this change, the lowering of the language of tragedy to the level of common life, the earliest author (as we are told in c. 2. 5) was Euripides, in his *later* plays, which are to be carefully distinguished from such as the Medea, Hippolytus, and Ion. The change was completely carried out in the New Comedy of Menander, Philemon Diphilus, &c. On this *everyday* character of Euripides' later and worse compositions—which are to be carefully distinguished from such as the Medea, Hippolytus and Ion—to which the language was

ἐστιν, <sup>1</sup>οἷς [δ'] <sup>1</sup>οἱ πρότερον <sup>1</sup>ἐκόσμου, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ  
ἐξάμετρα ποιούντες<sup>1</sup>. διὸ γελοῖον μιμεῖσθαι τούτους οἱ  
10 αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρῶνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. ὥστε φανε-  
ρὸν ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ἀκρι-  
βολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἴας λέγο-  
μεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

1 ἔστω οὖν ἐκεῖνα τεθεωρημένα, καὶ ὠρίσθω λέξεως CHAP. II.  
ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι. σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, εἰ μὴ P. 1404 b.  
δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔργον· καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν

<sup>1-1</sup> [The rendering given at the foot of p. 11 follows Bekker's Oxford ed. of 1837, which has οἷς δ' (sic) οἱ πρότερον ἐκόσμου, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξάμετρα ποιούντες, ἀφείκασιν· but there is nothing to shew that Mr Cope deliberately preferred this to the text as printed in Bekker's third edition; which is also approved in Spengel's note, except that he would strike out the first ἀφείκασιν, and not the second.]

made to conform, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* ch. xxv. §§ 2, 3. In Arist. *Ran.* 959, Euripides is made to take credit for it, οἰκεία πράγματ' εἰσάγων, οἷς χρώμεθ', οἷς ἔξυνεσμεν.

§ 10. 'And therefore it is plain that we must not go into exact detail in describing all that may be said about style, but confine ourselves to the kind of which we are now speaking (i.e. the use of it in Rhetoric). The other (the general view of the subject) has been treated in the Poetics'.

There is a useful note on the various senses of ἀκριβεία in Aristotle in Grant's *Ethics*, 17. 18. Here it is used in the first of these, of accuracy, or exactness, as shewn in *minute detail*, a complete survey of an entire subject.

## CHAP. II.

Some general remarks upon Style and its virtues, and the various classifications of these in ancient and modern systems of Rhetoric, are given in the Introduction, as preliminary to the paraphrase of this chapter, pp. 279—282. [Volkman, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, § 43.]

§ 1. 'Let so much suffice for the consideration (observation) of *that* (τὰ περὶ ποιητικῆς, c. 1. 10); and (now) let it be regarded as settled (or determined) once for all that one virtue of style is to be perspicuous: for a sign of this is, that if the speech (or language) do not explain its meaning, it will fail to perform its own proper function'.

This is a reference to the rule first laid down by Plat. *Rep.* 1 352 D seq., and adopted by Aristotle who constantly recurs to it—see especially *Eth. Nic.* 11 5, init.—that the virtue or excellence of anything, knife, horse, or anything that can be employed *as an instrument*, is determined by its *ἔργον* or special function, in the due performance of which it lies. If the special function of language is to explain one's meaning, it is plain that if it fail to do that—if it is not perspicuous—it does not answer its intended purpose.

μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν· ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἴσως οὐ ταπεινὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῇ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τᾶλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν· ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὸ αὐτὸ

'And neither mean nor exaggerated' (beyond or above the true valuation of the subject it is employed upon, turgid, pompous, inflated), 'but decent, appropriate, suitable' (a precept of *propriety*): 'for though it may be (*ἴσως*) poetical language is not tame, yet it is by no means suitable to prose'. Comp. Poet. XXII 1, λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῇ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. These are the two indispensable excellences of style, (1) clearness or perspicuity, and (2) propriety. On these see Introduction, p. 280.

§ 2. 'Of nouns and verbs' (the ultimate elements, and principal components, of language: see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. III. p. 371. Poet. XXI 8—9) 'perspicuity is produced by (the use of) *proper* names, a character not tame but ornate is imparted by all the rest of the (kinds of) words which are enumerated in the Poetics (c. XXI 4): to alter language in this way' (from the received and familiar expressions to which we are accustomed), 'invests it with a higher dignity' (because it makes it unusual, and strange; not familiar, which 'breeds contempt'): 'for men have the same feeling in regard of language as they have to strangers as compared with their fellow-citizens' (they disregard those whom they are in the habit of seeing every day, but are struck with the appearance of strangers, and pay them attention, if not always respect). To the note on κύρια ὀνόματα, Introd. p. 282, note 2, add that in the Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26) 1, and 30 (31) 6, these are called οἰκεία 'proper', by a different metaphor.

ἐξαλλάξαι] *infra* § 5, ἐξαλλάττειν τοῦ πρέποντος, c. 3. 3, τὸ εἰωθὸς ἐξαλλάττειν (which explains it: comp. Poet. XXII 3 *infra*). So Poet. XXI 4, and 20, ὄνομα ἐξηλλαγμένον, XXII 3, (λέξις) ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικόν, Ib. § 8, ἐξαλλαγαὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων. From which it results that the meaning of the term is 'a change out of, or departure from ὀνόματα κύρια, the vulgar language, the ordinary mode of expression', for which something novel, unusual, striking is substituted. Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 179, λόγους διεξιὼν πολὺ τῶν εἰθισμένων λέγεσθαι παρ' ὑμῖν ἐξηλλαγμένους; Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας, περὶ συγκρίσεως ult. (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 280), λέξιν περιττὴν καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένην, καὶ ἀσυνήθη. Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene, c. 10, ἐξηλλαγμένον τοῦ συνήθους χαρακτήρος, Ib. c. 15, περιττὰ καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένον τοῦ συνήθους, de Thuc. Iud. c. 28, τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξαλλάττειν ἐκ τῶν ἐν ᾗθει, Ep. II ad Amm. c. 3 ἡ ἐξηλλαγμένη τῆς συνήθους χρήσεως. Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v.

§ 3. 'And therefore a *foreign* air must be given to the language; for people are admirers of (or wonder at) what is far off, remote, and

3 πᾶσχουσι. καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν. διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν, ἡδὺ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλὰ τε ποιεῖ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀρμόττει ἐκεῖ· πλέον γὰρ ἐξ-έστηκε περὶ ἃ καὶ περὶ οὓς ὁ λόγος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψιλοῖς λόγοις πολλῶ ἐλάττωσιν· ἡ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις ἐλάττων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, εἰ δούλος καλλιπεῖτο ἢ λίαν νέος, ἀπρεπέστερον, ἢ περὶ λίαν μικρῶν· ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπισυστελλόμενον καὶ αὔξανόμενον τὸ πρέπον.

all that is *wonderful* (excites surprise, raises our curiosity) is agreeable'. Poet. XXIV 17, τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδὺ· σημείον δέ, πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαρίζομενοι. Comp. I 11. 21, on the pleasure of 'wonder', and the gratification of curiosity in *learning*: see the note.

ξένην] *infra* § 6, ξενικόν. Poet. XXII 3.

'Now in verse of all kinds there are many ways of producing this effect, and *there* they are appropriate, because the subject (circumstances) and the characters (persons) of the story (the fable or poem) are further removed' from common life; stand *out of*, and above, the ordinary level of humanity, Hist. An. I 14. 1)—'but in prose compositions these (modes of giving novelty and variety to the language) must be much more sparingly used' (χρηστέον, or are appropriate to fewer occasions, τοῦθ', or rather ταῦθ', ἀρμόττει, Buhle), 'because the subject (theme, *argument*<sup>1</sup>) is less (lower, less elevated),—(and this is true *a fortiori* in prose) for even in the other (in poetry) if a slave or a very young man were to use fine language it would be rather unbecoming, or (if any one else did so) on a very trifling subject, but on the contrary even in *that*' (poetry, not 'prose' as Victorius), 'propriety consists in a due contraction and expansion (amplification)'; the adaptation of the language to the circumstances, raising or lowering it as the occasion requires. Comp. Cic. de Orat. III 38. 153. Orat. LX 202. Also XXI 70, *ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilius quam quid deceat videre*. Πρέπον appellant hoc Graeci; nos dicamus sane decorum. § 72, *Quam enim indecorum est de stilicidiis quum apud unum iudicem dicas amplissimis verbis et locis uti communibus, de maiestate populi Romani summis et subtiliter!* De stilicidiis dicere illustrates περὶ λίαν μικρῶν. On the language of poetry and prose, comp. Isocr. Evag. §§ 8—11.

καλλιπεῖσθαι. Comp. Plat. Apol. Socr. 17 B, *κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ'...εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασι*. Thuc. VI 83, Plat. Hipparch. 225 C, τῶν σοφῶν ῥημάτων...ὧν οἱ δεξιοὶ περὶ τὰς δίκας καλλιπεοῦνται. Valckenaer, *Diatr. Eur.* Fr. p. 261 c.

<sup>1</sup> ὑπόθεσις, anything that is subjected as a foundation, a supposition or hypothesis, the basis of an argument, a first principle *assumed*, a theory, an underlying principle on which a scheme is to be built, the *plot* (ground plan) of a play, and so forth.

4 διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιούντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλάσμενως ἀλλὰ πεφυκότης. τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, ἐκείνο δὲ τούναντίον, ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα διαβάλλονται, καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οἶνους τοὺς μεμιγμένους,<sup>1</sup> καὶ οἶον ἢ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν ἢ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν

<sup>1</sup> μεμιγμένους.

§ 4. 'Hence—from the necessity of paying attention to the selection of appropriate language in respect of characters and subjects—may be inferred (διὸ) the necessity of disguising the art employed, and of avoiding the appearance of speaking, not naturally, but artificially' (πλάττειν *ingere*, of *fiction*, or artificial composition), 'for the one is persuasive, the other the contrary', (comp. c. 8 § 1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον, πεπλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ.) 'For people take offence at (*lit.* are at variance with, in opposition to) (one who employs artifice) as at one who has a design upon them, just as they do at mixed wines'.

Victorius quotes Plut. Symp. IV p. 661 D, διὸ φεύγουσι τὸν μεμιγμένον οἶνον οἱ πίνοντες· οἱ δὲ μινύοντες πειρῶνται λανθάνειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντες. From this curious coincidence it seems that "mixed wine" must have been proverbial for a concealed enemy: mixed wine, 'the mixing of liquors', being, as was supposed, of a much more intoxicating character than unmixed. Philinus is arguing against ποικίλη τροφή: *simple* food is always best.

'And as is the case with Theodorus' voice (*lit.* Theodorus' voice is affected) in comparison with that of all the rest of the actors' (there should be a colon, instead of a comma, at μεμιγμένους: καὶ οἶον ἢ Θεοδώρου is continued from τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν: it is an instance of the art disguising art, an artificial voice assuming the appearance of one natural and simple): 'for *his* voice *appears* to be that of the speaker (though it is in reality disguised), but the others as though they belonged to other people' (were *assumed*, with the character represented).

Theodorus, a celebrated tragic actor, is mentioned—generally with Polus or Aristodemus—by Dem. de F. L. § 274, *bis*; Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 17, sub fin., 1336 b 28, from which it appears that, like other great artists and performers, ancient and modern, he presumed upon his reputation and artistic skill: also by Plutarch, frequently, as Bellone an pace cl. f. Ath. c. 6, 348 F, de sui laud. c. 7, 545 F (a dictum of his to Satyrus the comic poet), Praecepta gerendae reipublicae, c. 21, 816 F, Theodorus and Polus taken as types of τὸν ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ πρωταγωνιστὴν: *probably*, by Diogenes Laertius, who at the end of his account of Aristippus, II 8, § 103, 4, enumerates twenty Theodoruses (including the philosopher who gives occasion to this digression), and amongst them one οὗ τὸ φωνασκεῖν (on the exercise of the voice) βιβλίον παγκαλόν: a subject so germane to the profession of a tragic actor, that, although Diogenes says no more about him, one cannot help suspecting that he must be the same with the one here mentioned. Fabricius in his catalogue of Theodoruses, Vol. x, names him with a special reference to the passage of Aristotle's Politics, and a general one to Plutarch,

5 εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριοι. κλέπτεται δ' εὖ, εἴαν τις ἐκ  
τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθῇ· ὃ περ Εὐρι-  
πίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος.

ὄντων δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος  
συνέστηκεν, τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων τοσαῦτ' ἐχόντων εἶδη  
ὅσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, τούτων γλώτ-  
ταις μὲν καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ πεποιημένοις ὀλιγάκις  
καὶ ὀλιγαχοῦ χρηστέον (ὅπου δέ, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν,

Valckenaer *Diatrise ad Eur. Fragm.* p. 182 b. He is omitted in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*.

§ 5. 'And this cheat (disguise, delusion) is fairly effected' (the assumed character escapes observation, is *stolen* from the view), 'if the composer selects for his composition words out of the ordinary language (of common life); such as are the verses of Euripides, who gave us the earliest specimen (hint or glimpse, *ὑπό*) (of this kind of writing)'.

κλέπτεται] Comp. *infra* § 10, οὐ κλέπτεται οὖν, c. 7. 10, οὕτω κλέπτεται ὁ ἀκροατής. Rhet. ad Alex. 15 (16) §§ 5, and 6, κλέπτειν τὴν μαρτυρίαν, Ib. 35 (36) § 4, τὰ δ' ἔξω κλέπτεται. Aesch. Choeph. 839, οὗτοι φρέν' ἂν κλέψειαν ὀμματωμένην. Soph. Phil. 57, τὸ δ' οὐχὶ κλεπτέον (not to be disguised), Aj. 188, εἰ δ' ὑποβαλλόμενοι κλέπτουσι μύθους οἱ μεγάλοι βασιλεῖς, et alibi ap. Soph. (Wunder's note ad loc.). Ib. 1135, κλέπτῃς, 1137, πόλλ' ἂν κακῶς λάθρα σὺ κλέψῃς κακά. Eur. Fragm. Ἰππόλυτος καλυπτόμενος, 12, εὐρόοισι στόμασι τάληθίστατα κλέπτουσι. Dionysius, de Comp. Verb. c. 19, τάσεις (tension, pitching) φωνῆς αἱ καλούμεναι προσφῳδίαι διάφοροι, κλέπτουσαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸν κύρον. Ib. Ars Rhet. c. x § 14, κλέπτοντα τὴν ἀκρόασιν ('captata furtim auditorum attentione,' Reiske). Bacon, *Essays, Of great Place*, "And do not think to steale it."

*ὑπέδειξε*] as I have pointed out, *Introd.* p. 284, note 2, q. v., may also signify 'traced as a guide', for his successors to follow. See also p. 285, note 1, on Euripides' style, and Archimelus' epigram there given.

'And of the nouns and verbs' (or subject and predicate, *Introd.* p. 371, Appendix A to Bk. III), 'of which the speech (or language, in general) is composed, of which the nouns have so many kinds as have been considered in the treatise on Poetry' (c. XXI, where, in § 4, eight varieties are enumerated, and then defined *seriatim*, §§ 5-20), 'of these words, foreign or obsolete, and (long) compound words' (Aeschylean compounds), 'and words invented (manufactured for the occasion), are to be rarely employed, and in rare places (on rare occasions); *where* (these are), we will state by and by: (in cc. 3 and 7). The *why*, has been already stated; and that (the *why*) is because *it* (the use of them) varies (from the ordinary standard) towards, in the direction of, exaggeration (or excess) beyond propriety (what is becoming)'.

Ὀν γλώτται, διπλὰ ὀνόματα, see *Introd.* on c. 3, pp. 287, 8. πεποιημένον δ' ἐστὶν ὃ ὅλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τινων αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής· οἷον τὰ κέρατα ἔρυνγας καὶ τὸν ἱερέα ἀρητῆρα (Poet. XXI. 17).

τό τε διὰ τί εἴρηται· ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον γὰρ ἐξαλλάττει  
 6 τοῦ πρέποντος), τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκείον καὶ μετα-  
 φορὰ μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων  
 λέξιν. σημεῖον δὲ ὅτι τούτοις μόνοις πάντες χρῶν-  
 ται· πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς  
 οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις· ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ἂν εὖ ποιῇ

§ 6. 'The proper (ordinary) name, and the special name of anything' (οἰκείον, the thing's *own* or right name, its special designation, Victorius), 'and the metaphor, are alone serviceable for the language of prose. And a sign of this is, that these alone are used by everybody (are of universal application); for everyone makes use of metaphors<sup>1</sup>, and the common' (sanctioned by common usage) 'and appropriate words in his ordinary conversation: and therefore it is clear that good composition will have a *foreign* air (an air of novelty, something unusual, above the flatness and monotony of ordinary, vulgar, talk: § 3), that (the art employed in it) may escape detection (pass unobserved, § 4), and that it will be clear and perspicuous, (in virtue of the κύρια and οἰκεία ὀνόματα). And in these, as we said (ἦν, in §§ 1, 3, 4, 5, 6), consists the excellence of the rhetorical speech<sup>2</sup>'.

With the 'foreign', unusual character of good composition, comp. Demetr. περὶ ἐρμηνείας § 77, (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 280), τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἐν τῷ χαρακτῆρι τούτῳ περιττὴν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένην καὶ ἀσυνήθη μᾶλλον. οὕτω γὰρ ἔξει τὸν ὄγκον, ἡ δὲ κυρία καὶ συνήθης σαφὴς μὲν, λειτὴ δὲ καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητος.

κύριον ὄνομα is ὁ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι (Poet. XXI 5), opposed to γλῶττα φῖ ἕτεροι: the common, usual, *established*, term, for expressing anything, opposed to the foreign and barbarous, or archaic and obsolete γλῶττα. The word derives its special meaning from the original signification of κύριος, 'carrying authority', 'authoritative'; whence 'authorised, established, fixed (by authority), settled', as κύριος νόμος, δόγμα, κυρία ἡμέρα, ἐκκλησία, opposed to the *irregular* ἐκκλησία σύγκλητος, convoked at uncertain times on special occasions: and hence applied to the established, settled, regular name of a thing. See further on κύριον ὄνομα in note 2, *Introduct.* pp. 282, 3. [On κύριος, compare notes on I 2. 4 and 3. 4.]

οἰκείον ὄνομα expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor. It is something 'of one's own', appropriate, peculiar, characteristic, special. This is the Latin '*nomen proprium*', of which Cicero says, de Or. III 37, 149, *quae propria sunt, et certa* ('definite') *quasi vocabula rerum, paene una nata cum rebus ipsis* (naturally belonging to them). From these are distinguished *quae transferuntur* (all metaphorical words)

<sup>1</sup> Schrader quotes Cic. Orator, c. 24 § 81, *Translatione frequentissime sermo omnīs utitur, non modo urbanorum, sed etiam rusticorum, siquidem est eorum gemmare vires, suture agros, laetas esse segetes, luxuriosa frumenta.*

<sup>2</sup> 'If the orator confines himself to these, his style may be novel and ornamental, yet without forcing itself unduly upon the attention, and perspicuous.' Paraphr. in *Introduct.*

τις, ἔσται τε ξενικὸν καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέχεται καὶ  
 σαφηνιῇ. αὕτη δ' ἦν ἡ τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ λόγου ἀρετή.  
 7 τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμία χρήσιμοι  
 (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυ-  
 μίαι. λέγω δὲ κύριά τε καὶ συνώνυμα οἷον τὸ πορεύ- P. 1405.  
 εσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ  
 κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις.

*et quasi alieno in loco collocantur: aut iis quae novamus et facimus ipsi*  
 (all foreign innovations on the ordinary language, *aliena*, Cicero, γλῶτται,  
 διπλὰ ὀνόματα, πεποιημένα, &c.). Cicero and the Latins do not distinguish  
 κύρια and οἰκεία. Yet, as Victorius has pointed out, he uses terms exactly  
 corresponding to those of Aristotle: de Or. III 39, 159, *quod omnes*  
*translatis et alienis magis quam propriis et suis*. For even if we under-  
 stand here *suis* of *their own language* (as I suppose we should), this  
 is immediately followed by *nam si res suum nomen et vocabulum pro-*  
*prium non habet*; and in pro Caecina, c. 18 § 51, we have, *res ut omnes suis*  
*certis ac propriis vocabulis nominentur*. οἰκείος stands for κύριος, Metaph.  
 Δ 29, 1024 a 32, of Antisthenes, εὐηθῶς φέτο μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν  
 τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἔν ἐφ' ἐνός.

§ 7. This is a parenthetical *note*: it has little to do with Rhetoric  
 except so far as it occupies common ground with poetry, in the use  
 of synonyms. 'Of names (words) *homonyms* (ambiguous words, with  
 more than one meaning) are useful to the Sophist' (the fallacious reasoner;  
 see II 24.2, the topic of *ὁμωνυμία*, and the note)—'for those are the  
 (principal) instruments of his (logical) frauds or cheats; to the poet,  
*synonyms*'. The *homonym* and the *synonym* are defined at the com-  
 mencement of the Categories. The former is a word of more than  
 one signification, of which the several definitions do *not* agree; so that  
 the *name* being the same, the one signification can be employed fal-  
 laciouly for the other: synonyms are words which can be variously  
 applied, in which the name and the definition (or meaning) *do* agree;  
 as animal, can be said with truth of man and ox. Trendelenburg, *El. Log.*  
*Ar.* § 42, p. 116, on synonyms. Of hononyms Quintilian says, Inst. Or.  
 VII 9. 2, *singula afferunt errorem, quum pluribus rebus aut hominibus*  
*eadem appellatio est*, (ὁμωνυμία dicitur) ut Gallus; avem enim, an gentem,  
*an nomen, an fortunam corporis significet incertum est: et Ajax Tela-*  
*monis an Oilei filius. Verba quoque quaedam diversos intellectus habent,*  
*ut cerno*: (with the application of it in suits of law). Of this logical  
 application of *κακουργεῖν*, see the examples quoted in note on I 1. 10.

'By proper and synonymous I mean such words as πορεύεσθαι and  
 βαδίζειν: these are both of them proper and identical in meaning'.  
 According to Trendelenburg, u. s., πορεύεσθαι is the *genus* and βαδίζειν  
 the *species*, both predicable of animals in the same sense: "Aristoteles  
 enim constanter vocabulum (συνώνυμος) ita frequentavit, ut vel eiusdem  
 generis formas vel genus et species, quatenus communi nomine com-  
 prehenduntur, synonyma diceret." The use of these to the poet lies



τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι, καὶ πόσα εἶδη  
[μεταφορᾶς<sup>1</sup>], καὶ ὅτι<sup>2</sup> τούτων πλείστον δύνανται<sup>3</sup> καὶ ἐν  
ποιήσῃ καὶ ἐν λόγοις αἱ μεταφοραί, εἴρηται, καθάπερ  
8 ἐλέγομεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς τοσοῦτο<sup>3</sup> δ' ἐν λόγῳ  
δεῖ μάλλον φιλοπονέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσῳ ἐξ ἑλατ- p. 114.

<sup>1</sup> μεταφορᾶς *sine uncinis*.

<sup>2-3</sup> τοῦτο πλείστον δύνανται

<sup>3</sup> τοσοῦτω

in this, that they help him to give variety to his diction, and relieve him from the necessity of constantly repeating the same word.

'Now what each of these things is'—i.e. the things already enumerated, *nomina propria, translata, συνώνυμα* &c. (Victorius)—'and the number of the kinds of metaphors, and that this, metaphor, is most effective both in poetry and prose, has been already stated, as we said (§ 2, τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων—τάλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς), in our work on poetry'. Max Schmidt, in his tract *On the date of the Rhetoric*, Halle, 1837 (frequently referred to in the Introd.), and before him Victorius, notices here, that the synonyms alone of all the words here referred to do not appear in the Poetics; from which each of them infers a *lacuna* in that work: more especially as Simplicius had left on record that Aristotle had treated of them in his book on poetry. There is another loss in that work indicated by a reference in Rhet. I 11. 29 [and III 18. 7] to the Poetics for an account of τὸ γελοῖον, which is now no longer to be found there.

§ 8. 'And they require all the more diligent attention (*φιλοπονέειν* 'labour *con amore*, fond, affectionate, loving, care and pains), to be bestowed upon them in prose, in proportion as the sources from which prose draws its aids or supplies are fewer than those of verse': see *ante* § 3. I have translated *τοσοῦτω* which seems much more likely than *τοσοῦτο*. If the latter be retained, it can only mean 'so much as I have described', but where? or when? I have no doubt that *τοσοῦτω* is the right reading. [*οὕτω* A (quod Bekkerum fugit) Q, unde iam Victorius *τοσοῦτω* restituit." Spengel.]

'And perspicuity' (perhaps rather, 'clearness' in the sense of vivid, graphic, representation<sup>1</sup>), 'and pleasure, and the foreign air, are conveyed by metaphor more than in any other way', (more than by any other kind of word which can be used to give an extraneous interest to language). ἔστι δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἐκάστω τῶν εἰρημένων προπόντως χρῆσθαι, καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. Poet. XXIII. 16. The *pleasure* derived from metaphors is that we learn something from them; they bring into view hitherto unnoticed resemblances between things the most apparently dissimilar. τὸ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ το ὁμοιον θεωρεῖν, Poet. XXII 17. Top. Z 2, 140 a 9. This is the fourth kind of metaphor, that from analogy, and by far the commonest and most attractive. On the pleasure of learning, see I 11. 21 and 23, III 10. 2.

'And it can't be derived (acquired) from anyone else'. This does not of course mean that one writer or speaker cannot *borrow* a metaphor

<sup>1</sup> Demetrius, however, περὶ Ἑρμηνείας § 82, (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 281), says, ἐνία μόντοι σαφέστερον ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λέγεται καὶ κυριώτερον ἢ περ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κυρίοις, ὡς τὸ ἐφρίξεν δὲ μάχη (II. N 339), κ.τ.λ. but this is by the vividness of the description.

τόνων βοηθημάτων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων. καὶ τὸ  
σαφές καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικόν ἔχει μάλιστα ἢ μετα-  
9 φορά, καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν παρ' ἄλλου. δεῖ

from another; but that the invention of metaphors is a mark of original genius, and therefore cannot be *taught*, derived from another in the way of instruction. Not that metaphors in general are *confined* to men of genius, πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται, § 6; but they all shew originality more or less, and are marks of *natural* (not acquired) ability, or genius, each in proportion to its merit. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο (τὸ μεταφορικόν) οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν, εὐφύιας τε σημείον ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὁμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν. Poët. XXII 17. And therefore, the more remote the resemblance between the two objects brought together by the metaphor, the more ingenuity and natural ability is required for detecting it.

Harris, *Philol. Inq.*, Part II, ch. 10, takes this view of the meaning; "that metaphor is an effort of genius and cannot be taught is here again (in the present passage) asserted in the words, καὶ λαβεῖν...παρ' ἄλλου." Whately, on the other hand, denies that this means, "as some interpreters suppose, that this power is entirely a gift of nature, and in no degree to be learnt: on the contrary he expressly affirms that the 'perception of resemblances' on which it depends is the fruit of 'philosophy': but he means that metaphors are not to be, like other words and phrases, selected from common use and transferred from one composition to another, but must be formed for the occasion" [*Rhetoric*, chap. III p. 277 ult.]. Whatever Aristotle may have said *elsewhere*, it is certain that what he says in the *Poetics*, and therefore in this passage which is repeated from it, is what Harris has described: the close connexion of παρ' ἄλλου λαβεῖν with the following εὐφύια shews this unmistakably. Besides this, a remark about borrowing metaphors from other people's speeches or writings is not only trivial in itself, but here altogether out of place: and if it were not, why should metaphors be singled out from all other forms of speech as things that should not be borrowed? Is not purloining your neighbour's thoughts or expressions or *bons mots* equally reprehensible in all cases? or may γλῶτται and πεποιημένα and the rest, all of them be 'borrowed', and metaphors alone excepted? Victorius, according to Schrader, renders it, "non licet *semper* sumere ipsam ab alio auctore," which he approves, and interprets, that you musn't be always begging or borrowing your metaphors from others, when you can and ought to invent them yourself. In my copy of Vettori's Commentary [Petri Victorii Commentarii in Opera Aristotelis, 5 vols. folio, published at Florence, 1548—1583], these words do not occur: the passage is there explained, as it should be, of 'acquiring metaphors' from any one but oneself: they being due to a natural ingenuity. Victorius also says that this remark, upon the inventive power which they presuppose, is introduced as an additional recommendation of metaphors: and refers to one of the topics of Top. III., the degrees of good, καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔστι παρ' ἄλλου πορίσασθαι ἢ ὃ ἔστι παρ' ἄλλου, what can't be procured from another, any *native* excellence or advantage, is superior to anything that *can*. Also c. I, 116 b 10, τὸ φύσει τοῦ μὴ

δέ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς ἀρμοττούσας λέγειν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀπρεπὲς φανεῖται διὰ τὸ παρ' ἄλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὡς νέω φοινικίς, οὕτω γέροντι τί· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ πρέπει

φύσει (αἰρετώτερον) τὸ μὲν γὰρ φύσει, τὸ δ' ἐπικτητον, the superiority of the *natural* to the *acquired*.

§ 9. 'Epithets' (including not only single adjectives, but any ornamental or descriptive addition to a plain ὄνομα κύριον, as a sauce to a joint; see *Introd.* p. 289) 'and metaphors must be made appropriate (in the former, to the subjects to which they are applied, in the latter to those to which we *transfer* them from something else): this appropriateness will proceed from the proportion' (between the epithet or metaphor and the thing it is applied to in either case: "si ex proportione duxerimus, observaverimusque ut ipsa sibi mutuo respondeant, similemque rationem inter se habeant." Victorius): 'otherwise (εἰ μὴ εἰσιν ἀρμόττουςαι) the impropriety will be apparent, *glaring*, (by the juxtaposition), because the opposition of two contraries becomes most apparent when they are placed side by side of one another. But (on the contrary) we must consider, as a scarlet coat is suitable to a youth, so also (what is suitable) to an old man: for the same dress is not becoming to both'.

φανεῖται, φαίνεσθαι] in the emphatic sense, equivalent to φανερόν εἶναι—which occurs in the parallel passage, II 23. 30—is illustrated in note on II 2. 1, and I 7. 31 [p. 141]. The observation that παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μᾶλλον φαίνεται is a favourite one with Aristotle. The parallels from the *Rhetoric* are quoted in note on II 23. 27. Add *Dem. de F. L.* § 192, παρ' ἄλληλα γὰρ ἔσται φανερώτερα.

An inappropriate *epithet* may be illustrated by the substitution of *amabile* and *formosum* for *horrendum* and *informe* in Virgil's line, *Monstrum horrendum informe ingens cui lumen ademptum*: a *metaphor* is inappropriate when you bring some incongruous notion into juxtaposition with the object which you 'invest' with your metaphor, like an old man with the incongruous dress of a scarlet coat;—although *viridis* is not inappropriate to *senectus*, though greenness and old age might seem incongruous, because in this application of the metaphor the *proportion* or ratio is observed between the *freshness* implied in the green vegetation and the freshness and vigour of old age, and the two are thus brought under a common genus. When old age is called the evening of life the metaphor is appropriate, because there is a true proportion or analogy; evening : the day :: old age : man's life; evening and old age are under a common *genus*, viz. the close of a period, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, *infra*; comp. *Poet.* XXI 10, ταμεῖν, ἀρύσαι· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀφελεῖν τι ἐστίν. But when Shakespeare [*Hamlet*, III i. 59] speaks of *taking arms against a sea of troubles* there is neither proportion nor congruity: and in such cases, when the two notions are placed side by side, and so brought directly into contrast, the incongruity becomes at once apparent. This kind of solecism is usually called 'confusion of metaphor'.

10 ἐσθής. καὶ εἰάν τε κοσμεῖν βούλῃ, ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων  
τῶν ἐν ταύτῳ γένει φέρειν τὴν μεταφοράν, εἰάν τε  
ψέγειν, ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων. λέγω δ' οἶον, ἐπεὶ τὰ  
ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, τὸ φάναι τὸν μὲν πτωχεύ-  
οντα εὐχεσθαι τὸν δὲ εὐχόμενον πτωχεύειν, ὅτι ἄμφω  
αἰτήσεις, τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστὶ ποιεῖν· ὡς καὶ Ἰφικράτης  
Καλλίαν μητραγύρτην ἀλλ' οὐ δαδούχον. ὃ δ' ἔφη *be-  
cause he was*

§ 10. 'And if you want to set off anything (if praise is your object), you must take your metaphor from the superior (better, more honourable or valuable) things that fall under the same genus; if blame, from the inferior. As an instance of my meaning; since contraries are (the extremes of the *species*) under the same *genus*, to say that one that prays, begs, and one that begs, prays, is to do this; because both of them are kinds of petition'. These are the two extremes of the *genus* petition, or solicitation; praying the highest form, begging the lowest; 'as also (besides others, καὶ) Iphicrates (called) Callias (whom he wished to depreciate) μητραγύρτης instead of δαδούχος ['a mendicant priest', instead of 'bearer of the mystic torch']. The other (Callias) replied, that he (his opponent) never could have been initiated (or he would have been incapable of such a mistake), else he would not have called him μητραγύρτης but δαδούχος—for it is true (adds Aristotle, by way of explanation) that they are both attached to the service of a goddess (both come under the common genus 'servants of a goddess'), but the one is a term of honour, the other of dishonour'. It is much like calling the Precentor of a Cathedral a ballad-singer.

τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει] This is the definition of 'contrary', ἐναντίον: τὰ πλείστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, Categ. c. 6, 6 a 17.

Καλλίας is the third of that name, the son of the third Hipponicus, of that noble and wealthy Athenian family, of which the heads received these names alternately during several generations, Arist. Ran. 283, Ἰππόνικος Καλλίου καὶ Ἰππονίκου Καλλίας. The title of δαδούχος, hereditary in his family, is especially assigned to him by Xenophon, Hellen. VI 3 3, Καλλίας ὁ δαδούχος. His pride in this distinction would of course have rendered him much more susceptible to the slight conveyed by Iphicrates' ignorant, or malicious, mistake. The substitution of the one word for the other, though evidently interpreted by Callias (from his reply) as a mistake made in ignorance of the distinction between the two—perhaps wilfully, to save his dignity—is much more likely to have been intentional and malicious. Callias was a vain foolish man—see Xenoph. l. c. § 3, ult. and Callias' speech §§ 4, 5, 6,—and Iphicrates, the self-made man, who had risen to distinction by his own merits, ἐξ οἶων εἰς οἶα, would doubtless have enjoyed a joke at the expense of the pompous and empty 'descendant of Triptolemus' (Xen. l. c.) and hereditary δαδούχος of the Great Mysteries. Xenophon mentions him as one of the ambassadors to the congress at Sparta in 371 B. C., in virtue of his here-

ἀμύητον αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δαδούχον· ἄμφω γὰρ περὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ

ditary *προξενία* of that state. There is a good account of this Callias by Mr Elder in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* He is the entertainer of the Sophists in the Protagoras, and the host of Xenophon's 'Banquet'. On Callias and his family, its wealth and splendour, see Böckh, *Publ. Econ. of Athens*, Bk. IV c. 3, pp. 42, 3 (Lewis' Transl.), and Heindorf's learned note on Protag. 311.

The δαδουχία was, as we have seen, an office of great distinction. The δαδούχος led the procession of the *μύσται* from Athens to Eleusis on the fifth day of the great Eleusinia, the *torch-day*, ἡ τῶν λαμπάδων ἡμέρα. See *Dict. Antiq.* Art. 'Eleusinia,' p. 373 b. Rich, *Dict. Gr. and Rom. Ant.* s. v. p. 232.

μητραγύρτης, on the contrary, implies everything that is vile and contemptible: it is the designation of a class of profligate beggars, chiefly women, who attached themselves to the worship of some particular deity—usually Cybele, the *Magna Mater*, from which *μητραγύρτης* is taken—at whose festivals they attended to ply their profession, that of ἀγείρειν, collecting alms, *stipem cogere*, and then practised every kind of imposture and indulged in every variety of licentiousness. They seem also to have gone their rounds through the great houses in cities, Plat. Rep. II 364 B—C, fortune-telling, and with charms and spells (as to draw down the gods from heaven) and other nostrums for sale. They carried about with them an image of the goddess in whose name they asked alms. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 629, compares them to mendicant friars or *Béguines*, and designates them *viles Metragyrtes*. Menander wrote two or three plays upon them, the *Θεοφορουμένη* and *Μητραγύρτης* (or *Μηναγύρτης*, so Meineke, *Fr. Comic. Gr.*, Menander, IV 163, on which see Lobeck, *ibid.* 645, note), and the *Ίέρεια*, which, from the lines εἰ γὰρ ἔλκει τὸν θεὸν τοῖς κυμβάλοις ἄνθρωπος εἰς ὃ βούλεται, Lobeck supposes (apparently with little reason) to have been directed against the *Μητραγύρται*. Meineke, *ib.* Menand. IV 140. Compare on their character, Antiphanes, *Fragm. Μισοπονήρου*, Meineke, *Ib.* III 86, αὐται δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι μετὰ γε νῆ Δία τοὺς μητραγυρτοῦντάς γε· πολὺ γὰρ αὖ γένος μαρώτατον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, κ.τ.λ. On incantations and the like, see Ruhnken ad *ἐπαγωγαί*, p. 114. To this extremity Dionysius the younger, once tyrant of Syracuse, was finally reduced, αὐτὸς δὲ Διονύσιος τέλος μητραγυρτῶν καὶ τυμπανοφορούμενος οἰκτρῶς τὸν βίον κατέστρεψε: Clearchus ap. Athen. 541 C (Victorius). The *μητραγύρται*, male and female, did not confine themselves to a single goddess, though Cybele was their favourite, but also attached themselves to the service of Isis; and apparently to that of Demeter and Cora (from the present passage); of Opis and Arge, Hdt. IV 35; and in general, of those whose worship was of an *orgiastic* character, see by all means Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 10, s. v. ἀγείρειν. Here there are two goddesses implied, Demeter in δαδούχος, and Cybele in *μητραγύρτης*. There is a short article in *Dict. Antiq.* on the subject under ἀγύρτης.

ἀγείρειν is used to signify collecting alms, or begging, several times by Herodotus; twice, for instance, in IV 35. By Homer, ἀγείρεσθαι and ἀγυρ-

τὸ μὲν τίμιον τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον. καὶ ὁ μὲν διονυσοκό-  
λακας, αὐτοὶ δ' αὐτοὺς τεχνίτας καλοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ'

τάζειν, Od. τ [XIX] 284. Plato, Rep. II 364 B, 381 D. Dem. π. τ. ἐν χερῶν. 96. 17, ἀφ' ὧν ἀγείρει καὶ προσαιτεῖ καὶ δανείζεται. Hence ἀγύρτης, ἀγυρτρία, 'a vagabond', one that goes about collecting for a deity. Aesch. Agam. 1244, Cassandra of herself, καλουμένη δὲ φοιτάς, ὡς ἀγυρτρία, Blomfield's Gloss. ad loc. Soph. Oed. R. 387, μάγον τοιόνδε...δόλιον ἀγύρτην. Lysippus, Comic. ap. Meineke, Lys. II p. 746, Fragm. Cratin. Δραπετ. II, Ib. II 51 Eubul. κυβευταί, Fr. 2, v 5, σφάλλων, ἀγύρτης οἴστρος. Rhes. 503, of Ulysses, ἀγύρτης πτωχικὴν ἔχων στολήν. Ib. 715, βίον δ' ἐπαίτων εἶρ' ἀγύρτης τις λάτρης.

The next is a case of the same kind ; of two possible designations of actors one takes the lowest and most contemptuous, the other the opposite and highest and most complimentary. Διονυσοκόλακες represents them as parasites or flatterers, not worthy to be companions or friends of the god ; the lowest and most degraded form of *service*, of Dionysus the patron deity of the stage and its belongings (Aristophanes *passim*) τεχνίται as 'artists', or '*artistes*'—as the lower kind of professional performers, singers, dancers, posture-makers, are fond of calling themselves nowadays by way of dignifying their profession : the term is actually applied to them by Dem. de F. L. § 212, of Philip who collected at a festival πάντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ; on which Ulpian (quoted by Shilleto ad loc.) τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς οὕτω καλεῖ κωμικοὺς τε καὶ τραγικοὺς. Shilleto adds, *ut aiunt in Graecis artificibus*, Cic. pro Murena 13 (29). [Ar. Problems 30. 10, 956 b 11, διὰ τί οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνίται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πονηροὶ εἰσιν; referred to by Aulus Gellius, XX 4. Comp. Alciphron, III 48, (Δικύμμιον τὸν τραγῳδῶν) ὃν ἐγὼ τῆς ἀχαρίστου φωνῆς ἕνεκα αὐτοκόρυδον καλεῖσθαι πρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τοῦ χοροῦ τῶν Διονυσιοκόλακων ἔκρινα (Otto Lüders, *die Dionysischen Künstler*, 1873, pp. 58—63).]

The common *genus* or notion which unites Διονυσοκόλακες and τεχνίται as 'contraries' is that of service to a deity : the τεχνίται as well as the κόλακες being assumed as actors, to be devoted to his especial service. The distinction is that between true *art*, and low buffoonery. This, as far as I can see, is the whole meaning of the passage.

Victorius however, and Schweighäuser on Athen. VI 249 F, drag in here, wholly as I can conceive beside the point, another sense of Διονυσοκόλακες in which it was applied to the flatterers of Dionysius of Syracuse—of whose filthy and disgusting practices Theophrastus (quoted in Wytttenbach on Plut. p. 53, F) gives some revolting examples—in a double sense, of Dionysus and Dionysius : see their notes for the explanation of this. (It is supposed by them and Mr Shilleto u.s. to be a joke ; if so, it is of a very frigid description.) Wytttenbach says (note ad Plut. l. c.) "Actores scenici honesto nomine dicebantur οἱ περὶ Διόνυσον τεχνίται, per contemptum Διονυσιοκόλακες" : which is no doubt all that is meant here, though he refers to Victorius' note, who makes a great deal more out of it. This special sense of τεχνίται is fully confirmed by another passage of Athen. v 198 B describing a magnificent procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus (cc. 25—30), μεθ' οὓς ἐπορεύετο Φιλίσκος ὁ ποιητής, ἱερεὺς ὧν Διόνυσου, καὶ πάντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνίται. It

ἄμφω μεταφορᾶ, ἣ μὲν ρύπαινόντων ἣ δὲ τούναντίον.  
καὶ οἱ μὲν ληστὰι αὐτοὺς ποριστὰς καλοῦσι νῦν· διὸ

occurs also in Diog. Laert. x 4. 8, Epicurus called τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα (Plato's followers) Διονυσοκόλακας, καὶ αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα χρυσοῦν (which is translated 'Dionysii assentatores' in Cobet's corrected version, though *Dionysius* can surely have nothing to do with the matter, any more than here). Here also the word is a term of reproach; and seems by this time to have become *proverbial* for gross and low flattery: "tanquam assentatores eos, non sodales, insimulans." Victorius. Victorius understands the term, as here used, to express the lowest order of attendants on the stage (parasites of Bacchus), such as the scene-shifters, candle-snuffers, and such like menials of a modern theatre, but another passage of Athen. xi 538 F,—καὶ ἔκτοτε οἱ πρότερον καλούμενοι Διονυσοκόλακες Ἀλεξανδροκόλακες ἐκλήθησαν, διὰ τὰς τῶν δώρων ὑπερβολὰς ἐφ' οἷς καὶ ἦσθη ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος. This occurs in a list of the entertainments which were exhibited in a great marriage-feast given by Alexander after the capture of Darius, taken from a work of Chares, 'the histories of Alexander'. Now whether ἐφ' οἷς ἦσθη refers to Alexander's delight at their gifts (neut.) or at themselves (masc.), that is, their acting, in either case their employment could not have been of the mean and degrading character attributed to it by Victorius—in the one case they were too rich, in the other, if they amused him, they must have been actors, or at all events above the degree of menials, though their acting may have been mere grimace and buffoonery.

'And one (to vex and lower them) calls them' (whether this means any 'one' in particular, we do not know) 'parasites of Dionysus (low buffoons), whereas they themselves style themselves *artists*: and each of these is a metaphor (*artist* as applied to them is a metaphor, I suppose, because the proper object of art is *production*—τέχνη μέτα λόγου ποιητική, ταῦτόν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική: and ποιήσις being distinguished from πράξις, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. Eth. Nic. vi 4, 1140 a 7 seq.—and these men *produce* nothing; their profession is practical, ends in πράξις, or action), 'the one for the purpose of (*lit.* belonging to) blackening (soiling, defaming), the other the contrary'.

ρύπαινειν (ρύπος, dirt), Eth. N. i 9, 1099 b 3, ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ρύπαινουσι τὸ μακάριον, 'their bliss is tarnished, sullied, defiled, defaced'. Pherecrates, ap. Meineke, *Fr. Comic. Gr.* ii 352, Pherecr. Fr. Inc. 48, ap. Photium, Suidam, Thomam Magistram. "Schol. ad Ar. Nub. 97, εἰς δουλείαν ἐρρύπαινέτο ὁ φιλόσοφος. Simile est ἐπισμῇν." Meineke, Id. ad fragm. Cratini, Cleobul. 9,\*ap. Schol. ad Arist. Thermoph. 389, τί γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἐπισμῇ τῶν κακῶν; Dion. de Isocr. Iudicium, c. 18, καὶ οὐτ' Ἀριστοτέλει πείθομαι ρύπαινειν τὸν ἄνδρα βουλομένην.

'And pirates nowadays call themselves *purveyors*'. So Pistol, in *Merry Wives of Windsor*, i 3. 49, "Convey the wise it call: Steal, foh! a fico for the phrase!"

νῦν] referring to the early times spoken of by Thucyd., i 5, when the Greeks ἐτράποντο πρὸς ληστείαν...οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνῃν τούτου τοῦ ἔργου,

ἔξεστι λέγειν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν, τὸν δ' ἀμαρτάνοντα ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ τὸν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ πορθῆσαι. τὸ δὲ ὡς ὁ Τήλεφος Εὐριπίδου φησί,

κώπης ἀνάσσω καποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν,

ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μείζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν ἢ κατ' ἀξίαν οὐ

11 κέκλεπται οὖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἀμαρ-  
τία, ἐὰν μὴ ἡδείας ἢ σημεῖα φωνῆς, οἶον Διονύσιος  
προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραυγὴν

φέρontos δέ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ. On what follows, see Homer, Od. III 73, and elsewhere.

On the actual πορισταί at Athens, see Schneider's note on Arist. Pol. I 11, ult., *Comm.* p. 65. *σφαιραῖς πορὶς τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἐκείνων.*

'And therefore (by the same rule) wrong may be called error, and error wrong' (both of them kinds of injury or offence; that is here the supposition in ἀμαρτάνειν; but the one is a crime because it is done with a bad προαίρεσις or moral purpose, the other a venial offence; ἀνευ δὲ κακίας ἀμάρτημα κ.τ.λ. Eth. N. v 10, 1135 b 18 seq.) 'and stealing either taking or robbing (on a grand scale)'.

'A phrase like that of Euripides' Telephus, "He lords it over the oar (*sways* it, like a sceptre, the emblem of royalty), and having on his departure for Mysia," is unbecoming (inappropriate), because *ruling, swaying, lording*, is too big, pompous, for the value (measure, merits) (of the object described); and so, the disguise (concealment) is not effected (the art or effort becomes apparent, *supra*, § 5).

κώπης ἀνάσσω καποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν] The rest of the sentence is supplied by the Schol. ἐτραυματίσθη πολέμῳ βραχίονι. The first line should be read [not, as in the MSS, κώπας ἀνάσσειν, καὶ ἀποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν, but] as it is by Dindorf, *Poet. Sc.*, Fragn. Eur. Tel. 20, and Wagner, Fragn. Tel. 10 (*Fr. Trag. Gr.* II 359), κώπης ἀνάσσω καποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν. ἀνάσσειν takes the genit. and dative, not the accus. κώπης ἀναξ and ἀνάσσειν *et similia* are found elsewhere in Eurip. Helen. 1048, Cyclops [86], and Aesch. Pers. 378. In Aeschylus the pompous phrase is much more characteristic. The cautious and sober Sophocles never employs it.

§ 11. 'There is also a fault (which may be committed) in the (composition of, and the sound thence arising of the) syllables of a word if (i. e. if ever, or when) they are not signs or marks (indications, representations) of sweet or agreeable voice' (i. e. if, when they are pronounced, or expressed by the voice, they don't produce an agreeable sound; φωνή is the sound of the voice, or the voice as uttered, and forming words) 'as Dionysius the Brazen calls poetry in his elegies "Calliope's screech," because they are both *voices*'—and so far his metaphor was right: both terms fall under the same genus, φωνή, the met. εἶδος πρὸς εἶδος—'but his metaphor is a bad one by reason of its insignificant sounds'.

κραυγῇ] a screech, scream, any harsh and dissonant sound. κράζειν,



**Καλλιόπης τὴν ποίησιν, ὅτι ἄμφω φωναί· φαύλη δὲ**  
**12 ἡ μεταφορὰ ταῖς ἀσήμοις φωναῖς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ πόρρωθεν**

with which it is connected, expresses the harsh voices of certain animals as the 'croak' of the raven and the frog, and the 'bawling' of a man, all suggestive of disagreeable associations. The 'badness of the metaphor' seems to reside in this. ἄσημος φωνή is, it is true, nothing but a non-significant voice or sound, applied, Poet. xx §§ 5, 6, 7, to sounds like syllables, and conjunctions, which signify nothing by themselves, but only in combination with other sounds or words; and opposed to σηματικά, sounds which *do* signify something each by itself, as noun and verb §§ 8, 9. But these non-significant sounds, which represent discordant and unmeaning cries, are here to be interpreted as *expressing* also the associations which they suggest, and so κραυγή, which suggests all these disagreeable cries and screams, is particularly ill applied as a metaphor to the sweetest of all voices, such as that of a Muse.

'Dionysius the Brazen', so called from having first suggested the use of *bronze* money at Athens, Athen. xv 669 D, was a poet and rhetorician, *ibid.*, whose floruit is to be referred to the earlier part of the fifth cent. B. C., judging from a remark in Plut. Nic. c. 5, 526 B, where we are told that there was in Nicias' household a man called Hiero, who claimed to be the son of Dionysius the Brazen. A further account of him is to be found in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*, Dionysius no. 16; and a collection of the fragments of his elegies, amounting to seven, in Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr.* p. 432 [p. 468, 2nd ed.]. In fragm. 5 there is a still worse specimen of his metaphors preserved, which beats even the κόπης ἀνάσσει, and in the same kind of fault. καὶ τινες οἶνον ἀγορτες ἐν εἰρεσίῃ Διονύσου, συμποσίου ναῦται καὶ κυλικῶν ἐρέται.

[On the Bronze coinage of Athens, see Beule's *Monnaies d'Athènes*, pp. 73—77. It seems impossible to say with certainty, either when it first came in, or what is the date of the oldest bronze money extant. Leake supposes it probable that it came in soon after the first unsuccessful attempt to introduce it, while Beule thinks that the early extant bronzes are of the age of Alexander. It is certain they were in circulation in the time of Philemon, the Comic poet. See Leake's *Numismata Hellenica* (European Greece), p. 22. These details are due to Professor Churchill Babington.]

On harshness of sound in composition, see Hermog. περὶ ἰδεῶν Τομ. α'. c. 7, περὶ τραχύτητος, Spengel *Rhet. Gr.* II 299. Of the second class, the ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν σκληραί, the harshness arising 'out of themselves' from the disagreeable combination of the letters, ἀταρπός, ἔμαρπεν, ἔγναμψε, and such like, are given as examples. In the same treatise Τομ. β'. c. 4, (II 359), there are some remarks upon the connexion of sounds with pleasant associations, which make the sounds themselves pleasant.

§ 12. 'Further, they must not be far-fetched, but from things kindred (cognate) and of like form must be transferred notions (in the form of words) hitherto nameless in the fashion of names (so as to become new names), any one of which as soon as spoken will be clearly perceived

δεῖ ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μετα-  
φέρειν τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὀνομασμένως, ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλόν  
ἐστίν ὅτι συγγενές, οἶον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδο- P. 1405 δ.  
κιμοῦντι

ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα· p. 115.

ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δ' ἄμφω πρόσθεσίς τις·

to be near of kin, as in the popular (famous) aenigma, 'I saw man gluing upon man bronze with fire'; for the process was nameless, but both of them are a kind of *application* (the common *genus*); and accordingly he (the author of verses) gave the name of 'gluing' to the application of the cupping glass.'

πόρρωθεν] *infra* c. 3. 4, ἀσαφείς δὲ ἂν πόρρωθεν. Demetrius, *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, 78, μήτε μὴν πόρρωθεν μετενηνεγμέναις (μεταφοραῖς. χρηστέον), ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου. Cic. de Or. III 41. 163, *Deinde videndum est ne longe simile sit ductum*. Syrtē patrimonii, scopulum libentius dixerim; Charybdim bonorum, voraginem potius. *Facilius enim ad ea quae visa, quam quae audita, mentis oculi feruntur*. Ib. II 63. 255, of jokes, *in quo, ut ea quae sint frigidiora vitemus—etenim cavendum est ne arcessitum dictum putetur...* Quint. VIII Proem. 23, *sunt optima minime accessita*. Similarly of arguments *supra*, I 2. 12, II 22. 3. Top. A 105 a 8.

ἀνώνυμα ὀνομασμένως] Cic. de Or. III 38. 155, *tertius ille modus transferendi verbi late patet, quem necessitas genuit inopia coacta et angustia, post autem iucunditas delectatioque celebravit*. In fact, to say nothing of others, words which stand for moral and intellectual operations, notions, abstractions, conceptions, are and must be ultimately derived by metaphor from objects of sense: see Locke, who gives a list of them, *Essay*, Bk. III ch. I. 5, Berkeley, *Three Dialogues*, Dial. III Vol. I p. 202 (4to. ed.), "most part of the mental operations" (this is saying far too little) "being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms, comprehend, reflect, discourse, &c." Whewell, *Nov. Org. Renov.* Bk. IV I, p. 260. Renan, *Orig. du Langage*, p. 128, seq. Leibnitz, *Nouv. Essais sur l'entend. hum.* III 1. 5 (quoted by Renan), Max Müller, *Lect. on science of Lang.* 1st series, Vol. I p. 377 seq.

The second line of this aenigma, which completes it, is found in Athen. x 452 C, the only author, says Victorius, who gives it entire, οὕτω συγκόλλως ὥστε σὺναιμα ποιεῖν. τοῦτο δὲ σημαίνει τῆς σικύας προσβολήν. It is inserted amongst the αἰνίγματα, No. VIII in the Anthology, Vol. IV p. 288, Jacobs' ed., and preceded by another on the same subject in four lines. The first line is also quoted, Poet. xxii 5, Demetr. *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 102, (Demetrius recommends that aenigmatical expressions of this kind *should be avoided*), and Plut. Symp. Sept. Sap. 154 B (Victorius). Harris, *Philol. Inq.* Pt. II ch. 10, on aenigmas. [On the cupping-instrument referred to in the riddle, compare Juvenal xiv 58 (with Mayor's note), *iam pridem caput hoc ventosa cucurbita quaerit*.

κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆς σικύας προσβολήν. καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εὖ ἡνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν ἐπικεῖς· μεταφοραὶ γὰρ αἰνίττονται, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι  
 13] εὖ μετενήκεται. καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν· κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος

Bronze specimens about four inches high, found by Pompeii, may be seen in the Museum at Naples.]

‘And in general, from all ingenious, well-constructed, aenigmas good metaphors may be derived: for all metaphors convey (imply) an aenigma, plainly therefore a metaphor (so borrowed from a good aenigma) must be itself well converted (i. e. a well-selected metaphor)’. Cicero thought less highly of aenigmas as a source of metaphors; at all events metaphors, accumulated till they become aenigmas, are reprehensible. De Or. III 42. 167, *est hoc (translatio) magnum ornamentum orationis, in quo obscuritas fugienda est: etenim hoc genere fiunt ea quae dicuntur aenigmata.*

εὖ μετενήκεται] is rendered by Cicero (according to Victorius) *ratione translata*, and *quae sumpta ratione est*, de Or. III 40. 160. τὸ ἐπικεῖς μεταφέρομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Eth. N. v. 14, sub init.

§ 13. ‘And (metaphors should be taken) from things fair and noble (*subaudi* δεῖ λαβεῖν μεταφοράς): but the beauty of a word (especially a noun, which can represent some visible or audible object), as Licymnius says, resides either in the sound or the sense (the thing signified), and the ugliness in like manner’.

When Aristotle wrote τὸ μὲν, he seems to have intended to introduce τὸ δέ to correspond as the second member of the division, which was afterwards carelessly changed into ἡ. It is surprising however that he never corrected such palpable blunders as these, for which he must have had frequent opportunities. Did he think that they were of no consequence in writing, of which the object was instruction only? He says at any rate, III 1. 6, that no one pays much attention to style in teaching geometry.

ἀπὸ καλῶν] Cic. de Or. III 41. 163, seq. *Et quoniam haec vel summa laus est in verbis transferendis ut sensum feriat id quod translatum sit, fugienda omnis turpitudine earum rerum ad quas eorum animos qui audient trahet similitudo. Nolo dici morte Africani castratam esse rempublicam; nolo stercus curiae dici Glauciam: quamvis sit simile, tamen est in utroque deformis cogitatio similitudinis.* Quint., VIII 6. 14—17, quotes the line of *Furius Bibaculus* (Hor. Sat. II 5.41), *Iuppiter hibernas cana nive conspuat Alpes.*

κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος] Theophrastus, according to Demetrius περὶ ἑρμηνείας, §§ 173—5 (*Rhet. Gr.* III 300, ed. Spengel), recognised three sources of beauty in words, (1) the appeal to the sight, the direct suggestion of beautiful objects by the words which are associated with them; (2) to the ear, by the sound of the words themselves; and thirdly διάνοια, by the ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’, Licymnius ὁ σημαινόμενον, and Aristotle’s δυνάμει the *vis*, virtue, force, i. e. significance, its *power* of suggestion. These are illustrated by Demetrius, l. c., the first by ῥοδόχροον, ἀνθοφόρου χροάς: the second by Καλλίστρατος, Ἀνθοῶν, (the λλ and νν seem

τὸ μὲν, ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ αἶσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον, ὃ λύει τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐθέννα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦ τόδε εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος· ἐστὶ

to have pleased his ear): and the third by ἀρχαῖος as compared with παλαιός, the former being suggestive of higher and nobler associations: οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι ἄνδρες ἐντιμότεροι. It seems from this that the distinction between the first and third of these sources of beauty in a word is that the first is the *direct* suggestion, by *word-painting*, of a beautiful object of sight, as a rosy cheek or skin: the third is the remoter suggestion of beauty, by *inference* from association, as ἀρχαῖος suggests worth and respect; this form of suggestion has an intellectual character, and is therefore represented by Theophrastus as διάνοια. To the direct suggestions of sight in the first class, Aristotle afterwards adds all the other senses—as music to the ear, a well-remembered flavour to the palate, smell to the nose, soft and warm things to the touch. The second of the three, is the actual sound of the word, *suggesting* nothing else; Licymnius' ψόφοι, and Theophrastus' and Demetrius' πρὸς ἀκοήν.

τοῖς ψόφοις] There are [as already remarked *supra* p. 12, on § 9, διάλεκτος], three degrees of *sound* in an ascending scale. The first and lowest is ψόφος 'noise', such as even inanimate things are capable of *when struck*. The second is voice, φωνή or φθόγγος, (as distinguished from speech,) which is shared by all animals that have a *throat*. The third is distinctive of the human race, διάλεκτος (sometimes called λογός), *discourse*, articulate speech. ψόφος as distinguished from φωνή will include all *sounds* which, though human, do not proceed from the voice and organs of speech: such as sneezing, coughing, hissing, whistling (ποππυσμός) and so on. These particulars are taken from two passages, Ar. Hist. Anim. IV 9, 535 a 27—b 3, and Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 14 (p. 72, Reiske). Of sound, ψόφος, in its most general sense, as the *object of hearing*, see de Anima II 8. De Sens. c. 3, init. Ib. c. 1, 437 a 10. Hist. An. I 1. 29, 488 a 31, seq., of the distinctions of animals, in respect of the *sounds* they make.

What is known of Licymnius, I have collected in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX Vol. III pp. 255—7. [Plato Phaedrus p. 267 C, τὰ δὲ Πῶλον πῶς φράσσωμεν μουσεῖα λόγων... ὀνομάτων τε Λικυμνίων, ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο πρὸς ποίησιν εὐπετίας. Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*. I 75, 76.]

And again thirdly (a third observation upon metaphors), which solves (furnishes an answer to, serves to refute) the sophistical argument (theory or position); for it is *not* true, as Bryson said, that no one ever uses (that there is no such thing as) foul or indecent language, if (if—as the case really is, i. e. since or because) the same thing is signified by saying this or that (by using the broad word or disguising it by a veil of ὑποκορισμός), for this is false: for one term is more *properly* applied to an object than another (represents it more *literally* and directly), and is more assimilated to it, and more nearly *akin* to it, by setting the

γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλον κυριώτερον καὶ ὠμοιωμένον μᾶλλον  
καὶ οἰκειότερον τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων.  
ἔτι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχον σημαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε καὶ  
οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον θετέον· ἄμφω  
μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἴσχρὸν σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλ’

thing more directly before the eyes (and so making it more *vivid, striking, and impressive*).

Of Bryson, I have collected what is known in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. v Vol. II pp. 143—6. In this dogma of the impossibility of indecent language he seems to have anticipated the Stoics—see Cicero’s famous letter to Paetus on this Stoic *libertas loquendi*, u. s. p. 144 note. *Suo quamque rem nomine appellare* was their statement of this ‘liberty’, to call everything its right and proper name without shame or disguise, to call a spade a spade, to use the language of a Swift or Aristophanes. Aristotle answers Bryson by a simple denial of the fact. It is *not* true that there is no difference in the use of words in respect of their moral effect upon us; the broad and literal expression presents the abomination much more vividly and impressively to the mind, naked as it were, than the same notion when half hidden from the view by a decent veil which conceals a great deal of its deformity. On this subject of plain speaking, besides Cicero’s letter to Paetus (ad Div. IX 22), already referred to, see Cic. de Off. I 35. 128 where the Stoics are again introduced. Cicero takes the moral and delicate side of the question. Eth. N. IV 14, 1128 a 23, ἴδοι δ’ ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν τοῖς μὲν ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια (the covert insinuation: this is the difference between coarse and refined indelicacy). Ar.’s opinion upon the subject is given much more strongly and decidedly, Pol. IV (VII) 17, 1336 b 3, ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν· ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερώς λέγειν ὑτιοῦν τῶν αἰσchrῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς. Perhaps one of the wisest observations the author ever made. Comp. Quint. VI 3.29.

‘And besides, it is not under the same conditions and circumstances that it signifies this or that, so that on this ground again we must assume that one (mode of expression) is fairer or fouler than another: for though both of them *do* express (or signify) beauty and deformity, yet not *qua* beautiful and deformed (in so far as they are beautiful and the reverse, and *in no other respect*): or, if the latter also, at all events in different degrees’. These two different effects of *αἰσχρολογία* seem to be thus distinguishable. We are first told that the use of the broad word is offensive because it suggests directly and immediately, paints on the mind a vivid picture of the ugly, foul or impure object: nothing is said of any further, indirect, associations connected with it, and the bad effect arises solely from the *strength* or vividness of the impure or ugly impression. But in the second case the effect of the plain speaking and its associations is contrasted with those that may be produced by softening the term, or employing one which *signifies* the

οὐχ ἡ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ἡ αἰσχρόν· ἢ ταῦτα μέν, ἀλλὰ  
μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τὰς δὲ μεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰ-  
στέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ τῇ ὄψει  
ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει. διαφέρει δ' εἰπεῖν, οἷον ῥοδο-  
δάκτυλος ἥως μᾶλλον ἢ φοινικοδάκτυλος, ἢ ἔτι φαν-  
14 λότερον ἐρυθροδάκτυλος. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ἔστι

same thing, but suggests an entirely different and innocent set of asso-  
ciations. As in the instances given by Cic. in de Off. I 35. 128 *liberis dare operam*. Here all the associations which would be at once suggested by the broad, obscene word, are diverted, and another set introduced, connected solely with children, as the result of the intercourse, and perfectly free from all impurity. In the one case it is the mere comparison of strength and intensity that makes the difference, in the other there is a difference of *kind*. 'The fair term and the foul term it is true *mean* the same thing, point to the same object, but not in respect of beauty and deformity alone simply and solely (ἡ), but besides that, there are associations suggested by which the one may be invested with a moral and the other with an immoral character, either altogether, or at all events in different degrees': ἄμφω γάρ...μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. An example of these words suggestive of unpleasant associations which are willingly avoided by the well-bred and refined under the name of αἰσχρολογία, is to be found in Plat. Gorg. 494 C, where Socrates is made to apologise to Callicles for shocking him by the use of terms such as ψωρᾶν, κυησιᾶν.

'These are the sources from which metaphors may be taken; from things beautiful either by the voice (the sound of the word itself when uttered), or by the force or meaning' (what it indirectly suggests: as δύνασθαι, to have the power, force, virtue, when applied to words, denotes their 'value', in the sense of *meaning* or signification, see note on I 9.36; so δύναμις the subst. may of course be similarly employed), 'or by (i.e. conveyed by) the sight or any other sense'. These terms have been already explained. ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει is illustrated by Victorius from Cic. de Or. III 40.161, *Nam ut odor urbanitatis, et mollitudo humanitatis, et murmur maris, et dulcedo orationis, sunt ducta a ceteris sensibus; illa vero oculorum multo acriora, quae ponunt paene in conspectu animi quae cernere et videre non possumus*.

'But it is preferable (διαφέρει here, to surpass, excel) to say *rose-fingered* dawn, rather than *purple-fingered*, or, still worse, *red-fingered*.' The latter suggests cooks' hands, or other vulgar associations. The rose on the contrary reminds one of what is agreeable to the *sight*, and the *smell*. Add to this from Campbell, *Phil. of Rhet.*, Bk. III ch. I § 1, (Vol. II p. 142, 2nd ed.), that the last of the three epithets compared is the vaguest and most general, and therefore the worst: the second better, because more special; and the first best of all, because the most particular, the red (*purple* Campbell says) of the rose. He also mentions the gratification of the *two* senses.

§ 14. 'In the epithets also, the application of them may be made (they

μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ φαύλου ἢ αἰσχροῦ, οἷον ὁ μητροφόντης, ἔστι δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος, οἷον ὁ πατὴρ ἀμύντωρ· καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀρεῦσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμιόνους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἱκανὸν ἔδωκεν, ἐποίησε

χαίρετ' ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων·

καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἦσαν. ἔτι τὸ αὐτὸ  
 15 ὑποκορίζεσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὁ ὑποκορισμὸς ὃς ἐλαττον  
 ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἄρι-

may be derived, for application) from what is mean and low (morally bad in this sense), or foul and ugly, or disgraceful (another kind of badness), for instance "matricide", or from what is (nobler and) better, as "a father's avenger". The one represents the fair side of Orestes' act, the other its bad aspect. "Locus ex Eur. Oreste 1587, ὁ μητροφόντης, ἐπὶ φόνφ πράσσω φόνον inquit Menelaus, Orestem criminans : cui se defendens respondet Orestes, ὁ πατὴρ ἀμύντωρ ὃν σὺ προῦδκας θανεῖν."

On ἐπίθετα, see Introd. on c. 3. p. 289. Ernesti's *Lex. Technologiae Gr.*

'And Simonides, when the victor in the mule-race offered him only a small fee, refused to write (the ode on this occasion) on the plea of being offended (shocked) at the notion of "composing an ode on half-asses," but when the other gave him as much as he wanted (as satisfied him), he wrote at once, "All hail, daughters of storm-footed mares" ["Hurrah, for the brood of the storm-footed coursers!"], and yet they were daughters of the asses as well'. Dion., de Comp. Verb. c. 25 (Vol. v 201, ed. Reiske), quotes a pentameter verse, without the author's name, which contains an analogous epithet, κοῦραι ἐλαφροπόδων ἔχνε' ἀειράμεναι. On Simonides' greed of gain and miserly habits, see Aristoph. Pax 697—9. Ar. Eth. N. IV 2. ult. (ὁ ἐλευθέριος) Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος, which has the air of a proverbial expression for a miser. Comp. his dictum in II 16.2, on the comparative advantages of money over wisdom. The case of Simonides is referred to by Whately, *Rhet.* c. III (p. 277, *Encycl. Metroph.* Enc. of mental philosophy), in illustration of the "employment of metaphors (*epithets*, not metaphors) either to elevate or degrade a subject," of which he says in the note "a happier instance cannot be found" than this.

§ 15. 'Further the same thing may be effected (as by epithets in the way of elevation or depreciation) by diminutives', *lit.* 'diminutives are, or amount to, much the same thing as epithets'. As epithets, so diminutives, may be applied to diminish the good or bad of a thing, according as a favourable or unfavourable view is to be taken of it. On ὑποκορίζεσθαι, ὑποκορισμός, see note on I 9.29. Add Gräfenhan, *Geschichte der Klass. Philologie*, I p. 459. It will be seen by the examples quoted in the note referred to, that the term includes much more than mere diminutives.

στοφάνης σκώπτει ἐν τοῖς Βαβυλωνίοις, ἀντὶ μὲν χρυσίου χρυσιδάριον, ἀντὶ δ' ἱματίου ἱματιδάριον, ἀντὶ δὲ λαιδορίας λαιδορημάτιον καὶ νοσημάτιον. εὐλα-ρ. 116. βεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτριον.

ικ. ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποκαταστάσεσιν

tives, and is extended to the expression of all coaxing, flattering, soothing, endearing phrases ; and does *not* (properly) include expressions of contempt, which *is* however conveyed by many diminutives. The two terms are therefore by no means co-extensive: Aristotle, who has merely illustrated this form of language by *examples* of diminutives, has taken them alone as the most distinctive class of words which convey by the termination endearment and contempt. The form of *endearment* used in *extenuation* diminishes the bad, the *contemptuous* employment of them diminishes the good.

There are no less than thirteen varieties of Greek diminutive terminations, which may be found in Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 103. Donaldson, *Gr. Gr.* § 361, 3. f. aa, p. 320, gives only ten. Both of them have omitted a form Ἀττικίων, which occurs in Arist. Pax 214, where the Schol. has καταφρονήσεως ἔνεκα. It is to be noted that some of these diminutives in -διον have the ι long, though by the ordinary rule it is short. τῷ κιδίον, Ar. Nub. 93. οὐσιδίον, Nicom. Inc. Fr. ap. Meineke, IV. 587. σπηδίον, Arist. Fragm. et octies ap. Comic. Fragm. ἀργυρίδιον, Av. 1622. ἱματίδιον, Lysistr. 470. δικαστηρίδιον, Vesp. 803, and others, ap. Fritzsche ad Arist. Ran. 1301. πορνιδίον has the ι long and short, Arist. Ran. 1301, and Nub. 997. The long ι arises from a contraction, so that πορνιδίον must be, derived from πορνι-ιδίον, and is a diminutive of a diminutive. [Kühner *Gr. Gr.* § 330.]

On Latin diminutives, Madvig, *Lat. Gr.* § 182. "By means of *lus*, *la* or *lum*, and *culus*, *cula* or *culum*, are formed diminutives (*nomina diminutiva*) which denote littleness, and are often used by way of endearment, commiseration, or to ridicule something insignificant, e.g. *hortulus*, a little garden, *matercula*, a (poor) mother, *ingeniolum*, a little bit of talent."

On English diminutives see a paper by Sir G. C. Lewis, *Phil. Mus.* 1 697 seq. in Marsh's *Lect. on the Eng. Lang.*, Smith's ed. p. 218 ; and Latham's *Eng. Lang.* c. xv § 337 ; also a paper by J. C. Hare in (Hare and Thirlwall's) *Phil. Mus.* Vol. I. p. 679. These are in *kin*, *ling*, and *et*, *let* (from the Norman, French and Italian (E. M. C.), Marsh. *Lect.* u. s. *Lect.* XIV. § 6). To which Latham adds *ie* (Scotch), (*lassie*, *doggie*), *en* (chicken, kitten), *et* and *let*, trumpet, lancet, pocket, owl, brooklet, streamlet ; *ock* (Grimm), bullock, hillock : paddock, buttock, hummock (Lewis). "The Greek word *μείωσις* means diminution ; *ὑποκόρημα* means an endearing expression. Hence we get names for the two kinds of diminutives ; viz. the term *meiotic* for the true diminutives, and the term *hypocoristic* for the dim. of endearment." Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, III 664 (ap. Latham). The *contemptuous* diminutive in English is *ling* ; lordling, bantling, foundling, underling, hiring.

'By diminutive I mean that which diminishes the evil and the good (which belongs to the proper meaning of a word ; by the addition of a



I τὰ δὲ ψυχρά ἐν τέτταρσι γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἐν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οἷον Λυκόφρων τὸν πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανὸν τῆς μεγαλοκορύφου γῆς

termination), of which Aristophanes' sarcasm in the *Babylonians* is a specimen, where he substitutes *χρυσιδάριον* for *χρυσίον* (this again is diminutive of diminutive), *ιματιδάριον* for *ιμάτιον*, *λοιδορημάτιον* for *λοιδορία*, and *νοσημάτιον*' (Fritzsch, ap. Meineke l. c., by a very probable conj., reads *νοημάτιον*, which is certainly much more germane to the matter). 'We must, however, be very careful (in the use of this figure), and be on our guard against exaggeration in both' (in the employment of *ἐπίθετα* and *ὑποκορισμός*). On these diminutives of Aristophanes, Meineke, *Fragm. Babyl. XXX. Fr. Comic. Gr.* II. 982, observes: "Usurpasse autem videtur poeta istas verborum formas, ut Gorgiam et qui eius in dicendo artem sectarentur rideret, quemadmodum etiam in Acharnensibus saepissime ista ornamenta orationis vituperat." This explains *σκάπτει*.

*παρατηρεῖν*] 'to lie in wait for', see on II 6.20. In the word here there is no 'evil purpose' implied. It is rather 'to wait upon', watch for an opportunity.

### CHAP. III.

From the graces and excellences of style we now pass on to some of its defects. These are comprehended under the term *ψυχρά*, 'faults of taste', expressions stale and cold, flat, lifeless, opposed to *πρόσφατα* 'fresh'. The import and origin of this word, as applied to style, are illustrated in *Introd.* pp. 286, 7. The faults lie mostly in some kind of exaggeration, or turgid and bombastic phraseology, the error of excess. Add to the examples there given, *Dem. de Cor.* § 256, de F. L. § 207, τὸ *ψυχρὸν τοῦτο ὄνομα* (the name of *εὐεργέτης* applied to Philip).

Demetrius, *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 116, refers (in his chapter *περὶ ψυχροῦ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ*) to this division with the author's name. All the details are omitted, and only *one* of the examples, the *ὕγρὸν ἰδρῶτα* in § 3, is given. There is no doubt a *lacuna*.

§ 1. 'Faults of taste are shewn (are made to appear; arise, grow) in four points of style or language; first in compound words, instances of which are Lycophron's 'many-visaged heaven', his 'vast-topped earth', and his 'narrow-passaged shore'.

On *διπλὰ ὀνόματα*, see *Introd.* p. 287. All the compound words mentioned are words compounded of two *significant* elements, *ὀνόματα σημαίνοντα*, *Poet.* XXI. 1, 2, i. e. of words which have an independent sense of their own; opposed to such as are only significant in combination with others, as prepositions, conjunctions, particles.

*πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανόν*] "quod plurimam variamque faciem habeat ob sidera ipsa, nisi fallor." Victorius. Compare Plato's famous epigram: *ἀστέρας εἰσαθρεῖς ἀστήρ ἐμός· εἶθε γενοίμην οὐρανός, ὥς πολλοῖς ὄμμασιν εἰς σε βλέπω*. *Anthol. Πλάτωνος*, I (Vol. I. p. 102, ed. Jac.), Bergk, *Plat. Epigr.* 14, *Lyr. Gr.* p. 445. [*Anthol. Gr.* VII 669].

*μεγαλοκορίφου*] *κορυφή* is a *mountain-top*. To one who lived in Greece and knew nothing beyond it, the Earth might well seem to be covered with vast summits.

καὶ ἀκτὴν δὲ στενοπόρον, καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὠνόμαζε, πτωχόμουσος κόλαξ, ἐπιорκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας “μένους μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν P. 1406.

ἀκτὴν στενοπόρον] also belongs to the mountainous character of Greece. The cliffs come down precipitously to the very edge of the sea (in which there are *no tides*), leaving but a narrow passage for horseman or foot-passenger. The word is used appropriately enough by the poet Aeschylus, P. V. 729, and Eur. Iph. Aul. 1497; also by Herod. VII 211.

[Blass, in his brief notice of Lycophron, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II p. 235, while conjecturing that several of the phrases here quoted must have come from a panegyric in glorification of Athens and her heroes, and of Theseus in particular, is led by the Sophist's application of *πέλωρον ἄνδρα* to Xerxes in § 2, to refer ἀκτὴν στενοπόρον to the Hellespont. It would be more reasonable, however, to take the hint supplied by his allusion to Sciron in the same section, and explain it of the narrow path which runs like a cornice along the precipitous sides of the cliffs of Sciron on the coast of Megara (Eur. Hippol. 1208, Σκείρωνος ἀκτάς, Strabo IX p. 391, αἱ Σκειρωνίδες πέτραι πάροδοι οὐκ ἀπολείπονται πρὸς θαλάττῃ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδὸς ἢ ἐπὶ Μεγάρων, and Pausanias I 44 § 6 (Bekker), τὴν ὀνομαζομένην ἀπὸ Σκίρωνος (ὁδὸν) Σκίρων πρῶτος ἐποίησεν ἀνδράσιν ὁδεύειν εὐζώνοις. Hadrian (as Pausanias adds) made this narrow ledge *εὐρυχωρῇ*, but the cliff and its pathway have since once more become an ἀκτὴ στενοπόρος, which is described by Leake (*Northern Greece*, II 414) as 'only practicable by foot-passengers'.]

On Lycophron the Sophist, see *Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Phil.* No. v, Vol. II. p. 141 seq. Not to be confounded with Lycophron the tragic poet, the author of Cassandra, who lived at Alexandria in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, towards the middle of the third cent. B.C.

'And the name given by Gorgias, "beggar-witted or pauper-witted flatterer". *πτωχόμουσος* κόλαξ, as Victorius understands it, *inops ingenium*. Or perhaps rather one who prostitutes his literature and intellectual accomplishments to flattery and sycophancy to make a living by them, 'making his Muse a beggar.' ["This can hardly mean 'arm an *dichterischer Begabung*,' as Rost and Palm explain. Liddell and Scott give with greater probability "living (or rather starving) by his wits." It might also mean, "one whom poverty inspires" (*cui ingeni largitor Venter*). Wit and poverty are the hackneyed attributes of the Greek parasite, and in a comic poet the epithet would probably have been thought happy. A similar compound, *πτωχαλάζων*, is quoted from Phrynichus com. (Meineke, *C. G.* II p. 582)." Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 179 note.]

ἐπιорκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας] 'forsworn, and oath-observing'. The objection here is to κατευορκήσαντας, in which the *κατά* is superfluous. All that Gorgias meant might have been equally well expressed by the simple *εὐορκεῖν* 'to keep one's oath'; or rather the simple opposition of false and true, which he has *exaggerated* into two long words. *εὐορκεῖν*, though itself a compound, seems to be regarded here as a single word. The Schol. has on this, καὶ τὸ κατευορκῆσαι λέγεται ἐπὶ ἀληθῶς ὁμώσαντος· οὐχ ἀρμόζει δὲ ἡ λέξις αὕτη ρηθῆναι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς

πληρουμένην, πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὄψιν γιγνομένην,” καὶ “τελεσφόρον ᾤθη τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν γενήσεται,” καὶ “τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθῶ τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν,” καὶ “κυανόχρων τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἔδαφος.” πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιητικὰ διὰ τὴν δίπλωσιν  
 2 φαίνεται. μία μὲν οὖν αὕτη αἰτία, μία δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην πέλωρον ἄνδρα,

εἰπόντος τὸ ἀληθές, οἷον ὅτι ὑπὲρ γῆν ὄντος τοῦ ἡλίου ἡμέρα ἐστίν, i. e. this is like expounding ‘it is day’ into the longer and more pompous phrase ‘the sun is above the earth.’

μένους μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν πληρουμένην πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὄψιν γιγνομένην] ‘And Alcidas’ phrases, “His soul saturated with wrath, and his face growing the colour of fire” (‘fire-coloured’). This, as I have noted in the account of him in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX, Vol. III, p. 266, is an exemplification of three of the new figures which Gorgias, his master, had recently introduced into Rhetoric, ἀντίθεσις, παρίσσωσις or ἰσόκωλον, and ὁμοιοτέλετον, on which see Ib. No. VII, III 69—72. The ψυχρόν objected to is of course the διπλοῦν ὄνομα, πυρίχρων [‘flame-flushed’].

‘And “end-fulfilling deemed he would be their zeal”, and “end-fulfilling established he the persuasion of his words”, and “dark-blue-coloured the sea’s foundation”. (κυάνεος is indigo blue, also dark in general)—‘for all these have a poetical character arising from (due to) the doubling’.

τελεσφόρος may be translated by Shakespeare’s “thought-executing” fires; but that is poetry [*King Lear* III. 2. 4.—τελεσφόρος became commoner in later Greek prose, as remarked by Lobeck, *Phrynichus*, p. 673 (referred to by Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas*, p. 491 *infra*].

An account of Alcidas will be found in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX, Vol. III, pp. 263—8 (omit pp. 264, 5, where the proof of a paradox is unnecessarily undertaken). [See also Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas*, pp. 491—528 of *Transactions of Vienna Academy*, XLIII 2, 1863; and Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II pp. 317—335.]

§ 2. On the second defect of rhetorical style, γλώτται, see Intro. p. 288.

‘Now this is one cause (of ψυχρότης); another is the employment of obscure and unintelligible words. As Lycophron calls Xerxes a “hugeous” man, and Sciron’ (the famous robber who gave name to the Scironian rocks; put to death by Theseus, after Hercules the greatest eradicator of nuisances from the land of Attica) ‘a “bale” of a man’.

γλώτταις] Whether those which have never been much in use, unusual; or those which have gone out of use, obsolete or archaic; or those which belong to a foreign language or dialect. Comp. Julius Caesar’s rule, *tantum scopolum fugere inauditum atque insolens verbum* (Aulus Gellius I 10).

πέλωρον] This word frequent in Hom. and Hes. under the forms πέλωρ, πέλωρος (subst.), πέλωρος and πελώριος (adj.); πελώριος twice in Aesch.

καὶ Σκίρων σίννις ἀνὴρ, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσῃ, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτῳ 3 τῆς διανοίας ὀργῇ τεθηγμένον. τρίτον δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐπι-

and once in Eurip. Iph. T., had it seems become obsolete in Arist.'s time. Comp. *infra* 7 § 11.

σίννις ἀνὴρ] If σίννις stands for the actual robber, ὁ Πιτυοκάμπτης, rival and contemporary of Procrustes, and Sciron, all of whom Theseus disposed of, he may be translated a "Turpin-man:" but the word is also used to represent the "incarnation of all mischief and destructive agency"—see Monk on Eur. Hippol. 981, and the authors cited; comp. the old poetical words σίνεσθαι, σίνος, (σίντης of the great robber and ravager, the mischievous, destructive lion, Hom. Il. xx 165,) and σίνις. Both σίνος and σίνις occur in Aeschylus in the abstract sense of mischief or destruction, and if σίννις is to be so understood here, as I rather think it should, *baile*, an old English word of similar import, may serve to express it. [Suidas s. v. *Σίνις*· ὄνομα ληστοῦ βλαπτικοῦ.]

ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσῃ] 'And Alcidas "toys to poetry."'. The rest of the phrase is supplied below § 4, "to apply to or introduce *toys* in poetry". ἄθυρμα is a childish amusement, ἀθύρειν to sport like a child, of a child's sport or pastime. So employed by Homer, Pindar, Apoll. Rhod., Anthol. (*quinguiēs*), Euripides (in his Auge, Fragm. viii Wagner, vi Dindorf) *νηπιόις ἀθύρμασιν*, and by Plato in the solemn semi-poetical *Leges*, vii 796 B. See Donaldson on Pind. Nem. iii 44, *παῖς ἐὼν ἄθυρε*, also Meineke ad Fragm. Crat. Ὀδυσσεύς, xvi; Suidas *ἄθυρμα, παίγνιον*. It seems from this that 'toy' is the corresponding English word; which is actually used by Spenser in the same more general sense of 'a childish sport or amusement,' and *in this sense* is with us obsolete. *Faery Queen*, Bk. i. Cant. 6, 28 "To dally thus with death is no fit *toy*, Go, find some other play-fellowes, mine own sweet boy." 'Gawd' is another word now obsolete that might represent it.

τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν] and 'the *outracundance* of his nature'. ἀτασθαλία, ἀτάσθαλος, ἀτασθάλω, a poetical word denoting 'mad, presumptuous arrogance', found in Homer and Herod., and also in an epitaph of Archidice quoted by Thucyd. vi 59, *οὐκ ἦρθη νοῦν ἐπ' ἀτασθαλίην*. ['Retchlessness,' for recklessness, is similarly an unfamiliar word with ourselves, and may serve as an illustration, if not a rendering of this use of *ἀτασθαλία*.]

καὶ ἀκράτῳ—τεθηγμένον] and 'whetted with the unadulterated' (hot and heady, like pure unmixed wine) 'wrath of his mind'. The γλώττα here is τεθηγμένον, a not very rare, but usually poetical, metaphor for exasperated, excited, provoked, irritated; *sharpened* like a knife or tool, or an animal's teeth. Examples from the tragic poets are supplied by Valck. on Eur. Hippol. 689, *ὀργῇ συντεθηγμένους φρένας*: it is opposed to *ἀμβλύνειν* as Aesch. Theb. 721, *τεθηγμένον τοί μ' οὐκ ἀπαμβλυνεῖς λόγῳ*, comp. P. V. 308, Soph. Aj. 585, *γλώσσαν τεθηγμένην*. Ib. Fragm. 762, *Inc. Trag.* Dind., Eur. Cycl. 240, Electr. 836. Xenophon however has employed it several times; Cyrop. i 2. 10, 6. 19, 6. 41, ii 1. 4, 5, 7, Mem. iii 3. 7. Lat. *acuere*. [Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas* p. 492, notes that

θέτοις τὸ ἢ μακροῖς ἢ ἀκαίροις ἢ πυκνοῖς χρῆσθαι·  
 ἐν μὲν γὰρ ποιήσει πρέπει γάλα λευκὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν  
 δὲ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν ἀπρεπέστερα, τὰ δέ, ἂν ἢ κατακορῇ,  
 ἐξελέγχει καὶ ποιεῖ φανερόν ὅτι ποίησις ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ  
 δεῖ γε χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ· ἐξαλλάττει γὰρ τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ

its repeated use by Xenophon need not prevent us from regarding this use of *θήγειν* in prose as a kind of provincialism; it appears among the *γλῶτται κατὰ πόλεις* in Bekker's *Anecdota*, Ἀρκάδων ἄορ ξίφος. θήγει ἀκονῶ.]

§ 3. 'The third vice of style lies in the misuse of "epithets", that is, in introducing them either too long, or out of season (out of *place*, *we* say), or too frequent (numerous); for in poetry it is suitable enough to say "white milk" (a Homeric epithet of course; as red wine, fair women, &c. in ballad poetry), but in prose it is not only less appropriate, but also, if they be employed to satiety (excess), they convict (detect, expose, the *art* of the composition) and make it plain that it is poetry: for, to be sure, it must be used; for it varies the customary style and gives a foreign air to the language'.

On *ἐπίθετα* see Introd. p. 289. The over-long 'epithets' are illustrated by those of Aeschylus in Tragedy, and Aristophanes in Comedy—who sometimes strings together an entire line of epithets, as ἀρχαιομελισιδανιφρυγχήρατα, of Phrynichus' μέλη [Vesp. 220]. Such epithets are of course most inappropriate to prose. The excessive length may also be shewn in the 'descriptive additions' to a substantive, which often takes the place of a regular *epithet*.

δεῖ γε χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ] i. e. to a limited extent; taking care at the same time that the poetical character of the language be not *marked* and *apparent* (reading αὐτῇ the *vulgata lectio* retained by Bekker). Spengel with A<sup>c</sup> αὐτῷ: Victorius and Vater αὐτοῖς; but the *variation of the customary language* is far more applicable to *poetical usages* than to *epithets*: in fact I doubt whether ἐξαλλάττει could be applied to ἐπίθετα with any satisfactory meaning).

ἐξαλλάττει] *supra* c. 2 § 2, note, and § 5. ξενικὴν τὴν λέξιν] *supra* c. 2 § 3.

'But the mean should always be our aim, for (the reverse of moderation, excess) does more mischief than careless, random, speaking, (over-doing it, exaggeration, is worse than entire carelessness, taking no pains at all): for the one no doubt wants the good, but the other (*has*) the bad (the defect in the one case is negative, the mere absence of special excellence, in the other it is positive). And this is why Alcidas' (epithets) appear tasteless; because he employs them, not as the mere seasoning but as the actual meat (*pièce de résistance*, the substance, not the mere adjunct or appendage); so frequent, and unduly long (μείζονι τοῦ δέοντος, too long) and conspicuous are they'. Victorius is doubtless right in his opinion that these three words are a repetition in slightly altered terms of the three views of epithets at the commencement of the section; *unseasonableness*, the importunity with which they engross the attention, is now represented by the conspicuousness or

ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ στοχαζέσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μείζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκῇ λέγειν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἢ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μείζοσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις, οἷον οὐχ ἰδρῶτα ἀλλὰ τὸν ὑγρὸν ἰδρῶτα, καὶ οὐκ εἰς Ἴσθμια ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἴσθμίων πανηγυριν, καὶ οὐχὶ νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν

undue prominence which produces the same effect. A fair specimen of this pompous inflated writing, in epithet and metaphor, is given in Auctor. ad Heren. IV 10. 15, *nam qui perduellionibus vendidit patriam non satis supplicii dederit si praeceps in Neptunias depulsus erit lacunas. Paeniteat igitur istum qui montes belli fabricatus est, campos sustulit facis.*

[ἐπιδήλοις, 'obtrusive', 'glaring'. Bernays proposes ἐπὶ δήλοις, apparently without due cause, though Vahlen quotes it with approval.]

[The little that is left of Alcidas seems to justify Aristotle's strictures on his want of taste in the use of epithets: e.g. περὶ σοφιστῶν, § 6, ἀντίτυπος καὶ προσάντης ἡ τῶν χαλεπωτέρων ἐπιμέλεια, § 7, ὁ ποδώκης δρομεύς, § 16, εὐλύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγχινοία χρόμενον ὑγρῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως μεταχειρίζεσθαι τοὺς λόγους, § 17, ἡ γραφή... ἄπορον καὶ δεσμῶτιν τὴν ψυχὴν καθίστησι καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοσχεδαστικοῖς εὐροίας ἀπάσης ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, (where for εὐροίας we should surely read εὐπορίας which is a suitable contrast to ἄπορον and is supported by § 26, τοῖς αὐτομάτοις εὐπορήμασιν ἐμποδῶν ἔστιν, and by the fact that εὐπορία, εὐπορος, ἀπορία and ἀπορος occur at least ten times in the thirty-five sections of the rhetorician's diatribe, e.g. § 34, which is also an instance of the superabundance of epithets here criticised; τὴν γνώμην εὐλυτον καὶ τὴν μνήμην εὐπορον καὶ τὴν λήθην ἄδηλον). See also Vahlen, *Alkidamas*, u. s. pp. 508—510, and Blass (who has edited Alcidas, Gorgias, and Antisthenes in the same volume as Antiphon), *die Attische Beredsamkeit* II 328.]

'For instance, (he says) not 'sweat', but "the moist sweat"; and not 'to the Isthmian games', but "to the general assembly (great convocation) of the Isthmian games"; and not 'laws', but "laws the kings of cities"; and not 'running', but "with the impulse of his soul at speed"; and not merely 'a Museum, or haunt of the Muses', but "a Museum of all Nature that he had received"; and "sullen-visaged (or sullen-looking, with sullen aspect) the care (solicitude, anxiety) of his soul"; and "artificer" not of 'favour', but "of universal public favour"; and "steward (administrator, dispenser) of the pleasure of the hearers"; and "concealed", not 'with boughs', but "with the boughs of the wood"; and "he clothed", not 'his body', but "his body's shame"; and "counter-imitative (responsive-answering) the desire of his soul"; and "so extravagant (inordinate, [abnormal]) the excess of the wickedness".

πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους, καὶ οὐ δρόμῳ ἀλλὰ δρομαίᾳ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμῇ, καὶ οὐχὶ μουσεῖον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβῶν μουσεῖον, καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐ χάριτος ἀλλὰ πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός, καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ οὐ κλάδοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις p. 117. ἀπέκρυσεν, καὶ οὐ τὸ σῶμα παρήμπισχεν ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην, καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν (τοῦτο δ' ἅμα καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ ἐπίθετον,

πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους] Fragm. Pind. quoted by Plat. Gorg. 484 B, νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων, and Sympos. 196 C, οἱ πόλεως βασιλῆς νόμοι. [Also by Herod. III 38, καὶ ὁρθῶς μοι δοκεῖ Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι, quoted by Thompson on Gorg. u. s.]

τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβῶν μουσεῖον] I have above translated this quite literally, and own that I do not fully understand it: παραλαβῶν seems suspicious: A\* has περιλαβῶν, which does not much mend the matter. Perhaps all the meaning lies on the surface, and there is none underneath. Victorius says that μουσεῖον is *locus a musis bonisque artibus frequentatus*: and translates, *cum naturae museum accepisset*: adding, *appellat igitur hic quoque τῆς φύσεως epitheton, cum adpronatur illi nomini ad naturam eius explanandam*. [Vahlen discusses the phrase in his article on Alcidas, u. s., pp. 494—6, and suggests that the passage originally stood as follows: δρομαίᾳ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμῇ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβῶν μουσεῖον, which he translates “mit der Seele Sturmesdrang den Wissensschatz der Naturum fassend.” μουσεῖον occurs in a well-known passage of the Phaedrus, 267 B, τὰ δὲ Πῶλου πῶς φράσωμεν αὐτὸ μουσεῖα λόγων, ὥς διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωμολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν, and an interesting account of the word may be found in Thompson's note. Vahlen, who holds that μουσεῖα λόγων there means *Redeschulen, in denen man das doppelte und das doppelte eikonen, durch gewöhnliche lehren konnte*, suggests that by τὸ τῆς φύσεως μουσεῖον Alcidas here intends to express what in ordinary language would have been expressed by some such phrase as ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία. In illustration of this view, he quotes a fragment of Diogenes Laertius, VIII 2. 56, where Ἀλκίδαμος ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ says of Empedocles, Ἀναξαγόρου διακοῦσαι καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τοῦ μὲν τὴν σεμνότητα ζηλῶσαι τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τοῦ δὲ τὴν φυσιολογίαν.—In Stobaeus, 120. 3, the quotation of two lines of Theognis ἐκ τοῦ Ἀλκιδάμαντος Μουσείου shews that as a title of a book (whatever its exact meaning may be) the term is not so modern as might be supposed. (Compare Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit* II 322, note.)

ἀντίμιμον—ἐπιθυμίαν] ἀντίμιμος ‘corresponding by, in the way of, imitation’, as ἀντίμορφος ‘corresponding in form’, ἀντίτυπος ‘stroke answering stroke’, ἀντίτροφος of an ‘answering wheel’ of a chorus. Aristoph. Thesm. 18, ὕφθαλμον ἀντίμιμον ἡλίου τροχῷ. Thuc. VII 67, ἀντιμίμησις.

ὥστε ποίημα γίνεται), καὶ οὕτως ἔξεδρον τὴν τῆς *alumnus*  
μοχθηρίας ὑπερβολήν. διὸ ποιητικῶς λέγοντες τῇ  
ἀπρεπείᾳ τὸ γελοῖον καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμποιοῦσι, καὶ  
τὸ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν· ὅταν γὰρ γιννώ-  
σκοντι ἐπεμβάλλῃ, διαλύει τὸ σαφὲς τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖν·

From the passage of Aristoph. it seems that this word, like ἀντίστροφος, should have after it a dative of the object to which it answers; what that object was in Alcidas' declamation Aristotle has not informed us.

'And this is at the same time a compound word and an epithet, so that it becomes quite a poem (a mere bit of poetry: plain prose is turned by this inflated style into poetry).'

ἔξεδρος, from the analogy of ἔκτοπος, ἐκτόπιος, and the actual use of the word—as ἔξεδρον χώραν ἔχειν, of birds of omen in an unlucky quarter of the heavens, Arist. Av. 275; ἔξεδροι φρενῶν λόγοι 'words beside the seat of the wits', Eur. Hippol. 985, οὐκ ἔξεδρος, ἀλλ' ἔντοπος ἀνὴρ, Soph. Phil. 212—must mean 'out of its proper seat or place', 'abroad'; and hence as an exaggeration of *excess*, 'extravagant', as translated.

On these extracts from Alcidas Victorius remarks, "Cum autem haec omnia a mediis quibusdam orationibus sumpserit, ut vitiosae tantum locutionis exemplum sint, non est quod miremur aut plenam sententiam in nonnullis non esse; aut desiderari, ut in hac, verbum unde casus nominum regantur."

'And so this poetical diction by its unsuitableness introduces absurdity and tastelessness into their composition, and obscurity which is due to the verbiage: for whenever (a speaker or writer) accumulates words (throws a heap of them) upon one already informed (already acquainted with his meaning), he destroys (breaks up, dissolves, effaces) all perspicuity (distinctness) by the cloud (or darkness, obscurity) in which he involves his meaning' (*lit.* which he brings *over* it; ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει, I 1.7, see note: *to over-cloud*, over-shadow, obscure).

ἀδολεσχία] the accumulation of unnecessary or unmeaning words: ἀδολεσχία is idle, empty, chatter, prating. It is applied to Socrates and the Sophists by Aristoph. Nub. 1480, 1485, and Eupol. τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολεσχήν, Fragm. Inc. x (Meineke, II 553), comp. XI (Ib.) ἀδολεσχεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκδιδάξον, ὃ σοφιστά. Aristoph. Fragm. Tegenist. III (Meineke II 1149) ἢ Πρόδικος ἢ τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν εἰς γέ τις. *Supra* II 22.3, *infra* III 12.6, Eth. N. III 13, 1118 a 1, de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15.

ἐπεμβάλλῃ. "Similiter locutus est Plat. Cratyl. 414 D, de inculcatis alicui nomini syllabis, ὥστε ἐπεμβάλλοντες ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τελευτῶντες ποιοῦσι μὴδ' ἂν ἓνα ἄνθρωπον συνκίμαι ὅτι ποτὶ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα. Illae enim impediunt ne unde ductum id nomen sit videri possit. Idem affirmavit M. Varro, de L. L. multa enim verba litteris commutatis sunt interpolata." Victorius.

'And people in general, use their compound words (τοῖς, those that they *do* use) when it (what they want to express) is nameless (has no single word to represent it) and the word is easily put together (the combination is easily made), as *χρονοτριβεῖν*: but if this be carried too far



οἱ δ' ἀνθρώποι τοῖς διπλοῖς χρῶνται, ὅταν ἀνώνυμον ἢ καὶ ὁ λόγος εὐσύνθετος, οἷον τὸ χρονοτριβεῖν· ἀλλ' P. 1406 b.  
 ἂν πολὺ, πάντως ποιητικόν. διὸ χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλῇ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοποιοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ ψοφώ-  
 δεις· αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς· σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ

(overdone), it (the result) becomes absolutely poetical. And this is why compound words are most serviceable to the dithyrambic poets—*τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν διπλὰ μάλιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς διθυράμβοις*, Poet. XXII 18—for these are noisy, “full of sound and fury”; full of pompous, high-sounding phrases’ (on *ψόφος* see III 2.13); ‘and obsolete or unusual, to Epic poets, for language of this kind has a stately (majestic, dignified, proud, solemn, and scornful or disdainful) air; and metaphor to writers in iambics, for these they (i.e. the tragic poets) now-a-days—since they have quitted the tetrameter—employ, as has been already stated. III 1.9 comp. *infra* 8.4, and Poet. IV 18. The reason, conveyed by γὰρ, is this: I say iambics, not tetrameters, *because* now-a-days, &c.

[*χρονοτριβεῖν*. Compare our ‘pastime,’ which is also a λόγος εὐσύνθετος. So in Daniel’s *Ulysses and Siren*, “*Delicious nymph! suppose there were No honour or report, Yet manliness would scorn to wear The time in idle sport.*” Isocr. Paneg. § 41, ἡδίστας διατριβάς.]

On compound words, as connected with dithyrambic poetry, Demetrius, *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 91, says, *ληπτέον δὲ καὶ σύνθετα ὀνόματα, οὐ τὰ διθυραμβικῶς συγκεῖμενα, οἷον θεοτεράτους πλάνας, οὐδὲ ἄστρων δορύπορον στρατόν, ἀλλ’ εἰκότα τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς συνηθείας συγκεῖμένοις* (such as *νομοθέται, ἀρχιτέκτονες*): comp. § 78, the accumulation of metaphors will make *διθύραμβον* ἀντὶ λόγου.

The dithyramb at Athens became at and after the end of the fifth cent. the wildest, and (in point of style) most licentious and most extravagant of all the kinds of poetry. See note in *Introd.* on III 9, pp. 307, 8, and the ref. to Aristoph. there given; Bode, *Gesch. der Hell. dichtk.* Vol. II. Pt. II. p. 111 seq. and 290 seq.; and Müller, *H. G. L.* s. xxx. To use words suited to a dithyrambic poet is therefore an exaggeration of the ordinary defect of the introduction into prose of poetical language.

Plat. *Phaedr.* 238 D, οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι, *Ibid.* 241 E, ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους. *Cratyl.* 409 C, (σελαναία) διθυραμβῶδες γε τοῦτο τοῦνομα. *Dionys.* *Dinarch.* *Iud.* c. 8, of the imitators of Plato, διθυραμβῶδη ὀνόματα καὶ φορτικὰ εἰσφέροντες, *Lys.* *Iud.* c. 3, Γοργίας... οὐ πόρρω διθυράμβων ἔνια φθειγόμενος, *de adm. vi. dic. in Dem.* c. 29, *Ep. ad Pomp.* c. 2 (of Socrates’ poetical outburst, *Phaedr.* 237 A), ψόφοι ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ διθύραμβοι, (p. 763 R) and (764) where the words of *Phaedr.* 238 D (u. s.) are quoted. *Hor. Od.* IV 2.10, of Pindar, *per audaces nova dithyrambos verba devolvit*, *Donaldson, Theatre of Gks.* p. 37, note 3; and the references. *διθυραμβεῖν* is a step beyond *τραγωδεῖν* in pomp and exaggeration of language.

*σεμνὸν γὰρ*] *σεμνός*, contracted from *σεβόμενος*, *lit.* an object of worship: applied again to the *heroic measure* or rhythm, III 8.4.

On these *passive* forms in Greek and Latin, see *Donaldson, New*

αὔθαδες· ἡ μεταφορὰ δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβείοις· τούτοις γὰρ  
4 νῦν χρῶνται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. καὶ ἔτι τέταρτον τὸ  
ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίγνεται· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ  
μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται  
γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμωδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς), αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ  
σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν· ἀσαφεῖς δέ, ἂν πόρρωθεν.

*Crat.* § 410, *Varron.* p. 406 (ed. II), 97. Add to the Greek examples given *σεμνός* and *ἐρμηνός* and to the Latin, *somnus* (sopio).

καὶ αὔθαδες] This means that the *unusual* γλώτται affect an air of independence and hauteur; they, like the αὐθάδης, the self-pleaser, self-willed, stubborn, haughty, independent *man*, will not conform to ordinary usage, and scornfully affect singularity. Comp. *Poet.* XXIV 9, τὸ γὰρ ἥρωϊκὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν, διὸ καὶ γλώτταις καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα.

§ 4. And further, the fourth vice of style is shewn in metaphors; for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are laughable—for the comic poets also employ metaphors—others from their exaggeration of the stately (solemn) and tragic (pompous) style: if far-fetched, they are obscure'. *πόρρωθεν*, see on III 2. 12. 'As Gorgias, "things (πράγματα, actions, occurrences, events, business) all fresh and raw"'. This certainly is a good exemplification of what it is designed to illustrate: it is obscure. It seems, however, to mean nothing more than 'recent events', events *fresh*, and with the blood in them: the metaphor from a beast just killed. It therefore corresponds to *πρόσφατος*, 'fresh', which also stands for 'recent'. *πρόσφατος* is specially applied to 'fresh meat'. See Lobeck *On Phrynichus*, p. 375, note: examples of *πρόσφατος* are there given, p. 374. "And these things *thou* hast sown in disgrace, and reaped in misery". For it smells too much of poetry'. [Both the extracts probably belong to the same context, and may perhaps be combined by rendering them thus: 'all was green and unripe (fresh and flushed with sap), and this was the crop that you sowed in shame to reap in ruin'. *χλωρὰ καὶ ἔναιμα* possibly refer to the green and unripe stalks of corn, with the sap still fresh in them. This assumes that *αἷμα* can be used metaphorically of 'sap', both coming under the generic notion of 'vital juice'. If so, the metaphor is a sufficiently bold one. Thompson (ed. of the Gorgias, p. 179) notes that *ἄναιμα* (which is the reading of Q, Y<sup>b</sup> and Z<sup>b</sup>) is 'well supported, and cannot but be right,' and remarks that while the metaphor of sowing and reaping is a mere commonplace, "pallid and bloodless affairs" would need apology even from a modern.]

A metaphor, nearly resembling the first of these two, occurs in Demetrius *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, § 116, γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν μεταφορᾷ τὸ ψυχρὸν, τρέμοντα καὶ ὥχρα τὰ πράγματα. Longinus *περὶ ὑψους* 3.2, ταῦτη καὶ τὰ τοῦ Λεοντίνου Γοργίου γελᾶται γράφοντος, "Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεύς." καὶ "γῦπες ἔμψυχοι τάφοι" [comp. *supra* I § 9, on the poetical style of Gorgias].

Hermogenes also, *περὶ ἰδεῶν* Τομ. α', *περὶ σεμνότητος* 226 (p. 292, Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. II.) gives some examples of exaggerated metaphors, ἐκνευρισμένοι, καὶ τὸ πεπρακὸς ἑαυτὸν, καὶ τὸ λωποδυτῶν

οἷον Γοργίας “χλωρὰ καὶ ἔναιμα τὰ πράγματα· σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχροῦς μὲν ἔσπειρας κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας.” ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων, καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, καὶ “οὐδὲν τοι οὐτον ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει προσφέρων.” ἅπαντα γὰρ

τὴν Ἑλλάδα: and a few lines below, τάφους ἐμψύχους τοὺς γύπας, but without the author's name. The objection to some of these metaphors, as the ‘sowing and reaping’, the ‘selling oneself’, and above all, Alcidas’ ‘mirror of human life’, seems to shew a change of taste from ancient to modern criticism. We certainly should object to none of these; and the ‘mirror’ in particular has become one of the commonest metaphors in our language. The ‘sowing and reaping’ appears in Plato, Phaedr. 260 c (see Thompson's note), and Aesch. Pers. 821. In Cic. de Orat. II 65. 261 (without comment), *ut sementem feceris ita metes*. I Ep. ad Cor. xv. 42—4. Ep. ad Gal. vi. 7 (and Lightfoot ad loc.). “They that sow in tears shall reap in joy: he that now goeth forth weeping, and beareth forth good seed, shall doubtless come again with joy, and bring his sheaves with him,” Psalm cxxvi. 6, 7. Possibly the antithesis, one of Gorgias’ new inventions, may have helped to offend Aristotle's tastes, and it is the effect of the whole phrase, and not of the harmless metaphor alone, that has unconsciously provoked his disapprobation: yet the same occurs in the simple psalm.

[καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον. Alcidas elsewhere uses this metaphor from a mirror, in the form of a *simile*, *περὶ σοφίστων*, § 32, *εἰς δὲ τὰ γεγραμμένα κατιδόντας ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ θεωρῆσαι τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιδόσεις βράδιον ἐστίν*. The present passage and those already quoted in § 3 *τοῖς τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις ἀπέκρυσεν κ.τ.λ.* (Odys. VI 128) and *κτανόντων τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἔδαφος*, probably belong to a declamation on Odysseus (or on the Odyssey); while *τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθὰ τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν* (§ 1), and *πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων ἡδονῆς* (§ 3), point with equal probability to a pamphlet on Rhetoric.]

‘And as Alcidas (follower of Gorgias), (called) philosophy a “fortress to threaten” (a standing menace to), the laws; and the Odyssey a “fair mirror of human life”; and “introducing no such toys, or gawds, in his poetry”—for all such things are subversive of credibility, for the reasons already stated’. These are, that forced metaphors, and all such-like artificial graces and ornaments, make the art and the labour of composition apparent; make the speech appear studied and affected, and therefore *premeditated* and unreal, and without *serious purpose*: οὐκ εὖ κλέπεται: the language of genuine emotion, of earnest and real conviction, which are required for persuasion, being always simple and natural. Probably the most perfect example of art thus disguised by art is to be found in Mark Antony's speeches over Caesar's body in *Julius Caesar*; and the first thing he does is to impress upon his audience the entire artlessness and unstudied simplicity of

ταῦτα ἀπίθانا διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα. τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοῦ πετομένη ἀφῆκε τὸ περίττωμα, ἄριστα τῶν τραγικῶν· εἶπε γὰρ “αἰσχρόν γε ὦ Φιλομήλα.” ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ, εἰ ἐποίησεν, οὐκ αἰσχρόν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. εὖ οὖν ἐλοιδόρησεν εἰπὼν ὃ ἦν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃ ἔστιν.

his address: *I am no orator as Brutus is, but, as you know me all, a plain, blunt man that love my friend*, &c [III 2. 221].

ἐπιτείχιμα] in the first extract from Alcidas, is interpreted in this passage in the Lexicons of Rost and Palm, and Liddell and Scott—in Stephens' *Thesaurus* it is quoted but *not* explained—‘a bulwark or defence of the laws’. But ἐπιτείχιμα in its proper literal sense seems to be invariably used of an offensive, not defensive, fortification, to command and annoy an enemy's country, like Decelia, which, τῇ χώρῃ ἐπῳκείτο, Thuc. VII 27. 3 (Bekker, in Thuc. VIII 95, reads τείχιμα for ἐπιτείχιμα, on this account) as indeed is required by the ἐπὶ with which it is compounded; and *philosophy* may be used in the attack, as well as the defence, of established laws and institutions, whether it be understood as speculation or scientific research.

‘And Gorgias’ address to the swallow, when she discharged her excrement’ [rather, ‘dropped her leavings’] upon him as she flew over, is in the best style of tragic diction, (τὸ δὲ Γ. ἄριστα, sc. εἴρηται,) “For shame, Philomel”, said he. For to a bird it was no disgrace to have done it, but to a young (unmarried) lady it was. And therefore he was right in his reproach to describe (speak of) her as she *was*, and not as she *is*’. The simplicity of all this is delightful. I could fancy Aristotle winking to his imaginary reader as he wrote the explanation, ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ., a bird, you know, &c. [The anecdote illustrates the habit of irony ascribed to Gorgias in 7 § 11, *infra*, μετ' εἰρωνείας ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐποίησεν, as noticed in Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 180.]

περίττωμα] in medicine and natural history is ‘a secretion’. It occurs constantly all through Ar.'s writings on Nat. Hist. Plut. Symp. p. 727 D (Victorius), in telling the same story, uses the broad Aristophanic word: Γοργίας δὲ ὁ σοφιστὴς χελιδόνος ἀφείσης ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀπόπατον, ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτήν, οὐ καλὰ ταῦτ', εἶπεν, ὦ Φιλομήλα.

On the transformation of Procne and Philomela authorities differ. Thucydides, II 29, referring to the story, seems to adopt Gorgias' view, and make Procne the nightingale. Ovid seems to leave the point unsettled, Metaph. VI 667 seq. But tradition in general, and English poetry in particular, have always associated Philomela with the nightingale; e. g. 'Less Philomel will deign a song. Milton's *Penseroso*, 56.

Victorius notices on this passage that Aristotle includes under the designation of metaphor more than is now recognised as belonging to it. The case here, he says, is a mere *hypallage* or change of name. Comp. Cic. Orator c. XXVII 93, 94. *Hanc ὑπαλλαγὴν rhetores, quia quasi summutantur verba pro verbis, μεταωνυμίαν grammatici vocant, quod nomina*

1 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ CHAP. IV.  
μικρόν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα

ὥς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν,

εἰκὼν ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ “λέων ἐπόρουσε,” μεταφορά·  
διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄμφω ἀνδρείους εἶναι, προσηγόρευσε μετε-  
2 νέγκας λέοντα τὸν Ἀχιλλέα. χρήσιμον δὲ ἡ εἰκὼν  
καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὀλιγάκις δὲ ποιητικὸν γάρ. οἷστέαι

*transferuntur. Aristoteles autem translationi et haec ipsa subiungit, et abusionem quam κατάχρησιν vocant, ut quum minutum dicimus animum pro parvo, et abutimur verbis propinquis, si opus est, vel quod delectat vel quod decet.* Comp. Introd., Appendix on Metaphor, pp. 375 and 376.

#### CHAP. IV.

From metaphors (c. 2), and the abuse of them (c. 3), we pass on in this chapter to the simile, *εἰκὼν*; which differs from the metaphor only in this, that the latter concentrates, or fuses into one, the two things or notions brought into comparison. The former separates them by the particle of comparison *ὥς*. Thus the simile may be regarded as an expanded metaphor. See further on this in Introd. p. 290, and the references to other authorities.

§ 1. ‘The simile too is a metaphor, the difference between them being slight: for when he (Homer<sup>1</sup>) says of (his, or the great) Achilles “and as a lion he rushed on”, it is a simile, but when, “he rushed on, a (very) lion”, a metaphor: for (in the latter) because they are both brave, he transferred to Achilles the appellation of lion’.

§ 2. ‘The simile is useful also in prose, but seldom (to be employed), since it has a poetical character. They must be used like metaphors (the same rules must be observed in the use of them as of metaphors); in fact they *are* metaphors, only with the difference already stated’.

*οἷστέαι*] *φέρειν* for *λέγειν* or *χρῆσθαι* is commonly applied in Arist.

<sup>1</sup> The words here assigned to Homer do not occur in our present text: but the substance of them is found at the beginning of the famous simile of the lion, Il. xx 164, Πηλεΐδης δ’ ἐτέρωθεν ἐναντίον ὤπτο λεὼν ὥς, κ.τ.λ. followed by a long description of this animal. On the quotations from Homer in Aristotle, see Heitz, *Verl. Schrift. Arist., die homerischen Fragen*, p. 258, seq.: and Paley’s note, with the extract from Wolf’s Proleg. § 11, Introd. (to the ed. of the Iliad) p. xxxvi. The former of course includes this amongst the quotations which differ from Homer’s text, but draws from this the inference that the *text* used by Aristotle (who himself revised it) was here different to our own. I think that nothing more can fairly be inferred from *cases like this* than that Aristotle has misquoted the *words* of our present version: all the substance is there. As we have already so many times had occasion to notice, Ar. has here quoted from memory; and like all other men of very extensive reading and very retentive memory, Bacon for example, and Walter Scott, has trusted too much to his memory, not referred to his author, and consequently misquoted. And I think that is all that can reasonably be said about it.

δὲ ὥσπερ αἱ μεταφοραί· μεταφοραί γάρ εἰσι δια-  
3 φέρονσαι τῷ εἰρημένῳ. εἰσὶ δ' εἰκόνες οἷον ἤν' Ἀνδρο-  
τίων εἰς Ἰδριέα, ὅτι ὅμοιος τοῖς ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν κυνι-  
δαίοις· ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ προσπίπτοντα δάκνει, καὶ Ἰδριέα  
λυθέντα ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν εἶναι χαλεπὸν. καὶ ὡς  
Θεοδάμας εἵκαζεν Ἀρχίδαμον Εὐξένῳ γεωμετρῆν οὐκ

to any topic, example, argument, or anything else that is to be 'brought forward'. *Supra* c. 2. 10, 13, *infra* c. 6. 7, also II 22. 16, 17. Top. Θ 1, 153 a 14, et passim. Isocr. Areopag. § 6.

§ 3. 'An example of the simile is' (*lit.* Similes are ~~a thing like that~~ simile which), 'that which Androtion (directed, discharged) against Idrieus, that he was like the curs when they are let loose (untied); for *they* fly at you and bite, and so Idrieus was vicious (or savage) when *he* was freed from his chains'.

Androtion was an Athenian orator, whose name occurs coupled with many opprobrious epithets not only in the speech delivered against him (Or. 22), but also in that against Timocrates in which he is very frequently mentioned. He was sent on an embassy with Melanopus and Glaucetes, Dem. c. Timocr. §§ 12, 13, alibi, to Mausolus prince of Caria 377—351 B. C. Idrieus was his brother, and Androtion may have met him at his court, and there had the encounter with him which ended in the discharge of his simile. The Scholiast on Isocr. p. 4 b 27 (ap. Sauppe, *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.*) tells us that he was a pupil of Isocrates, and the writer of the 'Atthis', "a work on the history of Attica", *Biographical Dictionary*—which settles the question raised in that Dictionary about the identity of the orator and author—and the Scholiast adds that he was also the defendant in Demosthenes' speech *contra Androtionem*.

Idrieus was a prince of Caria who succeeded to the throne on the death of his brother Mausolus in 351 B. C. See Mr Bunbury's Art. in *Biogr. Dict.* He is mentioned by Isocrates, Philippus § 103, as *εὐπορώτατον τῶν νῦν περὶ τὴν ἡπειρον*. This speech was published in 346 B. C. (Clinton), and therefore subsequent to his accession. It may be presumed that the imprisonment with which Androtion taunts him was due to his brother, and of course prior to his accession to the throne. He is referred to again without his name by Demosth. in the speech de Pace, § 25,—this was also delivered in 346 B. C. (Clinton *F. H.* II 360)—as 'the Carian', who had been permitted to take possession of the islands of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes. [A. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, I 351, 440.]

'And Theodamas' comparison of Archidamus to Euxenus—*minus* his geometry, by proportion: for Euxenus also will be Archidamus *plus* geometry' (a geometrical Archidamus). Nothing is known of the three persons here mentioned. Theodamas compares Archidamus to Euxenus without his geometry; and so—by the rule of proportion, i. e. in the same proportion—will Euxenus be to Archidamus with geometry: i. e. *equal*, both being alike rascals. The *proportion* is that of equality. With *ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον* supply *λόγῳ*, 'in the ratio, or relation, of *proportion*'.

ἐπισταμένῳ ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Εὐξενος Ἀρχίδαμος γεωμετρικός. καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς τεθνεώτας σκυλεύοντες εἰκόασιν τοῖς κυνιδίοις, ἃ τοὺς λίθους δάκνει τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἀπτόμενα. καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυ-

In this we are referred to the 'proportional metaphor', the last and most approved of the four kinds described in Poet. XXI 7—16. Comp. Rhet. III 10. 7, where the proportional met. is illustrated at length. Victorius, who agrees in this explanation, supplies a parallel case from Diogenes Laertius, Polemo, IV 3. 7, *ἔλεγεν οὖν τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον ἐπικὸν εἶναι Σοφοκλέα, τὸν δὲ Σοφοκλέα Ὅμηρον τραγικόν*. Theodamas has taken this common mode of comparison and applied it to the *equal worthlessness* of Archidamus and Euxenus. It was probably a standing joke at Athens. The case may have been something of this kind:—Two contemptible fellows, one of them priding himself upon a little knowledge of geometry, are comparing or disputing their respective merits: "you needn't say any more about the matter," says Theodamas, a bystander, who was listening much amused to the discussion, "you are both equal, *Arcades ambo*, a pair of fools, only Euxenus is a geometrical Archidamus, Archidamus an ungeometrical Euxenus."

'And that in Plato's Republic (v 469 D), that "the spoilers of the dead are like *curs* (κυνιδίαι, contemptuous, diminutive: an improvement on Plato, who merely says *κυνῶν*), which bite the stones (thrown at them) without attacking, setting upon, the thrower". Aristotle, like Bacon, quoting from memory, and assuming a knowledge of the original in his readers, has left out the explanatory part of the illustration which is supplied by Plato. Victorius cites Pacuvius, ap. Nonium, in *Armorum Iudicio, Nam canis, quando est percussa lapide, non tam illum appetit, Qui se icit, quam illum eum lapidem, qui ipsa icta est, petit*.

καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον] This, which originally stood in MSS Q, Y<sup>o</sup>, Z<sup>o</sup>, and the early editions, καὶ ὡς ὁ Δημοσθένης εἰς τὸν δῆμον, was first corrected by Victorius from MS A<sup>o</sup>.

'And that (simile, understand *εἰκὼν*), (directed) against democracy, that it is like a ship-owner (or ship's captain) strong but slightly deaf'. This again is a mere allusion to or reminder of, 'what every one must surely remember', Plato's celebrated illustration (Rep. VI 488 A) of the evils of democracy by the comparison of it to the undisciplined, untrained, turbulent, anarchical, crew of a ship; each of them, though utterly without qualification for the charge, ready to dispute with the captain the direction and control of the vessel. The passage is referred to by Cicero, de Off. I 25. The words quoted by Ar., few as they are, are not correct: he makes the *ναύκληρος* the representative of the *δῆμος*, the whole state; in Plato the *ναύκληρος*—the ship-owner, who in this case is captain, and steers his own vessel—is the governor, or governors, of the unruly mob of citizens.

'And that (*sc. εἰκὼν*, as before) applied to the poet's measures, that they are like the bloom of youth without beauty (actual beauty of features):

κλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ μὲν ὑποκάφῳ δέ. καὶ ἡ εἰς τὰ μέτρα  
τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι ἔοικε τοῖς ἀνευ κάλλους ὠραίοις· οἱ  
μὲν γὰρ ἀπανθήσαντες, τὰ δὲ διαλυθέντα οὐχ ὅμοια  
φαίνεται. καὶ ἡ Περικλέους εἰς Σαμίους, εἰκέναι P. 1407.  
αὐτοὺς τοῖς παιδίοις ἃ τὸν ψῶμόν δέχεται μὲν, κλαί-<sup>ε</sup>σθαι  
οντα δέ. καὶ εἰς Βοιωτοὺς, ὅτι ὅμοιοι τοῖς πρίνοις

for they, when their bloom has faded (worn off, when they have *lost* it), and the other (the poet's measures) when they are broken up, seem utterly unlike (their former selves)'. This also comes from Rep. x 601 B, *ἔοικε* (τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν) τοῖς τῶν ὠραίων προσώποις, καλῶν δὲ μὴ, οἷα γίγνεται ἰδεῖν ὅταν αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπη. All poetry is imitation of natural objects, which are invested with certain 'colours' by the poetical art, in which the entire interest and beauty of poetry lie. These colours resemble the bloom on a youthful face, which is merely superficial, when there is nothing corresponding underneath, no beauty of feature or solid attraction. The imitation of the objects themselves may be bad and incorrect, as the face itself may be plain; so that when the bloom, the poetical colours, the graces and ornaments, and especially the *numbers*, are removed, there remains only a substratum, which may be worthless, of the direct imitation. Horace, Sat. I 4. 60, has pronounced, as is well-known, a directly contrary opinion, at least in respect of the better kind of poetry. After applying to Lucilius' verses much the same criticism as Plato does to poetry in general, he adds, *Non, ut si solvas 'postquam discordia tetra Belli ferratos postes portasque refregit,' Invenias etiam disiecti membra poetæ*: from Ennius. Compare Isocr. Evag. § 11, ἦν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπη, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεέστερα τῆς δόξης ἥς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. Also Rhet. III 1. 9.

With the expression comp. Eth. N. x 4, 1174 b ult. οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα, pleasure is like the bloom on the *ἐνέργεια*, the realized, active energy: illustrated by Zell's note ad loc., from Valerius Paterculus [I 29. 2], of Pompeius, *forma excellens, non ea qua flos commendatur aetatis, sed ex dignitate constanti*. Youthful bloom, distinct from, and independent of, personal beauty.

'And that of Pericles against the Samians, that they are like babies (παιδίοις, 'little children') which cry whilst they take the morsel (or sop) offered them'. *ψῶμος* recurs, under the form *ψώμισμα*, in the third simile following, where it is explained. The comparison made here by Pericles of the Samians to babies, which take their food, but cry while they take it, refers to their conduct after the final reduction of the island by Pericles in 440 B.C., Thuc. I 115—117, after an eight months' contest, *ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ἐνάτῃ μηνί*. The sop, i.e. the nourishment, benefits, favours, they had received—from the *Athenian* point of view—consisted, thinks Schrader, in their freedom, and liberation from the yoke of the Persians and the oligarchs. They nevertheless, though they accepted them, most ungratefully and unreasonably grumbled. Buhle refers to Diodor. XII 27.

'And (of Pericles again) against the Boeotians; that they are like their



τοὺς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὑφ' αὐτῶν κατακόπτεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχομένους. καὶ ἡ Δημοσθένους εἰς τὸν δῆμον<sup>1</sup>, ὅτι ὁμοίός ἐστι τοῖς ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ναυτιῶσιν. καὶ ὡς ὁ Δημοκράτης εἵκασε τοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς τίτθαις αἰ τὸ ψῶμισμα καταπίνουσαι τῷ σιάλῳ τὰ παιδία παραλείφουσιν. καὶ ὡς Ἀντι-

<sup>1-1</sup> ὁ Δημοσθένης τὸν δῆμον *vulgata lectio*.

own holm-oaks: for as these are cut down (knocked about or down) by themselves' (dashed one against another by the wind; so Victorius; or 'cut down', split by wedges and mallets made of their own wood, like the "struck eagle" of Aeschylus, Waller, and Byron), 'so are the Boeotians, by their civil (or domestic) contentions'.

'And Demosthenes compared the people' (of the Athenian, or some other, democracy: understand *εἵκασεν*, which is expressed in the next example) 'to the sea-sick passengers in the vessels at sea'. Their *squeamishness*, fastidiousness, nausea with the existing state of things, constant desire of change, is produced by the perpetual *agitation, fluctuation* of their political condition and circumstances, the tumultuous waves of the stormy sea of civil commotion: they are sick of the present, and long for change. The Demosthenes here mentioned is, by general consent, *not* the Orator; more probably the Athenian general of the Peloponnesian war in Thucydides [*sine causa*, says Spengel].

The very remarkable fact that the *name* of the great Orator is in all probability only once mentioned by Aristotle—II 24. 8, where Demades' condemnation of his policy is quoted—though the pair were living together for many years in the same city—is parallel to a similar silence of Bacon as to *his* great contemporary Shakespeare; but still more remarkable in the former case, from the constant occasion offered to the writer on Rhetoric of illustrating his rules and topics from the practice of the first of speakers. It has been already noticed in the Introduction, pp. 45, 46, and notes, where the cases of supposed mention of or allusion to Demosthenes are collected and examined. And this omission will appear still more remarkable when it is contrasted with the nine closely printed columns of references and citations in Spengel's *Index Auctorum ad Rhetores Graecos* III 312, seq.

'And Democrates' comparison of the "orators" to the nurses who themselves swallow the morsel (which they have previously chewed and softened for the baby), and smear (or slobber over) the babies with the spittle (that they have used in the process)'. This is the case of the lawyer and the oyster in the caricature; the legal practitioner swallows the savoury contents, and presents the rival claimants with a shell apiece; so the public speakers swallow the substantial profit themselves, and besmear the audience with their unctuous flattery. Comp. Ar. Eq. 715, (Κλέων) ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν (τὸν δῆμον, represented as a toothless old man that must be fed like a baby) οἷς ψωμίζεται' (Ἀλλαντοπώλης) καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ τιτθαὶ γε σιτίσεις κακῶς· μασώμενος γὰρ τῷ μὲν ὀλίγον ἐντίθης, αὐτὸς δ'

σθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῶ εἵκασεν,  
ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει. πάσας γὰρ ταύτας καὶ

ἐκείνου τριπλάσιον κατέσπασας. Democrates, the author of this saying, seems, from a passage of Plutarch (in Vict.), Pol. Praec. 803 D, to have been notorious for biting and offensive sayings, τὸ λυποῦν ἀκαίρως τοὺς ἀκούοντας: two of them are quoted. Two persons of this name are mentioned by the Orators. One, son of Sophilus, of the deme of Phlya, in a list of the ambassadors sent to Philip in 347 B.C., after the fall of Olynthus (in the spurious ψήφισμα, Demosth. de Cor. § 29, see Dissen), and again in another questionable ψήφισμα, Dem. de Cor. § 187, purporting to be Demosthenes' decree for the appointment of ambassadors to Thebes and the other Greek states, to negotiate an alliance, and arrest the progress of Philip, June, B.C. 338, Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, sub anno. The other, of Aphidna, Isaeus, περὶ τοῦ Φιλοκτήμονος κλήρου, § 22, and Aesch. de F. L. § 17. Nothing more seems to be known of either of them. The two are confounded in the article of Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*, Democrates No. 1; and the saying here quoted is styled "a fragment of one of his orations."

'And Antisthenes' comparison of Cephisodotus the thin (slight, lean) to frankincense, because he gives pleasure by wasting away'. ὁ λεπτός seems to have been a sobriquet of Cephisodotus; and may also indicate a second point of resemblance between him and frankincense, namely his slight, vaporous, unsubstantial nature. Buhle quotes in illustration the German proverb, *die Juden nehmen sich nirgend besser aus als am Galgen*. "Ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει means that that was the *only* enjoyment that was to be got out of him: all the rest of him, his properties, qualities, character, was anything but enjoyable, bad and vicious. On λεπτός contrasted with παχύς, and men distinguished by this personal peculiarity, Athenaeus has three chapters, XII 75—77, p. 551, seq.

Antisthenes is most likely the Cynic philosopher, who outlived the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C., Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, sub anno 365, and was therefore contemporary with Cephisodotus. He, like his successor, Diogenes, had a habit of bitter sarcasm, of which the saying here quoted is a fair specimen. It is truly a bitter jest. See the account of him in Cotton's art. in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* Vol. I, p. 208 a. A long list of his sayings is given by Diog. Laert. in his life, VI 1, some of which are caustic enough. Mr. Grote, in his account of Antisthenes, *Plato*, III, p. 504, seq., has not specified this cynical feature in his character. [Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II 304—316.]

Cephisodotus, ἐκ Κεραμείων. Distinguished by Sauppe (*Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* III, p. 77) from the general of that name, mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. §§ 153, 156, 163, 167, as sent (about 359 B.C.) to cooperate with Charidemus in the Hellespont and Chersonese, and elsewhere; by Aesch. c. Ctes. § 51, seq.; by Suidas and Harpocration. Cephis. ἐκ Κεραμείων, the orator, is referred to in Dem. c. Lept. § 146, together with Leodamas, Aristophon, and Deinias, as one of the best speakers of the time; and again, § 150, οὗτός ἐστιν οὐδενὸς ἦττον τῶν λεγόντων δεινὸς εἰπεῖν. The Cephisodotus who was sent (with Callias, see note on III 2. 10) to the congress at Sparta in B.C. 371, Xen. Hellen. VI 3. 2, VII 1. 12, seems more

ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς μεταφορὰς ἔξεστι λέγειν· ὥστε  
 ὅσαι ἂν εὐδοκιμῶσιν ὡς μεταφοραὶ λεχθεῖσαι, δῆλον  
 ὅτι αὗται καὶ εἰκόνες ἔσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες μετα-  
 4 φοραὶ λόγου δεόμεναι. αἰεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν  
 ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα τῶν  
 ὁμογενῶν· οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπὶς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν  
 ἀσπίδα ἀρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην Ἄρεος.

I ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος συντίθεται ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι δ' CHAP. V.

likely to have been the orator than the general; and so Schneider pronounces, ad Xen. l. c. Three more *bons mots* of the same are quoted, *infra* III 10. 7. In Mr Elder's art. Cephisodotus No. 2, *Biog. Dict.*, the two are identified. [Arnold Schaefer distinguishes them, *Dem. u. s. Zeit* III 2. 155—6.]

'For all these may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors: and therefore, plainly, all those that are popular when expressed as metaphors, will be also (if required) similes, and similes metaphors without the descriptive details (the detailed explanation)'. "A simile is a metaphor *writ large*, with the details filled in; this is λόγος." Introd. p. 290.

§ 4. 'The *proportional metaphor* should always be reciprocally transferable, and to either of the two congeners; for instance, if the goblet is Dionysius' shield, then also the shield may be appropriately called Ares' goblet. Such then are the elements of which the speech (or discourse in general, or prose) is composed'. This section, and its concluding observation, are fully explained in detail in the Introd. pp. 290—292, to which the reader is referred.

Anaxandrides (Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* III. 201, Anax. Fr. Inc. xxxi.) as well as Antiphanes (Καινέυς, Meineke, *Fragm.* III. 58) quote this metaphor of Timotheus in ridicule. From Athenaeus, XI. 502 B, we learn that the goblets which Anaxandrides calls φιάλας Ἄρεος are τὰς καρνωτάς, 'walnut-shaped'. This tends to confirm Twining's remark, on Poet. XXI. 12, note 185, that there was a resemblance in shape between this kind of cup and a shield, which helped to suggest and justify the metaphor. He refers, as also Buhle ad loc. Poet.—see also Gräfenhan, ad Poet. p. 157—to Hom. II. xxiii 270, on the shape of the φιάλη, πέμπτω δ' ἀμφίθετον φιάλην ἀπύρωτον ἔθηκε and the notes.

I have followed Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, in his recent ed. [1867], who agree in excluding from the text the superfluous καὶ ἐπὶ, before τῶν ὁμογενῶν,—apparently a mere repetition of the preceding καὶ ἐπὶ before θάτερα.

#### CHAP. V.

Here commences the second division of λέξις, the treatment of style as it appears in the *combination* of words in *sentences*, and the connexion of the latter in harmonious periods. The ἀρχή, the beginning, basis or

ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἐλληνίζειν τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν  
2 πέντε, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, ἂν ἀποδιδῶ τις p. 119.  
ὡς πεφύκασι πρότεροι καὶ ὕστεροι γίγνεσθαι ἀλ-

foundation, of style in this sense, is *purity* of language, τὸ 'Ἐλληνίζειν, pure and correct Greek, in idiom and choice of words, opposed to barbarism, solecism, and all impropriety in general. The subject of Purity has been already treated in the Introduction, under the head of 'General observations on Style,' p. 279, note 3.

The divisions of the chapter, the five heads to which Purity may be reduced—to which are added in the last section two supplementary topics which belong rather to *perspicuity*, punctuation and μεταξυλογία, or *parenthesis*—are explained and illustrated by references to the works of other rhetoricians, in the analysis, Introd. pp. 292—5.

The classification is, as we shall see, extremely imperfect and deficient; and, moreover, the distinction of *purity* and *perspicuity* is not carefully observed. Most probably Aristotle did not recognise it at all. Nearly all the precepts given in this chapter are referrible to perspicuity rather than purity.

§ 1. ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως] Cic. Brut. LXXIV. 258, *Solum quidem, et quasi fundamentum oratoris...locutionem emendatam et Latinam.*

τὸ ἐλληνίζειν] 'Ἐλληνισμός, φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος (Diogenes Laertius, Zeno, VII. 59). τὸ ἐλληνίζειν τριτὸν ἢ τὸ τὴν 'Ἑλληνικὴν συνθήειαν διασώζειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπὶ πάντων' οἱ πολλοί· ἢ τὸ ἀκριβοῦν τὴν 'Ἑλληνικὴν φωνήν, καὶ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ' οἱ γραμματικοί· ἢ τὴν κυριότητα τῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν κατὰ φύσιν προσήκουσαν τοῖς πράγμασιν· οἱ φιλόσοφοι (Schol. ad Plat. p. 70 ap. Gaisford). This takes quite a different view of the meaning of the word to that of Aristotle; in the one case the 'purity of the Greek' is shewn in the choice of words, in the other in the connexion of sentences by observance of the *idiom* of the language. But in fact both of these belong to 'pure Greek': and purity is a *negative* quality of style, consisting in the avoidance of error (φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος, *emendata locutio*), in the shape of (1) *solecism* (Aristotle's view, idiomatic, grammatical, blunders), (2) *barbarism*; the latter, the use especially of *foreign* words (whence the name), or any similar impropriety. *Atque, ut Latine loquamur, non solum videndum est ut et verba efferamus ea quae nemo iure reprehendat, et ea sic et casibus et temporibus et genere et numero conservemus, &c.* Cic. de Orat. III 11.40. In the next section he includes *pronunciation*. The examples of σολοικισμός, the opposite to ἑλληνισμός, given in de Soph. El. 32, 182 a 13 and 34, are both of them grammatical errors: one who is guilty of either, οὐκ ἂν δοκοῖ ἐλληνίζειν. In the same, c. 3, 165 b 20, σολοικίζειν is defined, τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν. [Dem. Or. 45 (κατὰ Στεφάνου α') § 30, ὅμοις δ' ἴσως αὐτὸν ὑπειλήφατε, ὅτι σολοικίζει τῇ φωνῇ, βάρβαρον καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητον εἶναι.]

'(Pure, correct) Greek is the foundation of style: this falls under five heads or divisions'.

§ 2. 'The first of these is (the proper use of) *connective particles*, that is, when they are made to correspond, in such a natural position (relation) of priority or posteriority to one another in the sentence, as some of them

λήλων, οἷον ἔνιοι ἀπαιτοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἐγὰ  
 μὲν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δέ καὶ τὸν ὁ δέ. δεῖ δὲ ἕως μέμ-  
 νηται ἀνταποδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ μήτε μακρὰν ἀπαρ-  
τᾶν μήτε σύνδεσμον πρὸ συνδέσμου ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ

require; as μὲν and ἐγὼ μὲν require δέ and ὁ δέ (as correlatives)'. That is to say, the connective μὲν (ὁ 'μὲν' σύνδεσμος) requires an answering δέ in the apodosis, the one particle necessarily implying the other; and the same with ἐγὼ μὲν, and ὁ δέ; μὲν with ἐγὼ necessarily implies a *second*, or *other* person, *some one else*, (see note on I 6. 22, and Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, § 154, there cited,) correlative and subsequent or posterior: and therefore in the construction of the sentence μὲν is placed *before* (πρό-τερον), δέ *after* (ὕστερον).

On σύνδεσμος as a 'part of speech', see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. III c. 2, p. 371 seq.; and on its various senses in general, ib. Appendix D, p. 392; and again p. 437, in the analysis c. 25 (26) of the Rhet. ad Alex. The rule here given for the treatment of connectives is derived originally from Isocrates' τέχνη. Ibid. pp. 437, 8. The Rhet. ad Alex. also has it, c. 25 (26), 1, μετὰ δὲ συνδέσμον οὓς ἂν προείπης ἀποδίδου τοῖς ἀκρολουθούντας; which is then exemplified by μὲν and δέ, and καὶ, καί.

ἀποδιδόναι] to render, or 'assign, to its proper place', see note on I 1. 7. ἀντ-ἀποδιδόναι (in the following clause) is to do this so that there is a 'reciprocal correspondence' between the two, ἀντ-ἀλλήλοις. 'But this reciprocal correspondence between them should be introduced (by the speaker, δεῖ τὸν λέγοντα) before the audience has had time to forget (ἕως μέμνηται, sc. ὁ ἀκροατής, while he still retains in his recollection) the first of the two connectives, with its accompanying clause; and the two should neither be too widely separated, nor should (another) conjunction be introduced before that which is absolutely required; for (such a construction) is seldom appropriate. "But I, as soon as he told me—for Cleon came entreating and requiring (*claiming*, demanding)—set out with them in my company." For in examples like this, several clauses with conjunctions are prematurely inserted before that which is to correspond as the correlative'.

The example of this faulty construction here given is one of the very few which Aristotle has manufactured, contrary to his usual rule of citing examples from the sayings or writings of others supplied by memory. This has been noticed as one of the characteristic differences which distinguish *Aristotle's Rhetoric* from the Rhet. ad Alex.—see Introd. p. 414<sup>1</sup>—the author of the latter, almost invariably, illustrating his precepts by examples of his own. The example itself, as appears from the πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι of the ensuing clause, is to be regarded, not as an actual exemplification of the fault, but only as a suggestion of what might be. In itself it is clear enough: but if these parenthetical clauses be *multiplied*—as in fact is very often done in Aristotle's own writings—between protasis and apodosis, the hearer, or reader, is very apt to

<sup>1</sup> Where "the *single* exception, of III 16" requires modification: but the exceptions are extremely rare.

ἀναγκαῖον· ὀλιγαχοῦ γὰρ ἀρμόττει. “ἐγὼ δ’, ἐπεὶ  
μοι εἶπεν (ἦλθε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενός τε καὶ ἀξιῶν),  
ἐπορευόμην παραλαβὼν αὐτούς.” ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πολ-  
λοὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένου συνδέσμου προεμβέ-  
βληνται σύνδεσμοι. εἰ δὲ πολὺ τὸ μεταξὺ γένηται  
3 τοῦ ἐπορευόμην, ἀσαφές. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ εὖ ἐν τοῖς  
συνδέσμοις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίῳις ὀνόμασι λέγειν  
4 καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν. τρίτον μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις.

forget the commencement of the sentence, and the argument becomes confused.

‘But if the clauses that intervene (before) ἐπορευόμην (*between* the πρότασις and it) be numerous, it becomes obscure’. μεταξὺ is not unfrequently used with only one of the two extremes, between which the intermediate lies, expressed: examples are, Arist. Ach. 432, Τηλέφου ρακώματα. κείται δ’ ἄνωθεν τῶν Θυεστείων ρακῶν, μεταξὺ τῶν Ἴνου. Aesch. Choeph. 55, τὰ δ’ ἐν μεταίχμῳ σκότου, for σκότου καὶ φάους. Others in Shilleto’s note on Dem. de F. L. § 181, who compares with the last instance, our own *twilight*, i.e. ‘betwixt (darkness and) light’. Add Soph. Oed. Col. 583, τὰ ἐν μέσῳ. Ib. 291 (with Schneidewin’s note). Eur. Hec. 437. [Isocr. Paneg. § 70, ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς χώρας, Dem. de Corona § 32, τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον τῶν ὅρκων.]

A violation of this rule is pointed out by Arnold, on Thuc. I 32. 1. Comp. Quint. VIII 2. 14, 15. The parenthesis, τὸ μεταξὺ, is there called *interiectio*. *Interiectio, qua et oratores et historici frequenter utuntur, ut medio sermone aliquem inserant sensum, impediri solet intellectus, nisi quod interponitur breve est*; Virg. Georg. III 79—83 being adduced as an example. This is properly referred by Quint. to *perspicuitas*.

§ 3. ‘So one point (or head, of merit in style) appears, resides, in the due construction of connectives (conjunctions); a second is to call things by their own proper (special) names, and not by terms that are *general* (comprehensive; i. e. names of *classes*, abstract terms)’.

τὰ περιέχοντα is explained by Victorius and Schrader, ‘periphrases, circumlocutions’, such as the general definition for the particular object under it, the λόγος for the ὄνομα; or a description in *several* words substituted for the *single* ἴδιον ὄνομα, as *Ibericas herbas* for *spartum, duratos muria pisces for salsamenta*, Quint. VIII 2. 2, 3, and others, quoted by Schrader from Cic. de Div. II 64. This is *περίφρασις*, a *roundabout*, not *direct*, expression of your meaning, *circumlocutio, circuitus eloquendi*, Quint. VIII 6. 59—61.

I have followed this explanation myself in the paraphrase, Introd. p. 293; but I now see that the word cannot bear this meaning, and adopt the explanation of Schweighäuser on Athen. VII 309 A (q. v.), who understands by it the γένος, the genus or class name, which, being an abstract, *general* term, is of course less *perspicuous* than the direct expression of one of the particulars, (ἴδια, of which the class is composed,) by the name of the concrete individual; as animal or man than John

ταῦτα δέ, ἀν μὴ τάναντία προαιρήται. ὃ περ ποι-  
οῦσιν ὅταν μὴθὲν μὲν ἔχωσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δέ  
τι λέγειν· οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἐν ποιήσει λέγουσι ταῦτα,  
οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· φενακίζει γὰρ τὸ κύκλῳ πολὺ ὄν,

and Thomas. The genus may be said περιέχειν 'to comprehend, embrace, include', the species, and individuals of which it is made up; and conversely περιέχεσθαι of the included object, τὸ ὑποκείμενον, Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 23, 29. Comp. Met. Δ 2, 1013 b 34, τὰ περιέχοντα ὅτιοῦν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα. Ib. Θ 2, 1046 b 24, μᾶ γὰρ ἀρχῇ περιέχεται, τῷ λόγῳ. Moreover ὀνόμασι, which must be carried on to περιέχουσιν, can hardly stand for 'descriptions' consisting of many words.

§ 4. 'Thirdly, to avoid ambiguous terms; but that, (viz. to avoid them,) only if the purpose be not the contrary': the contrary, viz. to perspicuity, that is obscurity. If your object is to be obscure, you should then not avoid, but make use of, these equivocal terms, to hide your meaning and mystify your audience.

ἀμφιβολοῖς] I 15. 10. ἀμφιβολία is one of the fallacies of language, παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, 'ambiguity' in words connected in a sentence, 'in the proposition'; distinguished from ὁμωνυμία, ambiguity in single words, de Soph. El. c. 4. It is exemplified, I. c. 166 a 6 seq. See above, in preliminary observations to II 24. These two last precepts are most probably taken, like the preceding on σύνδεσμος, from Isocrates' τέχνη; and appear also in Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26) 1, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὀνόμαζε τοῖς οἰκείοις ὀνόμασιν ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς, διαφεύγων τὸ ἀμφίβολον. See in the analysis of this treatise, c. 25, Introd. p. 437. The qualification, ἀν μὴ τάναντία προαιρήται, seems to be Aristotle's own. On the various kinds of ἀμφιβολία, *ambiguitas*, in Rhetoric *sunt innumerabiles* (Quint. VII 9). They may be referred to two general heads; in *singulis verbis* (ὁμωνυμία), and *coniunctis* (Aristotle's ἀμφιβολία).

'As is done (ambiguous terms employed, by speakers and writers) whenever, having in fact nothing to say, they make a pretence (affect) of saying something; for such (those who pretend to a meaning when there is none) express this no-meaning in verse (comp. III 1. 9, οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη κ.τ.λ.), Empedocles, for instance: for this (roundabout, circuitous, phraseology) circumlocution cheats (deludes) by the multitude (accumulation) of words, and the listeners are affected (i. e. imposed upon) in the same way as the vulgar in the presence of diviners; that is, when (the latter) pronounce their ambiguous utterance, they express their approval by a nod of assent, "Croesus, if he pass the Halys, shall destroy a mighty realm"'.  
The oracle leaves it doubtful whether the power or dominion to be destroyed is his own, or some other. Herod. I 53, 91. Oracles are proverbially ambiguous and enigmatical. [*Macbeth*, v 8. 19, *Be these juggling fiends no more believed That palter with us in a double sense; That keep the word of promise to our ear; And break it to our hope.* Cicero, de Divin. II 56. 116 (to Pyrrhus), *Aio te Aecida Romanos vincere posse.*]

Perhaps the two following verses of Empedocles' collected fragments,

καὶ πᾶσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ὃ περ οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς μάντεσιν· ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀμφίβολα, συμπαραινέουσιν.

Κροῖσος Ἄλυν διαβὰς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει.

Karsten, p. 100, lines 106—7, may in some degree illustrate Aristotle's allusion to this writer, and his sound without sense ;

Νεῖκος τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη,  
καὶ Φιλότης μετὰ τοῖσιν ἴση μῆκος τε πλάτος τε.

Karsten's remarks on Empedocles' style, *de Emp. vita et studiis* p. 60, (prefixed to the Fragm. and Comment.) well illustrate this passage, to which he refers. He notices the obscurity of his diction, which appears especially in the symbolical terms, such as *Νῆστις*, by which he sometimes designates the elements—see for instance the four lines, Fragm. 211—214—and in the ambiguities ascribed to him here by Aristotle, “Nonnunquam vero ad *oraculorum* gravitatem adsurgit, quales sunt versus illi, ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα κ.τ.λ. Fragm. init. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον κ.τ.λ. v. 404. Quamobrem minime miramur quod affirmat Theodoretus, seniores fatidicos ex Empedoclis potissimum versibus oracula sua compilasse.”

Aristotle says of him, Poet. I 11, οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὅμηρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον· διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν. It is curious to contrast this contemptuous judgment of his poetry and the general character and value of his writings, as it may be gathered from the two passages of the Rhet. and Poet., with the glowing eulogium of Lucretius, *de rerum nat.* I 716—733. After describing the wonders and good things of Sicily, his birthplace, he concludes, *Nil tamen hoc habuisse viro praeclarior in se, nec sanctum magis et mirum carumque videtur. Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius vociferantur et exponunt praeclara reperta, ut vix humana videatur stirpe creatus.* And still more remarkable is Aristotle's contradiction of himself, if Diogenes Laertius' quotation, VIII 57, is to be depended upon, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ποιητῶν φησιν ὅτι καὶ Ὅμηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν, κ.τ.λ.—comp. the passage of the Poetics:—the possible explanation, that what he said in the one refers to the style, and in the other to the contents, of Empedocles' poem, is excluded by the contemptuous remark upon his style in the Rhetoric. On the passage of Lucretius, see Munro's note, I 733.

Of the vagabond impostors who hawked about spurious oracles and predictions under the names of μάντις and χρησμολόγοι, prophets or diviners and soothsayers, Aristophanes has given us specimens, Hierocles in the ‘Peace,’ 1252, foll., and the nameless χρησμολόγος in the ‘Birds,’ 959, foll.

‘And by reason of the less liability to mistake in general (by following this course) diviners are accustomed to deliver their predictions in (through the channel, or *medium* of) general terms of the fact (which is prophesied), *fraus latet in generalibus*; for a man is much more likely to make a hit in playing “odd and even” by saying “even” or “odd,” than



καὶ διὰ τὸ ὅλως ἔλαττον εἶναι ἀμάρτημα, διὰ τῶν P. 1407 b.  
γενῶν τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν οἱ μάντεις· τύχοι γὰρ  
ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἄρτια ἢ περισσὰ  
εἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσα ἔχει, καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἔσται ἢ τὸ  
πότε, διό οἱ χρησμολόγοι οὐ προσορίζονται τὸ πότε.  
 5 ἅπαντα δὴ ταῦτα ὅμοια· ὥστ' ἂν μὴ τοιούτου τινὸς  
ἕνεκα, φευκτέον. τέταρτον, ὡς Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη  
 τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεύη· δεῖ

any particular number that he has in his hand; or "that (the event predicted) *will* be" than "when" (it will be); and this is why the soothsayers never add (to their prediction) the *precise* time (lit. the definition of the 'when'). All these then (circumlocutions, ambiguities, and the like) are alike (in being *faults*) and therefore, unless for some such (reason as was before suggested), to be avoided'.

Of *ἀρτιασμός* "odd and even", (a child's game, played with *ἀσπράγαλοι*, or knuckle-bones, Plato, *Lysis* 206 E, *ἡρτίαζον ἀσπράγαλοις παμπόλλοις*), an account is given in Becker's *Charicles*, on 'the games', p. 354; and of the corresponding Latin game *par impar* in *Gallus*, p. 504. *Ludere par impar*, Hor. Sat. II 3. 248 (Heindorf's note), Ovid, *Nux Eleg.* line 79, *est etiam, par sit numerus, qui dicat, an impar*. The game might be played with any kind of counters, beans, acorns, coins—in Carion's house, after he had grown rich, Arist. *Plut.* 816, "the servants played at odd and even with golden staters." It is usually described as played by two persons, one of whom held in his closed hand a number of counters, and the other had to guess whether it was odd or even. This was no doubt one way of playing it, but there was also another not quite so simple, as appears from this passage of the *Rhetoric*, and also from the Schol. on *Plut.* 1057, in which the guess was made at the *number, πόσα*. In the *Plutus*, l. c., the game is played with 'walnuts', *κάρνα*, and the Scholiast's comment is, "one grasps a handful of walnuts, and with his hand stretched out asks, how many? and if the other guesses right, he receives all the contents of his hand; if wrong, he *pays* the number found in the other's hand when opened."

οἱ χρησμολόγοι οὐ προσορίζονται τὸ πότε] On this intentional indefiniteness and obscurity of would-be prophets, Victorius refers to Aeschines c. Ctes. § 99, who contrasts Demosthenes with other *ἀλάζωνες*, who *ὅταν τι ψεύδωνται, ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσαφὴ πειρῶνται λέγειν, φοβούμενοι τὸν ἔλεγχον*: and, to the same effect, of a supposed citation from the Sibylline verses, Cic. de *Divin.* II 54. 110, *Callide enim qui illa composuit perfecit ut, quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur, hominum et temporum definitione sublata*.

§ 5. 'Fourthly, to observe Protagoras' division of the classes (classification) of nouns, into *male*, *female*, and *inanimate* (prop. implements): for these also must be correctly assigned, each to its proper place'. This is illustrated by an example of two participles in the feminine following §.

γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς “ ἡ δ’ ἐλθοῦσα καὶ  
6 διαλεχθεῖσα ὥχεται.” πέμπτον ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ  
ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν. “ οἱ δ’ ἐλθόντες ἔτυπ-  
τόν με.”

ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον  
καὶ εὐφραστον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτό. ὃ περ οἱ πολλοὶ

On the import of this, the earliest attempt at Greek grammar, and other similar essays of Protagoras in the same line, see *Camb Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. VII. Vol. III. p. 48 seq. in the article on Protagoras. I have there, and subsequently in a note, *Introd.* p. 293, endeavoured by comparison of various passages on the subject to determine its meaning, and I need not here repeat what is there said. At all events it is *not* the now recognised grammatical classification of ‘genders of nouns’, masculine, feminine and neuter. γένη is not here ‘genders’, though the later grammar adopted this name to express it; but simply ‘classes’. This is a genuine precept of ‘Ελληνισμός, ‘purity of language’, as is also the next.

§ 6. ‘Fifthly, in the correct expression (by change of termination) of many, few, and one’, followed by an example of a *plural* participle and verb. This is of course the due expression of the *number* of nouns, and the observation of the *concord*, or agreement of adj. with subst. or pronoun, or verb with nom. case, *in number*. Victorius thinks that ὀλίγα stands for what was afterwards distinguished as the *dual* number. *Comp. Cic. de Orat.* III 11. 40.

‘And, as a general rule, every written composition must be easy to read, or—which is much the same thing—to speak, or deliver’. *Comp. Quint. VIII 2. 17. Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, § 193 (*Spengel, Rhet. Gr.* III 304), γραφικὴ δὲ λέξις (written composition) ἡ εὐανάγνωστος. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ συνηρημένη καὶ οἷον ἡ σφαιλισμένη τοῖς συνδέσμοις, i.e. written composition must be carefully and well constructed, with due regard to the conjunctions, and the connexion of sentences, or syntax in general. This is opposed to declamatory speaking, ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις, ἡ διαλελυμένη, in which the want of exact connexion—particularly asyndeton, the omission of καὶ—often aids the effect: *comp. § 194.*

‘This is wanting (in compositions in which) conjunctions and other connecting particles are numerous, and such as are not easy to *punctuate*, like those of Heraclitus’. This does not contradict what was said before about the necessity of conjunctions, &c., to ensure perspicuity, it only condemns the excessive use of them; a long string of connected clauses is apt to lead to obscurity: the due mean is to be observed, here as elsewhere. With what follows compare Demetrius, u. s. § 192, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνδετον καὶ διαλελυμένον ὅλον ἀσαφές πάν· ἀδελφός γὰρ ἡ ἐκάστου κώλου ἀρχὴ διὰ τὴν λύσιν, ὥσπερ τὰ ‘Ηρακλείτου’ καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα σκοτεινὰ ποιεῖ τὸ πλείστον ἡ λύσις, and Theon, *Progymn. περὶ διηγήματος* § 187 (*Spengel, Rhet. Gr.* II 82), παρὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν (ambiguity arising from punctuation) τὰ ‘Ηρακλείτου τοῦ φιλοσόφου βιβλία σκοτεινὰ γέγονε κατακόρως αὕτη χρῆσάμενος, ἥτοι ἐπίτηδες ἢ καὶ δι’ ἄγνοιαν (the fault had been previously illustrated)

σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδ' ἂ μὴ ῥάδιον διαστίξαι,  
 ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου δια- p. 120.  
 στίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται,

Quintilian, VII 9. 7, classes this as one of the varieties of *ambibolia* (ambiguity), viz. *per collectionem, ubi dubium est quid quo referri oporteat*, exemplifying it from Virgil, Aen. I 477 *lora tenens tamen*. § 8, *unde controversia illa, Testamento quidam iussit poni statuam auream hastam tenentem. Quaeritur, statua hastam tenens aurea esse debeat, an hasta esse aurea in statua alterius materiae?*—σκοτεινὰ, in the above passages of Demetrius and Theon, is of course an allusion to Heraclitus' well-known sobriquet, ὁ σκοτεινός; his 'obscurity' was proverbial. This want of punctuation is not by any means the only, or indeed the principal, source of the obscurity of the mystic enigmatical sayings of the 'dark' philosopher. The remains of these have been collected by Schleiermacher, Bernays [and Bywater] in their respective tracts, and several of the most remarkable quoted by Thompson in his note on Butler's *Lect. on Anc. Phil.* I 313, note 10; see also Diog. Laert. IX 1, *vita Heracliti*.

διαστίξαι] διὰ στίξιν, ('to prick'), is 'to distinguish or duly distribute by pointing or punctuation'. Two examples similar to this are given in de Soph. El. c. 4, 166 a 36, in illustration of the fallacy of διαίρεσις.

'For to punctuate Heraclitus' writing is a hard matter (a difficult job, a business), owing to the uncertainty as to which of the two (words), the preceding or following, (any particular word) is attached; as for instance, at the commencement of his (αὐτοῦ, masc.) composition, where he says, "Of this reason constant (being) ever (reading τοῦδ' ἐόντος δέ) men come into being devoid of understanding"; for this leaves it uncertain to which of the two (ἐόντος or ἀξύνετοι γίνονται) the word *ever* should be attached by the punctuation'. Bekker, who in his first edition reads τοῦ δέοντος, has in the third altered it to τοῦδ' ἔοντος. Spengel retains the former—which is the reading of MS A<sup>c</sup> (or A). τοῦδ' ἐόντος, which had been already proposed by Victorius from a passage of Sext. Empir., is undoubtedly right. The words are quoted also by Clemens Alex. *Strom.* V 14, p. 716, by Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* XIII, and by Sextus Empiricus *adv. Math.* VII 132, who extracts several lines, reading τοῦδε ἐόντος, and omitting δέ, which are cited and commented on by Schleiermacher in his tract on the fragments of Heraclitus, No. 47, p. 482. Clemens and Eusebius have τοῦ δέοντος (Schleierm.). The λόγος, according to Sextus—and this is confirmed by Heraclitus' context, which he quotes—is the universal reason, ὁ θεῖος λόγος, of which men are unconscious, depending rather upon sense, though it is the true κριτήριον. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ θεῖον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν γινόμεθα λογικοί, κριτήριον ἀληθείας φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος. This interpretation of course requires ἔοντος. An additional argument in its favour is suggested by Schleiermacher, that if δέοντος had been the reading in Aristotle's copy of Heraclitus, he would have found no difficulty in the reference of δέ. The title of his σύγγραμμα—which is omitted by Diogenes in his life, IX 1, though the σύγγραμμα itself is twice mentioned, §§ 6, 7, and some of its contents quoted in the 7th and follow-

τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἶον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ  
τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ “ τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’  
έόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται.” ἄδηλον γὰρ  
7 τὸ αἰεὶ, πρὸς ὁποτέρῳ διαστίξαι. ἔτι δὲ ποιεῖ σολοι-  
κίξειν τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, εἰ μὴ ἐπιζευγνύης ἀμφοῖν <sup>ἢ ὡς καὶ τὸ</sup>

ing sections—seems to have been *περὶ φύσεως*; the ordinary title of works upon similar subjects by the earlier cosmical speculators, as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, &c.

*ἔργον*] of something hard, difficult of execution, laborious—in the same sense as *ἐργώδης*, *operosus*, which is derived from it—occurs occasionally in various Greek writers, though it is exemplified by only one instance in Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon. It is used sometimes with, sometimes without, *χαλεπὸν*. Arist. Ran. 1100, *χαλεπὸν οὖν ἔργον διαιρεῖν*. A number of instances of *ἔργον* in this sense and *ἐργώδης* are to be found in the fragments of the Comic poets, Menander, Diphilus, Posidippus, Apollodorus; for instance, *ἔργον—ἄνοιαν ἡμέρα μεταστῆσαι μία· ἔργον ἐστὶ μακρὰν συνθεῖαν—λύσαι· ἔργον ἐκ λόγου πίστιν λαβεῖν*, κ.τ.λ. See the Ind. to Meineke’s *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* s. v. Xen. Mem. IV 7. 9, *ἔργον εἶναι εὐρεῖν ἱατρόν* κ.τ.λ. Plat. Symp. 187 E, *μέγα ἔργον...καλῶς χρῆσθαι*, Ib. Tim. 28 C, *τὸν ποιητὴν...εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα*, κ.τ.λ. Demosth. de Rhod. Lib. § 34, *ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ ὁποίων λόγων—τοῦτ’ ἔργον εὐρεῖν*. It occurs more frequently in Aristotle, and is, I think, almost confined to the later of the classical Greek writers. Arist. Pol. II 7, 1266 b 13, *ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιῶνς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους*. III 15, 1286 a 35, *ἐκεῖ δ’ ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν*. Eth. Nic. V 13, 1137 a 13, *τοῦτο δὲ πλεόν ἔργον* (a harder task) *ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι*. Ib. c. 3, 1130 a 8. Topic. E c. 4, 133 b 16, c. 5, 134 a 19, Θ 3, 159 a 5, c. 11, 161 b 32, *πλεόνος ἔργου δεομένων*. Hist. Anim. II 6, *ὥστε ἔργον εἶναι ἰδεῖν*. Ib. VI 20. 7, 30. 2, IX 40. 29, *ἔργον δ’ ἐστὶ λαθεῖν*. *ἐργώδης* occurs, Eth. N. I 13, 1102 a 25, IX 2, *sub finem*, c. 7, 1168 a 24, c. 10, 1171 a 5, and Top. Z I, 13 b 9, *ἐργωδέστερον*. In Latin we have *negotium* similarly employed, and *nullo negotio*; and Virgil has *opus*; *Hoc opus, hic labor est*, Aen. VI 129.

*ὁποτέρῳ διαστίξαι*. Bekker in margin of 4to. edition “an δεῖ στίξαι?” He (and Spengel) has now returned to the *vulgata lectio διαστίξαι, subaudi δεῖ*. Gaisford conjectured *δεῖ διαστίξαι*.

§ 7. ‘And further a solecism is made if, in combining (two words) in one phrase (and grammatically connected with a third; as two substs. with one verb, or two verbs with a subst.), you fail to assign one which is equally appropriate to them both (*lit.* and again, a solecism is made, by not assigning, that is, if you don’t unite in construction with them, i. e. with the two verbs or nouns, which are not expressed, one which is appropriate to them both: in other words, if you *do* assign to them a third word which is appropriate only to one of them). For instance, *to see* is not common to sound and colour (won’t combine with, is not appropriate to, both) but *to perceive* is’.

*σολοικίζειν*] See note on *σόλοικοι*, II 16. 2 [and Dem. Or. 45 § 30, quoted on p. 55].

ἀρμόττει, οἷον ἢ ψόφον ἢ χρῶμα· τὸ μὲν ἰδῶν οὐ κοινόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθόμενος κοινόν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ ἂν μὴ προθεῖς εἴπῃς, μέλλων πολλὰ μεταξὺ ἐμβάλλειν, οἷον “ἐμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεῖς ἐκείνῳ τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὧδε πορεύεσθαι,” ἀλλὰ μὴ “ἐμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεῖς πορεύεσθαι, εἴτα τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὧδε ἐγένετο.”

I εἰς ὄγκον δὲ τῆς λέξεως συμβάλλεται τάδε, τὸ CHAP. VI.

ἐπιζευγνύναι, which occurs again c. 6 § 5, and c. 9 § 7, seems to be technical in this grammatical application, of ‘uniting’ as it were ‘under a *vinculum* or bracket’; the *yoke* in the Greek fulfilling a similar function in uniting two animals, as a bracket, in arithmetic or algebra, unites two or more symbols that are placed under it. So that ἐπιζευγνύναι is to place the ζυγόν *υφον* the two words, and so bring them together in one construction. This solecism, as Ar. rightly calls it, usually passes under the respectable name of a *figure*, grammatical or rhetorical. It is the figure ζεύγμα or σύλληψις, the office of which has been already explained. It is illustrated at length in the note on I 4.6.

ψόφον and χρῶμα are ‘governed’ by ἰδῶν following. Why Aristotle should have chosen to write ἢ the alternative, instead of καὶ the copula, which he clearly means, no one I suppose can guess. I have taken for granted, as Victorius has also done, that he *does* mean *and*, and not *or*, and have so translated it. A bad instance of ζεύγμα is given in note 1, Introd. p. 295, from the immaculate Isocrates, Paneg. § 80 (καὶ σωτήρης ἀλλὰ μὴ λυμεῶνες ἀποκαλείσθαι).

‘It tends to obscurity too (is an offence against, violation of, *perspicuity*) if you intend to introduce a number (of words or details) in the middle of a sentence, not to complete the sense first (πρῶ, before you proceed, *lit.* not to put first, that which will remove what would else be the obscurity). For instance, “I intended, after having talked to him about this and that and so and so”—here the details are to be introduced; but these are so long, that before the speaker has come to the end of his sentence the hearers have forgotten the beginning—“to start:” instead of, “I was about to start after my conversation with him, and then (when) this and that and so and so happened.” This is μεταξυλογία, *interiection* (Quint.), or Parenthesis. See Introd. p. 295.

#### CHAP. VI.

Of ὄγκος (swelling), pomp, grandeur, dignity (Auct. ad Heren. IV 13.18, *dignitas*), of style; most appropriate to *Épic* poetry: Poet. xxiv. 9, τὸ γὰρ ἡρώϊκον στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν. Ib. § 6, ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὄγκος. See Gräfenhan’s note ad loc. So Dion. Hal. de Dinarch. Iud. c. 7 (Vol. v. 643, Reiske), τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς τὸ μὴ τραγικὸν μηδὲ ὀγκῶδες ἔχει. This is near akin to σεμνότης, on which Hermogenes has a chapter, περὶ ἰδεῶν, τομ. α’. (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* II. 287), and περὶ σεμνοῦ λόγου, περὶ εὐρέσεως, τομ. δ’. c. 11 (Ib. p. 255), and again περὶ μεγέθους, in the preceding chap. 10, p. 286. So Demetrius writes περὶ

λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ἀντ' ὀνόματος, οἷον μὴ κύκλον, ἀλλ' ἔπιπεδον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον. εἰς δὲ συντομίαν τὸ  
 2 ἐναντίον, ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου ὄνομα. καὶ εἰς αἰσχροὺς ἢ

ἀπρεπές· εἰς μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἢ αἰσχροὺς, τοῦνομα  
 μεγαλοπρεπούς, in his *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, § 38, seq. (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III. 270 seq.): and Dion. Hal., de Dinarch. Iud. 3. 7, attributes *μεγαλοπρέπεια* to Demosthenes' style. And in these writers *ὄγκος*, *μέγεθος*, and *ἀξιώμα* (dignity) are often associated as characteristics of style. In *Top.* Θ 1, 155 b 22, ἡ εἰς ὄγκον τοῦ λόγου (one of the four motives for multiplying *προτάσεις*), it means nothing more than a device for swelling out, increasing the bulk of, the discourse or argument.

In the language of Rhetoric we see that *ὄγκος* implies excellence and is a virtue of style. In the vulgar usage of common life, when it and its derivatives are applied metaphorically, as they often are, it may bear either a favourable or an unfavourable interpretation. In the latter case the 'pomp' of style becomes 'pomposity', and the 'swelling phrases' turgid and inflated *αμφυλλαί*. And in a moral sense the same notion of *fastus* is attached to it, and it comes to denote vanity, ostentation, arrogance, as *Plat. Meno* 90 A, where it is personal, and opposed to *κόσμος*. In *Soph. Oed. Col.* 1162, *βραχὺν μῦθον οὐκ ὄγκου πλέων* is a short conversation without 'bulk', not unnaturally and unreasonably *swelled out* or lengthened. *ὄγκωδεις* *χλιδῇ* in the same author (*Fragm.* Inc. ap. *Stobaeum*, No. 679, *Dind.*) has the same sense in a moral application. And so *ὄγκον ἀφρεῖν*, *Soph. Aj.* 129. τὸ ὀγκηρόν, *Ar. Eth. N.* iv. 13, *sub finem*, is again 'inflated', of mere bulk without solidity, show without substance; i. e. morally, 'ostentation', a pretentious air and exterior, assumption. See *Ernesti, Lex. Tech. Gr.* s. vv. *ὀγκηρόν*, *ὄγκος*, *ὀγκοῦν*, *ὀγκώδεις*.

§ 1. 'To dignity, amplification of style, the following things contribute; first, the substitution of definition (or detailed description) for the (direct, proper) name (of the object); to say for example not *circle*, but "a plane figure which is in all points equidistant from the centre"'. One would have supposed that this was an exemplification rather of the unfavourable sense of *ὄγκος*: it also seems to be opposed to what was said c. 5. 3, τοῖς ἰδίῃς ὀνόμασι λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν: and in fact dignity ought not to interfere with perspicuity. The two precepts, however, do not in reality contradict one another. The use of abstract, general terms, instead of the plain and direct individual names, is a source of obscurity: there is no obscurity, but rather the contrary, in setting forth the definition of it at length. 'For (the purpose of) brevity the contrary (is the rule), the proper name, and *not* the definition'. Both of these precepts appear in the *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 22 (23) §§ 3 and 5. They are probably taken, like the others mentioned in *Introd.* pp. 437, 438, from *Isocrates' τέχνη*.

§ 2. 'And if (you have to express) anything ugly or foul' (to the eye or to the mind and moral sense), 'or unbecoming, if the foulness or indecency is in the (conception, explanation, description, i. e.) meaning and associations, use the *word*, if in the word itself, the description'. See on *αἰσχρολογία*, note on c. 2. 13, and the distinction there laid down.

3 λέγειν, ἐὰν δ' ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, τὸν λόγον. καὶ μεταφοραῖς δηλοῦν καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθέτοις, εὐλαβούμενον τὸ 4 ποιητικόν. καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ ποιεῖν, ὃ περ οἱ ποιηταὶ ποιοῦσιν· ἐνὸς ὄντος λιμένος ὅμως λέγουσι

λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαικοὺς

καὶ

δέλτου μὲν αἶδε πολύθυροι διαπτυχαί.

§ 3. 'And setting forth (representing) things by metaphors and the descriptive and ornamental epithets (epithets proper, and any descriptive addition to a noun), guarding at the same time against giving them a too poetical character'. One of the characteristics of Thucydides is τὸ ποιητικὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων, according to Dionysius, de Thuc. Iud. 24; as likewise of Gorgias and his school, who exaggerated this defect so that their prose made a near approach to dithyrambics.

§ 4. 'And to make one many (to put plural for singular) after the manner of the poets: they say, though all the while there is only *one* harbour, "to Achæan harbours"'. [Victorius refers to the treatise *περὶ ὕψους*, 23 § 2 (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* I 274), *ἔσθ' ὅπου προσπίπτει τὰ πληθυντικὰ μεγαλορρημονέστερα, καὶ αὐτῷ δοξοκομποῦντα τῷ ὄχλῳ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ*, which the writer illustrates by quoting Soph. Oed. Rex 1403—7, *ᾧ γάμοι γάμοι κ.τ.λ.*]

λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαικοὺς] There are five instances of *λιμένες* for a single harbour in Euripides, and one in Sophocles, but none of them is 'Achæan harbours'. Victorius says that he has not been able to find the passage.

'And again, "Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablets"', the letter, namely, which Iphigenia was proposing to send by one of the two strangers to Orestes at Argos. Iph. Taur. 727.

πολύθυροι] restored (for *πολύθρηνοι*) from *πολύθρηροι* found in one MS, describes the many leaves of the tablets: this, which was less usual than the simpler form, with only two leaves, shews that it was a *long letter*.

On *δέλτος*, comp. Becker's *Charicles*, p. 162 note [Vol. I. p. 285, of unabridged German ed.], Rich's *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant.* s.v. *cera* p. 144. The leaves of the tablets, which were thin slabs or plates of wood coated with wax, were sometimes shaped like doors (a very natural form to give them), whence the name *θύρα*. Pollux IV 18 (ap. Herm. ad Iph. T. 715), οἱ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ γραμματεῖον δίδυρον· καὶ θύρας τὰς πτύχας, ἄχρι δύο· εἴτα πτύχας, καὶ τρίπτυχον καὶ πολύπτυχον. Hesychius, *θυρίδας Ἀττικοὶ τὰς τῶν γραμμάτων πτύχας, καὶ δίδυρον λέγουσιν, οὐ τρίθυρον, ἀλλὰ τρίπτυλον [τρίπτυχον?]*. Paley, ad loc., well compares the *δέλτος* with its wooden leaves to 'the modern ivory memorandum-book'. Becker, u.s., observes that 'these wax tablets were only used for *letters*, and matters of no permanent moment'. They could be fastened with a string and sealed, Paley on Iph. Aul. 37.

*διαπτυχαί* is interpreted by the Lexicons as equivalent to *πτυχαί*, and meaning 'folds'—not of course, though the difference is not stated, *folded* like a modern letter, of paper, which this explanation sug-

5 καὶ μὴ ἐπιζευγνύναι, ἀλλ' ἑκατέρω ἑκάτερον, "τῆς  
 γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας." εἰ δὲ συντόμως, τούναντίον  
 6 "τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός." καὶ μετὰ συνδέσμου λέ-  
 γειν· εἰ δὲ συντόμως, ἄνευ μὲν συνδέσμου, μὴ ἀσύν-  
 δετα δέ, οἷον πορευθεῖς καὶ διαλεχθεῖς, πορευθεῖς

gests, but in another sense of *πτυχή* or *πτύξ*, 'a leaf, layer, slab, or plate'. It is repeated in line 793, *γραμμάτων διαπτυχάς*. The Commentators, who are totally silent on the subject, appear to take the same view. As it seems necessary to assign *some* meaning to the *διά*, we may suppose that it expresses the *division* of the leaves, whether two or more; but in the latter case, derived from the *primary* division into *two*. Hermann and Paley have both noticed, what is sufficiently apparent, that Aristotle here has mistaken Euripides' meaning. It is quite plain from the epithet *πολύθυροι*, that the *plural* is to be understood literally of the several leaves of the tablets. If Euripides had written *δελτοὶ* he would have used the licence ascribed to him by Aristotle.

§ 5. 'And not to combine (two cases with one article, Victorius: *τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός*), but to assign or attach (*ἀποδιδόναι* or *προστιθέναι*, understand *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ*, or by *ζεύγμα*, from *ἐπιζευγνύει*) each to either (an article in either instance to either case) *τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας*, "that wife of ours". But if conciseness be the object (if you would express yourself concisely), the contrary, *τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός*, 'our wife.'

§ 6. 'And to use (as a rule) in speaking (and writing) conjunctions and other connectives; or, for conciseness, to write without connectives, but not without connexion: as either *πορευθεῖς καὶ διαλεχθεῖς*, or *πορευθεῖς διελέχθη*'. It is impossible to translate this into *English*, so as to shew the difference in the two Greek phrases, because the approved translation of the second is to convert the participle, which we seldom use in this connexion, into a finite verb connected by a copula with the verb succeeding: so that in our language the two expressions become identical.

*ἀσύνδετος λόγος* is composition in which the conjunctions and other connecting particles, especially the copula, are omitted; and therefore more or less loose, unconnected, incoherent. Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* p. 45. It is to be observed that as connecting particles occur much more frequently in Greek than in our own language, the want of them, which constitutes *asyndeton*, would be much more disagreeable to the Greeks than to us, and would give the composition the appearance of being both naked and disjointed. Consequently the *general* rule (which is stated here) is to avoid it: but in special cases, where the aim is to give emphasis and vigour, rapidity and conciseness to a narrative, it may often be used with advantage, as the examples will shew. Demetrius *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, § 192, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνδετον καὶ διαλελυμένον ὄλον ἀσαφές πάν.

*ἀσύνδετον* is defined alike in several of the later Greek rhetoricians, Hermogenes, *περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος*, 11, Phoebammon, Tiberius, Herodian, Zonaeus and others, as the 'omission of *σύνδεσμοι*'; and all alike exemplify it by the omission of *καί*, which is no doubt the most frequent



7 διελέχθην. καὶ τὸ Ἀντιμάχου χρήσιμον, ἐξ ὧν μὴ P. 1408.  
ἔχει λέγειν, ὃ ἐκείνος ποιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ Τευμησσοῦ,

ἔστι τις ἡνεμόεις ὀλίγος λόφος·

case. Comp. Cic. Orat. XXXIX 135, who speaks of it as one of the *orationis lumina et quodammodo insignia, quum demptis coniunctionibus dissolute plura dicuntur*. Quint. IX 3, 50, *figuram, quae quia coniunctionibus caret dissolutio vocatur; apta quum quid instantius dicimus; nam et singula inculcantur et quasi plura fiunt*, seq. Confer omnino Dem. Phil. Γ 118, § 27, Ibid. p. 130 § 130, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Ἕλληνας συγκαλεῖν συνάγειν διδάσκειν νοουθετεῖν. The speeches of Lysias against Erasthenes and Andocides both conclude with an asyndeton of this kind. The former ends thus: παύσομαι κατηγορῶν. ἀκηκόατε, ἐώρακατε, πεπόνθατε· ἔχετε, δικάσετε: which Aristotle quotes Rhet. III 19. 6, at the end of the work; and of course wrongly. See also III 12. 2 and 4, where a similar example is given; not to omit Cicero's, *abiit excessit, evasit, erupit* [in Catilinam II § 1]. Demetrius περὶ ἑρμηνείας, § 194 (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 304), ὅτι δὲ ὑποκειρικὸν ἢ λύσις παράδειγμα ἐγκείσθω τότε· ἐδεξάμην, ἔτικτον, ἔτρεφον, φίλην, κ.τ.λ.

The meaning of § 6 is this. If you wish to add pomp and dignity to your style, as in an ordinary narrative, employ conjunctions—Victorius refers this to the so-called figure *ἐν διὰ δυοῖν*, hendiads, *pateris libamus et auro, in breviam et Syrtis, molemque et montes insuper altos imposuit*, from Virgil's *Georg.* and *Aen.*—Or, if you don't employ conjunctions, at any rate don't break the connexion between the parts of the sentence; if on the other hand (as he implies elsewhere) you want to be concise or give vigour and animation to your language, *asyndeton* will often do it.

§ 7. 'And the (practice) of Antimachus is useful (for this purpose), to draw the materials of a description from the attributes, (qualities, virtues, excellences,) which (the thing described) has *not*, as he does in the case of Teumessus, "There is a windy low hill"; for in that way the amplification may be carried to infinity'. This is a quotation from Antimachus' Thebais, the expedition of Adrastus and his six Argive companions against Thebes, the *ἑπτὰ ἐπὶ Θήβας*. In this he had occasion to mention Teumessus, "a village of Boeotia in the plain of Thebes, standing upon a low rocky hill of the same name". Launching out, as his manner was, into an episodic encomium of this little hill, he expended many verses upon it *διὰ πολλῶν ἐπῶν*, "enumerating all the virtues that did *not* belong to it". Strabo, IX. 2, Boeotia, p. 409. Strabo, like Aristotle, only quotes these five words, adding, as a reason for breaking off there, *γνώριμα δὲ τὰ ἔπη*. This same poem is referred to by Horace, A. P. 146, *Nec reditum Diomedis ab interitu Meleagri*; a narrative of Diomedes' fortune and return seems to have been interwoven with the main subject of the poem. Düntzer, *Epic. Gr. Fragm.* p. 99. (The fragments of Antimachus are collected by Düntzer in this volume, p. 99 seq. and *Nachtrag* pp. 38—43.)

The Scholiast Porphyrius, on the verse of Horace, says, *Antimachus fuit cyclicus poeta: hic adgressus est materiam, quam sic extendit ut*

αὐξεται γὰρ οὕτως εἰς ἀπειρον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ὅπως οὐκ ἔχει, ὅποτερως ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον. ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἱ ποιηταὶ φέρουσι, p. 121.

*viginti quattuor volumina* (i. e. books) *impleverit antequam septem duces usque ad Thebas perduceret.* On the connexion of the two stories, see Welcker *Ep. Cyclus*, p. 163; also quoted by Orelli ad loc. Antimachus was an elder contemporary of Plato. The occasion of their meeting is related by Plutarch, *Lysand.* 18, and differently by Cicero, *Brutus* 51 § 191, *Antimachum, Clarium poetam, ... qui quum convocatis auditoribus legeret eis magnum illud quod novistis volumen suum* (the Thebais), *et eum legentem omnes praeter Platonem reliquissent, Legam, inquit, nihilominus: Plato enim mihi unus instar est omnium millium.* (Welcker pronounces both forms of the story unworthy of credit.) In *magnum* Cicero no doubt refers not to the merit or celebrity, but to the bulk of the poem. His style is spoken of by Dionysius de Comp. Verb. c. 22 (v. 150, ed. Reiske), together with that of Empedocles, Pindar, Aeschylus, Thucydides and Antiphon, as belonging to the αὐστηρὰ λέξις, already described. To class him with these authors may seem to imply approbation. Quintilian, x 1. 53, in a comparison of the Epic poets, places him next to—though far below—Homer. *Contra in Antimacho vis et gravitas et minime vulgare eloquendi genus* (this agrees with Dionysius) *habet laudem. Sed quamvis ei secundas fere grammaticorum* (of Alexandria) *consensus deferat; et affectibus et incunditate et dispositione et omnino arte deficitur, ut plane manifesto appareat quanto sit aliud proximum esse, aliud secundum:* (so Horace of Jupiter, *nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum; proximos illi tamen occupavit Pallas honores*). He is called by some authors Clarian, by others Colophonian. Claros was a small town near Colophon, a colony and dependency of it. Most probably Claros was his birthplace, for which the more important and neighbouring mother-city was substituted. See further on Antimachus in Schrader and Buhle's notes; and on Teumessus, Valken. ad Phoen. 1107.

[ἐξ ὧν μὴ ἔχει. This device of description by a series of negations may be exemplified by Homer's *Odyss.* vi 43, (Olympus) οὐτ' ἀνέμοισι τινάσσεται οὔτε ποτ' ὄμβρῳ δέυεται οὔτε χιῶν ἐπιπλυνταί (and *Lucr.* III. 18). There are some striking instances in an expanded Anglo-Saxon paraphrase by Cynewulf of Lactantius' poem *de Phoenice*, *And there nor rain nor snow, nor breath of frost, Nor blast of fire, nor rush of rattling hail, Nor fall of rime nor scorching heat of sun, Nor lasting cold nor drought nor winter-shower...* (This translation is due to the Rev. W. W. Skeat).]

'This mode of treatment, that the things are not there, (or that the object of praise or censure has them not,) may be applied to things either good or bad (to *bad* things in a panegyric, to *good* as virtues, accomplishments, merits of all kinds, in a censure or invective), in whichever of the two ways it may be serviceable (or, whichever of the two the occasion may require). Hence (from the *absence* of a certain quality or attribute) the poets also derive their epithets (ὄνομα here stands for an adjective: see *Introd.* Appendix A to Bk. III. on ὀνόματα and ῥήματα)

*privation*  
τὸ ἄχορδον καὶ τὸ ἄλυρον μέλος· ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων  
γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν· εἰδόκιμει γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μετα-  
φοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἷον τὸ φάναι τὴν  
σάλπιγγα εἶναι μέλος ἄλυρον.

such as a *stringless* or *lyreless music*—music, but without the ordinary accompaniment or instrument, the strings of the lyre, or the lyre itself : applied to the sound of the *wind*-instrument, the trumpet—‘for they apply privative epithets; this being popular when expressed in the metaphors of proportion, as when the (sound or music of the) trumpet is called a lyreless music’.

ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων...ἐπιφέρουσιν] *lit.* they attach epithets borrowed or derived from *privations* : στερήσεις and ἕξις being one of the four forms of opposition : Categ. c. 10, 11 b 17 and 12 a 26 seq.

μεταφοραῖς...ταῖς ἀνάλογον] ἀνάλογον in this combination seems to be used adverbially ; comp. *supra* c. 4 §§ 3, 4, τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον, *infra* c. 7 § 10, τοῖς ἀνάλογον. On the proportional metaphor, the best of all the four kinds, I have already referred (on III 4. 4) to the *Intro.* pp. 290—292. See also Appendix B Bk. III on Metaphor, where this is fully explained.

Comp. with this section Poet. XXI 15, 16 ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς (the proportional, to wit) χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν οἰκείων τι, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα εἴποι φιάλην μὴ Ἄρεως ἀλλ’ ἄοινον (Victorius’ *emendatio palmaria* for the *vulgata lectio* ἀλλ’ οἴνου).

I transcribe Twining’s excellent note on this passage, which well illustrates our present subject. Note 189, p. 446. “Metaphors from their nature are in danger of being obscure or forced, though it is essential to their beauty and effect that they should be clear and apposite. For this purpose a metaphor may be guarded in various ways. If the simple substitution of the improper for the proper term would be obscure or harsh, the metaphor may be converted into an *image* or *comparison* (referring to Demetrius, *περὶ ἐρμηνείας* § 80) ; it may be used *analogically*, and we may say φιάλη Ἄρεως or φιάλη ἄοινος ; or if that be not sufficient for perspicuity—that is, if the meaning be not sufficiently pointed out by the manner or circumstances in which the expression is introduced—we may join these (φιάλη Ἄρεως ἄοινος), or even add to either of them the *proper* word itself. There is a fine instance of this *negative* mode of explaining a metaphor in Isaiah li. 21, ‘Thou drunken, *but not with wine*.’ The same end is often answered by an epithet *affirming* of the thing *expressed* some quality of the thing *signified* ; thus ships are *floating bulwarks* [Mason’s Ode to the Naval Officers], and the lyre a *chorded shell*, where Dryden [Song for St Cecilia’s Day, line 17,  *Jubal struck the chorded shell,*] has made the same use of the affirmative epithet *chorded* that Theognis did of the negative ἄχορδος in his metaphorical expression for a bow, φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος (comp. Rhet. III 11. 11, and Demetr. *περὶ ἐρμηνείας* § 85, quoted in *Intro.* p. 297). Sometimes the explanatory epithet is itself a metaphor ; as in the *πτερωτοῖς ἄρμασι* (Iph. Aul. 251) of Euripides, ‘winged chariots’. Here we have a double metaphor : *chariot* for *ship*, and *wing* for *sail*.”

1 τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἡ λέξις, ἐὰν ᾗ παθητική τε καὶ CHAP. VII.  
2 ἡθική καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον. τὸ

He then concludes with four examples of these privative explanatory epithets from the Greek Tragedians, which I have already quoted with some others in the Introduction p. 297, in the note on this passage of the Rhetoric. Add to these Cephisodotus' 'parti-coloured millstones', *μύλωνας ποικίλους*, III 10. 7, by which he meant to represent the 'crushing' properties of the Athenian 'triremes' in devastating the coasts and islands and exacting tribute. These differ from millstones in having their sides gaily painted in various colours. *ἄπτερος φάτις*, Aesch. Agam. 267 (contrasted with *ἔπεα πτερόεντα*), *ἄπτερος ὄρνις*, Eur. Iph. Taur. 1095. [Eur. Phoen. 791 (*Ἄρης*) *κῶμον ἀναυλότατον προχορεύεις*, 808 *Σφιγγὸς ἀμουσοτάταισι σὺν ψαδαῖς*, Herc. Fur. 879, 891, 892. Similarly the Italian poet, Guarini, called birds 'winged lyres'.]

It remains to notice the *proportion* of the metaphor, which, according to Victorius, is Trumpet : sound of trumpet (anonymous) :: lyre : μέλος, the music of the lyre (*properly* so called). To qualify the harshness, throw light on the obscurity, of this improper application of the word μέλος, the epithet *ἄλυρον* "not that of the lyre" is added.

One more remark on privative epithet, which has not been pointed out. They have two uses, the one to *qualify*, the other to *contradict*, the substantive they are joined with. In the latter case they are not metaphors at all. This is what is called the figure *oxy-moron*, which combines in one expression two contradictory notions of which the one denies the other : *ἐχθρῶν ἄδωρα δῶρα* (Aj. 655), an enemy's gifts are no gifts at all ; *χάρις ἄχαρις* "graceless grace", or "thankless favour" ; *μήτηρ ἀμήτωρ*, Soph. El. 1154 ; *γάμος ἄγαμος*, Oed. T. 1214 ; *δοικὸν εἰσοίκησιν*, Phil. 534 ; *ὑπνος δῦπνος* Ib. 848 ; *βίος ἀβίωτος* or *ἀβίωτος* (Eur. Hipp. 821, 867), *insaniens sapientia, strenua inertia*.

#### CHAP. VII.

On the general subject, and the connexion of the several parts of this Chapter on *Propriety*, see the Introduction, pp. 297—303, where they are treated in full.

The passages of Cicero and Quintilian in which the same subject is dealt with are referred to in p. 298 : and p. 299 has a note (1), with various references on *ἥθος* and *πάθος* in *style*.

§ 1. 'Style will have propriety, if it be made to express feeling (the various emotions) and character, and be proportionate to the subject-matter'. The perverse transition from the feminine to the *abstract neuter ἀνάλογον* (sc. *πρᾶγμα*, as in *triste lupus stabulis* et sim.) is characteristic of Aristotle's carelessness in writing. Perhaps, however, it may be used adverbially as in c. 6 § 7 (see note).

§ 2. 'This *proportion* consists in a style of composition (*λέγεται* of speaking and writing) such as is neither off-hand (i. e. careless and slovenly, *αὐτοκάβδαλος* is 'extemporaneous') on a dignified, nor stately on a slight and mean (lit. *cheap*), subject, and has no ornamental epithets (*ἐπὶ* refers to *ἐπιθέτα*) attached to mean words ; otherwise, it (the composition) has the appearance of mere comedy (i. e. laughable ; its subject

δ' ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἂν μήτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβάδᾶ-  
 λως λέγῃται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ  
 εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαί-

is τὸ γελοῖον: Poet. v. 1, 2), like Cleophon's poetry (*tragic* poetry: he was a tragedian): for some things that he wrote (said) were like saying (like as though one were to say), "Lady fig", or "august fig".

On propriety in this sense, the adaptation of language to the subject or matter of the speech, spoken or written, comp. Hor. Ars Poet. 86 seq., Cic. de Or. III 55. 212, *ut figuram orationis...ad id quod agemus accomodatam deligamus*, seq. Orator XXI 70, seq. *Quam enim indecorum est de stiticiis quum apud unum iudicem dicas, amplissimis verbis et locis uti communibus, de maiestate populi Romani summis et subtiliter!* § 72. Quint. VIII 3. 11, *Illud observatione dignius, quod hic ipse honestus ornatus pro materiae genere decet variatus*, et seq. *Clara illa atque sublimia plerumque materiae modo cernenda. Quod alibi magnificum, tumidum alibi. Et quae humilia circa res magnas, apta circa minores videntur.* § 18.

εὐόγκων] here refers to the ὄγκος or dignity of style, as applied in c. 6. 1. Elsewhere, as Meteor. IV 2. 6, it is to be interpreted literally of *bulk* or *size*, "of a good or fair bulk": εὐογκότερον καὶ παχύτερον are there equivalent to a preceding παχύτερα. Similarly Eur. Syleus, Fragg. 2 sq. (Dind.), *πρόσχημα σεμνὸς καὶ ταπεινός, οὐδ' ἄγαν εὐογκος* (bulky): this is said of Hercules, whom Mercury is selling to Syleus, and like an auctioneer, setting forth all his excellences: several more examples are to be found in Rost and Palm's Lex. The ordinary meaning of the word seems to be 'of fair, or reasonable, size'.

αὐτοκαβάδᾶως] *extempore*, recurs as an adj. αὐτοκάβαδα III 14. 11 sub fin. cap. It is said to be derived from κάβος (ill-kneaded meal or dough, (Hebr. *Kab*, translated κάβος in LXX; Rost and Palm's Lex. s. v. κάβος). The αὐτό is 'self', as in αὐτοποιητός, αὐτόματος, αὐτογνώμων, αὐθαδής, et sim. Comp. αὐτοσχεδιαστὴ 'extempore', αὐτοσχεδιασμός 'an impromptu', Poet. IV 7, αὐτοσχεδιαστική, of tragedy and comedy in their infancy, whilst still 'extemporaneous', ib. § 14. αὐτοκάβαδοι—Semus of Delos, ap. Athen. XIV 16, 622 B—*improvisatori*. Rost and Palm's Lex. interprets this *eine art possenreisser aus dem stegreif*, and Liddell and Scott sim. *buffoons, buffo-actors*. But Athenaeus says of them *σχέδην ἐπέρανον ῥήσεις*, which is exactly equivalent to αὐτοσχεδιαζόν. So *σχέδια* is 'a raft', a vessel *extemporised*, constructed on the spur of the moment to meet a sudden occasion. And the whole family of these words seems to derive the notion of hasty, off-hand, unpremeditated, unartistic, action or composition, which distinguishes them, from *ἔχειν* (*ἔσχον, σχεῖν*) or rather *ἔχεσθαι*, in the sense of seizing or grasping the first materials that come to hand for a sudden and unforeseen emergency.

αὐτοκαβάδᾶων in Lucian, Lexiph. § 10 (ed. Hemsterh. II 336), is interpreted, *quæ farinam ipsi sibi subigunt*: with the note, αὐτοκάβαδων ἀλευρον, τὸ ὡς ἔτυχε φυραθέν. Spengel reads αὐτοκιβδηλον (apparently a *vox nihili*—at all events a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*, and without meaning here) from MS A<sup>o</sup> (A). ["Victorius prius αὐτοκαβάδᾶως scripsit." Spengel].

νεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἓνια ἔλεγε  
καὶ εἰ εἶπειεν [ἄν]· “πότνια συκῇ.” παθητικὴ δέ, ἐὰν  
3 μὲν ἢ ὕβρις, ὀργιζομένου λέξις, ἐὰν δὲ ἀσεβῇ καὶ  
αἰσχρὰ, δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ εὐλαβουμένου καὶ λέγειν,

<sup>1</sup> ἄν *sine uncinis*.

κόσμος] This is mentioned as one of the kinds (εἶδη) of poetical and ornamental words, with γλῶττα and μεταφορά, Poet. xxii 7, and again § 19, as an ὄνομα, ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορά καὶ κόσμος. It is therefore a *poetical or ornamental word*. ἅπαν δὲ ὀνόματα ἔστιν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορά ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον κ.τ.λ., eight in all. Poet. xxi 4. All these are defined *seriatim* except κόσμος. Twining, in his note on § 17, argues from this that Aristotle could not have intentionally omitted this alone, and that the explanation of κόσμος is one of the many *lacunae* which had to be supplied in Aristotle's MSS, one of the διαβρώματα—the moth- and worm-eaten passages, as Strabo calls them in his celebrated account of the transmission of Aristotle's manuscripts (xiii. 1). In the Paris MS, indeed, there is a mark of omission which Buhle and Hermann have indicated in their editions. He understands κόσμος to signify “such an epithet as embellishes or *elevates* the thing to which it is applied.” Though he quotes this passage of the Rhetoric, he does not notice that ἐπὶ here applied to it proves that the kind of *ornament* intended by κόσμος is an ornamental *epithet*. See also Gräfenhan, on Poet. xxi 17, p. 159 and on xxiv 9, p. 189, where τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις κόσμοις is quoted from Dionysius de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene c. 1, (vi 955. 12, ed. Reiske) and again, de Thuc. Iud. c. 23, p. 864. 2.

Κλεοφῶν] Ἀθηναῖος τραγικός. τῶν δραμάτων αὐτοῦ Ἀκταίων, Ἀμφιάραος, Ἀχιλλεύς, Βάκχαι, Δεξαμενός, Ἡριγόνη, Θυέστης, Λεύκιππος, Περσίς, Τηλέφος, Suidas. He is omitted in Wagner's collection, *Fragm. Trag. Gr.* vol. III. We learn from Poet. ii 5, that his subjects and characters were neither above nor below the level of ordinary, every-day, life and character. To the same effect it is stated in Poet. xxii 1, that his style was low or humble, ταπεινή, and devoid of all poetical ornament. Gräfenhan, ad loc. ii 5. Id. ad Poet. xxii 1, “qui humili dictione imitabatur vulgares mores.”

To Suidas' list of 10 tragedies must be added the Μανδρόβουλος, de Soph. EL 15, 174 b 27, οἷον ὁ Κλεοφῶν ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Μανδρόβουλῳ, where it is quoted in illustration of a mode of argument.

εἰ εἶπειεν ἄν] That ἄν, which Bekker puts in brackets, may be retained and justified with εἰ and the optative, will be seen by referring to the Appendix (D) on εἰ δύναιτ' ἄν II 20. 5 [Vol. II p. 336].

πότνια] the feminine of πόσις and δεσ-πότ-ης, is a female title of honour, equivalent to δέσποινα, implying reverence and high station, ‘august’. It is best rendered by ‘Lady’. It has two forms, πότνια and πότνα—δσία, πότνα θεῶν, Eur. Bacch. 370—and in both the ᾱ is short, and can therefore be elided. There is a good article on the word in Liddell and Scott's Lex. which will supply further information.

§ 3. ‘Emotion is expressed, if insult (wanton outrage) (be what you

ἐὰν δὲ ἐπαινετά, ἀγαμένως, ἐὰν δὲ ἐλεεινά, ταπεινῶς,  
4 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ὁμοίως. πιθανοὶ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα  
καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς

are describing), by the language of one in anger; if impiety or anything foul or base, by that of indignation and reluctance (hesitation) even to name (or mention) it; what is praiseworthy, by that of admiration; what is pitiable, in a low tone and language, and so on for the rest in like manner'. With ἀγαμένως and ταπεινῶς supply λέγοντος. [For ἀσεβῆ καὶ αἰσχροῖ κ.τ.λ., compare Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) § 9, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ βλασφημίαν ἔχει τινα, καὶ ὀνομάζειν ὀκνήσαιμ' ἂν ἐν ὑμῖν ἔνια.]

ἀγαμένως] as in Plat. Phaedo 89 A, 'approvingly, admiringly, with admiration', ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο. The word is rare, and the meaning here has been doubted. Victorius, *cum laetitia*, 'with delight or exultation'. Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 9, *omnibus perpensis*, inclines to the opinion that in Aristotle (that is, here: in Plato, it has the other meaning,) it signifies *admirabiliter, magnifice*, 'admirably, so as to be admired'; which seems to me the least likely of the three.

ταπεινῶς] seems to combine Horace's *dolet sermone pedestri* (A. P. 95) of the language, with Cicero's *summissa voce* [Orator § 56] of the tone of voice: a low tone in expressing pity is appropriate to both.

§ 4. 'This appropriate language (proper or peculiar to the emotion to be represented) also gives a plausible air to the facts (or statements under consideration): for the mind draws a false inference to the truth of the speaker (the reality of his emotion, and hence to the truth of his statements), because every one under similar circumstances feels the same—so that they (the audience) are led to think, even though the fact is really not so, that the things (the facts of the case, the things under consideration) are as the speaker represents them (αὐτὰ ἔχειν φησί, Buhle), and (besides this) the listener always has a fellow-feeling with one who speaks with emotion, even though what he says is naught (worthless; proves nothing)'.

οἰκεία] comp. *infra* § 7, ὀνόματα οἰκεία τῇ ἔξει.

παραλογίζεται κ.τ.λ.] The fallacy is this. A speaker puts himself into a passion in describing some atrocity imputed to his opponent, assuming the tone of anger or virtuous indignation, which would naturally be provoked by the act as described. People always sympathize with the expression of emotion, and the audience, knowing what it is to be angry themselves, and perceiving by reference to their own experience the 'appropriateness' of the language, tone, and gestures, to the true expression of the passion, draw from this the fallacious inference that the speaker must be in earnest, as they were when they were similarly affected, and therefore that the facts that he states must be true: arguing from the truth of the delineation to the truth of the fact stated.

The logic of the fallacy is explained in de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 1 seq. It proceeds from the false assumption, in antecedent and consequent, that they are reciprocally convertible: that if a consequent always follows an antecedent the converse is likewise true, and that the consequent in-

ο/ ἀληθῶς λέγοντας, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστ' οἴονται [εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὥς ὁ λέγων] τὰ πράγματα οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ συνομοιοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων αἰεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, καὶ μὴθὲν λέγει. διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς θορυβοῦντες. 6 καὶ ἠθικὴ δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις, ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ ἀρμόττουσα ἐκάστῳ γένει καὶ ἔξει. λέγω *δεῖξις*

variably implies the antecedent as well as the antecedent the consequent. Here, the language &c. used *is* the ordinary sign of the emotion represented, as they themselves know from their own experience; and *does* usually arise in men as a consequence of such facts as those alleged: the antecedent is then falsely inferred 'reciprocally' from the *ordinary*, but not necessary or universal, consequent. This may be otherwise represented as a confusion between the *σημεῖον*, the usual and ordinary, and the *τεκμήριον*, the universal and necessary, accompaniment of something thereby signified. Comp. Poet. XXIV 18, *ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἰοῦνται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν τοῦδὶ ὄντος τοδὶ ᾗ ἢ γινόμενον γίνηται, εἰ τὸ ὕστερόν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γινεσθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος.* And with the language of our text, *ἡντὰ παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ.* Twining in his note on the passage of the Poet., at the end of n. 222, p. 488 [II p. 352, ed. 2], has quoted and translated this sentence of the Rhetoric.

§ 5. 'And this is the reason why many (speakers) try to stun (overwhelm, confound) their hearers with the clamour that they raise'. The speaker carries, that is, his *δείνωσις* or exaggeration even to the *excess* of mere empty noise and clamour, thinking thereby to produce a deeper impression upon the audience, who will suppose that the depth and sincerity of his feeling are in proportion to the noise he makes. The *διό* is, because the listener always sympathizes with the language and raised tone of passion; the more violent the expression of it, the more he is likely to be affected. Thuc. VII 42 has *κατάπληξις* to describe the 'consternation', *abattement de coeur*, of the Syracusans at the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon.

§ 6. 'And this mode of proof arising out of (external) signs (exhibited in language, tone, and action) may be invested also with an ethical character, in that (in so far as) that which is appropriate (i. e. the appropriate language, &c.) to each class and moral state (i. e. character, *ἦθος*; the sum of the moral states and habits which characterizes the individual) is attendant upon each of them'. The datives *γένει* and *ἔξει* seem to belong equally to *ἀκολουθεῖ* and *ἀρμόττουσα*. Compare, with what is said here of *ἔξις* and *ἦθος*, III 16. 9.

In the Introduction, p. 108 foll., on *ἦθος*, I have endeavoured to shew (against Spengel) that there are three kinds of *ἦθη* distinguished by Aristotle in the Rhetoric; (1) the *ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*, the personal character exhibited by the speaker himself, serving as a kind of proof of his sincerity, competency, and good will; (2) the characters of certain



δὲ γένος μὲν καθ' ἡλικίαν, οἷον παῖς ἢ ἀνὴρ ἢ γέρων, καὶ  
 γυνὴ ἢ ἀνὴρ, καὶ Λάκων ἢ Θετταλός, ἔξεις δέ, καθ'  
 ἃς ποιός τις τῷ βίῳ· οὐ γὰρ καθ' ἅπασαν ἔξιν οἱ βίοι  
 7 ποιοὶ τινες. ἐὰν οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα λέγη  
 πῇ ἔξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά οὐδ' ὡσαύτως

ages and classes, with which the speaker must be previously acquainted, in order to accommodate his general tone, and the opinions he expresses, to the tastes and dispositions of his audience, their political sentiments and such like: as for instance an audience of rich and poor, young and old, aristocratic and democratical, must be addressed each in a different tone and with different language, suitable to their several opinions and prejudices; and (3) what I have called the *dramatic* characters, which are treated only in the third book as belonging to style, and are still more important, and occupy a larger share of attention in poetry (especially dramatic poetry)—and therefore in the Poetics xv—than in the prose of Rhetoric. These consist in the accurate representation of *personal* character, as described by Horace, A. P. 114 seq. See also the instances given in the parallel passage, III 16. 9, above referred to. This is what is now called 'keeping', and seems to me to be totally distinct from the second, which refers to *classes*; although the two have some points in common. The principal differences between them are that the latter describes *personal peculiarities*, and is an ingredient of *propriety of style*: and the two are therefore treated in different parts of the work. The dramatic *ἦθος*, *morata oratio*, does however in some inferior degree assist the *argument*, as Aristotle has just told us, and is a *kind of δείξις*; it conveys a favourable impression of the accuracy of the speaker, and the truth of his description.

'By *class* I mean (according to age, different ages) the various ages of life, youth, manhood, old age; and (sexes) woman or man, and (natives of different countries) Lacedaemonian or Thessalian; and by *states* (moral states) those by which the character (or quality) of a man's life is determined: for it is not every kind of *state* that determines the character of men's lives'. *Ἔξις*, an acquired, developed, permanent, habit, is a general term (opposed to *διάθεσις* an incomplete and progressive state, Categ.) and applicable to various states in men and things, *physical* as well as *intellectual* and *moral*. It is only the last two that determine the *ἦθος*.

§ 7. 'If therefore (the speaker) use the words (language) also appropriate' (*οἰκεῖος*, *domestic*: hence properly belonging to, things of one's own: hence special, appropriate, &c) 'to the (given) state, he will produce this character (i. e. convey it to his speech): for the clown' (rustic, boor: *ἀγροῖκος*, *country-bred*, opposed to *ἀσπεῖος*, *city-bred*, polished, as *urbanus* to *rusticus*) 'would not use the same language nor in the same way (*sc.* the same tone, pronunciation, action), as the educated gentleman'. These are the two *ἔξεις* of *εὐτραπέλια* 'easy, well-bred pleasant' and its opposite *ἀγροικία*, 'rusticity, boorishness'; the contrasted 'conversational virtue and vice', of Eth. Nic. II 7, and IV 14. Comp. Poet.

ἀγροῖκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν. πᾶσχουσι δέ τι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ᾧ κατακόρως χρῶνται. οἱ λογογράφοι, “ τίς δ’ οὐκ οἶδεν; ” “ ἅπαντες ἴσασιν ” ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων αἰσχυνόμενος, ὅπως μετέχη οὐ περ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

8 τὸ δ’ εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι κοινὸν ἀπάν- P. 1408 b.

9 των τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστίν. ἄκος δ’ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ θρυλούμενον· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ προσεπιπλήττειν<sup>1</sup>. P. 122.

<sup>1</sup> προσεπιπλήττειν

XV 4, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα ἔστι γὰρ ἀνδρείον μὲν τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀρμόττον γυναικὶ τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι.

What follows is a *note* suggested by the preceding remarks upon the παθητικὴ λέξις, and not very closely connected with the immediate subject of ‘propriety’.

‘The hearers are affected also in some degree (some impression is also made upon the audience) by what (a trick which) the speech-writers employ to a nauseous excess; (the introduction viz. of such phrases as “Who doesn’t know?” “Everybody knows.” For the listener is shamed into an admission (of the fact) that he may be supposed to share (what is assumed to be) the feeling of “everybody else”’.

On λογογράφοι, the paid writers of speeches for the use of plaintiff or defendant in the law-courts, a much-despised class, see note on II 11. 7. Victorius supposes, in accordance with his preconceived opinion of a still continued hostility between Aristotle and Isocrates, that the latter is here alluded to; quoting four instances of it from Isocrates and two from Demosth. de Cor. This is hardly enough to sustain the charge. On this subject, see Introd. p. 41, foll.

§ 8. Of propriety in the use of every *τόπος* and every ornament of style. ‘The seasonable and unseasonable’, fitness in regard to time, place, occasion, ‘is common alike to all the kinds’. This observation is thought by Victorius to be suggested by the ‘nauseous excess’ of the preceding section.

§ 9. ‘A remedy for every excess (exaggeration in style) is the notorious practice of speakers: a speaker, that is, should pronounce censure on himself beforehand (in anticipation of the possible disapprobation of the audience): for (*then*, the exaggeration) is thought to be sound and right since the speaker himself is quite aware of what he is doing’.

τὸ θρυλούμενον] See note on II 21. 11.

The reading of all MSS is *προσεπιπλήττει*, which the staunch Bekker and Spengel, the consistent adherent of A or A’, both retain. Nevertheless, the emendation *προεπιπλήττει* makes excellent sense, and its rival is decidedly inferior; and a passage of Quintilian, VIII 3. 37, which seems to have been copied from this of Aristotle and repeats his words, has (in the Greek words) *προεπιπλήσσειν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ*, and a little above, *praemoniendum*, which also seems to be a reminiscence of *προεπιπλήττειν*; Spalding (ad loc. Quint.) and Gesner approve, and Casaubon had

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὃ ποιεῖ  
 10 τὸν λέγοντα. ἔτι τοῖς ἀνάλογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἅμα χρή-  
 σασθαι· οὕτω γὰρ κλέπτεται ὁ ἀκροατής. λέγω δὲ  
 οἶον ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρὰ ᾖ, μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ

already suggested this emendation, and Stephens introduced it in his Lexicon. Supported by this evidence, and the common-sense view of the case, I venture to read προεπιπλήττειν. The passage of Quintilian above referred to runs thus:—*Et si quid periculosius finxisse videbimur, quibusdam remediis praeveniendum est, ut ita dicam; si licet dicere; quodam modo; permittite mihi sic uti. Quod idem etiam in iis quae licentius translata erunt proderit, quae non tuto dici possunt. In quo non falli iudicium nostrum sollicitudine ipsa manifestum est. Qua de re Graecum illud elegantissimum est, quo praecipitur, προεπιπλήσσειν* (sic) τῇ ὑπερβολῇ. And again § 50, *sed hoc quoque quum a prudentibus fit* (ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὃ ποιεῖ), of another doubtful use of μίωσις. If we keep προεπιπλήττειν, it is “to add something in the way of reprehension of oneself”—so Vater;—which certainly gives a fair sense.

ἀληθές is similarly used for ‘sound, substantial, genuine’, *infra* II. 10; comp. also Hor. Ep. I 7. 98, *Metiri se quemque suo modulo et pede verum est*. Ib. Ep. I 12. 23. Liv. II 48, III 40.

§ 10. The greatest care and pains are always requisite to give the speech an artless, natural, and unstudied character: the rule *ars est celare artem* is of the utmost importance in effecting the end and object of a speech, persuasion or conviction. See, for instance, III 2. 4, 5; 8. 1. This applies equally to proportion, as an element of propriety. It has been laid down that a certain proportion (or resemblance) of style, tone, and manner to the subject is always to be observed: but this, if carried too far, will defeat its own object; the study will appear, and the suspicions of the hearers will be aroused. For instance, there is a proportion in the tone of voice and manner of delivery, in the expression of features and the action, to the subject of the words delivered: these however should not be all employed at once: if the words have a *harsh* sound—σκληρὰ ὀνόματα are exemplified by Hermogenes περὶ ἰδεῶν, α’, περὶ τραχύτητος, p. 236, II 300 (*Rhet. Gr.* Spengel), by ἀταρπός, ἐμαρπτεν, ἐγναμψε, &c., and again, Ib. β’, (II 359), by a line from Homer in which ἀγκᾶς ἐμαρπτε, both of them objectionable on this ground, occur together. “The voice and the features and the rest should not be made to assume a harsh expression, else the study becomes apparent—it will give the composition a stiff and studied appearance, make it look affected and overdone: whereas, if one or two of them are made to correspond, and the rest not, the same effect is produced, whilst the artifice escapes detection”. *Introd.* pp. 301, 2. Compare on this subject, Cic. de Or. III 57. 216.

‘Further, not to employ all these proportions (or correspondences) together; for by the observance of this precept (following this rule) the listener is deluded (i.e. the art is disguised). I mean, to take an instance if the words used are harsh (in *sound*), not to (extend the harshness) to

τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, φανερόν  
γίνεται ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστίν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή,  
λανθάνει ποιῶν τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκλη-  
ρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγεται, ἀπίθανον γίγνε-

the tone of voice and the features and the other appropriate (correspondences or proportions)': (we must supply here either *χρῆσθαι* from *χρήσασθαι* preceding; or, *ad sensum*, from *σκληρὰ ἢ, σκληρότητα προσφέρειν*, or something else similar). 'Otherwise the true character of each of them (their studied and artificial character, *πέπλασθαι supra* 2. 4) becomes manifest'.

Vahlen, in his observations on the Rhetoric, *Trans. Vienn. Acad.* p. 144 (already referred to), says, that nothing else can be implied in *τοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν* than the adaptation of voice and feature to subject, already specified; and therefore proposes to strike out *καὶ* before *τοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν* so that *τοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν* may be connected with, not distinguished from, the two preceding. This seems to me quite unnecessary. Besides the two proportions specified by Aristotle, there is at all events *ὑπόκρισις*, appropriate action or gesticulation, that may be brought into correspondence; and also the mode of delivery may be distinguished—at all events for the nonce—from the other three. And he adds a similar objection to another perfectly innocent *καὶ*, in I 15. 28, *καὶ ὡς οὗτος κ.τ.λ.*, the sense (as I have explained it in the paraphrase of the Introduction) being at least equally good with, as without, the conjunction.

In the succeeding clause—which guards against a possible misapprehension of the foregoing, as though it were meant that *all* this kind of adaptation should be avoided, and intimates that the *mean* is to be observed here as everywhere else; that we do not rush into the opposite extreme, like those who *dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt*—the connexion of thought might seem to require that *ἐὰν δέ* and *ἐὰν οὖν* should change places. If the two clauses, *ἐὰν δέ, ἐὰν οὖν*, are to be connected in sense, we require some kind of opposition, expressed by a restrictive or adversative particle such as *μέντοι, δέ*, or *ἀλλά*, to establish this, and not one that conveys an inference or consequence, which does *not* follow from the foregoing.

'But if (the speaker introduce) one and omit the other (make the adaptation in some cases, in others not), he does the same thing (really has recourse to study and art) and yet escapes detection. So then', (it results in a general way from all this,) or, 'well then—as I say—if things soft and mild (for instance, the expression of compassion) be represented by a harsh tone and language, or harsh things in soft tone and language (so Victorius), it (the expression or things expressed) loses all its plausibility (or power of persuasion)'. If *οὖν* be retained, it must be understood (I think) as I have rendered it. There will be no connexion between the clause which it introduces and that which immediately precedes it, and *οὖν* will be a mere continuative, as in the narrative use of *μὲν οὖν*—the *inferential*, as with our *then*, having degenerated into a *temporal* sense, denoting mere continuation or succession. The clause will then be a sort

11 ται. τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλᾶ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς· συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ κακὸν φάναι οὐρανόμηκες

of *general* conclusion from all that has been said in this section on the adaptation of delivery to subject-matter. ἀπίθανον, see III 3. 4.

§ 11. 'Compound words, epithets' (including descriptive additions of *more than* one word) 'more than one (several), and strange (foreign, unusual) words, are most appropriate to the language of emotion: an angry man may be forgiven (excused) for saying a *wrong heaven-high*, or for calling it *colossal*'. I have translated κακὸν 'wrong', on the supposition that the speaker is a complainant in a court of justice, and that the 'evil' at which he is so indignant is some *injustice* or *wrong* done to him by the defendant, against whom he is inveighing.

οὐρανόμηκες] is an example of a διπλοῦν ὄνομα, πελώριον of a ξένον. Comp. III 3. 2, where πέλωρος (the alternative form) is cited as an instance of a γλῶττα, an antiquated or barbarous term that requires explanation. Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 134, has used the former word quite in cold blood, τὸ δὲ κατορθωθὲν οὐρανόμηκες ποιήσουσιν, 'your success they will exalt as high as heaven'. Aristophanes has it as an epithet of φωνή, Nub. 357, and again of κλέος, 459, in a chorus. Herod., II. 138, of excessively tall trees, and so Hom., Od. v. 239, of a pine. Aesch., Agam. 92, of the beacon-light, in the πάροδος of the chorus.

With ὀργιζομένῳ κ.τ.λ. comp. III 11.16, where ὑπερβολαί, the figure hyperbole, or any excess or extravagance, is said to be most used by men in anger, and is illustrated by two quotations from Homer. Also Hermog., περὶ ἰδεῶν α'. (*Rhet. Gr.* Spengel, II 302.3) περὶ σφοδρότητος (vehemence), quotes a number of instances of this exaggerated language and long compound words from Demosthenes when he was affecting indignation, λαμβεισφάγος, de Cor. § 139, γραμματοκύφων, Ib. 209. "Nearly the whole of the speech against Aristogeiton," he says, "is a specimen of this vehement language": and then proceeds to illustrate it from his other writings: [the speeches against Aristogeiton are, however, undoubtedly spurious.]

'And also (this kind of language may be used) when (the speaker) has fairly' (*lit.* already, by this time, *then* and not till then: on this use of ἤδη, οὕτω, οὐκέτι, see note on I 1.7) 'overmastered (got into his power) his audience, and worked them up into a fit (raised them to the height) of enthusiasm, either by praise or blame or indignation, or love (which he has assumed towards them); as Isocrates also (as well as others, καὶ) does in his Panegyric, at the end: φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη'.

This is, as usual, a misquotation; Isocrates wrote, Paneg. § 186, φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην (Aristotle ought not to have forgotten this, for it is a striking case of ὁμοιοτέλετον, or rhyming termination, one of the new figures introduced into Rhetoric by Gorgias and his school): φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσῃν τινὰ χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ ζῶντας ἔξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν τοὺς ἐν τοιούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις ἀριστεύσαντας; It is in fact a finely written sentence.

'And again, οἱ τινες ἔτλησαν κ.τ.λ. (Paneg. § 96, another striking sen-

ἢ πελώριον εἰπεῖν. καὶ ὅταν ἔχη ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάζσαι ἢ ἐπαῖνοις ἢ ψόγοις ἢ ὀργῇ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἷον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει, “φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη” καὶ “οἳ τινες ἐτλησαν.” φθέγγονται τε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζον-

tence): for men (in general) give utterance to such language in their enthusiasm (the language of inspiration), and therefore (the audience) also being themselves in a similar state of feeling (having been brought thereto by the orator) are plainly ready to accept and approve of it’.

[It is worth noticing that *ἐτλησαν*, ‘in that they brooked to &c.’, is characteristic of *poetic* usage, and is rare in Attic prose: though found in Xenophon, *Cyrop.* III 1. 2, οὐκέτι *ἐτλη* εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν. The corresponding prose form is *ἐτόλμησαν*, which indeed is the manuscript reading in Isocrates l.c. and is corrected by the editors from the present passage and Dionysius Halic. de adm. vi dicendi in Dem. c. 40.]

ἔχη] Comp. Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s.v. “τοὺς ἀκροατὰς, auditores occupatos tenere, obsedis oratione. Ar. Rhet. III 7, ubi permutat cum τῷ ἐνθουσιάζσαι, extra se rapere.” [Cicero, *Orator* § 210, *id autem* (numerosa oratio) *tum valet cum is qui audit ab oratore iam obsessus est ac tenetur*; and (for ὅταν ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάζσαι) compare ib. § 99, *si is non praeferatis auribus inflammare rem coepit; furere apud sanos et quasi inter sobrios bacchari vinolentus videtur.*]

The careless introduction of the superfluous τε after φθέγγονται, repeated *infra* c. 11.7, τό τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ., is abundantly illustrated by Shilleto, *Dem. de F. L.*, critical note on § 176, τὴν τε γὰρ εἰρήνην κ.τ.λ., including this passage amongst his instances. [See Bonitz, *Zeitschrift f. Oest. Gymn.* 1867, pp. 672—682, quoted in *Index Aristotelicus* s.v. τε, ad fin., where, amongst other passages, a reference is given to Pol. VII 14 § 6, 1333 a 1, τόν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναι φασὶ δεῖν πρῶτον.]

‘This also accounts for the fitness of this kind of language for poetry, because poetry is inspired. It must therefore (be used) either in the way above described, or with irony, as Gorgias did, and (in) the passages of Plato’s *Phaedrus*. The ‘passages’ referred to are 231 D, εἰς ἀρα πολλαῖς νυμφόληπτος...γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι, alluding to the exaggerated and enthusiastic expressions with which Socrates had been inspired by the local influence; in particular to the rhapsody at the conclusion of his speech, ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα νικήσασα ἀγωγῇ κ.τ.λ., and 241 E, οὐκ ἦσθου... ὅτι ἦδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; εἰς δ’ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἔτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οἶε ποιήσῃ; ἀρ’ οἷσθ’ ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν... σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάζω;

A specimen of Gorgias’ irony is found in Ar. Pol. III 2, 1275 δ 26, Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ’ εἰρωνευόμενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισσαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρισσαίους, so read, with Schneider, for λαρισσοποιούς retained by Bekker. “Aristotle

τες, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δῆλον ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἤρμοσεν· ἐνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις. ἢ δὴ οὕτω δεῖ, ἢ μετ' εἰρωνείας, ὃ περ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ.

I τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μῆτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι CHAP. VIII. μῆτε ἄρρυθμον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον (πεπλάσθαι

refers to an ingenious evasion of an awkward question. Whilst Gorgias was in Thessaly, where he seems to have spent a considerable time at Larissa, some Thessalian, who had no doubt heard his boast that he was able and ready to answer any question upon any subject, took him at his word, and asked him what constituted a citizen.—This is the constitutional question which gives occasion to Aristotle's quotation.—Partly in jest, and partly because he was really at a loss, he replied, that citizens were made by citizen-manufacturers: as the vessels made by mortar-manufacturers were mortars, so those made by the Larissaeon-manufacturers were Larissaeon citizens or Larissaeans: for there were such people as *Λαρισσαίοιοι*. *Λάρισσα*, besides the Thessalian city, denotes also some kind of kettle or other cooking-utensil. The reply is much the same as if some one being asked, What makes a citizen of the town of Sandwich? were to answer, 'a cook, for he is a sandwich-maker'; and is no bad specimen of the way in which Gorgias most likely fulfilled his promise of solving any problem whatsoever that was proposed to him. It may be doubted whether, as Schneider supposes, there is also an ambiguity in *δημουργῶν*: the word bears also the sense of a magistrate, as the grammarians tell us, especially in Doric states. Larissa was not a Doric state: but we learn from K. O. Müller, *Dor.* Bk. III ch. 8. 5; from Thuc. v 17, ἐν Μαντινείᾳ οἱ δημουργοὶ καὶ ἡ βουλὴ... ἐν Ἡλίδι οἱ δημ. καὶ οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες, and from a (doubtful) letter of Philip, Dem. de Cor. § 157, Πελοποννησίων τοῖς δημ.; that the use of the term was not confined to these, and Aristotle applies it to 'magistrates' in general, Pol. VI (IV), 4, 1291 a 34. See further on this subject, Müller's *Dorians*, u. s." From a note in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* Vol. III No. VII p. 80, with additions [see also p. 180 of Thompson's edition of the Gorgias].

#### CHAP. VIII.

##### On rhythm in Prose.

In the paraphrase of the Introduction I have already given an outline of the contents of this chapter and their connexion, with references and some details, pp. 303—306. And on rhythm in general, and its application to prose, there is an Appendix (C), pp. 379—392; in which is a full account of its original and derived significations in the first part, and of its distinction from *μέτρον* in the second. The commentary on this chapter will therefore deal principally with the details of the language, allusions, and such particulars as require explanation, which are omitted in the paraphrase.

In the fragments of Isocrates' *τέχνη*, collected by Benseler in the Teubner series, Vol. II p. 276, we have the following, fragm. 4—cited from

γὰρ δοκεῖ) καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐξίστησιν προσέχειν γὰρ

Maximus Planudes ad Hermog. and Joannes Siceliotus—δὼς δὲ ὁ λόγος μὴ λόγος ἔστω· ξηρὸν γὰρ· μὴδὲ ἔμμετρος· καταφανές γάρ· ἀλλὰ μεμίχθω παντὶ ῥυθμῷ, μάλιστα λαμβικῷ ἢ τροχαϊκῷ. The first of these precepts is in entire agreement with Aristotle, § 1; the disagreement of the second with the statements of § 4 is equally striking. It seems from what is said of Thrasyarchus and the paeon in § 4, that the subject of prosaic rhythm was not included in the τέχναι of himself and the succeeding writers on Rhetoric. It does not appear even in the Rhet. ad Alex. Cicero, de Or. III 44. 173, attributes to Isocrates the first introduction of 'numbers' into prose composition.

Dionysius de Comp. Verb. c. 25 (p. 197 R.) refers to this chapter of Aristotle in support of his observations on rhythm in prose. His own opinions on the subject are given, pp. 195, 6.

References are made by Cicero to this chapter (§ 4 et seq.), de Or. I 47. 182, 183, in the course of his dissertation on rhythm, from § 171 foll. The same subject is treated, Orat. c. LXIII 212 seq. The various rhythms heroic, iambic, trochaic, &c. are discussed in c. LXIV, where Aristotle's opinions, as expressed in this chapter, are twice referred to, §§ 215, 218. In § 214 we have, *temeritas ex tribus brevibus et longa est, quem* (sc. paeonem) *Aristoteles ut optimum probat, a quo dissentio*. Cicero is referring to this chapter, from which the other references are taken: and as this is *not* found there, he must be either quoting inexactly, from memory, or perhaps confounding Aristotle's opinion on the point with that of one of the other rhetoricians whom he mentions, § 218. There is likewise an incorrectness in the opinion which he there attributes to Aristotle, that the paeon is, *aptissimus orationi vel orienti vel mediae*: Aristotle says nothing of the 'middle' of the sentence.

Compare also, Demetrius *περὶ ἑρμηνείας, περὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς*, § 38 seq. (*Rhet. Gr.* Spengel, III 270—273) who also refers thrice to this chapter of the Rhetoric. Quint. IX 4. 45 seq. There are references to this ch. in §§ 87, 88.

On the abuse of rhythm, which degrades and is incompatible with the sublime, there is a short chapter in Dionysius *περὶ ὕψους*, c. 41.

§ 1. 'The structure (figure, fashion) of the language (i. e. prose composition) should be neither metrical (run into verse)<sup>1</sup> nor entirely without measure or rhythm: for the one has no power of persuasion, because it is thought to be artificial (*supra*, c. 2. 4, *πεπλασμένως*), and at the same time

<sup>1</sup> A remarkable instance of this defect in composition is quoted by Twining on Poet., note 36, p. 209, from Dr Smith's *System of Optics*—where, as he truly says, one would least expect to find such a thing—the beginning of Bk. I c. 2 § 47, Where parallel rays Come contrary ways And fall upon opposite sides. This is decidedly more metrical than a parallel instance in one of Dr Whewell's treatises on Mechanics, Hence no force however great, Can stretch a cord however fine, Into an horizontal line, Which is accurately straight [Whewell's *Mechanics* I p. 44, ed. 1819, *Facetiae Cantabrigienses* p. 162]. Quintilian is particularly indignant at this introduction of a verse into prose writing: *versum in oratione fieri multo foedissimum est, totum; sed etiam in parte deforme*, IX 4. 72. [For iambic verses in the prose of Isocrates, see Paneg. § 170, *ἐχρῆν γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰπερ ἦσαν ἄξιοι* and Spengel's *Artium Scriptores*, pp. 152—4.]



ποιεῖ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, πότε πάλιν ἤξει. ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν κηρύκων προλαμβάνουσι τὰ παῖδιά τὸ “τίνα αἰρεῖται  
 2 ἐπίτροπον ὁ ἀπελευθερούμενος; Κλέωνα.” τὸ δὲ ἄρ-  
 ρυθμον ἀπέραντον, δεῖ δὲ πεπεράνθαι μέν, μὴ μέτρω  
 also diverts (the hearers' attention, from the main subject or the proof of the fact): for it makes him attend to the recurrence of the similar cadence. And so (the audience anticipate the answering or recurring cadence) just as the children anticipate the answer to the herald's summons, “Whom does the freedman choose for his attorney? and the answer is, Cleon”.

ἐπίτροπος one who is charged or entrusted with the management of his case, or of any business as deputy for another; procurator, ἐπιτρόποις Καίσαρος, Plut. Praec. Ger. Reip. c. 17, 813 E, ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν οὐκ ἐπεμελήθη τούτων, ὁ δ' ἐπίτροπος Μιλύας, 'his man of business, deputy, agent'.

On Cleon's self-assumed functions of public prosecutor and poor man's advocate, see Grote, *Hist. Gr. ch. LIV*, Vol. VI. p. 667 seq. An example in Arist. *Ran.* 569, (one of the tavern-keepers says,) ἴθι δὴ κάλεσον τὸν προστάτην Κλέωνα μοι, (and the other) σὺ δ' ἔμοιγ', ἐάνπερ ἐπιτύχῃς, Ὑπέρβολον, ὧ' αὐτὸν ἐπιτρίψωμεν: from which Mr Grote draws his inferences as to the real nature of Cleon's misrepresented policy. The children, in the illustration, are so accustomed to the invariable reply to the herald's proclamation, for an attorney or deputy to plead some freedman's cause—who by law was not allowed to speak for himself in court—that they have learned to say 'Cleon' whenever the question is asked. It has not been noticed that this story is told in the *present* tense, as if the children were in the habit of doing this in Aristotle's own time. Can it be meant that the custom had been handed down from generation to generation for a century or so after Cleon's death? If so, it is a very remarkable fact.

With the opening words of the chapter, comp. Cic. *Orat.* LI 172, *Is* (Aristoteles) *igitur versum in oratione vetat esse, numerum iubet.* Ib. § 189, of verses unintentionally introduced by the orator in his speech, *Inculcamus per imprudentiam...versus; vitiosum genus, et longa animi provisione fugiendum.* With ἀνίθανον κ.τ.λ., comp. Ib. LXII 209, *Si enim semper utare* (these studied arts and tricks of rhetoric), *quum satietatem adfert tum quale sit etiam ab imperitis agnoscitur. Detrahit praeterea actionis dolorem, aufert humanum sensum actoris, tollit funditus veritatem et fidem...* LXV 220, *Multum interest utrum numerosa sit, id est, similis numerorum an plane e numeris constet oratio. Alterum si fit, intolerabile vitium est; alterum nisi fit, dissipata et inculta et fluens est oratio.*

§ 2. 'That (composition) which is (entirely) devoid of rhythm (has no measure) is indefinite (or, unlimited), but it ought to be limited, only not by metre (like verse): for the infinite (indefinite, unlimited) is displeasing and (i. e. because it) cannot be known. But everything is defined (or limited) by number; and the number (numerus in both its senses) of the structure of the language (prose composition) is rhythm, of which metres are so many sections'. Here we pass for a moment into Platonian metaphysics. The doctrine of the formless, vague, indefinite,

δέ· ἀηδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον. περαίνεται  
 δὲ ἀριθμῷ πάντα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως  
 3 ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμὸς ἐστίν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητά. διὸ  
 ῥυθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μὴ· ποίημα  
 γὰρ ἔσται. ῥυθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται

unlimited, infinite of more or less, of degree; into which τὸ μέτριον order, harmony, measure, symmetry, law—the mean—are introduced by the limiting πέρας, the *definite* principle; coming originally from the Pythagoreans, is adopted and expounded by Plato in the *Philebus*, 23 E et seq. The principle is applied to the numbers or measures of music and composition, verse and prose, 26 A, ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ (the tones of music) καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἀρ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα (τὸ πέρας καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον) ἅμα πέρας τε ἀπειράσαστο καὶ μουσικὴν συμπάσαν τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσαστο; From him Aristotle undoubtedly borrowed his conception of rhythm, as he did likewise his grand division of ὕλη, the *informis materia*, the potential, unenergized matter, the material cause of all things; and λόγος, the formal cause, that which gives form and substance to the brute matter, energizes or realizes it into complete existence, and is the original design, or conception in the mind of the Creator, the 'what it was to be', τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: and also his doctrine of the 'mean'. With ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον, compare *Anal. Post. A 24*, [86 a 5,] ἐστὶ δ' ἢ μὲν ἄπειρα οὐκ ἐπιστητά, ἢ δὲ πεπέρανται ἐπιστητά. *Metaph. B 4*, 999 a 27, τῶν ἀπείρων πῶς ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην; κ.τ.λ.

On τὸ ἄρρυθμον ἀπέραντον, compare *Cic. Orator. LXVIII 228*, *Hanc igitur, sive compositionem sive perfectionem sive numerum vocari placet, adhibere necesse est, si ornate velis dicere, non solum, quod ait Aristoteles et Theophrastus, ne infinite feratur ut flumen oratio*, seq. On ῥυθμός, μέτρον, 'measure of time', *Ib. § 227*, *sonantium omnium quae metiri auribus possumus*.

περαίνεται...ἀριθμῷ πάντα] This axiom is doubtless derived ultimately from the Pythagoreans, who traced the laws of the universe in numbers and mathematical symbols. Καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὲν τὰ γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι, οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτω, ap. *Stobaeum*, Böckh, *Philolaos*, p. 58. "The finite in number is the calculable, that which the mind can grasp, and handle; the infinite is the incalculable, that which baffles the mind, that which refuses to reduce itself to law, and hence remains unknowable." *Grant, Essay on Ar. Ethics*, p. 202 (1st ed. [p. 252, 3rd ed.]). *Probl XIX 38*, ῥυθμῷ δὲ χαίρομεν διὰ τὸ γνῶριμον καὶ τεταγμένον ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν, καὶ κινεῖν ἡμᾶς τεταγμένως· οἰκειότερα γὰρ ἢ τεταγμένη κινήσεις φύσει τῆς ἀτάκτου, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον. This illustrates ἀηδὲς...τὸ ἄπειρον. With ῥυθμός...οὐ τὰ μέτρα τμητά, comp. *Poet. IV 7*, τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστί, φανερόν. i.e. metres, verses or systems of verses, are definite lengths or sections, into which the indefinite matter of rhythm is as it were cut. Similarly it is said, *III 9. 3*, that the period and all metres are *measured* by number.

§ 3. 'From this it may be inferred that the speech (i.e. prose composition) should have rhythm, but not metre; otherwise it will be a poem

4 εὖν μέχρι του ἦ. τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρώος σεμνός  
καὶ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ἱάμβος αὐτῇ

(verse-composition). Its rhythm however should not be exactly and nicely finished': (i.e. with exact and systematic accuracy so as to be continuous, and pervade the whole structure of the writing. The description of prose rhythm by Hermogenes, *περὶ ἰδεῶν α'*, Introd. p. 391, Appendix on ῥυθμός, will serve as a commentary on this and *μέχρι τοῦ*): 'and this will be effected if it be only carried up to a certain point (and there stop short; left incomplete and irregular; not finished and systematic, like verse)'.

§ 4. 'Of (the three) rhythms, the heroic (hexameter, epic) is (too) stately (or solemn), and deficient in conversational harmony'. By using the word 'harmony', I have left it open whether we are to understand by ἁρμονία 'harmony' in its ordinary musical sense—in which case the meaning will be 'that particular kind of harmony which is adapted to ordinary conversation', the language of common life, and *inferior* to that of the heroic rhythm—a somewhat non-natural interpretation; or in the primary, more general sense of the word, 'an adaptation or fitting of parts into an organized whole', which with λεκτικῆς will signify 'deficient in conversational structure', in an adaptation of parts fitted for conversation (Dionysius uses ἁρμονία as equivalent to λέξις, for style of *composition*); the iambic is the very language of the vulgar, and therefore of all measures the iambic is most frequently uttered in common speech (or conversation); but it wants (the acquisition of, *γενέσθαι*) solemnity and dignity and the power (or faculty) of *striking*. The trochaic is too farcical (has too much of the comic dance about it; reminds one of its indecency and buffoonery<sup>1</sup>: is totally devoid of all dignity and sobriety, too light and lively): this is shown by the trochaic tetrameters, for the tetrameter is a tripping (running, rolling) measure<sup>2</sup>.

ὁ...ἡρώος] The 'heroic' measure, also called 'dactylic', 'hexameter', 'epic', including the spondaic and anapaestic, is one of the three kinds of rhythm, its *basis*, *βάσις*—corresponding to the 'feet' in metre—expressing the ratio of equality 1 : 1. See further on the doctrine and ratios of rhythm, in the Appendix on that subject, Introd. p. 387, foll. where the statements of the following sections are illustrated. The epithet σεμνός has been already applied to it in III 3.3; Dionysius, de Isocr. Iud. c. 11 (p. 557. 3, Reiske), designates it by the similar epithet μεγαλοπρεπές. Comp. Poet. XXII 9, τὸ ἡρωϊκὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων.

σεμνός καὶ λεκτικὸς καὶ ἁρμονίας δεόμενος is the *vulgata lectio*. But to say that the heroic or hexameter measure—Homer's verses for instance—are deficient in harmony is absurd in itself, and contradictory to the evidence of our own ears, and all ancient authority: at all events Dionysius was not

<sup>1</sup> This may *possibly* be included in the meaning of the word *here*: but if so, it is quite subordinate. In the references from other authors it is predominant.

<sup>2</sup> τροχερὸς ῥυθμός. There are some bars in the overture to Auber's *Bronze Horse*, which, to those who are acquainted with it, will perfectly represent the measure of trochaic tetrameter, and illustrate the epithet here used, implying a light, tripping, metre.

ἐστὶν ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν· διὸ μάλιστα πάντων  
τῶν μέτρων ἱαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες. δεῖ δὲ p. 123.  
σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστήσαι. ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος  
κορδακικώτερος· δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα· ἔστι γὰρ P. 1409.

of that opinion, who says, de Comp. Verb. c. 18 (p. 109, Reiske), the exact opposite; δακτυλικὸς πᾶν ἐστὶ σεμνὸς καὶ εἰς κάλλος ἁρμονίας ἀξιολογώτατος. Victorius, from Demetrius, περὶ ἐρμηνείας § 42, read ὁ μὲν ἡρῶς σεμνὸς καὶ οὐ λογικός, which leaves ἁρμονίας δεόμενος to explain itself as it best may. I have adopted with Tyrwhitt on Poet. IV 19, ἐξάμετρα ὀλιγάκις (λέγοντες) καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας, the reading suggested by that passage, which had been already proposed by Vincentius Madius, ad loc., and since approved by Spalding ad Quint. IX 4. 76, and finally adopted by Bekker and Spengel, each in his latest ed.

ἱαμβος.. ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν] This has been already noticed, III 1. 9, and twice in Poet. XXII. 19. The Latin rhetoricians make the same remark upon their own language. Cic. de Or. III 47. 182, Orat. LVI 189, *magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio*, LVII 192. Quint. IX 4. 76, *Illi (trimetri) minus sunt notabiles, quia hoc genus sermoni proximum est.*

ἐκστήσαι] is used here in a much milder sense than its ordinary one, to strike, excite, *mettre hors de soi*, to displace or remove a man out of his ordinary state of feeling, to a higher one of excitement: whereas in this metaphorical application, it usually implies a much more violent emotion than mere admiration or amusement, as Demosth. c. Mid. 537 ult., *ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτα ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπους αὐτῶν*, 'drives men besides themselves, drives them mad'. Eur. Bacch. 850, *πρῶτα δ' ἐκστήσων φρενῶν ἐνείς ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν*, equivalent to *ἔξω δ' ἐλαύνων τοῦ φρονεῖν*, in line 853.

τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος] Cic. Orat. LVII 193, *Trochaicum autem, qui est eodem spatio quo choreus, cordacem appellat* (Aristoteles), *quia contractio et brevis dignitatem non habeat*. Quint. IX 4. 88, herous, *qui est idem dactylus, Aristoteli amplior, iambus humanior* (too like the language of vulgar humanity) *videatur: trochaicum ut nimis currentem (τροχερόν) dampnet, eique cordacis nomen imponat*. Harpocr. κορδακισμός· ὁ κόρδαξ κωμικῆς ὀρχήσεως εἰδὸς ἐστίν, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἀριστότενος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς τραγικῆς ὀρχήσεως. Suidas κορδακίζει· ἀσχαρὰ ὀρχεῖται (the rest as Harpocr.). The characteristics of the κόρδαξ, a kind of Comic dance, may be gathered from notices in Theophr. Char. 6, περὶ ἀπονοίας, 'desperate recklessness', where it is a mark of this character to dance the cordax sober and without a mask: in Aristophanes, who takes credit to himself, Nub. 540, for never introducing it into his comedies: in Athenaeus, XIV 28, ult. 630 E, who calls it παργινώδης, 'sportive'. Dem. Olynth. II § 18 (of Philip's mode of life), εἰ δέ τις σόφρων ἢ δίκαιος ἄλλως, τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν ἀκρασίαν τοῦ βίου καὶ μέθην καὶ κορδακισμούς οὐ δυνάμενος φέρειν κ.τ.λ. It seems therefore to have been accompanied by the grossest indecencies, so that no respectable person could allow himself even to look on the performance of it. See further in Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* XXVII 7.

This however is not the point of the reference here. But the κόρδαξ

τροχερός ρυθμός τὰ τετράμετρα. λείπεται δὲ παιάν,  
 ᾧ ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενοι, οὐκ  
 εἶχον δὲ λέγειν τίς ἦν. ἔστι δὲ τρίτος ὁ παιάν,  
 καὶ ἐχόμενος τῶν εἰρημένων· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δὺ ἐστίν,  
 ἐκείνων δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐν πρὸς ἓν, ὁ δὲ δύο πρὸς ἓν. ἔχεται  
 δὲ τῶν λόγων τούτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ  
 5 παιάν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα ἀφετέοι,  
 καὶ διότι μετρικοί· ὁ δὲ παιάν ληπτέος· ἀπὸ μόνου

was accompanied by verses in the trochaic tetrameter, and these are identified; and all that is implied here by the term is the lightness, the want of gravity and dignity, and the *dancing* tripping measure, afterwards expressed by *τροχερός*; as we see also in the passages of Cic. and Quint. This character always belonged to the tetrameter; and hence we are told that the dithyrambs, from which Tragedy took its rise, were originally written in this measure, which was afterwards exchanged for the iambic, the metre nearest to the language of ordinary conversation, when the *dialogue* had been introduced, and Tragedy assumed a regular form. Τὸ τε μέτρον (of Tragedy) ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἱαμβεῖον ἐγένετο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὔρεν· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἱαμβεῖον ἐστίν (Poet. IV 19). Comp. Rhet. III 1. 9.

These rhythms being set aside, (they are in fact reducible to two, the proportions 1 : 1, and 2 : 1, iambus and trochee, -- and -- respectively) the third 'the paeon remains, the use of which began with Thrasymachus, though he and his followers couldn't tell what it was (did not know how to define it). The paeon<sup>1</sup> is the third (of the rhythms) and closely connected with the preceding: for it has the ratio of three to two ( $\frac{3}{2}$  : 1, three short, and one long syllable equal to two short), whilst the others have that of one to one (dactyl, spondee, anapaest), and two to one (iambus and trochee), severally. And one and a half ( $\frac{3}{2}$  : 1, the ratio of the paeon) is connected with these (two) ratios ['next to' both ratios, i. e. the mean between the two extremes, 1 : 1 and 2 : 1], and that is the paeon'. On this see Introd. Appendix on *ῥυθμός*, pp. 387, 8. The paeonic ratio includes also the bacchius and cretic. These three ratios are the *βάσεις* of the three measures.

§ 5. 'Now all the rest (of the *ῥυθμοί*) are to be discarded, not only for the reasons already mentioned, but also because they are metrical (too suggestive of the cadence of regular verse): but the paeon is to be adopted: for it is the only one of the rhythms named which cannot be made into a regular verse, and therefore (the use of it) is most likely to escape detection'. ἀπὸ μόνου γὰρ κ.τ.λ., that is, it is an element of rhythm, not metre. Hermann, *Elem. doctr. metr.* II 19, de vers. Cret. (near the beginning of the chapter), has a criticism of this passage which

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle writes *παιάν*: Cicero, *paeon* in the Orator, and *paeon* in the de Oratore; Quintilian, *paeon*.

γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι μέτρον τῶν ῥηθέντων ῥυθμῶν, ὥστε  
 μάλιστα λανθάνειν. νῦν μὲν οὖν χρῶνται τῷ ἐνὶ  
 παιᾶνι καὶ ἀρχόμενοι (καὶ τελευτῶντες<sup>1</sup>), δεῖ δὲ διαφέ-  
 ρειν τὴν τελευτὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς. ἔστι δὲ παιᾶνος δύο

<sup>1</sup> *addidit Bekker, ed. III.*

he quotes, attributing to the author a misconception of the nature of the paeonic measure, which has caused him to fall into the error of denying it to be a metre<sup>1</sup>. See Cic. Orator, § 194, *paeon autem minime est aptus ad versum*; and the whole section. Also § 218, *numerus a quibusdam* (Aristotle, no doubt), *non pes habetur*. 'At present the one (form of) paeon is employed (at the end) as well as at the beginning (of the sentence), but the end ought to be different to the beginning'. Vater proposed to supply τελευτῶντες before καὶ ἀρχόμενοι: but in a writer like Aristotle the supplement or opposite may be very well supposed to be implied in the καὶ.

§ 6. 'There are two kinds of paeon opposed to one another, of which the one is suitable at the beginning (of the sentence or period), as in fact it is employed: and this is the one which begins with the long (syllable), and ends with three short. Δαλογενὲς εἶπε Λυκίαν, "O Delos-born, or if perchance Lycia" (were thy birthplace). The poet, whose alternative is cut short by the inexorable brevity of the quotation, was doubtless going on, as the manner of the ancient poets is, to offer the deity whom he was addressing the choice of the various titles under which he was known and worshipped, expressive of place of birth, special character or office: which was done to avoid the possibility of giving offence by omitting any title of honour of which he might be specially proud. The following specimens of a very frequent custom will suffice to illustrate it. Hor. Carm. Sec. line 14, *Lenis Ilithya... sive tu Lucina probas vocari seu Genitalis*. Sat. II 6. 20, *Matutine pater, seu Iane libentius audis*. [We may also compare Horace's enumeration of the favourite haunts of Apollo, *qui rore puro Castaliae lavit crines solutos, qui Lyciae tenet dumeta natalemque silvam Delius et Patareus Apollo*. Od. III 4. 61.] Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τόδ' αὐτῷ φιλονεκλημένῳ, τοῦτό νιν προσεννέπω. Agam. 147. The author of the paeon was apparently about to add after Λυκίαν, νέμων or some such word, offering the god the alternative birthplace of Lycia, if he happened to prefer it. The Homeric epithet Λυκηγένης, Il. Δ 101, 119, is usually supposed to denote his Lycian birthplace, Patara, though Müller, *Dor.* II 6. 8, would "rather understand" by it 'born of light'. On the epithet Λύκειος, frequently applied to Apollo by the Tragedians, as Aesch. Suppl. 668 (with Paley's note), Sept. c. Theb. 133, Agam. 1228, Soph. Oed. R. 203 (Schneidewin), Electr. 6, &c. &c., see Müller's *Dorians*, II 6. 8, where the various significations of Apollo's titles are discussed at length; and Donaldson's *New Cratylus* § 269, on the connexion of Λύκος with

<sup>1</sup> Though I cannot see much force in Hermann's argument against Aristotle, yet it must be owned that it is odd to deny that to be metrical, which derived its very name from the hymns to Apollo which were principally written in that measure, as may be seen from the two specimens here quoted.

εἶδη ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀρμόττει, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶνται· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν οὐ ἄρχει μὲν ἡ μακρά, τελευτῶσι δὲ τρεῖς βραχεῖαι,

Δαλογενὲς εἴτε Λυκίαν

καὶ

χρυσεοκόμα Ἑκατε παῖ Διός.

ἕτερος δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας, οὐ βραχεῖαι ἄρχουσι τρεῖς, ἡ δὲ μακρά τελευταία·

μετὰ δὲ γὰν ὕδατα τ' ὠκεανὸν ἠφάνισε νύξ.

οὗτος δὲ τελευτὴν ποιεῖ· ἡ γὰρ βραχεῖα διὰ τὸ

λευκός and -λύκη. [In G. Curtius' *Greek Etymology*, § 88 λευκός and ἀμφι-λύκη, and § 89 λύκος, no such connexion is suggested.]

Brandis' 'Anonymus' [*Philologus* IV. 1] reads "Δαλογενὲς", εἴτα, "Λύκειε ἐκάεργε".

Victorius has noted that this and the following quotation are both commencements of paeans to Apollo, from which the name of the metre is derived : and each of them exemplifies the 'paeon at the beginning'.

"Golden-haired Archer son of Zeus". The other, the opposite to this, in which three short syllables form the beginning, and the long one comes at the end. "After earth and its waters, night obscured (blotted out) ocean". In the Greek line there are four pure paeans, all of this construction --- : but Ar. appears to quote it as an exemplification only of this form of paeon in the last place of the verse, or rhythm.

ἐξ ἐναντίας] = ἐναντίας, or ἐναντίον, *ex opposito*. Polit. VIII (V) 11, 1314 a 31, ὁ δ' ἕτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοισι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. Herod. VII 225, οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἐπισπόμενοι. Thucyd. IV 33, ἐξ ἐναντίας οὗτοι καθεστήκεσαν, 'opposite', opposed to ἐκ πλαγίου. Ep. ad Titum ii. 8, ὁ ἐξ ἐναντίας. ἐξ ἐναντίου is the more usual form. The ellipse to be supplied is according to Bos, *Ellips.* p. 325 (562, ed. Schäfer), χώρας, corrected to ἀρχῆς by Schäfer ad loc., q. v., where several instances of the omission of that word are produced. But the ellipse of ὁδός, in one or other of its cases, is very much more common than that of χώρα or ἀρχή, in the formation of adverbs and quasi-adverbs in the feminine, genitive, dative and accusative ; such as ἡ τῇ ταύτῃ τῇδε ἐκείνῃ ἄλλῃ et sim.—a large number of instances of these three varieties of the ellipse of ὁδός is collected under that head in the work referred to, pp. 188—192 ; and at p. 192 init. ἐπ' ἐναντίας φέρεσθαι is rightly inserted among them by Leisner (one of the earlier editors).

'And this makes a (true and proper) end: for' (γὰρ: the reason of this, that the long syllable *is* required for the end, may be inferred from the consideration that follows of the incompleteness, &c. of the *short* syllable) 'the short syllable by reason of its incompleteness makes (the rhythm appear) mutilated (cut prematurely short)'. Cic. Orator, §§ 214, 215, 218, u. s.

ἀτελής εἶναι ποιεῖ κολοβόν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ μακρᾷ ἀποκόπτεσθαι καὶ δῆλην εἶναι τὴν τελευτήν, μὴ διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν παραγραφὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ῥυθμόν.

- 7 ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὐρυθμον δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ ἄρρυθμον, καὶ τίνες εὐρυθμον ποιοῦσι ῥυθμοὶ καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εῖρηται· τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ εἰρο-

CHAP. IX.

κολοβόν] *truncus*, de Soph. El. 17, 176 a 40, ὅσα μὴ σαφῶς ἀλλὰ κολοβῶς ἐρωτᾶται, παρὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει ὁ ἔλεγχος. Poste, 'elliptical.' For other examples see the Lexicons.

'But the (sentence or period) should be broken off (brought *abruptly* to a close) and the end marked by the long syllable—not (however) by the scribe (or copyist), nor by a marginal annotation (marking the end of the sentence), but by the measure itself'. διὰ with the accusative, which indicates the cause or motive, (not the medium, channel or means, which is διὰ with genitive,) here implies that the indication of the end of the sentence should not be *due* to the scribe or his marks, stops, or what not, but solely to the rhythm: that the end should appear by the abrupt close of *that*.

παραγραφή, a by-writing, or marginal annotation. That these were occasionally *stops* appears from our use of the word 'paragraph': just as the words that we use for *stops*, comma, colon, period, originally represented members of the period or the whole period itself. Victorius aptly quotes, Cic. Orat. c. LXVIII § 228 (already referred to), *quod ait Aristoteles et Theophrastus, ne infinite feratur ut flumen oratio, quae non aut spiritu pronunciantis aut interductu librarii, sed numero coacta debet insistere*. And to the same effect de Orat. III 44. 173, where the *librarium* notes are again mentioned. Victorius also cites Isocr. Antid. § 59—to the clerk of the supposed court—ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς παραγραφῆς ἀναγῶθι κ.τ.λ. Ernesti *Lex. Tech. Gr.* s. v. [In the papyrus of the Funeral Oration of Hyperides, preserved in the British Museum, and edited in *fac-simile* by Professor Churchill Babington, the approach of the end of a sentence is indicated by a short interlinear dash below the first word of the line in which the sentence is about to close.]

§ 7. 'So this subject, that the composition should be rhythmical, and not altogether without rhythm, and what rhythms, and how constructed, make style rhythmical, is finished and done with'.

#### CHAP. IX.

We now come to another kind of ἁρμονία, the adaptation of the several parts of the sentence to one another in order to its fit composition (*apta compositio*, Cic. [de Orat. III 52. 200]), shewn in the arrangement of its words and subordinate clauses. The subject of the chapter is accordingly the period and its construction; and some of its leading figures—those originally introduced by Gorgias and his school—are illustrated by several examples from Isocrates' Panegyricus.



μένην καὶ τῷ συνδέσμῳ μίαν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν τοῖς  
 διθυράμβοις ἀναβολαί, ἢ κατεστραμμένην καὶ ὁμοίαν  
 2 ταῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστρόφοις. ἡ μὲν  
 οὖν εἰρομένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστίν· “Ἡροδότου  
 Θουρίου ἡδ’ ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις.” ταύτη γὰρ πρό- p. 124.

Of the two principal varieties of style, the *εἰρομένη* and *κατεστραμμένη λέξις*, the latter more usually called *περιοδική*, the style of Demosthenes, Isocrates, and the more finished rhetoricians, there is a detailed account in the Introduction, in the analysis of this chapter, p. 306 seq. So that we may at once pass on to the translation, and the particular points of interest and difficulty that the text offers. On Dionysius' distinction of three varieties of style, see p. 306, note 4. On the *εἰρομένη λέξις*, the earlier style of Hecataeus, Herodotus and the *λογογράφοι*, see p. 307, and 306, note 5; and on *ἀναβολαί*, to which this style of prose is compared, p. 307 note 1. The opposite style, *ἡ κατεστραμμένη*, is described at length, pp. 308—310. See Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v. συστρέφειν*. For a good description of both, following Aristotle, see Demetr. *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 12.

§ 1. ‘The style must be either *loose and concatenated*’ (the sentences loosely strung together, connected solely by connecting particles, as *καί*, like onions on a string) ‘and one only by the connecting particle, like the preludes in the dithyrambs, or *close and compact* (i.e. periodic) and resembling the (regular) antistrophes of the old lyric poets’, Pindar Arion, Stesichorus, and the like. The last of the three is said to have owed his new name of Stesichorus—his original name was Tisias—to his having been the first to bring the chorus to a stand, make it stationary, for a time at least; and give it order, regularity, symmetry, and dignity. This is also attributed to Arion.

§ 2. ‘Now the loose style is the ancient (original) one. “This is the setting forth of the researches of Herodotus of Thurii.” This style which was formerly universal is now confined to a few. By *loose* I mean that which has no end in itself except the completion of the subject under discussion. And it is displeasing by reason of its endlessness (or *indefinite* length or character, *supra* c. 8. 2); for every one desires to have the end distinctly in view’. Quintilian, VIII 5. 27, thus describes the *εἰρομένη λέξις*, *soluta fere oratio, et e singulis non membris sed frustis collata, structura caret*. Cicero, Or. LV 186, notices the want of ‘numbers’ in Herodotus and his predecessors: which may possibly include the periodic structure of sentences; as Aristotle does, *infra* § 3, ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ ἐν περιόδοις λέξις.

[Ἡροδότου Θουρίου] This appears to be the reading of all MSS, except that A<sup>c</sup> has *θυρίου*. Herodotus did actually join the colony established at Thurium in 443 (Clinton, *F. H.* sub anno 443, col. 3), and was thence sometimes called a Thurian from this his second birthplace. So Strabo, XIV c. 2, (Caria,) p. 657, of Halicarnassus; ἄνδρες δὲ γεγόνασιν ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἡρόδοτός τε ὁ συγγραφεύς, ὃν ὕστερον Θούριον ἐκάλεσαν, διὰ τὸ κοινωνῆσαι τῆς εἰς Θουρίους ἀποικίας. Plut. de

τερον μὲν ἅπαντες, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρώνται. λέγω δὲ εἰρομένην ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ' αὐτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀηδὲς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν. διό περ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρσιν ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται·

exilio, c. 13, τὸ δέ, “Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνασσεὺς ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις ἦδε,” πολλοὶ μεταγράφουσι, “Ἡροδότου Θουρίου.” μετώκησε γὰρ εἰς Θουρίους, καὶ τῆς ἀποικίας ἐκείνης μέτεσχε. Id. de Herodoti malignitate c. 35, καὶ ταῦτα, Θούριον μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων νομιζόμενον, αὐτὸν δὲ Ἀλικαρνασσεὺς περιεχόμενον. The second of these passages may be interpreted to mean, that the reading in Plutarch's time was often found altered in the copies of *Herodotus' history*, from Ἀλικαρνασσεὺς to Θουρίου; and if so, no doubt Aristotle's copy may have had that reading, which he transferred to his Rhetoric. But on the other hand, Demetrius, περὶ ἐρμηνείας, § 17 (περὶ περιόδου), in quoting the same passage, follows the reading of all our MSS Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνασσεὺς ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις ἦδε. Which, together with two other inaccuracies of quotation (in the Rhet.), the transposition of ἦδε, and the writing ἀπόδειξις for ἀπόδεξις—Demetr. preserves the correct form—leads me rather to conclude that the variation from our text is due here, as we have already seen in so many other instances, to our author's carelessness in quoting from memory, without referring to the original. Aristotle was a book-collector, and no doubt possessed a copy of Herodotus. Victorius thinks that the reading here is sufficiently justified by the fact that Herodotus did actually become a citizen of Thurii, and was so called. But the point here to be decided is not whether he was ever so called by others, or even by himself at odd times; but whether he did, or did not, write himself a Thurian at the commencement of his own history: which I deny, and attribute the implied assertion of that fact as a mere misquotation to our author himself.

‘And this is why it is only at the goal that (the runners) pant (or gasp) and become faint, because whilst they are looking forward to the limit of the race they don't flag before that (i.e. before they have reached the goal)’. This, as I have said in *Introductio* p. 311, note, seems the explanation of the illustration which is required by the application of it and by the context. The sight of the goal before them, the term of their labour, keeps up the racers' spirits and stimulates their exertions, so that they neither faint nor fail till they reach it: *then* ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται, they breathe hard, and their exertions being over, their sinews are relaxed, they slacken and grow languid. This interpretation, which is opposed to that of Victorius (see note u.s.), makes the καμπτήρ, which is properly the *turning-point* of the δίαυλος—whence its name—here the *goal* of the στάδιον or single race, in a straight line: the καμπτήρ of the δίαυλος being in fact the πέρας of the στάδιον. If the καμπτήρ were intended here for the turning-point, the statement made of it could not be true, for in that case the runners would not come in sight of the goal until they had *passed* the καμπτήρ. So in *Eth. N. v. 1. 2*, 1095 b 1, an illustration is borrowed from the *single foot-race*, the στάδιον; ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ

## 3 προορώντες γὰρ τὸ πέρασ οὐ κάμνουσι πρότερον. ἡ

σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ ἀνάπαλιν (to illustrate the Platonic ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς). And similarly the Tragic poets express reaching the term or end of life by κάμπειν, which seems to imply the necessity of this explanation. Soph. Oed. Col. 91, ἐνταῦθα κάμψειν τὸν ταλαίπωρον βίον. Eur. Hel. 1666, ὅταν δὲ κάμψῃς καὶ τελευτήσῃς βίον. Electr. 956, πρὶν ἂν τέλος γραμμῆς ἵκηται καὶ πέρασ κάμψῃ βίον. Hippol. 87, τέλος δὲ κάμψαιμ' ὥσπερ ἡρξάμεν βίον. This single course is also called δρόμος ἄκαμπτος, or ἀπλοῦς, or εὐθύς, Pollux et Hesychius ap. Stallbaum ad Phaedo 72 B. The καμπτήρ, or στήλη, with the inscription κάμψον, was called τέρμα, βατήρ, τέλος and νύσσα. Comp. Krause *Gymn. u. Agon. der Hell.* I 140.

ἐκλύονται] Comp. Isocr. Paneg. § 150, πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐκλελυμένος (slack, remiss). Ib. ἀντίδ. § 59, ἵν' οὖν μὴ παντάπασιν ἐκλυθῶ (be exhausted) πολλῶν ἔτι μοι λεκτέων ὄντων. Ar. Pol. VII (VI) 6, πλοῖα ἐκλελυμένα, of crazy vessels. Ib. Hist. Anim. IX 1.32, ἕως ἂν ἐκλύσωσιν (of taming elephants). Xen. de Ven. 5.5, dogs lose their keen smell in the summer διὰ τὸ ἐκλελῦσθαι τὰ σώματα. Ar. Probl. xxx 1.6, λίαν πολὺς (οἶνος) ἐκλύει, de Gen. Anim. I 18.51, ἔκλυσις, relaxation, weakness. Ib. v 7.21, ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ κινούσα τὴν φωνὴν ἐκλύεται.

§ 3. 'Such then is the loose ('jointed' Mure, *H. G. L.*) kind of style; the compact, condensed, concentrated, kind is the periodic, that which is constructed in periods: by *period* I mean a sentence (*lit.* kind of style or composition) having a beginning and end in itself, and a magnitude such as can be readily taken in at one view'. The other style is ἀπειρος, *perpetua*, indefinite, continuous, running on without end, and without proper divisions; and therefore *can't* be comprehended in one view. εὐσύνοπτον, comp. Pol. IV (VII) 4, ult. ἡ μεγίστη ὑπερβολὴ πλήθους...εὐσύνοπτος, (for purposes of supervision). So of a tragedy, Poet. VII 10.74, ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι. On the construction ἡ εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεως, for ἡ εἰρομένη λέξις, see the examples in Matthiae's *Gr. Gr.* 442. 2. Add this, and Isocr. Paneg. § 132, τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς, ib. § 148, τὴν ἀοίκητον τῆς χώρας. Plat. Protag. 329 A, δόλιχον τοῦ λόγου. Arist. Pol. VIII (V) 10, 1312 b 20, πολλὰ τῶν καταλύσεων.

'A style of this kind is agreeable, and easy to be learnt' (εὐμαθής, passive; see Aesch. Eum. 442, Soph. Aj. 15, Trach. 611, where 'easy to be learnt' means 'readily intelligible'); 'agreeable, because it is the contrary of the endless, indefinite, and also because the listener is constantly thinking by reason of this constant definite conclusion (or limitation of each sentence) that he has got hold of something (got something in his grasp—in the way of a conclusion) for himself (αὐτῷ, retained by Bekker and Spengel; *quaere* αὐτῷ?); whereas, to have nothing to look forward to (no conclusion to anticipate) either to be, or to be finished (ἀνύειν, ὥστε τινὰ ἀνύειν), either fact, or effect, is disagreeable'. It occurred to me that εἶναι, which seems superfluous, might have arisen from a repetition of the εἶν in προνοεῖν. The translation will then be, 'nothing to look forward to nor to finish (get done, effect)': ἀνύειν identifying the hearer with the speaker, as if he himself had to come to the conclusion. Comp. § 6, ὁρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω, καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ ὄρον, ἀντισπασθῇ παυσάμενον.

μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεώς ἐστιν ἡδε, κατεστραμ-  
 μένη δὲ ἢ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν  
 ἔχουσιν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ  
 μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἡδεῖα δ' ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής, P. 1409 b.  
 ἡδεῖα μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν τῷ ἀπεράντῳ, καὶ ὅτι  
 αἰεὶ τι οἶεται ἔχειν ὁ ἀκροατὴς τῷ αἰεὶ πεπεράνθαι τι  
 αὐτῷ· τὸ δὲ μηδὲν προνοεῖν εἶναι μηδὲ ἀνύειν ἀηδές.  
 εὐμαθής δὲ ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος. τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι ἀριθμὸν  
 ἔχει ἢ ἐν περιόδοις λέξις, ὃ πάντων εὐμνημονευτό-  
 τατον. διὸ καὶ τὰ μέτρα πάντες μνημονεύουσι μάλ-  
 λον τῶν χύδην· ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἔχει ᾧ μετρεῖται.  
 4 δεῖ δὲ τὴν περίοδον καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τετελειῶσθαι, καὶ

‘And easy to be learnt because easily recollected: and this because the periodic style can be *numbered*, and number is of all things the most easily recollected’. The proportions, or relations of the several parts or members of the period to the whole, and to one another—its symmetrical structure—can be expressed in numbers, like the numerical relations of rhythm, c. 8. This gives the periodic structure a hold upon the memory, by its definite proportions, which is entirely wanting to the continuous and indefinite succession of the other.

‘And this is why every one recollects metres (verses) better than (disorderly) irregular prose; because it has number which serves to measure it’.

τῶν χύδην] is the *soluta oratio* (Cic. Orat. § 228, alibi), the διαλελυμένη or διερριμένη λέξις (Demetrius): the incoherent style, words poured out at random, in confused mass, one after another, without order or discrimination. Thus, in distinguishing the symmetrical structure of verse from the comparative confusion and disorder of prose, Plato, Legg. VII 811 D, writes λόγων, οὓς ἐν ποιήμασιν ἢ χύδην οὕτως εἰρημένους (where οὕτως is, *Platonice*, ‘just as they are’, ‘just as it happens’, ‘indiscriminately’, ‘without order or regularity’; or ‘without consideration’, ‘just as it may be’. Heindorf Gorg. § 127 and Ast’s Lex. Plat. s. v.); Phaedr. 264 B, οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλήσθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου (helter-skelter, like rubbish shot out of a cart; Thompson). Rep. VII 537 C, τὰ τε χύδην μαθήματα...γενόμενα (taught promiscuously). Isocr. Panath. § 24, ὁμοίως ἂν εἶναι δόξαίμιν τοῖς εἰκῇ καὶ φορτικῶς καὶ χύδην ὅτι ἂν ἐπέλθῃ λέγουσιν (who utter at random, promiscuously anything that comes into their head). Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 2, 1324 b 5, τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων (shot out in a heap, indiscriminately, at random, without order or system), de part. An. IV 5. 27, φὰ διεσπαρμένα χύδην. The passage of Plato, Legg. u.s., is referred to by Dionysius, Ars Rhet. x 6 (v 381 ed. Reiske), οὐ χύδην, ὡς ἔτυχον βεβλήσθαι τὰ ἐνθυμήματα.

§ 4. ‘The period must also be completed (or brought to a conclusion)

μη διακόπτεσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ Σοφοκλέους ἱαμβεῖα,

Καλυδὼν μὲν ἦδε γαῖα Πελοπίεας χθονός·

τοῦναντίον γὰρ ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν τῷ διαιρεῖσθαι,  
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου τὴν Καλυδῶνα εἶναι τῆς  
Πελοποννήσου.

by the sense (καί, as well as by the structure and rhythm) and not broken off abruptly (without completing the sense: διακόπτειν 'to cut in two'), like Sophocles' iambics, "Calydon is this land of the Pelopian soil—": for the contrary supposition (to this real fact) arises from (*lit.* is caused by; *dativus instrumenti*) this (wrong) division (in general), as also in the instance given, that Calydon belongs to the Peloponnesus'.

We learn from the Anonymous Scholiast on this passage (see Brandis' tract [*Philologus* IV i] pp. 46, 7,) and more precisely from the Schol. on Ar. Ran. 1269, that this verse comes not from Sophocles, but from Eur. Meleager, of which it is the commencement. See Wagner, *Fragm. Eur.* Mel. I (*Fr. Tr. Gr.* II 270). The second verse, which completes the author's meaning, is supplied by Lucian, Conv. c. 25 (Hemsterh. III. 436), and Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 58 (*Rhet. Gr.* Spengel III 275), ἐν ἀντιπόρθμοις πέδι' ἔχουσ' εὐδαίμονα: and the three following by Wagner, u. s. This makes it clear that this misstatement was not due to Euripides. As to the substitution of Sophocles for Euripides as the author, I have no doubt, from the abundant evidence we have already had, that it is due solely to a lapse of memory on Ar.'s part, and that no alteration of the text, as suggested by Vater and Buhle, is required.

The *stop*, or *pause*, which the speaker or reader makes, when introduced in the wrong place, may make a complete alteration in the meaning: as here, if the verse be read as an entire sentence with the pause at χθονός, it conveys the meaning that Calydon is situated in the Peloponnesus, which is contrary to the fact: but if it be read continuously without a pause with the ensuing line, the true sense becomes clear. διαιρεῖσθαι here is equivalent to διαστίξαι III 5. 6, comp. Anon. ap. Brandis, p. 47, οἳ εἰσι κατὰ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα μὲν διαστίξαντες ἄλλην διάνοιαν ἀπαρτίσομεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ διαστίξαντες ἄλλην. This is in fact the 'fallacy of division', de Soph. El. 4, 166 a 33, παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν, where two verses are quoted in illustration.

Demetrius u. s. quotes the two verses in illustration of a different kind of fault; the interpolation of a σύνδεσμος—in which he includes *interjections*—by actors, as an *expletive*. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀναπληροῦντες, φησί, τὸν σύνδεσμον εἰκόασιν τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς τοῖς τὸ καὶ τὸ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἔπος λέγουσιν, οἷον εἴ τις ὧδε λέγοι, Καλυδὼν μὲν ἦδε γαῖα Πελοπίεας χθονός, φεῦ, ἐν ἀντιπόρθμοις πέδι' ἔχουσ' εὐδαίμονα, αἱ αἱ. ὥς γὰρ παρέλκει τὸ αἱ αἱ καὶ τὸ φεῦ ἐνθάδε, οὕτω καὶ ὁ πανταχοῦ μάτην ἐμβαλλόμενος σύνδεσμος.

The MSS, with the exception of A\*, have Πελοπίεας, which is found also in Demetrius and retained by Bekker and Spengel; MS A\*, Lucian, the Schol. on Aristophanes, Dindorf (*Eur. Fragm.* Mel. 2), and Wagner, read the more usual form Πελοπίας. The text of Euripides, who alone of the

5 περίοδος δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν κώλοις ἢ δ' ἀφελής. ἔστι δ' ἐν κώλοις μὲν λέξις ἢ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ διηρημένη καὶ εὐανάπνευστος, μὴ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει ὥσπερ ἡ εἰρημένη περίοδος, ἀλλ' ὅλη. κῶλον δ' ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον three Tragedians uses the word, has Πελόπιος in five places, including the line of the Meleager (Beck's Index).

§ 5. 'A period may be either divided into clauses, or simple (confined to one)'. Ar. himself defines what he means here by ἀφελής, viz. μονόκωλος, a sentence consisting of a single member, without the complication, or elaborate construction of the period. ἀφελής properly denotes smooth and level, without inequalities or irregularities, as Arist. Eq. 527, διὰ τῶν ἀφελῶν πεδίων ἔρρει. It is therefore 'plain' as opposed to 'mountainous', literally and metaphorically, level, easy to be traversed, simple, *plain*; whereas the mountain is suggestive of difficulty. It is applied by Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene [c. 2], to Lysias' style, which is said to be λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής, 'smooth and plain or simple'. Lysias' style is in fact a medium between the εἰρομένη λέξις of Hecataeus and Herodotus, and the complex periods of Isocrates and Demosthenes: and a comparison of the sentences of Lysias with those of Demosthenes will clearly shew the difference between the ἀφελής and ἡ ἐν κώλοις περίοδος. Quint. IX 4.124, 12. 5. *Genera eius (periodi) duo sunt: alterum simplex, quum sensus unus longiore ambitu circumducitur; alterum, quod constat membris (ἐν κώλοις) et incisis, quae plures sensus habent. Habet periodus membra minimum duo: medius numerus videntur quatuor* (so Cic. Orat. § 221), *sed recipit frequenter et plura.*

'The period in clauses or divisions must be complete in itself, duly divided (its members distinct and definite), and such as can be easily delivered without stopping to draw breath' (*lit.* easily breathed, well adapted to the limits of the breath).

εὐανάπνευστος] Cic. de Or. III 44. 175, *Rudis orator incondite fundit... spiritu non arte determinat.* Orat. § 228, *Non spiritu pronunciantis... debet insistere.*

'Not however (μή, if, provided, it be not) by the mere (arbitrary) division (as if the speaker might pause for breath, *wherever he pleases*), as (in) the period already cited (Καλυδῶν μὲν ἦδε...), but as a whole. A member or clause is one of the two parts of this. By *simple* I mean a period of a single member'. It appears from this that a period, according to Ar., is a sentence that includes a *complete sense*<sup>1</sup>, and is thereby distinguished from a κῶλον or member of it: which *is* a member or part of a whole, and therefore incomplete until the whole has been expressed. The period therefore is twofold, simple, μονόκωλος, and compound, ἐν κώλοις. The phrase τὸ ἕτερον μόριον divides the compound period primarily or essentially into *two* parts, which stands for, and may be extended to, division in general. Cicero, as Vater

<sup>1</sup> So Hermog. περὶ εὐρέσεως τομ. δ', περὶ περιόδου (II 241 *Rh. Gr.* Spengel), of the κῶλον. The period may consist of one, two, three or four, colons. κῶλον δὲ ἐστὶν ἀπηρτισμένη διάνοια, a complete sense. Aristotle admits this *only* of the μονόκωλος περίοδος.

6 μόριον ταύτης. ἀφελῇ δὲ λέγω τὴν μονόκωλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μούρους εἶναι  
 observes, acknowledges the compound alone to be a true period. Τὸ δὲ κῶλον Ἀριστοτέλης οὕτως ὀρίζεται, “κῶλόν ἐστι τὸ ἕτερον μέρος περιόδου”· εἴτα ἐπιφέρει, “γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἀπλὴ περίοδος.” οὕτως ὀρίσάμενος “τὸ ἕτερον μέρος” δίκωλον ἐβούλετο εἶναι τὴν περίοδον δηλονότι. ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος συλλαβῶν τὸν ὅρον τοῦ Ἀρ., καὶ τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον τῷ ὅρῳ σαφέστερον καὶ τελεώτερον οὕτως ὀρίσατο, “κῶλόν ἐστιν ἥτοι ἀπλὴ περίοδος, ἡ συνθέτου περιόδου μέρος” [Demetrius π. ἑρμηνείας, § 34]. On κῶλα and κόμματα in general, see *Introduct.* pp. 312, 3, note 1.

μονόκωλος appears in a totally different sense, *Pol. IV (VII) 7, 1327 b 35*, τὰ μὲν γὰρ (ἔθνη) ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, one-sided, ill-balanced, like a man with one arm or leg; opposed to the Athenian, *in se totus teres atque rotundus*.

§ 6. ‘The members or clauses and the periods themselves should be neither truncated (cut prematurely short), nor too long’. *Constat ille ambitus et plena comprehensio ex quattuor fere partibus, quae membra dicimus, ut et aures impleat et ne brevior sit quam satis sit neque longior.* *Cic. Orat. § 221.*

μούρους] This word is variously written *μν-* and *μεί-ουρος*, and so here the MSS. The Lexicons, including Stephens’, regard them as two different words: Stephens only distinguishing the *sense*, *μείουρος*, *κολήβουρος*, bob-tailed, with a stunted tail; *μούρος*, sharp-tailed, like a mouse: while Liddell and Scott, and Rost and Palm, deriving *μούρος* from a mouse’s tail, set the facts of the case at defiance by defining it nevertheless ‘curtailed’, ‘*abgestutzt oder abgestumpft*’. This at all events is no doubt the meaning of it. It seems to me rather that the word is the same, and the variety only in the spelling. The meaning of it is always the same; bob-tailed, curtailed, originally; and thence blunted, truncated, docked, maimed, cut *short* where you would naturally expect a prolongation. *Comp. Poet. c. XXVI 13*, εἰ μὲν ἓνα τὸν μῦθον ποιῶσιν ἀνάγκη ἢ βραχέα δεικνύμενον μούρον φαίνεσθαι, unnaturally, unduly, curtailed. See Twining’s note, p. 557. He refers to Hephaest. *μείουρος* στίχος, ὁ κατὰ τὸ τέλος ἐλλείπων χρόνος, opposed to *δολίχουρος*, ‘long-tailed’, ὁ κατὰ τὸ τέλος πλεονάζων συλλαβῇ. *Comp. de part. Anim. III 1. 13*, of blunt-nosed, as opposed to sharp-nosed, fishes: οἱ σαρκοφάγοι, fishes of prey, like the shark, are sharp-nosed, οἱ δὲ μὴ σαρκοφάγοι μούροι (a bulldog’s nose is particularly *μούρος*). And again *IV 13. 22*, the same remark is repeated. Pausanias, *X 16. 1*, describing one of Croesus’ offerings at Delphi, σχῆμα δὲ τοῦ ὑποθήματος κατὰ πύργον μάλιστα εἰς μούρον ἀνιόντα ἀπὸ εὐρυτέρου τοῦ κάτω, of a truncated cone or pyramid. Athenaeus (*XIV 632 D, E, 1er*), of three kinds of defective verses; ἀκέφαλοι, at the beginning, as a verse beginning with ἐπειδή; λαγαροί, prop. spider-shaped, contracted or weak in the flanks; hence of verses, faulty in the middle (*claudicant in medio* Schweighäuser *ad loc.*), where a short syllable occurs for a long one in the middle of the verse: illustrated by *Il. B [11] 731*, and another hexameter which Schweighäuser can’t find, and to him is inexplicable; and thirdly *μείουροι*, οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκβολῆς, at the end of the verse; of which three specimens are given, *Il. M [XII] 208*, another which

μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίνει πολ-  
λάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν· ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὅταν ἔτι  
ὁρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὗ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ  
ὅρον, ἀντισπασθῇ παυσαμένου, οἷον προσπταίνειν  
γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολεί-  
πεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ  
τέρματος· ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπερι-

is misquoted from Il. Θ [VIII] 305, and a third from Od. ε' [IX] 212. This passage of Athenaeus is quoted at length by Hermann, *El. doctr. metr.* II 26.20. Athenaeus writes μέιουρος. Ernesti *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v. μέιουρος.

'For that (sc. the κῶλον) which is too short often makes the listener stumble (*balks* him by bringing him up short and abruptly); because if, whilst he is still hurrying (eager) to get on (forward), and to the (end or completion of the) measure (rhythm), of which he has already a definition (i.e. a definite and preconceived notion) in himself, he be suddenly pulled up (checked, *lit.* pulled against) by a pause (a premature cessation on the part of the speaker), there must necessarily follow (arise γίγνεσθαι) a sort of stumble by reason of the check'.

προσπταίνει] must be regarded as a subst. in the accusative before γί-  
νεσθαι, equivalent to τὸ προσπταίνειν. The metaphor is from driving:  
a sudden and unexpected check, or pulling against him, will often cause  
a horse to stumble, or bring him on his knees. The abrupt cessation of  
the onward motion, in the listener's mind, as in the horse's career, pro-  
duces analogous effects—whence the metaphor—in the two cases.

'Those again which are too long produce a feeling of being left  
behind, like those who (in a measured walk, as in the colonnade of a  
gymnasium) turn back only after passing (not till they have passed) the  
limit; for they too—like the speaker that uses too long periods—leave  
behind their companions in the walk'.

The notion is that of a party walking backwards and forwards in  
the portico of a gymnasium, the walk, like the period, being properly  
limited, though the limit is capable of being passed. If one of the party  
—suppose Aristotle himself in his daily περίπατοι in the Lyceum—  
chanced to have thus outstripped his companions, the latter would be  
left in the lurch, and be no longer able to hear him. Similarly the speaker  
who makes his periods of undue length, leaves *his* hearers in the lurch:  
they stop short, as it were, and lose the thread of his discourse. ἀποκάμ-  
πειν is here not in its usual sense, but 'to turn away' in the sense of  
'turning back', as ἀποδιδόναι, ἀπονέμειν, ἀπαιτεῖν.

On this subject comp. Cic. Orat. LIII 178, *ilaque et longiora et  
breviora iudicat et perfecta ac moderata semper expectat; mutila sentit  
quaedam et quasi decurtata, quibus tanquam debilo fraudetur offenditur,  
productiora alia et quasi immoderatus excurrentia, quae magis etiam  
aspernantur aures*, et seq.



πατοῦντας. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὔσαι<sup>p. 125.</sup>  
 λόγος γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολῇ ὅμοιον. ὥστε γίνεται ὁ  
 ἔσκωψε Δημόκριτος ὁ Χίος εἰς Μελανιππίδην ποιή-  
 σαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστρόφων ἀναβολάς,

οἱ τ' αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλω κακὰ τεύχων,  
 ἢ δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολὴ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακίστη·

ἄρμόττει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ εἰς τοὺς μακροκώλους

‘And in like manner also the periods that are too long become so many speeches, and like a dithyrambic prelude; that is, rambling and incoherent, without unity or system.

*αἱ περίοδοι...λόγος γίνεται*] verb attracted from the plural to the singular, as the nearer of the two: so *infra*, *αἱ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίνεταί*. For *ὅμοιον* cf. *triste lupus stabulis*, et sim. On *ἀναβολή*, see note 1, *Introd.* p. 307.

‘And therefore what Democritus of Chios quoted to taunt Melanippides for writing (long, rambling) dithyrambic preludes instead of the (compact and regular) stanzas, is realized (in these overgrown periods). “A man works mischief to himself in working mischief to another, and the long dithyrambic prelude is most mischievous to its composer” (substituted for ἢ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλευσάντι κακίστη, of the original, Hesiod. *Op. et D.* 263): for a taunt of the same kind may also be appropriately applied to the long-membered gentry, (the dealers in long-membered periods)’. *The makers of the periods* are themselves called here *μακρόκωλοι*. To scan the second verse of the quotation *μακρᾶναβολή* must be read as a crasis. “Democritus Chius Musicus, Abderitae aequalis teste Diogene Laertio, IX 49 (γεγόνασι δὲ Δημόκριτοι εἰς· πρῶτος αὐτὸς οὗτος, δεύτερος Χίος μουσικὸς κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον). Meminerunt eius Suidas s. v. *χιάζειν*, Pollux, IV 9. 4, Arist. *Rhet.* III 9. De hoc omnium optime egit Coraes ἐν *Χιακῆς Ἀρχαιολογίας Ὑλη Ἀτακτ.* III p. 192, seq.” Müllach, ad *Democr. Fragm.* p. 91.

In the note on *ἀναβολαί*, *Introd.* p. 307, already referred to, may be found some account of the two kinds of dithyramb here alluded to; the earlier antistrophic form of that of Arion, Stesichorus, Pindar, and the novel, relaxed, often incoherent, extravagances, of Melanippides and his followers. Nevertheless, Melanippides is selected by Aristodemus, in answer to Socrates’ question, *Xen. Mem.* I 4. 3, as the most distinguished representative of dithyrambic poetry, as Homer of epic, Sophocles of tragedy, Polycletus of sculpture, and Zeuxis of painting. This represents the popular judgment, as opposed to that of the critics. On this subject, I have referred to Bode, *Gesch. der Hell. Dichtk.* Vol. II Pt. II p. 111 seq. and 293 seq. and to Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. xxx. See also Arist. *Probl.* XIX 15. Of Melanippides of Melos, there is a life in Smith’s *Biogr. Dict.* [E. Curtius, *Greek Hist.* Vol. IV p. 102 of Ward’s tr.]

‘Those which have their members too short make no period at all: and so it (i. e. the period made up of these short κῶλα) drags the hearer with it headlong’. The audience is *carried away* by them, as by a

λέγειν. αἶ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίγνεται·  
προπετῇ οὖν ἄγει τὸν ἀκροατὴν.

- 7 τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλοις λέξεως ἣ μὲν διηρημένη ἐστὶν ἣ δὲ ἀντικειμένη, διηρημένη μὲν οἶον “πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων,” ἀντικειμένη δέ, ἐν ἡ ἐκατέρῳ τῷ κώλῳ ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίον σύγκειται ἢ ταὐτὸ ἐπέξευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, οἶον “ἀμφοτέρους P. 1410. δ' ὦνησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλείῳ τῆς οἴκοι προσεκτήσαντο, τοῖς δὲ ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι κατέλιπον.” ἐναντία ὑπομονή ἀκολούθησις, ἱκανὸν πλείον.

horse, at a headlong, break-neck, pace. Specimens of this style are given in *Introd.* p. 314, note 1.

§ 7. ‘The periodic style has two divisions, of which the one has its clauses (simply) divided; the other opposed to one another; an instance of simple division is, “I have often wondered that those who first assembled these universal gatherings and established the athletic contests...”’ διηρημένη λέξις, “in qua membra periodi copula a se invicem distinguuntur.” *Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. διαρῆν.* This is the opening of Isocrates’ Panegyric Speech, supposed or intended to be delivered at the ‘General Assembly’ of the great Olympic games—whence the name. It is remarkable, and shews that Ar. could not have looked at the passage he was quoting, that the very next words to those at which his quotation stops, long before the end of the sentence, contain a regular antithesis or opposition of members, and the ‘simple division’ is absolutely confined to the words cited. I should suppose that he could not have been aware of this.

‘(An instance) of the antithetic period, wherein in each of the two clauses contrary by contrary are brought together, or (the same word is imposed as a yoke, i.e. bracket, or *vinculum*, on both contraries) the two contraries are coupled together by one and the same word, is “Both they served, them that remained, and them that followed; for the one they acquired more land than they had at home in addition, and to the others they left behind sufficient in what they had at home.” ὑπομονή, (staying behind) is contrary to ἀκολούθησις (following), ἱκανὸν το πλείον’.

It is unnecessary to say that the passage is quoted wrong: it runs in the original, *Paneg.* § 35, 6, ἀμφ. δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀκολ. καὶ τοὺς ὑπομ. ἔσωσαν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι χώραν κατέλιπον, τοῖς δὲ πλείῳ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐπόρισαν. The first clause is an exemplification of ἐπίξευξις, on which see note *supra* c. 5 § 7; the second, of the antithesis of contraries in two clauses balanced and opposed to one another.

In the quotation that follows, *Paneg.* § 41, the original is, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς

χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι βουλομένοις.” ἀπόλαυσις κτήσῃ ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἔτι “συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας κατορθοῦν.” “εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἡξιώθησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον.” “πλεῦσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἡπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δ’ Ἀθω διορύξας.” “καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεσθαι.” “οἱ μὲν γὰρ

χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀμφοτέροις ἀρμόττειν. Ar. in his alteration has adorned Isocrates' text with an additional rhetorical figure, the *ὁμοιστέλευτον* or rhyming terminations of *δεομένοις* and *βουλομένοις*. *ἀπόλαυσις*, (sensual) enjoyment, is opposed to *κτήσῃ*, acquisition', as the text has it. As these two can hardly be considered antithetical, and nothing corresponding to *κτήσῃ* occurs in Isocr., are we to suppose that Ar., meaning to write *ἐνδεία*, carelessly substituted *κτήσῃ*? or rather, that *κτήσῃ* is a mistake of a copyist for *δεήσει*, which occurs twice in the sense of 'want' II 7. 3 and 4: and also, in the same sense, Pseudo-Plato, Eryxias, 405 E *dis*.

Then follows a string of quotations from the same speech of Isocrates, illustrative of antithesis; § 48 (wrong), § 72 (right), § 89 (right again), § 105 (wrong), § 149 (right), § 181 (wrong), § 186 (wrong, *ἄξιον* for *ἔξειν*).

The passage τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον κ.τ.λ. occurs likewise in the funeral oration attributed to Lysias, § 29. This speech is marked as spurious by Baiter and Sauppe in their ed. of the *Or. Att.* If this be so, the figure is probably due to Isocrates, which is all the more likely as Lysias' style, *λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής*, is usually free from these rhetorical artifices. Victorius refers to an imitation of this, Cic. de Fin. II 34. 112, *Ut si Xerxes... Hellesponto iuncto, Athone perfosso, maria ambulavisset terramque navigasset.* And Lucr. III 1042 (1029, Munro), *ille quoque ipse (Xerxes) viam qui quondam per mare magnum stravit*, et seq.

'And what some one (some advocate, in accusation, whose name Ar. either had never heard, or didn't recollect) said against Peitholaus and Lycophron in the law-court (at some trial: *quaere*, theirs?), "And these fellows (οὔτοι, apparently 'the accused' or 'opponents' as usual) who used to sell you when they were at home, now that they have come to you here, have bought you'". Peitholaus and Lycophron were brothers of Thebe, the wife of Alexander of Pherae. At her instigation they murdered their brother-in-law and succeeded him in the dynasty. They maintained themselves long against the attacks of Philip by the aid of Onomarchus the Phocian commander, but at last were defeated, 353—352 B. C., and Onomarchus slain; upon which they "retired with their mercenaries, 2000 in number, into Phokis." Grote, *Hist. Gr.* from Diodorus, Vol. XI ch. LXXXVII pp. 366, 408, 9, 11, where Lycophron alone is mentioned as 'the despot of Pherae': in p. 412,

αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δ' αἰσχυρῶς ἐσώθησαν.”  
 “ἰδία μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι, κοινῇ δὲ  
 πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν δουλεύοντας.” “ἢ  
 ζῶντας ἄξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν.” καὶ ὁ  
 εἰς Πειθολαόν τις εἶπε καὶ Λυκόφρονα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ,  
 “οὔτοι δ' ὑμᾶς οἴκοι μὲν ὄντες ἐπώλουν,  
 ἐλθόντες δ' ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐώνηνται.” ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα  
 8 ποιεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις,

Peitholaus and Lycophron are named together for the first time as joint commanders.

As the time, place, and circumstances, as well as the speaker, of what is here related, are alike utterly unknown, any attempt at interpreting it must be a mere guess. *My* conjecture is, (1) that the scene is a court of justice—*where*, no one can say; I will assume at Athens—(2) that οὔτοι are Peitholaus and Lycophron, as accused or defendants—this is suggested by εἰς Π. τις εἶπε and the use of οὔτοι—and if so, this must have been *after* their downfall: and (3) that, to give the remark a point, ἐώνηται must have a double sense. ‘These fellows, says *some one* to the judges, used when they were at home, at Pherae, to *sell you* (as slaves)—*ὑμᾶς* maliciously identifies the Athenian judges with their fellow-countrymen, captives in Thessaly—*now* that they are come to you, the tables are turned, and they have to *buy you*’ (i. e. to bribe the judges). Victorious, but utterly without point, *Videtur contumeliosa vox in eos iacta, qui pecunia, quam comparassent in suis civibus hostibus emancipandis, eadem postea uterentur in illis ab iisdem emendis, atque in servitudinem sibi adiudicandis.*

‘For all these (passages) do what has been mentioned’, i. e. give an antithetical structure to the several sentences.

§ 8. ‘This kind of style is agreeable because contraries are best known (in themselves and by reason of their opposition), and still better when placed side by side (in juxtaposition, for the purpose of contrast and comparison); and also because it resembles a syllogism; for the ἐλεγχος (the refutative syllogism) is a bringing together (for the same purpose) of the two opposites (the two contradictory conclusions)’.

This opposition of contraries in the antithesis, also reminds us of the ἐλεγχος, the conclusion of opposites, refutation by an opposite conclusion; this resemblance makes the former look like a proof, which is a source of pleasure.

Aristotle is constantly telling us—see Bonitz ad Metaph. B 2, 996 a 18—that contraries, which are the two extremes of things under the same genus, are also subject to the same science, τῶν ἐναντία μία, or ἡ αὐτή, ἐπιστήμη. And accordingly, inferences may be drawn from one contrary to another, Eth. N. V 1, 1129 a 14 seq. This appears to be the foundation of what is here said, that contraries are best known to us; they can be studied together, and one throws light upon the other. Comp. III 11. 9,

ὅτι τὰναντία γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρ' ἄλληλα μᾶλλον p. 126.  
γνωρίμα, καὶ ὅτι ἔοικε συλλογισμῶ· ὁ γὰρ ἑλεγχος  
συναγωγή τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν.

- 9 ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐστίν, παρίσωσις  
δ' ἐὰν ἴσα τὰ κῶλα, παρομοίωσις δ' ἐὰν ὅμοια τὰ  
ἔσχατα ἔχη ἐκάτερον τὸ κῶλον. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ ἐν  
ἀρχῇ ἢ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἔχειν. καὶ ἀρχὴ μὲν αἰεὶ τὰ

ὅσα ἀν...ἀντικειμένως λεχθῇ τοσούτῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ μᾶλλον. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ  
μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον...γίνεται. II 23. 30 and III 17. 13, on  
ἑλεγχος, and the *conclusion* (implying learning) *from opposites*. In Probl.  
XIX 5, ἡδὺ τὸ μανθάνειν is assigned, as an acknowledged truth, in ex-  
planation of a musical fact. 'Best known' seems to mean that contraries,  
being under the same genus, are better known than any other things that  
have no such relation, or no relation at all, to one another.

On the pleasure derived from learning, which is here assumed to be  
the explanation of the agreeableness of this periodic style, see the notes  
on I II. 21, 23; particularly the latter, in which it is fully illustrated from  
Aristotle's writings. I will repeat here that the *Metaphysics* opens with  
a statement that all men have a natural longing for (strive after) know-  
ledge, πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει: and this of course  
implies pleasure in learning, which is the satisfaction of this natural  
appetite. The natural love of imitation or copying, which gives rise to  
all the imitative arts, is based in the same way upon the desire and plea-  
sure of learning. And contrariwise therefore (this is additional), as we  
saw in c. 8. 2, ἀγνῶς καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον, the infinite, or indefinite, is  
displeasing to us because it is unknowable. Comp. *infra* c. 10. 2, τὸ γὰρ  
μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστὶ: the *words* that convey the most  
instruction to us are the most pleasing; hence the pleasure derived from  
*metaphors*, which is explained: γλῶτται on the contrary, which teach us  
nothing, are therefore disagreeable.

παρ' ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνωρίμα] juxtaposition makes things more intelligible  
is a fact already more than once appealed to, as II 23. 30; compare  
the parallel passage, III 17. 13; III 2. 9; and again III 11. 9.

On the ἑλεγχος and its opposite conclusions, συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως  
see *Intro.* on II 22, and note I, p. 262, and again, on II 25, p. 268.

§ 9. 'Such then is antithesis; the equality of the members (or  
clauses) is παρίσωσις; παρομοίωσις is when each of the two members (the  
supposition that the period consists of only *two* clauses is still carried on)  
has its extremities similar (i. e. in the letters, so that the terminations  
*rhyme* to one another). (The clauses) must have this either at the  
beginning or at the end. And when they (the similar sounding letters)  
are at the beginning (the figure is) always (expressed in) whole words (*lit.*  
the words, entire words, always are a beginning), but at the end (it  
admits of) either the (similarity of the) last syllables, or the same word  
with a changed termination (declension, adverbial, adjectival, termina-  
tion, &c), or the same word. Similar sound (παρομοίωσις) at the com-

ονόματα, ἡ δὲ τελευτὴ τὰς ἐσχάτας συλλαβὰς ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσεις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα. ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα “ἀργὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ,”

δωρητοὶ τ’ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἐπέεσσιν· ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δὲ “ὤήθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγονέναι,” “ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν.” πτώσις δὲ ταύτου “ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὦν χαλκοῦ.” ταῦτ’ ὁ νόμος “σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς.” ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς δὲ “τί ἂν

mencement (may be illustrated by) such examples as this; ἀργὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν (fallow, uncultivated) παρ’ αὐτοῦ. Victorious quotes a parallel example from Xen. Cyrop. VIII 3. 15, οὐ δυνάμενος τρέφειν ἀργὸν εἰς ἀργὸν ἀπαγαγὼν ἐκέλευσεν ἐργάζεσθαι. The ‘rhyme at the beginning’ of clauses is properly called ὁμοιοκάρκτον; at the end ὁμοιοτελευτον and, δωρητοὶ τ’ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἐπέεσσιν. II. I [IX] 526. ‘At the end, ὤήθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγονέναι (in this there appears to be neither rhyme nor reason [the assonance, or correspondence of vowel sounds, is however clearly marked in the two clauses]; it is most likely corrupt, says Buhle). ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν’.

‘And an inflexion (declension, change of termination from a root: see note on I 7. 27) of the same word (i. e. root) ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὦν χαλκοῦ, “worthy to be set up in brass (have a bronze statue erected in his honour, Dem. de F. L. § 296, Φίλιππον θαυμάζουσι καὶ χαλκοῦν ἰστᾶσι... Ib. § 378, ἔστιν ὄντιν’ ὑμεῖς...χαλκοῦν στήσαι’ ἂν ἐν ἀγορᾷ; as a public benefactor), not being worth a brass farthing”’. (Supposed to deserve a brass statue—*bronze* in reality—when he doesn’t deserve a brass farthing. This is in fact more in the nature of a *παρονομασία*, or play upon words, than of an ὁμοιοτελευτον. Ag. however seems to class both under his *παρομοίωσις*).

‘And the same word (repeated) ἔλεγες κακῶς...γράφεις κακῶς’. Demetrius, who repeats all this, following Arist. very closely, and sometimes borrowing his examples, supplies in his version a word which is wanting in our text, both to the sense and to the due balance of the sentence: σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς, καὶ νῦν θανόντα γράφεις κακῶς. Demetr. περὶ ἐρμηνείας § 26. Compare the three chapters, π. περιόδου, π. παρομοίων κώλων, π. ὁμοιοτελεύτου, *Rhet. Gr.* III 262—268, ed. Spengel. This sentence was applied by some rival orator to one who, after slandering some one all his life, after his death wrote a panegyric on him—which, the speaker says, was just as bad as his slander<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> This reminds us of Lord Lyndhurst’s saying of Campbell’s *Lives of the*

ἐπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ' εἶδες ἀργόν;" ἔστι δὲ ἅμα

'And (a rhyming termination arising) from a single syllable: δειν-όν... ἀργ-όν. And the same clause may have all three at once, and the antithesis and balance of clauses, and similar termination may be the same' (included or exemplified in one or the same clause). An instance of this is given by Victorius from a saying of Gorgias preserved by Plutarch, Cimon. c. 10, τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς χρῶτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο. Gorg. Fragm. Sauppe, *Or. Att.* III p. 131, Fr. Inc. 6. This is not only antithesis and the rest, but a false antithesis to boot. Demetr., u. s. § 23, has supplied a much more elaborate example from Isocr. Helen. § 17. τῷ (τοῦ Isocr.) μὲν ἐπίπονον καὶ φιλοκίνδυνον τὸν βίον κατέστησε (Dem. has ἐποίησε), τῆς δὲ περιβλεπτον καὶ περιμάχητον τὴν φύσιν ἐποίησεν (Dem. κατέστησεν). 'The *commencements* of periods (in this view of the artificial structure of the sentence) have been enumerated with tolerable (σχεδόν 'pretty nearly') completeness (ἐξ—'out', 'to the end or full') in the Theodectea. There are also false antitheses, as Epicharmus, besides others, (καί) wrote, τόκα μὲν κ.τ.λ.' This line of Epicharmus is also given by Demetr. u. s. § 24. He speaks of it as 'said in jest', πεπαιγμένον—τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον—to make fun of the rhetoricians, σκώπτων τοὺς ῥήτορας, viz. Gorgias and his school, the inventors of antithesis and the rest of these rhetorical novelties.

For further details on the subject of these rhetorical figures introduced by Gorgias and his school, who carried them to a vicious excess, a style to which the term Γοργιάζειν was afterwards applied; which was thought to have attained its highest perfection in the measured and laboured, empty and monotonous, periods of Isocrates;—see the paper on Gorgias, *Cambr. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.*, No. VII, Vol. III. p. 69 seq. where they are classified and arranged under three heads, representing parallelism in *sense*, *structure*, and *sound*, which is in fact Aristotle's division. Illustrative extracts from Gorgias' speeches are given at p. 67: and a collection of his fragments in Sauppe, *Fragm. Or. Att.* (appended to the *Or. Att.* Vol. III) p. 129 seq. [Compare Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, I pp. 60—62, and Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, Appendix, *On the Fragments of Gorgias.*]

Perhaps the most complete specimen of Isocrates' style in his Panegyric, from which I will select one or two illustrations, is § 76, οὐ γὰρ ὀλιγώρου τῶν κοινῶν, οὐδ' ἀπέλαυνον μὲν ὡς ἰδίῳν, ἡμέλουν δὲ ὡς ἀλλοτρίῳν, ἀλλ' ἐκίδοντο μὲν ὡς οἰκείῳν, ἀπείχοντο δ' ὥσπερ χρὴ τῶν μηδὲν προσηκόντων and so on, in the same measured strain. Of παρομοίωσις, we have an example § 45, ἔτι δ' ἀγῶνας ἰδεῖν μὴ μόνον τάχους καὶ ῥώμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων καὶ γνώμης, κ.τ.λ. The rhyming terminations pervade §§ 185, 186, culminating in a sentence, in which for once the echo is really effective, φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσῃν τίνα χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ ζῶντας ἔξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἀριτεύσαντας; (Aesch. c. Ctes. p. 65 § 78, at the close of a paragraph, οὐ γὰρ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ τὸν τόπον μόνον μετήλλαξεν. Ennius, ap. Cic. *Orat.* XXVII 23, *Arce et urbe orba sum.*) No better illustration could be found of the importance of

*Chancellors*: that the prospect of having his life written by him added a new terror to death,

πάντα ἔχειν ταυτό, καὶ ἀντίθεσιν εἶναι ταυτό καὶ P. 1410 b.  
 πάρισον καὶ ὁμοιοτέλευτον. αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιό-  
 10 δων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηρίθμηνται. εἰσὶ  
 δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀντιθέσεις, οἷον καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐποίει,  
 τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις  
 ἐγὼν.

I ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, πόθεν λέγεται τὰ CHAP. X.  
ἀστεία καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμούντα λεκτέον. ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν  
 ἐστὶ τοῦ εὐφυνῶς ἢ τοῦ γεγυμνασμένου, δεῖξαι δὲ τῆς

the precept so much insisted upon by Aristotle, that the art employed in composition should be carefully concealed, than the striking difference in point of interest between the studied, monotonous, wearisome periods of Isocrates, and the animated, vigorous, natural, yet rhythmical periods of Demosthenes, on which though at least as much pains and labour had been bestowed by the one as by the other—the critics said ‘they smelt of the lamp’—in the one the study entirely escapes notice, in the other it is most painfully apparent.

On antithesis and the rest, there are also remarks in *Introduct.* pp. 314, 5, and the note: and on the divisions of the period, *κόμμα* and *κῶλον*, of which the last two are *not* distinguished by Ar., p. 312, note 1.

The meaning and authorship of the Theodectea has been already discussed at length, p. 55, seq. The conclusion arrived at is, that the work here referred to was an earlier treatise on Rhetoric by Aristotle, the result of his rhetorical *teaching*, which confined itself to the subjects dealt with in the extant third book. *αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων*, which is confined by the *expression* to the *ὁμοιοκάταρκτον*, may perhaps, as Victorius supposed, be intended to include by inference all the other figures described in this chapter.

#### CHAP. X.

This chapter offers a remarkable exception, at all events in the first six sections, to Aristotle's ordinary manner of writing; in that the thoughts are in some degree written out and the meaning fairly represented by the language: instead of being left, as usual, to the sagacity of the reader to fill up and interpret as best he can.

§ 1. ‘Having discussed and settled the preceding subject we have next to describe the sources of lively, pointed, sprightly, witty, facetious, clever, and popular (*εὐδοκιμούντα*) sayings. Now to make them is the result either of natural ability (cleverness) or of long practice (exercise); the exhibition (or explanation) of them is the province of this study (or treatise)’. *εὐφυνής*, note on I 6.15. The *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 22 (23) treats of *ἀστεῖον* in style, apparently with much the same meaning as that of Aristotle. See the analysis of the chap. in *Introduct.* p. 434. Brevity is at all events an element of *τὸ ἀστεῖον*. Aristotle's *τὸ ἀστεῖον* seems to correspond to Campbell's ‘vivacity’ of style, which is treated in the first three chapters of his third book.



2 μεθόδου ταύτης. εἵπωμεν οὖν καὶ διαριθμησώμεθα·  
 ἀρχὴ δ' ἔστω ἡμῖν αὕτη. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥαδίως  
 ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι,  
 ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἥδιστα.  
 αἱ μὲν οὖν γλωτταὶ ἀγνώτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν, ἡ  
 δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἶπη  
 τὸ γῆρας καλάμην, ἐποίησε μάθησιν καὶ γινώσιν διὰ  
 3 τοῦ γένους· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀπηνθηκότα. ποιοῦσι μὲν  
 οὖν καὶ αἱ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰκόνες τὸ αὐτό· διό περ ἂν  
 εὖ, ἀστέιον φαίνεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εἰκὼν, καθάπερ  
 εἴρηται πρότερον, μεταφορὰ διαφέρουσα προθέσει.<sup>p. 127.</sup>

§ 2. 'Let us then describe it by a complete (thorough or detailed) enumeration, and let this be our starting-point. Learning namely with ease (without trouble or labour) is naturally agreeable to every one, and names (nouns) are significant; and therefore all nouns or words from which we learn anything are most agreeable'. On this see note on c. 9 § 8, add c. 11. 9, and I 11. 21, 23.

'Now words strange, foreign, archaic, are not known at all (and can therefore convey no information), and the proper, ordinary, names of things, we know already. It is the metaphor (the only remaining kind of single word) that does this in the highest degree: for when (the poet, Homer Od. ξ [XIV] 214) calls old age a (dry, withered) stalk or stubble, he conveys learning and knowledge through the medium of the *genus*, because both are withered', 'are fallen into the *sere and yellow leaf*'. διὰ τοῦ γένους, because the metaphor brings remote members (*species*) of the same *genus* into a novel comparison, which teaches us something new of one or the other.

§ 3. 'Now the poets' similes produce the same effect (give point, vivacity, or liveliness, to the narrative of an epic poem, in which they usually appear): and therefore if the simile be well (selected or executed, or both), it gives an air of liveliness, point, vividness to the composition. For the simile, as has been said before' (not literally what is said here, but the substance of it, III 4. 1), 'is a metaphor, differing from it merely by the manner of setting forth (mode of statement): and therefore it is less agreeable because longer (*μακροτέρως, λεγομένη* or *πεποιημένη, lit.* written in a longer form, at greater length), and (because) it does not say directly that (of the two things compared) one *is* the other; and accordingly (as the speaker's *tongue* does not say this, so) neither does the (hearer's) mind look out for it—and so loses the opportunity of *learning*.

[*μακροτέρως*] On this termination of the adv. comparative, see Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 141. 3, Donaldson's *Gr. Gr.* § 282 b, [Kühner, *Gr. Gr.* § 158, 2]. Matthiae has omitted it.

The meaning of *προθέσει*, by which the simile is said here to differ from

διὸ ἦττον ἡδύ, ὅτι μακροτέρως· καὶ οὐ λέγει ὡς  
 τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο· οὐκ οὐκ οὐδὲ ζητεῖ τοῦτο ἢ ψυχῇ.  
 4 ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα ταυτ' εἶναι  
 ἀστεῖα, ὅσα ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ταχέαν. διὸ οὔτε  
 τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ (ἐπιπόλαια  
 γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἃ μηδὲν δεῖ  
 ζητῆσαι), οὔτε ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοούμενα ἐστίν, ἀλλ'  
 ὅσων ἢ ἅμα λεγομένων ἢ γινώσις γίνεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ  
 πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν, ἢ μικρὸν ὑστερίζει ἢ διάνοια· *καὶ ἡ διάνοια*  
 γίγνεται γὰρ οἷον μάθησις, ἐκείνως δὲ οὐδέτερον.

the metaphor, may be inferred from the previous passage referred to, III 4. 1, but is not there directly expressed. It means the 'mode of setting forth', of describing or stating the comparison which both of them make; just as in c. 13. 2, 3 (in Ar.'s division of the speech), and Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30) §§ 2, 21; 35 (36) § 1, *πρόθεσις* and *προεκτίθεναι* are put for 'the statement of the case' or exposition of the facts. There are two distinguishable points in which the simile differs from the metaphor; the length, and (consequent) dilution of the force of its impression. The metaphor is concise, generally expressed in a single word, which *suggests* the comparison, and *identifies* the two things compared, *λέγει ὡς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο*; so that the comparison is forced directly upon the hearer's mind, who thereby learns something: whereas the simile goes into detail, often to a considerable length, so that it loses the pointed brevity of the metaphor; and instead of identifying the two objects compared, like the other, by the introduction of the *particle of comparison* ὡς, so weakens its force that the hearer is apt to lose the lesson and the pleasure that should be derived from it.

§ 4. 'Accordingly in style and enthymemes, all those' (*ταῦτα*, agreeing only with *ἐνθυμήματα*, stands for *ταύτην καὶ ταῦτα*; including the former of the two) 'are pointed and lively, which convey to us instruction rapidly'. Then follows a *note* on the preceding. 'And this is the reason why neither superficial enthymemes are popular—by superficial (*γὰρ, videlicet*) I mean those that (lie on the surface, and) are (therefore) plain to everybody (so that he who runs may read) and require no research or investigation—nor those which when stated are unintelligible (to a popular audience); but all those of which the knowledge is acquired at the moment of delivery—even though it did not exist previously—or (in which) the understanding is only a little in the rear (of the speaker). For in the one case knowledge as it were is acquired; in the other, neither the one nor the other', i. e. in either of these two ways there is a sort of learning, either immediate or nearly so: in the other case, that of superficial and unintelligible enthymemes or style in general, neither immediate nor quasi-immediate knowledge is attainable. Compare with this the second clause of II 23. 30.

- 5 κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῖ λεγομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τῷ  
μὲν σχήματι, εἰς ἀντικειμένως λέγεται, οἷον “καὶ  
 τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομιζόντων τοῖς  
 αὐτῶν ἰδίοις πόλεμον.” ἀντίκειται πόλεμος εἰρήνῃ.<sup>1</sup>  
 6 τοῖς δ’ ὀνόμασιν, εἰς ἔχη μεταφοράν, καὶ ταύτην  
 μήτ’ ἀλλοτρίαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνιδεῖν, μήτ’ ἐπι-

<sup>1</sup> colon.

§ 5. ‘Such is the approved (popular) kind of enthymemes in respect of the sense or meaning (in their intellectual aspect). In that of style or language, so far as regards the *figure* (i. e. the *structure* of the period and its clauses), the popularity is attained by the antithetical expression of them (the balance of opposite *clauses* or *members*), as in the example, (Isocr. Phil. § 73), καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν πόλεμον τοῖς αὐτῶν ἰδίοις (their own private interests) εἶναι νομιζόντων’—as it stands in Isocrates’ text, Aristotle having altered the arrangement, as usual;—‘war is antithetical to peace’:

§ 6. ‘and in the single words, by the metaphors they contain, and these neither foreign and strange’, (compare III 11. 5, ἀπ’ οἰκείων, where reference is made to this place; so that ἀπ’ οἰκείων may be regarded as an interpretation of μὴ ἀλλοτρίαν here: and this coincides with III 2. 9, metaphors should be ‘appropriate’, ἀρμοτούσας, or ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ‘derived from a proportional or *kindred* subject’: and ibid. § 12, metaphors should not be ‘far-fetched’, οὐ πόρρωθεν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν,) ‘for such it is difficult to take in at a glance; nor superficial, for these produce no impression. Further, (words are popular) if they vividly represent (things that they describe); for things should be *seen* (in the orator’s description of them) as if they were actually being done (going on, transacted, before the hearer’s eyes) rather than as future. This is in fact the ‘historic present’, applied to future, instead of past, events. On πρὸ ὀμμάτων, see note on II 8. 13. ἀλλοτρίαν “alienam, ductam a rebus parum propinquis et affinis,” Victorius; who also, as a parallel case, refers to Cic. de Or. II 59. 241, *est autem haec huius generis virtus, ut ita facta demonstres, ut mores eius de quo narres, ut sermo, ut vultus omnes exprimentur, ut iis qui audiunt tum geri illa fierique videantur.*

‘These three things then are to be aimed at (in the attempt to give vivacity and pungency to style), metaphor, antithesis, and vivid representation’.

The meaning of ἐνέργεια is clearly shewn by a comparison with the statements of c. 11. It is there identified with πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, § 2, and is principally shewn in *animation*, literally and metaphorically, in a vivid, vivacious, style, and in animating, vivifying, inanimate objects; investing them with life, motion, and personality<sup>1</sup>;

<sup>1</sup> I may observe that this is one of the principal arts by which Mr Dickens attracts his readers, to which the remarkable vivacity of his writings is due.

πόλαιον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν. ἔτι εἰ πρὸ  
ὁμμάτων ποιεῖ· ὁρᾶν γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα μᾶλλον  
ἢ μέλλοντα. δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν,  
μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας.

7 τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οἷσων εὐδοκιμοῦσι P. 1411.

§§ 2, 3, 4. κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις (Eth. N. x 4, 1175 a 12). This sense is borrowed from the metaphysical use of the term, to express 'realization', as opposed to *δύναμις*, the mere capacity or potentiality of life and action. I may add that *ἐνέργεια* is used in two distinct senses, representing two different forms of development, which may be distinguished as the metaphysical and moral applications of it; as will appear from a comparison of the form it assumes in the Nicom. Ethics, and the biology of the *de Anima*. It is sometimes identifiable with *ἐντελέχεια*, expressing the actuality or actual realization of *existence* out of a mere undeveloped capacity of life: in the moral view, it is the realization of *action*, a realized activity, from the dormant capacity—implying existence—to the active exercise or energy of the bodily and mental functions. So happiness is an *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, pleasure *τελειοί* (completes and crowns) *τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, Eth. N. x 4, sub init. and again c. 4, ult. c. 5, sub init.: and the def. of pleasure in the seventh (Eudemian) book, *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*. Sometimes three stages are distinguished (as frequently in the *de Anima*), illustrated by three degrees of knowledge in man: (1) the latent capacity, (2) knowledge acquired but not exercised, and (3) the active exercise of thought and knowledge by *θεωρία*, philosophical contemplation and speculation<sup>1</sup>.

Quintilian on *ἐνέργεια*, VIII 3. 89, *ἐνέργεια confinis his (est enim ab agendo dicta) et cuius propria virtus, non esse quae dicuntur, otiosa*. Ib. 6. 11, *Praecipueque ex his oritur sublimitas quae audaci et proxime periculum translatione tolluntur, quum rebus sensu carentibus actum quendam et animos damus; qualis est, pontem indignatus Araxes*. From *ἐνέργεια* another quality of style is to be distinguished (in Quint) viz. *ἐνάργεια*, 'clear, lively, graphic, narration,' (*evidentia*), though near akin to the other. It is mentioned IV 2. 63, and distinguished from *perspicuitas*, VIII 3. 61. *ἐνάργεια, quae a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere: et affectus non aliter, quam si rebus ipsis intersimus, sequentur* [id. VI 2. 32]. See Ern. *Lex. Tech. Gr.* s. v. et *ἐνέργεια*.

§ 7. 'Of the four kinds of metaphors, the proportional are the most popular'. On metaphor in general, and the proportional metaphor in particular, see Appendix B to Bk. III, Introd. p. 374.

Here follows a string of pointed, striking, sayings, exemplifying

<sup>1</sup> At the conclusion of Mr Mill's *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Phil.* p. 559, we find the following remark. "In Aristotle's case the assertion (of Sir W. H.) rests on a mistake of the meaning of the Aristotelian word *ἐνέργεια*, which did not signify energy, but fact as opposed to possibility, *actus* to *potentia*." Had Mr Mill turned to the first two sentences of Aristotle's Ethics, or to the chapters on Pleasure, X. 4, 5, he would have seen reason to alter this statement. By 'energy' I suppose active, vigorous, exercise to be intended.

μάλιστα αἱ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλκοι. καὶ Λεπτίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, οὐκ ἔαν περιδεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐτερόφθαλμον γενομένην. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος σπουδάζοντος Χάρητος εὐθύνας

τὸ ἀστεῖον in style ; all of them metaphors, and most of these conveyed in single words. They do really, I think, deserve the character attributed to them. The passage, τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν—πειρᾶσθαι δοῦναι, is transcribed by Dionysius, Ep. I ad Amm. c. 8, in his enquiry into the date of the Rhetoric. The most important variation from the text of Ar. is the omission of the example from Leptines "by all the MSS" (Spengel's *Tract on Rhet.* Munich 1851 p. 47), though it has been supplied in the printed copies ; he begins the quotation with κατὰ λέξιν οὕτω γράφων. The only other difference of any importance is ἀγαρόντα for ἔχοντα, and διδόναι οὕτως for δοῦναι.

'As Pericles said, that the youth that had perished in the war had vanished out of the city, as though one were to take the spring out of the year'. On this saying, and Pericles' claim to it, see note on I 7.34.

'And Leptines of the Lacedaemonians, (to the Athenian assembly,) that he would not let them look on whilst Greece became one-eyed (lost one of her eyes—the other being of course Athens ; *Athens, the eye of Greece*, Milton, *P. R.* IV 240). Victorius has produced similar expressions from Cic. pro leg. Manil. c. 5 § 11, de Nat. Deor. III 38, *Hi duos illos oculos orae maritimae effoderunt*. "Similiter Cimon Atheniensibus suavit, μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἐτερόφθαλμον περιδεῖν γεγεννημένην, Plut. Cim. 489 C, *ὡς οὐ εἰπῶν, μὴ ποιήσῃτε ἐτερόφθαλμον τὴν Ἑλλάδα* (Plut. Polit. Praecept. 803 A)," Victorius. The Leptines here mentioned is no doubt the proposer of the law περὶ τῆς ἀρελείας against which Demosthenes delivered the speech c. Leptin. in B.C. 355. He may possibly be the same as the Leptines mentioned by Demosth. c. Androt. § 60, *ὁ ἐκ Κοίλης*. Wolf, *Proleg. ad Dem. Leptin.* p. 45, note 12 (Schäfer, *Appar. ad Dem.* p. 8), supposes that the author of this saying and the opponent of Demosthenes are the same person. The occasion on which Leptines produced his metaphor was the embassy sent by the Lacedaemonians to Athens in their extremity, after the defeat of Leuctra (371 B.C.), during the invasion of their country by the Thebans, B.C. 369 ; see Xen. Hellen. VI 5. 34, 35, Isocr. Archia § 64, seq. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. X [ch. LXXVIII] p. 320 seq. Thirlw. *Hist. Gr.* ch. XXXIX (Vol. V. p. 106, 1st ed.). Isocrates, Areop. § 69, alludes to the same event, *ὥστε Λακεδαιμονίους, τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ὀλίγου δεῖν καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν προστάτοντας ἡμῖν* (see the fragm. of Lysias, Or. 34, quoted in note on II 23. 19, on this Lacedaemonian 'dictation', 404 B.C.) *ἔλθειν ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας* (369 B.C.) *ἱκετεύοντας καὶ δεησομένους μὴ περιδεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀναστάτους γενομένους*. [A. Schäfer's *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, I p. 75, note.]

'And the saying of Cephisodotus, in his indignation at Chares' eager-

δοῦναι περὶ τὸν Ὀλυνθιακὸν πόλεμον ἡγανάκτει, φάσκων εἰς πνίγμα τὸν δῆμον ἔχοντα<sup>1</sup> τὰς εὐθύνας πειρᾶσθαι δοῦναι<sup>2</sup>. καὶ παρακαλῶν ποτὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰς Εὐβοίαν ἐπισιτισαμένους<sup>3</sup> ἔφη δεῖν ἐξίεναι τὸ

<sup>1</sup> ἀγαγόντα *cum Dionysio*. <sup>2</sup> δίδοναι οὕτως *cum Dionysio*. <sup>3</sup> ἐπισιτισομένους  
ness for the scrutiny of the accounts (of his charge) in the conduct of the Olynthian war, "that he drove the people into a fit of choking by his (pertinacity in the) attempt to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way." He wanted to force his accounts down their throats, and nearly choked them in the attempt. I have followed Dionysius' version of this extract, which is plainly preferable to the text of Aristotle. *ἄγειν εἰς πνίγμα* is Greek and sense; *ἔχειν εἰς πνίγμα* neither one nor the other; and *δίδοναι οὕτως*, at the end, has far more meaning than the simple *δοῦναι* of our text. With the vulgar reading, *ἔχοντα* must be taken with *τὰς εὐθύνας*, "with his accounts in his hands"—which is so far graphic, as it indicates the eagerness with which he was trying to force them upon the people—but then *δοῦναι τὸν δῆμον εἰς πνίγμα*, for 'to drive them into a choking-fit', is surely indefensible.

Cephisodotus, ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων, has been already quoted; see III 4.3 note (near the end of the section [p. 53]), where some account is given. Two more of his pungent sayings are quoted further on. Chares, with his mercenaries, was sent to take the command in the Olynthian war in 349 B.C. (Clinton, *F. H.*). Olynthus was taken by Philip, 347. This notice is cited by Max Schmidt in his tract *On the date of Ar.'s Rhetoric*, p. 15, as a piece of evidence on that question; but the limit of the period of publication can be brought much lower down. See *Introd. On the date of the Rhetoric*, p. 36 seq.

*πνίγμα* or *πνιγμός*, and its congeners, is a medical term, used by Hippocrates, expressive of choking, stifling, suffocation.

'And the same (Cephisodotus) once in an exhortation to the Athenians said that they must march out (at once) to Euboea (to the aid of the Euboeans), and *there* provide themselves with provisions' (read by all means *ἐπισιτισομένους*, the future, with Spengel; Bekker retains the *vulgata lectio* *ἐπισιτισαμένους*, which spoils the point), 'like Miltiades' decree' (with all the unhesitating haste prescribed by Miltiades' decree at the time of the first Median invasion). They were *therefore* not to lose any time in making provision *at home*, but to get to Euboea with all speed and *there* provide themselves: the future is necessary: Victorius, though he reads the aorist, translates it as the future. This hurried expedition to Euboea occurred in 358 B.C., Clinton, *F. H.*, sub anno, Dem. c. Androt. § 14, ἴσθ' ὅτι πρῶην Εὐβοεῦσιν ἡμερῶν τριῶν ἐβοηθήσατε κ.τ.λ. and Aesch. c. Ctes. § 85. It was made to assist the Euboeans against the Theban invaders; and in the archonship of Cephisodotus himself.

τὸ Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα] is explained by the Scholiast, quoted by Vater, τὸ μὴ βουλευσασθαι Μιλτιάδης μὴ βουλευσάμενος ἐξήλθεν κατὰ τοῦ Ξέρξου; and more at length by Ulpian in Shilleto's note to Dem. de F. L. § 346, ἐπιόντων τῶν Μήδων, ἐξαρχῆς καὶ ὁ Μιλτιάδης δραμεῖν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Μαραθῶνα ἐψηφίσατο καὶ μὴ ἀναμένειν ἕως συλλεγῶσιν οἱ συμμαχῆσόντες. As to the grammatical construction of the accusative, it seems to be a substitution

Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα. καὶ Ἰφικράτης σπεισαμένων  
 Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἐπίδauρον καὶ τὴν παραλίαν ἡγα-  
 νάκει, φάσκων αὐτοὺς τὰ ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου παρη-  
 ρῆσθαι. καὶ Πειθόλαος τὴν παράλον ρόπαλον τοῦ

of τὸ Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα for the proper cognate accusative *ἐξοδον*, to make an expedition, such as, on the principle of, Miltiades' decree, with all haste, and without deliberation.

‘And Iphicrates, indignant at the truce that the Athenians had made with Epidaurus and the neighbouring coasts, said of them that “they had stript themselves of their provisions (not ‘for the way’, but) for the war”. *ἐφόδια* are *viatica*, provisions for a journey; which in the absence of inns the traveller had to carry with him: here, provisions for the support and maintenance of war and its expeditions. HdT. writes *ἐπόδια*, Xen. *ἐφόδιον* (sing.). Arist., Pol. II 5, 1263 a 37, uses it of provisions for hunting expeditions in Lacedaemon.

The small independent state of Epidaurus, bounded by the territories of Corinth, Argolis, Troezen, and the Saronic gulf, was at this time in alliance with Sparta, to which it supplied troops, in the great contest with the confederate Greeks, allied for the reduction of the Lacedaemonian power, terminating in the battle of Corinth, 394 B.C., see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. IX [ch. LXXIV] p. 422, 425; and Xenophon’s description of the battle, Helen. IV 2.9—23. It appears from this passage that the Athenians had made a truce with Epidaurus. Cephisodotus’ indignation was aroused at the folly of making a truce with people who had a sea-board, which the Athenians with their naval superiority could have plundered with impunity, and so have supported the war.

‘And Peitholaus (called) the Paralian (trireme) “the people’s cudgel”, and Sestos “the corn-stall of the Piraeus”. Whether this Peitholaus is the same as the one already mentioned III 9.7, as associated with Lycophron in the government of Pherae, we have no means of precisely determining. The probability is that he is. For even Aristotle’s carelessness could hardly have carried him so far as to neglect to mention the distinction between two persons named so nearly together, if there were any. This being so, it appears again, as from the former passage, that he lived at Athens after his downfall.

τὴν παράλον] This vessel and its companion the *Σαλαμινία* were two picked vessels, fast sailers, and with carefully chosen and highly paid crews, kept in reserve at the Piraeus for state purposes; such as sacred embassies, *θεωρίαι*, to carry the admiral of the fleet in a naval expedition, for ordinary embassies, ‘for the transport of money and persons’ (Böckh, *Publ. Econ.*, Bk. II. c. 16, Lewis’ Transl. p. 240), and for the pursuit and conveyance to Athens of state offenders who had made their escape; as Alcibiades after the mutilation of the Hermae, Thuc. VI 53, 61 *bis*, of the Salaminia. As illustrating the use of the Paralus as a *ρόπαλον*, Demosth. *περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρόνησφ*, § 29 is still more in point; ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, οὓς οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν ὑπὸ τοῖς νόμοις, καὶ στρατιώτας τρέφειν καὶ τριήρεις ἐπέμπειν καὶ χρήματα εἰσφέρειν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἐπὶ δ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ψήφισμα, εἰσαγγελία, Πάραλος, ταύτ’ ἐστίν, i.e. the special decree,

δήμου, Σηστόν δὲ τηλίαν τοῦ Πειραιεύς. καὶ Περι- p. 128.  
κλῆς τὴν Αἴγιαν ἀφελεῖν ἐκέλευσε τὴν λήμην τοῦ αὐτοῦ

impeachment, and the Paralus, were the three principal *instruments of punishment* of offenders amongst the Athenian citizens. The Πάραλος therefore is here compared to a *ρόπαλον* or cudgel, because it is the instrument with which the state deals her heaviest blows, not only upon those that have escaped her justice, but upon all those who offend her. Πάραλος· μία τῶν παρ' Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὰς δημοσίας χρεῖας διυπεμπομένων τριήρων, Harpocr. s. v. He adds that the crews of the two vessels received four obols a day, and stayed at home the greater part of the year. Photius has four articles on the word, one of them borrowed from Harpocr., almost in the same words. The first of the four identifies the Salaminian and Paralian. There is an article upon this in Smith's *Dict. of Ant.* (s. v. *Salaminia*).

Sestos, on the Hellespont, seems from this passage to have been one of the emporia for the corn which was imported from the coasts of the Black Sea and the adjacent regions. It is mentioned with others by Isocr. *ἀντιδ.* § 107, as an important and well-situated town. Strabo, in writing of Troas, makes no mention of the corn-stores of Sestos. [Büchschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb*, pp. 421—430 (on the corn-trade between Greece and the Euxine). The present passage, which he does not quote, suggests a modification of his statement on p. 426 that Sestos and Abydos were less important emporia than Lampsacus.]

This corn-store or warehouse is compared to the 'shopboard' or 'stall' τηλία, the tray on which corn was exposed for sale in the shops. The word was used for a 'stand' or 'stage' of various kinds. A passage which illustrates the use of it referred to here (which does *not* appear in the Lexicons) is Arist. Hist. An. VI 24. 3, where there is an account of a wonderful mule, that lived to the age of 80; after it had been released from labour by reason of its age, it used to walk by the side of the teams which were dragging the stone for the building of *the* temple (doubtless the Parthenon), and not only urged them on to their work, but helped them itself to drag the load up the hill (how this was done by the animal is not explained); ὥστ' ἐψηφίσαντο μὴ ἀπελαύνειν αὐτὸν τοὺς σιτοπώλους ἀπὸ τῶν τηλίων. This clearly explains the particular sense of τηλία in this passage. The τηλία is the tray or stand at the corn-dealer's door, in which the corn is exposed for sale. In Aristoph. Plut. 1038, it means 'a sieve', κοσκίνου κύκλος σίβε περιφέρεια, Schol. ad loc., Etym., Suidas and Hesychius.

'And Pericles bade (his countrymen) get Aegina out of the way (get rid of it, as a plague or obstacle to their enjoyment or happiness) "the eyesore of the Piræus"'. This saying is quoted by Plutarch, Pol. Praec. 803 A, amongst the πολιτικὰ παραγγέλματα: and also μὴ ποιήσῃτε ἐτεροόφθαλμον τὴν Ἑλλάδα, without the author's name. It is attributed to Demades by Athen. III 99 D, Δημάδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔλεγε τὴν μὲν Αἴγιαν λήμην εἶναι τοῦ Πειραιῶς. Comp. Plut. Apophth. Reg. et Duc. 186 C, and Wyttenbach note β' ad loc. It suggested to Casaubon an emendation of an apparently unmeaning word in Strabo IX p. 395, of the islet of Psyttaea,



Πειραιέως. καὶ Μοιροκλῆς οὐθὲν ἔφη πονηρότερος  
 εἶναι, ὀνομάσας τινὰ τῶν ἐπικεικῶν· ἐκεῖνον μὲν γὰρ  
 ἐπιτρίτων τόκων πονηρεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιδεκάτων.  
 καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου ἱαμβεῖον ὑπὲρ τῶν θυγατέρων  
 πρὸς τὸν γάμον ἐγχρορίζουσῶν,

ὑπερήμεροί μοι τῶν γάμων αἱ παρθένοι.

between Salamis and the mainland, νήσιον ἔρημον πετρῶδες (δύσορμος  
 Aesch. Pers. 450) ὃ τινες εἶπον λιμένα (lege λήμην) τοῦ Πειραιῶς.

λήμη and λημῶν seem (from the Lexx.) to be almost confined to Ari-  
 stophanes amongst the earlier writers. Arist. Lysistr. 301, with a pun  
 upon λήμνιον πῦρ (on which see Schneidewin on Soph. Philoct. 799); Plut.  
 581, Κρονικαῖς λήμαις (old-fashioned prejudices, dimnesses of sight) ὄντως  
 λημῶντες τὰς φρένας ἄμφω. Nub. 327, λημῶν κολοκύνταις. (They occur  
 however as medical terms in Hippocrates.) They are not found, where  
 they were to be most expected, in the Fragments of the other Comic  
 writers. No instance of either is to be found in the very complete  
 Index to Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.*

‘And Moerocles said that he was in no respect a greater knave than  
 —one of the respectable (upper) classes that he named: for the other  
 played the knave at the rate of 33 per cent., he (himself) only at ten’.  
 The degree of knavery is compared to the rate of interest or profit which  
 is made upon each: “a very respectable person indeed!” says Moerocles  
 “and a very respectable interest he makes upon his respectability (or,  
 rightly interpreted, roguery): why! I only get a third of that for mine.”  
 Of Moerocles an account is given in Smith’s *Biogr. Dict.* s. v. Μοιροκλῆς,  
 Σαλαμίνιος τῶν παρ’ Ἀθηναίους οὐκ ἀφανῶς πολιτευσαμένων. Harpocr. He  
 was a contemporary of Demosthenes, who mentions him four times, see  
 Sauppe’s *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* III 99, and an anti-Macedonian orator.  
 He seems from the allusion, de F. L. § 293 (§ 335) to have been a  
 greedy fellow, and inclined to exaction in money-matters. On the rates  
 of interest at Athens, and the modes of computing it, see Böckh, *Publ.*  
*Econ.* Bk. I. c. 22, Lewis’ *Tr.* p. 130.

‘And Anaxandrides’ iambic verse about (not ‘on behalf of’, of which  
 there is no evidence *in the text*) the daughters’ (so in the Scriptures,  
 ‘daughters of Jerusalem’, &c) ‘who were over long about marrying, “I  
 find (μοί) the young ladies have passed the day for their marriage.”’  
 [“My daughters’ marriage-bonds have passed their date.”]

ὑπερήμερος, here metaphorically used by Anaxandrides, is properly a  
 technical term of Attic law, signifying one who has failed to pay a fine, or to  
 comply with any judgment or verdict imposed by the court on the day  
 appointed: one who has passed the prescribed term or the day fixed. It  
 takes the genit. here, as if it were ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡμέραν τῶν γάμων, like ἀχάλκος  
 ἀσπίδων, ἀπεπλος φαρέων, ἀψόφητος κωκυμάτων, &c. Anaxandrides was a  
 poet of the Middle Comedy, Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Att.* Vol. I. p. 367  
 seq. The line here quoted is *Fragm. Inc.* XVII, Meineke III 200. Anaxan-  
 drides is quoted again, c. II. 8, an equally uncertain fragment, No.  
 XVIII, and probably again, II. 10, also II. 3, and *Eth. N.* VII 11.

καὶ τὸ Πολυεύκτου εἰς ἀποπληκτικόν τινα Σπεύσιπ-  
πον, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐν  
πεντεσυρίγγῳ νόσῳ δεδεμένον. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος τὰς

‘And that of Polyeuctus to one Speusippus who was paralysed, “that he could not keep still (was as restless as ever), though bound (fettered, confined) by fate (or accident) in a pillory- (or stocks-) complaint” [“bound in a perfect pillory of pain”].’

Polyeuctus, probably of (the Ath. deme) Sphettus, an Attic orator, contemporary with Demosth. and of the same political party, viz. anti-Macedonian. See Plut. Vit. Demosth. 846 c, which connects him with Demosthenes. Also, Vit. Parallel. Demosth. c. 10, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς φιλόσοφος (Ariston of Chios) Πολυεύκτου ἱστορεῖ τὸν Σφήττιον, ἕνα τῶν τότε πολιτευομένων Ἀθηναίων, ἀποφαίνεσθαι μέγιστον μὲν εἶναι ῥήτορα Δημοσθένη κ.τ.λ. A short account of him is to be found in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* s. v. No. 2, (the writer says that “the orations (!) of P.” are here referred to). There are six of the name mentioned in the Orators—Sauppe *Index Nominum* (ad Or. Att.) III 117.—It is uncertain whether the P. who appears in Dem. c. Mid. § 139 is the same as he of Sphettus. Sauppe distinguishes them: Buttman, ad loc. Mid. 560. 2, has this note: “Orator temporis illius, praeter hanc Midiae defensionem, cum Demosthene coniunctissimus, si credimus Ruhnkenio, qui eundem putat ac Sphettium. Augerus non item;” nor, apparently, Sauppe [nor Arnold Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* II. p. 100, who elsewhere quotes Dem. Phil. III. § 72, Πολυεύκτος ὁ βέλτιστος οὐτοσί (of the Sphettian)]. The speaker quoted by Ar. was doubtless the best known of them, the Sphettian. See the reff. in Westermann, *Gesch. der Bereds.* § 53, 5, 6.

ἀποπληκτικός, ἀπόπληκτος, one who has received a shock or *stroke* (as of palsy), which has driven him away from (ἀπό) himself and his normal condition, and so disabled, paralysed, him: of an ‘apoplectic stroke’, but not here; also, like ἐκπλήττεσθαι, to be startled out of one’s wits, or driven mad, *attonitus*. I have followed Victorius in the interpretation of the saying; that Speusippus, though his body was now paralysed, and motionless as if he had been fastened in the stocks or pillory—or worse, in an instrument that confined his head, hands, and feet—had his mind as restless and excitable as ever.

πεντεσύριγγος is a transfer from a wooden instrument with five ‘pipes’ or holes, kept in the prison for the punishment of refractory prisoners, which confined at once the head, hands, and feet, to a disorder which paralyses and deprives of motion. Arist. Eq. 1049, δῆσαι σ’ ἐκέλευε πεντεσύριγγῳ ξύλῳ. “πέντε ὅπας ἔχοντι, δι’ ὧν οἱ τε πόδες καὶ αἱ χεῖρες καὶ ὁ τράχηλος ἀνεβάλλετο.” Schol. ad loc. πεντεσύριγγῳ ξύλῳ, τῷ ποδοκάκῃ· πέντε γὰρ ὅπας ἔχει, δι’ ὧν... (as before) ἐμβάλλονται (Suidas). Comp. Ib. s. v. ποδοκάκῃ (a later form of ποδοκάκη), Δημοσθένους κατὰ Τιμοκράτους (in a law, § 105), τὸ ξύλον τὸ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ οὕτως ἐκαλεῖτο κ.τ.λ. To which Harpocr. adds, s. v. ποδοκάκῃ, Λυσίας δ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Θεομνήστου, εἰ γνήσιος, ἐξηγείται τοῦνομα· φησὶ γάρ· ἡ ποδοκάκῃ αὐτό ἐστιν ὃ νῦν καλεῖται ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ δεδεσθαι (Lys. c. Theomn. α’ § 16. q. v.). On this, and the various other punishments in use at Athens, see Becker's *Charicles*,

τρίηρεις ἐκάλει μύλωνας ποικίλους, ὁ Κύνων δὲ τὰ καπηλεῖα τὰ Ἀττικά φιδίτια. Αἰσίων δέ, ὅτι εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν πόλιν ἐξέχεαν· τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὁμμάτων. καὶ “ὥστε βοῆσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα”

pp. 369, 370. He says “Suidas is wrong in taking this (π. ξ) to be synonymous with the ποδοκάκη:” but does not tell us why, or upon what authority (probably on account of the name, ποδο-κάκη).

‘And Cephisodotus called the triremes parti-coloured (gaily-painted) (mills i. e.) millstones’ from their crushing and grinding (exactions and oppressions) the Athenian tributaries and others. Comp. on this expression III 6. 1, as an instance of a “privative epithet”, the note on that section, near the end. On ποικίλους, Victorius quotes Virg. Georg. IV 289, *pictis phaselis* [cf. St John’s *Hellenes* III 302]. On Cephisodotus, ὁ λεπτός, ὁ ἐκ Κεραμῶν, see note on III 4. 4.

‘And “the Dog” (Diogenes the Cynic) called the taverns (or wine-shops) “the Attic messes”’.

Of Diogenes, ὁ Κύνων<sup>1</sup>, see Grote’s *Plato* III p. 507, seq. ch. 38. “Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under this title. Aristotle (l. c.) cites from him a witty comparison under that designation.” u. s. p. 509. He receives this name from the little boys or the bystanders in several of Diogenes’ (Laert.) stories about him. A long list of his sayings, often witty, but usually bitter and sarcastic, is to be found in Diogenes Laertius’ Life. This does not appear amongst them.

τὰ καπηλεῖα] retail shops (καπηλῶν), cook-shops, wine-shops and taverns. Comp. Isocr. Areop. § 49; speaking of the change of habits and manners in Athens in the author’s time: ἐν καπηλείῳ δὲ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν οὐδεὶς οὐδ’ ἂν οἰκετὴς ἐπιεικὴς ἐτόλμησεν<sup>2</sup> σεμνύνεσθαι γὰρ ἐμελέτων ἄλλ’ οὐ βωμολοχεύεσθαι<sup>3</sup>. These scenes of riot, drunkenness, and licentiousness, says the satirical Diogenes, are what the Athenians call *their* συσσίτια; this is *their* substitute for (or representative of) the sober and orderly Spartan φιδίτια. See the description in Grote, *H. G.* II 513 [chap. VI], Müller, *Dor.* IV 3, on the meals of the Dorians. φιδίτια, or as it is usually written φειδίτια, is the name given by the Spartans to what the Athenians and others called συσσίτια, the public tables or messes at which all the citizens dined in common. Müller, u. s. § 3, II 294 (Lewis’ Transl.), remarks, note 2, “It is very probable that this φειδίτια,

<sup>1</sup> One Aristogeiton, an Athenian orator, also received this nickname, ἐπεκαλεῖτο κύων διὰ τὴν ἀναίδειαν αὐτοῦ. Suidas.

<sup>2</sup> This passage of Isocr. Areopag. is cited by Athen. XIII 21, 566 F, on tavern-haunting, ὅς ἐν τοῖς καπηλείοις καὶ τοῖς πανδοκείοις δεῖ διαιτᾶται, καίτοι Ἰσοκράτους τοῦ ῥήτορος ἐν τῷ Ἀρεοπαγετικῷ εἰρηκότος—here follow the words quoted in this text. Athenaeus continues Ἐπερὶδὸς δὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Πατροκλέους... τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγίτας φησὶν ἀριστήσαντά τινα ἐν καπηλείῳ κωλύσαι ἀνέναι εἰς Ἀρειον πάγον. σὺ δέ, ὦ σοφιστά, ἐν τοῖς καπηλείοις συναναφύρη οὐ μεθ’ ἐταίρων, ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐταιρῶν κ.τ.λ. Plut. Vit. x Orat. Demosth. 847 F, Διογένης δὲ ὁ κύων θεασάμενος αὐτόν (Demosth.) ποτε ἐν καπηλείῳ ἀσχυνόμενον καὶ ὑποχωροῦντα, εἶπεν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὑποχωρεῖς τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐν καπηλείῳ ἔση. These extracts descriptive of the character of these taverns will throw some light upon Diogenes’ pleasantry.

καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων.  
καὶ ὥσπερ Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευε μὴ  
πολλὰς ποιήσωσι τὰς συνδρομὰς ἐκκλησίας. καὶ

(*spare or scanty meals*) was a ludicrous distortion of an ancient Spartan name *φιλιτία*, i.e. *love-feasts*." This is made still more probable by the fact that Ar. in his *Politics* always writes the word *φιδίτια*—τὰ συσσίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια, II 9, 1271 a 27, Ib. 10, 1272 a 2, c. 11, 1272 b 34—and the constant interchange of *d* and *l* (*δάκρυ*, *lacrima*; 'Ὀδυσσεύς', *Ulysses*). They were originally called *ἀνδρεία*, *men's meals*, both by Cretans and Spartans, the institution being common to both peoples, the Spartan being in this, as in other particulars, borrowed from the Cretan. Pol. II 10, 1272 a 2, καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἐστὶν καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλ' ἀνδρεία, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἐλήλυθεν. And of the Carthaginian constitution, Ib. c. 11, 1272 b 34, ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακ. πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἐταυριῶν τοῖς φιδιτίοις κ.τ.λ.

'And Aesion, that (the Athenians) had emptied (or drained) their entire city into Sicily'. Meaning, that the Athenian forces sent over for the invasion of Sicily in 415—413 B.C. were so enormous in proportion to the population of Athens, that they might be said to have completely drained it, 'For this is a metaphor, and sets the thing before our eyes'.

Aesion's name occurs, but only as the father of Euctemon, in Demosth. Mid. § 165. Also in a citation from Hermippus, in Plut. Vit. Demosth. (Vit. Parall.) c. 11, in which he compares Demosthenes' speeches, especially for *reading*, advantageously with those of his predecessors. The only other notice of him that I have been able to find is Suidas s. v. *Δημοσθένης*: which is merely that he (Dem.) *συνεφιλολόγησε Αἰσιῶνι τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ*; which implies community of studies. He was therefore an Athenian orator, contemporary with Demosthenes.

'And'—Aesion again—"so that Greece cried aloud": this again is in some sense a metaphor, and a vivid expression'. A metaphor no doubt (though Victorius says it is a mere *hyperballe*), since it *transfers* the voice from an individual to a collective people, or country. It is *πρὸ ὀμμάτων* in that it animates an inanimate object, or abstraction; c. 11. 2, 3. Demosthenes has used this twice, de F. L. § 92, ἡ γὰρ ἀλήθεια καὶ τὰ πεπραγμένα αὐτὰ βοᾷ, and § 129, ταῦτ' οὐχὶ βοᾷ καὶ λέγει ὅτι χρήματ' εἴληφεν Αἰσχίνης: and a very near approach to it, Olynth. a' § 2, ὁ μὲν οὖν παρὼν καιρὸς...μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφιεῖς ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Aesch. Agam. 1106 (Dind.), πᾶσα γὰρ πόλις βοᾷ. Eur. Hippol. 877, βοᾷ βοᾷ δέλτος ἄλαστα.

'And as Cephisodotus bade (the Athenians) take care not to convert many of their mobs into assemblies' (*lit.* their mobs, in any numbers). Cephisodotus we have had three times already as the author of pointed sayings, III 4. 3, and 10. 6, *bis*. The point of this saying seems to lie in the word *συνδρομὰς*, which is substituted for *συγκλήτους ἐκκλησίας*. It implies that most of their ordinary assemblies are mere mobs, tumultuary gatherings, riotous and unruly, instead of *σύγκλητοι*, regularly convoked for special occasions in due form and order. It would certainly be

Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. καὶ οἶον ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῷ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὡς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας· εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι ἄξιον δακρῦσαι συγκαταθαπτομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς, μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὁμμάτων, τὸ δὲ “τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ἐλευθερίας” P. 1411 b.

better without *ἐκκλησίας*, as Wolf proposes. It would then mean “not to hold their—mobs too frequently.” Both Bekker and Spengel retain the *vulgata lectio*: the latter with a comma between *συνδρομὰς* and *ἐκκλησίας*.

‘And Isocrates, “to those that flock together promiscuously (scramble, as it were) in the general festivals”’. This is an expression of precisely the same import as the preceding. It occurs in Isocr. Phil. § 12, and runs thus, *ὅτι τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς οὐδένα λέγειν ἐστίν*, κ.τ.λ.

‘And the example in the Funeral Oration, that “Greece might well have her hair cut off (go into mourning) over the tomb of those that died at Salamis, for her freedom and their valour were buried in the same grave”: for had he only said “that she might well weep for the virtue that lay buried with them”, it would have been a metaphor and a graphic touch, but the (addition of) “freedom with the virtue” carries with it a kind of antithesis’. This really affecting passage, which Aristotle has partially spoiled by omission and alteration, runs thus in the original—the funeral oration attributed to Lysias<sup>1</sup>, Or. 2, in Baiter and Sauppe’s *Or. Att.* I 68, § 60: “and therefore Greece might well that day cut off her hair over yonder tomb (the orator is on the spot, and points to it) and mourn for those that lie buried here, seeing that her own (the text has *αὐτῶν*, *their own*, the collective ‘Ἑλλάς’ being resolved into its component members) freedom and their valour are laid together in one grave”. Aristotle has very much marred the simple beauty of the sentence (which if it be not Lysias’, is at all events quite worthy of him) by his alterations ;

<sup>1</sup> This speech is condemned as spurious by [Dobree and] Baiter and Sauppe [and also by Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, I p. 431, and Jebb, *Attic Orators*, I p. 208. It contains some close parallels to the Panegyric of Isocrates and would appear to have been written by one of the pupils of that rhetorician, from whom Ar. (it will be observed) takes the quotation just preceding the present passage]. Let us hear on the other side Mr Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vol. VI [chap. XLVIII] p. 191, note, “Of (the funeral orations) ascribed to Plato and Lysias also, the genuineness has been suspected, though upon far less grounds (than that attributed to Demosth.)..... but this harangue of Lysias, a *very fine composition*, may well be his, and may perhaps have been really delivered—though probably not delivered by him, as he was not a qualified citizen.” In this judgment I entirely agree ; and it seems to derive some authority from the citation of this extract here, as a specimen of pointed style, which shews that it was at all events well known to Aristotle and the Athenian public, and well remembered, though the author’s name is not given ; perhaps for this very reason, that the authorship of it *was* so well known.

ἀντίθεσιν τινα ἔχει. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης εἶπεν “ ἡ γὰρ  
ὁδὸς μοι τῶν λόγων διὰ μέσων τῶν Χάρητι πεπραγ-  
μένων ἐστίν.” μεταφορὰ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τὸ διὰ  
μέσου πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ φάναι παρακαλεῖν  
τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὁμμά-

especially the substitution of the frigid, explanatory, τῶ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι, for the graphic τῷδε and τότε of the original (I here follow Victorius). [The context of the original passage shews that the substitution is really a blunder, as the reference is not to the Athenians who fought at Salamis but to those who died at Aegospotami and elsewhere towards the close of the Peloponnesian war.]

The metaphor lies of course in the word *κεῖρασθαι*, by which Greece is personified and compared to a woman who, according to the national custom, cuts off her hair as a sign of mourning—on this custom see Becker's *Charicles*, p. 398; comp. Eur. *Troad.* 141, *Orest.* 458, *Alc.* 515, *Suppl.* 97, 974, *Hel.* 1060, *πένθιμος*, *πενθήρης*, *κουρά*, *κουραῖ*. Aesch. *Choeph.* 6 (Paley's note ad loc.), *Hom.* *Il.* XXIII. 142, &c. The last two passages shew that this custom was not absolutely confined to women, though it was especially characteristic of them. In Lysias the personification, which is most tastelessly interrupted by the plural *αὐτῶν*, is resumed in the next clause, ὡς δυστυχῆς μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς τοιοῦτων ἀνδρῶν ὀρφανὴ γενομένη κ.τ.λ. Here Greece becomes a bereaved mother.

‘And as Iphicrates said, “the course of my argument cuts right through the middle of Chares’ acts”: a proportional metaphor; and the “right through the middle” sets the thing vividly before our eyes’. This was said by Iphicrates in the same case as that which is noticed in II 23.7 (see note), the prosecution, namely, of him and his colleagues Menestheus and Timotheus, together with Chares, who were all brought to trial by Aristophon the Azenian in 355 B.C. on the scrutiny of their accounts, for misconduct in their command during the Social war. Sauppe u. s. p. 191, commenting on this passage, says “Iphicrates se et collegas accusatos defendens exponit quam male Chares rem gesserit. Hoc facturum dixit, iter orationes suae ferre per medias Charetis res gestas, quasi de itinere per hostium fines faciundo diceret.” The *proportion* of the metaphor is this: As a road is carried, or an army or expedition marched, right into the heart of an enemy's country, so Iphicrates in his defence carried hostility and destruction (exposure and censure) into Chares' conduct during their joint command.

‘And the saying, “to invite dangers to the help (rescue, remedy) of dangers” is a vivid metaphor’. The author, and occasion, of this sentence are alike unknown. I have followed Schrader in the translation. To rid yourself of one danger another must often be invoked or invited, as a man saves himself from a shipwrecked vessel by throwing himself overboard and clinging to a plank. He also quotes Florus, I. 17, *Fabius Maximus periculosissimum bellum bello explicavit*. The metaphor lies in *παρακαλεῖν* and *βοηθήσοντας*, which are transferred from men to dangers, which are thereby ‘animated’; τὸ ἄψυχον becomes *ἐμψυχον*.

των μεταφορά. καὶ Λυκολέων ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου “οὐδὲ τὴν ἱκετηρίαν αἰσχυνθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῇν” μεταφορὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὁμμάτων· κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἱκετεύει ἢ εἰκὼν, τὸ ἄψυχον δὴ ἔμψυχον, τὸ ὑπόμνημα

<sup>1</sup> fortasse δὲ

‘And (what) Lycoleon (said) in his defence of Chabrias, “not even awed by that symbol of his supplication, the bronze image (yonder)”’. Of Lycoleon nothing seems to be known, beyond what may be gathered from this passage, that he was an Athenian orator, and defended Chabrias in his trial B. C. 366.

The circumstances referred to are briefly these. In 366 B. C. Chabrias was brought to trial with Callistratus, the orator, on a charge of misconduct leading to the loss of Oropus. See *ante*, note ad I 7.13. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* x [chap. LXXIX] pp. 392, 3, and note 3<sup>1</sup>. Chabrias had greatly distinguished himself on a former occasion, described in Grote, *Hist. Gr.* x [chap. LXXVI] pp. 172, 3, in an action near Thebes fought against Agesilaus and the Lacedaemonians, 378 B. C. Agesilaus “was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await his approach on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the knee, and their spears protruded” (Diodorus, xv. 33, Cornelius Nepos, Chabr. c. 1, *obnixo genu scuto*). “The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue in his honour, he made choice of this attitude for the design.” Ib. 173, note 1. This is also referred to, the details being passed over, in Dem. c. Lept., in a long enumeration of all Chabrias’ services to his country, §§ 75—78; πρὸς ἀπαντας Πελοποννησίους παρέρχεται ἐν Θήβαις, § 76. See also Wolf, ad loc. p. 479.25 (Schäfer, *Appar. ad Dem.* III 168). Lycoleon in his speech points to this statue which stood in the ἀγορά in sight of the court, and taking advantage of the posture of it, which he interprets as that of a suppliant, appeals from it to the feelings of the judges, at the same time reminding them of the merits of the original. The effect no doubt must have been very striking. The *metaphor* resides in ἱκετηρίαν, which is transferred from the suppliant’s olive-branch (ἐλαίαν) to a suppliant attitude in general, implied in the posture of the kneeling figure. On the accusative of the object of awe with αἰσχύνεσθαι, see note on II 2.22.

‘For it was a metaphor at the moment (whilst Lycoleon was speaking and Chabrias was in actual danger), but not for ever (i. e. so long, and no longer; not permanently), but yet perpetually (repeat αἰεὶ, Schrader) before the eyes (vivid and graphic): for it is only while he (Chabrias) is in danger that the image seems to supplicate, but the inanimate is ever animated—“the monument of his deeds for the city”’.

This very obscure sentence seems intended as an explanatory com-

<sup>1</sup> Diog. Laert., III 3. 24, says that Plato also was engaged in the defence of Chabrias, no one else daring to undertake it. See Grote’s *Plato*, I 128, note i.

τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. καὶ “ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες.” τὸ γὰρ μελετᾶν αὖξειν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνῆψεν ἐν τῇ <sup>p. 129.</sup> ψυχῇ· ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τι. “ οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα.” ἄμφω γὰρ ἐστι μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη. καὶ

mentary on the preceding extract. It is truly *obscurum per obscurius*, a masterpiece of Aristotelian brevity, and a complete illustration of the Horatian *brevitas esse laboro, obscurus fio*. I follow Schrader and Victorius in the interpretation. First he says that there is a metaphor: this of course is in the word *ικετηρίαν*, as above explained. But the metaphorical application of it only continues during the danger of the person represented; when that is over, and the suppliant out of danger, the statue loses indeed the suppliant character with which it was invested for the time by the application of Lycoleon, but retains the posture and its associations as “the memorial of his services to the state.” (I agree with Victorius in supposing that this is a continuation of the extract, and τὸ ὑπόμνημα therefore in apposition with τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῇν. He ingeniously suggests an alternative, that it may be a second extract from the same speech, *alibi in eadem causa*, and another example of a pointed and graphic saying.) *κινδυνεύοντος γάρ... ἡ εἰκὼν* is the explanation of ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰεί, and τὸ ἄψυχον ἐμψυχον of πρὸ ὀμμάτων. Comp. c. 11. 2, 3, a vivid representation gives *animation* to *inanimate* objects. If this explanation be correct we must read δέ for δῆ: by which the explanation of ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰεί is *contrasted* with that of πρὸ ὀμμάτων. δῆ is retained by all the Edd., but I cannot discover any sense in which it is here applicable. It seems also that ὑπέρ has dropt out in the phrase τὸ ὑπόμν. τῶν (ὑπὲρ) τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. ὑπόμνημα occurs in the same sense, Isocr. Paneg. § 156, and de Pace § 124.

‘And, “in every way practising (or studying) meanness of spirit”, for *studying* is a kind of *increasing* or *promoting*.’ μελετᾶν being a ‘kind’, *εἶδος*, of αὖξιν, the metaphor is one ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ γένους, Poet. XXI 7, one of the four kinds of metaphor. ‘To study’ therefore, which is one kind of the genus ‘promoting’, is here put metaphorically for the general term ‘to promote’. And the *point* of the metaphor lies in the unusual application of ‘study’: a man usually studies or takes pains to promote some worthy object, to cultivate some virtue: here the object is an unworthy one, a vice or defect. This is taken from Isocr. Paneg. § 151, in a note on which passage Coraes ingeniously proposed to read ἀσκέειν for αὖξιν in Aristotle’s comment on μελετᾶν.

‘And “that God kindled (lit up) reason as a light in the soul”: for both of them shew something (make things clear and visible)’. This is a proportional metaphor. As light to material, so reason to intellectual objects. *Cuius haec verba sunt nondum repperi*, says Victorius, and no subsequent commentator has supplied the deficiency.

‘(The peaces that we make are nugatory) for we do not put an end to



τὸ τὰς συνθήκας φάναι τρόπαιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὐταὶ δ' ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου· ἄμφω γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα. ὅτι καὶ αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνas διδόασιν· ἢ γὰρ εὐθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν.

wars (do away with them altogether), but merely postpone them'. This also comes from Isocr. Paneg. § 172. 'For both of them look to the future (to future results), both actual postponement (in its proper sense and application) and a peace of that kind'. This therefore is a metaphor from εἶδος to εἶδος, from one kind of postponement, to another, analogous, kind.

'And to say "that the treaty is a far fairer trophy than those which are obtained in wars: for the one is for the sake of (to commemorate) a trifling success and a single chance, but *this* for (on behalf of, marking the issue of,) the entire war": for both of them are signs of victory'. Isocr. Paneg. § 180, quoted by Aristotle, as Mr Sandys says in his note, *memoriter*. μιᾶς τύχης is explained by Isocr. Antid. § 128. It is 'a single stroke of fortune', a mere lucky accident, as opposed to a *series of successes*, which prove design, skill, and knowledge. (δτι, the mark of quotation). 'Again, "Cities pay a heavy reckoning (render a terrible account, for their misdeeds) to (or by?) the censure of mankind." For the "account" or "reckoning" is a legal damage or punishment'. The explanation shews, first, (as Bernays also remarks, *Dialog. des Arist.* p. 16,) that εὐθυνα here expresses not merely the account itself that is rendered, but the penalty consequent upon it, if unsatisfactory: and secondly, that the metaphor is a transfer from the legal and particular scrutiny or account rendered by the officer on laying down his command, and extended from this to an account or scrutiny *in general*, the penalty paid by whole cities to the judgment and censure of mankind and posterity: consequently it is a metaphor from εἶδος to γένος, from species to genus. The passage referred to in Bernays' treatise will furnish a commentary on the use and signification of εὐθύνas and λόγον or λόγους διδόναι, pp. 15, 16.

εὐθυνα] This, according to some authorities, as Böckh and L. Dindorf, is the only true Attic form of the word, εὐθύνη belonging to the later Greek. G. Dindorf writes εὐθύναι, Dem. Olynth. α'. 17. 15, and Böckh, *Publ. Econ.* Bk. II, ch. 8, note 177, εὐθυνα, εὐθύναι (p. 190 Lewis' Transl.), Schäfer (*App. Crit.* p. 229) note on the passage of Dem. Shilieto on Dem. de F. L. § 19, not. crit., acknowledges both plurals, εὐθυνα and εὐθύναι: "εὐθύναι, quod nihili est..." The Zurich Editors have εὐθυνα. In Lysias κατὰ Θεομνήστου β' § 9, εὐθυναν is found without various reading. The parallel form ἄμυνα, *ultio*, is cited by Phrynichus p. 23 (Lobeck) as forbidden; also by Moeris and Thomas Magister. It is however approved by Timaeus (p. 26 Ruhnken). Ruhnken in his note indignantly denies the use of the word in Plato, and refers it to the later Greek.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε τῆς ἀνα-  
 λογον λέγεται καὶ τῷ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, εἴρηται.  
 1 λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιοῦσι CHAP. XI.  
 2 γίγνεται τοῦτο. λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν  
 ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει. οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα  
 φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά, ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια,

‘And so we have despatched the subject of the pointed sayings that are derived from the proportional metaphor and by the vivid graphic language that sets things described before your eyes (presents them vividly to your mind’s eye, as it were to the actual sense)’.

εἴρηται] is done, and over, and enough of it. Note on I 11. 29.

#### CHAP. XI.

This chapter is in continuation of the subject of the preceding, τὸ ἀστεῖον; first as it is exemplified in τὸ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, and next in jokes, puns, plays upon words, and verbal pleasantries of all kinds, metaphors and similes; and lastly hyperboles, which are also a kind of metaphor. All these may be employed in imparting ‘vivacity’ to style. Whately, *Rhet.* c. 3, on Style, following Aristotle, calls τὸ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, ‘energy’. His remarks on this, partly from Aristotle, are worth comparing.

§ 1. ‘We must now state what we mean by πρὸ ὀμμάτων, and what must be done in order to give rise to this.’

§ 2. ‘I mean then that things are *set before our eyes* by all expressions that indicate realized activity. For instance; to say that a good man is ‘square’ (i. e. complete) is a metaphor; for both are complete, but still don’t signify a state of realized action (or activity). On the other hand, the phrase “with his vigour and prime in full bloom” (Isocr. Phil. § 10) does convey the notion of life and activity, as is also, “but thee, free to roam at large” (Ib. § 127); and again, in the verse, “so thereupon the Greeks (with a rush) darting forward with the spear” (δορί, Eur. Iph. Aul. 80: I believe the otiose *ποσὶ* to be a mere misquotation of Ar.), ‘the word ‘darting forward’ is at once life-like and metaphorical’.

ἐνεργοῦντα...ἐνέργειαν] See *ante*, note on c. 10. 5. Comp. the explanation of πρὸ ὀμμάτων there given, ὁρᾶν γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα; the representation must be *life-like*, the action must seem to be actually carried on before us. Poet. xvii 1. Cic. de Or. III 53. 202. Auct. ad Heren. IV 55. 68. *Demonstratio, quum ita verbis res exprimitur ut geri negotium et res ante oculos esse videatur*: with examples. Cic. de Inv. I 54. 104, 55. 107; II 26. 78. Quint. VIII 3. 81. ἐνέργεια, Ib. § 89. *Infra* § 3, ἐμψυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα. φαίνεται, § 4, κινούμενα καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ. See Whately’s *Rhetoric* above referred to. This ‘energy’ includes *Prosopoeia* or Personification: illustrated in Whately’s note ‡. Demetr. π. ἐρμηνείας §§ 81, 82, quotes ἔφριξεν δὲ μάχη. Campbell, *Phil. of Rhet.*, has a section, III 1. 4, on “Things animate for things lifeless.”

τετράγωνος comes from Simonides—or rather from the Pythagoreans, who by a square number or figure symbolized (or, as Aristotle tells us, Met. A, actually identified it with) completeness, and perfect equality in

ἀλλ' οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν· ἀλλὰ τὸ “ἀνθούσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμήν” ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ “σέ δ' ὥσπερ ἄφετον” ἐνέργεια, καὶ

τοῦντεῦθεν οὖν Ἕλληνες ἄξαντες ποσὶν

3 τὸ ἄξαντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά. καὶ ὡς κέχρηται Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ τῷ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα λέγειν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, οἶον ἐν τοῖσδε,

αὔτις ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής,

the shape of justice. It was their type of perfection. Bergk, *Fr. Lyr. Gr.* p. 747 [p. 869, ed. 2], Simon. Fr. 5, ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν...χερσὶ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόφ' τετράγωνον. Plat. Protag. 339 B. Arist. Eth. N. I 11, 1100b 21, ὃ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου. Comp. Hor. Sat. II vii. 86, *in se ipso totus teres atque rotundus.*

The second extract quoted from Isocr. Phil. § 127 requires the context to justify its selection as an example of animated style; with that, it becomes very striking. The orator is contrasting the entire freedom of view which Philip's commanding position allows him, as compared with the narrow patriotism enforced upon those who are 'fast bound' in the constitution and laws of their native cities; which he expresses by *σέ δ' ὥσπερ ἄφετον γεγενημένον ἅπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πατρίδα νομίζειν* κ.τ.λ.—a flight quite beyond Isocrates' ordinary range of imagination. The metaphor is of course derived from the sacred cattle which were devoted to the worship of some god, and left free from the ordinary labours of the plough and cart, to roam and graze at large in the sacred precincts, the *τέμενος* of his temple. See Plat. Protag. 320 A, Rep. VI 498 C, and the notes of the Comm.: Aesch. Prom. Vinc. 666, 684 (Paley) and the note there (also Blomfield's Glossary, 687), Eur. Ion 822, ὃ δ' ἐν θεοῦ δόμοισιν ἄφετος, ὡς λάθοι, παιδεύεται.

The difference between the mere metaphor *τετράγωνος*, and the metaphor which also vivifies and animates, is this: in a square there is neither life nor action; in 'blooming' we have the life of a plant, in *ἄφετον* of an animal, in *ἄξαντες* the vigour and impetuosity of living human beings.

§ 3. 'And Homer's frequent employment of the figure which invests inanimate objects with life and motion by the medium of the metaphor. But in all of them it is by representing (objects) as animated—setting them as it were in *action*—that he distinguishes himself (acquires his popularity, secures our approbation): in the following for instance: "again (this belongs to the preceding sentence: *αὐθις ἔπειτα πίδονδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής* is the reading of Homer, Od. XI 598): then to the plain rolled the ruthless (remorseless) stone" ["Downward anon to the valley the boulder remorselessly bounded"]. The animating metaphor is of course in *ἀναιδής*, which attributes not only life, but also shamelessness, recklessness, remorselessness, want of mercy and proper feeling, to the stone. Whately, u.s., ingeniously, but not correctly: 'provoking', mocking Sisyphus' efforts, *ἀναιδῆ*, in the same sense, ruthless, pitiless, Soph.

καὶ

ἔπατ' οἰστός,

καὶ

ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων,

καὶ

ἐν γαίῃ ἴσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἄσαι,

P. 1412.

καὶ

αἶχμῃ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαιμώνωσα.

ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμφυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τᾶλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατ' ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ p. 130.

Oed. Col. 516. αἰδώς, *clementia*, *misericordia*, opposed to *θρασύς*, *crudelis*, Elmsl. ad Med. 461. This line has always been quoted as an example of "the sound an echo to the sense."

'And, "the arrow flew"—like a bird—Hom. Il. N [XIII] 587.

'And, "raging or yearning to fly to its mark". Il. Δ [IV] 126. This attributes human feelings and passions to the arrow, οἰστός. He might have added ἄλτο in line 125.

'And, (sc. τὰ δοῦρα θρασειᾶν ἀπὸ χειρῶν) "longing to taste blood" (more lit. 'to take their fill of flesh'). Il. Δ [XI] 574, Paley ad loc.

'And "the spear-point panting, quivering in its eagerness, rushed through his breast".'

On these extracts, Whately, *Rhet. u. s.*, note, well observes, "that there is a peculiar aptitude in some of these expressions: an arrow or dart from it flying with a spinning motion quivers violently when it is fixed; thus suggesting the idea of one quivering with eagerness". This is particularly applicable to the two last extracts. In the third, ἴσταντο may help to convey this. The darts which fell short of their aim, struck, were fixed, in the ground, and there stood quivering. "And winged the shaft that quivered in his heart". Byron (of Kirke White), in *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers*. Gaisford, in *Variorum not.* p. 426, adds Od. ε' 175, νῆες, ἀγαλλόμεναι (exulting) Διὸς οὐρῷ. Eustath. ad loc. καὶ ὁρᾷ τὸ ἀγαλλόμεναι, ὡς ἐπὶ ἐμφύχων τῶν νεῶν λεχθέν. Soph. Aj. 581, πρὸς τομῶντι πῆματι, and this Schol., τομῆς ἐπιθυμείν, ὥσπερ εἰ αἰσθησιν εἶχεν. Plut. on Pyth. 398 A. See also in Heitz, *Verl. Schrift. Arist.* pp. 278, 9, some passages from the Schol. to Homer, and that of Plutarch, on this peculiarity of Homer.

'For in all these by reason of the living character (with which they are invested) they appear to be in action: for "shameless conduct", and "quivering with eagerness" and the rest, all express forms of activity (implying life). But these he has applied to them through the medium of the proportional metaphor, for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless actor to him who is shamelessly treated'.

4 ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσαις εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ταῦτα·

κυρτά, φαληριόωντα· πρὸ μέν τ' ἄλλ', αὐτὰρ ἐπ' ἄλλα· κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἢ δ' ἐνέργεια κίνησις.

5 δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ

I am sorry to be obliged to differ from our author in the view he here takes of the meaning of ἀναιδής. The notion of "reckless impudence", conveyed by his equivalent ἀναισχυντος, seems to me altogether alien from the Homeric conception of it. I can't think that "reckless impudence", ἀναισχυντία, is what *Homer* meant to attribute to the stone when he called it ἀναιδής, but 'unmerciful treatment'. At all events it is better than Pope's "huge round stone."

§ 4. 'In his most approved similes too (as well as metaphors) he deals thus (employs this treatment) with inanimate things (ἐπὶ 'in the case of' upon, applying to): "(Waves) arched, foam-crested, some in front, others (tumbling) after them"; for he draws (depicts) them all as living and moving, and living activity is a kind of motion'. II. N [XIII] 799, ['the waves of the bellowing ocean; Bending their heads foam-crested, they sweep on, billow on billow']. The following verse will shew where the ἐνέργεια lies; ὡς Τρῶες πρὸ μέν ἄλλοι ἀρηρότες, αὐτὰρ ἐπ' ἄλλοι, χαλκῷ μαρμαίροντες ἅμ' ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποντο.

I have followed Bekker (Ed. 3) and Spengel in reading κίνησις for μίμησις, from a conjecture of Bekker in his first ed. μίμησις will however make good sense.

§ 5. 'Metaphors should be drawn, as has been stated before, (III 2. 12, and 10. 5, also 11. 10; οἰκείων in the former, μὴ φανερῶν implied in the words μῆτ' ἐπιπόλαιον, in the latter,) from objects closely related, but not obvious to every one at first sight' (i. e. not so related, so clearly resembling one another, that no one can fail to see the resemblance at once: such metaphors do not pique the curiosity, and set people thinking; and from them you *learn* nothing, that you did not know before); 'just as in philosophy also, to observe the resemblances in widely distant things is characteristic of a sagacious penetrating intellect: like Archytas' saying, that arbitrator and altar were the same thing; because both are the refuge of the injured or wronged' (thing or person, animal or man, expressed by the *neuter*).

οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] Poet. XXII 17, μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἐστὶ λαβεῖν εὐφύιας τε σημείον ἐστίν (this is equivalent to εὐστόχου, 'requires quick wit, penetration, natural sagacity')· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὁμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν. Rhet. II 20. 7, of fables, used as arguments, ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἂν τις δύνηται τὸ ὁμοιον ὀρᾶν, ὅπερ μάθων

ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου, ὥσπερ Ἀρχύτας ἔφη ταῦτόν εἶναι διαιτητὴν καὶ βωμόν. ἐπ' ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ ἀδικούμενον καταφεύγει. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄγκυραν καὶ κρεμάθραν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἄμφω γὰρ ταυτό τι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῷ ἄνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι

ἔστιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, see the note, and references there given. On the use of resemblances and differences in defining, distinguishing, and the formation of concepts, see Trendelenburg, ad Categ. § 59 p. 137, and Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Logic*, Vol. I p. 102, Lect. VI. This is the kind of 'philosophy' here referred to. Diotima's account, Pl. Symp. 211, of the formation of general conceptions or ideas will serve as an illustration.

On Archytas, the Pythagorean philosopher and mathematician of Tarentum, see Diog. Laert. VIII 4. 79—83.

'Or if one were to say that an anchor and a hook were the same: for they are both the same kind of thing, but differ in position' (*lit.* 'the above and below').

κρεμάθρα is defined by the Schol. on Ar. Nub. 218, and by Suidas, as a basket for remnants, εἰς ὃ τὰ περιττεύοντα ὄψα (the leavings of the dinner-table) εἰώθαμεν ἀποτίθεσθαι. This was usually 'hung up', κρεμάθρα δὲ εἶρηται διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ κρεμαμένην μετέωρον εἶναι (Suidas). Hence the use of it for Socrates in the Clouds, u. s. But it is plain that that cannot be the meaning of it here, for it does not answer to the subsequent description of it, in respect either of the resemblance or the difference stated. Rost and Palm in their Lexicon translate it '*ankertau*', the cable that holds the anchor; but this is open to precisely the same objection. It must be something in the nature of a hook, from which things may be *suspended*; and is literally 'a suspending instrument'. The resemblance to the anchor lies in its hooked form, and also in the intention or design of them both, which is to keep things where they are, preservation or security. The difference is that the anchor is applied to keep the vessel safe and steady *at the bottom*, the hook is *above*, and from it the thing suspended *hangs*. Liddell and Scott have κρεμάστρα (the reading of three inferior MSS) with this reference, and identify it with κρεμάθρα in the Nubes.

'And the re-equalisation of cities (in the respect of property, and powers, i. e. state offices, privileges, &c.) when the same principle is applied to (is the same for) things standing wide apart (very dissimilar', viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions, offices, prerogatives &c.).' The widely dissimilar things which are here brought together for comparison, are the areas of properties, and the state offices and privileges, &c., which are to be alike *equalised*. The Scholiast quoted by Vater, explains the word and its application in the same way of the equalisation of the properties, fortunes or conditions, duties and rights of the citizens of a state. Victorius quotes Isocr. Phil. § 40, οἶδα γὰρ ἀπάσας ὡμαλισμένας ἐπὶ τῶν

ταυτό, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ δυνάμεσι τὸ ἴσον.

- 6 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δηλῶν ὅτι ἔμαθε παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ ἔοικε λέγειν ἡ ψυχὴ “ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δ' ἤμαρτον.” καὶ

συμφορῶν, all the Greek cities have been alike levelled to one condition by their misfortunes.

Vahlen has again applied his perverted ingenuity to the emendation of this passage. The passage wants none: it is clear in sense and construction, and the reading of the text is retained by Bekker and Spengel. In the first place, *av* in the compound verb is not a privative with *v* inserted, as ἀνώνυμος, ἀνόδυνος, &c., but ἀνά is *re*, of *breaking up* (ἀναλύειν, &c.) for redistribution, restoring to an original equality: so ἀναδιδόναι ‘to distribute’ (ψήφους), ἀναδάσασθαι ‘to redistribute’ Thuc. v 4, ἀνάδαστος, ἀναδασμός, *de agro ex integro aquis partibus dividendo* (Herod., Plat., see Ruhnken’s Timaeus p. 33), ἀνανέμειν, et sim. ἀνωμαλίσθαι therefore does not denote *inequality*, but *re-equalisation*. What the signification of the word is, appears from two passages of the Polit. II 7, 1266 b 3 and c. 12, 1274 b 9. In the first of these the word is ὁμαλισθῆναι, in the second, ἀνομάλωσις, from verbs in -ίζειν and -οῦν respectively. They both refer to the same thing, viz. Phaleas of Chalcodon’s scheme for the equalisation or re-equalisation of properties, and plainly, except perhaps so far as the ἀνά is concerned, have precisely the same signification: and this is perfectly applicable here. Vahlen proposes καὶ “ὁμαλισθῆναι τὰς πόλεις” ἐν πολὺν διέχουσι ταυτό. His objection to ἀνωμαλίσθαι seems to me to be entirely unfounded, and I can see no reason whatever for altering the text. There is another slight alteration proposed, which is not worth mentioning.

ἐπιφάνεια is a surface, here area; and in Euclid, a plane figure, which has only length and breadth, a superficies.

§ 6. This introduces a new topic of ἀστεῖα, things pointed and lively, in the sense of witticisms, things amusing and laughable, such as jokes παρ’ ὑπόνοιαν, or παρὰ προσδοκίαν, repartees, puns, plays upon words, and the like.

‘Though it is true in general that most of these ‘vivacities’ are conveyed by (διὰ) metaphor, yet they are also derived from (a temporary, momentary) delusion (leading to a pleasing *surprise* at the unexpected supplement): for it becomes clearer (to the listener) that he has learnt something from (the conclusion of the sentence) being contrary’ to his expectation—or, as Victorius, from *his own* contrary, i.e. changed, state of mind, which has arisen between the beginning and end of the sentence—‘and the soul seems to say to herself, “Really, so it is; and I missed it (never found it out till now)”’. (This explanation of the pleasure derived from the *unexpected* surprise,—that the previous deception heightens the pleasure of the acquired knowledge—is due, I think, rather to the theory which had become habitual with Ar., that all intellectual pleasure is due to the natural desire of learning, than to

τῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων. δὲ τὰ ἀστεϊά ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὀφρσι λέγειν, οἷον τὸ τοῦ Στῆσιχόρου, ὅτι οἱ τέττιγες ἑαυτοῖς χαμόθεν ἄσονται. καὶ τὰ εὖ ἡνιγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα· μάθησις γάρ, καὶ λέγεται μεταφορά. καὶ ὁ λέγει Θεόδωρος, τὸ καινὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δὲ ὅταν παράδοξον ᾗ, καὶ μὴ, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, πρὸς τὴν ἔμπροσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν

his sober judgment exercised upon this particular application of it.) Schrader has supplied two capital instances of this form of pleasantry: the first is from Cic. de Or. II 281, *Quid huic abest—nisi res et virtus?* Here the listener is *misled* by the opening of the sentence to expect a very good character of somebody, when unexpectedly, after a pause, two words are added as exceptions, which convert the expected eulogium into beggary and worthlessness: but is it the *learning*, the becoming acquainted with that fact, however unexpectedly, that constitutes the pleasure or amusement that the listener derives from his surprise? A still better from Quint. of a dandy advocate, *illud Afri* “*homo in agendis causis optime—vestitus*,” for the expected *versatus*<sup>1</sup>, Quint. VI 3. 24 and 84. This topic he calls, *decipiendi opinionem*. He returns to it again in VIII 5. 15 under the name of *ex inopinato*: and gives two examples. Cic. de Or. II 63. 255; 70. 284, *iocus praeeter expectationem*. I have quoted two or three English ones in the note to Introd. p. 319, note 3.

‘And the apophthegms that have point and vivacity derive this character from the *indirect* statement of the meaning (from the speaker’s not directly expressing the intended meaning), as that of Stesichorus “that their cicalas will have to sing to themselves from the ground” all the trees being cut down and the land devastated; which is the real, direct, meaning: and ἑαυτοῖς, that there will be no one else to listen to them. On ἀποφθέγματα, see II 21. 8, where this is also quoted, Stesichorus’ apophthegm also appears in Demetr. π. ἐρμ. § 99 where it is attributed to Dionysius (the tyrant; as a threat); and § 243, as an example of βραχυλογία in the chapter on δεινότης. This is a *riddle* in the shape of an apophthegm: the next topic brings us to aenigmas proper. The pleasure derived from these is traced, as usual, to that of learning: and against that explanation in the *present* instance I have no objection to make.

‘And for the same reason, riddles well wrapped up give pleasure: for not only is this (viz. the solution of them) a kind of *learning*, but they are also expressed in metaphor. And what Theodorus calls “novel phrases, expressions.” This is effected (this *novelty*, this *surprise*) when (the sequel) is unexpected, and not, to use his own words, “according to previous opinion or expectation”; but, as is the custom of humorous,

<sup>1</sup> What is learnt here is only that the man whom you expected (at the beginning of the sentence) to be an accomplished lawyer, turns out to be an empty coxcomb. It may be doubted again whether the knowledge of *that* fact would give much pleasure.



τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παραπεποιημένα. ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώματα· ἔξαπατᾷ γάρ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκούων ὑπέλαβεν·

ἔστειχε δ' ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμεθλα. <sup>χίμειναι</sup>  
ὁ δ' ὦετο πέδιλα ἐρεῖν. τούτου δ' ἅμα λεγομένου δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὃ λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὃ μεταστρέφει ὄνομα, οἷον τὸ Θεοδώρου

jocular writers, who alter the letters of words to make jokes'. I have given a free transl. of the last clause; with *οἱ ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις* understand *ὄντες* or *διατρίβοντες*; and with *τὰ παραπεποιημένα*, *ποιοῦσιν*, or the like.

*παραποιεῖν*<sup>1</sup> is, as I have pointed out in *Introd.* p. 320, the general name for all *falsification* (*παρά*) or (illicit) changes of the letters of words, for the purpose of a jest, *παρονομασία*, τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώματα, *perversion*, *misapplication*, of a word: all jokes that depend upon verbal or literal changes. Compare *παρώνυμος* and its congeners, in logic and grammar (*Categ. init.*), applied to *πτώσεις* or changes of termination. See further, *Introd.*, u. s., note 1.

On Theodorus of Byzantium, see note on II 23. 28, ult. and the references there given.

'Which is the effect also of *literal* jokes (founded upon the letters and the changes of them); for these also cheat (the expectation, and so far mislead). (This kind of joke is not confined to prose: it appears) also in verses. For (the conclusion) is not as the hearer (the *listener* to the recitation of a rhapsodist) supposed: "and he trod with his—chilblains under his feet" (statelyly stept he along, and under his feet were his—chilblains)—whereas the other thought he was going to say "sandals". This *παρὰ γραμμά σκώμμα*, which must be taken from some burlesque hexameter poem—author unknown—has its counterpart in *Arist. Vesp.* 1167, *κακοδαίμων ἐγώ· ὅστις γ' ἐπὶ γῆρα χίμετλον οὐδὲν λήψομαι*. The *Schol.* ad h. l. (in *Gaisford's Not. Var.*) refers, as another instance, to *Alcibiades' τραυλισμός*, *Arist. Vesp.* 45, *ὁλᾷς Θέωλος τὴν κεφαλὴν κόλακος ἔχει. παρ' ἐν γράμμα, ἦτοι παρὰ τὸ ῥ ἐστὶ τὸ σκώμμα*. *Hermogenes, περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος*, c. 34 (*Rh. Gr.* II 453, *Spengel*) in a chap. *περὶ τοῦ κωμικῶς λέγειν*, has illustrated this topic, which he calls *παρῳδία*, by the same verse of *Aristoph.*; and also this and τὸ παρὰ προσδοκίαν from *Dem. de Cor.*

'Pleasantries arising from changes of letters (plays on words) are produced, not by a mere enunciation of a word in its direct meaning, but by something (a change) which gives a different *turn* to it, (converts or twists it into a different sense); as that of Theodorus (of Byzantium, the rhetorician: *supra*, II 23. 28), against *Nicon* the harper, *θράττει*: he pretends namely to say "it confounds you" (you are confounded), and cheats; for he means something else: and therefore it is amusing only after one has become acquainted with the meaning (or circumstances);

<sup>1</sup> *Δίδυμός φησι τὴν περὶ ὄνου σκιάς παροιμίαν παραπεποιῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥήτορος λέγοντος περὶ τῆς ἐν Δέλφοις σκιάς...* [*Harpocration*].

εἰς Νίκωνα τὸν κιθαρωδὸν “θράττει σε.” προσποι-  
 εῖται γὰρ λέγειν τὸ “θράττει σε” καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ·  
 ἄλλο γὰρ λέγει· διὸ μαθόντι ἡδύ, ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπο- P. 131.  
λαμβάνει Θραῖκα εἶναι, οὐ δόξει ἀστεῖον εἶναι· καὶ P. 1412 b.  
 7 τὸ “βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι.” δεῖ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω προσ-  
 1 om.

for if (the hearer) doesn't know that he is a Thracian, he will see no point in it at all'. Victorious and Schrader have both missed the meaning of this pun. But in order to arrive at it, we must first remove from the text the first *σε* after *θράττει* which has been introduced from the second (where it is required) and spoils the pun. Nicon, it appears from the explanation, is, or is supposed to be, of foreign extraction; and not only that, but a Thracian, the most barbarous of all nations. The Thracian women were habitually slaves, in Athenian families: Arist. Thesm. 279, 280, 284, 293, Pac. 1138, Vesp. 828. This person is addressed by Theodorus with the word *θράττει*, which means *apparently*, “You are confounded”; this appears from the interpretation that follows, (τι) *θράττει σε*, which is of course convertible in meaning with the passive *θράττει* (and it follows also that the first *σε* must be an error of the transcriber, for *θράττει σε* would be no interpretation of *θράττει σε*; nor in that form would there be any pun). It *really* means, however, *Θράττ' εἰ*, “You are a Thracian maid-servant”, not only an out-and-out barbarian, but effeminate to boot, and a menial. Schrader's explanation is “*Θράττη (sic) σε, hoc est, Thracia mulier te, intellige peperit:*” at once impossible in respect of the Greek, and pointless. Victorious, to much the same effect.

The amusement derived from a pun is thus explained by Cicero, de Or. II 62. 254, *Ambiguum* (double-entendre) *per se ipsum probatur id quidem, ut ante dixi, vel maxime; ingeniosi enim videtur vim verbi in aliud atque ceteri accipiant posse ducere; sed admirationem magis quam risum movet, nisi si quando incidit in aliud genus ridiculi.*

*βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι*] No satisfactory explanation has hitherto been given of this pun. The point of the joke has been always supposed to lie in *πέρσαι*. Francesco dei Medici, a friend of Vettori, suggested to him a solution which he quotes at length, that the Persae a poem of Timotheus is referred to, and that we should read *Πέρσαις*. But as Buhle justly remarks, “non video quidnam in hoc sit *faceti*.” Majoragius' explanation, who supposes that there was a verb *Πέρσαι*, of the same meaning as *Μηδίζω*, *Persis favere*, is equally out of the question. I have looked (for once) into Spengel's commentary, and find that he has suggested an analogy with Horace's *vin tu curtis Iudaeis oppedere*, Sat. I 9.70. The same thought once occurred to me, but I abandoned it, in consideration of the *form* of the word, *πέρσαι*; which, though a possible aorist, is entirely without authority. *πέρδομαι* is a dep. and has *παρδήσονται* for its future, *ἔπαρδον* for the aorist. The solution I have finally arrived at is that the alteration of letters which makes the pun, resides in *βούλει*. This would probably be pronounced nearly, if not quite, like *βουλῇ*, and the word could be rendered ‘will you?’ or ‘the Council’: in the

ηκόντως λεχθῆναι. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα, οἷον τὸ φάναι Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν μὴ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν· ὄνασθαι γάρ. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τὴν ἀρχὴν τῇ πόλει ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν. ἀμφοτέρως γάρ ὁ οὐκ ἂν ᾤηθη τις ἐρεῖν, τοῦτ' εἴρηται, καὶ ἐγνώσθη ὅτι ἀληθές· τὸ τε γάρ τὴν ἀρχὴν φάναι ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐθὲν σοφόν· ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτω λέγει ἀλλ' ἄλλως, καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὃ εἶπεν ἀπόφησιν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως.

latter sense the words would mean 'may the council destroy him.' *Sed de his nugis iam satis est.*

§ 7. 'But both of them' (either the two last examples of *παρὰ γράμμα*; or that topic itself and the preceding, *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*: they all require the same precaution) 'must be properly pronounced' (or delivered—attention must be called to the *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*, by a slight pause, and to the double-entendre by heightening the tone or some similar expedient). The following words, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα, sadly want the end of the sentence to enable us to determine their meaning. Victorius understands it, "tanquam in σκώμμασιν et iocis amarioribus, ita in urbanis hisce sermonibus": but Ar. makes no such distinction: all the jokes *παρὰ γράμμα* are alike ἀστεῖα. Vater fills it up thus; οὕτω δὲ καὶ (ταῦτὸ δύναται ταῦτα) τὰ ἀστεῖα (διὰ ὁμωνυμίας): ταῦτα being the before-mentioned ἀμφοτέρα; so that this is to be referred to the ὁμωνυμία which follows, and begins a new topic: a most unnatural interpretation as it seems to me. In default of any thing better I propose the following:—

'And so likewise witticisms, pointed sayings *in general* (as distinguished from the two special varieties, or two particular instances preceding), (require the same attention to *pronunciation*), as to say that "to the Athenians the *command* of the sea was not the *beginning* (both expressed by the same word, ἀρχήν) of their misfortunes"; for they derived benefit from it' (it was the *source* not of evil, but of good). Or, as Isocrates puts it, that "the command was to the city the beginning (or source) of her calamities." This, or something like it, occurs three times in Isocrates. The two similar places, one a mere repetition of the other, Phil. § 61, and de Pace § 101, are probably what Ar. had (very imperfectly) in his recollection: the third is, Paneg. § 119, which differs more widely from the quotation.

'For in both (these cases, or examples) that is said which one would not suppose likely to be said by any one, (*scilicet* which one would not suppose that any one, τινά, would say) and (yet, at the same time) is recognised as true (sound, in accordance with facts, Victorius, see III 7.9, *infra* § 10): for though it is true that there is nothing particularly clever in calling the *command* a *beginning*, (in calling ἀρχή ἀρχή, though in different senses), still he uses the term not in the same, but in different senses, (in the *second* example, Vahlen), and does not contradict (or deny) the use of ἀρχή (in the *first* example), only in a different sense'. The second example, from Isocrates, may seem at first sight to

8 ἐν ᾗπασι δὲ τούτοις, ἐὰν προσηκόντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκῃ ὁμωνυμία ἢ μεταφορά, τότε τὸ εὔ. οἶον “Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἀνάσχετος.” ὁμωνυμίαν ἀπέφησεν, ἀλλὰ προσηκόντως, εἰ ἀηδής. καὶ

οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἢ σε δεῖ ξένος [ξένος]<sup>1</sup>.  
ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ σε δεῖ, τὸ αὐτό. καὶ “οὐ δεῖ τὸν ξένον ξένον αἰεῖ εἶναι.” ἀλλότριον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. τὸ

<sup>1</sup> ἢ [σε δεῖ] ξένος ξένος

contradict the first, what is affirmed in the one being denied in the other. But if allowance be made for the double sense of ἀρχή, the apparent discrepancy between the two statements will disappear.

§ 8. ‘But in all these cases, the merit (τὸ εὔ) consists in the proper application of the term (i.e. the appropriateness of it to the thing described), whether by (expressed in) ambiguity (the play on words) or metaphor’. ἐνέγκῃ, sc. ὁ λέγων : and comp. III 4. 2, οἰστέαι... αἱ μεταφοραί.

‘For instance “Intolerable Tolerable”—the contradiction lies only in the ambiguity ; but this is appropriate if the owner of the name is a bore (or nuisance)’. Read with Bekker and Spengel Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἀνάσχετος [not ἀσχετος, with Bekker’s Oxford ed. of 1837]. The first is a proper name ; as ‘Tolerable’ must be supposed to be in the English version. ὁμωνυμίαν ἀπέφησεν ‘the speaker contradicts the ambiguous word only’ ; not the thing itself : the application, not the fact. These contradictory, or privative, epithets of proper names—comp. the privative epithets of metaphors, III 6. 7 and note—may be exemplified in our own language by *ruthless Ruth, helpless Helps, fearless Phear, inconsistent Constance, unpleasant Pleasance, ignoble Noble, Hotspur cold-spur*, and the like. Significant Greek names are to be found in II 23. 29, III 15. 8 ; Latin in Quint. VI 3. 55. Others are Ἀνεκτος (which is precisely parallel to Ἀνάσχετος in our text) and Νικήτης, Eustath. ad Hom. II. A p. 156—but in fact most Greek proper names are significant in themselves, though they may have lost the appropriateness of their personal application.

‘And, “never make thyself as a stranger, more of a stranger than is required of thee”, “not more than thou art bound to do” ; the same thing (in different words)’. As the words are *not* different, but the same, Vahlen<sup>1</sup> very reasonably proposes to omit σε δεῖ in the Iambic verse, οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἢ ξένος ξένος ‘more strange than a stranger’ ; so that οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ σε δεῖ is now differently expressed, and becomes what it is said to be, an explanation ; or the expression of the same thing in different words. Victorius thinks that one of the two may mean ‘host’ or ‘guest’ ; but as ξένος is not repeated in the alternative, Vahlen’s explanation seems more probable. ‘And, (in a third way) “a stranger must not be always a stranger” (or, strange) : for that too is again of

<sup>1</sup> Vahlen, in *Trans. Vind. Acad.*, u. s. pp. 146, 7. He also would connect the sentence thus, which is a more doubtful improvement, ἢ αἰ μᾶλλον ἢ σε δεῖ. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ “οὐ δεῖ” κ.τ.λ.

αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον,  
καλὸν γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον·  
ταῦτ' οὖν γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἰπεῖν ἄξιόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν μὴ  
ἐντα ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν [ἢ ἄξιόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν μὴ θανά-  
9 του ἄξιον ὄντα] ἢ μὴ ποιοῦντα θανάτου ἄξια. τὸ  
μὲν οὖν εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς λέξεως τούτων· ἀλλ' ὅσῳ  
ἂν ἐλάττωσι καὶ ἀντικειμένως λεχθῇ, τοσοῦτ' εὐδο-  
κιμεῖ μάλλον. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ  
ἀντικεῖσθαι μάλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ θᾶττον  
10 γίνεται. δεῖ δ' αἰεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται  
ἢ τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές καὶ μὴ  
ἐπιπόλαιον· ἐστὶ γὰρ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἔχειν, οἷον “ἀπο-  
a different kind, or form”, (foreign, alien, to the two others: ἀλλότριον  
belonging to something or somebody else; opposed to οἰκεῖον).

‘Of the same kind is also that so highly praised verse of Anaxandrides, “A noble thing it is to die ere doing aught worthy of death”: for this is the same as saying, “It is worthy to die when one is not worthy to die”, or “it is a worthy thing to die when one does not deserve death”, or “doing nothing worthy of death”. Anaxandrides is quoted III 10. 7 (see note) and *infra* 12. 3.

§ 9. ‘Now of all these the kind of expression (language) is the same: but the more briefly (ἐλάττωσι, τῇ λέξει) and antithetically’, (repeat μάλλον from the compar. ἐλάττωσι: I have represented the similar ellipse which our own language makes in the like case), ‘so much the more are they popular (approved, applauded). The reason of this is, that to the antithesis is due the increase, and by the brevity (in a short time, χρόνῳ, or space, compass, τόπῳ,) the more rapid growth (or acquisition) of the learning (that arises from them)’. Comp. notes on I 11. 21, 23, and III 9. 8, also 10. 2.

§ 10. ‘(To make a phrase ἀσσεῖον) it should always have (attached to it, προσεῖναι) some special personal application (τό τινα εἶναι πρὸς ὃν λέγεται), or propriety in the expression if what is said (is to) be true and not superficial’ (*supra* c. 10. 5).

ἀληθές] i.e. sound, solid, substantial, genuine, comp. III 7. 9, *sententiam gravem et honestam*, Victorius. *Metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est*. Hor. Ep. 1. 7, ult. also I 12. 23, “et saepe ap. Livium.” Orelli ad loc. These two, the ἀληθές and the μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον, do not always go together: when they are separated, the sentence loses its point and attraction. This separation is illustrated by two examples: the first, as a *sentiment*, has *truth*, weight, and solidity; the second is well enough written, as far as the style goes; but neither of them is particularly attractive.

‘Because these two may be separated in a sentence: for instance, “a man should die free from all offence”—but there is no point

θνήσκειν δεῖ μηθὲν ἀμαρτάνοντα” ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστέϊον.  
 “τὴν ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον.” ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστέϊον.  
 ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἅμα ἀμφω ἔχῃ· “ἄξιον γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ  
 ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν.” ὅσω δ’ ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ,  
 τοσοῦτῳ ἀστέϊότερον φαίνεται, οἷον εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνό-  
 ματα μεταφορὰ εἴη καὶ μεταφορὰ τοιαδὶ καὶ ἀντί-  
 θεσις καὶ παρίστωσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν.

11 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς p. 132.

ἄνω, αἰεὶ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοραί· αἰεὶ  
 γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν λέγονται, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορὰ.  
 οἷον ἡ ἀσπίς φαμέν ἐστι φιάλη Ἄρεος, καὶ τόξον

in that: “the worthy man should marry the worthy woman<sup>1</sup>”—but  
 there is no point in *that* (this is *superficial*): but if they are both com-  
 bined in the sentence (then only the sentence becomes pointed). “It is  
 a worthy thing (or worth while) for a man to die when unworthy of death  
 (when he has done nothing to deserve death).” Here we have the grave,  
 sound, true doctrine, and the antithesis, which gives it point, and redeems  
 it from superficiality. ‘But the greater the proportion of these qualities,  
 the more pointed and attractive it appears; if, for instance, the (indi-  
 vidual) words also were to convey (εἶη) a metaphor, and a metaphor of a  
 particular kind (the *proportional* met. for example), and antithesis, and  
 balanced clauses, and to carry with them vividness and *animation*’. On  
 ἐνέργεια, see above § 1.

§ 11. ‘Similes too, as has been already said in the preceding (chap-  
 ter, c. 4), are always in a certain sense popular metaphors. For they are  
 always composed of (or, expressed in) two terms, just like the propor-  
 tional metaphor; as for instance, the shield, we say, is Ares’ goblet’, (the  
 shape of the φιάλη is in reality more like an elongated saucer, or shield—  
 whence the comparison), ‘and a bow a stringless harp. When thus ex-  
 pressed, the phrase is not single (or simple; it has *both* terms expressed,  
 the two terms viz. that are brought into comparison; and is therefore a  
 simile); whereas to call the bow a harp or the shield a goblet is single’  
 (and therefore only a metaphor). [αἰεὶ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι. “in αἰεὶ fortasse latet  
 αἰ.” Spengel.]

The meaning seems to be this. The difference between a simile and  
 a metaphor is—besides the greater detail of the former, the simile being  
 a metaphor *writ large*—that it always *distinctly expresses* the two terms  
 that are compared, bringing them into *apparent* contrast: the metaphor  
 on the other hand, *substituting by transfer* the one notion for the  
 other of the two compared, identifies them as it were in one image,  
 and expresses both in a *single* word, leaving the comparison between

<sup>1</sup> This comes most likely from Anaxandrides again (note on § 8). The verse  
 ran thus τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον. Spengel, *Artium Scriptores* p. 20, adds  
 δδ. Meineke, *Fr. Comic. Gr.* III 201.

φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οὐχ ἀπ- P. 1413.  
 | λούν, τὸ δ' εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα  
 12 | φιάλην ἀπλούν. καὶ εἰκάζουσι δὲ οὕτως, οἷον πιθήκῳ  
 αὐλητήν, λύχνῳ ψακαζομένῳ [εἰς] μύωπα. ἄμφω γὰρ

the object illustrated, and the analogous notion which throws a new light upon it, to suggest itself from the manifest correspondence to the hearer.

On the φιάλη Ἄρτος, see note on III 4.4, and Introd. pp. 220—292, there referred to. This was due to Timotheus the dithyrambic poet. The φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος for τόξον—the point of resemblance which brings the two together seems to be the common twang of the bowstring and harp-string produced in each case by the vibration of the string. The bow may therefore be called a stringless harp, as wanting the *many* strings of the musical instrument, or, in other words, an unmusical harp. On these privative epithets with metaphors, comp. III 6.7. The author of this last bit of ἀστεϊότης is a tragic poet named Theognis, mentioned with contempt and ridicule three times by Aristophanes, Acharn. 11, and 138, and Thesm. 168. He is said to have received the nickname of χῳν from his excessive ψυχρότης. Of all his writings only this one phrase has survived, preserved by Demetrius, π. ἐρμηνείας, π. μεταφορᾶς, § 85. He gives the author's name, and cites this as a specimen of a κινδυνώδης μεταφορά, ὡς ὁ Θεόγνις παρατίθεται το (τόξον) φόρμιγγα ἄχορδον ἐπὶ τοῦ τῷ τόξῳ βάλλοντος· ἢ μὲν γὰρ φόρμιγξ κινδυνώδες ἐπὶ τοῦ τόξου, τῷ δὲ ἀχορδῷ ἡσφάλισται. Out of this Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.* III 100, and the writer of the article Theognis No. 11 in *Biog. Dict.*, have made what they print as a verse, παρατίθεται τὸ τόξον, φόρμιγγ' ἄχορδον.

§ 12. 'The simile is made in this way, by comparing for instance a flute-player to an ape'—*Simia quam similis, turpissima bestia nobis* [Ennius, ap. Cic. de Nat. Deor. I § 97]: besides this general resemblance of the two natures, there is also a special resemblance between the two, thus described by Victorius, "quod tibicines quoque ut simiae contracto corpore, manibusque ad os appositis, cum tibiae inflant, ut bestia illa sedent." The resemblance is quite sufficient to justify the *simile*.

In the next example we must (with Bekker and Spengel) read, after MS A°, λύχνῳ [not λύκῳ], and omit εἰς.

'And a short-sighted man to a lamp with water dropping upon it'. The involuntary contraction, the convulsive winking, of the half-closed eyes of the short-sighted man is compared to the fizzing, spirting, and sputtering of the lamp when water is dropped on it: 'because both are contracted'. μύωψ (μύειν) is one that keeps his eyes half shut, Probl. XXXI 16, διὰ τί οἱ μύωπες βλέφαρα συνάγοντες ὁρῶσιν; Arist. makes the point of the comparison lie in the *contraction* of both, the eyelids and the flame. ψακάς or ψεκάς 'a drop'; ψακάσειν 'to drop, fall in drops', Ar. Nub. 580 of the clouds, ἢ ψακαζόμεν, 'we drizzle'; ψακάζεσθαι (pass.) 'to be sprinkled with drops.' Xen. Symp. II 26, ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μικραῖς κύλιξι πυκνὰ ἐπιψεκάζωσιν: opposed to ἄθροον πίνειν, to drink all at

13 συνάγεται. τὸ δὲ εὖ ἐστὶν ὅταν μεταφρὰ ἦ· ἐστὶ γὰρ εἰκάσαι τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλῃ Ἄρεος καὶ τὸ ἐρείπιον 700 ῥάκει οἰκίας, καὶ τὸν Νικήρατον φάναι Φιλοκτῆτην εἶναι δεδηγμένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος, ὥσπερ εἶκασε Θρασύμαχος ἰδὼν τὸν Νικήρατον ἡττημένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος ῥαψωδοῦντα, κομῶντα δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν ἔτι. ἐν οἷς

once, in *large* measures. The other is to distribute your potations in 'drops', as it were, in very small glasses; and so to make up for what you lose in the magnitude of the draught by the frequent repetition of the little one.

§ 13. 'Excellence is attained in them when they contain (involve) metaphor (comp. c. 10 § 3): for the shield may be compared to "Ares' goblet", and a ruin to the "rag of a house"; [conversely we have rags described as *ἐρείπια χλανιδίων*, Soph. *Fragm.* (Niobe) 400, comp. Eur. *Troad.* 1025.]

'And Niceratus may be said to be "a Niceratus stung by Pratys"—according to Thrasymachus' simile, when he saw Niceratus after his defeat by Pratys in the rhapsodical contest, and still all dishevelled and dirty (squalid)'; with the marks of the long and laborious struggle still fresh upon him; before he had had time to shave and dress. *κομῶν* is here used in the unusual sense of long hair as a sign of neglect, *incomitis capillis*, uncombed, unkempt: in the ordinary acceptation long hair is a sign of foppery, or the distinctive mark of a young man of fashion, Arist. *Eq.* 580, except at Sparta, *Rhet.* I 9.26, where it was a national distinction, *ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι κομῶν καλόν*: as it was likewise in the Homeric ages, when the Achaeans were *καρηκομῶντες*. Phd = 1011.

Of the many Niceratuses whose names appear in Sauppe's *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* p. 102, there are two better known to us than the rest, (1) the son of the distinguished Athenian general, who appears as one of the guests in Xenophon's banquet, in Lysias, &c., and was put to death by the Thirty tyrants. If the Thrasymachus who made the remark upon him be—as he doubtless is—the famous Sophist, this must be the Niceratus who is here meant. The second, mentioned in Dem. c. Mid. § 165, and afterwards in a list of witnesses with the name of his deme Ἀχερδούσιος, § 168, was probably the grandson of the other; for the names of Nicias and Niceratus seem to have alternated in successive generations in this family, as they did in that of Callias and Hipponicus. These two are habitually confounded by Taylor, Reiske (see his *Ind. ad Dem.*) and others; and the confusion still exists in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*, although Buttmann proved their diversity (in *Exc.* VIII ad Dem. c. Mid.). Sauppe likewise, in his *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* p. 102, distinguishes them. Several other Nicias and Niceratuses appear in Sauppe's *Index*, u. s.

Niceratus had engaged in a contest with one Pratys, a professional rhapsodist, and, being in all probability an amateur, had been defeated. In this state, and still bearing all the marks of it on his person, he is



μάλιστα ἐκπίπτουσιν οἱ ποιηταί, ἐὰν μὴ εὖ, καὶ ἐὰν  
 εὖ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. λέγω δ' ὅταν ἀποδιδῶσιν,  
 ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ,  
 ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.  
 καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντ' εἰκόνες εἰσίν. αἱ δ' εἰκόνες ὅτι  
 μεταφοραί, εἴρηται πολλάκις.

encountered by Thrasymachus, who thereupon compares him to "a Philoctetes bitten or stung by Pratys." Schneider on Xen. Sympos. III 5 supposes that "the subject of the recitation in which Niceratus was beaten was the account in Lesches' 'little Iliad' of the story of Philoctetes in which was related the calamity arising from the serpent's bite; alluded to by Homer, Il. B 721"; and by Soph. Phil. 267, *πληγέντ' ἐχίδνης ἀγρίῳ χαράγματι*, and 632.

'Wherein the poets are most condemned when they fail, and applauded when they succeed'. ἐκπίπτειν is properly said of an actor who is hissed off the stage, and hence of condemnation, disapprobation, in general. Poet. XVIII 15, *ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀγάθων ἐξέπεσεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ*, Dem. de Cor. § 265, *ἐξέπιπτες* (Aeschines) *ἐγὼ δ' ἐσύριττον*. Metaphorically, Plat. Gorg. 517 A, *οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον* (ἐκπίπτειν omnino dicuntur ea quae reiiciuntur et repudiantur; Stallbaum). *explodī, exactus*, Ter. Prol. (2) Hec. 4 et 7. The opposite of the agent is ἐκβάλλειν 'to hiss off the stage'; Dem. de F. L. § 389 (of Aeschines again, as acting Thyestes), *ἐξεβάλλετε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξεσυρίττετε ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων*.

'I mean when they make (the two members) correspond (bring into comparison, note on ἀποδιδόναι I 1.7). "He wears his legs as curly as parsley." (*οὔλος*, Buttman Lexil. No. 44 and 88). "Like Philammon, at close quarters with the sack". Philammon, a famous Athenian athlete, gained the prize at the Olympian games, Dem. de Cor. § 319.

Harpocr. Φ. τὸν Ἀθηναῖον πύκτην. Eustath. ad Hom. Il. ψ p. 1324, quoted in Dissen's note on Dem. l. c.

[ζυγομαχεῖν] of a close struggle, desperate encounter, prop. of two oxen under the yoke, or of any yoke-fellows. Ruhnken ad Tim. s. v.

τῷ κωρύκῳ] κώρυκος, θύλακος. Suidas. θυλάκιον. ἔστι δὲ δερμάτινον ἀγγεῖον, ὁμοῖον ἀσκῷ. Hesychius. 'A sack filled with bran and olive husks for the young, and sand for the more robust, and then suspended at a certain height, and swung backwards and forwards by the players.' *Dict. Ant.* art. 'Baths,' p. 144 b. It is evident that this describes only *one* use of it, namely for amusement or exercise at the baths: this game was called κωρυκομαχία. The other purpose for which it was employed was plainly from this passage that of boxers, who practised upon it. [Compare Plautus, Rudens 722, *follem pugilatorium faciam et pendentem incursabo pugnīs*, and see K. F. Hermann's *Privatalterthümer*, § 37. 17.]

These two iambic lines, from unknown authors, are clearly selected not for the *failure*, but the success, of the poet or poets who composed them.

'(These) and the like are all similes. That all similes are (a kind of, or involve) metaphors, has been stated already many times'.

14 καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι μεταφοραὶ ἀπ' εἰδους ἐπ' εἶδος  
εἰσὶν οἷον ἂν τις ὡς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγά-  
γηται, εἴτα βλαβῇ, ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιος φησι τὸν λαγῷ.  
ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν.

ἔθεν μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα λέγεται καὶ διότι, σχεδὸν  
15 εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι ὑπερβολαὶ

§ 14. 'Proverbs too are metaphors from species to species: as for instance, if a man has of his own accord invited the aid of (*lit.* called in to help him) another in the expectation of deriving benefit (from his assistance), and then incurs harm and loss instead, as the Carpathian says of the hare: for each of them is a case of the accident (or result) above mentioned'.

Carpathus, an island lying between Crete and Rhodes, from which the neighbouring sea took the name of Carpathian (Hor. Carni. I 35. 8): now called Skarpanto. The proverb is thus explained by Buhle. "Cum Carpathi incolae leporibus carerent, unus eorum par leporum introduxit" (rabbits, doubtless), "unde tanta eorum multitudo propter faecunditatem exorsa est, ut omnes fructus absumerentur." Erasmus, *Adag. Chil.* II Cent. I 81, p. 1250.

A similar result follows from similar conduct in Stesichorus' fable of the stag, the horse, and the man, II 20. 5. These are both *species* of the same *genus* of disappointed expectation, or disastrous result: and the proverb is a *transfer*, a *tralatio* of the one to the other. On the four kinds of metaphor, see Poet. XXI 7.

'So the sources of witticisms and pointed, pungent, vivid things in general, and the *reason why* (they are such; their *raison d'être*), have been pretty well explained'. I have omitted τὸ αἴτιον as a mere tautological repetition of διότι. On the three senses of διότι see note on I 1.11. Here the sense of "why" is proved by the explanatory τὸ αἴτιον.

§ 15. 'All *approved* hyperboles are also metaphors', i.e. a *mere* hyperbola, without metaphor, will *not* be approved. On the *hyperbole*, Auct. ad Heren. IV 33. 44, *superlatio est oratio superans veritatem aliquis augendi minuendive causa*, et seq. Cic. Topic. c. x § 45, *aut aliquid quod fieri nullo modo possit augendae rei gratia dicatur, aut minuendae, quae hyperbole dicitur*. Quint. VIII 6. 67—76, *Hyperbolon audacioris ornatus summo loco posui. Est haec decens veri superiectio. Virtus eius ex diverso par augendi atque minuendi*. Then follow the description and illustration of its several varieties. In Ernesti, *Lex. Techn.* (both Greek and Latin), hyperbole is omitted. ὑπερβολή is in fact 'exaggeration'. 'For instance (what was said) to (or *against*, for the purpose of exaggeration, making the most of it) the man with the black eye, "you'd have taken him for a basket of mulberries". For the black eye<sup>1</sup> is something red' (and so is the mulberry; the colour is similar; and

<sup>1</sup> τὸ ὑπώπιον, which stands here for 'a black eye', is originally nothing but the seat of that, the part that is under the eye. It is thence transferred to the signification of the discoloured surface that results from a blow under the eye (ὑπώ-)

μεταφοραί, οἶον εἰς ὑπωπιασμένον “ῥήθητε δ’ ἂν αὐτὸν εἶναι συκαμίνων κάλαθον.” ἐρυθρόν γάρ τι τὸ ὑπώπιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ σφόδρα. τὸ δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ καὶ τὸ ὑπερβολὴ τῇ λέξει διαφέρουσα.

ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.  
ῥήθης δ’ ἂν αὐτὸν Φιλάμμωνα εἶναι μαχόμενον τῷ κωρύκῳ.

ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖν  
ῥήθης δ’ ἂν οὐ σκέλη ἀλλὰ σέλινα ἔχειν οὕτως οὖλα.  
16 εἰσὶ δὲ ὑπερβολαὶ μεираκιώδεις σφοδρότητα γὰρ p. 133.

therefore so far it is a metaphor from one red thing—purple is nearer to the true colour—to another, *εἶδος πρὸς εἶδος*); ‘but the hyperbole or exaggeration’ (*σφόδρα*, which distinguishes it from metaphor) ‘lies in the excessive quantity’, (i. e. in the absurdly exaggerated number of black spots represented by a whole basket of mulberries. Victorius). According to Theophrastus, de Caus. Plant. VI 6. 4, there are two kinds of mulberries, red and white, *ἐρυθρὸν καὶ λευκόν*. This is an instance of Quintilian’s first variety of hyperbole; *quum plus facto dicimus*, direct exaggeration; of which two examples are given. Victorius refers to the saying of an Athenian wag about Sulla, *συκαμινόν ἐσθ’ ὁ Σύλλας ἀλφίῳ πεπασμένον*, “Sulla (i. e. his face) is like a mulberry powdered with flour”, in Plutarch [*Sulla*, c. 2, p. 451 F].

‘And another (kind of phrase) like so and so’ (comp. τὰ καὶ τὰ, *infra* c. 17. 11; this seems to mean the two preceding examples, which are here repeated, and others like them) ‘is a hyperbole, differing from it merely by the form of the expression (it becomes a hyperbole by dropping the particle of comparison, ὥσπερ). Thus “like Philammon at close quarters with the sack”, (may be thrown into the form of a hyperbole, thus,) “you would have taken him for Philammon fighting the sack”. Again, “to wear his legs curly like parsley”, becomes “you’d have thought his legs not legs, but parsley, so crooked are they”. This is Quintilian’s second variety of hyperbole, u. s. § 68, *superiectio per similitudinem, aut per comparisonem*: illustrated by *Credas innare revulsa Cycladas*, Virg. Aen. VIII 691.

§ 16. ‘The hyperbole has a *juvenile* character, signifying vehemence: and therefore they are most used by people when they are angry; “No, not if he were to offer me gifts as the sand or dust for multitude” (or gifts in number like the sand or dust). “And the daughter of Agamemnon

*πιασμός*)—the special for the general—*ὑπωπιάζειν* being to ‘strike, or inflict a blow under the eye’, and *ὑπωπιασμένον* here ‘one so struck’, including the resulting discolouration. See for exemplifications of all three, Arist. Pax 541, Acharn. 551, Vesp. 1386. Fragm. Apollon. I. Vol. II 880, Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.*, *κύαθον* (a cupping-glass) τοῖς ὑπωπίοις, Antiph. 13. 5, Vol. III 139. Ib., *στάσιν στάσει, μάχῃ μάχην ὑπωπίοις δὲ πύκτην* (*ἐξελαύνειν*). Eubul. Semele s. Dionysus. Fr. I. 8, *ἐκτὸς δὲ (κρατῆρ) κώμων ἐξδομος δ’ ὑπωπίων*. Meineke u. s. 14. Vol. II. 29.

δηλοῦσιν. διὸ ὀργιζόμενοι λέγουσι μάλιστα·  
οὐδ' εἴ μοι τόσα δοίῃ ὅσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε.  
κούρην δ' οὐ γαμέω Ἀγαμέμνωνος Ἀτρείδαο,  
οὐδ' εἴ χρυσεῖη Ἀφροδίτῃ κάλλος ἐρίζοι,  
ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίῃ.

χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες. διὸ P. 1413b  
πρεσβυτέρῳ λέγειν ἀπρεπές.

I δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθῆναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἐκάστῳ γένει ἀρ- CHAP. XII.  
μόττει λέξις. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀγω-  
νιστικὴ, οὐδὲ δημηγορικὴ καὶ δικανικὴ. ἄμφω δὲ

son of Atreus will I *not* wed, no, not though she vied in beauty with golden Aphrodite, and in accomplishments [deftness of handiwork] with Athene", comp. III 7. 11. II. I [IX] 385 (the angry Achilles indignantly refusing Agamemnon's offered presents). *μειρακιώδεις* is here meant to convey the fire, vigour, spirit, impetuosity, proneness to passion and excitement; or in general 'vehemence', as he tells us; which are characteristic of early youth. It is used by Plato [Rep. 466 B, and 498 B] in the sense of 'puerile'. The latter usually represents this by *νεανικός*, which he uses in two opposite senses, of the good and bad qualities of youth; either gallant, spirited, generous, noble, splendid and such like, or rash, wanton, insolent: also *νεανίας* and *νεανιεύεσθαι*.

'This figure is an especial favourite with the Attic orators'.

'And this is why the use of it is unbecoming to an elderly man'—not because, as might be supposed from the arrangement of the sentences, it was such a favourite with the Attic orators but—because it is a *juvenile* trait of character, and as such must be inappropriate to the *opposite*.

[It may be doubted whether the awkward remark, *χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες*, which is a parenthetical note immediately succeeding another parenthesis and breaking the connexion between the beginning and the end of the section, was really written by Aristotle at all. The phrase *οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες*, which is not found elsewhere in Aristotle (though we have *οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες*, *infra* 17 § 10), is peculiarly open to suspicion, and may perhaps be ascribed to the pen of some Alexandrine critic familiar with the canon of the Ten 'Attic Orators'.]

## CHAP. XII.

We now return for the last time to the subject of propriety of style, on which in this chapter we have some concluding observations. Rhetorical propriety must shew itself in the due adaptation of style to matter; and consequently the three branches of Rhetoric must be treated each in its appropriate style. We therefore distinguish two kinds of speeches, and two styles appropriate to them; (1) 'debate', speaking in the actual strife or contest of the assembly and the law-court, ἀγω-

ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν, ἂν τι

νιστική λέξις, and (2) γραφική, written compositions, which are confined to the third or epideictic branch: and the first is again subdivided into (a) public speaking, popular harangues addressed to the assembly, and (b) forensic. This is only true in theory: in practice speeches were often written by the orators, as Demosthenes and Isocrates, for the use of those who were incompetent or unwilling to write and plead for themselves.

Under the head of γραφική λέξις are included all compositions which are intended to be read, and consequently the whole range of literature, with the exception of speeches which are intended to be *delivered* or *acted*, deliberative and forensic, *public* and *private* orations—such as those of Demosthenes. Thus the third branch of Rhetoric, the ἐπιδεικτική, is made to embrace all poetry, philosophy, history, and indeed any *writing* on any subject whatsoever. The distinction coincides with that of Hermogenes, *περὶ ἰδεῶν τομ.* β'. *περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου* (see *Rhet. Gr.* II. p. 401 seq. Spengel), who divides composition into λόγοι συμβουλευτικοί, δικανικοί, and πανηγυρικοί, the last including the works of Homer and Plato, the most distinguished of poets and prose writers.

The declamations delivered at the Olympian Games and other great public festivals or assemblies *πανηγύρεις*, whence the name *πανηγυρικοί λόγοι*—such as Isocrates' Panegyric<sup>1</sup> and Panathenaic orations, and Lysias' celebrated Ὀλυμπιακός, of which a short fragment is preserved, (*Or.* 33, Baier et Sauppe, *Or. Att.* I 146)—were intermediate between the public or agonistic and the epideictic or graphic speeches, partaking of the character of both; being declaimed in public and sometimes with a political object (as Lysias' speech, and some of Isocrates'), but that object was subordinate, the main consideration being always the display. Isocrates is always anxious to impress his readers with the conviction that his speeches are not mere empty declamations, ἐπιδείξεις, but genuine πολιτικοί λόγοι—are indeed a branch of Philosophy, which with him is pretty nearly convertible with Rhetoric, see *κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν* §§ 1, 11, 21, and Mr Sandys' note on Paneg. § 10. [<sup>1</sup> Isocrates means by "Philosophy" a combination of the accomplishments of the *ρήτωρ* and the *πολιτικός*'. Thompson's *Phaedrus*, p. 172.]

Isocrates, writing from his point of view, *ἀντιδ.* §§ 46—50, contrasts himself and his own declamations, which he calls Ἑλληνικοὺς καὶ πολιτικοὺς καὶ πανηγυρικοὺς, with δικανικοί λόγοι, forensic pleading and plead-ers, whom, probably in consequence of his own failure in that branch of Rhetoric, he attacks and vituperates upon intellectual, social, and moral grounds. Writing before the establishment of Aristotle's three-fold division of the art, he evidently recognises only two branches, public or political speaking, in which national interests are concerned—and at the head of these he places his own *πανηγυρικοί λόγοι*, the true philosophy (§ 50)—and judicial or forensic, in which private interests

<sup>1</sup> See on this, Mr Sandys' Introduction to *Isocratis Panegyricus*, p. XL seq.

βούληται μεταδούναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὃ περ πάσχουσιν  
2 οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν. ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικῇ

between man and man are debated and decided. In respect of style, he of course gives the preference to his own kind of composition, §§ 46, 7.

On this adaptation of style to the different kinds of oratory, see Quint. VIII 3. 11—14. The opening observation, at all events, looks like a reference to this chapter, though Spalding in his note is silent on the subject.

Whately also, in his *Rhet.* c. IV 'on Elocution', (*Encycl. Metrop.* p. 299 b, 300 a, 301 b.) has some good observations, partly derived from Aristotle, upon the contrast of the *agonistic* and *graphic* styles. On the contrast of the two, see by all means Isocr. Phil. §§ 25, 26: all the main points of interest in public and forensic, or agonistic, speeches are there enumerated, and the comparatively lifeless speeches *to be read*, forcibly contrasted with them. [Comp. also Alcidamas, *περὶ τῶν τοὺς γραπτῶν λόγων γραφόντων*, (against Isocrates).]

§ 1. 'It must not be forgotten (lost sight of) that a different kind of language is appropriate to each different kind (of Rhetoric). For the same style is not suitable to *written* composition (that which is intended *to be read*) and that which is used in *debate* (in the *contests*, the actual struggle, of real life; nor again in (the two divisions of the latter) public and forensic speaking. The orator must be acquainted with both: for the one (debate) implies the knowledge and power of clear expression in pure Greek, and the other freedom from the necessity (*lit.* the not being obliged to) of suppressing in silence (*κατά*, keeping down) anything that one may want to communicate to the rest of the world; which is the case with those who have no knowledge (or skill) of writing (i.e. composition)'. Comp. III 1. 7. Cicero, de Or. II 82. 337, gives a brief description of the 'grand' and dignified style appropriate to the exalted subjects of public speaking.

The meaning of this seems to be—the orator must be acquainted with the written as well as the debating style; the latter implies and requires only the correct use of one's native language, so that one may be able to make oneself clearly intelligible: *this* (debate alone) does not require the minute accuracy of studied composition, which can be examined at leisure and criticized: but since one who can only speak, and not write, is incapable of communicating his opinions to the rest of the world (τοῖς ἄλλοις, all others besides the members of the assembly or law-court that he is actually addressing), it is necessary for a statesman to acquire the power of writing well, and therefore to study in some degree the art of exact composition. Victorius, who renders τὸ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι—τοῖς ἄλλοις of actual writing, that is of *letters* to absent friends, seems to narrow the meaning of 'writing' in such a way as to produce a somewhat ridiculous result. Surely *any* educated man, whether he be an orator and statesman or not, requires and possesses the knowledge of *writing* in that sense. On τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, Thuc. II 60, 5—6 may serve as a commentary; Pericles, in his defence, describing his qualifications for a statesman, says οὐδενὸς οἶμαι ἥσσω εἶναι γυνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα

μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη. ταύτης δὲ δύο εἶδη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ παθητικὴ. διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τοιούτους. Βαστάζονται καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα... ὃ τε γὰρ γνούς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθῃ.

§ 2. 'The written style is the most exact' (or finished: on ἀκρίβεια and its various senses, see Grant ad Eth. Nic. I 7. 18, and the references in Introd. ad h. l. p. 334, note 4), 'that of debate lends itself most to acting' (or delivery: is the 'most capable of being acted'). Comp. III 1. 4. The reason of this as far as *declamation* is concerned, viz. why the *graphic* style admits of more ornament and artificial arrangement than the other, is thus stated by Cicero, Orat. I.XI 208. After the invention of the period, &c., he says, *nemo qui aliquo esset in numero scripsit orationem generis eius, quod esset ad delectationem comparatum remotumque a iudiciis forensique certamine, quin redigeret omnes fere in quadrum numerumque sententias. Nam quum is est auditor, qui non vereatur ne compositae orationis insidiis sua fides attemptatur, gratiam quoque habet oratori voluptati aurium servienti.*

'Of this (ἀγωνιστικὴ) there are two kinds; one that (includes, conveys,) represents *character*, the other *emotion* (in the speech)'. That is, not that ἀγωνιστικὴ is a *genus*, containing two *species* under it, moral and emotional: for this is not the fact, and also *any* speech may have *both*: but that these two elements belong specially, not exclusively, to the two debating branches of Rhetoric, of which they are very prominent ingredients: the reality of the interests at stake giving more room for the play of passion and the assumption of character than the cold unimpassioned, deliberate *written* compositions. The ethical part is of two kinds, the *ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*, I 2. 4, II 1. 4, and the *characters ἦθος* of the several ages and conditions, II 12. 17. The emotional is of course that which is partially described I 2. 5, and treated at length in II 2. 16. Of these 'appeals to the feelings', δεινώσις and ἔλεος, the earlier rhetorical treatises were full, I 1. 3, of which Thrasyarchus' ἔλεος (III 1. 7) described by Plato, Phaedr. 267 C, was a well-known specimen. Quint. III 8. 12, (In concionibus deliberatio) *affectus, ut quae maxima, postulat, seq. Valet autem in consiliis auctoritas* (this is principally due to ἦθος) *plurimum*, seq. See III 7. 1, 3, 6, where the two are described. The ἦθος is there confined to those of age, nation, station, &c. Compare with all this, Demetr. π. ἐρμηνείας § 193, ἐναγώνιος μὲν οὖν ἴσως μᾶλλον ἢ διαλελυμένη λέξις, αὕτη καὶ ὑποκριτικὴ καλεῖται· κινεῖ γὰρ ὑπόκρισιν ἢ λύσιν. γραφικὴ δὲ λέξις ἡ εὐανάγνωστος. αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ συνηρημένη καὶ οἷον ἡσφαλισμένη τοῖς συνδέσμοις. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Μένανδρον ὑποκρίνονται λελυμένον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, Φιλήμονα δὲ ἀναγινώσκουσιν.

'And this is why actors also (as well as debaters) hunt after (διώκουσι) plays of this kind (that is, plays of which the subjects give scope for the exhibitions of passion and character), and the poets after persons (whether actors to represent the πάθη, or characters in the dramas to be represented with them) of the same kind. At the same time, the poets

δὲ οἱ ἀναγνωστικοί, οἷον Χαιρήμων (ἀκριβὴς γὰρ ὥσπερ λογογράφος) καὶ Λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν. καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι οἱ μὲν τῶν γραφικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι στενοὶ φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ τῶν ρητόρων

that can be read (that write to be read as well as acted or rhapsodised) become pocket-companions, or favourites'.

βαστάζεσθαι is said of anything that is carried about in the hand or arms, fondled, cherished, fondly and familiarly treated, like a baby or pet lapdog; and hence when applied to a book naturally means one that people are fond of, and carry about with them in their pockets. There are several instances in Sophocles—see Ellendt's Lex.—that illustrate this sense of βαστάζεσθαι, as Philoct. 655 of the *favourite* bow and 657, (Neopt.) ἔστιν ὅστε...καὶ βαστάσαι με (be allowed to *nurse* it), προσκύσαι θ' ὥσπερ θεόν; Aesch. Agam. 34, εὐφιλῇ χέρα ἄνακτος τῇδε βαστάσαι (to press and caress) χέρι (Blomfield's Glos. ad loc.). Quint. VIII 3. 12, of any striking sentiment or expression, *intuendum* (to be narrowly looked into) *et faene* pertractandum.

'Chaeremon for instance who is as exact (highly finished) as a professional speech-writer (such as Isocrates), and Licymnius amongst the dithyrambic poets'. On Chaeremon, see note II 23. 29, ult. [The ἀκρίβεια of Chaeremon may be illustrated by his partiality for minute details, such as enumerating the flowers of a garland, e.g. Athenaeus xv p. 679 F, κίσσῳ τε ναρκίσσῳ τε τριέλικας κύκλῳ στεφάνων ἐλκιδῶν.] On λογογράφος, see II 11. 7; Shilleto on Dem. de F. L. § 274. Licymnius is mentioned above, III 2. 13, where reference is made to *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX. Vol. III pp. 255—7, for an account of what is known of him; and again III 13. 5.

'And upon comparison the (speeches, λόγοι) of the *writers* when delivered in actual contests have a narrow, confined, contracted (i.e. poor, mean, paltry) appearance, whilst those of the orators (meaning particularly the *public* speakers, in the assembly), which by their skilful delivery succeed or pass muster' (none of this is *expressed* but 'well delivered'), 'when taken in the hands (to read) look like the work of mere bunglers or novices'. στενός is the Latin *tenuis*, and the English *slight* and *slender*, in a contemptuous and depreciatory sense. In its primary sense of *narrow* it stands in opposition, in respect of style, to the wider range, and the broader, *larger*, freer, bolder, tone required by the loftier and more comprehensive subjects, and also by the larger audiences, of public speakers; the high finish and minute artifices of structure, as well as the subtler and finer shades of intonation and expression, are lost in a crowd and in the open air. So Whately, *Rhet.* ch. IV (*Encycl. Metrop.* p. 301 a), describes the *agonistic* style, as "a style somewhat more blunt (than the *graphic*) and homely, more simple and, apparently, unstudied in its structure, and at the same time more daringly energetic." στενοὶ then

<sup>1</sup> [So in Introd. p. 325, after Victorius and Majoragius, but compare Mr Cope's second thoughts as given in the *note* on the same page: "εὖ λεχθέντες can mean nothing but 'well spoken of', *ρήtropes* being understood."]



εὖ λεχθέντες ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἀρμόττει· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ ἀφηρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, ὅλον τὰ τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὁρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ ἀγωνιστικῇ καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι γὰρ

represents the comparative *narrowness* or confined character of the graphic style, with its studied artificial graces, careful composition, and other such 'paltrinesses', 'things mean and trifling'—a sense in which it occurs in a parallel passage of Pl. Gorg. 497 C, where *σμικρὰ καὶ στενά* are contemptuously applied by Callicles to Socrates' dialectics. This is actually said of *Isocrates*, in the passage of Dionysius, de Isocr. Iud. c. 13, by Hieronymus, the philosopher of Rhodes; ἀναγνῶναι μὲν ἂν τινα δυνηθῆναι τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ (Isocr.) καλῶς, δημηγορῆσαι δὲ τήν τε φωνήν καὶ τὸν τόνον ἐπάραντα, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ κατασκευῇ μετὰ τῆς ἀρμοττοῦσης ὑποκρίσεως εἰπεῖν, οὐ παντελῶς.

[ἰδιωτικοί] such as have only the *capacity* (-κός) of unprofessional persons, or *laymen* in art, &c. as opposed to *clerks*, when all science and learning were in the hands of the clergy. ἰδιώτης is opposed to *δημιουργός*, a practitioner of *any* art, science, profession, or pursuit: and especially to philosophy and its professors, as in the adage, ἰδιώτης ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος ἐν ἰδιώταις.

Spengel follows MS A<sup>c</sup> (or A) in reading *ἡ τῶν λεχθέντων* for *εὖ λεχθέντες*. But I confess that I do not see who could be intended by *τῶν λεχθέντων* besides the orators. Certainly not the preceding ἀναγνωστικοί.

[ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν] This must have been the case with Cicero's rival, Hortensius. Quintilian [XI 3. 8], after telling us that Hortensius was, during his lifetime, first thought to be chief of all orators, secondly Cicero's rival, and thirdly second to him alone, adds, *ut appareat placuisse aliquid eo dicente quod legentes non invenimus* (the same may be said of many sermons). Isocrates' Phil. §§ 25, 26, an excellent commentary on this, is unfortunately too long to quote.

'The reason is that their appropriate place is in an actual contest or debate' (with ἀρμόττει supply, if you please, ταῦτα as the nomin.—it means at all events the subject of the immediately preceding clause): 'and this also is why things (speeches) intended to be *acted* or delivered (*lit.* proper to be, or capable of being, -κός), when the delivery is withdrawn don't produce their own proper effect (or perform their *special function*, ἔργον), and so appear silly: for instance *asyndeta*, and the reiteration of the same word in the written, *graphic* style'—with which the agonistic divested of its acting or delivery is now (surreptitiously) associated—'are rightly disapproved; whereas in debating the orators *do* employ them, because they are proper for acting'. Aquila c. 30 (ap. Gaisford, *Not. Var.*), *Ideoque et Aristoteli et iteratio ipsa verborum ac nominum et repetitio frequentior, et omnis huius modi motus actioni magis et certamini quam stilo videtur convenire.*

3 ὑποκριτικά. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντας· ὁ περὶ ὡς προοδοποιεῖ τῷ ὑποκρίνεσθαι. “οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ κλέψας ὑμῶν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐξαπατήσας, οὗτος ὁ τὸ ἔσχατον προδοῦναι ἐπιχειρήσας.” οἶον καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ ὑποκριτὴς ἐποίει ἐν τε τῇ Ἀναξανδρίδου γεροντομανίᾳ, ὅτε λέγει Ῥαδάμανθους καὶ Παλαμήδης, καὶ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν εὐσεβῶν τὸ ἐγὼ· ἐὰν γάρ τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ὑποκρίνηται, γίγνεται ὁ

§ 3. What follows is a *note*, a passing observation suggested by the subject, but not immediately connected with it. ‘In this repetition of the same thing, some change must be made in the mode of expression of each member of it’: (the repetition should be made in different words, to avoid monotony. See on the interpretation of this, and the figure μεταβολή; to which μεταβάλλειν points, a full explanation, Introd. p. 326, and note 1:) ‘which paves the way as it were for the delivery’ (on προοδοποιεῖ, see note on I 1. 2). “‘This is he that *stole* from you, this is he that *cheated* you, this is he that last of all attempted to *betray* you’”. (From an unknown rhetorician; most probably not the author’s own.) ‘And again, as another instance, what Philemon the actor (not to be confounded with the Comic poet) used to do in Anaxandrides’ *Old men’s madness*, where (lit. *when*, ὅτε) he says (uses the words in playing his part) “Rhadamanthys and Palamedes,” and also, in the prologue of the *Devotees*, the word ἐγώ: for if such things (phrases, sentences, or words) as these be not (varied) in the delivery, they become like “*the* man that carries the beam,” in the proverb (τήν), i.e. stiff and awkward, like one that has ‘swallowed a poker’, as *our* proverb has it.

Anaxandrides, quoted before, III 10. 7. The first citation from his comedy, the γεροντομανία, has the rest of the verse supplied in Athen. XIV 614 C, καὶ τοι πολὺ γε πονοῦμεν. τὸν ἀσύμβολον εὔρε γελοῖα λέγειν Ῥαδάμανθους καὶ Παλαμήδης. On the passage of Aristotle, which he quotes, Meineke, *Fr. Comic. Gr.* III 166, has the following remark: “Philemon autem quid fecerit in recitandis verbis P. καὶ Π., non satis apparet.” I don’t suppose the repetition to have been confined to these words; all that Aristotle means to say seems to be, when Philemon had come to that point, thereabouts, the repetition took place. “Num forte eadem verba in pluribus deinceps versibus recitabantur et alio atque alio vocis flexu et sono ab histrione recitabantur? (This follows Victorius’ interpretation of μεταβάλλειν.) Ita sane videtur, neque alia alterius loci fuerit ratio, in quo identidem repetebatur pronomen ἐγώ.” At all events, these were two notorious and well-remembered *points* made by Philemon in this *varied* repetition in acting the character which he sustained in these two comedies. There is, or was, a similar tradition (which I heard from Dr Butler, the late Bp of Lichfield, and Master of Shrewsbury School) of the effect produced by Garrick’s rendering of *Pray you undo this button*:—*thank you, sir*,—of Lear, choking in his agony, at the point of death [v. III. 309].

4 τὴν δοκὸν φέρων. καὶ τὰ ἀσύνδετα ὡσαύτως· “ἦλθον, p. 134.  
ἀπήντησα, ἐδεόμην.” ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ  
ὡς ἐν λέγοντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἦθει καὶ τόνῳ εἶπειν. ἔτι  
ἔχει ἰδίον τι τὰ ἀσύνδετα· ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ πολλὰ  
δοκεῖ εἰρηῆσθαι· ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλὰ,  
ὥστ’ ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δηλὸν ὅτι τούναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἐν  
πολλὰ. ἔχει οὖν αὖξισιν. “ἦλθον, διελέχθην, ἐκέ-  
τευσα.” πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπεν. τοῦτο δὲ P. 1414.  
βούλεται ποιεῖν καὶ Ὀμηρος ἐν τῷ

§ 4. ‘And of *asyndeton* the same may be said, “I came, I met, I implored”’. I have translated this upon the supposition that there is no intention of distinguishing here the aorist and imperfect: ‘for (here again) delivery (i. e. intonation) must come into play, and it must not be spoken as if it were all one, with the same *character* and accent’. Of *ἀσύνδετον* or *λύσις*, the disconnected style, in which *σύνδεσμοι* ‘connecting particles’ are absent, comp. Demetrius, π. ἐρμηνείας § 194, ὅτι δὲ ὑποκριτικὸν ἢ λύσις παράδειγμα ἐγκείσθω τόδε, ἐδεξάμην, ἔτικτον, ἐκτρέφω, φίλε (Menander, *Fr. Inc.* 230, Meineke, u. s. IV 284). οὕτως γὰρ λελυμένον ἀναγκάσει καὶ τὸν μὴ θέλοντα ὑποκρίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν λύσιν· εἰ δὲ συνδήσας εἶποις, ἐδεξάμην καὶ ἔτικτον καὶ ἐκτρέφω, πολλὴν ἀπάθειαν τοῖς συνδέσμοις ἐμβαλεῖς. Of *asyndeton* two examples are given from Demosthenes by Hermogenes π. μεθόδου δεινότητος, § 11, *Rhet. Gr.* II 435, Spengel.

A good example of *asyndeton*, illustrating the rapidity and vivacity which it imparts to style, is supplied by Victorius from Demosth. c. Androt. § 68, ὁμοῦ μετοίκους, Ἀθηναίους, δέων, ἀπάγων, βοῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος. Add Cicero’s *abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit*.

The vivacity imparted to style by *asyndeton* and the opposite (the employment of connecting particles) is admirably explained and illustrated by Campbell, *Phil. of Rhet.* Bk. III sect. 2, near the end (2nd ed. Vol. II pp. 287—293.)

‘Further *asyndeta* have a certain special property; that (by their aid) many things seem to be said in the same time’ (as *one* thing would be, if they had been employed); ‘because the connecting particle (or connexion) converts several things into one, (Harris, *Hermes*, II 2, p. 240,) and therefore if it be withdrawn (extracted), plainly the contrary will take place; one will become many. Accordingly (the *asyndeton*) exaggerates (or amplifies: or multiplies, increases the number)<sup>1</sup>: “I came, I conversed, I supplicated”: (the hearer or reader) seems to overlook or survey a number of things that he (the speaker) said’. (I have followed Bekker, Ed. 3, πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπεν. Spengel has, πολλὰ δοκεῖ,

<sup>1</sup> The opposite of this, the employment of *σύνδεσμοι*, sometimes tends to produce the same effect. Demetr. π. ἐρμηνείας, § 54, ὡς παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ (II. B 497), τῶν Βοιωτικῶν πολέων τὰ ὀνόματα εὐτελῆ ὄντα καὶ μικρὰ ὄγκῳ τινα ἔχει καὶ μέγεθος διὰ τοὺς συνδέσμους κ.τ.λ., and again, § 63.

Νιρεὺς αὖ Σύμηθεν,  
Νιρεὺς Ἀγλαΐης,  
Νιρεὺς ὃς κάλλιστος.

περὶ οὗ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴρηται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις  
εἰρησθαι· εἰ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὥστε  
ἠϋξησεν ἅπαξ μνησθεῖς διὰ τὸν παραλογισμόν, καὶ  
μνήμην πεποίηκεν, οὐδαμοῦ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον  
ποιησάμενος.

5 ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικε τῇ

ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπον, which does *not* agree with MS A<sup>c</sup>, and is also obscure. Bekker, Ed. 1, has πολλά· δοκεῖ δὲ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπον, ὅσα φημί).

‘And this is *Homer’s* intention also in writing Nireus at the commencement of three lines running’. II. II 671. On this Demetrius, π. ἐρμηνείας §§ 61, 62, τὸν δὲ Νιρέα, αὐτὸν τε ὄντα μικρὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτοῦ μικρότερα—all this is raised to magnitude and importance by ἐπαναφορά, repetition, and διάλυσις, *asyndeton*. He then quotes the three lines; and, § 62, continues, καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαξ τοῦ Νιρέως ὀνομασθέντος ἐν τῷ δράματι (dramatic poetry) μεμνήμεθα οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεώς, καίτοι κατ’ ἔπος ἕκαστον καλουμένων σχεδὸν κ.τ.λ. concluding with an ingenious simile; ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐστιάσεσι τὰ ὀλίγα διαταχθέντα πως (a few meats by a certain disposition or arrangement) πολλὰ φαίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς λόγοις. Comp. also Hermogenes, περὶ ἐπαναληψέως, de repetitione, π. μεθόδου δεινότητος, § 9 (*Rhet. Gr.* II 433, Spengel), who gives this example of Nireus, with others from Homer, Xenophon, and Demosthenes. Illustrations of this emphatic repetition, and especially of that of the pronoun αὐτός, occur in a fragm. of Aeschyl., *Fragm. Inc.* 266, quoted at length in Plat. Rep. II 383 B, the most forcible of them all: καγὼ (Thetis) τὸ Φοῖβον θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικὴ βρῦνον τέχνη. ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς ὑμῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοῇ παρών, αὐτὸς τὰδ’ εἰπών, αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ κτανὼν τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν. After this it will be unnecessary to quote inferior specimens; such as Xen. Anab. III 2. 4, Aesch. Eumen. 765, with Paley’s note, and Blomfield’s note on 745, in Linwood’s ed. p. 188, where several references are given.

‘For a person (or thing) of which many things are said must necessarily be often mentioned; and therefore (this is a fallacy) they think it follows (καί, that it is *also* true) that if the name is often repeated, there must be a great deal to say about its owner: so that by this fallacy (the poet) magnifies (Nireus) by mentioning him only once (i.e. in one place), and makes him famous though he nowhere afterwards speaks of him again’. This is the fallacy of illicit conversion of antecedent and consequent, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 1, ὁ δὲ παρεπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἶσθαι ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολουθήσιν κ.τ.λ. and Rhet. I 7. 5. Analogous to this is the fallacy exposed in III 7. 4.

§ 5. It seems as if in the following section Aristotle had, probably unconsciously misled by the ambiguous term, used ἀκριβής and its πτώ-

σκιαγραφία· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ἢ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρωτέρῳ ἢ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περιέργα καὶ χεῖρω φαί-

σεις in two distinct senses: exactness and high finish in *style* and *reasoning*. The general subject and connexion of the chapter will oblige us to refer the first clause, with its comparison of public speaking to a rough sketch in black and white, without details, and producing no effect on close inspection, to the *style* of the speech—which indeed is the subject of the whole book as well as this chapter—though it may possibly include also minute details of reasoning. The same thing may be said of ἡ δίκη ἀκριβέστερον: in this the style *and* the argument may be minuter, exacter and more detailed in proportion to the diminished size of the audience, and the increased probability of their paying attention to such things (see note ad loc.). But when we come to the third degree, the single judge, it seems to be false and absurd to say that exactness and high finish of *style* is *more* suited to speeches addressed to him: no man would endeavour to attract or impose upon an *arbitrator* by such artifices. The exactness in this case seems therefore to be confined to exactness of reasoning and minute detail, as of evidence and the like. A single judge—as in our own courts—would always be more patient, more inclined to listen to, and more influenced by, exact reasoning and circumstantial evidence than either of the two preceding: the mob of the assembly would not hear them, nor follow them, nor listen to them at all: the large body of dicasts would be more ready to do so: but most of all the single judge. The last clause of the section brings us back to the point from which it started, viz. differences of style, and *seems* to apply this exclusively to what has been said of ἀκριβεια in forensic pleading.

‘Now the style of public-speaking is exactly like scene-painting; for the greater the crowd, the more distant the point of view, and consequently’ (in these crowded assemblies; held too in the open air—which should be added in respect of the style required, though this does not *distinguish* it from forensic rhetoric,) ‘all exactness, minute and delicate touches, and high finish in general appear to be superfluous and for the worse (deviating from the true standard of *public* speaking) in both’. Compare with this Whately’s remarks, partly borrowed from Ar., *Rhet.* c. IV (*Encycl. Metrop.* p. 299), on the “*bolder*, as well as less accurate, kind of language allowable and advisable in speaking to a considerable number”: he quotes Ar.’s comparison of scene-painting, and then proceeds “to account for these phenomena”—which Ar. has omitted to do. His explanation is derived from the various sympathies which are especially awakened in a great crowd.

σκιαγραφία is a painting in outline and *chiaroscuro*, or light and shade, without colour, and intended to produce its effect only *at a distance*—herein lies the analogy to public speaking—consequently rough and unfinished, because *from the distance* all niceties and refinements in style and finish would be entirely thrown away (περίεργα). This point is well brought out in a parallel passage of Plat. Theaet. 208 E, νῦν δὲ τα, ὃ Θ., παντάσῃ γε ἔγωγε ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνήμι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως ἀφεστήκη πόρρωθεν ἐφαίνεται μοί τι λέγεσθαι

νεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἡ δὲ δικανικὴ<sup>1</sup> ἀκριβεστέρα. ἔτι  
 δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐνὶ κριτῇ· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν ῥητο-  
 ρικοῖς· εὐσύνοπτον γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγ-

<sup>1</sup> *Correxuit Tyrwhitt; secutus est Bekker<sup>3</sup> et Spengel.* MSS δίκη ἀκριβέστερον.

(Heindorf, note ad loc.): "as long as he was at a distance he seemed to understand the meaning of what was said; on a nearer approach all the apparent clearness vanished, and it became confused and indistinct." In Phaedo, 69 B, σκιαγραφία is a mere rough sketch or outline; a daub, without any distinct features (see Wytttenbach ad loc.). Parmen. 165 C, οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα, ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα, ... προσελθόντι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα. Rep. X 602 D. Ib. II 365 C, where it has the same sense as in the Phaedo. Ast ad loc. Comm. p. 410. And in several other passages of Plato. As the point of comparison here is solely the difference between the near and distant effects, I have translated it 'scene-painting' (as also Whately) which represents this better to us: the proper and literal meaning of the word is "the outline of a shadow", the supposed origin of painting. See further in Mr Wornum's art. on 'painting', in *Dict. Ant.* p. 680 b. With πορρωτέρω ἢ θέα, comp. de Soph. El. I 164 b 27, where the 'appearance' as opposed to the 'reality', is compared to this distant view, φαίνεται δὲ δι' ἀπειρίαν· οἱ γὰρ ἀπειροὶ ὥσπερ ἂν ἀπέχοντες πόρρωθεν θεωροῦσιν.

ἡ δὲ δίκη ἀκριβέστερον] 'Whereas justice (forensic pleading) admits of more exactness and finish'. The audience is less numerous, and *nearer*, literally and metaphorically, to the speaker; they are *nearer* to him locally, so they can *hear* better what he says, and also *nearer* to him in respect of the knowledge of persons and circumstances, which permits him to enter into more minute detail. Also they are not personally interested in the dispute, and can afford to bestow more attention upon *minutiae* of style, action, intonation, and such like, and being comparatively unoccupied are more likely to notice and criticize such things. All these are reasons why ἡ δίκη is ἀκριβέστερον in various senses. See Quint. III 8.62 seq. After speaking of the declamatory style, he continues, *Alia veris consiliis ratio est; ideoque Theophrastus quam maxime remotum ab omni affectatione in deliberativo genere voluit esse sermonem: secutus in hoc auctoritatem praeceptoris sui; quanquam dissentire ab eo non timide solet. Namque Aristoteles idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam, proximamque ab ea iudicalem putavit et seq.*

'And still further (in respect of the reduction of the number of hearers, and the consequent admissibility of accuracy and finish in the speech) that (*subaudi* δίκη, the pleading) before a single judge: for he is least of all subject to (liable to be imposed on by) rhetorical artifices (appeals to the feelings and the like): for he takes a more comprehensive view of what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it (this seems to define the kind of ἀκρίβεια that is here intended) and the *contest* is absent (there is no room for partisanship and prejudice) and his judgment clear or pure (i.e. free and unbiassed; *sincerum*, pure of all alloy, such as the preceding). And this is why the

ματος καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπεστιν, ὥστε καθαρά ἢ κρίσις. διὸ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις εἰδοκιμοῦσι ρήτορες· ἀλλ' ὅπου μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως, ἐνταῦθα ἤκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἐνι. τοῦτο δέ, ὅπου φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης.

6 ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις· δευτέρα δὲ ἡ δικανικὴ. τὸ δὲ

same orators don't succeed (become popular, distinguish themselves) in all these (at once): but where action or delivery is most required, there is least of exact finish to be found'. [With ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπεστιν comp. Cic. ad Att. I 16. 8 *remoto illo studio contentionis quem agōna vos appellatis*.]

With μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως something must be supplied: whether we should understand δέι or the like; or simply ἐστί, 'when it (the speech, or the thing in general,) belongs to, is concerned with, when it is a question of, delivery'. 'And this where voice is required, and especially loud voice' (to reach a larger assembly).

φωνή, voice in general, means the various qualities of voice, flexibility, sweetness, power, &c.; out of which a powerful voice is especially distinguished as the most important. It seems that Aeschines was very proud of his sonorous voice. Demosth. alludes to this, de F. L. § 388, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλλως ἐνταῦθ' ἐπαρεῖ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ πεφωνασκηκὼς ἔσται. And § 389, καὶ τοι καὶ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἴσως εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη· πάνν γὰρ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ φρονεῖν αὐτὸν ἀκούω. And elsewhere.

§ 6. 'So now, as I was saying, the demonstrative, declamatory, branch of Rhetoric is the best adapted for writing; for its special function (the purpose which it was made to serve, its ἔργον<sup>1</sup>) is reading: and in the second degree the dicastic branch' (and its pleadings). Comp. *supra* III 1.4 and 7. Cic. Orat. LXI 208 (already referred to). Quint. u. s. (III 8.63) referring to this place, *Namque Ar. idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam, proximamque ab ea iudicalem putavit: videlicet quoniam prior illa tota esset ostentationis; haec secunda egeret artis, vel ad fallendum, si ita poposcisset utilitas; consilia fide prudentiaque constarent*. It is very manifest, and had already been pointed out by Victorius and Spalding, ad loc. Arist. et Quint., that this is not Aristotle's meaning.

'To make the further distinction, that the language must be sweet and magnificent is superfluous'—the author of this 'distinction' is Theodectes, in his 'Art.' Quint. IV 2.63, *Theodectes...non magnificam modo vult esse, verum etiam iucundam expositionem*—'for why that more

<sup>1</sup> The ἔργον of a thing is always directed to its τέλος. If the end of a knife and of a horse be respectively to cut and to run, their ἔργον will be fulfilled in sharpness and fleetness. So here the end of one of these compositions is to be read, its ἔργον or appropriate function is exercised in reading, fulfilled in being pleasant to read.

προσδιαιρεῖσθαι τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἡδεῖαν δεῖ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῇ, περιέργον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ σῶφρονα καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη ἥθους ἀρετὴ; τὸ γὰρ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι ποιήσει δῆλον ὅτι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ὠρίσται ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς λέξεως· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα δεῖ σαφῇ καὶ μὴ ταπεινῇ εἶναι ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν; ἂν τε γὰρ ἀδολεσχῇ, οὐ σαφής, οὐδὲ ἂν σύντομος. ἀλλὰ p. 135. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἀρμόττει. καὶ τὸ ἡδεῖαν τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει, ἂν εὖ μιχθῇ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικόν, καὶ ὁ ῥυθμός, καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρέποντος.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως εἴρηται, καὶ κοινῇ περὶ πάντων καὶ ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ

than continent (or perhaps *discreet*) and liberal, or any other virtue of character (the moral virtues, of which *μεγαλοπρέπεια* is one. Eth. Nic. II and IV)?' For *προσδιαιρεῖσθαι*, Brandis' *Αποκρυμνισμὸς*, quoted in Schneidewin's *Philologus* [IV. i.] p. 45, has *προσδιορίζεσθαι*.

'For plainly the *sweetness* will be produced by all that has been enumerated (purity, propriety, rhythm, vivacity, and the rest) if we have rightly defined what the excellence of the language consists in: for why (else, *subaudi* ἄλλον) must it be (as we have described it) clear, and not low (mean and common-place), but appropriate (ch. 2 § 2, *μὴ ταπεινῇ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένῃ, σεμνοτέρᾳ*, § 3 *ξήνη*)? For if it be verbose, it is not clear; nor if it be too concise (brief)'. *Brevitas esse laboro, obscurus fio.* ἀδολεσχεῖν, said of idle chatter: here of verbosity, vain repetition, tautology. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχεῖν τὸν προδιαλεγόμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πολλάκις ἀναγκάσθαι (by the opponent) ταῦτο λέγειν. Comp. *supra* c. 3.3, τὸ ἀσαφές διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν, and II 21.3, where it is applied to unnecessary accumulation of steps of proof in reasoning, or drawing inferences.

'But (on the contrary) it is quite plain (of itself, and without rule or precept) that *the mean* is the appropriate style'. Of this the preceding example is an illustration: clearness or perspicuity is the mean between the excess of garrulity, verbosity, and the defect overconciseness, in the *amount of words*. 'Also the rules (ingredients) already stated will produce sweetness of language if they be well mixed, viz. the familiar (these are the *ὀνόματα κύρια*, the customary), and the foreign (*γλῶτται, ἐξηλλαγμένα, ξήνην τὴν διάλεκτον*, c. 2 § 3, c. 3 § 3, sub init. *ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν*), and the rhythm, and the plausibility that arises out of (the due observation of) propriety' (*supra* c. 7).

'We have now finished our remarks upon style or language, of all (the three branches of Rhetoric) in common (cc. 2—11), and of each kind individually (c. 12): it now remains to speak of the order (division and arrangement) of the parts of the speech'.



Ι τάξεως εἰπεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη· ἀναγ- CHAP. XIII.  
καῖον γὰρ τό τε πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τότ'  
ἀποδείξαι. διὸ εἰπόντα μὴ ἀποδείξαι ἢ ἀποδείξαι μὴ  
προειπόντα ἀδύνατον· ὃ τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύων τι ἀπο-  
δείκνυσι, καὶ ὁ προλέγων ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀποδείξαι προ-

## CHAP. XIII.

Of the two divisions of this third book, proposed at the conclusion of Bk. II, and the opening of Bk. III, *περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως, πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου*, the first having been dispatched in the preceding chapters 2—12, we now proceed to the second, on the arrangement of the parts of the speech: this will include a criticism of the anterior, and the current, divisions, with a new classification in c. 13: and an explanation and discussion of the proper contents of each. A full account of the various divisions which prevailed before and after Aristotle has been already given in the *Introd.* p. 331, 332, and the notes, and need not be here repeated. It will be sufficient to say that Aristotle in this chapter takes the fourfold division, adopted by Isocrates, and accepted by his followers, as the author of the *Rhet. ad Alex.*, viz. *προοίμιον, διηγήσεις, πίστεις, ἐπίλογος*, criticizes it, and reduces it to two, *πρόθεσις* and *πίστεις*, as the only two parts *necessary* to the speech; adding notices of some superfluous distinctions introduced by Theodorus (of Byzantium) and Licymnius. [See Rössler's pamphlet, *Rhetorum antiquorum de dispositione doctrina*, pp. 30, Budissin, 1866; and Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, § 38.]

On the importance attached to the arrangement of the topics of these divisions, and especially to the order of the *proofs*, Whately has some good remarks, *Rhet. c. 1 (Encycl. Metrop. p. 256)*. This is illustrated by the contest between Demosthenes and Aeschines. "Aeschines strongly urged the judges (in the celebrated contest for the Crown) to confine his adversary to the same order in his reply to the charges brought which he himself had observed in bringing them forward. Demosthenes however was far too skilful to be thus entrapped; and so much importance does he attach to the point, that he opens his speech with a most solemn appeal to the judges for an impartial hearing; which implies, he says, not only a rejection of prejudice, but no less also a permission for each speaker to adopt whatever *arrangement* he should think fit. And accordingly he proceeds to adopt one very different from that which his antagonist had laid down; for he was no less sensible than his rival that the same arrangement which is the most favourable to one side, is likely to be least favourable to the other."

§ 1. 'Of the speech there are (only) two parts: for it is only necessary first to state the subject, and then to prove (your side of) it. It follows from this necessary relation between them (*διώ*), that it is impossible (if the speech is to be complete) either to state your case without going on to prove it, or to prove it without having first stated it', (the *impossibility* lies in the absurdity of the supposition: it is a *moral*

- 2 λέγει. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσις ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ πίστις, argumenti  
ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα τὸ δὲ  
 3 ἀποδείξις. νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως· διήγησις γάρ narratio  
 πού τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνου λόγου ἐστίν, ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ  
 καὶ δημηγορικοῦ πῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διήγησιν οἶαν

impossibility): 'for proving implies *something* to prove, and a preliminary statement is made in order to be proved'. All this implies that the speaker has some object in view, some case to make out. It would not apply to all declamations; though it is true that, as a general rule, even they try to prove *something*, however absurd it may be.

§ 2. 'Of these the one is the statement of the case (the *setting forth* of all its circumstances, as a foundation for judgment and argument), the other the (rhetorical) arguments in support of it, just as if the division were (the dialectical one) the problem (alternative *question* proposed or stated) and its demonstration'. *πρόθεσις, propositio*: Rhet. ad Al. c. 29 (30). 2, προεκτιθέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα. Ib. § 21, τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐκθήσομεν. c. 35 (36). 1, φροίμαστέον...πρῶτον προθεμένους τὰς προθέσεις: *πίστις confirmatio*. "πρόβλημα διαλεκτικὸν θέωρημα, Top. A 11, 104 b 1, quod in disputando quaestione bipartita efferri solebat, ex. gr. voluptas estne expetenda, annon? mundus estne aeternus, annon?" Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Ar.* § 42, p. 118.

§ 3. 'The present' (current, Isocrates) 'division is absurd; for surely *narrative* (διήγησις *narratio*, the detailed description of the circumstances of the case) belongs only to the forensic speech, but in a demonstrative or public speech how can there be a *narrative* such as they describe, or a *reply to the opponent*; or an epilogue (peroration) in argumentative or demonstrative speeches?' On this Quint. says, III 9. 5, *Tamen nec iis assentior qui detrahunt refutationem* (sc. τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον) *tantum probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles; haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat. Hoc quoque idem aliquatenus novat, quod prooemio non narrationem subiungit, sed propositionem.* (This is one of Quintilian's ordinary misrepresentations of writers whom he quotes. Ar. says nothing here of the *prooemium*, theoretically disallowing it: though in compliance with the received custom he afterwards gives an account of it and its contents). *Verum id facit quia propositio genus, narratio species videtur: et hac non semper, illa semper et ubique credit opus esse.* The last clause very well explains Ar.'s substitution of *πρόθεσις* for (*προοίμιον and*) *διήγησις*.

In Introd. p. 333, I have given at length from Cic. de Inv. I 19. 27, the distinction of *διήγησις* in its ordinary sense and *πρόθεσις*. It is here said that the *narrative* or statement of the case, strictly speaking, belongs (he means *necessarily* belongs) only to the forensic branch of Rhetoric: *there* there is always a case to state: in the declamatory, panegyric branch, not a *regular* systematic narrative or detailed statement as of a case; in this the *διήγησις* is dispersed over the whole speech, *infra* 16. 1: and, in *δημηγορία* equally, there is not universally or necessarily, as in the law-speech, a *διήγησις*, because

κινωραιο

λέγουσιν, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον, ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν P. 1414b.  
ἀποδεικτικῶν; προοίμιον δὲ καὶ ἀντιπαραβολὴ καὶ  
ἐπάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντι-  
λογία ᾖ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία πολ-

its time is the future, and a narrative of things future is impossible: when it is used, it is to recall the memory of *past facts* for the purpose of comparison—which is a very different thing from the forensic διήγησις. Comp. c. 16. 11. The author of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 30 (31) includes διήγησις in the deliberative branch, δημηγορικὸν γένος; no doubt following Isocrates. On διήγησις see Dionysius Hal., Ars Rhet. c. x § 14.

The same argument applies to the *refutatio*, τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον, and with more force than to the preceding, for in the epideictic branch there is no adversary, and therefore can be no refutation of his arguments, at least such as those who lay down this division intend: though it is true that a panegyrist *may* have to meet adverse statements or imputations on the object of his panegyric, real or supposed. In fact, it is only in the forensic branch that there is *necessarily* an opponent. On this division, see III 17. 14, 15.

ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν] This is understood by Victorius, Majoragius, and Schrader of the *demonstrativum genus*, ἀποδ. being supposed to be put here for ἐπιδεικτικῶν. This in Aristotle I hold to be impossible. Nor have I found any example of it elsewhere, though Victorius says that Isocrates uses ἀποδεικνύειν for ἐπιδεικνύειν more than once in the Panath. speech. I have supposed (in note on p. 335 Introd.) that his text of Isocrates *may* have exhibited this interchange from the uncorrected carelessness of transcribers. What is true is, that Isocrates, twice in the Paneg. §§ 18 and 65, does use ἐπιδεικνύειν in a sense nearly approaching, if not absolutely identical with, that of ἀποδεικνύειν. The words can only mean, as I have translated them, that there may be some speeches which consist entirely of proof or arguments, and that a summary of these would not correspond to the ἐπίλογος in its ordinary sense—described c. 19. 1—of which only a small part is a recapitulation.

‘And again προοίμιον (preface, opening or introduction), and comparison (setting over against one another side by side) of opposing (views, statements, arguments), and review, are found in public speeches *then* only when there is a dispute (between *two opponents*)’: as in Demosthenes’ Speech for the Crown, of which the προοίμιον has been before referred to. ἐπάνοδος, ‘a going over again’ = ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, *summary* recapitulation of the foregoing topics of the speech, appears also in Plato Phædr. 267 D, τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικε συνδεογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα. The ἄλλο ὄνομα may be ἐπίλογος or ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, or παλλολογία (Rhet. ad Alex. c. 20 (21). 1). It is properly a subdivision of the ἐπίλογος, and as such is here condemned as superfluous.

ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ] “The object of the *prooemium* is to conciliate the audience, and invite their attention, and briefly intimate the subject of the ensuing speech. In recommending this or that measure to the assembly, unless there is an adversary who has poisoned the hearers’

λάκεις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ συμβουλή. ἀλλ' ὁ ἐπίλογος.<sup>3</sup> ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ παντός, οἷον ἐὰν μικρὸς ὁ λόγος ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα εὐμνημόνευτον· συμβαίνει γὰρ τοῦ μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστις.  
4 ἴδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλείστα προοίμιον πρόθεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον τῶν πίστεων ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὐξήσις τῶν

<sup>1</sup> ἡ

<sup>2</sup> delenda distinctio.

minds against it and its author, or some other special reason, there is no occasion for this: and also, the audience is usually well acquainted with the subject. See further on this, c. 14. 11. Comparison of argument, and review, can only be required when there is an opposition." Introd. pp. 335, 6. The Rhet. ad Alex. expressly tells us, c. 28 (29) ult., that the προοίμιον is "common to all the seven species, and will be appropriate to every kind of (rhetorical) business."

The following argument καὶ γὰρ—πολλάκις is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the preceding. You say that προοίμιον, ἀντιπαραβολή and ἐπάνοδος are essential parts of the public speech—'Why at that rate (is the reply) so are accusation and defence, for they are frequently there'—this involves the absurdity of introducing the *whole contents* of the forensic genus into the *δημηγορικὸν γένος* as a mere *part* of the latter—but not *qua* deliberation': not in the sense or character of deliberation, which is *essential* to the deliberative branch, but as mere accidents.

There can be no question that we should read ἡ for ἡ συμβουλή. So Victorius, Schrader, Buhle, Spengel. Bekker alone retains ἡ. The following clause requires an alteration of punctuation to make it intelligible; suggested long ago by Victorius, Majoragius, Vater, and adopted by Spengel; *not* so by Bekker. Spengel also rejects ἔτι [*delendum aut in ἐστὶν mutandum*]. With the altered reading, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐπίλογος ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ κ.τ.λ. it is certainly out of place. I am by no means persuaded of the certainty of this alteration—perhaps Bekker had the same reason for withholding his consent to the two alterations—I think it quite as likely that a word or two has dropt out after ἐπίλογος.

'But further' (if ἔτι be retained) 'neither does the peroration belong to every forensic speech; as for instance if it be short, or the matter of it easy to recollect; for what happens (in an ordinary epilogue) is a subtraction from the length'—not the brevity, of a speech: i. e. an epilogue is appropriate to a long speech, not a short one. This is Victorius' explanation, and no doubt right (that which I gave in the Introd. is wrong, and also *not* Victorius', as stated in the note).

'Consequently the (only) necessary parts are the statement of the case, and the proof'.

§ 4. 'Now these two are peculiar to, and characteristic of, speeches in general'.

It is possible that ἴδιον here may be the *proprium* of logic, one of the predicables: that which characterizes a thing, without being absolutely

αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστειων ἀποδείκνυσι γὰρ  
 τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ προοίμιον, οὐδ' ὁ ἐπί-  
 5 λογος, ἀλλ' ἀναμνήσκει. ἔσται οὖν, ἂν τις τὰ  
 τοιαῦτα διαιρῇ, ὃ περ ἐποιοῦν ὁ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διή-  
 γησις ἕτερον καὶ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις καὶ  
 ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος. δεῖ δὲ εἶδος τι λέγοντα

essential to it, as the *genus* and *differentia* are. The *proprium* is a necessary accident or property, though it is not of the essence itself: "but flowing from, or a consequence of, the essence, is inseparably attached to the species" (J. S. Mill, *Logic*, I p. 148). All this would apply very well to these two *parts*. They are not of the essence of the speech, and do not enter into the definition: the speech could exist without them. At the same time they are immediate consequences of that essence, and inseparably attached to all species of speeches, according to the view put forward here.

We might therefore be satisfied with these. 'If we add more' (following the authorities on the subject), 'they must be at the most, preface, statement of case, confirmatory arguments, conclusion: for the refutation of the adversary belongs to the proofs' (Quint. u.s. III 9. 5, *Tamen nec iis assentior qui detrahunt refutationem, tanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles; haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat*), 'and counter-comparison, (a comparative statement of your own views and arguments placed in juxtaposition with them to bring them into contrast,) which, being as it is a magnifying (making the most) of one's own case, must be a part of the confirmatory arguments, or general proof: for one who does this proves something: but not so the prologue; nor the epilogue, which merely recalls to mind'.

§ 5. 'Such divisions, if any one choose to make them, will be pretty much the same as the inventions of Theodorus and his school, that is, to distinguish narration from after-narration and fore-narration, and refutation and per-re-refutation'. In this compound word ἐνί 'in addition' is represented by *re*, and ἐξ, 'out and out', 'outright', 'thoroughly', 'completely' by *per*. διὰ and *per* in composition are the more usual and direct exponents of 'thoroughness' or 'complete carrying through', of a thing. On ἐπιδιήγησις, *repetita narratio*, see Quint. IV 2. 128, *res declamatoria magis quam forensis*. He accepts it as a division, but thinks it should be rarely used. Plato, *Phaedr.* 266 D seq., in speaking of these same superfluous divisions of Theodorus, leaves out ἐπι- and προ-διήγησις, and introduces πίστῶσιν καὶ ἐπιπίστῶσιν in their place. These plainly correspond to the other pair ἔλεγχος and ἐπεξέλεγχος, the one being confirmatory, the other refutatory arguments. See *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX. Vol. III p. 285, and Thompson's notes on the *Phaedrus*.

The general drift of the last clause is this; if you introduce such divisions at all, you may go on dividing and subdividing for ever, as Theodorus does in his τέχνη. This is followed by the statement of the true

καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρώδες, οἷον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄξους.

I τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιόν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ λόγου, ὃ περ ἐν CHAP. XIV.  
p. 136.

principle of division: the foundation of *my own* twofold division, hints Ar. 'But a name (like one of these, the class-name, or, as here, the name of a division) should be given to mark a kind and a specific difference'. It is the genus *plus* the specific (*εἰδοποιός*, species-making) difference that constitutes the distinct species or *kind*. Now these *names*, though supposed to mark distinct kinds, *have* no specific differences which thus distinguish them. A special name demands a real distinction of kinds. Waitz ad Categ. 1 b 17. Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Ar.* § 59.

'Otherwise they become empty and frivolous, such as Licymnius' inventions in his art, the names which he coins, *ἐπούρωσις*, *ἀποπλάνησις* and *ὄξοι*'. On Licymnius and his productions, see Heindorf ad Phaedr. u. s. p. 242, and *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX. Vol. III pp. 255—7; where an attempt is made to explain these three obscure names. Licymnius was a dithyrambic poet, *supra* III 12. 2, as well as a rhetorician, and his prose style seems to have participated in the dithyrambic character. *ἐπούρωσις* I take to be a word coined by Licymnius for his own purposes: it is a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*. It seems to be formed from *ἐπουροῦν*, a synonym of *ἐπουρίζειν*, 'to speed onward by a fair gale', also *συνεπουρίζειν*, Hist. Anim. VIII 13. 9, de Caelo, III 2. 17: Polybius has *ἐπουροῦν* II 10. 6, and *καρουροῦν*, I 44. 3, 61. 7, both as neut. The Schol. quoted by Spengel, *Artium Scriptores* p. 89, defines *ἐπόρουσις* (*ἐπούρωσις*) *τὰ συνευπορίζοντα καὶ βοηθοῦντα τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὅσα λέγονται βοηθοῦντα τῇ ἀποδείξει*. All which seems to favour the notion that the figurative rhetorician represented 'subsidiary' or 'confirmatory arguments', Theodorus' *πίστωσις* and *ἐπιπίστωσις*, under the image of 'a fair wind astern'. *ἀποπλάνησις* is no doubt, as in Plato Polit. 263 C, 'a digression', *wandering off* from the main subject, Schol. *τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος*; and *ὄξοι*, 'branches', most likely means places in which the discourse 'branches off' in different directions, 'ramifications': unless the same Scholiast's explanation be preferred, *τὰ ἄκρα, ἧτοι τὰ προοίμια καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλόγους*. This would mean the 'branches' opposed to the stock or trunk, as something extraneous, or at all events non-essential. (I think this *is* preferable.)

#### CHAP. XIV.

Having considered the divisions of the speech in general we now come to the details, to the enumeration and examination of the ordinary contents of each of the four. These in each case are discussed under the heads of the three branches of Rhetoric. The treatment of the *προοίμιον* occupies the 14th chapter, to which is appended a second, c. xv, which analyses the topics of *διαβολή*, the art of 'setting a man against his neighbour', infusing suspicion and hostile feeling against him in the minds of others, raising a prejudice against him—especially of course in the minds of judges against your opponent. One would be sorry to be

ποιήσῃ πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλήσῃ προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ' εἰσὶ, καὶ οἷον ὁδοποιήσις τῷ ἐπιόντι. τὸ μὲν οὖν προαύλιον ὅμοιον τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοιμίῳ· καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐληταί, ὅ τι ἂν εὖ ἔχωσιν αὐλῆσαι, τοῦτο προαυλήσαντες συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοσί-

obliged to call this 'calumniating'. Διήγησις is treated in c. xvi, *πίσεις* in xvi: to which is attached in xviii a digression on ἐρώτησις, the mode of putting questions—this includes the 'answer', repartee: and the 19th chapter, appropriately enough, concludes the work with the conclusion (*ἐπίλογος*, peroration) of the speech.

The *prooemium* is thus defined by the author of the *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 29 (30). 1, ἀκροατῶν παρασκευὴ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐν κεφαλῇ μὴ εἰδότες δηλώσεις, ἵνα γινώσκωσι περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος παρακολουθῶσί τε τῇ ὑποθέσει, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ προσέχειν παρακαλέσαι, καὶ καθ' ὅσον τῷ λόγῳ δυνατόν εὖνους ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι. These rules seem to be chiefly derived from the actual practice of the Orators. Some of the arts to which public speakers had recourse in the topics of their *prooemium* are mentioned by Isocrates, *Paneg.* § 13. Compare *Cic. de Orat.* II 19. 80; *de Invent.* I 15. 20; where it is defined: it has two parts, *principium* (the object of this is to make the hearer *benevolum aut docilem aut attentum*), and *insinuatio, oratio quadam dissimulatione et circuitione obscura subiens auditoris animum*. *Quint.* IV. c. 1, seq. *principium exordium*. He agrees with the preceding; see § 5. On the *προοίμιον* as a *hymn*, see *Stallbaum ad Phaed.* 60 D. On the *prooemium* in Rhetoric, *Cic. de Orat.* II 78, 79, *principia dicendi*. [See also *Volkman, die Rhetorik der Griechen u. Römer* § 12, *die Einleitung.*]

§ 1. 'Now the *prooemium* is the beginning of a speech and stands in the place of the prologue in poetry (i. e. tragedy, and specially of Euripides' tragedy), and of the prelude in flute music'.

*προαύλιον*] an introduction, ornamental, and preparatory to, not an essential part of, the theme or subject of the composition; for all these are *beginnings*, and as it were a paving of the way (preparation, pioneering of the road) for what follows (*ὁδοποιήσις*, note on I 1. 2).

'Now the flute-prelude is like the *prooemium* of the epideictic branch: that is to say, as the flute-players first open their performance with whatever they can play best (in order to gain attention and favour of the audience) which they then join on to the ἐνδόσιμον (the actual opening, preliminary notes, of the subject which gives the tone, or cue, to the rest), so in the epideictic speeches the writing (of the *προοίμιον*) ought to be of this kind: for (in these the speaker) may say first (*εἰπῶντα*) anything he pleases, and then should at once sound the note of preparation, and join on (the rest)'.

This represents the epideictic *prooemium*, like the flute-prelude, as hardly at all connected with what follows; it is a preliminary flourish, anything that he knows to be likely to be most successful, as already observed, to conciliate the audience and put them in good humour. "For here, as there is no real interest at stake, the author is allowed a much greater liberty in his choice of topics for amusing (and gaining

μῶ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτω γράφειν·  
ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν βούληται εὐθὺ εἰπόντα ἐνδιδόναι καὶ  
συνάψαι. ὁ περ πάντες ποιοῦσιν. παράδειγμα τὸ  
τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προοίμιον· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰκεῖον

over) an audience; a license which would be intolerable in a case of life and death, or in the suggestion of a course of action which may involve the safety or ruin of the state. Here the audience are too eager to come to the point to admit of any trifling with their anxiety." Introd. pp. 337, 8. Cic. de Or. II 80. 325, *Connexum autem ita sit principium consequenti orationi, ut non tanquam citharoedi prooemium affectum aliquod, sed cohaerens cum omni corpore membrum esse videatur* (Victorius). Quint. II 8.8, *in demonstrativis* (Arist.) *prooemia esse maxime libera existimat.*

The ἐνδόσιμον (*subaudi* ἄσμα or κροῦσμα, Bos, *Ellips.* s. v.) occurs again Pol. v (VIII) 5 *init.* apparently in the same sense as here, 'introduction'; also Pseudo-Arist. de Mundo, c. 6 § 20, where we have κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἀνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμου ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἄσπρα κ.τ.λ. 'for according to the law above, by him who might be rightly called leader of the chorus, the stars are set in motion, &c.' I have given this in full because it throws some light upon the meaning of ἐνδόσιμον, and explains its metaphorical application, God is here represented as the leader of a chorus who gives the time, the key-note, and the mode or tune, to the rest, and thus acts as a guide to be followed, or (in a similar sense) as an introduction, or preparatory transition to something else. It thus has the effect of the 'key-note', and takes the secondary sense of a 'guide', 'preparation for', 'introduction to', anything. So Plut. de disc. adul. ab amico, c. 55, 73 B, ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον ἔξει πρὸς τὰ μείζονα τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ubi Wytttenbach, *occasio, incitamentum*; similarly Ib. c. 30, 70 B, καὶ ψόγος... ἢ ἔπαινος ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον εἰς παρρησίαν ἐστιν, 'gives the tone, the cue, i. e. the occasion or incitement, to freedom (taking liberties).' See other passages from Plutarch and others in Wytttenbach's note on 73 B. Gaisford and Wytttenbach refer to Gataker ad Anton. XI 20, p. 336 (G), XI 26 (W), "ἐνδ. usurpatur pro modulationis exordio, quo praecentor sive chori praefectus cantandi reliquis auspiciū facit. Hesychius, ἐνδόσιμον, τὸ πρὸ τῆς φῶδης κιθάρισμα." ap. Gaisford *Not. Var.* Wytttenbach describes ἐνδόσιμον as "signum et adhortatio in certaminibus et musicis et gymniciis: tum ad alias res translatus." Lastly Athen. XIII 2, 556 A, of certain authors, οἷς τὸ ἐνδόσιμον Ἀριστοτέλης ἔδωκεν ἱστορῶν τοῦτο ἐν τῇ περὶ εὐγενείας, 'gave the tone, i. e. hint', furnished the occasion for their statement. Schweighäuser, ad loc. says, "Dalecampius vertit quos ad id scribendum provocavit Ar. Dicitur autem proprie praecentus praeludium, exordium melodiae quod praeci chorodidascalus cui dein accinere oportet chorum H. Stephanus' Thesaurus. Budaeus in Comm. Gr. Ling. p. 874 sq. ἐνδόσιμον δίδοναι or παρέχειν is expressed in one word ἐνδιδόναι XII 520 D," as it is here by Aristotle.

'And this is done by all. An example is the *prooemium* of Isocrates' Helen: for there is nothing in common between the disputatious dia-



ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένη. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐὰν  
ἐκτοπίσῃ, ἀρμόττει μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι.  
 2 λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου  
 ἢ ψόγου· οἷον Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ λόγῳ  
 “ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες.”  
 ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας· Ἴσο-  
 κράτης δὲ ψέγει, ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἀρετὰς

lecticians, and Helen'. The *prooemium*, which occupies the first thirteen sections of the speech, includes many other subjects besides the ἐριστικοί, and is certainly an excellent illustration of the want of connexion between proem and the rest in an epideictic speech. Quint. III 8. 8, *In demonstrativis vero prooemia esse maxime libera existimat* (Ar.). *Nam et longe a materia duci hoc, ut in Helenae laude Isocrates fecerit; et ex aliqua rei vicinia, ut idem in Panegyrico, cum queritur plus honoris corporum quam animorum virtutibus dari.*

'And at the same time also (it has this further recommendation) that if (the speaker thus) migrate into a foreign region, there is this propriety in it, that the entire speech is not of the same kind' (it removes the wearisome monotony which is characteristic of this branch of Rhetoric).

ἐκτοπίζειν is to 'change one's residence', and applied especially to migratory birds and animals. It is always neuter in Aristotle. Hist. Anim. VIII 12. 3 and 8, IX 10. 1, IV 8. 23, ἐκτοπισμοὺς ποιοῦνται, VIII 13. 14, ἐκτοπιστικὰ ζῷα, I 1. 26. In the primary sense of absence from one's proper or ordinary place, Pol. VIII (v) 11, 1314 b 9, τοῖς ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοισ ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας, and so ἔκτοπος, ἐκτόπιος, ἄτοπος 'out of their proper place'.

§ 2. 'The introductions in the epideictic branch are derived from praise and blame (naturally: see I 3 §§ 3, 4); as, for instance, Gorgias' opening of his Olympic oration (a πανηγυρικὸς λόγος, delivered at the Olympic games), "By many' (or ὑπέρ, 'for many things'; which seems more in accordance with what followed) 'are ye worthy to be admired, O men of Hellas': that is to say (γὰρ *videlicet*) he praises those who first brought together the general assemblies'. Comp. Quint. III 8. 9, (continuation of the preceding quotation) *et Gorgias in Olympico laudans eos qui primi tales instituerunt conventus* (translated from Ar.). Another short fragment of this oration is preserved by Philostr. Vit. Soph. I 9. 'Ο δὲ Ὀλυμπικὸς λόγος, says Philostratus, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μεγίστου αὐτῷ (Gorgiae) ἐπολιτεύθη· στασιάζουσιν γὰρ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὁρῶν ὁμονοίας ξύμβουλος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τρέπων ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πείθων ἄθλα ποιέσθαι τῶν ὁπλῶν μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων χώραν. The rest of his fragments, genuine and spurious, are collected by Sauppe *Or. Att.* III 129, seq. [See also Appendix to Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias.] Hieronymus adv. Iovin. (quoted by Wyttenbach on Plut. 144 B), "Gorgias rhetor librum pulcerrimum de concordia, Graecis tunc inter se dissidentibus, recitavit Olympiae." Isocr., Panegy. § 3, after stating the nature of the contents of his own speech, adds, in allusion to this,

δωρεαῖς ἐτίμησαν, τοῖς δ' εὖ φρονοῦσιν οὐθὲν ἄθλον  
 3 ἐποίησαν. καὶ ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς, οἷον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς  
 ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ, ἢ  
 τοὺς τοιούτους οἳ μήτε εὐδοκιμοῦσι μήτε φαῦλοι,  
 ἀλλ' ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἄδηλοι, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ  
 4 Πριάμον· οὗτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει. ἔτι δ' ἐκ τῶν P. 1415.  
 δικανικῶν προοιμίων· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν

with others, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν ἐπὶ  
 τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὥρμησαν.

‘But Isocrates blames them for that bodily excellences they rewarded  
 with gifts, whilst to intellectual excellence they awarded no prize’. This  
 is the *substance* of the two first sections of Isocr. Paneg. Mr Sandys,  
 in his note *ad locum*, gives a summary of the whole exordium §§ 1—14.  
 Victorius points out this as one of the places in which Aristotle's hostility  
 to Isocrates appears! The *problem* here proposed by Isocr.—the omis-  
 sion of the institution of prizes for intellectual competition—is solved  
 by Arist., Probl. XXX 11.

§ 3. ‘(A second topic for an epideictic *prooemium*) is derived from  
*advice* (the deliberative branch); for instance “men are bound to pay  
 honour to the good”, and therefore he, the speaker, himself is going  
 to praise Aristides’ (αὐτός is *obliqua oratio*: the *directa oratio* would  
 have been ἐγώ: it is a sort of semi-quotation: where it comes from  
 no one seems to know); ‘or, to all such as though not distinguished are  
 yet not bad, only their merits are buried in obscurity, as Alexander  
 (Paris), Priam's son. For one who speaks thus offers advice’. The  
*encomium Alexandri* here referred is doubtless the same as that which  
 has been already mentioned in II 23. 5, 8, 12 and II 27. 7, 9; the author  
 is unknown.

§ 4. ‘Further (a third kind) they may be borrowed from the forensic  
 introductions; that is to say, from the appeals to the audience, or as  
 an apology to them, (comp. *infra* § 7)—when the subject of the speech  
 happens to be either paradoxical (contrary to ordinary opinion or ex-  
 pectation, and therefore *incredible*), or painful<sup>1</sup>, or trite and worn-out,  
 and therefore tiresome (τεθρυλημένου that which is in everyone's mouth,  
*decantatum*, note on II 21. 11)—for the purpose of obtaining indulgence  
 (with an apologetic object); as Choerilus says, for instance, “But now

<sup>1</sup> χαλεποῦ, Victorius, Majoragius, *ardua*; Vet. Transl. et Riccobon *difficilis*.  
 Is it ‘hard to do’ or ‘hard to bear’? χαλεπός has both senses. If the former,  
 it *may* mean, either, difficult, to the speaker to handle, or to the hearer to  
 understand, or the recommendation of some scheme, undertaking, or policy,  
*difficult* to encounter or execute, (but this belongs to the *deliberative* rather than  
 the epideictic branch); if the latter—which seems equally probable—it is simply  
 painful, *unpleasant*. So Pind. *Fragn.* 96 (Böckh, *Fragn.* P. II p. 621) v. 9,  
 τερπνῶν ἐφέρπουσαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν. Pl. *Protag.* 344 D, χαλεπὴ ὥρα ‘a  
 hard season’. Legg. [744 D] χαλεπὴ περία. Et passim ap. Hom. et cet.  
 So in Latin *durus*.

ἀκροατήν, εἰ περὶ παραδόξου λόγος ἢ περὶ χαλεποῦ  
ἢ περὶ τεθρυλημένου πολλοῖς, ὥστε συγγνώμην ἔχειν,  
οἶον Χοιρίλος

νῦν δ' ὅτε πάντα δέδασται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν λόγων προοίμια ἐκ  
τούτων, ἐξ ἐπαίνου, ἐκ ψόγου, ἐκ προτροπῆς, ἐξ

when all is spent" (*lit.* has been distributed *sc.* amongst others; and nothing is left for me). [Compare Virgil's *omnia iam vulgata* in the Exordium of the third Georgic.]

Of the four Choeriluses distinguished by Näke, this is the Epic poet of Samos, born, according to Näke, in B.C. 470. His principal work, from which this fragment is taken, was a poetical narrative of the Persian wars with Greece under Darius and Xerxes—"all that was left him" by his predecessors—very much applauded, as Suidas tell us, and "decreed to be read with Homer." Aristotle (*Top.* Θ 1, ult. *παράδειγματα...οἷα Ὅμηρος, μὴ οἷα Χοίριλος*) thinks less favourably of it; and it was afterwards excluded from the Alexandrian Canon in favour of the poem of Antimachus. An earlier Choerilus was the Athenian tragic poet, contemporary with Phrynichus, Pratinas, and Aeschylus in early life; the third a slave of the Comic poet Ecphantides, whom he is said to have assisted in the composition of his plays; and the fourth, Horace's Choerilus, Ep. II 1. 232, Ars Poet. 357, a later and contemptible epic poet who attended Alexander on his expedition, and according to Horace, *incultis qui versibus et male natis rettulit acceptos, regale nomisma, Philippus*. Suidas tells this story of the Samian Choerilus, an evident mistake. The fragments of the Choerilus of our text are all collected and commented on by Näke in his volume on Choerilus. This fragm. is given on p. 104. See also Düntzer *Epic. Gr. Fragm.* p. 96 seq. where five lines of the poem, from which our extract is made are given: and the four articles in *Biogr. Dict.* The context is supplied by the Schol. on this passage—see in Spengel's ed., *Scholia Graeca*<sup>1</sup>, p. 160: printed also in Näke and Düntzer—and runs thus: ἃ μάκαρ, ὅστις ἔην κείνον χρόνον ἱδρὶς αἰοδῆς, Μουσάων θεράπων ὄτ' ἀκήρατος ἦν ἔτι λειμῶν· νῦν δ' ὅτε πάντα δέδασται, ἔχουσι δὲ πείρατα τέχνηαι, ὕστατοι ὥστε δρόμον καταλειπόμεθ', οὐδὲ πη ἐστὶ πάντῃ παπταίνοντα νεοζυγὲς ἄρμα πελάσσαι. καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς<sup>2</sup>. Which are certainly pretty lines enough: perhaps the rest was not equal to them. Compare with λειμῶν Μουσάων, and the whole passage, Lucr. I 925 seq. *avia Pieridum p̄cragro loca, nullius ante trita solo*, et seq., which might possibly have been suggested by this of Choerilus. An apology of the same kind is introduced by Isocrates in the *middle* of his Panegy. § 74; and another in his *ἀντιδοσις*, § 55. In the latter the word *διατεθρυλημένους* occurs.

<sup>1</sup> On these Scholia, see Spengel, Praef. ad Rhet., p. viii.

<sup>2</sup> Näke, *Choerilus* p. 105, thinks that this, and not the second fragm. in § 6—as Buhle, Wolf, Vater, agree in supposing—was the opening of the poem. This is rendered probable by the λόγον ἀλλοῦ in v. 1, of the other.

ἀποτροπῆς, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν· δεῖ δὲ ἡ ξένα  
5 ἢ οἰκεῖα εἶναι τὰ ἐνδοσίμα τῷ λόγῳ. τὰ δὲ τοῦ δικα-  
νικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ταὐτὸ δύναται ὁ περ  
τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια·  
τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν διθυράμβων ὅμοια τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς·  
διὰ σὲ καὶ τεὰ δῶρα εἴτε σκῦλα.

6 ἐν δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἔπεισι δειγμά ἐστι τοῦ λόγου, p. 137.  
ἵνα προειδῶσι περὶ οὗ ἡν ὁ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμῃται ἡ

‘So the introductions of the epideictic speeches are derived from the following topics ; from praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer : and these “introductions” (see the note on § 1 : ἐνδοσίμα is used here for προοίμια in general, instead of the more limited sense of the preceding passage) ‘must be either foreign or closely connected with the speeches (to which they are prefixed)’.

ξένος, a stranger or foreigner, is properly opposed to οἰκεῖος, domestic, one of one’s own household. This last clause, δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. is, as Vater remarks, introduced as a transition to the next topic, the forensic *prooemia*.

§ 5. ‘The introduction of the forensic speech must be understood as having the same force (or value, or signification) as the prologue of a drama (τοῦ, the drama to which it belongs), or the introduction to an epic poem: for to the epideictic *exordia* the preludes (introductions, ἀναβολαί) of the dithyrambs bear resemblance, “for thee and thy gifts, or spoils”. On the ἀναβολαί, the openings or introductions of dithyrambs, and their loose, incoherent, flighty character, see note on III 9. 1. Introd. p. 307, note 1. It is this which makes them comparable to the epideictic *exordia*, as above described.

The dramatic, i. e. tragic, prologue, and the introduction of the epic, are compared to the *exordium* of the *dicastic* speech, in that all three contain ‘statements of the case’; the last, literally; the tragic and epic, virtually. The prologue of Euripides (who of the three extant tragedians can be the only one whose prologues are referred to) actually states all the preceding circumstances of the story of the drama, which it is necessary that the spectator should be acquainted with in order to enter into the plot. The introduction of the Epic poem is neither so long nor so regular. That of the *Iliad* occupies only seven lines, and states the subject very simply and in few words. That of the *Odyssey* is concluded in ten, and little or nothing of the story told. The *Aeneid*, and *Pharsalia* have seven apiece.

§ 6. Having hinted at the points of resemblance between the dithyrambic ἀναβολαί and the epideictic *prooemia*, he now proceeds to explain further the resemblance of the *dicastic* proem to the prologue of tragedy and prelude of the Epic poem.

‘In the prose speeches as well as the poetry’ (Victorius understands

διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾷ· ὁ δούς οὖν ὥσπερ  
εἰς τὴν χεῖρα τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ  
λόγῳ. διὰ τοῦτο

μῆνιν αἶεде θεά.

ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε μούσα.

ἡγεό μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὅπως Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαίης

ἦλθεν ἐς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.

καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ τὸ δράμα, καὶ μὴ εὐθύς  
ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που [δη-  
λοῖ], ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς

ἐμοὶ πατὴρ ἦν Πόλυβος.

τ. λόγους<sup>1</sup>, *fabulae poetarum*, meaning the *dramas* as contrasted with the Epics: the other contrast of *prose* and *verse* is more natural as well as more suitable here) 'these *prooemia* are (present, offer) a specimen or sample of the subject (of the speech or poem) in order that they may have some previous acquaintance with the intention of it' (if ἦν, 'about what it was to be', as in τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; the object, purpose, or design), 'and the mind not be kept in suspense; for all that is vague and indefinite keeps the mind wandering (in doubt and uncertainty): accordingly, (the speaker or writer) that puts the beginning into his hand supplies him with a clue, as it were, by which he may hold, so as to enable him to follow the story (or argument). This is why (Homer in the Iliad and Odyssey, *began* the two poems with the lines quoted; and Choerilus—if Näke u. s. is right about the order of the two fragments in our text—did not *begin* his poem with ἡγεό μοι κ.τ.λ., but introduced it in his *exordium*)'—here the quotations from the three poems are introduced, and the sentence remains unfinished.

'Similarly the tragic poets explain the subject of their play, if not immediately at the opening, as Euripides, at any rate somewhere or other the poet explains it in his prologue or introduction), as *even* Sophocles (who does not *usually* employ it; in the Oedip. Tyr. 774 seq.) "Polybus of Corinth was my father, &c.", and the following.'

"The Commentators object to *πρόλογος* here because the passage that it indicates occurs not at the beginning, but in the middle of the play. But, it seems that Aristotle has here used *πρόλογος* in a more compre-

<sup>1</sup> Spengel puts *λόγους καὶ* and *ἦν* in brackets, as spurious or doubtful: Bekker retains *ἦν*. MS A<sup>o</sup> has *ἦν*. By rejecting the words Spengel seems to shew that he thinks that *λόγοι* alone cannot mean 'stories' in the sense of *dramas*. I think it is doubtful. Otherwise, this interpretation is certainly more suitable to the general connexion and what follows. On the other hand, our author here seems to be rather digressive, and *not* to observe any very regular order of succession in his remarks. So that perhaps upon the whole, we may let the other consideration have its due weight in deciding the point.

καὶ ἡ κωμωδία ὡσαύτως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαιότατον ἔργον τοῦ προοιμίου καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο, δηλῶσαι τί ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος οὗ ἔνεκα ὁ λόγος· διόπερ ἂν δῆλον ἦ καὶ 7 μικρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐ χρηστέον προοιμίῳ. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα εἶδη οἷς χρῶνται, ἰατρεύματα καὶ κοινά. λέγεται δὲ ταῦτα ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου, ὅσα περὶ διαβολὴν λῦσαι καὶ

hensive sense than that which it usually bears, for an 'explanatory introduction' in general, wherever it may occur: and that it has much the same relation here to its *ordinary* signification, as *πρόθεσις* has to *διήγησις* in c. 13. Also the analogous *προοίμιον* is applied twice in § 10 *infra* to introductory speeches *anywhere* in a play." Introd. p. 339 note.

'And comedy in like manner': that is, wherever an introductory explanation is required, there it is introduced. Victorius notes that this appears in Terence, the Latin representative of the New Comedy, and Plautus. Simo in the *Andria*, Menedemus in the *Heautontimorumenos*, Micio in the *Adelphi*, perform this office. And similarly, Strepsiades in Aristoph. *Nubes*, Demosthenes in the *Equites*. 40 seq., Dionysius in the *Ranae*—Victorius says "tum maxime cum *Servo* narrat, &c.," but the conversation referred to is with Hercules, not Xanthias, lines 64 seq. There is another explanatory introduction, preparatory to the dramatic contest between Acacus and Xanthias, 759 seq.

'So then (to resume) the most necessary function of the *prooemium*, and that peculiar to it, is to make it clear what is the end and object of the speech or story' (the former is the λόγος in *Rhetoric*, the latter in the Epic and the drama). Compare Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 1, def. of *προοίμιον*. 'And therefore if the subject (the thing, the matter in hand) be already clear and short (or, of trifling importance) the *prooemium* is not to be employed'. Comp. Cic. de Or. II 79. 320, *in parvis atque infrequentibus causis ab ipsa re est exordiri saepe commodius*: Victorius, who writes *frequentibus*: repeated in Gaisford, *Not. Var.*

§ 7. 'The other kinds (of *prooemia*) which are employed are mere cures (remedies [specifics] for the infirmities or defects of the hearers—διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν, III 1. 5—such as inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the like), and common', to all parts of the speech. κοινά is opposed to the *special* office, peculiar to the *προοίμιον*, καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο *supra*: all these *other* kinds *may* be introduced in the exordium—and also anywhere else, wherever they are required.

'These may be derived from the speaker himself, from the hearer, the subject, and the adversary' ('the opposite'). Cic. de Or. II 79. 321, seq. *Sed quum erit utendum principio, quod plerumque erit, aut ex reo, aut ex adversario, aut ex re, aut ex eis apud quos agitur* (ἐκ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ), *sententias duci licet. Ex reo*—reos appello, *quorum res est*—quae significant bonum virum seq. followed by the illustration of

ποιῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως· ἀπολογουμένων μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν, κατηγοροῦντι δ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ. δι' ὃ δέ, οὐκ ἄδηλον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογούμενον, ὅταν μέλλῃ εἰσάξειν αὐτόν<sup>1</sup>, ἀναγκαῖον ἀνελεῖν τὰ κωλύοντα, ὥστε λυτέον πρῶτον τὴν διαβολήν· τῷ δὲ διαβάλλοντι ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ διαβλητέον, ἵνα μνημονεύσωσι μᾶλλον. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν

<sup>1</sup> αὐτόν

the remaining three. Cicero, who is certainly following Arist., seems here to translate τοῦ λέγοντος by *reus*, in the sense which he explains, of *both parties* in the case. Quintilian, IV 1. 6, seems to charge Aristotle— if he includes him in the *plerique* who have been guilty of the omission— with having neglected to include the '*auctor causae*' amongst the sources of topics for *prooemia*. Victorius defends him against this, by pointing out, as Cicero, that ὁ λέγων includes *both parties* in a suit or prosecution, *actor* as well as *reus* (in its ordinary sense). See the passage of Quint., with Spalding's note.

'The topics derivable from the speaker himself and the opponent, are all such as relate to allaying (*lit.* 'refuting') and exciting prejudice and ill-feeling (after ποιῆσαι understand αὐτήν): but with this difference: that in defending oneself all that relates to διαβολή (i. e. the removal of prejudice and ill-will from ourselves, and exciting them against the opponent) must be put first (*subaudi* λεκτέον, viz. in the *exordium*), but in the accusation of another reserved for the peroration. The reason of this is not difficult to see; that is, that the defendant, when he is about to introduce his own case, must necessarily begin by doing away with all hindrances (*sc.* to the establishment of it; all prepossessions against him on the part of the judge); and therefore must make the removal or refutation of all calumnies or prejudices against him his first point; whereas the accuser (the speaker whose office it is to 'set' the defendant 'against' the judges, conciliate their ill-will to him) must reserve all that tends to prejudice his antagonist for the epilogue (peroration, conclusion), that they may better remember it' (that his accusations may 'leave their sting behind them' in the judges' minds). Both Spengel and Bekker write αὐτόν after εἰκάξειν for the *vulgata lectio* αὐτόν; which as far as appears to the contrary is the reading of all MSS. I think αὐτόν for 'his own case', *lit.* himself, is defensible. We often say 'him' for 'himself', leaving the reflexive part to be understood, in our own language. See note on I 7. 35, and Waitz on Organ. 54 a 14, Vol. I. p. 486, there referred to.

'The topics of the προοίμιον which are addressed to the hearer (i. e. in the dicastic branch now under consideration, the judges,) are derived from (*subaudi* γίγνεται, or as before, λέγεται) the conciliation of his good will (towards ourselves) and irritating him (exciting his indignation against the adversary, δεινῶσις), and sometimes too (δέ), (but only when it is required,) from engaging his attention or the reverse: for it is not always

ἀκροατὴν ἔκ τε τοῦ εὖνουν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ  
ὀργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐκ τοῦ προσεκτικὸν ἢ τούναν- <sup>make him</sup>  
τίον· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρει ποιεῖν προσεκτικόν, διό <sup>attend</sup>  
πολλοὶ εἰς γέλωτα πειρῶνται προάγειν. εἰς δὲ

expedient to make him attentive, and this is why many (speakers) try to move or provoke him to laughter'. Προάγειν εἰς γέλωτα, to move, or provoke to'. Herod. II 121. 4, σκῶψαί μιν καὶ ἐς γέλωτα προαγαγέσθαι. Rhet. I 1. 5, εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον, I 2. 5, εἰς πάθος, et sim. 'to carry forward, i. e. stimulate, excite, provoke'.

εὖνουν ποιῆσαι] "The three requisites in the disposition of the audience, according to the later writers on the subject, are that they should be *benevoli*, *dociles*, *attenti*. Cic. de Inv. I 15. 20, Quint. IV 1. 5: and frequently elsewhere. Ar. includes the two latter under one head *προσεκτικοί*: and in fact if a man is inclined to *attend*, he shews that he is already inclined to or desirous of learning. The two are closely connected, Cic. de Inv. I 16. 23." Introd. p. 340, note 1.

*Causa principii nulla est alia, quam ut auditorem, quo sit nobis in ceteris partibus accommodatior, praeparemus. Id fieri tribus maxime rebus, inter auctores plurimos constat si benevolum, attentum, docilem fecerimus; non quia ista non per totam actionem sint custodienda, sed quia initiis praecipue necessaria, per quae in animum iudicis, ut procedere ultra possimus, admittimur.* (Quint. IV 1. 5).

οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρει κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Or. II 79. 323. He begins by saying that neither of these topics is to be confined to the *prooemium* § 322, *nam et attentum monent Graeci ut principio faciamus iudicem et docilem* (this is included in *προσεκτικοί*); *quae sunt utilia, sed non principii magis propria quam reliquarum partium; faciliora etiam in principiiis, quod et attenti tum maxime sunt, quum omnia expectant, et dociles magis initiis esse possunt.* Quint., IV 1. 37, 38, criticizes Aristotle's remark on this point: *Nec me quanquam magni auctores in hoc duxerint ut non semper facere attentum ac docilem iudicem velim: non quia nesciam, id quod ab illis dicitur, esse pro mala causa qualis ea sit non intelligi: verum quia istud non negligentia iudicis contingit, sed errore. Dixit enim adversarius, et fortasse persuasit: nobis opus est eius diversa opinione: quae mutari non potest nisi illum fecerimus ad ea quae dicemus docilem et attentum,* seq. That is, the judge's inattention often arises not from negligence, but from a mistaken supposition that the adversary is right and we are wrong: in order to set him right we must rouse his attention. The supposition implied here in explanation of οὐκ ἀεὶ συμφ. κ.τ.λ., which Quint. refers to and criticizes, is that inattention on the judge's part is sometimes expedient when our cause is bad. Quint.'s reply is, it is not his *inattention* that would be of use to us in such a case, but his *attention* to the arguments which we are about to use in order to convince him to the contrary. Another disadvantage that may arise from over-attention on the judge's part, occurs when we want to slur over an unfavourable point in our case. In illustration of the following διὸ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Gaisford very appositely quotes Arist. Vesp. 564, Οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν μύθους ἡμῖν, οἱ δ' Αἰσώπου τι γελοῖον, οἱ δὲ σκώπτουσιν, ὡ



εὐμάθειαν ἅπαντα ἀνάξει, ἐάν τις βούληται, καὶ τὸ  
ἐπικὴ φαίνεσθαι. προσέχουσι γὰρ μᾶλλον τούτοις.  
 προσεκτικοὶ δὲ τοῖς μεγάλοις, τοῖς ἰδίοις, τοῖς θαν- P. 1415 b.  
 μαστοῖς, τοῖς ἡδέσιν διὸ δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ὡς περὶ τοιού-  
 των ὁ λόγος. ἐάν δὲ μὴ προσεκτικούς, ὅτι μικρόν,

ἐγὼ γελᾶσω, καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καταθῶμαι. [Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) §§ 13, 20, γελᾶσαντες ἀφήσετε, and Or. 23 § 206.]

The Scholiast on this place (see in Spengel's Ed. p. 158), tells, *apropos* of this, the story from Demosth. de Cor. §§ 51, 52, with additions. The Scholiast, Ulpian on the passage of Dem., and a scholiast on Ar. Anal. Pr. I 24 b 20 (in Brandis' collection, Arist. Op. Bekker's 4to. vol. IV. p. 147 b 43 of Bekker's quarto ed. of Aristotle), all agree that Demosthenes' *joke* consisted in an intentional mispronunciation of the word *μισθωτός*, which he applied to Aeschines, pronouncing it *μίσθωτος*, in order to divert the attention of the audience: he appealed to them to say whether the word was not well applied: they burst into a roar of laughter, accepted the application, and shouted *Αἰσχίνης μισθωτός, Αἰσχίνης μισθωτός*, with the pronunciation corrected. I entirely agree with Dissen that this is a foolish and improbable story, absurd in itself, and receiving no countenance from the *text of Demosthenes*. All that he *did* say is found in the existing text, viz. that he interpreted Aeschines' *ξενίαν* Ἀλεξάνδρου—which Aesch. claimed—as meaning that he was not a *ξένος*, a guest and friend, but a *μισθωτός* (a hireling) Ἀλεξάνδρου and nothing more, and that the people accepted this version. See Dissen's note on § 52.

(*εὐμάθεια, docilitas*, need not be made a *separate* topic, because) 'any speaker may refer to this (carry back, i. e. apply) any thing he pleases (any of the topics of the *προοίμιον*), even the appearance of worth and respectability; for to these (*τοῖς ἐπικέσει*) the audience is always more inclined to attend'. (This is in fact the *ἀρετή* which the speaker must always assume *by his speech*, in order that his hearers may have confidence in him, that he may have weight and *authority* with them; one of the three ingredients in the *ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*, II 1. 5. *Introd. on ἦθος*, p. 108 seq.) In short, *εὐμάθεια* need not be made a *separate* topic, provided only the speaker treats the other topics of the *προοίμιον* with the view of making the audience *dociles*, that is, ready to receive the information which he is prepared to communicate to them.

'The things to which the audience is most *inclined* to listen are things great (momentous, important), things of special interest (to the hearers themselves), things wonderful (surprising), and things pleasant (to hear; either in themselves, or in their associations); and therefore the speaker should always try to produce the impression (*ἐν* in his hearers' minds) that things of such kinds are his subject. If he wish to make them inattentive (he must try to convey the impression, *ἐὰν μὴ, subaudi* ποιεῖν ἐθέλῃ τις—*προσεκτικούς*) that his subject is trifling, has no reference to *them* and their interests (that is, is unimportant in general, or to them in particular: the opposite of the *τὰ ἴδια* in this preceding topic) or that it is unpleasant'.

8 ὅτι οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνους, ὅτι λυπηρόν. δεῖ δὲ μὴ p. 138.

λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα·

πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγμα- se. hinc are

τος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾗ, οὐθὲν δεῖ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ

προοιμίον, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιω-

9 δῶς, ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλὴν. ἔτι τὸ προσεκ-

τικοὺς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν κοινόν, εἰάν δέη·

On interesting and uninteresting topics, see the parallel passages in Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 3, where those of Aristotle are subdivided: Cic. de Inv. I 16. 23: Cic. Orat. Part. c. 8, expresses Ar.'s ἴδια, *Coniuncta cum ipsis apud quos agetur*.

§ 8. 'However it must not be forgotten that all such things as these (all these ordinary contents of the προοίμια) are foreign to (outside; *extra*, not *secundum*, *artem*) the speech (and its real object, which is the *proof* of the case, and that alone, αἱ δὲ πίστεις ἐντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, I 1. 3): it is only because the audience is bad, and ready to listen to things beside the real question, (that these are addressed to them); for if he be not such, there is no occasion for an exordium (to flatter him into a good humour, and the rest), except just so far as to state the case in a summary way, that, like a body, it may have a head on it'. There is probably a reference in this to σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, as the enthymemes, or direct logical proofs, are called I 1. 3.

φαῦλος, as applied to the audience or judges, means here not morally bad, but only defective in intellect and patience, too ignorant and frivolous to attend long to sound and serious reasoning: they require to be relieved and *diverted* occasionally. So Schrader. Comp. what is said of the 'single judge' in 12. 5. Of the *summary* προοίμιον, the Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 2, gives two examples.

ἵνα—κεφαλὴν] Comp. Eth. Nic. VI 7, 1141 a 19, of σοφία; νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμωτάτων. Plat. Gorg. 505 D, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιίτῃ. Phaedr. 264 C, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον συν-εστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον μήτε ἄπουν, κ.τ.λ. Phileb. 66 D. Polit. 277 C. Legg. VI 752 A. Stallbaum and Heindórf ad loc. Gorg. Thompson ad loc. Phaedri [et Gorg.]. The notion conveyed in all these places is the same, a headless animal is *incomplete*. See note in Introd. p. 341, on the book, which, without a preface, looks like a man going out into the street without his hat. This gives the same notion of want of finish and completeness. Quint. IV 1. 72, *Haec de prooemio, quoties erit eius usus: non semper autem est; nam et supervacuum aliquando est, si sit praeparatus satis etiam sine hoc iudex, aut si res praeparatione non eget. Aristoteles quidem in totum id necessarium apud bonos iudices negat; seq. Comp. XII 10. 52, Quod si mihi des concilium iudicum sapientum...Neque enim affectus omnino movendi sunt, nec aures delectatione mulcendae, quum etiam prooemia supervacua esse apud tales Aristoteles existimet.*

§ 9. 'Besides, this making the hearers disposed to listen (keep up

πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιᾶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρχόμενοι. διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὅτε μάλιστα πάντες προσέχοντες ἀκροῶνται. ὥστε ὅπου ἂν ἡ καιρός, λεκτέον “καὶ μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν· οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἢ ὑμέτερον” καὶ

ἐρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν οἶον οὐδεπώποτε  
ἀκηκόατε δεινόν,

ἢ οὕτω θαυμαστόν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔφη  
Πρόδικος, ὅτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν  
10 τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοῖς. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὸν  
ἀκροατὴν οὐχ ἤπερ ὁ<sup>1</sup> ἀκροατῆς, δηλὸν· πάντες γὰρ ἢ  
<sup>1</sup> οὐχ ἢ

their attention), is common to all the parts of the speech alike, wherever it is required: for they are more inclined to relax it anywhere rather than at the opening. It is absurd therefore to fix its place (*‘post’ it*) at the beginning, a time when everybody listens with the greatest attention’. Cic. de Or. II 79. 323 quoted on § 7, *οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ συμφέρει*. Also Quint. IV. 1. 73, who follows Arist. in quoting Prodicus’ artifice. ‘And therefore, (not only at the beginning, but) wherever there is occasion, such phrases as this must be used, “And now attend to what I say, for it is no more my affair than yours”; or, “I’ll tell such a strange thing—or a thing so marvellous—as you have never yet heard before.” And this is like what Prodicus said, “whenever his audience were inclined to be drowsy, he would slip them in a taste of the fifty drachm”’. *παρεμβάλλειν*, throw them in by the side of the rest, on the sly, (*παραδιηγείσθαι*, *ἱνῆρα* 16. 5). The ‘fifty drachm’ was Prodicus’ most famous, and interesting, and expensive lecture. Plat. Crat. 384 B, Σωκρ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἀκηκὴ παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδεύσθαι, ὥς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυέ σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν.

§ 10. ‘But (that all this is beside the point, and *extra artem*;) that it is not addressed to the hearer as a hearer (read by all means ἢ ἀκροατῆς sc. ἐστὶ: i. e., that it is addressed to him as a hearer and something more, as a man liable to all the defects and infirmities and feelings above mentioned) ‘is plain: for speakers invariably employ their exordia either in prejudicing (the audience against the adversary), or in the endeavour to remove similar apprehensions (of the like suspicions and prejudices) from themselves’. If the audience were mere impartial listeners, met there to hear and judge the case, and *nothing more*; there would be no occasion for all this accusation and defence with which the orators always fill their *prooemia*.

The first example referred to, the excuse of the φύλαξ for his lack of speed and his unwelcome message, Soph. Antig. 223 seq., is a case

διαβάλλουσιν ἢ φόβους ἀπολύονται ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις.

ἀναξ, ἐρῶ μὲν οὐχ ὅπως σπουδῆς ὑπο.

τί φροιμάζῃ;

καὶ οἱ πονηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχοντες ἢ δοκοῦντες·  
πανταχοῦ γὰρ βέλτιον διατρίβειν ἢ ἐν τῷ πράγματι.

διὸ οἱ δούλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ  
II κύκλῳ, καὶ προοιμάζονται. πόθεν δ' εὖνους δεῖ ποι-  
εῖν, εἴρηται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων.  
ἐπεὶ δ' εὖ λέγεται

δός μ' ἐς Φαίηκας φίλον ἐλθεῖν ἢδ' ἐλεεινόν,

of ἀπολογεῖσθαι φόβους, 'to remove the threatened danger, or postpone it as long as he can, by a defence': and the application is, that if he had not been *afraid* of Creon, if he had been quite sure that Creon was an altogether impartial hearer, he would not have indulged in such a long preface. The second is an example of the same kind from Eur. Iph. Taur. 1162, Thoas to Iphigenia, *τί φροιμάζει νεοχμόν; ἐξαῦθα σαφῶς*. The actual defence is confined to one line (1161), but Thoas suspects her of entering upon a long apology. Buhle, who could not have looked at the passage, says "Iphig. longo exordio utentem." The Scholiast (Spengel's Ed. p. 161) here gives a long paraphrase of the watchman's speech. After this, incredible as it may appear, he adds *τὸ δὲ τί φροιμάζῃ τοῦ Κρέοντός ἐστι λέγοντος*, as if this had been a continuation of the line from the Antigone.

'And those who have, or suppose themselves to have, a bad case (*lit.* their case bad) are apt to indulge in long proemia: for it is better for them to dwell upon anything rather than upon their case'.—This also is illustrated by the speech of the φύλαξ in the Antigone: and perhaps was suggested by it; for it is not very consecutive—'And this is why slaves (when charged with a fault, and excusing themselves to their masters) never answer the questions directly, but (state) the attending (*surrounding*) circumstances, and make a long (roundabout) preface (before they come to the point)'. On τὰ κύκλῳ see I 9. 33. Victorius quotes Virg. Georg. II 45, *Non hic te carmine ficto Atque per ambages et longa exorsa tenebo*.

§ 11. 'The topics for conciliating good will have been already stated' (φιλία II 4, ἔλεος II 8, especially, from the quotation following. II 1. 7, *περὶ δ' εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον νῦν*. Cic. de Inv. I 16. 22, *benevolentia quattuor ex locis comparatur*, seq.) 'as well as (for exciting) any feeling of the same kind in general (any of the *πάθη* in Bk. II 2—11). And since the saying is true, seeing that it is well said "Grant that I may come to the Phaeacians an object of love and pity"—Hom. Od. η' [VII] 327,—it follows that these two (to make ourselves loveable and pitiable) are what we ought to aim at (for this purpose)'.

τούτων δεῖ δύο στοχάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς οἶεσθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν συνεπαινέσθαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν, ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ γένος ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματ' αὐτοῦ ἢ ἁμῶς γέ πως. ὁ γὰρ λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἐν Λακεδαιμονίοις.

- 12 τὰ δὲ τοῦ δημηγορικοῦ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ δικανικοῦ λόγου ἐστίν, φύσει δ' ἥκιστα ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ οὗ ἴσασι, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖται τὸ πρᾶγμα προσιμίον, ἀλλ' ἢ δι' αὐτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ἡλίκον βούλει

δύο] here is indeclinable, like ἅμφω sometimes. As only the first four numerals in Greek (and Sanskrit; the first three in Latin) are declinable; δύο occasionally follows the *general* rule of indeclinability. In Homer this is the usual form (see Damm's Lex. s. v.); in later and Attic writers not so frequent. Several examples are to be found in Ellendt's Lex. Soph., Sturz, Lex. Xen. See Schweighäuser, Lex. Herod. for instances with fem. plur. Analogous to this of Arist. is δύο νέων ἀνελκυσμένων, Thuc. III 89. Aristoph. δύο μυριάδες τῶν δημοτικῶν. Plat. Gorg. 464 B, δύο λέγω τέχνας. Eur. Bacch. 916, δύο ἡλίουσ. Orest. 1401, λέοντες δύο, Phoen. 55, &c.

'In the epideictic *prooemia* the hearer must be made to suppose that he is a sharer in the praise, either personally, or by his family, or his studies and pursuits, or at any rate somehow or other: for what Socrates (i. e. Plato, Menex. 235 D, *supra* I 9. 30) says in his funeral oration is quite true, that it is easy enough to praise Athenians at (friendly) Athens; the difficulty lies in doing it at Sparta (amongst rivals and enemies)'. The old adj. ἁμός, 'some', survives in several forms found in most Greek authors; ἁμῶς (γέ πως) and ἁμῇ (γέ πῃ), sc. ὁδῶ, ἁμοῦ, ἁμόθεν, and the compounds οὐδαμός, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμοῦ, οὐδαμῇ (or μῇ), οὐδαμόθεν, οὐδαμόσε, and the same with μῇ.

§ 12. 'The *exordia* of the public oration are borrowed from those of the forensic speech, but are naturally very rare in it: for in fact the subject of it is one with which they are already well acquainted, and therefore the facts of the case require no preface (no preparatory explanation) except—if at all—on his own account or that of the adversary (δι' αὐτὸν to put himself right with the audience, the ἡθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι; ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας to meet the adversary's charges, combat the prejudices the other has raised against him: both of these therefore are *accidental*), or in case the subject (this is *essential*) is not considered by them of the precise degree of importance which you wish, but rated either too high or too low.' As to τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, we had been told before, c. 13. 3, προσιμίον δὲ...ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ: as in Demosth. de Corona, and de Falsa Legatione. Comp. Quint. III 8. 8, who borrows this from Aristotle, *Aristoteles quidem nec sine causa putat et*

ὑπολαμβάνωσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μείζων ἢ ἑλαττω. διὸ ἢ p. 139.  
διαβάλλειν ἢ ἀπολύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἢ αὐξῆσαι ἢ  
 μειῶσαι. τούτων δὲ ἔνεκα προοιμίου δεῖται, ἢ κόσμον  
 χάριν, ὡς αὐτοκάβδαλα φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχη. τοι- P. 1416.  
 οὔτον γὰρ τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλείους· οὐδὲν  
 γὰρ προεξαγκωνίσας οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθὺς ἄρχε-  
 ται “Ἡλῖς πόλις εὐδαίμων.”

*a nostra, et ab eius qui dissentiet persona, duci frequenter in consiliis exordium, quasi mutantibus hoc nobis a iudiciali genere; nonnunquam etiam ut minor res maiore videatur: in demonstrativis vero prooemia esse maxime libera existimat.*

‘And hence the necessity of either raising or doing away with prejudice (διὸ, because when there *is* an adversary, as there always is in dicastic practice, the same treatment in deliberative speaking is *necessarily* required) and (the topics) of amplification and diminution (to meet the other requirement, ἐὰν μὴ ἡλικὸν βούλει, ὑπολοιπόν, κ.τ.λ.)’

On the κοινὸς τόπος (or τόποι) αὐξῆσις and μείωσις, see II 26. I. Ib. 18. 4.

‘These are the circumstances in which a preface is required (δεῖται, ὁ λόγος, or ὁ λέγων); either these, or for mere ornament’s sake, because, without it, the speech has an off-hand, slovenly (impromptu, extemporaneous) air (note on III 7. 1). For such is Gorgias’ encomium on the Eleans; without any preliminary sparring (flourish) or preparatory stirring up he starts abruptly (rushes *at once, in medias res*; *without* any previous warning or preparation) with “Elis, blessed city.”

τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλ.] Sauppe, *Or. Att. Fragm.*, *Fragm. Gorg.* No. IV. Nothing more is known of the speech.

προεξαγκωνίσας] is a metaphor from *boxing*, and denotes a preliminary exercise of the boxer, a swinging, and thrusting to and fro of the arms (*lit.* elbows), as a preparation for the actual blow, “ex athletarum disciplina ... qui bracchiis sublatis et vibratis pugnae proludent (I think this is not quite exact: the exercise is not so much to prepare for the *encounter with the antagonist*, though this of course may be included, as to give weight and impetus to the actual *blow*). Hinc ab Ar. ad oratorem traductum, qui prooemio quodam utitur priusquam ad rem ipsam deveniat.” Spanheim ad Callim. Hymn. Del. line 322. This word is a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον.

προανακινεῖν expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor; the rousing, stirring up, excitement of emotion or interest, as a *preparation* (πρό) for what is to follow. This is illustrated by Plato, *Legg.* IV 722 D, λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνὴ κεκοινώνηκε προοίμια τ’ ἔστι καὶ σχεδὸν οἷον τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχουσαι τινα ἐντεχρον ἐπιχείρησιν χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαινέσθαι. Ib. VII 789 C, of the inspiring, animating, exciting process—‘quo validiores atque animosiores ad certamina fierent,’ Stallbaum *ad locum*—which is the object of the training of fighting cocks and quails, (πόνους) ἐν οἷς αὐτὰ ἀνακινούσι γυμνάζοντες. Meno, 85 C,

I *περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις ὑπόληψιν* CHAP. XV.  
*δυσχερῇ ἀπολύσαιτο· οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἴτε εἰπόν-*

*ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἀνακεκίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὐταί.* Comp. Plut. Cato Mai. c. 26, *ἥδη δὲ καὶ προανακινεῖσθαι τοῖς Νομαδικοῖς (Numidae) τοὺς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγῶνας*, here literally, in the primary sense, the Numidians were already making preparations to stir up, &c. Ib. π. τοῦ πρώτου ψυχροῦ, c. 9, 948 C, *τὰ αἰσθητὰ ταυτὶ προανακινήσαι*, to stir up, by a preparatory examination or study, these sensible elements (of Empedocles &c.)—from all which it seems to me certain that Victorius is incorrect in interpreting this in the same way as the preceding metaphor, “brachia manusque commovere et concutere.” Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v., proludere prooemio quodam*, throws no light upon the matter.

#### CHAP. XV.

The following chapter is a continuation of the preceding on the ordinary contents of the *προοίμιον*, two of which, as we have seen c. 14 § 12, are *διαβάλλειν* and *ἀπολύεσθαι*: and on these two the orator is supplied with topics.

The same subject is treated in the *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 29 (30), at even greater length than by Aristotle: and a summary of its contents, with some remarks on its moral character, and its connexion with Isocrates, may be found in *Introd.* pp. 441—443. A comparison of this with Aristotle's treatment of the subject is altogether in favour of the latter. He had already told us that he disapproves of the *προοίμιον*, as distinct from the *πρόθεσις*, altogether: but he is obliged, by the practice of his predecessors, and the evident importance of the subject, which in spite of its unscientific character cannot be altogether passed over in a complete treatise on Rhetoric, to give it a place in his system; but it will be observed that in dealing with it he occupies at least three-fourths of the chapter with the topics of the *defensive* use of it, confining his observations on the aggressive side to two topics in a single section. See also especially § 10, *τοιούτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικώτατοι κ.τ.λ.* The reckless and unscrupulous precepts of the other treatise present *διαβολή* in its very worst character: it is truly here the ‘devil's art’, *ἡ τοῦ διαβόλου τέχνη*, the art of insinuating by whatever means prejudice and ill-will against your opponent—merely because he happens to be such, and for no other reason—and so *prejudicing his case*. There is something further on this in c. 36 (37). 46, 47. There is an invective against *διαβολή* in Isocr. *ἀντιδ.* § 18. “*διαβάλλειν* is ‘to set at variance’, ‘to make hostile’; and so to inspire ill-will, insinuate suspicions, or prejudice a person against another. It applies as a technical term to all insinuations and accusations by which one of the parties in a case endeavours to raise a prejudice against the other, which are to be reflected upon, but do not directly help to prove, the main charge or point at issue; and are therefore *extra artem*, *ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος*. See III 15. 9; and comp. the example, *infra* § 3. *ἀπολύεσθαι* is to clear oneself of such insinuated charges, to remove evil suspicions. Aristotle begins with this, because, as he told us before (c. 14. 7), it is *more* appropriate to the exordium, as the opposite (in accusation) is to the peroration.” *Introd.* p. 344.

2 ΤΟΣ ΤΙΝΟΣ ΕΊΤΕ ΜΗ, ὥΣΤΕ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ. ἄλλος <sup>to combat the</sup>  
 ΤΡΟΠΟΣ ὥΣΤΕ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΟΥΜΕΝΑ ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ, ἢ ὡς <sup>charges</sup>  
 ΟΥΚ ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐ βλαβερόν, ἢ οὐ τούτω, ἢ ὡς οὐ τηλι-  
 κούτον ἢ οὐκ ἄδικον ἢ οὐ μέγα ἢ οὐκ αἰσχροῦν ἢ οὐκ ἔχον  
 μέγεθος· περὶ γὰρ τοιούτων ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις, ὥσπερ

§ 1. 'With respect to *διαβολή*, (intentional and malicious) calumny or (accidental, undesigned) prejudice, one (the first) topic is *anything* from which arguments may be derived for removing offensive (unpleasant, injurious) *suspicion*: for it makes no difference whether (the charge or insinuation) has been actually spoken (expressed, in the shape of a direct *personal calumny*) or not' (i.e. has merely been conceived, not openly stated; *ὑπόληψις* as a mere conception or supposition—against us by inference, from our words, actions, or manners, or altogether accidentally, when people have a *bad opinion* of us: in either case the prejudice requires to be removed); 'and therefore this is a general rule'; includes everything, every kind of argument which tends to remove any bad opinion or prejudice which for whatever reason may be entertained against us: and this, whether the charge we have to meet be a direct statement, or merely an uncertified suspicion. This is illustrated by Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 8, 9.

In Benseler's Isocrates, II 276, a ref. is given upon *διαβολή* to Isocr. τέχνη, Fragm. τέχνη. No. 2 (from Anon. et Maxim. Planud. v 551. 10, Waitz), which runs thus: ἐν γὰρ ταῖς καταστάσεσι τὰ τε οἰκεία συνιστῶμεν (establish) καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων διαβάλλομεν πρὸς τὸ οἰκείον σύμφερον ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς καταστάσεις, ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἐδίδαξεν.

§ 2. 'Another way (of clearing oneself) is to meet the charge on any of these *issues*' (στάσεις or ἀμφισβητήσεις, *status*, the turning-point of the case, on which issue is joined: on these see Appendix E to Book III in Introd. p. 397 seq. where the various classifications of them are given;) 'either by denying the fact (τὸ ὄτι, *status coniecturalis*); or admitting that, and asserting that the alleged act was not injurious (*ab utili*, Victorius); or at any rate not to *him* (the complainant); or that the amount of injury is overstated; or that it was either no wrong at all (not *unjust*: not a legal crime), or a slight one; or, (taking the other view of morality, supposing it to be strictly speaking unjust, at any rate) not disgraceful, or a mere trifle, of no importance at all'. οὐ μέγα differs in this from οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος: the former qualifies merely the *wrong* of the ἄδικον, the latter is "no great matter"; of *greatness*, in the sense of magnitude or importance in general. 'For these are the points upon which the issue (of a case) turns, as in that between Iphicrates and Nausicrates: for he admitted the *fact* and the *injury*, but said it was no *wrong*'. Nausicrates or (always in the Latin Rhetoricians) Naucrates, is mentioned by Cicero, Orat. I 172, de Orat. II 23. 94, and III 44. 173, as a pupil of Isocrates. Quint., III 6. 3, stating the same fact, tells us also that some attributed to him the first systematic division of these στάσεις or *status*. See Art. in Biogr. Dict. s. v. Westermann's Gesch. der Gr. ü. Röm. Beredsamkeit, 50. 5, comp. 83. 10.



Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ναυσικράτην· ἔφη γὰρ ποιῆσαι ὁ ἔλεγε καὶ βλάψαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀδικεῖν. ἢ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι ἀδικούντα, εἰ βλαβερὸν ἀλλὰ καλόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν ἀλλ' ἀφέλιμον ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιούτον. ἄλλος τρόπος ὡς ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημα ἢ ἀτύχημα ἢ ἀναγκυῖον,

Spalding, on Quint. III 6. 60, retains the *vulgata lectio* τοῦτο (instead of τούτῳ) in the sense of ὀρίκη στάσις or *fnitio*.

On the redundant ὥστε in τρόπος ὥστε ἀπαντᾶν, add to the examples from the Tragic poets collected by Monk ad Eur. Hippol. 1323, Κύπρις γὰρ ἤθελ' ὥστε γίγνεσθαι τάδε, Thuc. I 28, ἐτοῖμοι εἶναι ὥστε (provided δέ be retained), Ib. c. 119, δεηθέντες ὥστε ψηφίσασθαι, VIII 45, ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε, Ib. c. 79, δόξαν ὥστε διανουμαχεῖν, Ib. 86, ὥστε...πάνν ἐπαίνειν. Pind. Nem. V 64, κατένευσεν ὥστε πράξει. Herod. I 74, συνήνεκε ὥστε...νύκτα γενέσθαι, Ib. III 14, συνήνεκε ὥστε...παριέναι. Plat. Protag. 338 c, ἀδύνατον ὥστε, where see Heindorf's note, and also on Phaedr. 269 D, τὸ δύνασθαι ὥστε...γενέσθαι. Phaedo 93 B and 103 E, ἔστιν...ὥστε...ἀξιοῦσθαι (Stallbaum's note), Isocr. Archid. § 40, γέγονεν ὥστε...κρατηθῆναι. Dem. de F. L. § 124 μὴδ' ἦν ὥστ' ἰδεῖν ἅπαντας (with Shilleto's critical note). Aesch. de F. L. p. 49 § 158, εἴσατε...ὥστε...ἀναστρέφεσθαι. Ar. Pol. II 2, 1261 a 34, συμβαίνει... ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, Ib. VIII (V) 9, 1309 b 32, ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν. Ib. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, συμβέβηκεν ὥστε...τὴν πολιτ. εἶναι. Soph. Oed. Col. 570, Ib. 1350 (Dind.), δικαίων ὥστ' ἐμοῦ κλύειν, Philoct. 656, ἄρ' ἔστιν ὥστε κἀγγυθεὶν θεὸν λαβεῖν. Eur. Iph. T. 1017, πῶς οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὥστε μὴθ' ἡμᾶς θανεῖν.

‘Or (in justifying oneself), admitting a wrong done, to balance (or compensate) it (by something else which may be taken as a set-off, or drawback, in diminution of the wrong); for instance you say, what I did was injurious no doubt, but honourable; or painful, but serviceable; or anything else of the same sort’. The comparison of a few passages will best illustrate the meaning of ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι. Ar. de part. Anim. I 5. 3, 644 b 22. The author is comparing the interest and value in natural philosophy of the objects of sense, things that we can see and touch and handle, and so examine and satisfy our curiosity about, with those that are beyond the reach of our senses, οὐσίας ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα. Though the latter are in themselves higher and more excellent, “yet by their greater nearness to us, and more immediate connexion with our nature, there is a sort of compensation, ἀντικαταλλάττεται τι, when they are compared with the things divine as objects of study.” Dem. de Cor. § 138, τῆς ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡδονῆς καὶ χάριτος τὸ τῆς πόλεως συμφέρον ἀνταλλαττόμενοι, ‘bartering, exchanging for, compensating by.’ Plat. Phaedo 69 A, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονάς, καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας, καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι...ὥσπερ νομίσματα: and other passages collected by Wytttenb. ad loc. Dinarch. adv. Dem. § 2, μὴδὲ τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἀντικαλλάξασθαι τῶν τοῦ κρινόμενου λόγων. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 92, ῥῆμα μόνον ἀντικαταλλάξάμενος ἀντὶ τούτων. Isocr. Phil. § 135, ὑπὲρ ἄλλου μὲν σῦδενός ἂν τὸ ἔην ἀντικαταλλάξαμένους. (Ernesti *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v., *ex-cusare reum*!)

§ 3. ‘Another method is (to extenuate the ἀδίκημα by the milder

οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη τρέμειν οὐχ ὡς ὁ διαβάλλων ἔφη, ἵνα δοκῇ γέρων, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐ γὰρ ἐκόντι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἔτη ὀγδοήκοντα. καὶ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, ὅτι οὐ βλάψαι ἐβούλετο ἀλλὰ τόδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο ὃ διεβάλλετο ποιῆσαι, συνέβη δὲ βλαβῆναι. “δίκαιον δὲ μισεῖν, εἰ ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται ἐποίουν.”

4 ἄλλος, εἰ ἐμπεριείληπται ὁ διαβάλλων, ἢ νῦν ἢ πρό- <sup>introduced in the same way</sup>

terms), (to say) that it is a mistake, or an accident, or compulsory', done under compulsion: *βία*, see I 10. 14, and Appendix C to Bk. I., Introd. p. 225, and the references there. *ἀνάγκη* or *βία*, 'overpowering force', *forza maggiore*, *force majeure*, absolves from responsibility. Four *degrees of criminality* are thus distinguished in Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 b 11, (1) *ἀτύχημα*, a mere accident, an injury done unintentionally without knowledge of the *special circumstances* of the case: (2) *ἁμάρτημα*, an error or mistake, where the act is intentional but the injury unintentional (the case of killing a friend with a gun supposed not to be loaded); this does not include the case of moral ignorance, ignorance of right and wrong, for which a man is responsible: (3) *ἀδίκημα*, a wrong, intentional in a sense, but without *deliberation* or *malice prepense*, as a deadly blow dealt in a fit of passion, when the judgment is for the moment overpowered; (this is, I believe, the only place in which this degree is distinguished from the following: at all events the *ordinary* division is threefold.) All these are short of actual guilt or crime. The last stage, of actual crime, is (4) *ἀδικία*, a wrong act committed with full knowledge of the circumstances, and deliberate purpose, *ὅταν ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός*. With this compare III 2, on the intentional and unintentional. Comp. also Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 8, 9.

'As for instance Sophocles said that his trembling was not, as his accuser (or traducer) said, assumed to convey the appearance of old age, (and thereby obtain the sympathy and compassion of the judges) but compulsory (and therefore he was not responsible for it); for his eighty years were quite unintentional'. On Sophocles—not the poet—see note on I 14. 3. The same Sophocles is mentioned again III 18. 6.

'And again, by a balance (compensatory interchange or substitution) of motives; (for instance) that you had no intention of injuring him; what you really intended to do was so and so, and not that which was falsely laid to your charge; the *injury* was an accident (not of the essence of what you did: a mere *συμβεβηκός*). "I should deserve to be hated if that were my intention in doing it". This seems to be introduced as a specimen of what might be said on such an occasion; and contrary to his usual practice, Aristotle's own manufacture.

§ 4. 'Another (way or topic) is *recrimination*, when the accuser is involved in the same charge, either at the present time or on some previous occasion; either himself or any of those *near* to him (relatives, connexions, intimate friends). If you can shew that your adversary or any one very near to him is liable to the same charge as that of

5 τερον, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐγγύς. ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπερι-  
λαμβάνονται, οὓς ὁμολογοῦσι μὴ ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ δια-  
βολῇ, οἷον εἰ ὅτι καθάριος ὁ<sup>1</sup> μοιχός, καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρα.  
 6 ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλους διέβαλεν, ἢ ἄλλος αὐτούς, ἢ ἄνευ δια-  
βολῆς ὑπελαμβάνοντο ὥσπερ αὐτὸς νῦν, οἱ πεφῆνασιν

<sup>1</sup> fortasse transponendum aut prorsus omittendum.

which he accuses you, though the charge may not therefore fall to the ground, at any rate you can silence him by saying, that *he* at all events was not the person to make it. Majoragius cites Cic. pro Ligar. § 2. *Habes igitur, Tubero, quod est accusatori maxime optandum, confitentem reum, sed tamen ita confitentem, se in ea parte fuisse, qua te, Tubero, qua virum omni laude dignum, patrem tuum. Itaque prius de vestro delicto confiteamini necesse est, quam Ligarii ullam culpam reprehendatis.* He adds that the whole of the *exordium* of the fifth action against Verres is to prove, *neminem debere alterum accusare de ea re qua ipse sit infectus.*

§ 5. 'Again, if others are included in the charge who are admitted not to be liable to the accusation; for instance if (it be argued) that so and so is an adulterer because he is a smart dresser, (the reply is) why in that case so must Smith and Jones be adulterers?—although it is perfectly well known that Smith and Jones are entirely free from that vice. Bekker and Spengel accept Riccoboni's, and Bekker's own, suggestion *καθάρσιος* for *vulgata lectio καθαρὸς*: but they retain the article *ὁ* in its old position *ὅτι καθάρσιος ὁ μοιχός*. With this reading the only translation can be, "that all adulterers dress smartly", which is not to the point. The *converse* is required by the *argument*—which is, to free yourself from a suspicion which has arisen from some accidental association, by shewing that, if the two things were really associated, others would be liable to the same suspicion, who are known *not* to be obnoxious to it: "if, as is alleged, all smart dressers were adulterers, then so and so, who are known *not* to be liable to the charge, would be involved in it": and besides this, the following passages on the same subject shew that this *was* the argument that was used. *καθάρσιος*, II 4. 15, for 'neatness and cleanliness in dress' and attention to personal appearance: the *argument* from this appears II 24. 7, *ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστής, καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός<sup>1</sup> τοιοῦτοι γὰρ*; and de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 9, *βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστής ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁράται πλανώμενος*. It is necessary therefore, besides the alteration of *καθαρός* into *καθάρσιος*, either to change the position of the article, *εἰ ὅτι ὁ καθάρσιος μοιχός* or to omit the article altogether *εἰ ὅτι καθάρσιος μοιχός*. If such a mistaken inference *has been drawn*, you infer from this example by *analogy* to a like case.

§ 6. 'Again, if (your accuser) ever brought against others (the same) charges (which he is now bringing against you); or if, without a direct accusation, these same were ever subjected to the same suspicions as you yourself are now; who have been shewn to be entirely innocent of them—you may infer by analogy that a similar mistake is likely to have been made in the present case.

7 οὐκ ἔνοχοι. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιδιαβάλλειν τὸν δια-  
βάλλοντα· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὅς<sup>1</sup> αὐτὸς ἄπιστος, οἱ  
8 τούτου λόγοι ἔσονται πιστοί. ἄλλος, εἰ γέγονε  
κρίσις, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα ἐν τῇ *decision*  
ἀντιδόσει κατηγοροῦντα ὡς ἀσεβής, ὅς γ' ἐποίησε  
κελεύων ἐπιροκεῖν

ἢ γλῶσσ' ὁμώμοχ', ἢ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.

p. 140.

<sup>1</sup> δ

§ 7. 'Or again, (another topic may be derived) from recrimination, by a retort upon the accuser: (the inference being, that) it is strange that where (in what, δ,) a man himself is not to be trusted, his statements should be trustworthy'. MSS δ αὐτός, Bekker Ed. 3, and Spengel (apparently from Bekker) δς. I read *ὅς* as nearer to the text, 'in what'.

§ 8. 'Another is, the appeal to a previous decision; an instance of which is Euripides' reply to Hygiaenon, in the *exchange* case, in which the latter accused him of impiety for the verse that he wrote in recommendation of perjury, "the tongue hath sworn; but the mind is unsworn". His reply was that the other had no right to bring cases (decisions) out of the Dionysiac contest into the courts of law: for he had already given an account (stood his trial) of them (his words, αὐτῶν, included in the verse), or was prepared to do so, if the other chose to accuse him'. This celebrated verse, Hippol. 608, probably owes a good deal of its notoriety to Aristophanes' parody of it near the end of the Frogs. Seldom has so "much ado about nothing" been made as about this unlucky line. The charge of recommending perjury is at any rate a gross exaggeration. Nor does it necessarily imply even mental reservation. Cicero, de Off. III 29.107 (quoted by Monk ad loc.), puts the case very clearly. *Quod ita iuratum est ut mens conciperet fieri oportere, id servandum est: quod aliter, id si non feceris nullum est periurium. Non enim falsum iurare periurare est; sed quod ex animi tui sententia iuraris, sicut verbis concipitur more nostro, id non facere periurium est. Scite enim Euripides, Iuravi lingua, mentem iniuratum gero.* See the whole of Monk's note. Paley in his note follows Cicero. Of course the deceit, if there be any, lies in the intention and not in the word; and this is all that Hippolytus seems to say. He never intended that his oath should be kept in *that* sense: and his ignorance of the circumstances absolves him from the responsibility, or obligation of the oath. See above in note on § 3<sup>1</sup>.

We learn from this passage that Euripides (the tragic poet) was

<sup>1</sup> I find this note in one of my copies of the Hippolytus. "I don't think the principle implied in this (the verse of Eurip.) can be defended. Hippolytus says that he swore to keep the secret in ignorance of the nature of it: now that he knows *that*, he is freed from the obligation of keeping it. Has a man a *right* to lay himself under an obligation, of the nature of which he is ignorant?" However the question still remains, if the oath *has been* taken in ignorance, is he still bound to keep it? The last sentence was added when this Commentary was written.

ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν τὰς ἐκ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ ἀγῶνος κρίσεις εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἄγοντα· ἱκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν δεδωκέναι λόγον ἢ δώσειν, εἰ βούλεται κατηγορεῖν.  
 9 ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν, ἡλίκον, καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι ἄλλας κρίσεις ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πιστεύει τῷ πράγματι. κοινὸς δ' ἀμφοῖν ὁ τόπος τὸ σύμβολα P. 1+16 ἡ λέγειν, οἶον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτι οἰκείος τῷ

capable of pleading a cause in public. Another public speech, in an embassy to Syracuse, is attributed to him in II 6. 20 ult., where see note.

On the ἀντίδοσις, the compulsory 'exchange of property', in the case of an unfair assignment of a liturgy at Athens, see Böckh *Publ. Econ.* Bk. iv. ch. 16. It does not appear from the text which of the two parties it was that proposed the exchange.

Valckenaer ad Hippol. 612, p. 232, would change the name in the text to 'Υγιαίνετον, as more agreeable to the analogy of Greek proper names. The name is right. Harpocr. quotes twice the speech of Hyperides πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα, sub vv. ἐν καὶ νέα et θέσθαι.

§ 9. 'Another (may be borrowed) from the accusation of calumny and malicious insinuation itself, (shewing) its enormity (magnitude, how great it is)—and this in particular that it raises extraneous points for decision' (ἄλλας different from, foreign to, the question at issue: like Hygiaenon's quotation in the last section, which may perhaps have suggested this topic. This seems to fix the meaning of ἄλλας and so Victorius: otherwise it might be "gives rise to other trials," one trial generated out of another *ad infinitum*); 'and because it places no reliance on the facts of the real matter at issue'. Comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 12, and Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 18, who διαβάλλει διαβολήν, and in good round terms.

'Common to both (τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ ἀπολογουμένῳ) is the topic of *signs* and *tokens*: as, for example, in (Sophocles') Teucer, Ulysses charges him with being closely connected with Priam (i. e. with the enemy: closely connected in a double sense: it is an *inference* from his connexion by blood to his *political* connexion, to his favouring the cause of Priam); for Hesione (Teucer's mother) was his (Priam's) sister<sup>1</sup>: the other (Teucer) replies (in the same topic) that his *father*' (a still *nearer* relation. See Apollo's speech in Aesch. Eumen. 657—673 and in many other places, on the nearer connexion, and higher obligation, of the son to the father than to the mother) 'Telamon, was Priam's enemy, and also that he did not betray (inform against) the spies to him'. This play of Sophocles has already been *named* before—in II 23. 7. There are only two short fragments of it remaining (Dind., Wagn. *Soph. Fragm.*), from

<sup>1</sup> On this connexion, Victorius refers to Virg. Aen. VIII 157, *Nam meminī Hesione visentem regna sororis Laomedontiadem Priamum* seq.; and Soph. Aj. 1299 seq., where Teucer in answer to Agamemnon, boasting of his descent, says, *ὅς ἐκ πατρὸς μὲν εἰμι Τελαμώνιος... ὅστις... ἴσχει ξύνευνον μητὲρ, ἣ φύσει μὲν ἦν βασιλεῖα, Λαομέδοντος.*

Πριάμῳ· ἡ γὰρ Ἑσιόνη ἀδελφή· ὃ δὲ ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἐχθρὸς τῷ Πριάμῳ, ὁ Τελαμών, καὶ ὅτι οὐ κατεῖπε  
 10 τῶν κατασκόπων. ἄλλος τῷ διαβάλλοντι, τὸ ἐπαινοῦντι μικρὸν μακρῶς ψέξαι μέγα συντόμως, ἢ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ προθέντα, ὃ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα προφέρει ἐν ψέξαι. τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικώτατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι· τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ βλάπτειν πειρῶνται, μιγνύντες αὐτὰ τῷ κακῷ. κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ

which absolutely nothing is to be learned as to the plot of the play. It is clear from this passage, that Ulysses' accusation was that Teucer had betrayed the Greek cause, and had dealings with the enemy. The charge is supported by the *sign* of Teucer's connexion—in the double sense above explained—with Priam; and met by the other with two signs or tokens leading to the opposite inference. Wagner, *Soph. Fragm.* (*Fr. Trag. Gr.* 1, 385—391, Τεύκρος), supposing that Pacuvius "*Soph. fabulam imitatione expressisse*", collects a number of his fragments from various Latin writers, from which he derives an interpretation of the story of the play, totally different—as he candidly admits—from that which we shall gather from this passage. But as the interpretation of this passage is perfectly clear, and his hypothesis altogether the reverse, uncertain in every particular, there is little doubt which of the two is to be preferred for the elucidation of Ar.'s text—provided we confess our entire ignorance of all else in and about the play in question.

§ 10. 'Another, for the accuser, is to praise some trifle at great length, and then (under cover of that) to introduce in concise (and pregnant) terms a *censure* of something that is of real importance; or after a preliminary enumeration of a number of advantages (virtues and accomplishments, which have little or nothing to do with the point at issue) hold up that one thing to censure which has a direct and real bearing on the question'. *προφέρειν*, to *promote* (carry forward), aid, assist, further. Hes. Op. et D. 579, ἥως τοι προφέρει μὲν ὁδοῦ, προφέρει δὲ καὶ ἔργον. Thuc. 1 93, καὶ αὐτοὺς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν εἰς τὸ κτήσασθαι δύναμιν.

Victorius illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. 1 4. 94 seq. and the following well-known passage from Cic. pro L. Flacco, IV 9. *Verumtamen hoc dico de toto genere Græcorum: tribuo illis litteras: de multarum artium disciplinam: non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam: denique etiam, si qua sibi alia sumunt non repugno: testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit: totiusque huius rei quæ sit vis, quæ auctoritas, quod pondus, ignorant.*

'(Topics) such as these are at the same time most artful and most unfair: for they endeavour to do harm with what is good (to convert the good into an instrument of mischief) by mixing it with the bad'; like one who mixes poison with wholesome food. 'Another topic common to both accuser and excuser is, that since the same act may always be attri-

ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἕνεκα  
πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ  
χειρόν ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ  
βέλτιον· οἷον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα προ-  
εἶλετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν  
Ὀδυσσεῖα, τῷ δ' ὅτι οὐ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ  
ἀνταγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαῦλον.

I καὶ περὶ μὲν διαβολῆς εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα, διήγησις CHAP. XVI.  
δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλὰ  
κατὰ μέρος· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὰς πράξεις διελθεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὁ

buted to several (different) motives, the accuser has to depreciate (dis-  
parage, put a *bad* character or construction upon) it, by selecting the  
worse (lit. by *directing* his selection to what is worse), the apologist to  
put the more favourable interpretation upon it' (*interpretari in peius, in  
melius*).

ἐκλαμβάνειν. ἐκ of 'selection.' Rhet. ad Al. 10 (11). 2, ἐκληπτέον.  
Ib. 2 (3). 26, ἐκλάβωμεν. Top. Z 4, 141 ὁ 4, ἐκλαβεῖν. ἐκλέγειν and ἐκ-  
λαμβάνειν—technically applied to the selection of topics—are illustrated  
by Poste, Post. Anal. p. 21, n. 1, and p. 121, n. 1. Similarly we have ἐκ-  
κεῖσθαι, Rhet. III 9. 2, ἐκθέσθαι, Phys. VI 5. 9, ἐκτιθέναι, Rhet. ad Al. 29 (30).  
21, ἐκκεῖσθαι, pluries, Top. A 9. ἐκτιθέναι, ἐκθεσις, Waitz, Ind. ad Org.  
s. vv. Poet. XVII 5, ἐκτίθεσθαι. Ar. Pol. IV (VII) 13, sub init. ὁ σκοπὸς  
ἐκκεῖται καλῶς, "the mark stands well out, full in view, prominent." Lite-  
rally, Dem. c. Mid. § 103, πλὴν ἢ ἐκκείτο (Euctemon, 'publicly posted',  
*affiche*) πρὸ τῶν Ἑπώνυμων. Dem. (?) κατὰ Θεοκρ. § 8, ἐξέκειτο δὲ πολὺν  
χρόνον ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ συνεδρίου ἢ φάσις.

'For instance, (to say) that Diomede preferred Ulysses (to be his  
companion in the nocturnal adventure), on the one side because he sup-  
posed Ulysses to be the best (i.e. the most valiant) of men (or the best  
companion, for such an occasion), on the other, not for that reason, but  
because, from his worthlessness, he was the only (one of the heroes)  
of whose rivalry he (Diom.) was not afraid'. *Supra* II 23. 20, 24: where  
the same case is given, and the two sides opposed, in illustration of  
two different topics. See Hom. II. K [x] 242 seq.

'And so much for the treatment of διαβολή'.

#### CHAP. XVI.

On the various divisions of the parts of the speech, including διή-  
γησις, the special subject of the following chapter, see the introductory  
reimarks to c. 13, Intro. p. 331 seq., and in the Commentary.

Ἰσοκράτης ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ φησὶν ὡς ἐν τῇ διηγῇ σκελετέον τὸ τε πρᾶγμα  
καὶ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὰς διανοίας, αἷς ἑκάτερος  
τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων χρώμενος τότε τι πέπραχεν ἢ μέλλει πράττειν, καὶ τούτων  
τοῖς συμβαλλομένοις ἡμῖν χρηστέον (from Syrianus, Sopater, and Anon. ap.  
Walz, Benseler Isocr. II 276, ἀποσπάσμ. No. 3); Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37).

λόγος· σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον (οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων) τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς τέχνης· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἐστὶ δεῖξαι, εἴαν ἢ ἄπιστον, ἢ ὅτι ποιόν, ἢ ὅτι ποσόν, ἢ καὶ ἅπαντα.

2 διὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐφεξῆς δεῖ διηγεῖσθαι πάντα, ὅτι δυσμνημόνευτον τὸ δεικνύναι οὕτως. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀνδρείος, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε σοφὸς ἢ δίκαιος. καὶ ἀπλούστερος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ἐκείνος δὲ ποικίλος καὶ

14, the διήγησις is there called ἀπαγγελία. Cic. de Or. II 19 § 83; 80 §§ 326—330. Orat. XXXV 122, 124. Orat. Part. IX 31, 32. de Inv. I 19. 27—21. 30. By Quintilian *narratio* is treated in great detail in IV 2. [Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, §§ 11—27, esp. § 13, *die Erzählung*.]

§ 1. 'In the epideictic branch of Rhetoric narration is not consecutive but fragmentary'. οὐκ ἐφεξῆς, not continuous, one part of it following the other in a regular series or succession, but broken up into parts, piecemeal, κατὰ μέρος, to aid the memory by giving opportunity for proving each point of laudation as it arises. 'For we *have* to go through' (*narrate*, or enumerate in detail; there *must be* a narration;) 'all the actions which form the subject of the panegyric' (*li.* out of which the speech, i. e. the praise conferred by the speech, is made to arise: the special topics of ἐπανοις are 'moral action', πράξεις; see on this Appendix B to Bk. I c. 9, Introd. p. 212 seq.): 'for the speech is constructed with (or from) one element with which *art* is not concerned—because the speaker is not the author of the actions he praises' (*art* is *productive*, Eth. Nic. VI 4. The speaker has not *made* his materials himself: he finds them ready to his hand, and *uses* them. These are the ἀτεχνοὶ πίστεις of I 15)—'and another which is derived from the (rhetorical) art (these are the ἐντεχνοὶ πίστεις, the inferences which are derived from the materials); and this (the latter) is to prove either the fact, if it be incredible, or that it is of a certain quality, or quantity (amount, magnitude, importance), or all three'.

§ 2. 'And it is this character of an epideictic speech (this necessary admixture of inference with statement of facts) that sometimes obliges the speaker not to relate everything *serialim* (one after another, in continuous, uninterrupted order), because a proof of this kind (a long series of statements followed by a still longer series of proofs, which after the first two or three topics would be difficult to recollect in their proper connexion, so as to fit them together,) would be difficult to retain in the memory. From *this* set of topics he (the hero) is to be shewn to be brave, from the others to be wise or just, (and the proofs of these would get intermixed and confounded in the hearer's memory). And the speech by this arrangement of topics (οἶτος) is simpler; by the other it is made puzzling (prop. parti-coloured, and so by the *variety*, perplexing) and not smooth' (i. e. *plain* and easy—like a smooth surface to walk or drive over).



3 οὐ λιτός. δεῖ δὲ τὰς μὲν γνωρίμους ἀναμνησκειν· διὸ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐδὲν δέονται διηγήσεως, οἷον εἰ θέλεις Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖν· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι αὐταῖς δεῖ. ἐὰν δὲ Κριτίαν, δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ p. 141.

λιτός] connected with λισσός and λείος. The metaphor is from a smooth and easily travelled road; like the road to vice, smooth and easy, λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει, in Hesiod's often-quoted lines, Op. et D. 287—292: and Euripides' style, in Archimelus' epigram, Anthol. II 64, λείη μὲν γὰρ ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐπικροτος—"it seems indeed to the eye a smooth and well-beaten track"—εἰ δέ τις αὐτὴν εἰσβαίνει χαλεποῦ τρηχύτερη σκόλοπος. It is applied frequently by Dionysius to style in the sense of ἀπλοῦς, εὐτελής (Hesych.). In de adm. vi dic. in Demosth. c. 2 init., the terms λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής are applied to a style like that of Lysias, plain, smooth, simple, easy, opposed to the rough, rugged, contortions of that of Thucydides. In de vet. script. cens. c. 2 § 11, it is opposed to ὑψηλός, 'low or mean', ὁ δ' Εὐριπίδης οὔτε ὑψηλός ἐστιν οὔτε μὴν λίτος: de Thuc. Iud. c. 23, it is 'simple and unadorned', λέξιν λιτὴν καὶ ἀκόσμητον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν περιττόν: and in de adm. vi dic. in Demosth. c. 34, it is again opposed to ὑψηλός, 'low', τὴν λιτὴν καὶ ἰσχνὴν (thin, *tenuis*.) καὶ ἀπείριστον (without any striking points or features, 'flat').

§ 3. 'Of well-known actions the hearer should merely be reminded (they should merely be suggested, by a brief allusion, not dwelt upon); and therefore most people<sup>1</sup> (i.e. men of ordinary education) in such cases don't require a regular narrative of them'—everybody at once remembers that Achilles conquered Hector; people only need to be reminded of that—'as for instance, if you want to praise Achilles: for his actions are known to everybody, they only require to be employed (that is, to be enlarged upon, and commented, for the purpose of enhancing their glory). If Critias is to be praised (or censured), he does want one: for not many people know anything about him'. Critias too—one of the Thirty—was a famous man in his day: one wonders that he should have been so entirely forgotten in Aristotle's time. Pericles and Alcibiades still lived fresh in men's memories; though I don't mean that the three were absolutely on a level in contemporary reputation.

It appears that between ἴσασι and ὡν δὲ γελοιώς there has been a gap in the MSS, including A\*, which has been filled up with an extract from I 9, on ἔπαινος, §§ 33—97. Comp. Spengel, in a paper on the Rhet. ad Alex. in *Zeitschrift für Alt. Wiss.* 1840, p. 1226. Bekker's *Variae Lectiones* include A\* with the rest, as having the interpolated passage: Buhle, ad h. l., says "in nearly all the Edd. except that of Victorius and his followers," the interpolation is found.

The abrupt transition from the epideictic to the dicastic branch had already made Vettori (for once I will give him his proper name) suspect

<sup>1</sup> There is a temptation here to understand οἱ πολλοί as 'the heroes of the declamation'; 'those who have their actions narrated'—which is to be resisted. It is not true in this sense.

4 πολλοὶ ἴσασιν... νῦν δὲ γελοίως τὴν διήγησίν φασιν  
 δεῖν εἶναι ταχέαν. καίτοι ὥσπερ ὁ τῷ μάττοντι  
 ἐρομένῳ πότερον σκληρὰν ἢ μαλακὴν μάξῃ, “τί δ’;”  
 ἔφη, “εὐ ἀδύνατον,” καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· δεῖ γὰρ μὴ  
 μακρῶς διηγέισθαι ὥσπερ οὐδὲ προοιμιάζεσθαι μακρῶς,  
 οὐδὲ τὰς πίστεϊς λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθά ἐστι τὸ εὖ  
 ἢ τὸ ταχὺ ἢ τὸ συντόμως, ἀλλὰ τὸ μετρίως· τοῦτο  
 a lacuna. The words νῦν δέ, which have no reference to anything pre-  
 ceding, suggest the same conclusion.

§ 4. Something is here lost. ‘But as it is, it is absurd to say’ (as the writers on Rhetoric do in their treatises; and especially Isocrates) ‘that the narration ought to be rapid’. This precept is suggested in Rhet. ad Alex. 6 (7). 3, in the word βραχυλογία; and 30 (31). 4, it is further recommended that the narrative of a *δημηγορία* should be *βραχεία* and *σύντομος*. See Spengel’s note on ed. of Anaximenes’ *Ars Rhet.*, pp. 214, 5: and 219. Cic. de Orat. II 80. 326. Quint. IV 2. 31, 32, (Narrationem) *plerique scriptores, maxime qui sunt ab Isocrate, volunt esse lucidam, brevem, verisimilem.... Eadem nobis placet divisio; quanquam et Aristoteles ab Isocrate in parte una discesserit, praeceptum brevitatis irridens, tanquam necesse sit longam aut brevem esse expositionem, nec liceat ire per medium*. From Plato Phaedr. 267 A, it appears that this precept appeared in rhetorical treatises as early as those of Tisias and Gorgias; and a remark of Prodicus, to precisely the same effect as that of the customer to the baker here, is quoted, 267 B. The precept, that it should be *σύντομον*, is found also in Dionysius de Lys. Iud. c. 18, (p. 492 R): probably taken from Isocrates. (Spengel’s *Artium Scriptores*, p. 158).

The extract from *Isocrates*, on this quality of the διήγησις, is quoted at the commencement of this chapter. This is one of Vettori’s evidences (perhaps the best) of Aristotle’s dislike of Isocrates. This subject is discussed in Introd. pp. 41—45, and the probability of the hypothesis reduced to a minimum. If they ever were enemies—as is likely enough in Ar.’s early life—after the death of Isocrates, by the time that this work was completed and published, all trace of *hostility* (γελοίως φασίν can at the worst hardly imply hostility) must have long vanished from Aristotle’s mind.

‘And yet—just as the man replied to the baker when he asked him whether he should knead his dough (τὴν μάξαν) hard or soft<sup>1</sup>, “what”, said he, “is it impossible to do it *well*?”—so here in like manner: that is to say (γάρ), the narration should be no more over long<sup>2</sup> than the *prooe-*

<sup>1</sup> Spengel, *Art. Script.* 169 note, has discovered here some fragments of a comic verse: which he thus restores: σκληρὰν δὲ... ἢ μαλακὴν μάξω; τί δέ; ἀδύνατον εὖ κμάττω σε. [The addition of πότερον would fill the blank left in the first line.]

<sup>2</sup> It would be difficult to assign any sufficient reason (in point of the sense) for making the distinction of μὴ and οὐδέ here; though we may say, grammatically, of course, that the μὴ is joined immediately with the inf. mood, whereas the two οὐδέ-s following require δεῖ to be supplied after them in each case.

δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅσα δηλώσει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ ὅσα P. 1417.  
 ποιήσει ὑπολαβεῖν γεγονέναι ἢ βεβλαφέναι ἢ ἡδικη-  
 κέναι, ἢ τηλικαῦτα ἤλικά βούλει· τῷ δὲ ἐναντίῳ τὰ  
 5 ἐναντία. παραδιηγείσθαι δὲ ὅσα εἰς τὴν σὴν ἀρετὴν  
 φέρει, οἷον “ἐγὼ δ' ἐνουθέτουν αἰετὰ δίκαια λέγων,  
 μὴ τὰ τέκνα ἐγκαταλείπειν,” ἢ θατέρου κακίαν· “ὁ  
 δ' ἀπεκρίνατό μοι ὅτι, οὐδ' ἂν ἦ αὐτός, ἔσται ἄλλα  
 παιδιά,” ὁ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους Αἰγυπτίους ἀποκρί-  
 νασθαί φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος. ἢ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς δικα-  
 6 σταῖς. ἀπολογουμένῳ δὲ ἐλάττων ἢ διήγησις· αἱ γὰρ  
 ἀμφισβητήσεις ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ βλαβερὸν εἶναι

*nium* should be over-long, or the proofs: for neither in *these* two cases does the excellence consist in the rapidity or conciseness, but in the observation of the due mean: and that is, to say just so much—and no more—as will clearly explain the facts of the case, or will (make the judge suppose) establish in the judge's mind the conviction of their having occurred, (the question of *fact*, τὸ ὄν), or that by them injury has been done (harm and loss) or *wrong* (according to the *status* or issue which you wish to raise): or (as will produce on him the impression, make him suppose them,) of any amount or magnitude that you please (to estimate them at): or the opposites of these, for the opponent', if he be the pleader.

§ 5. 'You may slip into your narrative (bring in by a side wind, on the sly, παρεμβάλλειν, *supra* c. 14. 9) anything that tells to the advantage of your own character—as for instance, “and I always admonished him to do what was right, *not* to leave his children behind him in the lurch” (in distress and difficulty), or to the disadvantage of your opponent's; “but he made answer to me, that wheresoever he was himself, there would he find other children:” the answer, as Herodotus tells us, of the revolted Egyptians (to the king who was inviting them to return).’ The story of the latter part of the alternative is told by Herodotus II 30, with the addition of certain circumstances, which add indeed to its graphic character, but cannot be here repeated. Aristotle seems to have tacked on the first part of the alternative—out of his own head—to make a little “imaginary conversation.” ‘Or (to slip in) anything else that is likely to be agreeable to the judges’.

§ 6. 'In defence'—when you have to narrate circumstances in order to correct an opponent's statement of the facts—‘the recital may be shorter (because most of the story has been already told by the other), and as the issues (ἀμφισβητήσεις is Arist.'s term for what were afterwards called *στάσεις*, *status*) are (on the defensive side) the denial either of the fact, or the injury, or the wrong, or the degree (the estimated *amount* of the crime and penalty), we must therefore waste no time upon proving what is already admitted, unless it (the proofs of any of the facts) chance

ἢ μὴ ἄδικον ἢ μὴ τηλικούτον, ὥστε περὶ τὸ ὁμολογούμενον οὐ διατριπτέον, εἰ μὴ τι εἰς ἐκεῖνο συντείνη, 7 οἷον εἰ πέπρακται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄδικον. ἔτι πεπραγμένα δεῖ λέγειν ὅσα μὴ πραττόμενα ἢ οἶκτον ἢ δέινωσιν φέρει. παράδειγμα ὁ Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐν ἐξήκοντα ἔπεσι πεποιήται. καὶ ὡς Φάυλλος τὸν κύκλον, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Οἰνεῖ πρόλογος. to contribute to the establishment of the issue (on which we *do* rest our case); for instance, when we admit the fact, but deny the wrong'. Though on the other hand, it may be necessary, whilst we admit the facts of our opponent's case, still to go over that ground, in order to clear up points which have a bearing upon the *justice* of the act which is acknowledged to have been done.

§ 7. 'Events should generally be recited as past and gone—except those which by being acted' (represented as actually done, passing before the eyes, *πρὸ ὀμμάτων*, note on III 11. 2,) 'may afford an opportunity for exciting either commiseration or indignation'. *δέινωσις*, and *ἔλεος*, *οἶκτος*, *σχετλιασμός*, are two ordinary 'common topics', (subordinate varieties of *αὔξησις* and *μείωσις*), of *appeals to the feelings* in use amongst rhetoricians. See notes on II 21. 10, and 24. 4. Of Thrasymachus, and his use of these in his Rhetoric, Pl. Phaedr. 267 C, D, and of the early rhetoricians in general, Ib. 272 A, where *βραχυλογία* is joined with the other two.

'An example of this is "the story of Alcinous," (it *is* an example) *because* it is told (*πεποιήται*, composed, written) to Penelope in sixty verses', i. e. the long story of Ulysses' wanderings, which occupies in the narration of it to the Phaeacians four whole books of the Odyssey, IX—XII, is condensed by Ulysses, when he repeats it to Penelope, Od. ψ' [XXIII] 264—284, 310—343, into a summary of 55 verses—which here (with the characteristic inaccuracy of the ancient writers in calculations and descriptions of all kinds) are called in round numbers sixty—and thus furnishes a good example of the *summary* treatment required in an ordinary narrative. Vater, who explains all this in his note, understates the actual number by two. "Hi versus quinquaginta et tres numero rotundo *recte* (correctly *enough* for the occasion, I suppose) ἐξήκοντα ἔπη nominantur."

'And as Phayllus reduced (condensed: *ἐποίησε*, I suppose, must be understood from *πεποιήται*, 'composed') the Epic cycle: and Euripides' prologue to the Oeneus'. These three cases are appealed to as well-known instances of concise summaries. The Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, in its original form, when given at length with all its details, became proverbial for "a long story." Erasmus *Chil.* Ἀπόλογος Ἀλκίνου ἐπὶ τῶν φλυαρούντων καὶ μακρὸν ἀποτεινόντων λόγον, Suidas s.v. Plato, Rep. x 614 B, uses it in the same proverbial application. See Ast and Stallbaum *ad locum*. The Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος appears in Aelian's list of *ῥαψωδίαί* into which the Homeric poems were divided for recitation (Var. Hist. XIII 13, π. Ὁμήρου ἐπῶν καὶ ποιήσεως, quoted by Paley, Pref. to Hom. II. p. xlvii). It is quoted again to supply an instance of *ἀναγνώρισις*, Poet. XVI.

Of Phayllus nothing whatever is known. It seems that this is the

8 ἡθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιᾶν ταύτην· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιά τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἦθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ

only place in which his name occurs; neither is it to be found in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* We gather from the notice of him here, that whether poet or rhapsodist, he attempted to reduce the whole of the Epic Cycle into a brief summary. F. A. Wolf is so staggered by the overwhelming labour of such a task that he prefers to read *Κύκλωπα*, from a correction in one of the MSS; overlooking the fact that τὸν *Κύκλωπα* is *not* in point here; τὸν *κύκλον*, which gives a second instance of a summary, is.

The third example is the prologue to Euripides' Oeneus. Four lines and a half of this are to be found in Wagner's collection, *Fragm. Eurip.* p. 290, Oen. Fr. 1. and Dindorf, Eur. Fr. Oeneus. They are written with Euripidean compactness, and seem to justify their citation for this purpose.

§ 8. 'The narrative should have an ethical cast: this will be effected when (if) we know what imparts this ethical character. One thing in particular that does so, is any indication of a moral purpose (II 21. 16, III 17. 9, Poet. VI 24): it is by (the quality of) this that a moral quality is given to character: and the quality (good or bad) of the moral purpose is determined by the end'. On *προαίρεσις*, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 4, 5, VI 2. 'Consequently Mathematics (mathematical calculations or reasonings, λόγοι) can have no moral character, because they have no moral purpose: for they have no (moral or practical) end in view'. (*Their end is the intellectual one, truth.*) 'But the "Socratic dialogues" have (a moral purpose, and an ethical and practical end), for they treat of such (ethical) subjects'. On this class of works, called collectively 'Socratic dialogues', see Grote, *Plato* III 469; also Heitz, *Verl. Schrift. Ar., die dial. des Arist.* pp. 140—144. By 'Socratic dialogues' are meant dialogues on moral philosophy, after the manner of Socrates, and therefore bearing his name, whether (as in Plato and Xenophon) he was an interlocutor, or not; the compositions of Socrates' friends and followers, the Socratic 'family', Xenophon, Plato, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Phaedo, (*Socraticam domum*, Hor. Od. I 19. 14, comp. III 21. 9, *Socraticis sermonibus madet*, Ars Poet. 310. *Socraticae chartae*, all meaning moral philosophy). On Socrates' philosophical pursuits and studies see Arist. de part. Anim. I 1. 44, 642 a 28, Cic. Tusc. Disp. v 5. 10, Academ. Post. I 4. 15. Conf. Athen. XI 505 C, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητῶν οὕτως γράφει, "Οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐμμέτρους τοὺς καλουμένους Σώφρονος μέμους...μη φώμεν...ἢ τοὺς Ἀλεξ-αμενοῦ τοῦ Τηίου τοὺς πρώτους γραφέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων." ἀντι-κρὺς φάσκων ὁ πολυμαθέστατος Ἀρ. πρὸ Πλάτωνος διαλόγους γεγραφέναι τὸν Ἀλεξ-αμενόν. This extract will serve as a corrective to Poet. I 8, from which it *might* seem that the 'Socratic dialogues' were in verse. See

9 τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν. ἄλλα ἠθικὰ τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἦθει, οἷον ὅτι ἅμα λέγων ἐβάδιζεν· δηλοὶ γὰρ θρασύτητα καὶ ἀγροικίαν ἦθους. καὶ μὴ ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν, ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως. “ἐγὼ δ' ἐβουλόμην· καὶ προειλόμην γὰρ τοῦτο· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ὠνήμην, βέλτιον.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ p. 142. φρονίμου τὸ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ· φρονίμου μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τὸ

Tyrwhitt's note ad loc. p. 110. The meaning of that passage is, that the Socratic dialogues are not to be called poetry or verse, although they have a dramatic character (Gräfenhan).

§ 9. ‘Another, different, kind of ethical drawing or representation (ἄλλα; no longer confined to *moral* qualities, but the representation of *character* in general) are the characteristic peculiarities that accompany each individual character: for instance, “so and so walked on as he was talking”—an indication of audacity and rudeness of character’. The rudeness and insolence are shewn in *not stopping* to speak to the other; it is a sign of slight esteem and contempt, *δλιγωρία*. The characters here spoken of differ in one point from the dramatic characters of III 7. 6,—though they belong to the same family, the *third* kind of ἦθ, Introd. p. 112—in that these are the characteristic peculiarities of *individuals*, the others those of *classes*. A good specimen of this *ethical* description occurs in Demosth. de F. L. § 361, a portrait of Aeschines; and two similar traits in c. Steph. α' § 63, οὗτος γὰρ, ἥνικα μὲν συνέβαιεν εὐτυχεῖν Ἀριστολόχῳ τῷ τραπέζιτῃ, ἴσα βαίνων ἐβάδιζεν ὑποπεπτωκῶς αὐτῷ...ἐπειδὴ δ' ἀπώλει· ἐκεῖνος κ.τ.λ. and § 77, ἐγὼ δ'...τῆς μὲν ὕψεως τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ ταχέως βαδίζειν καὶ λαλεῖν μέγα (signs apparently of ill-breeding) οὐ τῶν εὐτυχῶς πεφυκότων ἐμαντὸν κρίνω. The ἴσα βαίνων in the former passage, is ‘to keep pace with’, ‘to walk on a level’, ‘place oneself on equal terms with’ another. See Shilleto ad loc. de F. L. (His reference to the passage of c. Steph. should be § 63, not 77.)

‘And again, in speaking, let your words seem to proceed, not from the intellect (as the effect of calculation, deliberation), but as it were from a moral purpose or intention (the will; or, as we should say, the heart)’. “Let your style bear the impress, not so much of intellectual subtlety and vigour, as of good feeling and sound moral purpose: the one may be the mark of a wise man, the other is that of a good—and, what is more to the purpose in Rhetoric, a popular—character.” Introd. (slightly altered). “And I wished this to take place; in fact such was my purpose and intention: it is true that I gained nothing by it; but even so it is better.” The one is characteristic of a wise or prudent man, the other of a good one: for prudence (worldly, practical, wisdom) shews itself in the pursuit of one's interest, goodness in that of the fair, high, noble, right’.

‘If any (trait of character that you introduce) seem incredible, then add the statement (or explanation) of the cause or reason, as (in) the example that Sophocles gives, the passage of (from) his Antigone “that

ὠφέλιμον διώκειν, ἀγαθοῦ δ' ἐν τῷ τὸ καλόν. ἂν δ' ἄπιστον ἦ, τότε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, ὥσπερ Σοφοκλῆς ποιεῖ παρὰδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολόμενα,

μητρὸς δ' ἐν ἄδου καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων,  
οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅς τις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς ἄ-

she cared more for her brother than for husband or children, for the one could be replaced (recovered) if they were lost—but when father and mother are buried in the grave, no brother can spring up evermore". This is Antigone's reason for preferring the burial of her brother's body to marriage with Haemon, a husband and children: she has shewn her character in the preference, and the obstinacy in which she adheres to it. It is the conclusion of a beautiful passage, beginning, *ὦ τίμβρος, ὦ νυμφεῖον*, Antig. 891—912. Arist. has altered *κεκευθότων* of the original to *βεβηκότων*.

The same answer is put into the mouth of the wife of Intaphernes, when Darius, having condemned her husband and the whole of his family to death, allows her to choose one of the number whose life is to be spared. She chooses her brother, and when Darius expresses his surprise and demands the reason, replies thus: *ὦ βασιλεῦ, ἀνὴρ μὲν μοι ἂν ἄλλος γένοιτο, εἰ δαίμων ἐθέλοι, καὶ τέκνα ἄλλα, εἰ ταῦτα ἀποβάλοιμι· πατρὸς δὲ καὶ μητρὸς οὐκ ἔτι μεν ζώντων, ἀδελφὸς ἂν ἄλλος οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ γένοιτο. ταύτῃ τῇ γνώμῃ χρεωμένη ἔλεξα ταῦτα.* The comparison of these two passages of the poet and historian, and another equally close correspondence of Herod. II 35 with Soph. Oed. Col. 337, have led to the inference that there was some connexion or acquaintance between the two. When or where they met, if they ever did meet, cannot now be ascertained: Samos (which has been suggested) is out of the question; for Herodotus was at Thurium before Sophocles was appointed to his command in the expedition under Pericles against that island. The Antigone was produced in 440 B.C. It is probable that some parts of Herodotus' history had been published<sup>1</sup> before the final completion of the work at Thurium, and Sophocles may have thus obtained access to them. That he was the borrower, there can be no reasonable doubt. At all events that Sophocles was an admirer of Herodotus we know from Plutarch, who gives us the first line and a half of an epigram by Sophocles in his honour; *φῶδ' ἂν Ἡροδότῳ τεύξεν Σοφοκλῆς ἐτέων ὧν πέντ' ἐπὶ πεντήκοντα*; adding that it was *ὁμολογουμένως Σοφοκλέους*.

<sup>1</sup> If you *have* no reason to give, at *any rate* you may say that "you know that what you say will convince nobody, but such is your nature (you can't help being virtuous and disinterested, do what you will)—for

<sup>1</sup> There is a doubtful story of a recitation at Olympia.

πιστα λέγων, ἀλλὰ φύσει τοιοῦτος εἶ· ἀπιστοῦσι  
 γὰρ ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἐκόντα πλὴν τὸ συμφέρον.  
 10 ἔτι ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγειν, διηγούμενον καὶ τὰ  
 ἐπόμενα, καὶ ἃ ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἰδία ἢ αὐτῷ, ἢ ἐκείνῳ  
 προσόντα. “ὁ δ’ ὥχετό με ὑποβλέψας.” καὶ ὡς περὶ  
 Κρατύλου Αἰσχίνης, ὅτι διασίζων καὶ τοῖν χεροῖν P. 1417 b. *h*  
 διασειῶν· πιθανὰ γάρ, διότι σύμβολα γίνεται ταῦτα  
 ἃ ἴσασιν, ἐκείνων, ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν. πλείστα δὲ τοιαῦτα  
 λαβεῖν ἐξ Ὁμήρου ἐστίν.

ὡς ἄρ’ ἔφη, γρῆνυς δὲ κατέσχετο χερσὶ πρόσωπα.

people never believe in disinterested motives”. (*Lit.* people always disbelieve that any one does anything intentionally except what is for his own interest.) Even such a *reason* is better than none at all.

§ 10. ‘Further, besides the *ἦθος*, topics may be also derived from the expression of emotion of various kinds, by introducing in your narration both the usual accompaniments of these emotions (the outward expressions, attitudes, and other external indications), which everybody is acquainted with, and also any *special* peculiarities by which you yourself or the adversary may be distinguished (which may be attached to, belong to, *προσόντα*)’. These special touches and traits in the expression of individual emotion will lend a lifelike character to the descriptions of your narrative, and impart fidelity to your own impersonations of feelings, and your representation of them as they manifest themselves in others. How true and lifelike all that is, the audience will say: that can be no counterfeit: the man is evidently in earnest. Again, the same popular fallacy as before; the illicit inference from the faithfulness of the imitation to the sincerity of the feeling and truth of the fact.

‘Such indications are “and he went away with a scowl at me from under his eyebrows” (so *ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας* of ‘an angry glance’, Pl. *Phaed.* 117 B; three other examples in *Ast’s Lex.*, where it is joined in the same sense with *ὡς καταφρονοῦντα*, *Symp.* 220 B, *ὥσπερ τι ἀδικοῦμενος*, *Eryx.* 395 A, *ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι*, *Crit.* 53 B. *ὑπό* represents an ‘under-look’. Comp. the Homeric *ὑποδρα ἰδών*): ‘and as Aeschines says of Cratylus “furiously hissing and shaking his fists”’ (*διὰ* in both participles is intensive, ‘thorough, thoroughly’; here ‘violently’: Aeschines and Cratylus are supposed by Victorius to be, the one Socrates’ intimate, the other Plato’s instructor in the Heraclitean philosophy, and the Eponymus of one of his dialogues: but nobody really knows): ‘these are persuasive, because these things (indications of passion) which they *do* know are made (by the speaker) signs or tokens of those that they *don’t* know (in the manner above explained). A great number of these (indications of

<sup>1</sup> Comp. *Rhet. ad Al.* 7 (8). 10, *πειρῶ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν καὶ ὡς λυσitelῆς ἦν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ποιεῖν*: οἱ γὰρ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων αὐτοὶ τὸ λυσitelῆς μάλιστα προτιμῶντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νομίζουσιν ἕνεκα τούτου πάντα πράττειν.



οἱ γὰρ δακρύνειν ἀρχόμενοι, ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. καὶ εὐθὺς εἰσάγαγε σεαυτὸν ποιόν τινα, ἵνα ὡς τοιοῦτον θεωρῶσι καὶ τὸν ἀντίδικον· λανθάνων δὲ ποίει. ὅτι δὲ ῥάδιον, ὁρᾶν δεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἀπαγγελ-  
 λόντων· περὶ ὧν γὰρ μὴθὲν ἴσμεν, ὅμως λαμβάνομεν  
 ὑπόληψιν τινα. πολλαχοῦ δὲ δεῖ διηγείσθαι, καὶ  
 11 ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ. ἐν δὲ δημηγορίᾳ ἥκιστα διήγησις  
ἐστίν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων οὐθεὶς διηγεῖται· ἀλλ’

feeling) may be obtained from Homer: "Thus then he spake; and the aged dame (Euryclea, Ulysses' old nurse) held fast (clasped) her face with her hands" (Hom. Od. τ' [XIX] 361)—for people, when they are beginning to cry, are apt to lay hold of their eyes. Introduce yourself at once (to the audience) in a particular character (in that, namely, which you wish to bear in their eyes) that they may regard you as such: and the adversary in the same way (*mutatis mutandis*): only take care that the design isn't detected. That there is no difficulty in this—in conveying these impressions to the audience, how readily they seize, and draw inferences from, these indications of emotion, expression of features, action and the like—must needs be seen' (retaining δεῖ with Bekker, Spengel omits it) 'from the case of messengers: of things that we know nothing whatever about, we nevertheless (instantly) conceive a notion or suspicion' (from the face, expression, gestures, general appearance of the messenger; as if he is hot and tired, and so on).

*See what a ready tongue suspicion hath! He that but fears the thing he would not know, hath by instinct knowledge from others' eyes, that what he feared is chanced.* Northumb. *Henry IV.* Act 1, Sc. 1, 84. Victorius refers to Soph. Trach. 869 (Dind.) as an instance of this, the suspicions of the Chorus gathered from the old woman's face.

'The narrative should be (not confined to one place and continuous, but) distributed over the speech (πολλαχοῦ 'in many places'), and sometimes not at the beginning'. In saying οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ, Ar. is referring to his own division of the speech, which excludes the προοίμιον and commences at once with the πρόθεσις, c. 13. The narrative, he says, should sometimes even be entirely out of its proper place, which is at the beginning.

§ 11. 'In public speaking there is least occasion for narrative, because no one ever gives a narrative of things future' (the only province of deliberative Rhetoric, from which *all* its materials are derived; ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν): 'but if there *be* a narrative, it must be of things past, in order that with these in their recollection they may be better able to deliberate about things to come'. Gaisford refers to Dionys. *Ars Rhet.* X 14, ὅλη μὲν ἰδέα συμβουλευτικῇ διηγήσεως οὐ δεῖται· ἴσασι γὰρ οἱ βουλευόμενοι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦνται, καὶ δέονται μαθεῖν ὃ πρακτέον ἐστίν, οὐχ ὅπερ βουλευτέον.

'Or it may be employed in the way of accusation or of praise', διηγῶνται, εἰ διηγούνται, to be understood from the preceding. 'But in

ἐάν περ διήγησις ἦ, τῶν γενομένων ἔσται, ἢ ἀνα-  
μνησθέντες ἐκείνων βέλτιον βουλευσῶνται περὶ τῶν  
ὑστερον. ἢ διαβάλλοντες, ἢ ἐπαινοῦντες. ἀλλὰ τότε,  
οὐ τὸ τοῦ συμβούλου ποιεῖ ἔργον. ἂν δ' ἢ ἄπιστον,  
ὑπισχνεῖσθαι τε καὶ αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθύς, καὶ δια-  
τάττειν οἷς βούλονται· οἷον, ἢ Ἰοκάστη ἢ Καρκίνου  
ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι αἰεὶ ὑπισχνεῖται πυνθανομένου τοῦ  
ζητοῦντος τὸν υἱόν, καὶ ὁ Αἴμων ὁ Σοφοκλέους.

I τὰς δὲ πίστεις δεῖ ἀποδεικτικὰς εἶναι· ἀποδει-

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that case, (the speaker who thus employs it) does not fulfil the proper function of the adviser' (whose office is to exhort and dissuade).

P. 143.

The following sentence to the end of the chapter I have done what I can to elucidate in the Introd. p. 354. No commentator, except Victorius, whose explanation I have there criticized, has bestowed a single word upon it; not even Spengel in his recent edition: I suppose he has given it up as hopeless. What it seems to me to mean is something of this kind—but I think there is most likely some latent corruption. 'If there be anything incredible in your narrative, you may promise your audience (omit τε) to add<sup>1</sup> a reason (i. e. explanation, to *account for it*), and a full, detailed, explanation of it as long as they please'. διατάττειν is one of the chief difficulties of the passage. The only appropriate meaning that occurs to me is to 'set out in order, i. e. set forth in full and clear detail': οἷς βούλονται 'with what, with as many details as, they please'. 'As Carcinus' Jocasta, in his Oedipus, is perpetually promising, in answer to the inquiries of the man who is looking for her son—(something or other, which is left to be supplied by the hearer's knowledge of the context: probably, to satisfy him). And Sophocles' Haemon'. This last example must be given up as hopeless: there is nothing in the extant play which could be interpreted as is required here. And what Carcinus' Jocasta has to do with the topic to be illustrated, is not easy to see. Carcinus' Medea has been already quoted II 23. 28, where an account is given of him in the note. His Thyestes is referred to, Poet. XVI 2, and a fault pointed out, XVII 2. And as if to aggravate the difficulties which surround the interpretation of this passage, Wagner, in his collection of the Tragic Fragments, has chosen to omit this reference to Carcinus.

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Of the various kinds of proof, the various ways in which facts and statements may be made to appear probable, *πίστεις*, some are direct and logical, and appeal exclusively to the reasoning faculty; others indirect, which by appealing to the moral sense *ἦθος*, or to the emotions *πάθος*, support the logical arguments by the favourable impressions they produce upon the hearts and feelings of the listeners, who are ever ready to

<sup>1</sup> καὶ αἰτίαν a reason in addition, besides the mere statement.

κύναι δὲ χρή, ἐπεὶ περὶ τεττάρων ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις, περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητουμένου φέροντα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· οἶον, εἰ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν ἀμφισβητεῖ, ἐν τῇ κρίσει δεῖ τούτου μάλιστα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν φέρειν, εἰ δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔβλαψεν, τούτου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τοσόνδε ἢ ὅτι δικαίως. ὡσαύτως καὶ εἰ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο ἢ  
 2 ἀμφισβήτησις. μὴ λανθανέτω δ', ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβήτησει μόνῃ, τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι

draw inferences from what *they feel* to the *truth of what is said*; and further the adventitious and external aids, which are not invented by the speaker but found ready for use and applied by him in evidence of the facts of his case: of these three the first only have any pretension to the character of ἀποδεικτικά. But not even these are entitled to the name in its strict and proper sense, ἀπόδειξις 'demonstration' implying conclusions universal and necessary and a rigorous exact syllogistic method. This belongs, strictly speaking, exclusively to the domain of Science and to the sphere of certainty, to which no conclusion of Rhetoric can ever attain. When it is said therefore in § 1, that "the proofs of preceding statements, and refutation of those of the adversary"—which from the third division of the speech—"must be demonstrative",—no more is meant than that they must be demonstrated, so far as the nature and limits of rhetorical proof permit, that is, that they must be such, so far consistent with sound reasoning and the rules of logic, as will induce those who hear them to *believe* what they seek to establish. We have very frequently had to remark the language of strict Logic applied to the laxer methods of Rhetoric, here it is done a little more formally than usual.

'The point to which this *proof* must be directed (addressed) of the four questions on which the issue may turn, is the particular point on which the issue is actually joined between the two contending parties: for example, if the issue is the question of *fact*, was the thing done or not? in the trial *this* is the point that he must most aim at establishing; if of *harm or loss*, injury, at *that*; or if—these two being admitted—the question is one of the *degree* or amount of the injury; or of the justice of the action—admitting the fact and the injury and even the amount charged—of that; just as much (in the three last cases) as if the issue had been one of that same thing as a *fact*'. Spalding, ad Quint. III 6. 60, seems to understand περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο of a distinct issue, the *στάσις ὁρμή*, or *status finitivus*.

§ 2. 'But let it not be forgotten that this issue (of *fact*) is the only one in which it may happen that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue: for in such cases, ignorance (which exempts from responsibility, see note on c. 15. 3) cannot be pleaded (cannot be assigned as the cause or reason), as it may when the issue is the justice (or injustice) of the act'—and the same of the *injury*, and alleged degree or amount of the offence—and therefore in this issue alone the topic may be dwelt

πονηρόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄγνοια αἰτία, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ  
 τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν, ὥστ' ἐν τούτῳ  
 3 χρονιστέον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπι-  
 δεικτικοῖς τὸ πολὺ, ὅτι καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα, ἡ αὐξησης  
 ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα δεῖ πιστεῦεσθαι· ὀλιγάκις  
 γὰρ καὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις φέρουσιν, εἰς ἄπιστα ἢ  
 4 ἢ ἐὰν ἄλλως αἰτίαν ἔχῃ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς  
 ἢ ὥς οὐκ ἔσται ἀμφισβητήσεεν ἂν τις, ἢ ὥς ἔσται  
 upon, but not in the (three) others'. It is important to observe here a  
 qualification of the apparent meaning, which has not been—at all events  
 distinctly—pointed out by the Commentators. It would not be true to  
 say *universally* that when the issue is that of fact, whether the act  
 alleged has or has not been committed, that one of the two parties con-  
 cerned must necessarily be a rogue: as when A accuses B of murder, the  
 question is one of fact, is B guilty or not guilty? B may be perfectly  
 innocent, though the circumstantial evidence is so strong as to justify A  
 in bringing the charge. All that is meant is, that there is a certain class  
 of cases which fall under this *status* or issue, in which this topic may be  
 safely used. Comp. Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 b 30, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγ-  
 μασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν,  
 ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. This is the case of a deposit, which A seeks  
 to recover from B, who denies having received it. Here—unless either  
 of them has forgotten the transaction—either A, if he seeks to recover  
 what he knows that he has never confided, or B, if he refuses to restore  
 what he knows has been lent him, must intend to defraud the other  
 (Schrader). This is repeated from Introd. p. 356, note.

MS A<sup>o</sup> (Bekker) has *χρηστέον*, which has not been adopted either by  
 Bekker or Spengel. The Schol., quoted by Gaisford *Not. Var.*, manifestly  
 reads *χρηστέον*.

§ 3. 'In the epideictic branch, in its ordinary topic, amplification  
 is mostly employed in shewing that things are fair (fine) or useful'—  
 the other, *μείωσις*, 'detraction' employed in censure, is omitted as *less*  
*usual*—'the facts must be taken on trust: declaimers seldom adduce  
 proofs of these; only when they seem incredible, or some one else has  
 got the credit of them (been *charged* with them; made responsible for  
 them)'. Bekker and Spengel have both adopted *ἄλλως* without manuscript  
 authority, from a conjecture of the former in his 4th ed. I think they  
 must have overlooked the natural interpretation of *ἄλλως* given in the  
 translation. *πιστεῦεσθαι* belongs to the family of irregular passives,  
 of which an account, and a list, are given in Appendix (B) [Vol. I p. 297].

§ 4. 'In public, deliberative, speaking (the four forensic issues may  
 be applied to its special subjects), it may be contended (against an oppo-  
 nent), (1) that the future *facts* alleged will not be (i. e. that the conse-  
 quences which are assumed to result from the policy recommended will  
 not take place); or admitting that, (2) that it will be unjust; or (3) inex-  
 pedient; or (4) that the amount and importance of them will not be so

μὲν ἂν κελεύει, ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαια ἢ οὐκ ὠφέλιμα ἢ οὐ  
τηλικάυτα. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁρᾶν εἴ τι ψεύδεται ἐκτὸς τοῦ  
 5 πράγματος. τεκμήρια γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων, ὅτι ψεύδεται. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα P. 1418.  
 δημηγορικώτερα, τὰ δ' ἐνθυμήματα δικανικώτερα· ἢ  
 μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ μέλλον· ὥστ' ἐκ τῶν γενομένων  
 ἀνάγκη παραδείγματα λέγειν, ἢ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ  
 ὄντων, οὗ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξις ἔστι καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ  
 6 τὸ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην. οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ

great as the other anticipates. (The principal attention of the speaker is of course to be directed to the point immediately in question,) but he must *also* be on the look out for any lurking fallacy or misstatement outside the main point or issue: for the one may be shewn necessarily to imply the other. τεκμήριον, a *necessary* sign, or indication, I 2. 17. The construction is, ταῦτα φαίνεται τεκμήρια τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ψεύδεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.

§ 5. 'Examples are most appropriate to public speaking, enthymemes more so to forensic'. Pleading gives more occasion to the employment of logical reasoning; it admits of closer and subtler argumentation; for the reasons stated in III 12. 5. Comp. I 9. 40, where the facts are the same, but the reason assigned for the latter different.

'For the one', (understand δημηγορία, from δημηγορικώτατα. Victorius understands συμβουλή, and Vater πίστις,) 'dealing as it does with the future, is forced consequently to derive examples from past events (from which the *analogous events* future are inferred), whilst the other' (understand in like manner δίκη from δικανικώτερα; not πίστις as Vater) 'deals with matters of fact, true or false, which admit to a greater extent (than deliberative speaking) of demonstrative reason and necessary conclusions (not to the full extent, which is found only in science): for past facts involve a kind of necessity'. Past events are beyond recall, fixed and definite, and thus have a *sort of* necessary character about them; and they can be argued about, and their relations deduced, with some approach to certainty: about things future no exact calculation is possible, anticipation and inference from the past is all that nature allows: uncertainty is the characteristic of the future.

§ 6. 'The enthymemes, or argumentative inferences, should not be all brought forward one after another, in a continuous connected series, but mixed *ὑφ' (ἀνά)* with other topics: otherwise they injure one another by destroying *κατά* the effect<sup>1</sup>. (And this is not all,) for there is *also* a

<sup>1</sup> This is, "to relieve the weariness, and assist the intelligence of the uncultivated audience. A long and connected chain of arguments not only puzzles and confounds a listener unaccustomed to continuous reasoning, but also wearies and overwhelms him: so that, one argument coming upon another before he has perceived the force of the preceding, they clash together, come into conflict, as it were, and the force and effect of the whole is weakened or destroyed. Comp. I 2. 12, 13, II 22. 3, *alibi*." From Intro. p. 357.

ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ' ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ μή, καταβλάπτει  
ἄλληλα. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὅρος·

ὦ φίλ', ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅσ' ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνὴρ,  
7 ἀλλ' οὐ τοιαῦτα. καὶ μὴ περὶ πάντων ἐνθυμήματα  
ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, ποιήσεις ὃ περ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι τῶν  
φιλοσοφούντων, οἱ συλλογίζονται τὰ γνωριμώτερα  
8 καὶ πιστότερα ἢ ἔξ ὧν λέγουσιν. καὶ ὅταν πάθος  
ποιῆς, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα· ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ πάθος  
ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἔσται τὸ ἐνθύμημα· ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ  
αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας αἱ ἅμα, καὶ ἢ ἀφανίζουσιν ἢ  
ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦσιν. οὐδ' ὅταν ἠθικὸν τὸν λόγον, οὐ

limit of *quantity*; (as Homer says, Od. IV 204, Menelaus to *Nestorides Pisisstratos*.) "Dear boy, seeing that thou hast said as much as a prudent man would" (speak and utter, εἶποι καὶ ῥέξειε)—τόσα he says, not τοιαῦτα', shewing thereby that it is the *quantity* and not the *quality* of the words that he had in view.

§ 7. '(Another topic is) not to look for arguments about every thing (see again II 22. 3): otherwise, you will do like some philosophers, who draw conclusions better known and more to be trusted (easier to believe, more self-evident or evident at first sight) than the premisses from which they deduce them. Quint. V 12. 8, *Nec tamen omnibus semper quae invenerimus argumentis onerandus est iudex: quia et taedium afferunt et fidem detrahunt... In rebus vero apertis argumentari tam sit stultum quam in clarissimum solem mortale lumen* (a lamp, or other artificial light, made by human agency) *inferre*.

§ 8. 'Also, when you are trying to excite emotion (appealing to the feelings) use no logical argument: for either it will knock out (drive out, expel) the emotion, or (the emotion will get the better of it and) the argument will have been stated in vain: all simultaneous *motions* mutually drive out one another, and are either obliterated altogether (by the co-existence) or (the less powerful) is (still further) weakened'; overpowered by the stronger. Comp. Poet. XXIV 22, *νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφανίζει ἡδῶν τὸ ἄτοπον*, and again § 23, *ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἡ λῖαν λαμπρὰ λέξις τὰ τε ἡθὴ καὶ τὰς διανοίας*. Long. de Subl. § 15, *φύσει δὲ πως, ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἅπασιν, αἰ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀκούομεν· ὅθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικού περιελκόμεθα εἰς τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἐμπληκτικόν, ᾧ τὸ πραγματικόν ἐγκρύπτεται περιλαμπόμενον*. And again § 17 ult. *τῶν λόγων τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ὑψηλὰ, ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐγγυτέρω κείμενα διὰ τε φυσικὴν τινα συγγένειαν καὶ διὰ λαμπρότητα, αἰ τῶν σχημάτων προεμφανίζεται, καὶ τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν ἀποσκιάζει καὶ οἷον ἐν κατακαλύψει τηρεῖ*. Twining ad Poet. p. 424, note 227.

'Nor again, when you would give the speech an ethical cast, should there be any attempt to combine enthymeme with it; for proof has no

δεῖ ἐνθύμημά τι ζητεῖν ἅμα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει οὔτε ἦθος p. 144.  
 9 οὔτε προαίρεσιν ἢ ἀπόδειξιν. γνώμαις δὲ χρηστέον  
 καὶ ἐν διηγήσει καὶ ἐν πίστει· ἠθικὸν γάρ. “καὶ ἐγὼ  
 δέδωκα, καὶ ταύτ’ εἰδὼς ὡς οὐ δεῖ πιστεῦειν.” ἐὰν δὲ  
 παθητικῶς, “καὶ οὐ μεταμέλει μοι καίπερ ἡδικημένῳ·  
 τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ περίεστι τὸ κέρδος, ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ δι-  
 10 καιον.” τὸ δὲ δημηγορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικά-  
 ζεσθαι, εἰκότως, διότι περὶ τὸ μέλλον· ἐκεῖ δὲ περὶ  
 τὸ γεγονός, ὃ ἐπιστητὸν ἤδη καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν, ὡς

moral character nor moral purpose'. When the hearer's mind, says Schrader (in substance), is occupied with the impression of the moral and intellectual good qualities which the speaker is endeavouring to convey to them, of his intelligence and good intentions, he has neither time nor inclination to attend to the proof of anything else.

§ 9. 'Still, general maxims are to be employed both in narrative and in proof, by reason of the ethical character which belongs to them'. (See II 21. 16, III 16. 8.) This is illustrated by a γνώμη that "it is folly to trust" any one, in the instance of a deposit which has not been returned (Victorius). The maxim is expressed by Epicharmus in the well-known verse, *Νᾶφε, καὶ μέμνασ' ἀπιστεῖν ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν*, quoted by Polybius, Dio Chrysostom, and Cic. ad Att. I 19. 6. Müller, *Fragm. Phil. Gr.* p. 144. Epicharm. Fr. 255.

'And I have given it, and that, knowing all the while "that trust is folly". If your object is to appeal to the feelings (ἔλεος is the πάθος here appealed to), (express it thus) "And I don't regret it, though I have been wronged: for he (the opponent) it is true has the advantage in profit, but I in justice"'. Compare the first example in c. 16. 9.

§ 10. '(Here again, as in general) public speaking is more difficult than pleading (see I 1. 10); and naturally<sup>1</sup> [so, because it is concerned with the future.]

[On the 'times' with which the three classes of speeches, λόγοι δικανικοί, συμβουλευτικοί and ἐπιδεικτικοί are concerned, see I 3. 4, τῷ μὲν συμβουλευόντι ὁ μέλλον...τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γενόμενος κ.τ.λ.]

ἐκεῖ δὲ—ἀδῆλων δέ] 'whereas in the former case (forensic oratory) the speaker is concerned with the past, which, as Epimenides the Cretan said, is already known even to diviners; for he himself was not in the habit of divining the future, but only (interpreting) the obscurities of the past.'

καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν] as has been noticed elsewhere, "was doubtless meant by Epimenides as a sarcasm upon his prophetic brethren, who pretended to see into futurity. 'Even diviners', said he, 'impostors as they are, can prophesy what is past'". Introd. p. 358, note.

<sup>1</sup> At this point the manuscript of Mr Cope's Commentary comes to an end; the rest of the notes have accordingly been supplied by Mr Sandys.

ἔφη Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρής· ἐκείνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἐμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν ἀδήλων δέ. καὶ ὁ νόμος ὑπόθεσις ἐν τοῖς δικανικοῖς· ἔχοντα δὲ ἀρχὴν ῥαὸν εὐρεῖν ἀπόδειξιν. καὶ οὐκ ἔχει πολλὰς διατριβάς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' ἥκιστα πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ

The statement that Epimenides specially devoted himself as a soothsayer to solving the riddles of the past, is exemplified by his being invited by the Athenians to advise them as to the purification of the city from the pestilence which arose in consequence of the crime of Cylon (Plutarch, reipubl. ger. pr. 27, Pausanias, I 14.4, Diogenes Laert. I 10: Grote, *H. G.* chap. x *sub finem*). Plato, who calls him a *θεῖος ἀνὴρ*, speaks of his foretelling the future (Legg. 642 D), and the very gift which in the text he appears to disclaim is similarly ascribed to him by Cicero, who after saying *est enim ars in iis qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt*, classes Epimenides among those who are destitute of this art; *qui non ratione aut coniectura, observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quadam animi, aut soluto liberoque motu, futura praesentiunt* (de divin. I 18. 34). But the office of the prophet, or intermediary interpreter between God and man, was not necessarily confined to the prediction of the future, but also included the expounding of the will of heaven respecting the present and the past. Spengel observes: “*dicat ἐμαντεύετο, non ἐμαντεύετο, i.e. plerumque, non semper.*”

καὶ ὁ νόμος—ἀπόδειξιν] ‘Besides, in forensic pleadings, the *law* supplies a subject; and when you once have your starting-point, it is easier to find your proof’.

‘And it (namely, public speaking) does not admit of many digressions, such as references to one’s opponent or to oneself; or again, appeals to the emotions’. The subject of οὐκ ἔχει is τὸ δημηγορεῖν, all the intervening clauses from ἐκεῖ δέ down to ἀπόδειξιν being parenthetical.

By διατριβαί are meant ‘landing-places’, where the speaker may pause and linger for a while, and whence he may even expatiate into a passing digression. This use of the word, which is not noticed in Liddell and Scott, is defined in Ernesti’s *Lex. Techn. Gr.* as *commoratio, excursio et quoddam ἐπισύδιον, quo orator subinde utitur, ornatus atque amplificationis gratia*. Comp. Menander, διαίρεσις ἐπιδεικτικῶν (Spengel’s *Rhet. Gr.* III 338), ἔπειτα (τὰς διατριβάς) εἶναι τῷ ποιητῇ μὲν ἄλλα (ἄλλως Waitz) προσφόρους· ἢ γὰρ ἐξουσία καὶ τοῦ κατὰ σχολὴν λέγειν, καὶ τὸ περιστέλλειν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς κόσμοις καὶ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς οὔτε κόρον οὔτε ἀγχανίαν παρίστησι, (καίτοι οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὡσαύτως ὅτι ἐνίοι τῶν ποιητῶν προσφέρουσι τὰς ἀκαίρους διατριβάς) συγγραφεῖσι δὲ ἢ λογοποιοῖσι ἐλαχίστη ἐξουσία.

ἀλλ' ἥκιστα—ἐξίστηται] ‘On the contrary, there is less room (for digression) in this than in either of the other branches of Rhetoric, unless the speaker quits his proper subject’. With ἐξίστηται, compare *supra* 14. I, ἐὰν ἐκτοπίσῃ.



*οι αθηνησιν*  
*subiect*  
ἐξίστηται. δεῖ οὖν ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες ποιοῦσι καὶ Ἰσοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλευὼν κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δ' ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιῶν ἐπαίνους, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· αἰεὶ γὰρ τινα εἰσάγει. καὶ ὃ ἔλεγε Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος,

οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες] This does not imply that Aristotle himself was absent from Athens while writing the Rhetoric; here and elsewhere he simply uses the phrase which would be most intelligible to his readers, whether at a distance from Athens or not. Poet. V 6, 1449 b 7, τῶν Ἀθήνησιν (κωμωδοποιῶν) Κράτης πρῶτος ἤρξεν κ.τ.λ. and *supra* II 23. II Ἀθήνησι Μαντιὰ τῷ ῥήτορι. This usage is rather different from the suspicious phrase in c. 11 ad fin., οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες.

ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ] The Panegyric of Isocrates is strictly speaking a λόγος συμβουλευτικός, as its ostensible object is to advise Athens and Sparta to unite their forces against Persia, under the lead of the former state, but incidentally it becomes a λόγος ἐπιδεικτικός, in so far as it eulogizes the public services of Athens (§§ 21—98), while it also digresses into the region of λόγος δικανικός when it attacks (κατηγορεῖ) the conduct of Sparta and her partisans (§§ 110—114).

ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ] By this is meant the pamphlet generally known as *Isocratis de Pace*, where the policy of the Athenian general Chares in the conduct of the Social war is criticised, though his name is not mentioned, § 27, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔξω τῶν εἰθισμένων ἐπιχειροῦντα δημηγορεῖν... τὰ μὲν ἀναμνήσθαι τῶν δὲ κατηγορῆσαι.

§ 11. 'In speeches of display you must introduce laudations into your speech by way of episode, as Isocrates does; for he is always bringing in some character'. The reference to Isocr. is explained by his laudatory episode on Theseus in the Helen §§ 22—38; on Agamemnon in the Panathenaicus §§ 72—84; and on Timotheus in the ἀντίδοσις § 107 seq. Spengel, who gives the first two references, also cites some less striking instances, the episode on Paris in Hel. §§ 41—48, on Pythagoras and the Egyptian priests in Busiris §§ 21—29, and on poets ib. §§ 38—40. Comp. Dionys. Halic. de Isocr. lud. c. 4, where, among the points in which Isocrates appears superior to Lysias, special mention is made of τὸ διαλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ὁμοειδίαν ἰδίαις μεταβολαῖς καὶ ξένοις ἐπεισοδίοις.

ἐπεισοδιῶν] Poet. XVII 7, ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδιῶν, ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκεία τὰ ἐπεισόδια σκοπεῖν. ib. XXIV 7, (of epic poetry) τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἐπεισοδιῶν ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις. Quintil. III 9. 4, *egressio vero vel...excessus, sive est extra causam, non potest esse pars causae; sive est in causa, adiutorium vel ornamentum partium est earum ex quibus egreditur.*

'And this is what Gorgias meant when he remarked that he was never at a loss for something to say; for if (for instance) he speaks of

τοῦτο ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει, Πηλέα ἐπαινεί,  
 εἶτα Αἰακόν, εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἢ  
 12 τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ· ὁ τοιόνδε ἐστίν. ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν  
 ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἠθικῶς λεκτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς, εἰ  
 δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ἐνθυμήματα, ἠθικῶς καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπιει- P. 1418 b.  
 κεῖ ἀρμόττει χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι ἢ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ.

Achilles, he (naturally) praises Peleus, next Aeacus, then Zeus himself (the father of Aeacus); and similarly valour also (the special virtue of Achilles), and so and so (so *ad infinitum*); and this is just what I have been describing'.

From this passage of Gorgias the existence of a panegyric oration 'in praise of Achilles', is inferred by Dr Thompson (on p. 178 of his ed. of the Gorgias), who also suggests that "a fragment preserved by the Scholiast on Iliad IV 450 may have belonged to this speech: ἀνεμισγόντο δὲ λίταις ἀπειλαὶ καὶ εὐχαῖς οἰωγαί."

The unfailing resource of complimentary episodes on which Gorgias appears to have prided himself, may be paralleled by Pindar's favourite device of leading up by easy transitions to the praises of the Aeacidae (Isthm. IV (v) 20, τὸ δ' ἐμὸν οὐκ ἄρερ Αἰακιδῶν κέαρ ὕμνων γέυεται); and also by the artifice adopted by the rhetorician Lycophron, de Soph. El. 15, 174 δ 30, as explained by Alexander Aphrodisiensis:—"the sophist Lycophron, when he was compelled by some persons to write an encomium upon the lyre, and found that he hadn't very much to say about it, first very briefly touched upon the praises of the sensible lyre, which we have here on earth, and then mounted up to that in heaven,...the constellation called the Lyre, upon which he composed a long and beautiful and excellent discourse" (from Cope's translation in *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, Vol. II, No. v, p. 141).

ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ] In Vol. III, No. VII, p. 75 of the Journal above mentioned, Mr Cope has the following note: "The sentence hangs so ill together, and the ἢ has so little meaning, that I think we ought to change it into the relative pronoun ἣ: and then the sentence will run 'and in like manner valour, which performs such and such feats,' i.e. he first praises valour generally, and then proceeds to enumerate different acts of prowess; which may be multiplied *ad infinitum*." This suggestion, it may be remarked, harmonizes fairly with the reading of MS A° ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἢ (not δ) τοιόνδε ἐστίν. It has been anticipated by Foss (de Gorgia p. 77 ap. Spengel) who proposes ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ δ τοῖον γέ ἐστιν.

Spengel's own suggestion is εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγων (A°, Q, Z<sup>b</sup>) Πηλέα ἐπαινεί...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ δ τοιόνδε ἐστίν.

§ 12. 'If you have proofs to produce, you may express yourself both in the ethical style, and in that of proof besides; but if you are at a loss for enthymemes, then in the ethical style alone. In fact, it better befits a man of worth to appear in his true character than that his speech be elaborately reasoned'. The change of subject in the last clause would have been more sharply marked by αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι χρηστὸν ἢ τὸν λόγον

13 τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικά μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἔλεγχον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δῆλον ὅτι συλλελογίσται· παρ' ἄλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τάναν-  
 τία γνωρίζεται.

14 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον οὐκ ἕτερόν τι εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τῶν πίστεων ἔστι τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῶ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν λέγειν τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεις πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ πρὸς τάναντία ἀπαντᾶν λύοντα καὶ προ- p. 145.

ἀκριβῆ. Spengel asks with some reason, "nonne nexus flagitat χρηστὸν τὸν λόγον φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀκριβῆ? magis enim convenit probō viro, ut ἡθικῶς quam ut ἐπιδεικτικῶς loquatur."

§ 13. 'Of enthymemes, those that refute are more popular than those that prove; because a syllogistic conclusion is more clearly drawn (thereby); for opposites are more readily recognised when set beside one another'. Comp. II 23. 30, εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικά τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παράλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἶναι τῷ ἀκροατῇ μᾶλλον. The ἔλεγχος which is described in Anal. Pr. II 20, 66 b 10, as ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμὸς, meets the opponent's conclusion with a counter-syllogism drawing a conclusion contrary to that of the opponent, while the ἐνστασις checks the opponent's argument at an early point by attacking one of his premisses (see Introd. pp. 264, 5).

§ 14. 'The refutation of your opponent is *not* a distinct division of the speech; on the contrary, it is part of the proofs to refute the opponent's positions either by contrary proposition or by counter-syllogism' (i.e. by ἔλεγχος).

Quint. III 9. 5, *Tamen nec his assentior, qui detrahunt refutationem, tanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles, haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat.*

'Now both in public deliberation and in forensic pleading it is necessary, when you are the opening speaker, to state your own proofs first, and then to meet the arguments on the other side, by direct refutation and by pulling them to pieces beforehand.'

For ἀπαντᾶν, comp. Apsines Rhet. περὶ λύσεως c. 7 (Spengel's *Rhet. Gr.* II 366), σὺ δὲ κατ' αὐξῆσιν ἀπαντήσης κατὰ πηλικότητα ἢ ποσότητα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν αὐξητικῶν ἢ κατὰ ἀντιπαράστασιν.

For προδιασύροντα ('cutting up by anticipation') comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 18 (19). 13, προδιέσυρε λέγων, ib. § 12, προκατέλαβε...προδιέβαλεν...διασεύρθαι πρότερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ib. 33 (34). 1, προκαταλαμβάνων διασύρεις. Isocr. ἀντίδοσις § 199, διασύρουσι (τὴν παιδείαν) ὥς οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖν δυναμένην (ib. § 300); Dem. Or. 13 § 12, διέσυρε τὰ παρόντα καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἐπήνεσε.

'But if there is much variety in the opposition, you should *begin* with the points opposed to you'. For πολύχους (manifold, complex, diversified,

διασύροντα. ἂν δὲ πολύχους ἢ ἡ ἐναντίωσις, πρότε-  
ρον τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον ἐποίησε Καλλίστρατος ἐν τῇ  
Μεσσηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ· ἀ γὰρ ἐροῦσι προανελών οὕτω  
15 τότε αὐτὸς εἶπεν. ὕστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον τὰ  
πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύνοντα καὶ ἀντι-  
συλλογιζόμενον, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν εὐδοκιμηκότα ἢ·  
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον προδιαβεβλημένον οὐ δέχεται ἡ  
ψυχὴ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ λόγον, ἐὰν ὁ ἐναντίος  
εὖ δοκῇ εἰρηκέναι. δεῖ οὖν χώραν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ  
ἀκροατῇ τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ. ἔσται δὲ ἂν ἀνέλῃς.  
διὸ ἢ πρὸς πάντα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα ἢ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἢ

πολυειδής), comp. de Part. Anim. II 10, 656 a 5, πολυχουστέρα ιδέα, where it is combined with πολυμορφότερα.

On Callistratus, see note on I 7. 13. The reference is probably to the embassy on which Callistratus was sent into the Peloponnesus, shortly before the battle of Mantinea, B.C. 362. ἡ Μεσσηνιακὴ ἐκκλησία can hardly mean anything else than 'the public assembly of the Messenians', and not 'the assembly held (at Athens) respecting the Messenians', (which last appears to be the view of Sauppe, *Or. Att.* II 218, note 1; A. Schaefer, *Dem. und seine Zeit* I p. 113, rightly understands it *die Volksgemeinde der Messenier*). It was on this embassy that Epaminondas, *cum in conventum venisset Arcadum petens ut societatem cum Thebanis et Argivis facerent*, was confronted by Callistratus, *Atheniensium legatus qui eloquentia omnes eo praestabat tempore*, who urged them to ally themselves with Athens (Nepos, Epam. 6, quoted by A. Schaefer).

προανελών κ.τ.λ.] i.e. It was not until after he had by anticipation got rid of the arguments of his opponents that he stated his own arguments. οὕτω, 'accordingly'; similarly used after the participle *μαχεσάμενον*, at the end of the next section.

§ 15. 'When you are speaking in reply, you should first mention the arguments against the statement on the other side, by refuting that statement and drawing up counter-syllogisms, and especially if the arguments on the opposite side are well received; for just as the mind refuses to open itself favourably to one who has been made the victim of prejudice, the same applies to oratory also, if your opponent is held to have made a good speech'.

'You must therefore as it were make room in the hearer's mind for the speech that is about to be made, and this will be effected by getting out of the way your opponent's speech' (with which the minds of your audience are pre-occupied).

'Hence you should establish the credibility of your own case, by first contending either against all or the most important or the most popular or the most easily refuted of the adverse arguments'. As an instance, Aristotle refers to the lines in the Troades of Euripides, beginning with

τὰ εἰλέλεκτα μαχεσάμενον οὕτω τὰ αὐτοῦ πιστὰ ποιητέον.

ταῖς θεαῖσι πρῶτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι·  
ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἦραν.

ἐν τούτοις ἤψατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου.

- 16 περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα· εἰς δὲ τὸ ἦθος, ἐπειδὴ ἓνια περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίφθονον ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ λουδορίαν ἢ ἀγροικίαν, ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὃ περ Ἴσο-

969, the first line of Hecuba's lengthy reply to Helen's speech in her own defence; then follows a line καὶ τήνδε δείξω μὴ λέγουσαν ἔνδικα. After this, in a passage beginning with the lines ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἦραν παρθένον τε Παλλάδα οὐκ ἐς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἔλθειν δοκῶ, she disposes of Helen's weakest argument first, an argument which Euripides, like a skilful rhetorician, has placed in the *middle* of Helen's speech, lines 932—5, νικᾷ Κύπρις θεᾶς, καὶ τοσόνδ' οὐμοὶ γάμοι ὤνησαν Ἑλλάδ', οὐ κρατείσθ' ἐκ βαρβάρων.

§ 16. 'As regards ethical proof, since there are some things, which, if you say them of yourself, are either invidious or tedious or provoke contradiction, or which, if said of another, involve slander or rudeness, you must ascribe them to some one else instead'.

The reference to the Philippus of Isocrates points (according to Victorius) to p. 96 D §§ 72—78, where the writer gets rid of the indelicacy of himself reminding Philip of the current imputation that his growing power οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταύτην αὐξάνεται, by attributing it to others in the words, αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ σε διαβαλλόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοὶ φθονούντων in § 73, and by describing it in § 78 as τοιαύτην φήμην σαντῶ περιφυσμένην, ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ περιθεῖναι σοὶ ζητοῦσι. This, however, seems to be open to the objection pointed out by Spengel, that Isocrates can hardly be regarded as putting what are really *his own* views as a friend of Philip into the mouth of that monarch's enemies ("at vix Isocrates ipse haec animo probans vera putabat"). Spengel accordingly prefers taking it as a reference to §§ 4—7, where, instead of expressing his own satisfaction with one of his compositions, he states that his friends who have heard it recited had been struck by its truthful statement of facts, § 4, and had expected that, if published, it would have led to the establishment of peace; it so happened, however, that Philip had concluded peace, before the fastidious rhetorician had elaborated his pamphlet to a sufficient degree to think it deserving of publication. Perhaps a still more apposite passage, which is omitted by Victorius and Spengel, is that in p. 87 B, § 23, where the writer, after describing himself as deterred by his friends from addressing Philip, adds that finally ἔσπευδον μάλλον ἢ γὰρ πεμφθῆναι σοὶ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, ἔλεγον δ' ὡς ἐλπίζουσιν οὐ μόνον σὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐξεῖν μοι χάριν ὑπὲρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἅπαντας.

κράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει, καὶ  
ὡς Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα  
περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ

χρημάτων δ' ἄελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπώμοτον,  
καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ  
οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω.

καὶ ὡς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἴμονα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης

ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει] §§ 141—149, ἀκροώμενος δέ τις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ. In the course of the passage referred to, the rhetorician makes his imaginary friend compliment him on his writings as οὐ μέμψεως ἀλλὰ χάριτος τῆς μεγίστης ἀξίους ὄντας, an expression which would have been open to the imputation of indelicacy (περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἐπίφθονον), had not the writer ingeniously placed it in another man's mouth. The device is sufficiently transparent, even if it were not for the candid confession in § 8, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπαυεῖν ἐμᾶντὸν ἐπιχειροῖην, ἑώρων οὔτε...ἐπιχαρίτως οὐδ' ἀνεπιφθόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν δυνησόμενος.

The same device, in a less refined form, may be noticed in the modern parallel from *Martin Chuzzlewit*, which will occur to every reader (chap. xxv).

Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει...ἰάμβῳ] Hor. A. P. 79, *Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo*. Comp. note on II 23. 11. Archilochus (*Lycambae spiritus infido gener*, Epod. VI 13), instead of directly attacking Neobule, the daughter of Lycambes, puts his lampoon into the mouth of her own father, thereby ostensibly refraining from a coarseness of invective, which would imply ἀγοικία on his own part, but really intensifying its bitterness; as the reader will naturally argue, 'If her own father can say nothing better of her, what will the rest of the world say?' Comp. Bergk, *Gr. Lyr.*, p. 542, ed. 2, *Archil. fragm.*, οἴην Λυκάμβεω παῖδα τὴν ὑπερέρην. Stobaeus (CX 10, Bergk u. s. p. 552) has preserved nine trochaic lines beginning with the first of the two quotations given by Aristotle, but there is nothing in the passage, so far as there quoted, which illustrates Aristotle's object in here referring to it. There is a rendering of the lines by J. H. Merivale in Wellesley's *Anthologia Polyglotta* p. 220, beginning *Never man again may swear, things shall be as erst they were*.

οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω] τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει. The four lines of which this is the first are preserved by Plutarch de tranquill. an. c. 10 (Bergk *Gr. Lyr.* p. 541) and are thus rendered by Milman, *No care have I of Gyges' golden store, Unenvious I for nought the gods implore; I have no love of wide and kingly sway But turn from pride my reckless eyes away*. On Gyges, the wealthy king of Lydia, compare Herod. I 12, τοῦ (sc. Γύγεω) καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος ὁ Πάριος κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον γενόμενος ἐν ἰάμβῳ τριμέτρῳ ἐπεμνήσθη. Archilochus is inveighing against the vice of envy and the vanity of riches, and with a dramatic skill that is one of his characteristics, gives expression to his own feelings by ascribing them to Charon the contented carpenter (comp. Mure, *H. G. L.* III 167).

Σοφοκλῆς] Antig. 688—700, where Haemon quotes the talk of the

17 πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς λεγόντων ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον “χρὴ δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὐτυχοῦντας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοῖεν.” ἐνθυμηματικῶς δέ, “εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὠφελιμώταται ὥσι καὶ πλεονεκτικώταται αἱ καταλλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐτυχοῦντας δεῖ καταλλάττεσθαι.”

I περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὐκαιρόν ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μά-  
λιστα μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον εἰρηκῶς ᾗ, ὥστε ἐνὸς

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town about Creon's treatment of Antigone, instead of himself directly attacking him. 693, τὴν παῖδα ταύτην οἱ ὀδύρεται πόλις..., 700, τοιαύτῃ ἐρεμνῇ σὺν ἐπέρχεται φάτις.

§ 17. 'Further, you should occasionally transform your enthymemes and express them as general maxims'. Comp. II 21. 1, 2, with the notes in Vol. II p. 206. On the 'enthymeme', see Saint-Hilaire's *Rhetorique d'Aristote*, Vol. II pp. 345—376; and Jebb's *Attic Orators*, II 289.

Aristotle's example of a γνώμη seems to be a general reminiscence of a passage in Isocr. Archidamus p. 126 B § 50, χρὴ δὲ τοὺς μὲν εὖ πράττοντας τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖν· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ καταστάσει πλείστον ἂν τις χρόνον τὰ παρόντα διαφυλάξειεν· τοὺς δὲ δυστυχοῦντας τῷ πολέμῳ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ταραχῆς καὶ τῆς καινουργίας θάπτον ἂν μεταβολῆς τύχοιεν. Spengel gives a reference to Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3). 32, δεῖ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας μὴ περιμένειν ἕως ἂν πέσωσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. In expressing the γνώμη in the form of an ἐνθύμημα, Ar. alters διαλλαγὰς into its synonym καταλλαγαί, possibly for no other reason than to avoid the reiteration of similar sounds in δεῖ...διαλλαγαί...διαλλάττεσθαι, and the harsh collocation δεῖ διαλλάττεσθαι.

#### CHAP. XVIII.

This chapter treats of 'Interrogation' of one's opponent (§§ 1—4), and of 'Reply' to his interrogations (§§ 5, 6); it concludes with a few remarks on the use of 'ridicule', as an accessory to argument. These may be regarded as subdivisions of the general subject of proofs, *πίστεις*, dealt with in the previous chapter, to which the present is an appendix.

"A favourite instrument of debate with speakers in the public assembly and law-courts is the interrogation of the adversary. The object of this is to enforce an argument; or to take the adversary by surprise and extract from him an unguarded admission; or to place him in an awkward dilemma, by shaping your question in such a way that he must either by avowing it admit something which his antagonist wishes to establish, or by refusing seem to give consent by his silence to that which the questioner wishes to insinuate; or to gain some similar advantage." Introd. p. 362.

A Greek paraphrase of the first six sections of this chapter, with the headings *περὶ ἐρωτήσεως* and *περὶ ἀποκρίσεως*, which owes its interest

προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον· οἶον Περικλῆς  
 Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας

mainly to the rareness of such commentaries on the *Rhetoric*, was edited in 1838 by Seguer from a MS in the library in Paris, and is reprinted in Spengel's *Rhetores Graeci* I pp. 163—8, and also in his edition of the *Rhetoric*, Vol. I pp. 147—152. It is a puerile piece of composition, but one or two extracts from it will be given where the writer's language really illustrates the text of Aristotle.

On the subject of Interrogatories it may be noticed, that by Athenian Law either party to a suit might put questions to the other, and demand a reply, not only at the preliminary hearing (*ἀνάκρισις*) but also at the trial itself (Plato, *Apol.* 25 D, ἀποκρίναι δ' ἑκάστῳ καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνασθαι). In the former instance, the answers were taken down in writing, and produced in court if wanted; in the latter, the questions could only be asked by the party addressing the court, who could not himself be interrupted by any interrogation on the part of his opponent, but only by the enquiries of the jury, which were sometimes even invited by the speaker. (Comp. C. R. Kennedy's *Demosthenes* IV Appendix VII *On Interrogatories*).

Such interrogations, judging from the few specimens that have come down to us, were of the simplest kind; and owing to the large number and the natural impatience of the audience present, (whether as members of the general assembly or of the jury, in cases of the deliberative or the forensic class respectively), anything approaching an elaborate and protracted cross-examination was quite out of the question.

As instances we may quote the following: Isaeus *Or.* 10 (π. τοῦ Ἀγνίου κλήρου) §§ 4, 5, σὺ δ' ἀνάβηθι δεῦρο... ἐρωτήσω σε. ἀδελφός ἐσθ' ὁ παῖς Ἀγνίου, ἀδελφιδούς ἐξ ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἀδελφῆς γεγονώς, ἢ ἀνεψιός, ἢ ἐξ ἀνεψιοῦ πρὸς μητρός ἢ πρὸς πατρός; ... δεῖ δὲ σε τῆς ἀγχιστείας, ὃ τι ὁ παῖς Ἀγνίου προσήκει, τὸ γένος εἰπεῖν. φράσον οὖν τουτοισί.—αἰσθάνεσθε ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὴν συγγένειαν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνεται πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ δεῖ μαθεῖν ὑμᾶς. καίτοι τὸν γε πράττοντά τι δίκαιον οὐ προσήκεν ἀπορεῖν ἀλλ' εὐθύς λέγειν.

Lysias *Or.* 22 (κατὰ τῶν σιτοπώλων) § 5, (α) μέτοικος εἶ; (β) ναί. (α) μετοικεῖς δὲ πότερον ὥς πεισόμενος τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς τῆς πόλεως, ἢ ὥς ποιήσω ὃ τι ἂν βούλη; (β) ὥς πεισόμενος. (α) ἄλλο τι οὖν ἀξιοῖς ἢ ἀποθανεῖν εἴ τι πεποίηκας παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἐφ' οἷς θάνατος ἢ ζημία; (β) ἔγωγε. (α) ἀποκρίναι δὲ μοι, εἰ ὁμολογῇς πλείω σίτον συμπρίασθαι πενήτην φορμῶν, ὣν ὁ νόμος ἐξέειναι κελεύει; (β) ἐγὼ τῶν ἀρχόντων (not the Archons but the σιτοφύλακες of § 7) κελεύοντων συνεπριάμην. *ib.* *Or.* 13 (κατὰ Ἀγοράτου) §§ 30—33, ἐπ' αὐτοφάρῳ ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἐξελέγξω. ἀποκρίναι δὲ μοι κ.τ.λ. *ib.* *Or.* 12 (κατ' Ἐρατοσθένους) § 25, set forth at length in *Introduct.* p. 364, note. Spengel also gives a reference to *Dem. de Cor.* § 52.

The subject of questioning and replying in sophistical debate is treated by Aristotle himself in the *Sophistici Elenchi*, esp. c. xv and xvi, (Grote's *Aristotle* II pp. 109—115; see also *Top.* Θ). Some of the more striking parallels will be quoted in the course of the commentary.

§ 1. 'As to Interrogation, you may opportunely resort to it, when your opponent has said the opposite, so that as soon as one more



ιερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἤρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός, φάσκοντος δέ, “καὶ πῶς ἀτέ-  
 2 λεστος ὢν;” δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερόν ᾤ, τὸ  
 δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ᾤ ὅτι δώσει· πυθόμενον γὰρ δεῖ  
 τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερόν ἀλλὰ  
 τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἶον Σωκράτης Μελήττου οὐ  
 φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν εἶρηκεν εἰ δαιμόνιον  
 τι λέγοι, ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες  
 ἦτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἴεν ἢ θεῖόν τι, φήσαντος δέ, “ἔστιν  
 οὖν” ἔφη “ὅς τις θεῶν μὲν παῖδας οἶεται εἶναι, θεοὺς  
 question is put to him, a contradictory result ensues’, i.e. the result is  
 a *reductio ad absurdum*.

This Topic is exemplified by Pericles’ retort to Lampon, the sooth-  
 sayer, who is mentioned in Arist. Av. 521, Λάμπων δ’ ὄμνος’ ἔτι καὶ νυνὶ  
 τὸν χῆν’ ὅταν ἐξαπατᾷ τι, and Plut. Pericles c. VI, Λάμπωνα τὸν μάντιν.  
 On τελετή, see note on II 24. 2.

The fragment *περὶ ἐρωτήσεως* (as Spengel points out), besides having  
 ἤρετο and ἀνῆρετο instead of ἐπήρετο and ἤρετο respectively, closes with  
 the paraphrase *συμφήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Λάμπωνος, καὶ πῶς εἶπεν ἀτέλεστος ὢν*.

§ 2. ‘Or, secondly, (you may employ interrogation) when *one* point  
 is self-evident, and it is clear that the person interrogated will grant  
 you the *other* as soon as you put the question. For, when you have  
 obtained your first premiss by asking your opponent to admit it, you  
 must not proceed to put what is self-evident in the form of a question,  
 but simply state the conclusion yourself’. Soph. El. 15, 174 ὅ 38,  
 οὐ δέῃ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα προτατικῶς ἐρωτᾶν· ἐνια δ’ οὐδ’ ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ’ ὡς  
 ὁμολογουμένῳ χρηστέον. Top. Θ 2, 154 α 7, οὐ δέῃ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐρώτημα  
 ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνανεύσαντος, οὐ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι συλλογισμός.

The illustration is taken from the Apologia of Socrates. ‘Socrates,  
 when accused by Meletus of denying the existence of the gods, asked  
 (*vulg. lect.* said), if there was anything which he called divine, and on  
 his admitting this, he enquired whether the divine beings (δαίμονες) were  
 not either children of the gods or of godlike nature, and on his answering  
 “Yes”, “Is there any one” he said “who believes in the existence of  
 the children of the gods and yet denies that of the gods themselves?”  
 This corresponds only partially to the well-known passage in Plat. Apol.  
 p. 27, already commented on in the note on II 23. 8. There is probably  
 some corruption in the word *εἶρηκεν* where we should expect *ἠρώτα*  
 or *ἤρετο*. Spengel, following A° and the *vetus translatio*, reads *εἶρηκεν*  
*ὡς ἂν δαιμόνιον τι λέγοι, ἤρετο*. “Illud ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ sensui et consilio  
 Aristotelis repugnat, neque *εἶρηκεν* εἰ significat : *quaesivit ex Meleto num*  
*daemonion quid crederet*. Sed Meletus de Socrate *εἶρηκεν ὡς ἂν δαιμόνιον*  
*τι λέγοι*.” After quoting part of the passage of Plato, he says in con-  
 clusion, “Vides Socratem id quod Meletus dixit, non interrogare, sed  
 affirmare.”

3 δὲ οὐ;” ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἢ ἐναντία λέγοντα δείξῃν ἢ  
 4 παράδοξον. τέταρτον δὲ ὅταν μὴ ἐνῇ ἀλλ’ ἢ σο-  
 φιστικῶς ἀποκρινάμενον λῦσαι· εἰ γὰρ οὕτως  
 ἀποκρίνηται, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ’ οὐ, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ  
 δ’ οὐ, ἢ πῇ μὲν πῇ δ’ οὐ, θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντες.  
 ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἐγχειρεῖν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνστή, κεκρατῆσθαι  
 δοκεῖ· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε πολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν  
 τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ. διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα  
 συστρέφειν δεῖ.

§ 3. ‘Further, (interrogation is appropriate) when the speaker is intending to shew up his opponent either in a self-contradiction or a paradox’.

§ 4. ‘Fourthly, when it is impossible (for the opponent) to meet the question, without giving a sophistical answer’. For the examples of this topic, ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ’ οὐ, κ.τ.λ., comp. Soph. Elench. 19, 177 a 21, ‘the proper way for the respondent to deal with questions involving equivocation of terms or amphiboly of propositions is to answer them, at the outset, with a reserve for the double meaning’: ὥσπερ τὸ σιγῶντα λέγειν ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ’ ὡς οὐ. καὶ τὰ δέοντα πρακτέον ἔστιν ἂ, ἔστι δ’ ἂ οὐ (Grote’s *Ar.* II 114), where the interrogation is characterized as sophistical, while here the same invidious epithet is applied to the answer. Comp. Top. Θ 7, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσαφῶς καὶ πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων...τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος τὸ δ’ ἀληθές. As an instance of a quibbling answer, we may compare the subtle distinction drawn by the over-intelligent servant in reply to the enquiry whether his master Euripides was at home; *Ar. Ach.* 396, (ἔνδον ἔστ’ Εὐριπίδης;) οὐκ ἔνδον, ἔνδον τ’ ἔστιν, εἰ γνῶμην ἔχεις.

θορυβοῦσιν] This is a neutral word, and may be used of expressions of either pleasure or displeasure on the part of the audience, any ‘sensation’ in fact, whether breaking out into applause or the reverse (see Riddell’s note on its application to *δικασταί*, *Introd.* to Plato’s *Apology*, p. IX). *Isocr. ἀντίδοσις*, § 20, μετὰ θορύβου καὶ χαλεπότητος ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν ἀπολογουμένων. It is used of disapprobation (as here) in *Rhet. ad Alex.* 18 (19). 3, 6, 7, 8.

ὡς ἀποροῦντες] It is not the *audience* that is perplexed; on the contrary it has a perfectly clear opinion on the obviously shuffling character of the answer, and expresses its displeasure accordingly. It is the person who gives a ‘sophistical’ answer, who is apparently perplexed; hence we should accept the correction ὡς ἀποροῦντος proposed by Spengel and Schneidewin. The Paris MS A<sup>o</sup> actually has ἀποροῦντας, which suggested to Spengel the alternative emendation ἀποροῦντα. Similarly the fragment *περὶ ἐρωτήσεως* has, πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς οὕτω ἀποκρινάμενους οἱ ἀκροάμενοι θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντας καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντας ἀντειπεῖν.

‘But otherwise’ (i.e. except under the above limitations), ‘the speaker must not attempt interrogation; for if his opponent should interpose an objection, the questioner is considered beaten’. ἐνστή is here used of giving a check by interposing an ‘instance’ or ἐνστασις. See *Introd.* p. 269.

ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν] ‘to pack into as small a compass as possible’.

- 5 ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα. διαι-  
 ροῦντα λόγῳ καὶ μὴ συντόμως, πρὸς δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα  
 ἐναντία τὴν λύσιν φέροντα εὐθὺς τῇ ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν  
 ἐπερωτῆσαι τὸ ἐπὶ ἢ συλλογίσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ χαλε-  
 πὸν προορᾶν ἐν τίνι ὁ λόγος. φανερόν δ' ἡμῖν ἔστω  
 6 ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν καὶ τοῦτο καὶ αἱ λύσεις. καὶ συμ-  
 περαινόμενον, ἐὰν ἐρώτημα ποιῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὴν

II 24.2, τὸ συνεστραμμένον καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα. Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 6, ἡ συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις. The verb is used metaphorically to express conciseness and condensation of style; in its literal meaning it might be applied to any squeezing and compacting process like that (for instance) of making a snowball. Comp. note on II 7. 5, *συνηναγκάσθησαν*.

§ 5. 'In answering, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing a distinction, and not expressing yourself too concisely'. Top. Θ 7, 156 a 26, ἐὰν (τὸ ἐρωτηθῆν) ἐπὶ τὶ μὲν ψεῦδος ᾖ, ἐπὶ τὶ δ' ἀληθές, ἐπισημαντέον ὅτι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται καὶ διότι τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος τὸ δ' ἀληθές· ὕστερον γὰρ διαιρουμένου ἀδελον εἰ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ συνεώρα τὸ ἀμφίβολον. In the fragment *περὶ ἀποκρίσεως* (as Spengel notices) the latter part is paraphrased in such a manner as to shew that the writer read *διαιροῦντα λόγῳ* (omitting καὶ μὴ) συντόμως.

'In answering questions that appear to involve you in a contradiction, you must give your explanation immediately in your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion'. This corresponds to what in the old style of our legal pleading would have been termed 'confession and avoidance'.

ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν] namely in Top. lib. VIII (Θ), in the opening words of which πῶς δεῖ ἐρωτᾶν is mentioned as one of the subjects of the book; *περὶ ἀποκρίσεως* is treated from c. 4 to c. 10; (Grote's *Ar.* Vol. II 47—54). Spengel somewhat questionably remarks: "notandus imperativus ἔστω, hoc enim ut εἰρήσθω, librum illum nondum compositum esse indicare videtur;" (on the perfect imperative, see note on I 11. 29). He adds, "neque ἔσται, quod deteriores exhibent, placet, praesens expectamus, aut intelligendum potius verbum in hac formula."

§ 6. A second precept for 'answering'. 'When a conclusion is being drawn, if your opponent puts the conclusion in the form of a question, you must add the cause of your conduct'. *συμπεραινόμενον* is a neuter accusative absolute. It is here passive, not middle, though the *vetus translatio* renders it *concludentem*, which is contrary to the sense required and to the general use of the verb, which is rarely found in the middle. Spengel even asserts *non dicitur media forma*, but this assertion (unless I misunderstand his meaning) is refuted by Top. H 5, 150 a 33, ῥᾶον γὰρ ἐν συμπεράνασθαι ἢ πολλά, and by Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 22, ἀγαπητὸν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς...ἀληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι (which cannot be taken as any other than the middle voice).

αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν· οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ Πεισάνδρου εἰ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προβούλοις, καταστήσαι τοὺς τετρακοσίους, ἔφη. “τί δέ; οὐ πονηρά σοι ταῦτα ἐδόκει εἶναι;” ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν σὺ ταῦτα ἐπραξας τὰ πονηρά;” “ναί” ἔφη. “οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα βελτίω.” καὶ ὡς ὁ Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτώμενος εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολλύναι ἄτεροι, ἔφη. ὁ δὲ “οὐκοῦν σὺ τούτοις ταῦτα ἔθου;” καὶ ὁς ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἄν” ἔφη “καὶ σὺ <sup>p. 147.</sup> ἀπόλοιο;” “οὐ δῆτα” ἔφη. “οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταῦτα ἐπραξαν, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ γνώμη.” διὸ οὗτ' ἐπερωτᾶν δεῖ μετὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οὔτε τὸ <sup>P. 1419 d.</sup> συμπέρασμα ἐπερωτᾶν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ πολὺ περιῇ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

7 περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδὴ τινα δοκεῖ χρήσιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν

[Σοφοκλῆς] On this statesman and orator (not the poet), and on the ten πρόβουλοι of whom he was one, see note on I 14. 3.

εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας] ‘called to account for his administration of the office of ephor’. The ephors are charged with being liable to venality in Pol. II 9, 1270 b 10, διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὧνιοι. The ephor in the present instance repudiates the charge, and insists that he had not acted on the prompting of bribery, but ‘on principle’ (γνώμη).

οὗτ' ἐπερωτᾶν—ἀληθοῦς] ‘hence (to avoid being thus foiled), you should neither put a further question after drawing the conclusion nor express the conclusion itself in the form of a question, unless the truth of the facts is superabundantly clear’. Comp. Top. Θ 2, 154 a 7, already quoted on § 2.

§ 7 treats very briefly of ‘jests’, as a useful accessory in debate; *Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res* (Hor. Sat. I 10. 14). The subject of *ridiculum* is treated by Cicero de Oratore, II 58. 236 seq., Quintil. VI 3. 22—112, *haec tota disputatio a Graecis περὶ γελοίου inscribitur* (§ 22)...*usus autem maxime triplex, aut enim ex aliis risum petimus aut ex nobis aut ex rebus mediis* (§ 23). For other references see note on I 11. 29.

δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας—ὀρθῶς λέγων] ‘Gorgias laid it down, and rightly too, that you should confound (spoil the effect of) the seriousness of your opponents by ridicule, and their ridicule by seriousness’. In a Scholium on Plat. Gorg. p. 473 E, (where Socrates says to Polus) γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὐτοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή, the dictum of Gorgias is quoted in the following form: (δεῖ) τὰς σπουδὰς τῶν

σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλῳτι τὸν δὲ γέλῳτα σπουδῇ, ὀρθῶς λέγων, εἴρηται πόσα εἶδη γελοίων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ' οὐ. ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. ἔστι δ' ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὃ δὲ βωμολόχος ἐτέρου.

ἀντιδίκων γέλῳτι ἐκλύειν, τὰ δὲ γελοία ταῖς σπουδαῖς ἐκκρούειν (Plato, ed. Baiter and Orelli, p. 910 b 20; Sauppe, *Fragm. Or. Att.* III 131). The only material variation between the two forms of quotation is Aristotle's probably intentional alteration of τῶν ἀντιδίκων, which would apply to the forensic branch alone, into τῶν ἐναντίων, which extends the applicability of the remark to all the three branches of Oratory. Dr Thompson observes that "the remark is one which could not have been made by an ordinary man, and the sentence is too nicely balanced for a mere colloquial dictum" (*Gorgias*, p. 178). The first half of Gorgias' precept may be exemplified by the familiar line, *And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley by a grin* (Dr Brown's *Essay on Satire* II 224).

One of the best classical instances of the effective use of pleasantry to neutralize over-strictness on the part of one's opponent is Cicero's good-humoured banter of his friends Sulpicius and Cato, in the speech *pro Murena* (§§ 19—30 and §§ 61—65). We may also compare Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) §§ 13 and (as an illustration of meeting jest by earnest) 20, εἴτα γελᾶσαντες ὑμεῖς ἀφήσετε; οὐ γὰρ ἂν γέλῳς ὑμῶν ἔλαβεν οὐδένα, εἰ παρὼν ἐτύγχανεν κ.τ.λ. Comp. Or. 23 § 206, ἂν ἐν ἡ δὲ ἀστεία εἴπωσι...ἀφίετε, Arist. Vesp. 566, οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν μύθους ἡμῖν οἱ δ' Αἰσώπου τι γέλοιον· οἱ δὲ σκώπτουσ' ἔγὼ γελᾶσω καὶ τὸν θυμὸν κατὰθωμαι. See also Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, § 29, *Ueber Lachen und Witz*.

ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς] See note on I II. 29, διώριται περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ] Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 17, τοῦ ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκοῖεν ὅλα τῷ ἐπιεικεί καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει. Cic. de Off. I 29. 103, *ipsum genus iocandi non profusum nec immodestum, sed ingenium et facetum esse debet*, § 104, *facilis est distinctio ingenui et illiberalis ioci*.

τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται] Cic. Orator, § 88, *ridiculo sic usurum oratorem, ut nec nimis frequenti, ne scurrile sit...neque aut sua persona aut iudicium aut tempore alienum*. There is a kind of quiet irony observable in Aristotle's hint that the orator is to select his special line of pleasantry according as he happens to be a gentleman or the reverse.

εἰρωνεία—ἐτέρου] 'Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery: one who resorts to irony makes his joke for his own amusement only, whereas the buffoon does so for an ulterior object'. On βωμολοχία, comp. Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 4, οἱ τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλῳτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λεγεῖν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον. *ib.* line 34, ὃ δὲ βωμολό-

I ὁ δ' ἐπίλογος σύγκειται ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ τε τοῦ CHAP. XIX.  
 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὸν  
 ἐναντίον φαύλως, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐξῆσαι καὶ ταπεινῶσαι,  
 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατὴν καταστήσαι,  
 καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως. πέφυκε γὰρ μετὰ τὸ ἀποδείξαι

χος ἦτων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέ-  
 λωτα ποιήσει. On εἰρωνεία, comp. ib. c. 13, οἱ δ' εἰρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες  
 χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἥθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ  
 φείγοντες τὸ ὀγκρῶν· see also the references in note on II 2. 24, to which  
 may be added Auctor ad Herennium IV 34. 46, where irony is called  
*permutatio*.

It is a nice question whether αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα is neuter (as Mr Cope takes  
 it in the *text* of the Introd. p. 366), or 'perhaps masculine' (as he suggests  
 in the *note*, and as I have ventured to translate it above). The latter is  
 the view supported by Victorius: "Qui utitur dissimulatione, sibi que  
 semper in sermone detrahit, atque aliis plusquam vere concedi possit,  
 tribuit, ut ipse oblectetur, voluptatemque ex aliorum stultitia capiat, hoc  
 facit. quare sibi servit: contra scurra ridiculus est, et iocos undique  
 captat, ut alii voluptatem gignat, quod illiberale ac sordidum est, omnia  
 facere, ut alii turpiter inservias."

#### CHAP. XIX.

The book appropriately closes with a chapter on the Peroration:  
 the contents of that portion of the speech are distributed under four  
 heads: (1) to inspire the audience with a favourable opinion of yourself  
 and an unfavourable one of your opponents, (2) amplification and  
 extenuation, (3) the excitement of the emotions of your audience, (4)  
 refreshing their memory by recapitulation.

Cornificius, II 30. 47, gives three divisions, (1) *enumeratio*, (2) *ampli-  
 ficatio*, (3) *commiseratio*. Cic. de Inv. I 52. 98, (1) *enumeratio*, (2) *indig-  
 natio*, (3) *conquestio*. Apsines 12 p. 384, (1) ἀνάμνησις, (2) ἔλεος, (3) δει-  
 νωσις (ἡ δὲ δεινωσις κατὰ τὴν αὐξήσιν θεωρεῖται). *Amplificatio* and *com-  
 miseratio* are sometimes brought under one head, thus reducing the  
 divisions to two, as in Cic. part. orat. 15. 52, (1) *amplificatio*, (2) *enum-  
 ratio* (Volkman, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, § 29).

In spite of what is here said about αὔξησις, the student of ancient  
 eloquence cannot fail to be struck by the quiet character of most of the  
 perorations of the Attic orators. Perhaps the tamest of all (to our modern  
 taste) is the closing sentence of Lysias Or. 22 (κατὰ τῶν σιτοπώλων) § 22,  
 οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι δεῖ πλείω λέγειν· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀδικούντων,  
 ὅτε δικάζονται, δεῖ παρὰ τῶν κατηγορῶν πυθέσθαι, τὴν δὲ τούτων πομπήαν  
 ἅπαντες ἐπίστασθε. ἂν οὖν τούτων καταψηφίσησθε, τὰ τε δίκαια ποιήσετε καὶ  
 ἀξιώτερον τὸν σῖτον ὠνήσεσθε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τιμιώτερον. It is well  
 remarked by Brougham that "the perorations, if by this we mean the con-  
 cluding sentences of all, in the Greek orations, are calm and tame, com-  
 pared with the rest of their texture, and especially with their penultimate

αὐτὸν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον ψευδῇ, οὕτω τὸ  
ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ ἐπιχαλκεύειν. δυοῖν δὲ  
βατέρου δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἢ ὅτι τούτοις ἀγαθὸς ἢ  
ὅτι ἀπλῶς, ὃ δ' ὅτι κακὸς τούτοις ἢ ὅτι ἀπλῶς.  
ἐξ ὧν δὲ δὴ τοιούτους κατασκευάζειν δεῖ, εἴρη-  
ται οἱ τόποι πόθεν σπουδαίους δεῖ κατασκευά-  
2 ζειν καὶ φαύλους. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο δεδειγμένων

portions, which rise to the highest pitch of animation' (vol. VII, *Rhetorical Dissertations*, pp. 25, 184; see also especially Jebb's *Attic Orators* I p. ciii).  
πέφυκε—ἐπιχαλκεύειν] 'For the natural order is first to prove your own case to be true and your opponent's to be false; and after that, to use praise and blame, and to elaborate these topics'. These words give the reason for giving the *first* place in the four heads to inspiring in the audience a favourable opinion towards yourself.

ἐπιχαλκεύειν] is a difficult word to translate satisfactorily in the present context. Victorius dubiously explains it: "expolire et quod factum iam est cursim festinanterque eo consilio ut concinnes, iterare ac repetere." It is metaphorically used in Arist. Nub. 422, where Strepsiades offers himself (not his son, as Ernesti says *Lex. Techn.* s.v.), to Socrates, as sturdy and tough material for him to hammer upon and forge to his purpose, ἀλλ' ἐνεκὲν γε ψυχῆς στερρᾶς...ἀμέλει θαρρῶν, οὐνεκα τούτων ἐπιχαλκεύειν παρέχοιμ' ἄν (for a Latin metaphor from the anvil, comp. Horace, *A. P.* 441, *male tornatos incudi reddere versus*). At first sight the word might be supposed to refer to ἀνάμνησις, which is subsequently explained in the words πολλὰκις εἰπεῖν, in which case it would mean 'to hammer your subject down', 'drive it home'; but μετὰ τοῦτο in § 2 shows that in the present section Ar. is only dwelling on the first of the four heads of the epilogue, and does not at present touch on ἀνάμνησις, which is reserved for § 4. Consequently we must understand it to mean 'to elaborate', 'to finish off', the topics belonging to the first head. It may also mean to mould the audience to one's purpose. Brandis in Schneide-  
win's *Philologus* IV 1, p. 45, points out that his *Anonymus* read the clause as follows: καὶ μετὰ (not οὕτω) τὸ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν τὸ (not καὶ) ἐπιχαλ-  
κεύειν, in which case the last word corresponds to the *third* head, εἰς τὰ πάθη καταστήσαι τὸν ἀκροατήν.

'Now (in this) you must aim at one of two objects; to represent yourself as either relatively or absolutely good, and your opponent as either relatively or absolutely bad'. As is remarked in the *Introd.* p. 368, 'the virtue assumed may be either virtue *per se*, and independent of all other considerations, as times, places, and persons—or in default of this, at any rate good to the judges or audience; as it may be, useful, or well-disposed'. On ἀπλῶς, see note on I 2. 4.

εἴρηται οἱ τόποι] See I 9. 1.

§ 2. δεδειγμένων—ἐστίν] 'The next point in the natural order is to proceed to amplify what has already been proved (δεδειγμένων), or again to depreciate (what has been proved by your opponent); for the facts must be

ἤδη αὖξιν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ταπεινοῦν· δεῖ γὰρ  
τὰ πεπραγμένα ὁμολογεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποσὸν  
ἐρεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων αὖξις ἐκ προϋπαρ-  
χόντων ἐστίν. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ αὖξιν καὶ ταπεινοῦν,  
3 ἔκκεινται οἱ τόποι πρότερον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, δῆλων  
ὄντων καὶ οἷα καὶ ἡλίκᾳ, εἰς τὰ πάθη ἄγειν τὸν ἀκροα-  
τὴν ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἔλεος καὶ δεινῶσις καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ  
μῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις. εἰρήνται δὲ καὶ  
4 τούτων οἱ τόποι πρότερον. ὥστε λοιπὸν ἀναμνήσαι  
τὰ προειρημένα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀρμόττει ποιεῖν οὕτως p. 148.  
ὥσπερ φασὶν ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες·  
ἵνα γὰρ εὐμαθῇ ἡ, κελεύουσι πολλάκις εἰπεῖν. ἐκεῖ μὲν  
οὖν δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ περὶ οὗ ἡ  
κρίσις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ δι' ὧν δέδεικται κεφαλαιωδῶς,  
admitted, if one is to treat of the question of degree (by way of amplification  
or the reverse) ; just as the growth of the body arises from something  
pre-existing.' δεδειγμένον is supported by the *vetus translatio* and all  
the MSS except A\*, which has *δεδειγμένων*, an awkward genitive absolute  
which is left standing alone owing to the loss of some words which  
would have made the sentence run like the next transition in § 3, μετὰ  
δὲ ταῦτα, δῆλων ὄντων καὶ οἷα καὶ ἡλίκᾳ. Spengel suggests as an alternative  
that the participle refers to "ipsam argumentationem, i.e. confirmationem  
et confutationem, quod suadent verba δεῖ γὰρ τὰ πεπραγμένα ὁμολο-  
γῆσθαι."

ἔκκεινται οἱ τόποι] See I cc. 7, 9, 24 ; and II 7. 2.

§ 3. ἡλίκᾳ] referring particularly to αὖξιν καὶ ταπεινοῦν.

ἐλεος] 'commiseration'. Cic. de Inv. I 55. 106, *Conquestio oratio  
auditorum misericordiam captans*, ib. § 100. *Supra* II 8. 2.

δεινῶσις] 'indignation'. See note on II 21. 10, *σχετλιασμῷ* (correspond-  
ing to ἐλεος) καὶ δεινώσει, and note 3 on p. 368 of *Introductio*. Cf. Plat. *Phaedr.*  
272 A, *ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως*.

On ὀργή see II 2. 1 and 4. 31 ; on μῖσος, II 4. 31 ; on φθόνος, II 9. 3  
and 10. 1 ; on ζῆλος, II 11. 1.

οἱ τόποι] See II cc. I—11, where however δεινῶσις and ἔρις are not, like  
the other topics, specially treated of.

§ 4. 'The remaining branch of the peroration is the recapitulation  
of the previous parts of the speech. At this point you may appropriately  
do what some, absurdly enough, advise one to do in the exordium. They  
recommend you to to state your points again and again that they  
may be distinctly understood. In the exordium, however, you should  
simply state the subject of the speech, that the point at issue may be  
clearly seen ; in the peroration you have to state summarily the means  
whereby your case has been proved'.



5 ἀρχὴ δὲ διότι ἂν ὑπέσχετο ἀποδεδῶκεν· ὥστε ἅ τε καὶ δι' ὃ λεκτέον. λέγεται δὲ ἐξ ἀντιπαραβολῆς τοῦ ἐναντίου. παραβάλλειν δὲ ἢ ὅσα περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμφω εἶπον, ἢ μὴ καταντικρύν· “ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν τάδε περὶ τούτου, ἐγὼ δὲ ταδί, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα.” ἢ ἐξ εἰρωνείας, P. 1420. οἶον “οὗτος γὰρ τὰδ' εἶπεν, ἐγὼ δὲ τάδε. καὶ τί ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ τάδε ἔδειξεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ταδί;” ἢ ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως “τί οὐ δέδεικται;” ἢ “οὗτος τί ἔδειξεν;” ἢ δὴ οὕτως ἢ ἐκ παραβολῆς, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ἐλέχθη, οὕτω τὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν, ἐὰν βούλη, χωρὶς τὰ τοῦ

§ 5. ‘The first point (in the recapitulation) is (to state) that you have performed all that you have promised’. Isocr. ἀντιδοσις § 75, οἶμαι γὰρ ἀποδεδωκέναι τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν.

‘(The recapitulation) may also consist of a comparison (of the opponent's case with your own); you may either compare what both said on the same point, or else (you may do so) without setting each point over against the other’.

ἢ ἐκ παραβολῆς] as ἀντιπαραβολή is actually the subject of all the preceding part of the section, ἐκ παραβολῆς cannot be contrasted with οὕτως, but must be identical with it. Hence we should either strike out this clause, or at any rate (with Victorius and Spengel), put ἢ into brackets, in which case ἢ δὴ οὕτως will be explained if necessary by ἐκ παραβολῆς. Possibly, however, the clause is due to the intrusion into the text of a marginal explanation of οὕτως such as an abbreviated form of ἡ γοῦν (the scholiast's common equivalent for *scilicet*) ἐκ παραβολῆς.

κατὰ φύσιν] i. e. your recapitulation may follow and contrast your own points in the natural order, as they were spoken; and then, if you please, separately, what has been said by your opponent.

τελευτῇ—λόγος ἦ] ‘As a conclusion (to a speech) the most suitable style is that which has no conjunctions, to make it a true peroration, and not an actual oration’.

τελευτῇ is with much plausibility conjectured by Victorius, and the conjecture is supported by F. A. Wolf. The nominative is possibly due to the copyist being misled by the apparent parallelism above, ἀρχὴ δὲ διότι κ.τ.λ.—τῆς λέξεως is constructed with ἡ ἀσύνδετος; on this kind of ‘attraction’, comp. note on III 9. 3, ἡ εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεως.

ἐπιλόγος...λόγος] Quint. VI 1. 2, *nam si morabimur, non iam enumeratio, sed quasi altera fiet oratio*. *Supra* III 9. 6, αἱ περίοδοι αἱ μακრაὶ οὐσαι λόγος γίνονται.

εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε] ‘I must now close; you have heard all; the facts are in your hands; I ask for your verdict’. Considering the carelessness of style which characterizes many portions of the *Rhetoric*, it is all the more striking to find its close marked by a sentence so happily chosen,—a sentence which at once illustrates the point under

ἑναντίου λόγου. τελευτὴ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἀρμόττει ἢ ἀσύνδετος, ὅπως ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος ἦ· “εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε.”

consideration and also serves as an appropriate farewell to the subject of the treatise ; as though Aristotle had added at the conclusion of his course : ‘I have said all that I had to say ; my lectures are now finished ; I leave the subject in your hands, and trust it to your judgment’. The closing words of the *Sophistici Elenchi* are at least equally effective, *λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν ἡκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ’ εὐρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν χάριν.*

The illustration is doubtless a reminiscence of the closing words of one of the best-known speeches of Lysias, Or. 12 (*κατ’ Ἐρατοσθένους*), *παύσομαι κατηγορῶν· ἀκηκόατε, ἐωράκατε, πεπόνθατε· ἔχετε, δικάζετε*, a passage which may perhaps find its modern equivalent in some such words as these :

‘The speech for the prosecution must now close ; I have appealed to your ears, to your eyes, to your hearts : the case is in your hands ; I ask for your verdict.’]

## APPENDIX (E)

### *Shilleto's Adversaria on the Rhetoric of Aristotle.*

[Among the books belonging to the late Mr Shilleto which have been recently acquired by the University Library, are two interleaved copies of the edition of the *Rhetoric* printed at the Oxford University Press in 1826. One of these, which is in bad condition owing to many years of use, contains a large number of annotations of very unequal value, written in various hands; in the other, which bears on the title-page the name *Richard Shilleto* with the date *Dec. 15, 1863*, apparently all the notes on which his maturer judgment set any value, are copied out by himself in a hand rivalling that of Richard Porson for clearness and beauty. All these notes, and a few selections from the older book, with some trifling omissions, (parallel passages, for instance, already quoted at large in these volumes,) I have transcribed in full by permission of the Syndics of the University Library, and I append them here as an epilogue to Mr Cope's Commentary.]

### BOOK I.

A 1. 12, ἀναγκὴ δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι] δι' αὐτῶν i. e. τῶν ῥητορικῶν.

1. 13, τοῦτοις ἂν τις ὠφελήσῃε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως κ.τ.λ. Plat. Meno. 87 E, σκεψόμεθα δὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ. ὑγίεια, φασὲν, καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα...ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα φασὲν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν.

1. 14, σοφιστὴς μὲν] Intellige; σοφιστὴς μὲν (σοφιστὴς ἐστὶ),...διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ (σοφιστὴς ἐστὶ) κ.τ.λ.

2. 12, ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ ἔχειν] ἔχειν: Plat. Theaet. 183 A, 204 A, 1 Rep. 351 C inter ἔστιν et ἔχει lis est in Codd. Editt.)

2. 20, κατὰ τρόπον]=ὀρθῶς. Vid. Cobet. N. Lect. p. 87. "Plat. de Rep. IX 581 A, καλοῦντες αὐτὸ φιλοχρήματον ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν, et post pauca: φιλομαθὲς δὴ καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν." Itaque h. l. scribe κατὰ λόγον vel ἢ κατὰ τρόπον. Hoc praefero.

3. 2, ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτὴν κ.τ.λ.] Cicero Orat. Part. 3. 10, *Quid habes igitur de causa dicere?* Cicero Pater: *Auditorum eam genere distingui. Nam aut auscultator est modo qui audit, aut disceptator, id est rei sententiaeque moderator: ita, ut aut delectetur, aut statuatur aliquid. Sta-*

*tuit autem aut de praeteritis, ut iudex, aut de futuris, ut senatus. Sicut tria sunt genera, iudicii, deliberationis, exornationis: quae quia in laudationes maxime confertur, proprium habet iam ex eo nomen.* 1 de Oratore 31. 141, (non negabo me didicisse) *causarum...partim in iudiciis versari, partim in deliberationibus: esse etiam genus tertium, quod in laudandis aut vituperandis hominibus poneretur.* de invent. II 4. 12, *omnis et demonstrativa et deliberativa et iudicialis causa...Aliud enim laus aut vituperatio, aliud sententiae dictio, aliud accusatio aut recusatio conficere debet. In iudiciis quid aequum sit quaeritur, in demonstrationibus quid honestum, in deliberationibus, ut nos arbitramur, quid honestum sit et quid utile.*

3. 8, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἢ μὴ ἐσόμενα οὐχ οἷον τε κ.τ.λ.] alia collegit Herm. ad Plat. Rep. III 389 A. [Rhet.] III 17. 8, Isaei Ciron. Hered. § 27; Dem. Androt. 603, Mid. 532; Plat. Rep. IV 426 B, Dem. πρὸς Φορμίωνα 907, 1 Aphob. 834, Aesch. Choeph. 64, 470, Plat. Symp. 204 A; Lucian, 1 p. 22, Somnium 17; Bremi ad Aeschin. adv. Ctesiph. § 78; Lysias de olea 108 St=264 R, Theomnest. 116 St=344 R et 117 St=350 R; Herod. VII 101, Lys. xiii § 16, Dem. VII 83 § 28.

οὐδὲ...οὐ γιν. [Rhet.] I 5. 15; (ἀλλ') οὐ, I 11. 9.

4. 6, λήσεται] Anal. Pr. II 19, τοῦτο δ' ἡμᾶς οὐ λήσεται διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι πῶς ὑπέχομεν τὸν λόγον. De λήσω, λήσομαι, disputavit Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 265, 266.

5. 3, κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων] dead and live stock, thing-chattels, man-chattels.—Num Plat. Gorg. 511 D idem sibi vult? τὴν κυβερνητικὴν, ἢ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα.

5. 11, ὦν τὸ γήρας λωβᾶται] ὦν=τούτων ἃ (nominativus).

5. 13, τοσοῦτῳ μείζονι ὥστε μὴ...ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ.] Transl. 'by an amount just so far larger as not to render'. Si voluisset Ar. 'so that we make our movements not more tardily', scripturus fuit ποιεῖσθαι.

5. 15, οὐδ' ἄλυσος καὶ πολυχρόνιος· οὐτ' ἄνευ] Quid si οὐδ' ἄλυσος καὶ πολυχρόνιος οὐκ ἄνευ...? Si vera lectio est, ἄλ. καὶ πολ. idem fere valet quod πολυχρονίως ἄλυσος, ut in Tac. XI Ann. 5, *continuis inde et saevius accusandis reis Suillius*.—[οὐτ'] Bekk. st. De οὐδὲ...οὐ vid. ad I 3. 8.

6. 24, Κορινθίους δ' οὐ μέμφεται τὸ Ἰλιον] Schneidewin Simonides Fragm. XCIV, p. 105, 106. "Schol. Vratislav. Pind. Olymp. xiii 78, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Σιμωνίδης εἶπε· Κορινθίοισι δ' οὐ μανίει τὸ Ἰλιον οὐδὲ Δαναοί· ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ σύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο. Codex Κορινθίοισιν οὐ μανιεῖ, omissis τὸ Ἰλιον, tum Δαναοίς, quae omnia restituit Boeckhlus. Numeri dissoluti. Plutarch. Dion. I. Vox μνίειν interpretationi cessit apud Aristot. Rhet. I 6."

7. 14, ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ] "So then I will conclude with the saying of Pindarus *optima res aqua*; not for the excellency but for the common use of it." BACON, *Speech Touching Purveyors*, vol. IV, p. 306, ed. MDCCXXX.

τὸ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει] "degrees of well-doing there could be none, except perhaps in the *seldomness* and *oftenness* of doing well." HOOKER, *Eccl. Pol.* I 8. 8, vol. I, p. 290, ed. Keble.

7. 21, ὁ κρίνειν ἂν ἢ (vel) κεκρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ (sapientes sive omnes sive quam plurimi; cf. II 23. 12) ἢ (aut) οἱ πλείους ἢ (aut) οἱ κράτιστοι.

7. 28, ἡ οὐς οὗτοι κρίνουσι] ἡ οὐς ἀποδέχονται II 22. 3; 23. 12.—Xen. Memor. IV 4. 16, Eur. Heracl. 197.

9. 2, Quintil. III 7. 6.

9. 38, ὁ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν] ὁ delet Bekk. ed. ult. Sed ὁ idem valet quod εἴ τι.

(δι') 'Ἀρμόδιον] δι' add. Vater. Bekk. ed. ult.

9. 38, συνήθειαν] Cicero Brut. 12. 48 (Ait Aristoteles) *Isocratem primo artem dicendi esse negavisse, scribere autem aliis solitum orationes, quibus in iudiciis uterentur.* Quid sibi velit Bekker ex uno Codice praeferens ἀσυνήθειαν, quum reliqui tres συνήθειαν praebeant, parum intelligo. Cf. III 13. 3. ["Jebb, *Attic Orators* II p. 68 note 2. Surely ἀσυνήθειαν is utterly inconsistent with III 13." Note in Shilleto's older copy of Rhet.]

9. 41, ἐχομένων] Cf. II 22. 11, 16.

11. 10, πεισθαι] ἐκπιόνται, II 20. 6. ["Lobeck. ad Phrynich. p. 31" u.s.]

11. 23, "Not only what is great strange or beautiful, but anything that is disagreeable when looked upon, pleases us in an apt description... for this reason therefore the description of a dunghill is pleasing to the imagination, if the image be represented to our minds by suitable expressions; though perhaps this may be more properly called the pleasure of the understanding than of the fancy, because we are not so much delighted with the image that is contained in the description, as with the aptness of the description to excite the image." ADDISON, *Spectator*, 418.

11. 8, ἡ δι' ἀπορίαν] ἡ <εἰ> δι' ἀπορίαν Bekk. st. sed in οἷς latet εἰ τι.

12. 23, προφάσεις δέεται μόνον ἢ πονηρία] Proverbii scriptor sic scripsisse videtur: δέεται προφάσεις μόνον ἢ πονηρία, vel τό τοι πονηρὸν προφάσεις δέεται μόνον.

12. 28, οἷς χαριούνται] "οὐς A exhibere Thurot *Rev. Arch.* IV 299 dicit." Spengel.

13. 12, ἀντενποιεῖν] ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν. [See Shilleto's article in *Journal of Philology* VII, No. xiii, p. 157].

14. 5, δεξιὰς πίστει] vide ne aut δεξιὰς πίστει (Eur. Med. 21 et ibi Porson) scribendum aut πίστει omittendum tanquam gloss. vocabuli δεξιὰς.

15. 12, οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κείσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι] II 25. 10. Thuc. IV. 73, Dem. Pantaen. p. 978 § 41.

15. 10, ἐφ' ὁποτέρου κ.τ.λ.] Cf. II 4. 32. *Suspensa et quo ducerentur inclinatura responderet*, Tac. XI Ann. 34.

15. 12, οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἔνεκα δικάζειν] Plat. Gorg. 454 C, τοῦ ἐξῆς ἔνεκα περαινέσθαι τὸν λόγον. Dem. de Coron. p. 267 § 120, τοῦ δὲ τῶν στεφανούντων ἔνεκα συμφέροντος.

15. 13, πρόσφατοι] vid. Lob. ad Phryn. p. 374, 375.

## BOOK II.

B I. 1, αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως]=οἱ κριταί, sive ἐκκλησιασταὶ sive δικασταί.

2. 5, ὁ ὑβρίζων—ἡσθῆ] I 13. 10, οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε πάντως ὑβρισεν· ἀλλ' εἰ ἔνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκείνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι.

3. 10, ἀδύνατον ἄμα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι] "My affright at his baleful aspect begins to abate, and my hatred to arise," Scott, *Kenilworth* ch. xix. "Under this iron domination scarce a complaint was heard;

for hatred was effectually kept down by terror," Macaulay, *Hist. Eng.* I p. 628.

3. 13, παύει...ὀργὴν...ληφθεῖσα τιμωρία πρότερον] 'I have little doubt of procuring a remission for you provided we can keep you out of the claws of justice till she has selected and gorged upon her victims; for in this, as in other cases, it will be according to the vulgar proverb, "First come, first served."' Scott, *Waverley* ch. LXII. "After the first storm there is naturally some compassion attends men like to be in misery." Clarendon, *Rebellion*, Book I p. 3 b. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἱ τελευταῖοι κρινόμενοι σώζονται· πεπαυμένοι γὰρ τῆς ὀργῆς αὐτῶν ἀκροάσθε, καὶ τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἥδη ἐθέλοντες ἀποδέχεσθε, Lysias XIX § 6 p. 152 St=166 R.

3. 17, αὐτοὺς...παρασκευάζουσι τοιοῦτους] αὐτοὺς i.e. τοὺς κριτάς. Cf. 9. 16. Quid sibi velit Bekkerianum αὐτούς, me quidem latet.

4. 18, εἰδότες (τὰ τῶν πλησίον κακὰ)] 'Who make themselves acquainted with.' Thus Plutarch II 73 G, ὁ δ' ἐγκείμενος αἰεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ πικρὸς καὶ ἀτερπής, καὶ πάντα γινώσκων καὶ πολυπραγμονῶν [from Shilleto's older copy].

4. 27, οἷς θαρρόμεν] οὗς MS A°. Spengel. Ego diu conieceram.

4. 31, ὁ μισὼν] Ennius 379, *quem metuiunt, oderunt: quem quisque odit, perisisse expletit*. Ovid II Amor. 2, 10, *quem metuit quisque perisisse cupit*.

4. 32, ἄγειν] I 15. 10.

5. 17, ἡ πλείους...ἡ κρείττους...ἡ ἄμφω] vid. ad 12. 6.

6. 10, πάντα: vid. ad 9. 3.

6. 20, τοὺς πρώτον δεσθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται] Plato Sophist. 217 C, μὴ τοῖνον, ὃ ξένη, ἡμῶν τῇ γε πρώτῃν αἰτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρηνηθῆς γένη. Hinc explicandus locus Aristoph. in Nub. 1215, ἀλλὰ κρείττον ἦν εὐθύς τότε ἀπερυσθῆσαι i.e. μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὸν δεσθέντα.

7. 6, ἀχαριστεῖν] τέτακται μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον πρὸς τοὺς εὐ παθόντας, ὅταν μὴ βούλωνται χάριν ἐκτίνειν τοῖς εὐ πεποιηκόσιν. ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι μὴ θελόντων χρῶνται τῷ ἀχαριστεῖν, Bekk. Anecd. 218, 9. Plat. Symp. 186 c.

8. 6, οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι] Shakesp. *K. Lear* v 3. 231.

9. 2, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις πράττουσι κακῶς συνάχθεσθαι] Soph. Electr. 237, πῶς ἐπὶ τοῖς φθιμένοις ἀμελεῖν καλόν;

9. 3, ἅπασιν] all who possess these two feelings (νέμεσις and φθόνος). Cf. Politic. III 9. 1, τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες (all who uphold either form of government) γὰρ ἀπτονται δικαίου τινός. πάντα = πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 6. 10.

9. 4, τοὺς πατραλοῖας...ὅταν...τύχῳσι...οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθεῖ χρηστός] vid. nos ad Aristoph. Av. 652. ["ἐστὶν λεγόμενον δὴ τι τὴν ἀλώπεχ' ὡς φλαύρως ἐκοινωρήσεν ἀετῷ ποτέ. Accusativus *anticipatus* non solum post verba activa ponitur, sed neutralia (ut καὶ καταγελάς νιν ὡς ἐνεργάφῃ Διὸς μῆρῷ, Eur. Bacch. 286), deponentia quae intransitiva sunt (ut Πάνακτον ἐδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως παραδώσουσι Thuc. v 36), passiva (ut praeter h. l. Dem. I Aphob. p. 826 § 47, ἐγγέγραπτο...τὸν οἶκον ὅπως μισθώσοιτο. Xen. Cyrop. II 1. 5, τοὺς Ἕλληνας οὐδέν πω σαφές λέγεται εἰ ἔπονται. Aristot. Rhet. II 9. 4....); audacius post adiectiva ut infra 1269, δεινὸν γε τὸν κήρυκα...εἰ μὴδέποτε νοστήσει πάλιν. Nec alia est ratio loci Platonici τοῦτον οὖν τὸν μύθον ὅπως ἂν πεισθεῖεν ἔχεις τινα μηχανήν; III Rep. p. 415 c. Madv. Gr. Synt. citat

Xen. Anab. II 1. 5, § 159, Anm. 4." Transcribed from *adv.* on Aristoph. l.c.].

9. 5, φθονερός] Plat. Phileb. 48 B, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γ' ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

10. 11, ἀξιούμενοι] 'for whom a claim is put in.' Vid. nos ad Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 293.

12. 6, ἄμφω ταῦτα] i.e. φιλότιμοι, φιλόνοικοι. Vid. ad Plat. Phil. p. 37 C. ["Plat. Theaet. p. 154 B, εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, i.e. μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμόν. Aristot. Nic. Eth. I 9=8, 13, καθ' αὐτὰς ἂν εἴεν αἱ καθ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδέϊαι· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, i.e. ἡδύ, ἀγαθόν, καλόν. Rhetor. II 12. 6, καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι, i.e. φιλότιμοι, φιλόνοικοι, 5. 17, ἢ ἐὰν πλείους ὦσιν οἷς ταῦτα συμφέρει, ἢ κρείττους, ἢ ἄμφω." From Shilleto's copy of Badham's *Philebus*, l.c.].

16. 2, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι] Δαϊφάρνης δέ τις ἦν σολοικότερος ἄνθρωπος τῷ τρόπῳ, Xen. Cyrop. VIII 3. 21.

18. 3, πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ περὶ τοῦ δυνάτου καὶ ἀδυνάτου προσχρήσθαι] Vide ne ἀναγκαῖα (aut τὰ) Ar. scripserit. In I 3. 4, προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀναμνησκόντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες accusativus cum participiis coniungitur. In Xenoph. Agesil. XI 11, καὶ τὸ μεγαλόφρον (τῷ μεγαλόφρονι Schneider) οὐ σὺν ὕβρει ἀλλὰ σὺν γνώμῃ ἐχρήτο.

19. 21, εἰ ἐπείρασε, καὶ ἔπραξε] 'if he courted, he also succeeded.'

19. 24, συννεφεῖ] συννέφει Cobet, Var. L. p. 134.

21. 13, τὰ δεδημοσιευμένα] Vid. Thucyd. III 113. 13, IV 92. 4. δημοσιεύειν, publicare, Xen. Hellen. I 7. 10.

21. 14, ἄγαν...ἄγαν] 'in excess,' ut servetur ὁ παραλογισμός.

22. 3, τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὖς ἀποδέχονται] 23. 12, *σύμψα* I 7. 28, ἢ οἱ κρίνοντες ἢ οὖς οὗτοι κρίνουσι.

22. 3, λετέον=λέγειν δεῖ, itaque postea εἶναι...συνάγειν.

22. 8, συμβουλευόντες δέ] potuit addere (post δέ) ἢ ἀποτρέποντες. Cf. I 3. 6, II 18. 4. Vid. nos ad Plat. Protag. 331 E. ["Minus negligenter scripsit, nam συμβουλευόμεν ἢ προτρέποντες ἢ ἀποτρέποντες, quanquam alibi (e. g. I 3. 6, II 18. 4) συμβουλεύειν opponitur ἀποτρέπειν." Extracted from a long note on Protag. l.c. [τὸ ἀνύμοιον ἢ] τὸ ὁμοιον.]

22. 11, ἔχεται] passivum est ut § 16.

23. 6, προεῖτο] Plat. Gorg. p. 520 C, καὶ προεῖσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνεν μισθοῦ...εἰ προεῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης. D, ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προεῖσθαι. Xenoph. Anab. VII 7. 47, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι σοὶ δόξει ἀποδοῦναι πιστεύω καὶ τὸν χρόνον διδάξει σε, καὶ αὐτὸν γέ σε οὐχὶ ἀνέξεισθαι τοὺς σοὶ προεμένους εὐεργεσίαν δρῶντά σοι ἐγκαλοῦντας.

23. 7, τοῦτό τις ἂν εἴπειεν] τις εἴπειεν Bekk. ἂν εἴπειεν A.· ἂν ἀντεῖπειεν?

23. 20, οὐχ ἵνα κτάνωσι] κάνωσι Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 391, "καὶ τυφλῷ δῆλον legendum esse κάνωσι, ne senarius in prima sede habeat creticum." Quidni οὐκ \* \* | ἵνα κτάνωσι κ.τ.λ.

25. 10, ἂν οὕτως ἐλύθη] ἂν οὕτως ἐλύθη. Cf. infra ἂν λύση.

### BOOK III.

Γ 1. 6, φαντασία] Gataker ad Antonin. I § 7, p. 8.

2. 3, ἢ περὶ [λίαν] μικρῶν] 'or if one speak about very trivial matters.'

2. 8, οὐκ ἔστιν] Cf. Ethic. Nicom. III 1. 8, *ἐνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖν*.

2. 13, ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον] Quintil. X 1. 6, *cum sint aliis alia aut magis propria*.

3. 4, *ἐναιμα*] Lob. ad Phryn. p. 375 (*ἄναιμα* 3 codd. Bekkeriani). *χλωρὸν αἷμα* Soph. Trach. 1055, *decolorem* Cicero vertit Tusc. II 8. 20. Sed vid. Eur. Hecub. 129.

3. 4, *ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων*] Dem. Philipp. 41 § 5 ad q. l. Sauppilus citat de Rhod. Libert. p. 193 § 12 et locum nostrum. Errat Hemsterh. ad Lucian. Nigrin. 23, Tom. I p. 63. Eadem sententia est quae in Taciti Annal. XIV 57 et XVI 22. *φρούριον ἐτειχίσθη Ἀταλάντη* (Thuc. II 32); itaque *Ἀταλάντην ἐπιτείχισμα τῆς Λοκρίδος* appellat Diodor. XII 44.

5. 4, *πότε*] Dem. de fals. leg. § 260.

7. 7, *γάρ*] Eth. Nic. v. 10=8. 3 πολλὰ γάρ.

9. 8, *ἐλθόντες ὡς ὑμᾶς*] *εἰσελθόντες δ' εἰς* Cobet Var. Lect. p. 358. Si aequae *ἐν ὑμῖν* (i. e. *τοῖς δικασταῖς* Aphob. I. 813 § 1) et *παρ' ὑμῖν* § 2, et I contr. Stephan. 1101 § 1, alibi, dicitur; quidni aequae dicatur *εἰς ὑμᾶς* et *ὡς ὑμᾶς*? Vide etiam ne *ἐλθόντες* possit defendi Aphob. l. c. *εἰς δ' ὑμᾶς τοὺς οὐδὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀκριβῶς ἐπισταμένους ἐλήλυθεν*.

11. 6, *θράττει σε*] Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 655 "Quid igitur erat quod diceret quum *θράττει σε* videretur dicere? Nempe *Θράττης εἰ*, e Thressa natus es, ut satis Aristoteles ipse confirmat addens, *εἰ μὴ...εἶναι*."

11. 13, *μύωπα*] *luscitiosum* (Gell. IV 2). Arist. XXXI Probl. 8, *διὰ τί οἱ μύωπες μικρὰ γράμματα γράφουσι; ἀποπον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὀξὺ ὀρώντας ποτεῖν ἔργον ὀξὺ ὀρώντων· πότερον ὅτι μέγαλα φαίνεται τὰ μικρὰ ἐὰν ᾗ ἐγγύς· οἱ δὲ προσάγοντες γράφουσιν; ἢ διὰ τὸ συνάγοντας τὰ βλέφαρα γράφειν;* cf. 15 et 16... [From Shilleto's older copy].

11. 14, *ὁ Καρπάβιος...τὸν γλαῶ*] "In Iceland, the reindeer were introduced by the Danish Government about the middle of the last century; but they are understood to have proved a nuisance instead of a benefit. They have not the wolf to check the tendency of their population to exceed the means of subsistence, and they have multiplied so as to devour the summer pastures on which the inhabitants depend for their cattle; and having been allowed to run wild they are of no use." Laing, *Norway* p. 418.

14. 6, *κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που*] *Ἀν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προίοντι γέ που?*

19. 1, *ἐπιχαλκεύει*] "auditoris animum sibi conformare et conciliare," —velut "incude formare." [From Shilleto's older copy.]



## GREEK INDEX

### TO TEXT AND NOTES.

The references are to Book, Chapter, and Section.

α 2. 4<sup>n</sup> refers specially to the *note* ;

β 7. 4n<sup>1</sup> indicates the *notes in small print* at the foot of the page.

ap. for *apud* denotes words and phrases *quoted by* Aristotle.

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ἀνομολογούμενα	β 22. 15 <sup>n</sup> ; 23. 23 (his)	ἀνύειν	γ 9. 3
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ἀπλῶς		ἀποτροπή	α 3. 3
α 2. 4 <sup>n</sup> ; 15; 6. 1; 7. 21, 22; β 18. 1; 19. 26		ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι	β 5. 14; 6. 27
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ἀπλῶς (opp. το αὐτῷ)	α 7. 35	ἀποφαίνονται	β 21. 9
ἀπλῶς (opp. το αὐτῷ)	α 15. 12	ἀπόφανσις	β 21. 2, 15
ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν	α 13. 14	ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφασις	α 8. 2
ἀπο- and <i>de</i> -, verbs compounded with,	α 1. 1 p. 3	ἀπόφησιν	γ 11. 7
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ἀποβαίνοντα	α 7. 17; β 6. 14	ἀποφθέγματα	β 21. 8; γ 11. 6
ἀποβαλεῖν ἀσπίδα	β 6. 3	ἀπόχρη	γ 1. 2
τῶν κακῶν ἀποβολάς	α 6. 4	ἀπράγμονας	β 4. 10
ἀποδεικτικός (λόγος)	β 1. 2	ἀπρέπεια	β 6. 2
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ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ ἐνθύμημα	α 1. 11	ἐν Ἀργεὶ ζημιούται δι' ὃν ἂν νόμος τεθῇ	α 14. 4
ἀποδέξαιτ' ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος	β 21. 15	ὥσπερ ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής	α 15. 7
ἀποδέχονται	β 13. 16; 23. 12	ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ	α 1. 5
ἀποδίδομεν	β 9. 2	ἀρετὴ (defined)	α 9. 4
ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις	α 2. 5	ἀρετή	β 1. 5

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περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας	a 9. 1	πρὸς ἀσωτίαν	β 14. 2
τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετὰς	a 5. 4	τὸν ἀσῶτον ἐλευθέριον	a 9. 29
περαίνεται ἀριθμῷ πάντα	γ 8. 2	ἀτασθαλίαν	αφ. γ 3. 2
Ἄριστείδην	β 23. 7; γ 14. 3	ἀτέλεστος	γ 18. 1
Ἄριστιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα	β 23. 12	(ἀτεχνοὶ πίστεις) νόμοι μάρτυρες συν-	
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ἀριστοκρατία	a 8. 4	ἀτέχνων	a 5. 17
ἀριστοκρατίας τέλος	a 8. 5	περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστειν	a 15. 1
ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ	αφ. a 7. 14	ἀτεχνότερον	γ 1. 7
Ἄριστοφάνης	γ 2. 15	ἀτιμάζειν	β 2. 6
Ἄριστοφῶν	β 23. 7	ἀτίμητος	β 2. 6
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ἁρμονία τῆς φωνῆς	γ 1. 4	ἀτιμότητος	β 24. 2
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τὸ ἁρμόττον	β 9. 11	ἄτοπον	a 1. 12
ἄρρυθμον	γ 8. 1	ἄτρωτος ('invulnerable')	β 22. 12
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ἄρρωσθήματα	a 12. 6	Ἄττικὰ φιδίτια	γ 10. 7g
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ἀρχαῖοπλοῦτοι	β 9. 9	ἀτυχήματα (def.)	a 13. 16
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ἀρχή	a 7. 12*	αὐθαδὲς	γ 3. 3
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ἀστεία	γ 10. 1	αὐταρκέστατος	a 5. 4
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 τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν β 2. 1 p. 11<sup>n</sup>; αὐτοὶ γ 1. 3  
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 γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων γ 5. 5  
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γίρα	α 5. 9	δὲ ἰν ἀφ' ὁδοῦ	α 1. 11"
τῶν γερόντων	β 23. 11	δειγνύμενον	α 2. 17
τὰ γευστὰ	α 11. 5	δεδηγμένον	γ 11. 13
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αἱ γλῶτται ἀγνώτες	γ 10. 2	δεινὸν...ἐλευθὸν	β 8. 12
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γνησιότης ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν	α 5. 5	δείνωσις	β 21. 10; γ 16. 7; 19. 3
γνώθι σαυτὸν	αβ. β 21. 13	(τόπος) τὸ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν	β 24. 4
γνώμη (μέρος ἐνθυμήματος)	β 20. 1	δέλτου πολυθύρου	αβ. γ 6. 4
γνώμη (def.)	β 21. 2, 15	δεξιά	α 14. 5
γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη	α 15. 5; 12, 17	τὸ μὴ δεόμενον	α 7. 11
γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη κρίνειν	β 25. 10	δι' οὗς τὸ δεσποτήριον ἐκδομήθη	α 14. 4
γνώμῃς χρηστέον	γ 17. 9	δῆλον δὲ	β 25. 14
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γνωμολογίας πέρι	β 21. 1	δημηγορικὴ	γ 12. 1
γνωμοτύποι	β 21. 9	δημηγορικὴ λέξις	γ 12. 5
Γοργίας	γ 1. 9; 3. 1, 4; 7. 11; 14. 2; 18. 7	Δημοκράτης	γ 4. 3
Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον	γ 14. 12	δημοκρατία	α 8. 4
Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα	γ 3. 4	δημοκρατία ἤξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν	α 4. 12
τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα	γ 11. 6	δημοκρατίας τέλος	α 8. 5
γραφία	γ 8. 6	Δημόκριτος ὁ Σίσιος	γ 9. 6
γραφική	α 11. 23	Δημοσθένους εἰς τὸν δῆμον	γ 4. 3
γραφικὴ λέξις	γ 12. 1, 2 α	ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη	β 23. 3
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γραφόμενοι λόγοι	γ 1. 7	διὰ β 7. 3; διὰ τοῦ λόγου	β 22. 10
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οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω	αβ. γ 17. 16	διὰ μέσων	γ 10. 7 κ
γυμνάζεσθαι	γ 10. 2	δι' εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν	β 25. 10
τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαῦλα	α 5. 6	δι' δ...τὴν αἰτίαν	α 1. 2
δεδοῦχος	γ 2. 10	ὡς πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα διαβάλλονται	γ 2. 4
τὸ δαιμόνιον	β 23. 8; γ 18. 2	διαβεβλημένος	α 12. 22; β 3. 13
δακτύλιον	α 13. 14	ἐν τῇ ἐπιλόγῃ διαβλητόν	γ 14. 7
Δαλογενὲς	αβ. γ 8. 6	διαβεβαιούνται οὐδὲν	β 13. 1
δανεῖζεσθαι	β 6. 7; 23. 23	διαβολή	α 1. 4; β 4. 30
δάπαναι τῆς πόλεως	α 4. 8	λυτέον πρῶτον τὴν διαβολὴν	γ 14. 7
δαπανήματα	α 4. 8	διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν	γ 15. 9
δεδαπάνηται	α 6. 22	περὶ διαβολῆς	γ 15. 1
Δαρεῖος	β 20. 3	διαγράφειν	β 1. 9
περὶ δὲ τούτων	α 4. 3		



διάθερμοι	β 12. 8	διαφωνεῖν	β 23. 3
διάθεσις εὐπορος	α 12. 8	διαψεύδονται	β 1. 5
διαθέσεως	α 11. 2	διδασκαλία	α 1. 12; γ 1. 6
διαθέσεις	β 2. 11	διδασκαλική	α 2. 1
διαίρεσις	α 7. 31	διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ	β 23. 18
(τύπος) ἐκ διαίρέσεως	β 23. 10	διδόασι	α 1. 10
διαρετέον	α 2. 22; 3. 9	διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις	β 1. 9
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διελεῖν	α 8. 1	διεσπᾶσθαι	β 8. 10
διηρημένων	β 1. 7	διήγησις	α 1. 9; γ 13. 3, 5; 16. 1
δαίτα...δίκη	α 13. 19	διηκρίβωται ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς	α 8. 7
ὁ δαιτηγὴς τὸ ἐπεικὲς ὀρᾷ	α 13. 19	διήρηται (δῖς)	β 14. 3
δαιτηγὴς καὶ βωμὸς ταῦτόν	αβ. γ 11. 5	διηρημένη (λέξις)	γ 9. 7
διακατερουῖντες	α 15. 26	διελεῖν	α 4. 7; 8. 1
διακόπτεσθαι	γ 9. 4	διηρημένων	β 1. 7
διακριβοῦν	α 8. 7	διθυράμβων προοίμια	γ 14. 5
διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη	α 4. 4	διθυράμβοις	γ 9. 1
διαλεκτικός	α 1. 14	διθυραμβοποιῖς	γ 3. 3; 12. 2
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τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου	γ 2. 5	δι᾽σχυρίζονται	β 12. 14
διαλύειν	β 4. 32	δίκαιος κολασθῆναι	α 14. 3
διαλύειν τὸ σαφές	γ 3. 3	τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον	α 6. 16
διαλύοι τὰληθῇ	α 15. 26	δικαιοπραγεῖν	α 13. 3
διαλύονται ἐπὶ μικρῷ	α 12. 25	δικαιοσύνη (def.)	α 9. 7
διαλυθέντα	γ 4. 3	δικαίωμα	α 3. 9; 13. 1, 3
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τὴν διάνοιαν μὴ τὸν λόγον	α 13. 17	δικανική	γ 12. 1
τὼν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν	β 26. 5	δικανική (λέξις) ἀκριβεστέρα	γ 12. 5
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διαπτυχαί	αβ. γ 6. 4	δικαστής	α 1. 7
διαριθμοῦντα	α 13. 13	δικαστὴς βραβευτὴς τοῦ δικαίου	α 15. 24
διαριθμήσασθαι ἀκριβῶς	α 4. 4	πρὸς τὸν δικαστὴν	α 1. 4
διασειῶν ταῖν χερσίν	αβ. γ 16. 10	δίκη ἱσσις	α 14. 2
διασιζῶν	αβ. γ 16. 10	δίκης μέρος	α 3. 3
διαστιζαί	γ 5. 6	δίκην ἔχειν	β 3. 5
τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν	α 1. 5	δοῦναι δίκην (submit to trial)	β 23. 12
διατράγειν	β 24. 6	δικολογεῖν	α 1. 11
διατριβή	β 6. 20	ὁ τελώνης Διομέδων	β 23. 3
διατριβάς	γ 17. 10	ὁ Διομήδης προεἰλητο Ὀδυσσέα	β 23. 20
διατρίβειν	α 11. 28; 12. 5; β 2. 2	Διομήδην	β 22. 12
διατριπτέον	γ 16. 6	Διονυσιάκου ἀγῶνος	γ 15. 8
διὰ τύχην	β 10. 7	Διονύσιος	α 2. 19; 6. 27
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διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν	α 12. 8	Διονύσιος (quilibet)	β 24. 5
διαφορὰν	γ 13. 5	Διόνυσος ὁ χαλκοῦς	γ 2. 11
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Διοπεΐθει	β 8. 11	ἐγγίγνεσθαι	β 11. 7
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   pressing tendency or liability to, β 4. 13<sup>n</sup>  
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ἐπισκευάζων	α 4. 6	ἐρυθροδάκτυλος ἡώς	γ 2. 13
ἐπισκοτεῖν	γ 3. 3	ἐρυθρόν	γ 11. 15
ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει	α 1. 7	περὶ ἐρωτήσεως	γ 18. 1
ἐπιστήμη ἀφωρισμένη	α 1. 1	ἔρως	Appendix (A) vol. I p. 293
κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην	α 1. 14	ἔρωτος ἀρχή	α 11. 11
ἐπιστήμαι	β 19. 8	ἐσθῆτας τῶν πεπονθότων	β 8. 16
ἐπιστητόν	β 24. 10; γ 17. 10	περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου	β 19. 23
ἐπισυστελλόμενον	γ 2. 3	ἐσπουδασμένα παιδιαί	α 11. 15
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ἐπιτεινόμεναι	α 4. 12"	10. 3; β 3. 2; 4. 1; 5. 1; 6. 2; 7. 2;	
ἐπιτείχισμα νόμων	αβ. γ 3. 4	8. 2	
ἐλλιπὴ ἐπιτελεῖν	α 11. 22	ἐταιρεία	β 4. 28
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ἐπιτηδεύοντες ταῦτά	β 4. 21	εὐ ποιῇ	γ 2. 6
ἐπιτηροῦσιν δίκην	α 12. 5	Εὐαγόρας	β 23. 12
ἐπιτηρεῖν δίκην	α 12. 25	εὐαλαζόνευτα	β 15. 2
τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέλας ἡδύ	α 11. 27	εὐανάνωστος	γ 5. 6
ἐπιτιμήσεως	α 1. 12	εὐανάνωστος (λέξις)	γ 9. 5
ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς θεοῖς	α 15. 31	εὐβάστακτα	α 12. 34
ἐπιτρίτων τόκων	αβ. γ 10. 7e	Εὐβουλος	α 15. 15

εὐγενής...γενεῖον	β 15. 3	εὐλαβούμενον	γ 3. 7
εὐγένεια	α 5. 5	εὐλόγιστοι	β 8. 4
εὐγενείας ἥθος	β 15. 2	εὐμαθής ( <i>bis</i> )	γ 9. 3
εὐγηρία	α 5. 15	εὐμαθῇ	γ 19. 4
εὐγηρως	α 5. 15	εὐμάθεια	α 6. 15
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εὐδοκιμεῖ τὰ ἐλεγκτικά τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων	β 23. 30	εὐνοια	β 1. 5
εὐδοκιμοῦντα	γ 10. 1	ταῖς εὐνομούμεναις (τῶν πολέων)	α 1. 4
εὐδοκιμοῦντι νόμφ	α 15. 9	Εὐξένφ γεωμετρεῖν οὐκ ἐπισταμένφ	γ 4. 3
εὐδόκιμοι	β 4. 11	περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως	γ 7. 2
εὐδοξία	α 5. 8	εὐπαρακολουθητον	α 2. 13
εὐέλεγκτα	γ 17. 15	εὐπαρόρμητοι	β 2. 10
εὐέλπιδι	β 1. 4	εὐπιστατοι	β 12. 7
εὐέλπιδες	β 12. 8, 9	τὸ εὐποητικὸν ἡδύ	α 11. 22
εὐεξαπάτητοι	β 12. 8	εὐποητικὸς τῶν ἄλλων	β 2. 25; 4. 8
εὐεπακολουθητον	α 2. 13	εὐποητικὸς εἰς χρήματα	β 4. 8
εὐεργασία	α 5. 9	εὐπορήσομεν	β 26. 5
εὐεργετήματα	α 9. 19	εὐπραγαί	α 9. 19
εὐεργετήματα	α 9. 20	εὐρηται καὶ κατασκευάσθη (perf. and aor. combined)	α 9. 38 <sup>n</sup>
εὐεργετική δύναμις	α 9. 4	Εὐριπίδης	γ 2. 5; 14. 6
εὐεργετικῆς δόξης	α 5. 9	Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα	γ 15. 8
εὐήθεις...κακοήθεις	β 12. 7 <sup>n</sup>	Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις	β 6. 20
εὐήθη	γ 1. 9; 12. 2	Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβη	β 23. 29
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εὐθεώρητα	α 15. 25	εὐρυθμος λέξις	γ 8. 7
εὐθηνία κτημάτων	α 5. 3	εὐρυσμῶν αἰθῆρ	αφ. α 13. 2
Εὐθυδήμου λόγος	β 24. 3	ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν εὐσεβῶν	γ 12. 3
εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ἀτυχίαις	β 2. 20	εὐστοχος	γ 11. 5
Εὐθυνος	β 19. 14	εὐσυλλογιστότερα	α 1. 12
εὐθύνας διδῶσιν	γ 10. 7 <sup>n</sup>	εὐσύνθετος λόγος	γ 3. 3
εὐθύνας δοῦναι ( <i>dis</i> )	γ 10. 7 <sup>b</sup>	μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον	γ 9. 3
εὐθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία	γ 10. 7 <sup>n</sup>	εὐσύνοπτον	γ 12. 5
εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας	γ 18. 6	εὐσχήμων βαρύτης	β 17. 4
εὐθύς	α 10. 10; 11. 15	εὐτεκνία	α 5. 4, 5
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εὐκαιρως χρῆσθαι	γ 7. 8	εὐτελῇ ὀνόματα καὶ πράγματα	γ 7. 2
εὐκατάλλακτος	β 4. 17	εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις	β 12. 16
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εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργήν	β 2. 11, 12	εὐτυχήματα	α 5. 17
εὐκολοι	β 4. 12	εὐτυχία	α 5. 4, 17; β 17. 5
Εὐκτῆμων	α 14. 3	εὐφραστος	γ 5. 6
εὐλαβεῖς	α 12. 19	εὐφνεῖς	α 6. 29
τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον	α 9. 28	εὐφνᾷ γένη	β 15. 3
εὐλαβεῖται	α 12. 6	εὐφνοῦς	γ 10. 1

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ὁσμήν [εὐωδίας]	a 11. 5	ἡδὺ μεμνησθαι πόνων	αβ. a 11. 8
ἐφαρμόττειν	a 15. 10	τὸ ἡδύ	γ 2. 8
ἐφεξῆς a 7. 1; β 15. 10; γ 16. 1, 2; 17. 6		ἡδὺν ἰδεῖν	a 5. 11
ἔφεςις	β 4. 31 n <sup>3</sup>	ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι	a 6. 7
ἐφιεμένους	β 10. 6	ἡδέα	a 11. 8
πάντα ἐφίεται τὰ ζῶα τῆς ἡδόνης	a 6. 7	τῶν ἡδέων	a 11. 22
ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου	αβ. γ 10. 7 c	τῶν ἡδέων (τι)	a 11. 4"
ἐφορία	γ 18. 6	ἡδεσθαι	a 11. 6
ἐφ' ὑμῖν	a 4. 3	ἡδιον	a 7. 23
ἔχεσθαι ταῖς δίψαις	a 11. 10	(τι) τῶν ἡδίστων	a 11. 16
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ἐχόμενος	γ 8. 4	ἡθος (τί ποιεῖ)	γ 16. 8
ἔχθρα...ὀργή	β 4. 31	ἡθος ἔχοντες λόγοι	β 21. 16
ἔχθρας (ποιητικά)	β 4. 30	ἡθει τοῦ λέγοντος (note on ἡθος and	
ἔχθρους τιμωρεῖσθαι	a 9. 24	πάθος)	a 2. 3
τοὺς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροῦς	β 4. 7	ἡθ, three kinds of, notes on, a 8.6; γ 7.6	
ὁ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν	a 6. 24	ἡθους	a 2. 4
ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα	β 21. 11	ἡθικῇ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις	γ 7. 6
ἐχῖνος	β 20. 6	ἡθικῇ πίστις	a 2. 3
		ἡθικῇ λέξις	γ 7. 1
ζῆλος (def.)	β 11. 1	ἡθικοὶ λόγοι (διὰ τίνων γίνονται)	
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ζηλοῦσθαι	β 4. 24	ἡθικῶς	γ 17. 12
ζηλωτοί	β 11. 5	τὸν ἡλίθιον χρηστόν	a 9. 28
ζηλωτά	β 11. 4	ἡλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει	αβ. a 11. 25
ζηλωταί, θαυμασταί,	β 6. 24	ἡλικες	β 6. 12
ζηλωτικοί	β 11. 1, 3	ἡλικαίαι	β 2. 11; 12. 2
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ζῆν ἀφ' ἐτέρων	β 4. 9	τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ	β 13. 8
πρὸς ἄλλον	a 9. 28	ἡμόλιος	γ 8. 4
πρὸς τὸ σύμφερον	β 13. 9	κατὰ τὸ ἡμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονεοῦσιν	a 5. 6
πρὸς τὸ καλόν	β 14. 2	ἡμωβελία	a 14. 1
τῇ ἐλπίδι	β 12. 8	ἦν (was defined to be) a 6. 23; 7. 7, 8, 28;	
τῷ ἡθει	β 12. 12	β 7. 5; 13. 15; γ 2. 6	
τῇ μνήμῃ	β 13. 12	ἡνεκέως	αβ. a 13. 2
κατὰ λογισμόν	β 13. 14	ἡνεμοεῖς λόφος	αβ. γ 6. 7
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Ζήνωνι	a 12. 10	Ἡρακλείδων	β 22. 6
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		ἡρεμήσις ὀργῆς	β 3. 2
ἦ alternative, prefixed to interrogative sentences,	β 6. 27	Ἡρόδοτος (II 30)	γ 16. 5
ἦδη	a 1. 7 (bis)"; 6. 22, 24; β 2. 12; 6. 12 (bis)	Ἡροδοτοῦ Θουρίου	γ 9. 2"
		ὁ ἡρῶς (ῥυθμός) σεμένους	γ 8. 4
ἦδη διαφέρει	a 10. 11	ἡρρώστηκεν	a 12. 6
		ἦττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν	β 24. 11



- βέλτιστος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ *αῤ.* α 11. 28  
 τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν β 2. 1 p. 11<sup>n</sup>; αὐτοὶ γ 1. 3  
 αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν α 7. 3; αὐτῷ...αὐτῷ α 7.35  
 αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ τέκνα α 11. 26  
 ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου α 1. 2  
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 ἀφαίρεσθαι τὸν συλλογισμόν β 21. 2  
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 ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ β 25. 4  
 τὸ ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου μείζον α 7. 14  
 ἀφιλότιμοι β 9. 15  
 τὰ ἀφροδίσια β 12. 3  
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 ἀφύλακτοι α 12. 21  
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 πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους *αῤ.* γ 3. 3  
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 βούλεται (of tendency or aspiration)  
 β 23. 7<sup>n</sup>  
 βουλευέσας...βουλευσάμεντος α 7. 13  
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 τοῦ δικαίου βραβευτῆς ὁ δικαστῆς α 15. 24  
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 γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων γ 5. 5  
 τρία γένη τῶν λόγων α 3. 3  
 γενναϊότατος ὁ βέλτιστος β 23. 8

γέρα	α 5. 9	δὲ <i>in aphodosi</i>	α 1. 11 <sup>a</sup>
τῶν γερόντων	β 23. 11	δεδειγμένον	α 2. 17
τὰ γευστά	α 11. 5	δεδηγμένον	γ 11. 13
γεωμετρία	α 2. 1	δεδημοσιευμένα	β 21. 13
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γίγνεσθαι...εἶναι	β 7. 4n <sup>1</sup>	δειλὸς	α 10. 4
γενέσθαι...εἶναι	α 4. 2 <sup>a</sup>	δειλότεροι μᾶλλον	β 8. 4
γλῶτται	γ 2. 5; 3. 2, 3	δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια	α 12. 31
αἱ γλῶτται ἀγνώτες	γ 10. 2	δεινὸν...ἐλλεινὸν	β 8. 12
Γλαύκων ὁ Τήσιος	γ 1. 3	δεινούς· εἰπεῖν ἢ πράξαι	α 12. 24
γνησιότης ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν	α 5. 5	δείνωσις	β 21. 10; γ 16. 7; 19. 3
γνώθι σαυτὸν	αβ. β 21. 13	(τόπος) τὸ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν	β 24. 4
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γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη κρίνειν	β 25. 10	δὲ οὗς τὸ δεσμοτήριον ἐκδομήθη	α 14. 4
γνώμῃς χρηστέον	γ 17. 9	δῆλον δὲ	β 25. 14
γνομῶν	β 26. 5	ὁ Δημάδης	β 24. 8
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γνομτύποι	β 21. 9	δημηγορικὴ	γ 12. 1
Γοργίας		δημηγορικὴ λέξις	γ 12. 5
γ 1. 9; 3. 1, 4; 7. 11; 14. 2; 18. 7		δημοκρατίας	γ 4. 3
Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον	γ 14. 12	δημοκρατία	α 8. 4
Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα	γ 3. 4	δημοκρατία ἤξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν	α 4. 12
τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα	γ 11. 6	δημοκρατίας τέλος	α 8. 5
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γραφικὴ	α 11. 23	Δημοσθένους εἰς τὸν δῆμον	γ 4. 3
γραφικὴ λέξις	γ 12. 1, 2 α	ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη	β 23. 3
γραφικῶν	γ 12. 2	Δημοσθένους πολιτεῖαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν	
γραφόμενοι λόγοι	γ 1. 7	αἰτίαν	αβ. β 24. 8
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τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαῦλα	α 5. 6	δι' εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν	β 25. 10
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δαλογενής	αβ. γ 8. 6	ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῃ διαβλητέον	γ 14. 7
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Δαρείος	β 20. 3	περὶ διαβολῆς	γ 15. 1
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διαίρεσις	α 7. 31	διδόναί γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ	β 23. 18
(τόπος) ἐκ διαίρέσεως	β 23. 10	διδόασι	α 1. 10
διαιρετέον	α 2. 22; 3. 9	διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις	β 1. 9
διαιρούμενα μείζω	α 7. 31	διειλέχθαι	α 13. 9
διελεῖν	α 8. 1	διεσπᾶσθαι	β 8. 10
διηρημένων	β 1. 7	διήγησις	α 1. 9; γ 13. 3, 5; 16. 1
δαίτα... δίκη	α 13. 19	δικηκρίβωται ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς	α 8. 7
ὁ δαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπικεικὲς ὁρᾷ	α 13. 19	διηρηται (βίς)	β 14. 3
δαιτητὴς καὶ βωμὸς ταύτων ἀρ. γ 11. 5		διηρημένη (λέξις)	γ 9. 7
διακαρτεροῦντες	α 15. 26	διελεῖν	α 4. 7; 8. 1
διακόπτεσθαι	γ 9. 4	διηρημένων	β 1. 7
διακριβούν	α 8. 7	διθυράμβων προοίμια	γ 14. 5
διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἶδη	α 4. 4	διθυράμβοις	γ 9. 1
διαλεκτικὸς	α 1. 14	διθυραμβοποιοῖς	γ 3. 3; 12. 2
διάλεκτος	γ 1. 9	διῆναι	β 23. 6
τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου	γ 2. 5	διῆσχυρίζονται	β 12. 14
διαλύειν	β 4. 32	δίκαιος κολασθῆναι	α 14. 3
διαλύειν τὸ σαφές	γ 3. 3	τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον	α 6. 16
διαλῦοι τᾷληθῇ	α 15. 26	δικαιοπραγεῖν	α 13. 3
διαλύονται ἐπὶ μικρῷ	α 12. 25	δικαιοσύνη (def.)	α 9. 7
διαλυθέντα	γ 4. 3	δικαίωμα	α 3. 9; 13. 1, 3
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τὴν διάνοιαν μὴ τὸν λόγον	α 13. 17	δικανικὴ	γ 12. 1
τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν	β 26. 5	δικανικὴ (λέξις) ἀκριβεστέρα	γ 12. 5
ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν	γ 16. 9	ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ ἐριστικὴ ἡδεῖα	α 11. 15
διαπεφευγότες	β 5. 18; 8. 4	δικανικόν	α 3. 3
διαπτυχαί	ἀρ. γ 6. 4	δικαστὴς	α 1. 7
διαριθμοῦντα	α 13. 13	δικαστὴς βραβευτὴς τοῦ δικαίου	α 15. 24
διαριθμήσασθαι ἀκριβῶς	α 4. 4	πρὸς τὸν δικαστὴν	α 1. 4
διασείων ταῖν χερσίν	ἀρ. γ 16. 10	δίκη ἴσας	α 14. 2
διασίζων	ἀρ. γ 16. 10	δίκης μέρη	α 3. 3
διαστίξαι	γ 5. 6	δίκην ἔχειν	β 3. 5
τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν	α 1. 5	δοῦναι δίκην (submit to trial)	β 23. 12
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διατριβή	β 6. 20	ὁ τελώνης Διομέδων	β 23. 3
διατριβὰς	γ 17. 10	ὁ Διομήδης προειλετο Ὀδυσσεά	β 23. 20
διατρίβειν	α 11. 28; 12. 5; β 2. 2	Διομήδην	β 22. 12
διατριπτέον	γ 16. 6	Διονυσιάκου ἀγῶνος	γ 15. 8
διὰ τύχην	β 10. 7	Διόνυσιος	α 2. 19; 6. 27
διαφθείρειν τὴν σπουδὴν γέλωτι	γ 18. 7	οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου	β 15. 3
διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν	α 12. 8	Διόνυσιος (quilibet)	β 24. 5
διαφορὰν	γ 13. 5	Διόνυσιος ὁ χαλκοῦς	γ 2. 11
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Διοπεΐθει	β 8. 11	ἐγγίγνεσθαι	β 11. 7
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διότι	α 1. 11	ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους	α 7. 35
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διπλῇ λέξει	γ 3. 3	ἐγκαταλείπειν	β 4. 26; γ 16. 5
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τὰ περὶ Δίωνα	α 12. 29	ἐγκεχειρήκασι	γ 1. 7
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δίψα καὶ πείνα	α 11. 5	ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας	α 9. 33
περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος	α 2. 1	τὸ ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστίν	α 9. 33
ὁ τὴν δοκὸν φέρων	γ 12. 3	ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη	α 9. 38
(τόπος) ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγνεσθαι		ἔγνω θῆρ θῆρα	αφ. α 11. 25
ἀπιστῶν δέ	β 23. 22	ἐγχρονίζειν πρὸς γάμον	γ 10. 7
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Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην	β 23. 29	ἔθει	α 10. 15
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δρομικός	α 5. 14	ὅμοιον τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει	α 11. 3
δύναμις ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν	α 9. 4	δὲ ἔθος	α 12. 14
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δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικῆν	α 5. 6	ἐθιστόν	α 10. 18
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(τόπος) ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ' αὐτοὺς		ἐλεεινὸν...δεινὸν	β 8. 12
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ἡ εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεως	γ 9. 3	ἐλεος	α 1. 4; γ 19. 3
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τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς	β 22. 13	ἐλύθη ἡ διαβολή	β 23. 24
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		ἐμποδισμός	β 2. 4
		ἐμποιεῖν	γ 14. 7

ὀργήν ἐμποιεῖν	β 1. 9	ἐνθυμήματος τόπος	β 26. 2
ἐμποιεῖν γελοῖον	γ 3. 3	τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων	
ἐμφανέστερος	β 17. 4		β 25. 8
ἐμφανίζειν	α 13. 9	ἐνθυμήματα φέρουσι	β 26. 3
ἔμφρονα	α 2. 21	ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικανικοῖς	α 9. 40
ἐμφρονεστέρας τέχνης	α 4. 4	ἐνθυμήματα	γ 17. 17
ἐν- and συν-, verbs compounded with,		ἐνθυμήματα συστρέφειν	γ 18. 4
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ἐν πολλὰ ποιεῖν	γ 6. 4	περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσι	α 1. 3
(τόπος) ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττε-		περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου	β 22. 1
σθαι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἅμα σκοπεῖν		στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων	β 22. 13
	β 23. 27	ἐνθυμημάτων εἶδη δύο	β 22. 14
οἱ ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν	α 12. 5	τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικά	β 23. 30
τάναντία	β 19. 1 <sup>n</sup> ; γ 9. 8	τόποι τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων	
τάναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν	α 1. 12		β 24. 2
τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γίγνεται	γ 2. 10	ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν	
ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων	β 23. 1	φαινομένων	β 25. 1
ὅ τὸ ἐναντίον κακὸν τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν		ἐνθυμηματικὸς	α 1. 9, 11
	α 6. 18	ἐνθυμηματικοί	α 2. 10
ἐναντίωσις	γ 17. 14	ἐνθυμηματικῶς	γ 17. 17
ἐναγχος	α 15. 13	ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ δυνάμει	α 14. 1
διχῶς εἰσὶν ἐνδεεῖς	α 12. 15	οὐκ ἔνορκος	β 22. 12
ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν	α 2. 12	ἐνοχλή	β 2. 9
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πῖθανον	α 2. 1	ἐνοχος	α 13. 14 ; β 2. 27
ἐνδεχόμενα (used absolutely)	α 2. 14	τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα	β 25. 12
ἐνδοξα	α 1. 11 ; 2. 13	ἐνόχους	β 6. 18
ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων	β 25. 2	ἡ ἐνστασις	β 25. 4
τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ	γ 14. 1	ἡ ἐνστασις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα	β 26. 4
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ἐνδοῦναι	γ 14. 1	ἐνστασιν ἐνεγκόντα	β 25. 1
ἐνεκωμίαζε	α 7. 32	ἐνστάσεις τετραχῶς φέρονται	β 25. 3
ἐνέργεια	α 5. 7 p. 83 ; 14. 1 <sup>n</sup> ;	ἐνστασις φέρεται	β 25. 5
	γ 10. 6 ; 11. 2 ( <i>quater</i> ), 10	ἐνσῆ	γ 18. 4
ἐνέργεια δόξης	β 2. 3	ἐν τῷ Φιλιππῷ	γ 17. 16
ἡ ἐνέργεια κίνησης	γ 11. 34	τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως	α 1. 12
ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνειν	γ 11. 2	ἐντεχνος μέθοδος	α 1. 11
ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν	α 9. 14	ἐντεχνον	α 1. 3
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ἐνθεον... ἡ ποίησις	γ 7. 11	ἐντέχνων πίστειν	α 1. 9
ἐνθουσιάζοντες	γ 7. 11	τὸ ἐνυπάρχον	α 7. 2
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ἐνθύμημα	α 2. 9 ; β 20. 1 ; 23. 19	ἐνυπνίων φαντασία	β 2. 2
ἀπὸδειξις ῥητορικῇ ἐνθύμημα	α 1. 11	ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ	β 25. 3
ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς	α 1. 11 ; 2. 8	ἐξ οἷων εἰς οἷα	α 9. 31
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ἐκ τῶν ἐληφθέντων προτάσεων	α 3. 7	ἐξαλλάττει... τὸ εἰωθὸς	γ 3. 3
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ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως	β 15. 3	ἐπερωτῆσαι	γ 18. 5
ἐξίστησιν	γ 8. 1	ἔπεται ἡ τῷ ἅμα ἡ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἡ τῇ	
ἐξίστηται	γ 17. 10	δυνάμει	α 7. 5
ἐξέστηκε	γ 2. 3	ἐπηρεάζων	β 2. 4
ἔξω (for ἐκτός) τοῦ πράγματος		ἐπηρεασμός	β 2. 4 ; 4. 30
	α 1. 9, 10, 11	ἐπι-, adjectives compounded with, expressing tendency or liability to,	
ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν	α 1. 9		β 4. 13 <sup>n</sup>
ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς	α 1. 8	ἐπι-, verbs compounded with, implying	
ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ	α 4. 9	reciprocity,	α 13. 9 <sup>n</sup>
ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι	β 6. 11	ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν	α 6. 22
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ἐπάγοντα	α 2. 8	ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι	α 2. 19
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(τόπος) ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς	β 23. 11	τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὀλυμπιονικῇ	α 7. 32
ἐπαγωγὴν ῥητορικὴν	α 2. 8	ἐπιδέδωκεν	α 15. 15
ἐπαίειν	α 4. 12	ἡ ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη	γ 12. 5
περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίειν	α 4. 13	ἐπιδεικτικόν	α 3. 3
ἐπαίνειν ἄψυχα	α 9. 2	ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι	α 3. 9
ἐπαινοῦντι μικρὸν μακρῶς		ἐπιδεκῶν (τόκων)	αβ. γ 10 7 e
ψέξει μέγα συντόμως	γ 15. 10	ἐπιδέξιοι	β 4. 13
τῶν παρ' ἐκάστοις ἐπαινουμένων	α 9. 26	ἐπιδήλοις (ἐπιθέτοις)	γ 3. 3
τὸ ἐπαινετόν	α 6. 24	ἐπιδιήγησις	αβ. γ 13. 5
ἔπαινος	α 3. 3	ἐπίδοξον πολεμεῖν	α 4. 9
ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς	α 9. 33	ἐπιδραμεῖν	α 15. 1
ἐπακολουθεῖν	α 10. 10	ἐπιεικές	α 13. 13, 19 ; 15. 6
ἐπαναφέρουσιν	α 3. 5	ἐπιεικὲς ὁ ζῆλος	β 11. 1
ἐπαναφέροντες	α 8. 5	ἐπιεικὲς	β 1. 6
ἐπαναφέρειν	α 15. 26	τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τυχεῖν	α 12. 15
ἐπάνοδος	γ 13. 3	ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν	α 12. 28
ἐπανορθοῦν	α 11. 22	τὴν ἐπιεικίαν τοῦ λέγοντος	α 2. 4
ἐπανορθώσασθαι	β 23. 1	ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάττον	α. 2. 4
ἐπανορθώσεις	β 5. 17	τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι ὡς δικαιότεροις	α 15. 4
ἐπάρηται	α 13. 13	ἐπιευνγνύειν	γ 5. 7
ἐπάταξε	α 13. 10		

ἐπιζευγνύη	γ 5. 7	ἐπίτροπος	γ 8. 1
ἐπιζευγνύναι	γ 6. 5	ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ	γ 11. 5
ἐπιζήμιος	α 14. 7; β 23. 21	ἐπιφανείς	α 5. 5
ἐπιθίσεις ποιείσθαι	γ 2. 14	ἐπίφθονον	γ 17. 15
τὰ ἐπίθετα	γ 2. 9; 3. 3; 7. 11	ἐπιχαλκεύειν	γ 19. 1
ἡ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις	α 11. 5	Ἐπιχαρμος	α 7. 31; γ 9. 10
ἐπιθυμία...βούλησις	β 19. 19"	ἐπιχαίρέκακος	β 9. 5
ἐπιθυμητικοί	β 12. 3; 13. 13	ἐπιχαίμουσι	β 2. 20
ἐπιτεκεῖρηται	γ 1. 3	ἐποικοδομεῖν	α 7. 31
τοῦ ἐπικτήτου	α 7. 33	(τόπος) παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον	β 24. 7
ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν	γ 16. 10	ἐποιοιοί	γ 3. 3
ἐπιλέγεσθαι	β 20. 9	ἔπος καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ταυτό	β 24. 3
ἐπιλέλησται	β 19. 17	ἐπούρωσις	αφ. γ 13. 5
ἐπίλογος	γ 13. 3, 4; 19. 1	ἔπατα' ὁιστός	αφ. γ 11. 3
ἐπίλογος ἄλλὰ μὴ λόγος	γ 19. 6	ἔργον	α 2. 12
ἐπίλογος ("a supplementary addition")	β 20. 9	αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ τέκνα	α 11. 26
ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι	β 17. 3	ἔργον θητικόν	α 9. 26
ἐπιμελοῦς τὸ ἐπεξελεῖν	α 12. 19	πρὸς ἔργου (his)	α 1. 10
Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρήτης	γ 17. 10	τὰ ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἔξεως	α 9. 33
ἐπίπεδον	γ 6. 1	ἐπὶ Ἐργοφίλου	β 3. 13
ἐπίπλων κτήσις	α 5. 7	ἐρείπιον, ῥάκος οἰκίας	γ 11. 13
ἐπιπύλαιος	γ 10. 4, 6; 11. 10	ἔρις	γ 19. 2
ἐπιπολῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν	α 15. 22; β 16. 1	ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, β 24. 10	β 24. 11
ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι	β 23. 30	ἐριστική	γ 14. 1
ἐπιπτόσθαι μενεαίνων	αφ. γ 11. 3	ἐριστικοί	α 11. 15
ἐπισιτισαμένους	γ 10. 7b	ἐριστικά παιδιαί	β 24. 2
ἐπισκευάζων	α 4. 6	κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς	γ 2. 13
ἐπισκοτεῖν	γ 3. 3	ἐρυθροδάκτυλος ἡώς	γ 11. 15
ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει	α 1. 7	ἐρυθρόν	γ 18. 1
ἐπιστήμη ἀφωρισμένη	α 1. 1	περὶ ἐρωτήσεως	γ 18. 1
κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην	α 1. 14	ἔρως	Appendix (A) vol. I p. 293
ἐπιστήμαι	β 19. 8	ἔρωτος ἀρχή	α 11. 11
ἐπιστηγόν	β 24. 10; γ 17. 10	ἐσθῆτας τῶν πεπονθότων	β 8. 16
ἐπισυστελλόμενον	γ 2. 3	περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου	β 19. 23
ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ	γ 10. 7i	ἐσπουδασμένα παιδιαί	α 11. 15
ἐπιτείνόμεναι	α 4. 12"	ἔστω (popular def.)	α 5. 3"; 6. 2; 7. 2; 10. 3; β 3. 2; 4. 1; 5. 1; 6. 2; 7. 2; 8. 2
ἐπιτείχισμα νόμων	αφ. γ 3. 4	ἔταιρεία	β 4. 28
ἐλλιπῇ ἐπιτελεῖν	α 11. 22	ἐτερόφθαλμος	α 7. 41; γ 10. 7a
ἐπιτηδεῖους τύπους	α 4. 10	ἔτλησαν	αφ. γ 7. 11
ἐπιτήδευμα	β 23. 18	εὐ ποιῇ	γ 2. 6
ἐπιτηδεύοντες ταῦτά	β 4. 21	Εὐαγόρας	β 23. 12
ἐπιτηροῦσιν δίκην	α 12. 5	εὐαλαζόνευστα	β 15. 2
ἐπιτηρεῖν δίκην	α 12. 25	εὐανάγνωστος	γ 5. 6
τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέλας ἡδύ	α 11. 27	εὐανάπνευστος (λέξις)	γ 9. 5
ἐπιτιμήσεως	α 1. 12	εὐβάστακτα	α 12. 34
ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς θεοῖς	α 15. 31	Εὐβουλος	α 15. 15
ἐπιτρίτων τόκων	αφ. γ 10. 7e		



εὐγενές...γενναῖον	β 15. 3	εὐλαβούμενον	γ 3. 7
εὐγένεια	α 5. 5	εὐλόγιστοι	β 8. 4
εὐγενείας ἦθος	β 15. 2	εὐμαθής ( <i>dis</i> )	γ 9. 3
εὐγυρία	α 5. 15	εὐμαθῇ	γ 19. 4
εὐγυρως	α 5. 15	εὐμάθεια	α 6. 15
εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς	α 5. 3	εὐμετάβολοι	β 12. 4
εὐδαιμονία	α 5. 1; 6. 8	εὐμετάβλητα	α 12. 34
εὐδαιμονισμός	α 9. 34	εὐμνημόνευτος	γ 9. 3; 13. 3
εὐδιάβολος	α 12. 22	εὐμνημονευτότερα	α 9. 25
εὐδοκίμει τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων	β 23. 30	εὐνοια	β 1. 5
εὐδοκιμοῦντα	γ 10. 1	ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις (τῶν πολέων)	α 1. 4
εὐδοκιμοῦντι νόμῳ	α 15. 9	Εὐξένῳ γεωμετερεῖν οὐκ ἐπισταμένῳ	γ 4. 3
εὐδοκίμοι	β 4. 11	περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως	γ 7. 2
εὐδοξία	α 5. 8	εὐπαρακολούθητον	α 2. 13
εὐέλεκτα	γ 17. 15	εὐπαρόρμητοι	β 2. 10
εὐέλπιδι	β 1. 4	εὐπιστοι	β 12. 7
εὐέλπιδες	β 12. 8, 9	τὸ εὐποιητικὸν ἡδύ	α 11. 22
εὐεξαπάτητοι	β 12. 8	εὐποιητικὸς τῶν ἄλλων	β 2. 25; 4. 8
εὐεπακολούθητον	α 2. 13	εὐποιητικὸς εἰς χρήματα	β 4. 8
εὐεργεσία	α 5. 9	εὐπορήσομεν	β 26. 5
εὐεργετήματα	α 9. 19	εὐπραγίαι	α 9. 19
εὐεργετήματα	α 9. 20	εὐρρηται καὶ κατασκευάσθη (perf. and aor. combined)	α 9. 38 <sup>n</sup>
εὐεργετικὴ δύναμις	α 9. 4	Εὐριπίδης	γ 2. 5; 14. 6
εὐεργετικῆς δόξης	α 5. 9	Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα	γ 15. 8
εὐήθεις...κακοήθεις	β 12. 7 <sup>n</sup>	Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις	β 6. 20
εὐήθη	γ 1. 9; 12. 2	Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβη	β 23. 29
ἐν εὐημέριᾳ	β 3. 12	Τήλεφος Εὐριπίδου	γ 2. 10
εὐθεώρητα	α 15. 25	εὐρυθμος λέξις	γ 8. 7
εὐθηνία κτημάτων	α 5. 3	εὐρυσέμενος αἰθῆρ	αφ. α 13. 2
Εὐθυδημου λόγος	β 24. 3	ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν εὐσεβῶν	γ 12. 3
εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ἀτυχίαις	β 2. 20	εὐστοχος	γ 11. 5
Εὐθυνος	β 19. 14	εὐσυλλογιστότερα	α 1. 12
εὐθύνας διδῶσιν	γ 10. 7 <sup>n</sup>	εὐσύνθετος λόγος	γ 3. 3
εὐθύνας δοῦναι ( <i>dis</i> )	γ 10. 7δ	μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον	γ 9. 3
εὐθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία	γ 10. 7 <sup>n</sup>	εὐσύνοπτον	γ 12. 5
εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας	γ 18. 6	εὐσχημων βαρύτης	β 17. 4
εὐθύς	α 10. 10; 11. 15	εὐτεκνία	α 5. 4, 5
κατ' εὐθυρίαν	β 2. 9	εὐτελεῖς	β 15. 3
εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι	γ 7. 8	εὐτελῇ ὀνόματα καὶ πράγματα	γ 7. 2
εὐκατάλλακτος	β 4. 17	εὐτραπέλια πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις	β 12. 16
τὰ εὐκατέργαστα	α 6. 29	εὐτράπελοι	β 12. 16; 13. 15
εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργήν	β 2. 11, 12	εὐτυχήματα	α 5. 17
εὐκολοι	β 4. 12	εὐτυχία	α 5. 4, 17; β 17. 5
Εὐκλήμων	α 14. 3	εὐφραστος	γ 5. 6
εὐλαβεῖς	α 12. 19	εὐφυνεῖς	α 6. 29
τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον	α 9. 28	εὐφυνά γένη	β 15. 3
εὐλαβεῖται	α 12. 6	εὐφυσὺς	γ 10. 1

εὐφύια	a 6. 15	ἡδονή (def.)	a 11. 1
εὐχεσθαι...πτωχεύειν	γ 2. 10	τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι	a 6. 7
ὁσμήν [εὐωδίας]	a 11. 5	ἡδὺ μεμνησθαι πόνων	αφ. a 11. 8
ἐφαρμόττειν	a 15. 10	τὸ ἡδύ	γ 2. 8
ἐφεξῆς a 7. 1 ; β 15. 10 ; γ 16. 1, 2 ; 17. 6		ἡδὺν ἰδεῖν	a 5. 11
ἐφεςις	β 4. 31 n <sup>3</sup>	ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι	a 6. 7
ἐφιεμένους	β 10. 6	ἡδέα	a 11. 8
πάντα ἐφίεται τὰ ζῶα τῆς ἡδόνης	a 6. 7	τῶν ἡδέων	a 11. 22
ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου	αφ. γ 10. 7 c	τῶν ἡδέων (τι)	a 11. 4"
ἐφορία	γ 18. 6	ἡδεσθαι	a 11. 6
ἐφ' ὑμῖν	a 4. 3	ἡδιον	a 7. 23
ἐχεσθαι ταῖς δίψαις	a 11. 10	(τι) τῶν ἡδίστων	a 11. 16
ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν	γ 1. 2	ἡδύσματι...ἐδέσματι	γ 3. 3
ἐχόμενος	γ 8. 4	ἡθος (τί ποιεῖ)	γ 16. 8
ἐχθρα...ὀργή	β 4. 31	ἡθος ἔχοντες λόγοι	β 21. 16
ἐχθρας (ποιητικά)	β 4. 30	ἡθει τοῦ λέγοντος (note on ἡθος and πάθος)	a 2. 3
ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι	a 9. 24	ἡθη, three kinds of, notes on, a 8.6 ; γ 7.6	
τοὺς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροῦς	β 4. 7	ἡθους	a 2. 4
ὁ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν	a 6. 24	ἡθικὴ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δείξις	γ 7. 6
ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα	β 21. 11	ἡθικὴ πίστις	a 2. 3
ἐχίнос	β 20. 6	ἡθικὴ λέξις	γ 7. 1
ζηλος (def.)	β 11. 1	ἡθικοὶ λόγοι (διὰ τίνων γίνονται)	β 18. 1 ; 21. 16
ζηλος	γ 19. 2	ἡθικά (τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστω ἡθει)	γ 16. 9
ζηλουμένοις	a 5. 5	ἡθικῶς	γ 17. 12
ζηλοῦσθαι	β 4. 24	τὸν ἡλίθιον χρηστόν	a 9. 28
ζηλωτοί	β 11. 5	ἡλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει	αφ. a 11. 25
ζηλωτά	β 11. 4	ἡλικες	β 6. 12
ζηλωταί, θαυμασταί,	β 6. 24	ἡλικίαι	β 2. 11 ; 12. 2
ζηλωτικοί	β 11. 1, 3	ἡμέρα πρώτη	β 12. 8
ζημοῦν μικροῖς	a 12. 4	τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ	β 13. 8
ζῆν ἀφ' ἐτέρων	β 4. 9	ἡμόλιος	γ 8. 4
πρὸς ἄλλον	a 9. 28	κατὰ τὸ ἡμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονεοῦσιν	a 5. 6
πρὸς τὸ σύμφερον	β 13. 9	ἡμωβελία	a 14. 1
πρὸς τὸ καλόν	β 14. 2	ἦν (was defined to be) a 6. 23 ; 7. 7, 8, 28 ; β 7. 5 ; 13. 15 ; γ 2. 6	
τῇ ἐλπίδι	β 12. 8	ἡνεκέως	αφ. a 13. 2
τῷ ἡθει	β 12. 12	ἡνεμοεῖς λόφος	αφ. γ 6. 7
τῇ μνήμῃ	β 13. 12	'Ηρακλείαις στήλαις	β 10. 5
κατὰ λογισμόν	β 13. 14	'Ηρακλείδων	β 22. 6
πρὸς οὐς ζῶσιν	a 12. 28	τὰ 'Ηρακλείτου	γ 5. 6
Ζήνωνι	a 12. 10	ἡρεμήσις ὀργῆς	β 3. 2
ζυγημαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ	αφ. γ 11. 13, 15	'Ηρόδοτος (II 30)	γ 16. 5
ἦ alternative, prefixed to interrogative sentences,	β 6. 27	'Ηροδοτου Θουρίου	γ 9. 2"
ἦδη a 1. 7 (dis) ; 6. 22, 24 ; β 2. 12 ; 6. 12 (dis)		ὁ ἡρῶς (ἄνθρωπος) σεμνός	γ 8. 4
ἦδη διαφέρει	a 10. 11	ἡρῶστηκεν	a 12. 6
		ἦττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν	β 24. 11

ἥττους τοῦ θυμοῦ	β 12. 5	ἔργον θητικόν	α 9. 26
τοῦ κερδαίνειν	β 5. 7	θλίβειν	α 5. 14
		θορυβοῦνται	α 2. 10
θαρραλία	β 5. 17	ἐθορύβησαν	β 23. 22
θαρραλέον ἡ ὄργη	β 5. 21	θορυβεῖται	β 23. 30
θαρρεῖν, θύρσος	β 5. 16, 14. 1	καταπλήττουσι θορυβοῦντες	γ 7. 5
τὰ μέλλοντα	β 5. 18	θορυβοῦσιν	γ 18. 4
τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδύ	α 11. 21	Θρασύβουλος	β 23. 25
θαυμάζουσι	α 6. 29	Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκά- λει	β 23. 29
τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδύ	α 11. 18	Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις	γ 1. 7
τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐπιθυμητόν	α 11. 21	Θρασύμαχος	γ 11. 13
ἡδὺ τὸ θαυμαστόν	γ 2. 3	Ἡρόδικος Θρασύμαχον	β 23. 29
θαυμασταί	β 6. 24; γ 2. 3	ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου	γ 8. 4
Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις	α 2. 19	τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρείον	α 9. 29
θέλειν (for usual prose form)	ἐθέλειν	θρασύτης	β 14. 1
εἰ θέλεις	γ 16. 3	θράττει	αφ. γ 11. 6
διδόναί θέλει	α 15. 32	θρηνεῖν...θύειν	β 23. 27
τὸ θέλειν	α 15. 31	τεθρλημέναις καὶ κοῖναις γνώμας	β 21. 11"
μὲν θέλει	α 15. 32	τὸ θρυλούμενον	γ 7. 9
μὴ θέλει	α 15. 32	διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ὀργήν	α 10. 17
μὴ θέλειν	α 15. 30, 32	οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξείς	β 13. 13
θελῶσιν	β 24. 7	θυμικοί	β 12. 5
θεμέλιος	β 19. 25	θυμώδεις	β 12. 9
Θεμιστοκλῆς	α 15. 14	τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν	αφ. α 6. 23
-θεν, peculiar use of words ending in,	α 11. 16"	θυσασμένους	β 21. 11
Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ νόμῳ	β 23. 17	θυσιαί	α 5. 9
Αἴας ὁ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 20, 24		
Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 3"	εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν	γ 1. 9
ἐκ νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 11	ἱαμβεῖα φθέγγονται	γ 8. 4
ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 13	ἱαμβος ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν	γ 8. 4
ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις	γ 9. 9	ἱασις	α 14. 2
Θεόδωρος	γ 11. 6	Ἰάσων ὁ Θειταλὸς	α 12. 31
περὶ Θεόδωρον	γ 13. 5	ἱατὸν χρόνῳ	β 4. 31
ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη	β 23. 28	ἱατρεύματα	γ 14. 7
τὸ Θεοδώρου	γ 11. 6	ἱατρικὴ	α 2. 1
Θεοδώρου φωνή	γ 2. 4"	ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι	β 2. 13
θερίζειν κακῶς	αφ. γ 3. 4	ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος	α 15. 21
θερμοί	β 13. 7	ἴδιος νόμος	α 10. 3; 13. 2
ὁ θεωρός	α 3. 2	τὰ ἴδια ἀγαθὰ	α 6. 28
θεωρήματα	α 4. 4	τὰ παρ' ἐκάστου ἴδια καλὰ	α 9. 26
Θηβαίους διεῖναι Φίλιππον	β 23. 6	ἴδια	β 22. 12
τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος	β 23. 3	ἴδια ὀνόματα	γ 5. 3
ἔγνω θῆρ θῆρα	αφ. α 11. 25	ἰδιώτην	β 23. 5
θηρεύειν	β 21. 15	ἰδιωτικοί	γ 12. 2 c
θηρευτική	α 11. 15	ἰδριμεῦς	γ 4. 3
τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδίκημα μείζον	α 14. 5	ἰέναι εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν	α 11. 3
τὸν θησαυρὸν εὗρεν	α 5. 17		

ἱεροσυλεῖν	α 7. 5; 13. 9	καινὰ λέγειν	γ 11. 6
ἱέρων	β 16. 2	καιροὶ	α 7. 32
ἱκανὸν	α 5. 11	καιροὶ αἵτιοι	α 5. 9
ἱκετηρίαν	γ 10. 7 I	τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι	β 7. 3
ἱματιδάριον	αφ. γ 2. 15	κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους	α 6. 20
Ἰοκάστη ἡ Καρκίνου	γ 16. 11	κακοήθεις...εὐήθεις	β 12. 7"
Ἰππίας	α 2. 11	κακοήθεις, κακοήθεια	β 13. 3
Ἰππόλοχος	α 9. 38	κακοηθιστέον	γ 15. 10
τὴν Ἰσθμν (μοῖραν)	β 2. 17"	κακολόγοι	β 4. 18; 6. 20
Ἰσθμίων πανήγυρις	αφ. γ 3. 3	κακοπαθεῖν	β 20. 6
Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου	β 23. 11	κακουργεῖ παρὰ ταῦτας	γ 2. 7
Ἰσοκράτης	α 9. 38	κακούργον	α 1. 10
	β 19. 14; 23. 18	κακουργία	β 12. 15; 13. 14
γ 10. 7 i; 11. 7; 17. 10; 17. 16 (bis)		κακουργικά	β 16. 4
(Paneg. § 1)	γ 14. 2	σώματος κακώσεις	β 7. 3; 8. 9
ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ	γ 7. 11	καλάμη γῆρας	αφ. γ 10. 2
Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προσοίμων	γ 14. 1	Κυλλίας	α 2. 11; β 4. 31; γ 2. 10
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Ἰσοκράτης (Evagoras)	β 23. 12	Κύλλιπος	α 12. 29
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ἰσχυρὸς	β 2. 14	κάλλος	α 5. 11
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ἰσχύς (def.)	β 13. 2	καλλωπιστής	β 24. 7
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Ἰταλιῶται	β 21. 2; 23. 8, 17	τὰ καλὰ...δύο γένη	α 6. 7
Ἰφικράτης	γ 2. 10; 10. 7 c, k; 15. 2	μεταφορὰς ἀπὸ καλῶν	γ 2. 13
ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον	β 23. 6	ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρσιν	γ 9. 2
πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα	β 23. 7	καμπύλῳ	β 21. 2
Ἰφικράτης (ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρχε ταῦτα)	α 7. 32	κἂν εἰ	α 1. 5"
τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους, ἐξ οἷων εἰς οἷα, α 9. 31		κανὼν στρεβλὸς	α 1. 5
	α 2. 10	καπηλεία	γ 10. 7
καθάπερ	γ 15. 5	Καρκίνου Μηδεία	β 23. 28
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καθαρίους	β 3. 6	κάρπιμα	α 5. 7
καθίζοντες	α 1. 7; 2. 15 <i>ter</i> , 18	κατὰ ('in the case of')	α 7. 21
καθύλου, opp. το κατὰ μέρος	α 2. 9; 13. 13; β 25. 8	κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν	α 4. 4
καθόλου	α 2. 19	καταβλάπτει ἄλληλα	γ 17. 6
ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου	α 3. 9	καταγελᾶν	β 2. 12
καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου	α 2. 18	καταδικάζειν	α 15. 28
τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον καθόλου	β 21. 10	κατακορή	γ 3. 3
καθόλου μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν	α 4. 4"	κατακόρως	γ 7. 7
καί, δὲ and τε	α 6. 23"; β 22. 3; 23. 18	καταλλακτικώτερος	α 9. 31
καί...δὲ	γ 1. 3, 9	καταλλάττεσθαι	α 9. 24; 12. 24
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καταπραΰνειν	β 3. 17	Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτόν	γ 4. 3
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κατασκευάζειν	α 4. 6; 15. 21	τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον	α 15. 7
κατασκευάζειν τοιούτους	β 2. 27	οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος	β 15. 3
κατασκευάσειε	β 1. 7	τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας	αφ. γ 10. 7 <i>h</i>
κατασκευασθῆναι	α 2. 2	κίνδυνος	β 5. 2
τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν	β 26. 3	κινδυνευτικός	α 9. 29
κατάστασις	β 3. 2	κινεῖν ἕτερον	α 5. 12
κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν	α 11. 1	κινῆσαι	γ 1. 8
καταφρόνησις	β 2. 3; 11. 7	ποία κίνησις ἡ ψυχῇ	β 23. 13
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καταφρονεῖσθαι	β 2. 17	Κλεοφῶν	α 15. 13; γ 7. 2
καταψεύδεσθαι	α 15. 26	κλέπτεται εὖ	γ 2. 5
ῥαδίως καταψευδόμενοι ὡς πανσόμενοι	α 15. 26	κλέπτεται	γ 7. 10
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κατελιγμένος (τέχνας)	α 2. 20	κέκλεπται	γ 2. 10
κατεπίειν	β 5. 7; γ 15. 10	Κλέων ( <i>quilibet</i> )	β 2. 2; γ 5. 2
κατελθεῖν	β 23. 13	Κλέων	γ 8. 1
(λέξιν) κατεστραμμένην	γ 9. 1, 3	κληρουχία	β 6. 24
κατενορκήσαντας	αφ. γ 3. 1	κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς	α 8. 4
κατέχειν	α 5. 14	οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἀρχεῖν	β 20. 4
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κατηγόρει	α 14. 1	κοινῇ	α 6. 16
κατηγορία	α 3. 3	κοινὸν δίκαιον	α 13. 2
περὶ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας	α 10. 1	κοινὸς νόμος	α 13. 2
κατοικτεῖρειν	β 20. 6	κοινὰ γινώμαι	β 21. 11
κάτοπτρον βίου	αφ. γ 3. 1	κοινὰ πίστεις	β 20. 1
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ἐν κατορθώσει	β 3. 12	κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς	β 24. 2
κατάρθωσαν	α 6. 29	τοὺς κοινούς ὁμοίως πάντων	α 2. 22
κατάρθωκεν	α 9. 38; β 5. 18	κοινότερον	α 1. 10
Καύνιος ἔρως	β 25. 4	κοινωνία	α 13. 2
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κατωμόσατο	α 15. 28	κολακείας σημεῖα	β 6. 8
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κενολογεῖν	β 19. 27	κόλασις οἰκετῶν	β 3. 5
κενὸν	γ 13. 5	κόλλησιν	γ 2. 12
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κεφαλῆς	β 19. 10	κορδακικώτερος (ῥυθμός)	γ 8. 4
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κεκοσμημένην (λέξιν)	γ 2. 2	κώρυκος	αφ. γ 11. 13, 15
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κόσμοι	β 23. 8	λαῶς ἀναιδής	αφ. γ 11. 3
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κραυγὴν Καλλιόπης	αφ. γ 2. 11	Λακεδαιμόνιοι	α 5. 6
κρεμάθρα	γ 11. 5	ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομᾶν καλόν	α 9. 26
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ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι	α 1. 7	λελοιδορησθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ	
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ὥσπερ ἀργυρογνῶμων	α 15. 7	λέξις ἡ ἐν περιόδοις	γ 9. 7
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οἱ κριταὶ χαρίζονται	α 12. 4	ἀντικειμένη	γ 9. 7
Κριτίας	α 15. 13; γ 16. 3	γραφική	γ 12. 2
Κροῖσος Ἄλυν διαβάς	αφ. γ 5. 4	δημηγορική	γ 12. 5
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κτήματα ἄκαρπα ἐλευθεριώτερα	α 9. 26	ἐπιδεικτική	γ 12. 6
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κυβερνᾶν	β 20. 4	λέξει διαθέσθαι	γ 1. 3
κυκᾶν	αφ. α 9. 20	τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν	α 9. 36
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Κύκνος	β 22. 12	(τόπος) παρὰ τὴν λέξιν	β 24. 2
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κυνοραῖσταί	β 20. 6	Λευκοθία	β 23. 27
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ὁ Κύων	γ 10. 7 γ		α 7. 13
κύριος α 8. 2, 3; 15. 9, 21; β 10. 11; γ 2. 6		λέων ἐπόρουσε	αφ. γ 4. 1
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κύρια τε καὶ συνώνυμα	γ 2. 7	λήθη δι' ἀμέλειαν	β 3. 26
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κύριον ὄνομα	γ 2. 2, 6	λήμματα	α 12. 10
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ἐν κῶλοις λέξεως	γ 9. 7	λιβανωτὺς	γ 4. 3
κωλυτικά	β 9. 5	λιβυκοί	β 20. 2
κωμωδοποιοί	β 6. 20; γ 3. 4	λικύμνιος	γ 2. 13; 13. 5
κώπης ἀνάσσειν	αφ. γ 2. 10	λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν	γ 12. 2

εἰβη δρῶσιν	α 1. 2	ἐκστάσεις	α 5. 9
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εἰκόνες	γ 11. 11	ἐκχεῖν τὴν πόλιν	αφ. γ 10. 7
εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι	α 4. 2	ἐλαττοῦσθαι	α 4. 9
οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι	α 12. 2	τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα	α 14. 1
ὡς εἰπεῖν (see also under ὡς)	β 5. 12	(τόπος) ἐλεγκτικός	β 23. 23
ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν	β 5. 12	ἐλεγκτικοί	β 4. 12, 16
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εἶρηκα	γ 19. 6	ἐλεγχος καὶ συλλογισμός	β 22. 14
εἰρήσθω	α 11. 29 <sup>α</sup> ; 15. 33; β 15. 1; 19. 27; 26. 5	ἐλεγχος	γ 9. 8
(τόπος) ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ' αὐτοὺς	β 23. 7	ἐλεεινά	β 5. 12; 8. 1
πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα	α 4. 7	ἐλεεινὸν...δεινὸν	β 8. 12
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εἰρηνεύεσθαι	γ 9. 1	ἐλεήσειεν	β 12. 15; 13. 15
εἰρομένη (λέξις)	γ 9. 3	ἐλεητικοί	β 8. 2
ἡ εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεως	β 2. 24; γ 18. 7	ἐλεος (def.)	α 1. 4; γ 19. 3
εἰρωνεία	γ 19. 5	ἐλεος	γ 1. 7
ἐξ εἰρωνείας	γ 7. 11	ἐν τοῖς ἐλεοῖς	α 6. 25
μετ' εἰρωνείας	β 5. 11	Ἑλένην Θησεὺς προέκρινεν	α 5. 7
εἴρωνες	β 2. 24	ἐλευθέρια	α 9. 6
εἰρωνευόμενοις	αφ. β 21. 11	ἐλευθερίτης	α 9. 6, 10
εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης	α 4. 7	ἐλκοντα	α 5. 12
εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων	α 4. 11	ἐλλειμμα νόμου	α 13. 12
εἰσαγωγίμος	γ 14. 7	ὡς ἐλλείπειν οἶονται	α 6. 28
εἰσάξειν αὐτὸν	β 21. 2	εἰς τὴν ἑλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει	β 24. 7
ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι	α 1. 7; 3. 2	(τόπος) παρὰ τὴν ἑλλειψιν τοῦ πότε	β 24. 9
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ἐκκόψαι ἐκ τῆς στήλης	γ 17. 8	ἐλληνίζειν	α 11. 22, 26
ἐκκρούσει τὸ πάθος	β 8. 12	τὰ ἐλλιπῇ ἐπιτελεῖν	αφ. β 23. 15
ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου	γ 15. 10	ἐλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλας	β 3. 12
ἐκλαμβάνειν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον	γ 12. 5	ἐν ἐλπιδὶ ἐπιεικεῖ	β 12. 8
ἐκλέγων	β 13. 13	ζῶσιν ἐλπίδι	β 8. 7
ἐκλελοίπασιν	β 22. 13	ἐλπίσαι (vox media)	β 23. 24
τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς	γ 9. 2	ἐλύθη ἡ διαβολή	β 4. 13
ἐκλύονται	α 10. 3	ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες	α 8. 4
ἐκόντες (τίνα ποιούσι)	α 10. 18	οἱ ἐμμενεηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις	γ 8. 1
ἐκόντες πράττουσιν	α 15. 32	ἔμμετρον σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως	α 13. 2; γ 5. 4
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ἐκπνεύουσι		ἐμποδίζοντα	β 2. 4
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ὀργήν ἐμποιεῖν	β 1. 9	ἐνθυμήματος τόπος	β 26. 2
ἐμποιεῖν γελοῖον	γ 3. 3	τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων	
ἐμφανέστερος	β 17. 4		β 25. 8
ἐμφανίζειν	α 13. 9	ἐνθυμήματα φέρουσι	β 26. 3
ἔμφρονα	α 2. 21	ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικανικοῖς	α 9. 40
ἐμφρονεστέρως τέχνης	α 4. 4	ἐνθυμήματα	γ 17. 17
ἐν- and συν-, verbs compounded with,		ἐνθυμήματα συστρέφειν	γ 18. 4
	β 4. 12	ἐνθυμημάτων	β 18. 5 ; 26. 5 ; γ 1. 1
ἐν πολλὰ ποιεῖν	γ 6. 4	περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσι	α 1. 3
(τόπος) ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττε-		περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου	β 22. 1
σθαι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἅμα σκοπεῖν		στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων	β 22. 13
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τάναντία	β 19. 1 <sup>n</sup> ; γ 9. 8	τόποι τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων	
τάναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν	α 1. 12		β 24. 2
τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει	γ 2. 10	ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν	
ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων	β 23. 1	φαινομένων	β 25. 1
ὅ τὸ ἐναντίον κακὸν τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν		ἐνθυμηματικὸς	α 1. 9, 11
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ἐναντιώσις	γ 17. 14	ἐνθυμηματικῶς	γ 17. 17
ἔναγχος	α 15. 13	ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ δυνάμει	α 14. 1
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ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν	α 2. 12	ἐνοχλῇ	β 2. 9
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν	α 2. 1	ἐνοχος	α 13. 14 ; β 2. 27
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ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων	β 25. 2	ἡ ἐνστασις	β 25. 4
τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ	γ 14. 1	ἡ ἐνστασις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα	β 26. 4
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ἐνδοῦναι	γ 14. 1	ἐνστασιν ἐνεγκόντα	β 25. 1
ἐνεκωμίαζε	α 7. 32	ἐνστάσεις τετραχῶς φέρονται	β 25. 3
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	γ 10. 6 ; 11. 2 ( <i>quater</i> ), 10	ἐνοτῇ	γ 18. 4
ἐνέργεια δόξης	β 2. 3	ἐν τῷ Φιλιππῷ	γ 17. 16
ἡ ἐνέργεια κινήσεως	γ 11. 34	τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως	α 1. 12
ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνειν	γ 11. 2	ἐντεχνος μέθοδος	α 1. 11
ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν	α 9. 14	ἐντεχνον	α 1. 3
ὁ ἐπιστάμενος	β 25. 9	ἐντεχνα	α 2. 2
ἐνθεον... ἡ ποιήσις	γ 7. 11	ἐντέχνων πίστις	α 1. 9
ἐνθουσιάζοντες	γ 7. 11	τὸ ἐνυπάρχον	α 7. 2
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ἐνθύμημα	α 2. 9 ; β 20. 1 ; 23. 19	ἐνυπνίων φαντασία	β 2. 2
ἀποδείξεις ῥητορικὴ ἐνθύμημα	α 1. 11	ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ	β 25. 3
ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς	α 1. 11 ; 2. 8	ἐξ οἷων εἰς οἷα	α 9. 31
ἐνθύμημα ῥητορικὸς συλλογισμὸς	α 2. 8	ἐξαγγελτικούς	β 6. 20
ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶ συνεστηκῶς		ἐξαλλάττειν	γ 2. 2, 5
ἐκ τῶν ἐιρημένων προτάσεων	α 3. 7	ἐξαλλάττει... τὸ εἰωθός	γ 3. 3
ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς τις	β 22. 2 ;	ἐξαμαρτᾶν	α 15. 23
	24. 1	ἐξαπατᾶ	γ 11. 6



- ἐξαριθμεῖν γ 9.9  
 ἐξελεγκμένα β 22. 16  
 ἔξεων β 22. 16  
 ἀπὸ ἔξεως α 1. 2; note on α 11. 2  
 ἔξει γ 7. 6  
 ἔξεις α 6. 9; β 12. 2; γ 7. 6  
 κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις πράττειν α 10. 9  
 ἔξειδρος αβ. γ 3. 3  
 ἐξετάζειν α 1. 1  
 ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως β 15. 3  
 ἐξίστησιν γ 8. 1  
 ἐξίστηται γ 17. 10  
 ἐξίστηκε γ 2. 3  
 ἔξω (for ἐκτός) τοῦ πράγματος α 1. 9, 10, 11  
 ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν α 1. 9  
 ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς α 1. 8  
 ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ α 4. 9  
 ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι β 6. 11  
 ἐπάγγελμα β 24. 11  
 ἐπαγγελτικώτερον β 23. 12  
 ἐπάγοντα α 2. 8  
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 ἐπαγωγή (ἀρχή) β 20. 2  
 οὐκ οἰκεῖον ῥητορικοῖς β 20. 9  
 δι' ἐπαγωγῆς β 25. 8  
 (τόπος) ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς β 23. 11  
 ἐπαγωγήν ῥητορικὴν α 2. 8  
 ἐπαίειν α 4. 12  
 περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίειν α 4. 13  
 ἐπαινεῖν ἄψυχα α 9. 2  
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 ψέξαι μέγα συντόμως γ 15. 10  
 τῶν παρ' ἐκάστοις ἐπαινουμένων α 9. 26  
 τὸ ἐπαινέτον α 6. 24  
 ἔπαινος α 3. 3  
 ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς α 9. 33  
 ἐπακολουθοῦσι α 10. 10  
 ἐπαναφέρουσιν α 3. 5  
 ἐπαναφέροντες α 8. 5  
 ἐπαναφέρειν α 15. 26  
 ἐπάνοδος γ 13. 3  
 ἐπανορθοῦν α 11. 22  
 ἐπανορθώσασθαι β 23. 1  
 ἐπανορθώσεις β 5. 17  
 ἐπάρηται α 13. 13  
 ἐπάταξε α 13. 10  
 ἐπέξευκται γ 9. 7  
 ἐπελ...ὁ δὲ α 1. 11; β 25. 10  
 ἐπέiraσε β 19. 21  
 ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνους γ 17. 11  
 γινώσκοντι ἐπεμβάλλη γ 3. 3  
 ἐπεξέλεγχος αβ. γ 13. 5  
 ἐπεξελέθειν α 12. 4, 19, 20  
 ἐπεξίεναι α 12. 24, 35  
 ἐπεργάσασθαι...δημοσίαν α 13. 9  
 ἐπερωτῆσαι γ 18. 5  
 ἔπεται ἡ τῷ ἅμα ἡ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἡ τῇ  
 δυνάμει α 7. 5  
 ἐπηρεάζων β 2. 4  
 ἐπηρεασμός β 2. 4; 4. 30  
 ἐπι-, adjectives compounded with, ex-  
 pressing tendency or liability to, β 4. 13\*  
 ἐπι-, verbs compounded with, implying  
 reciprocity, α 13. 9\*  
 ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὕδριαν α 6. 22  
 ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνειν γ 15. 10  
 ἐπιβουλεύειν α 7. 13  
 ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι α 2. 19  
 ἐπίβουλος α 9. 28; β 21. 14  
 ἐπιγαμία α 14. 5  
 οἱ ἐπιγεγραμμένοι α 15. 21  
 ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν α 13. 9  
 τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὀλυμπιονικῇ α 7. 32  
 ἐπιδέδωκεν α 15. 15  
 ἡ ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη γ 12. 5  
 ἐπιδεικτικόν α 3. 3  
 ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι α 3. 9  
 ἐπιδεκάτων (τόκων) αβ. γ 10 7 e  
 ἐπιδέξιοι β 4. 13  
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 ἐπιζευγνύειν γ 5. 7

ἐπιζευγύη	γ 5. 7	ἐπίτροπος	γ 8. 1
ἐπιζευγύναι	γ 6. 5	ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ	γ 11. 5
ἐπιζήμιος	α 14. 7; β 23. 21	ἐπιφανείς	α 5. 5
ἐπιθίσεις ποιείσθαι	γ 2. 14	ἐπίφθονον	γ 17. 15
τὰ ἐπιθέτα	γ 2. 9; 3. 3; 7. 11	ἐπιχαλκεύειν	γ 19. 1
ἡ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος ὕρεξις	α 11. 5	Ἐπίχαρμος	α 7. 31; γ 9. 10
ἐπιθυμία...βούλησις	β 19. 19"	ἐπιχαίρέκακος	β 9. 5
ἐπιθυμητικοί	β 12. 3; 13. 13	ἐπιχαίρουσι	β 2. 20
ἐπιτελείρηται	γ 1. 3	ἐποικοδομεῖν	α 7. 31
τοῦ ἐπικτήτου	α 7. 33	(τόπος) παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον	β 24. 7
ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν	γ 16. 10	ἐποιοιοί	γ 3. 3
ἐπιλέγεσθαι	β 20. 9	ἔπος καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ταῦτό	β 24. 3
ἐπιλέλυσται	β 19. 17	ἐπούρωσις	αβ. γ 13. 5
ἐπίλογος	γ 13. 3, 4; 19. 1	ἔπατ' οἰστός	αβ. γ 11. 3
ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος	γ 19. 6	ἔργον	α 2. 12
ἐπίλογος ('a supplementary addition')		αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ τέκνα	α 11. 26
	β 20. 9	ἔργον θητικόν	α 9. 26
ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι	β 17. 3	πρὸ ἔργου (his)	α 1. 10
ἐπιμελοῦς τὸ ἐπεξελεῖν	α 12. 19	τὰ ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἔξεως	α 9. 33
Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρήης	γ 17. 10	ἐπὶ Ἐργοφίλου	β 3. 13
ἐπίπεδον	γ 6. 1	ἐρείπιον, ῥάκος οἰκίας	γ 11. 13
ἐπίπλων κτήσις	α 5. 7	ἔρις	γ 19. 2
ἐπιπόλαιος	γ 10. 4, 6; 11. 10	ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς,	β 24. 10
ἐπιπολῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν	α 15. 22; β 16. 1	ἐριστική	β 24. 11
ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι	β 23. 30	ἐριστικοί	γ 14. 1
ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίωνων	αβ. γ 11. 3	ἐριστικά παιδιαί	α 11. 15
ἐπισιτισαμένους	γ 10. 7b	κοινὺς Ἑρμῆς	β 24. 2
ἐπισκευάζων	α 4. 6	ἐρυθροδάκτυλος ἡώς	γ 2. 13
ἐπισκοτεῖν	γ 3. 3	ἐρυθρόν	γ 11. 15
ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει	α 1. 7	περὶ ἐρωτήσεως	γ 18. 1
ἐπιστήμη ἀφωρισμένη	α 1. 1	ἔρως	Appendix (A) vol. I p. 293
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ἐπιστήμαι	β 19. 8	ἐσθῆτας τῶν πεπονθότων	β 8. 16
ἐπιστητόν	β 24. 10; γ 17. 10	περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου	β 19. 23
ἐπισυστελλόμενον	γ 2. 3	ἐσπουδασμένα παιδιαί	α 11. 15
ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ	γ 10. 7i	ἔστω (popular def.)	α 5. 3"; 6. 2; 7. 2;
ἐπιτείνόμεναι	α 4. 12"	10. 3; β 3. 2; 4. 1; 5. 1; 6. 2; 7. 2;	
ἐπιτείχισμα νόμων	αβ. γ 3. 4	8. 2	
ἐλλιπὴ ἐπιτελεῖν	α 11. 22	ἐταιρεία	β 4. 28
ἐπιτηδεύουσ τύπους	α 4. 10	ἐτερόφθαλμος	α 7. 41; γ 10. 7a
ἐπιτηδεύμα	β 23. 18	ἔτλησαν	αβ. γ 7. 11
ἐπιτηδεύοντες ταῦτά	β 4. 21	εὐ ποιῇ	γ 2. 6
ἐπιτηροῦσιν δίκην	α 12. 5	Εὐαγόρας	β 23. 12
ἐπιτηρεῖν δίκην	α 12. 25	εὐαλαζόνευστα	β 15. 2
τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέλας ἡδύ	α 11. 27	εὐανάγνωστος	γ 5. 6
ἐπιτιμῆσεως	α 1. 12	εὐανάγνωστος (λέξις)	γ 9. 5
ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς θεοῖς	α 15. 31	εὐβάστακτα	α 12. 34
ἐπιτρίτων τόκων	αβ. γ 10. 7e	Εὐβουλος	α 15. 15

εὐγενές...γενεῖον	β 15. 3	εὐλαβούμενον	γ 3. 7
εὐγένεια	α 5. 5	εὐλόγιστοι	β 8. 4
εὐγενείας ἥθος	β 15. 2	εὐμαθής (δὲς)	γ 9. 3
εὐγερία	α 5. 15	εὐμαθῇ	γ 19. 4
εὐγερως	α 5. 15	εὐμάθεια	α 6. 15
εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς	α 5. 3	εὐμετάβολοι	β 12. 4
εὐδαιμονία	α 5. 1; 6. 8	εὐμετάβλητα	α 12. 34
εὐδαιμονισμός	α 9. 34	εὐμνημόνευτος	γ 9. 3; 13. 3
εὐδιάβολος	α 12. 22	εὐμνημονευτότερα	α 9. 25
εὐδοκίμει τὰ ἐλεγκτικά τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων	β 23. 30	εὐνοια	β 1. 5
εὐδοκιμοῦντα	γ 10. 1	ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις (τῶν πολέων)	α 1. 4
εὐδοκιμοῦντι νύμφ	α 15. 9	Εὐζέμφ γεωμετρεῖν οὐκ ἐπισταμένῳ	γ 4. 3
εὐδόκιμοι	β 4. 11	περὶ εὐόγκων αυτοκαβδάλως	γ 7. 2
εὐδοξία	α 5. 8	εὐπαρακολούητον	α 2. 13
εὐέλεγκτα	γ 17. 15	εὐπαρόρητοι	β 2. 10
εὐέλπιδι	β 1. 4	εὐπιστοι	β 12. 7
εὐέλπιδες	β 12. 8, 9	τὸ εὐποιητικὸν ἡδύ	α 11. 22
εὐεξαπάτητοι	β 12. 8	εὐποιητικὸς τῶν ἄλλων	β 2. 25; 4. 8
εὐεπακολούητον	α 2. 13	εὐποιητικὸς εἰς χρήματα	β 4. 8
εὐεργασία	α 5. 9	εὐπορήσομεν	β 26. 5
εὐεργετήματα	α 9. 19	εὐπραγίαι	α 9. 19
εὐεργετήματα	α 9. 20	εὐρηται καὶ κατασκευάσθη (perf. and aor. combined)	α 9. 38 <sup>n</sup>
εὐεργετικὴ δύναμις	α 9. 4	Εὐριπίδης	γ 2. 5; 14. 6
εὐεργετικῆς δόξης	α 5. 9	Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα	γ 15. 8
εὐήθεις...κακοήθεις	β 12. 7 <sup>n</sup>	Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις	β 6. 20
εὐήθη	γ 1. 9; 12. 2	Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβη	β 23. 29
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εὐθεώρητα	α 15. 25	εὐρυθμος λέξις	γ 8. 7
εὐθηνία κτημάτων	α 5. 3	εὐρυμέδων αἰθήρ	αβ. α 13. 2
Εὐθυδήμου λόγος	β 24. 3	ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν εὐσεβῶν	γ 12. 3
εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ἀτυχίαις	β 2. 20	εὐστοχος	γ 11. 5
Εὐθυνος	β 19. 14	εὐσυλλογιστότερα	α 1. 12
εὐθύνας διδόασιν	γ 10. 7 <sup>n</sup>	εὐσύνθετος λόγος	γ 3. 3
εὐθύνας δοῦναι (δὲς)	γ 10. 7δ	μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον	γ 9. 3
εὐθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία	γ 10. 7 <sup>n</sup>	εὐσύνοπτον	γ 12. 5
εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας	γ 18. 6	εὐσχήμων βαρύτης	β 17. 4
εὐθύς	α 10. 10; 11. 15	εὐτεκνία	α 5. 4, 5
κατ' εὐθυωρίαν	β 2. 9	εὐτελείς	β 15. 3
εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι	γ 7. 8	εὐτελῇ ὀνόματα καὶ πράγματα	γ 7. 2
εὐκατάλλακτος	β 4. 17	εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις	β 12. 16
τὰ εὐκατέργαστα	α 6. 29	εὐτράπελοι	β 12. 16; 13. 15
εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργήν	β 2. 11, 12	εὐτυχήματα	α 5. 17
εὐκολοι	β 4. 12	εὐτυχία	α 5. 4, 17; β 17. 5
Εὐκτῆμων	α 14. 3	εὐφραστος	γ 5. 6
εὐλαβεῖς	α 12. 19	εὐφρεῖς	α 6. 29
τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον	α 9. 28	εὐφυνά γένη	β 15. 3
εὐλαβεῖται	α 12. 6	εὐφροῦς	γ 10. 1

εὐφύια	a 6. 15	ἡδονή (def.)	a 11. 1
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ὁσμὴν [εὐωδίας]	a 11. 5	ἡδὺ μεμνησθαι πόνων	αφ. a 11. 8
ἐφαρμόττειν	a 15. 10	τὸ ἡδύ	γ 2. 8
ἐφεξῆς a 7. 1; β 15. 10; γ 16. 1, 2; 17. 6		ἡδὺν ἰδεῖν	a 5. 11
ἐφεις	β 4. 31 n <sup>3</sup>	ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι	a 6. 7
ἐφιεμένους	β 10. 6	ἡδέα	a 11. 8
πάντα ἐφίεται τὰ ζῶα τῆς ἡδόνης	a 6. 7	τῶν ἡδέων	a 11. 22
ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου	αφ. γ 10. 7 c	τῶν ἡδέων (τι)	a 11. 4 <sup>n</sup>
ἐφορία	γ 18. 6	ἡδεσθαι	a 11. 6
ἐφ' ὑμῖν	a 4. 3	ἡδιον	a 7. 23
ἐχεσθαι ταῖς δίψαις	a 11. 10	(τι) τῶν ἡδίστων	a 11. 16
ἐχόμενον ἐστιν εἰπεῖν	γ 1. 2	ἡδύσματι...ἐδέσματι	γ 3. 3
ἐχόμενος	γ 8. 4	ἡθος (τί ποιεῖ)	γ 16. 8
ἐχθρα...ὀργή	β 4. 31	ἡθος ἔχοντες λόγοι	β 21. 16
ἐχθρας (ποιητικά)	β 4. 30	ἡθει τοῦ λέγοντος (note on ἡθος and πάθος)	a 2. 3
ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι	a 9. 24	ἡθ, three kinds of, notes on, a 8.6; γ 7.6	
τοὺς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροῦς	β 4. 7	ἡθους	a 2. 4
ὁ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν	a 6. 24	ἡθικὴ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις	γ 7. 6
ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα	β 21. 11	ἡθικὴ πίστις	a 2. 3
ἐχίνος	β 20. 6	ἡθικὴ λέξις	γ 7. 1
ζῆλος (def.)	β 11. 1	ἡθικοὶ λόγοι (διὰ τίνων γίνονται)	β 18. 1; 21. 16
ζῆλος	γ 19. 2	ἡθικά (τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστω ἡθει)	γ 16. 9
ζηλουμένοις	a 5. 5	ἡθικῶς	γ 17. 12
ζηλοῦσθαι	β 4. 24	τὸν ἡλίθιον χρηστὸν	a 9. 28
ζηλωτοί	β 11. 5	ἡλιξ ἡλικα τέρπει	αφ. a 11. 25
ζηλωτά	β 11. 4	ἡλικες	β 6. 12
ζηλωταί, θαυμασταί,	β 6. 24	ἡλικίαι	β 2. 11; 12. 2
ζηλωτικοί	β 11. 1, 3	ἡμέρα πρώτη	β 12. 8
ζημοῦν μικροῖς	a 12. 4	τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ	β 13. 8
ζῆν ἀφ' ἐτέρων	β 4. 9	ἡμόλιος	γ 8. 4
πρὸς ἄλλον	a 9. 28	κατὰ τὸ ἡμισυ οὐκ εὐδαίμονε νοοῦσιν	a 5. 6
πρὸς τὸ σύμφερον	β 13. 9	ἡμωβελία	a 14. 1
πρὸς τὸ καλόν	β 14. 2	ἦν (was defined to be) a 6. 23; 7. 7, 8, 28;	
τῇ ἐλπίδι	β 12. 8	β 7. 5; 13. 15; γ 2. 6	
τῷ ἡθει	β 12. 12	ἡνεκέως	αφ. a 13. 2
τῇ μνήμῃ	β 13. 12	ἡνεμοῖς λόφος	αφ. γ 6. 7
κατὰ λογισμόν	β 13. 14	Ἡρακλείαις στήλαις	β 10. 5
πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν	a 12. 28	Ἡρακλείδων	β 22. 6
Ζήνωνι	a 12. 10	τὰ Ἡρακλείτου	γ 5. 6
ζυγνομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ	αφ. γ 11. 13, 15	ἡρεμήσις ὀργῆς	β 3. 2
ἦ alternative, prefixed to interrogative sentences,	β 6. 27	Ἡρόδοτος (II 30)	γ 16. 5
ἦδη	a 1. 7 (dis)"; 6. 22, 24; β 2. 12; 6. 12 (dis)	Ἡροδοτου Θουρίου	γ 9. 2 <sup>n</sup>
ἦδη διαφέρει	a 10. 11	ὁ ἥρως (ῥυθμός) σεμνός	γ 8. 4
		ἡρώστηκεν	a 12. 6
		ἦττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν	β 24. 11

ἥττους τοῦ θυμοῦ	β 12. 5	ἔργον θητικόν	α 9. 26
τοῦ κερδαίνειν	β 5. 7	θλίβειν	α 5. 14
		θορυβοῦνται	α 2. 10
θαρραλία	β 5. 17	ἐθορύβησαν	β 23. 22
θαρραλέον ἡ ὀργή	β 5. 21	θορυβεῖται	β 23. 30
θαρρεῖν, θύρσος	β 5. 16, 14. 1	καταπλήττουσι θορυβοῦντες	γ 7. 5
τὰ μέλλοντα	β 5. 18	θορυβοῦσιν	γ 18. 4
τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδύ	α 11. 21	Θρασύβουλος	β 23. 25
θαυμάζουσι	α 6. 29	Κῶν Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκά- λει	β 23. 29
τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδύ	α 11. 18	Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις	γ 1. 7
τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν	α 11. 21	Θρασύμαχος	γ 11. 13
ἡδὺ τὸ θαυμαστὸν	γ 2. 3	Ἡρόδικος Θρασύμαχον	β 23. 29
θαυμασταί	β 6. 24; γ 2. 3	ἀπὸ Θρασύμαχον	γ 8. 4
Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις	α 2. 19	τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον	α 9. 29
θέλειν (for usual prose form ἐθέλειν)	γ 16. 3	θρασύτης	β 14. 1
εἰ θέλεις	α 15. 32	θράττει	αφ. γ 11. 6
διδόναί θέλει	α 15. 31	θρηνεῖν...θύειν	β 23. 27
τὸ θέλειν	α 15. 32	τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοῖναις γνώμαις	β 21. 11"
μὲν θέλει	α 15. 32	τὸ θρυλούμενον	γ 7. 9
μὴ θέλει	α 15. 30, 32	διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ὀργήν	α 10. 17
μὴ θέλειν	β 24. 7	οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς	β 13. 13
θίλωσιν	β 19. 25	θυμικοί	β 12. 5
θεμέλιος	α 15. 14	θυμῶδεις	β 12. 9
Θεμιστοκλῆς	α 11. 16"	τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν	αφ. α 6. 23
-θεν, peculiar use of words ending in,	β 23. 17	θυσασμένους	β 21. 11
Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ νόμῳ	β 23. 20, 24	θυσιαί	α 5. 9
Αἷας ὁ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 3"		
Ἄλκμαῖωνι τῷ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 11	εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν	γ 1. 9
ἐκ νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 13	ἱαμβεῖα φθέγγονται	γ 8. 4
ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 13	ἱαμβος ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν	γ 8. 4
ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις	γ 9. 9	ἱασις	α 14. 2
Θεόδωρος	γ 11. 6	Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς	α 12. 31
περὶ Θεόδωρον	γ 13. 5	ἱατὸν χρόνῳ	β 4. 31
ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη	β 23. 28	ἱατρεῦματα	γ 14. 7
τὸ Θεοδώρου	γ 11. 6	ιατρικὴ	α 2. 1
Θεοδώρου φωνή	γ 2. 4"	ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι	β 2. 13
θερίζειν κακῶς	αφ. γ 3. 4	ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος	α 15. 21
θερμοί	β 13. 7	ἴδιος νόμος	α 10. 3; 13. 2
ὁ θεωρός	α 3. 2	τὰ ἴδια ἀγαθὰ	α 6. 28
θεωρήματα	α 4. 4	τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις ἴδια καλά	α 9. 26
Θηβαίους διεῖναι Φίλιππον	β 23. 6	ἴδια	β 22. 12
τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος	β 23. 3	ἴδια ὀνόματα	γ 5. 3
ἔγνω θῆρ θῆρα	αφ. α 11. 25	ιδιώτην	β 23. 5
θηρεῖν	β 21. 15	ιδιωτικοί	γ 12. 2c
θηρευτική	α 11. 15	ἰδριεὺς	γ 4. 3
τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδίκημα μείζον	α 14. 5	ἵνα εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν	α 11. 3
τὸν θησαυρὸν εὗρεν	α 5. 17		

ἱεροσολεῖν	α 7. 5; 13. 9	καινὰ λέγειν	γ 11. 6
Ἰέρων	β 16. 2	καιροὶ	α 7. 32
ἱκανὸν	α 5. 11	καιροὶ αἴτιοι	α 5. 9
ἱκετηρίαν	γ 10. 7/	τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι	β 7. 3
ἱματιδάριον	αβ. γ 2. 15	κακὰ συναίγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους	α 6. 20
Ἰοκάστη ἡ Καρκίνου	γ 16. 11	κακοήθεις...εὐήθεις	β 12. 7 <sup>α</sup>
Ἰππίας	α 2. 11	κακοήθεις, κακοήθεια	β 13. 3
Ἰππόλοχος	α 9. 38	κακοηθιστέον	γ 15. 10
τὴν Ἰσθμιν (μοῖραν)	β 2. 17 <sup>α</sup>	κακολόγοι	β 4. 18; 6. 20
Ἰσθμίων πανηγυρίς	αβ. γ 3. 3	κακοπαθεῖν	β 20. 6
Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου	β 23. 11	κακουργεῖ παρὰ ταύτας	γ 2. 7
Ἰσοκράτης	α 9. 38	κακούργον	α 1. 10
	β 19. 14; 23. 18	κακουργία	β 12. 15; 13. 14
γ 10. 7 εἰ; 11. 7; 17. 10; 17. 16 (dis)		κακουργικά	β 16. 4
(Paneg. § 1)	γ 14. 2	σώματος κακώσεσι	β 7. 3; 8. 9
ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ	γ 7. 11	καλάμη γῆρας	αβ. γ 10. 2
Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προσοίμων	γ 14. 1	Κυλλίας	α 2. 11; β 4. 31; γ 2. 10
περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης Ἰσοκράτης	β 23. 12	καλλιπεῖτο	γ 2. 3
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ἱστορία	α 4. 13	Καλλιππου τεχνή	β 23. 14, 21
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ἰσχυρὸς	α 5. 12	Καλλίστρατος	α 7. 13; 14. 1; γ 17. 14
ἰσχυρῶς	β 2. 14	κάλλος	α 5. 11
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Ἰταλιῶται	β 23. 11	καλόν (defined)	α 9. 3
Ἰφικράτης	β 21. 2; 23. 8, 17	τὰ καλὰ...δύο γένη	α 6. 7
γ 2. 10; 10. 7 εἰ; 15. 2		μεταφορὰς ἀπὸ καλῶν	γ 2. 13
ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον	β 23. 6	ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρσι	γ 9. 2
πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα	β 23. 7	καμπύλῳ	β 21. 2
Ἰφικράτης (ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρχε ταῦτα)	α 7. 32	κἂν εἰ	α 1. 5 <sup>α</sup>
τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους, ἐξ οἷων εἰς οἷα, α 9. 31		κανὼν στρεβλός	α 1. 5
καθάπερ	α 2. 10	καπηλεία	γ 10. 7
καθάριος μοιχός	γ 15. 5	Καρκίνου Μηδεία	β 23. 28
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καθίζοντες	β 3. 6	κάρπιμα	α 5. 7
καθόλου, opp. το κατὰ μέρος		κατὰ ('in the case of')	α 7. 21
α 1. 7; 2. 15 <i>et</i> , 18		κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν	α 4. 4
καθόλου	α 2. 9; 13. 13; β 25. 8	καταβλάπτει ἄλληλα	γ 17. 6
ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου	α 2. 19	καταγελᾶν	β 2. 12
καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου	α 3. 9	καταδικάζειν	α 15. 28
τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον καθόλου	α 2. 18	κατακορή	γ 3. 3
καθόλου μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν	β 21. 10	κατακόρως	γ 7. 7
καὶ, δέ and τε	α 4. 4 <sup>α</sup>	καταλλακτικώτερος	α 9. 31
καὶ...δέ	α 6. 23 <sup>α</sup> ; β 22. 3; 23. 18	καταλάττεσθαι	α 9. 24; 12. 24
καὶ...καὶ	γ 1. 3, 9	καταμαντευόμενοι τὰ μέλλοντα	α 9. 40
		καταντικρὺ	γ 19. 5
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- καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς γ 7. 5  
καταπραῦνει β 3. 17  
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ῥαδίως καταψευδόμενοι ὡς πανσόμενοι  
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ἐν κατορθώσει β 3. 12  
κατάρθωσαν α 6. 29  
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Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτόν γ 4. 3  
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τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας  
ἀρ. γ 10. 7 k  
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κινδυνευτικός α 9. 29  
κινεῖν ἕτερον α 5. 12  
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Κλεοφῶν α 15. 13; γ 7. 2  
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κληρουχία β 6. 24  
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κόλασις ἱστίς α 14. 2  
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ἀεὶ κολοῖς παρὰ κολοῖν ἀρ. α 11. 25  
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κεκοσμημένην (λέξιν)	γ 2. 2	κώρυκος	αβ. γ 11. 13, 15
κόσμος	γ 7. 2		
κόσμοι	β 23. 8	λαῶς ἀναιδής	αβ. γ 11. 3
κότον ἔχειν	β 2. 7	λαβεῖν (grasp with the mind)	β 22. 4
κοττάβια	α 12. 30	λαθητικοί	α 12. 5
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κρέμνεται	γ 14. 6	Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος	γ 18. 6
Κρέων	α 15. 6	Λακωνικά ἀποφθέγματα	β 21. 8
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ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι	α 1. 7	λελοιδορησθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου	α 6. 24
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κριτής	α 3. 2; β 18. 1	λέξις ἡ ἐν περιόδοις	γ 9. 7
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ἡ ἐνὶ κριτῇ (λέξις)	γ 12. 5	ἀντικειμένη	γ 9. 7
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Κριτίας	α 15. 13; γ 16. 3	δημηγορικὴ	γ 12. 5
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κυβεῖαι	α 11. 15	λέξει διαθέσθαι	γ 1. 3
κυβερνᾶν	β 20. 4	τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν	α 9. 36
κυκᾶν	αβ. α 9. 20	λέξις opp. το δianoia	γ 1. 7
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Κύκνος	β 22. 12	λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος	γ 8. 4
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κυνιδίους (δῖς)	γ 4. 3	Λευκοθέα	β 23. 27
κυνοραῖσταί	β 20. 6	Λεωδάμας	β 23. 25
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τὰ κύρια	γ 2. 2	λήμματα	α 12. 10
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ἐν κώλοις λέξεως	γ 9. 7	λιβυκοί	β 20. 2
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λιλαίόμενα	αφ. γ 11. 3	μακρολογία	γ 17. 16
λιτός	γ 16. 2	μακροτέρως	γ 10. 3
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λογίων	β 5. 21	τὸ μανθάνειν ἡδύ	α 11. 21
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τῷ λόγῳ προκολάζειν	β 3. 15	μάρτυρες	α 2. 2
λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ἀντ' ὀνόματος	γ 6. 1	μάρτυς πιστὸς καὶ εἰς χρήσιμος	β 20. 7
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λύσαι ἐνστάσει	γ 17. 14	μαχητικαὶ παιδιαί	α 11. 15
λύσαι τὸ λεχθέν	α 2. 17	μεγαλάδικοι	β 17. 4
λύσομεν	β 26. 5	μεγαλοκορύφου γῆς	αφ. γ 3. 1
λέλυμαι	β 23. 23	μεγαλοπρέπεια (def.)	α 9. 12
ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν δούς	β 7. 3	μεγαλοπρεπὴ (λέξιν)	γ 12. 6
Λυκολέων	γ 10. 7 <sup>l</sup>	μεγαλοψυχία (def.)	α 9. 11; β 12. 11
Λυκόφρων	γ 3. 1, 2	μεγαλόψυχος	β 11. 2; 12. 11; 24. 7
λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπονημένοις	β 3. 5	μεγαλοπρεπῆς and μεγαλόψυχος	α 9. 29 <sup>n</sup> .
λύπη	β 9. 3	μεγάλως	α 14. 3
λυπηρὰ	α 11. 29; β 8. 8	μέγεθος	α 5. 4
λύσις	β 25. 1	μέγεθος τῆς φωνῆς	γ 1. 4
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ὦν τὸ γῆρας λωβάται	α 5. 11 <sup>n</sup>	μέθοδος ἔντεχνος	α 1. 11
μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι	γ 16. 8	διὰ τῆς μεθόδου	α 2. 2
μάθησις γ 10. 2; μάθησιν ταχέαν	γ 10. 4	ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἰρηται	α 2. 10
μαιμᾶν	γ 11. 3	ἀδίκημα μείζον	α 14. 1
μακαρισμός	α 9. 34	τὸ μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι	α 7. 7
μακρὰν ἀπαρτᾶν	γ 5. 2	μείζονος ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν	ἐάν τις
μακρόβιοι	α 5. 15	μεθύων ἀμαρτάνη	β 25. 7
δύναμις μακροβιότητος	α 5. 15	μειοῦν καὶ αὔξειν	β 18. 4
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Μελανπιπίδης	γ 9. 6	μικραδικηταί	β 17. 4
Μελάνωπος	α 14. 1	μικροπρέπεια	α 9. 12
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μελετᾶν	γ 10. 7 <i>m</i>	μικρόψυχοι	β 13. 5
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ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας	α 12. 30	μμητικώτατον (ἡ φωνή)	γ 1. 8
μέλος ἄλυρον	γ 6. 7	μίσος	β 4. 31; γ 19. 3
ὁ ἂν εὖ μεμμημένον ἡδύ	α 11. 23	ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ	β 13. 12
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κῶλον	γ 9. 5	λήψει τῶν ἀγαθῶν	α 6. 4
ἐν κῶλοις λίξεως	γ 9. 7	λιβανωτὸς	γ 4. 3
κωλυτικά	β 9. 5	λιβυκοί	β 20. 2
κωμωδοποιοὶ	β 6. 20; γ 3. 4	Λικύμνιος	γ 2. 13; 13. 5
κώπης ἀνύσσειν	αφ. γ 2. 10	Λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν	γ 12. 2

Μελανιππίδης	γ 9. 6	μικραδικηταί	β 17. 4
Μελάνωπος	α 14. 1	μικροπρέπεια	α 9. 12
Μελιάγρος	β 2. 19	μικροψυχία	α 9. 11; β 6. 10; 13. 9
μελετᾶν	γ 10. 7 <i>m</i>	μικρόψυχοι	β 13. 5
μελλήσάντων	α 12. 23	Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα	γ 10. 7 &c.
ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας	α 12. 30	μιμητικώτατον (ἡ φωνή)	γ 1. 8
μέλος ἄλυρον	γ 6. 7	μίσος	β 4. 31; γ 19. 3
ὁ ἂν εὖ μεμνημένος ἦδύ	α 11. 23	ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ	β 13. 12
μὲν—δέ	α 1. 12; γ 5. 2	μνήμαι ἐν μέτροις	α 5. 9
μὲν οὖν	β 9. 11"; 23. 14, 15	μνήμαι	α 6. 15
μέρη τίμης	α 5. 9	τὰ μνημονευτὰ ἡδία	α 11. 8
(τόπος) ἐκ τῶν μερῶν	β 23. 13	τὰ μνημονευτὰ	α 9. 25
μέση (φωνή)	γ 1. 4	μνησικάκος	β 4. 17
ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ	β 23. 1	Μοιροκλής	γ 10. 7 <i>e</i>
τῇ Μεσσηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ	γ 17. 14	μοναρχία	α 8. 4
μεταβαίνειν	α 4. 6	μονόκωλος περίοδος	γ 9. 6
τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἡδύ	α 11. 20	τὰ μοῖφ' ὑπάρχοντα	α 9. 25
μεταβάλλειν	γ 12. 3; 17. 16	μόριόν τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς	α 2. 7
μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ	<i>αβ.</i> α 11. 20	μυσσεῖον φύσεως	<i>αβ.</i> γ 3. 3"
μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας	α 1. 14	μουσικὸς ('accomplished')	β 22. 3"
μετάληψις	α 10. 18	μουσικωτέρως (in a ref. to Eur.)	β 22. 3
μεταμελομένοις	β 3. 5	τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν	γ 1. 4
μεταξύ	γ 5. 2	μοχθηρίαν ἀκροατοῦ	γ 1. 5
μεταστρέφει	γ 11. 6	μυθολογεῖν	β 21. 9
τὸ δίκαιον μεταστρέψαι	α 15. 24	μυκτῆρα	α 4. 12
μεταστρέψαντα	α 15. 30	μύλωνας ποικίλους	<i>αβ.</i> γ 10. 7 <i>g</i>
μεταφέρειν ἀνώνυμα ὀνομασμένως	γ 2. 12	σπουδαῖον εἶναι μὴν	β 24. 2
εὖ μετενήνεκται	γ 2. 12	μούρος	γ 9. 6
ἡ ἀνύλογον μεταφορά	γ 11. 11	μυριοστόν	β 8. 14
μεταφορά	γ 10. 7 <i>n</i>	μυριοστόν ἔτος	β 10. 5
τῆς κατ' ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς	γ 11. 3	μυστήρια	β 24. 2
λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν τὴν μεταφορὰν παρ'		Μυσῶν λεία	α 12. 20
ἄλλου	γ 2. 9"	μύωπα	γ 11. 13
μεταφοραί	γ 2. 7, 9		
μεταφοραῖς δηλοῦν	γ 6. 3	ναοποιοὶ	α 14. 1
πάντες μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται	γ 2. 6	ναίκληρος	γ 4. 3
μεταφορὰς ἐπιεικεῖς	γ 2. 12	ναυτιῶντες	γ 5. 3
τὸ μέτρον (= τὸ μῖσον)	β 14. 3	κἂν ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν	β 6. 5
μετριάζουσιν	β 17. 4	νεμεσᾶν	β 6. 19; 9. 1, 2 <i>bis</i> , 7 (def.)
μέχρι τινὸς	α 1. 1	περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν	β 9. 6
μηδὲν ἄγαν	β 21. 13	νεμεσητικοί	β 9. 12
μῆκος	α 5. 13	νεμεσητὸν	β 9. 11
μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι	γ 13. 3	νέμεσις	β 9. 1", 3
μηνύειν ἀρετὴν	α 9. 3	νεόπλουτον	β 16. 4
μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γίροντα	<i>αβ.</i> α 15. 14	νεόπλουτοι	γ 9. 9; 16. 4
μηπραγύτης	<i>αβ.</i> γ 2. 10	οἱ νέοι	β 12. 3
μητροφώντης	<i>αβ.</i> γ 2. 14	νύτῃς	α 5. 6
μιαυφόνους	β 9. 4	νέφ' φουικαῖς	γ 2. 9

ὀνομάτων εἶδη	γ 2. 5	πάθος (various senses of)	β 1. 8'
ὀνομάτων... ῥημάτων	γ 2. 2	πάθος ποιεῖν	β 17. 8
ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων (λήθη)	β 2. 26	πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει	β 8. 6
διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι	γ 2. 5	πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς	α 1. 4
ὀξεῖα (φωνῇ)	γ 1. 4	συμβεβηκῶτα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι	α 2. 1
ὀξύθυμοι	β 5. 11; 12. 5	πάθη τῆς ἀρετῆς	α 9. 15
ὀξύθυμος	α 10. 4; β 5. 11; 12. 4	πάθη	β 12. 2
ὀποτεροῦν	α 3. 3	δι' ὧν τὰ πάθη ἐγγίγνεται	β 11. 7
ὀρᾶσθαι ἀτυχοῦντες	β 6. 24	παθῶν	α 2. 7
ὀργή α 1. 4; β 2. 1 (def.); 2. 26; γ 19. 3		περὶ τῶν παθῶν	α 2. 5
περὶ ὀργῆς	β 1. 9	παθημάτων	β 22. 16 <sup>a</sup>
ὀργὴν ἀναλώσασιν	β 3. 13	παθητικὴ λέξις	γ 7. 13
δι' ὀργὴν ποιήσασιν	β 3. 11	παῖαν	γ 8. 4
εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας	α 1. 5	παῖαντος δύο εἶδη	γ 8. 6
παύει ὀργὴν ὁ χρόνος	β 3. 13	παιδεία	α 8. 4
τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἡδύ	α 11. 9	πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις	β 12. 16
ὀργίσαι	γ 14. 7	πεπαιδευμένοι	β 6. 17
τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἀπλοῦν α 9. 29		ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων	α 11. 29
ὀργίλοι	β 1. 9; 2. 10	ἐν παιδίᾳ	β 3. 12
ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν	β 2. 27	παιδιαὶ	α 11. 4
ὀρεγέσθαι, α 8. 7; ὀρεγόμενοι,	β 9. 14	τὴς παιδιᾶς ἡδείας	α 11. 15
ὄρεξις	β 2. 1	ἐσπουδασμένας παιδιὰς	α 11. 15
δεήσεις αἱ ὀρέξεις	β 7. 3	παιδιὰ καὶ θηρία	β 6. 23
Ὁρέστη τῷ Θεοδίκτου	β 24. 3	παλαιστικός	α 5. 14
(τόπος) ἐξ ὀρισμοῦ	β 23. 8	Παμφίλου τέχνη	β 23. 21
ὄρκον δίδωσι... ὄρκον λαμβάνει	α 15. 27	πυνδήμον χάριτος δημιουργός	αφ. γ 3. 3
περὶ ὄρκων τετραχῶς	α 15. 27	πανήγυρις	γ 3. 3; 9. 7
ὀρμὴ τοῦ ποιεῖν	β 19. 23	πανούργοι	β 5. 11
ὀσμήν [εὐωδίας]	α 11. 5	πάντων περὶ πάντα	α 9. 4
ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον	α 5. 7	παρὰ μικρὸν σώζεσθαι	α 11. 24
ὅτι	α 15. 28	παραβάλλειν πρὸς ἄλλους	α 9. 39
(τόπος) τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἂν εἶη	β 23. 20	παραβολή	β 20. 2, 4
οὐ ἀπὸ μὴ	β 6. 4	παραγραφὴ	γ 8. 6
οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον	β 21. 15	παράδειγμα	α 2. 8; 9. 19; β 25. 8
οὐδὲν ἡλιθιότερον τεχνopoίας	β 21. 15	τὸ παράδειγμα ῥητορικῆ ἐπαγωγῇ	α 2. 8
οὐδὲν πλείον	α 2. 13	παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμήματος διαφορὰ	α 2. 9
οὐκ after ἂν	α 7. 12; vol. I App. (C)		
οὐκίτι	α 1. 7'; 2. 21	παραδείγματος χάριν	α 5. 2
οὐλα σκέλη	αφ. γ 11. 13, 15	διὰ παραδείγματος	β 25. 8
οὐν resumptive	β 9. 11	παραδείγματα	α 15. 26; β 20. 1
οὐρανόμηκες	αφ. γ 7. 11	παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικαῖς	α 9. 40
τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς	α 12. 5; β 6. 18		
ὀψὲ παρήλθεν	γ 1. 3	παραδειγμάτων	β 18. 5; 26. 5
		παραδειγμάτων εἶδη δύο	β 20. 2
παγίως	β 13. 2	παραδειγματώδεις ῥητορεῖαι	α 2. 10
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διὰ πάθος	α 13. 7	παρηδιηγείσθαι	γ 16. 5
εἰς πύθους προαχθῶσιν	α 2. 5	παυρίδουξιν	β 21. 4; γ 11. 6



τὸ πιθανόν	γ 1. 3	ποιητικόν	β 3. 26
πιθανῶν λόγων χρήσις	β 18. 1	ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς	γ 1. 13; 2. 7;
πιθανὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα	γ 7. 4	(εἰμηται) γ 2. 2; (διώρισταί)	α 11. 29;
πιθήκει αὐλητὴν εἰκάξειν	γ 11. 12	(τεθεώρηται)	γ 2. 5
πικρὸς	α 10. 4	ποιητικῇ	α 11. 23
Πίνδαρος	β 24. 2	τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς	α 6. 3
πιστεῖν εἶσθαι	γ 17. 3	ποιητικαὶ καὶ πρακτικαὶ	α 6. 6
πιστευτικὸς	α 12. 19	ποικίλος	γ 16. 2
πίστις	α 14. 5; γ 13. 4	αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα κατασκευάζειν	β 1. 2
πίστις ἀποδείξει τις	α 1. 11	ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα	β 1. 3
πίστεις κοιναὶ	β 20. 1	ποιούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας	
αἱ πίστεις ἔντεχρον μῖνον	α 1. 3		γ 1. 1
πίστεις ἀποδεικτικὰς	γ 17. 1	πόλεμος	α 4. 7
πίστεων ἄτεχνων εἶδη	α 15. 1	τοῖς πολεμίοις	α 13. 9
πίστεων ἄτεχνον... ἔντεχρον	α 2. 2	πολιτεῖαι τέτταρες	α 8. 3
πίστεων τρία εἶδη	α 2. 3	πολιτειῶν εἶδη	α 4. 12
τὰς πίστεις φέρειν	α 8. 1	τὰς πολιτείας ἀπάσας λαβεῖν	α 8. 1
τούτοις αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταὶ εἰσιν	α 15. 21	πολιτικῇ	α 2. 7
πιστὺς (λόγος)	β 1. 2	τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πολιτικῆς	α 4. 5
πιστώματα	α 15. 17	πολιτικοὶ ὁγῶνες	γ 1. 4
Πιτθεῖς	β 23. 22	πολιτικὸς συλλογισμὸς	β 22. 4
Πιττακός	β 12. 6; 25. 7	τοῖς πολιτικοῖς	α 8. 7
πλανᾶν	γ 14. 1	πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν	γ 5. 6
πεπλάσθαι γ 8. 1; πεπλασμένως γ 2. 4		Πολύεγκτος	γ 10. 7f
πλαπτομένους	β 4. 27	πολύθυροι	αβ. γ 6. 4
Πλάτων	α 15. 15	Πολυκράτης εἰς τοὺς μῦς	β 24. 6
ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος	γ 4. 3	Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασίβουλον	β 24. 3
πλευρεῖν α 4. 9; β 16. 5; 17. 5 <sup>α</sup> ; 25. 10		πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανόν	αβ. γ 3. 1
πλὴν ('only')	α 1. 14; 12. 10	πολυτεχνία	α 5. 5
ἐν πληρώσει	β 3. 12	πολυφιλία	α 5. 4, 16
πλησιασμός	β 5. 2	πολύφιλος	α 5. 16
τοῦ πλήσιον ἔτυχε τὸ βέλος	α 5. 17;	πολύχους	γ 17. 14
τοὺς πλήσιον	α 11. 22	πολυχρονώτερος	α 7. 26
πλοῖτος ἀρετὴ κτήσεως	α 6. 11	πολυωρεῖσθαι	β 2. 7
πλοῖτος οἷον τιμὴ τις	β 16. 1	πᾶσα ἔνδεια πονηρόν	β 25. 4
πλοῖτον μέρη	α 5. 7	πονηρεῖσθαι ἐπιτρίτων τόκων	αβ. γ 10. 7
τῷ πλοῦτῳ ἃ ἔπεται ἡθῆ	β 16. 1	πεπύνηται	α 6. 22
πλωτήρων	β 20. 4	ἀπὸ πονηρίας	α 13. 16
πνυστιῶν	α 2. 18	πορεύεσθαι... βιβλίζειν	γ 2. 7
πνίγμα	γ 10. 7 δ	πορθῆσαι	γ 2. 10
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ὁ ποιητής (Homer)	α 7. 31, 33; β 3. 16	πόροι	α 4. 7, 8
ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐύθη	γ 1. 9	πόρρωθιν	β 22. 3
ποιούντες τι α 11. 11; πεποίηκεν α 9. 20;		(τύπος) ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς	β 23. 9
πεποιήται	β 3. 16	‘πύτνια συνῆ’	γ 7. 2
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προσπταίν	γ 9. 6	ρήθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη	α 13. 8
προσπίπτοντα	γ 4. 3	ρήμάτων... ὀνομάτων	γ 2. 2
προσσημαίνει	α 13. 10	ρήμάτων	γ 2. 5
προστάται	β 23. 11	ρήτεον χωρὶς	α 6. 7
μάρτυρες διετοί, παλαοί, πρύσφατοι		ρήτωρ	α 1. 14
	α 15. 13, 15	ρήτορικὸς	β 2. 7
τὸ προσταττόμενον	β 23. 18	ἡ ρητορικὴ ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ,	α 1. 1
πρόσχισμα	β 19. 10	ἐνεκα κρίσεως ἢ ρητορικῇ	β 1. 2
προσχωῖνται	α 2. 3, 4; β 18. 3	ρητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεω-	
προτάσεις	α 2. 21, 22; 3. 7; β 18. 2	ρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανὸν	α 2. 1
τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις		τὰ γένη τῆς ρητορικῆς	α 2. 22
	α 2. 22	γένη τρία	α 3. 1
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προτρέπει ποιεῖν	β 23. 7	διαλεκτικῆς	α 2. 7
προτροπή	α 3. 3	τὰ ρητορικά	α 14. 5
ἐκ προῖπαρχόντων	γ 19. 2	ῥιπτεῖν τὰ σκέλη	α 5. 14 <sup>n</sup>
ἄξια τῶν προῖπηργμένων	α 9. 31	ρόδοδάκτυλος ἡὼς	αβ. γ 2. 13
προῖπηρχεν	α 2. 2	ρόπαλον τοῦ δήμου	αβ. γ 10. 7 c
προῖπυλαμβάνοντες	β 21. 15	ῥυθμός	γ 1. 4, 8. 2
προφάσεως δεῖται μόνον ἢ πονηρία		ῥυπαυόντων	γ 2. 10
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προφοβητικοί	β 13. 7	σαλάκωνες	β 16. 2
προωδοποίηκε	β 13. 7	Σαλαμῖς	α 15. 13
προωδοποιήται	β 2. 10	τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν	β 22. 6
Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα	β 24. 11	σῶλπιγγα μέλος ἄλυρον	γ 6. 7
Πρωταγόρας	γ 5. 5	Σάμου κληρουχίας	β 6. 24
πτώσεις ὅμοιαι	α 7. 27; β 23. 2	Σάμφ	β 20. 6
πτώσεων παρομοιώσεις	γ 9. 9	Σάμφω	α 9. 20; β 23. 11, 12
πτωχεύειν	γ 2. 10	τὸ σαφές	γ 2. 8
πτωχόμουσος κόλαξ	αβ. γ 3. 1	σαφηνεῖ	γ 2. 6
οἱ πτωχοί	β 24. 7	σέλινον οὐλον	αβ. γ 11. 13
Πυθαγόρας	β 23. 11	σεμναὶ θεαὶ	β 23. 12
πυκρὸν ἀναπνέει	α 2. 18	σεμνός	γ 3. 3, 4
πυκτικός	α 5. 14	σεμνότεροι ἢ βαρύτεροι	β 17. 4
πυρετοῖς ἐχόμενοι	α 11. 10	ἢ σεμνότης μαλακῇ καὶ εὐσχήμων βα-	
πυρίττει (dis)	α 2. 18	ρύτης	β 17. 4
πυρίχρων	αβ. γ 3. 1	σεμνότης	β 17. 4; γ 8. 4
πυρρότριχι	αβ. α 15. 13	τῇ σημαινομένῃ	γ 2. 13
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		τὸ ἐκ σημείου (τόπος)	β 24. 5
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ῤέδια	α 6. 27	διὰ σημείων	β 25. 8
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συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν	α 10. 18	συναριθμουμένον	α 7. 3
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τάπαντία συλλογίζεται	α 1. 12	σύνδεσμος	γ 12. 4
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συλλογισμός ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκείνο	α 11. 23	συνδιημερεῦσαι	β 4. 12
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συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν τῇ λέξει	β 22. 4	σύνεγγυς φαίνεται	β 5. 1
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συμβέβηκε	α 10. 9	συνέστραμμένως	β 24. 2
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συμβουλευτικόν	α 3. 3	συνηδόμενον	β 4. 3
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ἀηδὲς καὶ ἀγνωστον τὸ ἀπειρον·

περαίνεται δὲ ἀριθμῶ πάντα.

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
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




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